Ifnhrmttg 


REFERENCE. 

No. 

Division 

Range 

Shelf 

Received  _  .187 


37TH  CONGRESS,  )      HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES,     j  REPORT 
2d  Session.       )  (  No.  86. 


PERMANENT  FORTIFICATIONS  AND  SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

[To  accompany  bill  H.  R.  No.  416.] 


APRIL  23,  1862.— Ordered  to  be  printed. 

APRIL  25,  1862  — Resolved,  That  extra  copies,  two  thousand  bound  and  eight  thousand  in 
pamphlet  form,  of  the  report  (No.  86)  relating  to  fortifications  and  sea-coast  defences, 
be  printed  for  the  use  of  the  members  of  the  House. 


Mr.  F.  P.  BLAIR,  jr.,  from  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  made 

the  following 

REPORT. 

The  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  in  obedience  to  a  resolution  of  the 
House  of  Representatives,  directing  them  to  * '  examine  the  whole  system 
of  permanent  defences  of  the  country,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining 
tvhat  modifications  of  the  old  plans,  if  any,  are  required  to  repel  the 
improved  means  of  attack,  and  to  report  by  bill  or  otherwise,"  have 
given  this  subject  a  careful  consideration,  and  instructed  me  to  submit 
the  following  report  and  accompanying  biU : 

Invulnerability  to  all  attacks,  except  those  of  an  extraordinary 
character,  is  the  most  perfect  insurance  attainable  by  a  powerful  and 
peaceful  nation  against  the  calamity  of  war.  An  attack  upon  a  great 
military  nation,  to  be  dangerous,  requires  time  for  preparation,  and 
thus  affords  time  for  preparing  large  means  of  defence.  Hence  it  has 
ever  been  the  aim  of  military  engineers  to  construct  frontier  defences 
competent  only  to  resist  the  greatest  efforts  which  could  be  made 
suddenly  by  the  forces  ordinarily  at  the  command  of  powerful  rival 
nations,  taking  care  that  the  fortifications  should  be  capable  of  en- 
largement to  any  desirable  extent.  The  making  of  extraordinary 
defences  is  usually  left  to  the  occasions  which  demand  them.  It  is 
not  safe,  however,  for  a  nation  to  forget  that,  as  the  science,  wealth, 
population,  and  power  of  leading  governments  increase,  so,  part  passu, 
must  the  strength  of  the  ordinary  defences  be  increased;  nor  must  it 
be  forgotten  that  works  incapable  of  being  carried  by  sudden  assault 
one  year,  may,  by  new  applications  of  science  and  of  mechanical  arts, 
be  quite  vulnerable  the  next. 

To  aid  the  House  in  forming  an  intelligent  judgment  upon  the 
merits  of  our  present  system  of  frontier  defences,  the  committee 
have  collected  and  appended  hereto  several  leading  reports  of  army 
engineers  and  naval  officers,  and  also  that  of  Secretary  Cass  upon  this 
subject.  As  these  reports  elaborately  discuss  the  subject  of  frontier 
defences  in  all  its  varied  bearings  with  distinguished  ability,  and  as 
they  are  scarce  and  difficult  to  obtain,  the  printing  of  an  extra  number 


2  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

of  them  is  strongly  recommended.  They  are  worthy  of  the  attentive 
consideration  of  every  military  man  in  the  republic,  and  such  consid- 
eration may  lead  to  profitable  suggestions. 

FIRST   DEFENCES. 

Of  the  few  sea-coast  fortifications  built  prior  to  and  during  the 
revolutionary  war,  few  remain,  and  all  are  useless. 

Most  of  the  harbors  on  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  frontiers  were  sup- 
plied with  small  protective  works  after  the  breaking  out  of  the  French 
revolution  of  1789;  this  is  denominated  by  the  engineers  as  the  first 
system  of  coast  defences. 

SECOND    SYSTEM   OF   DEFENCES. 

Prior  to  the  war  of  1812  appropriations  were  made  for  fortifica- 
tions, ' '  and  there  was  not  a  town  of  any  magnitude  upon  the  coast 
not  provided  with  one  or  more  batteries. '7  These  works  are  called 
"the  defences  of  the  second  system/7  and  (though  much  better  than 
the  first)  were,  says  General  Totten,  "small  and  weak/7  "Being 
built,  for  the  sake  of  present  economy,  of  cheap  materials  and  work- 
manship, were  very  perishable.''  "The  government,  aware  of  this 
weakness,  called  out  to  their  support  during  the  war  vast  bodies  of 
militia,  at  enormous  expense,  covering  these  troops  with  extensive 
lines  of  field-works.'7 

The  inadequacy  of  these  small  works,  even  when  aided  by  large 
bodies  of  militia,  and  the  large  cost  of  life  and  money  their  weakness 
occasioned,  demanded  and  received  attention  as  soon  as  the  war 
closed. 

THIRD   SYSTEM  OF  DEFENCES. 

The  creation  of  the  present  or  third  system  of  frontier  defences  is 
thus  described  by  General  Totten,  chief  engineer  United  States 
army : 

"  The  war  with  England  being  over,  the  government  promptly  entered  upon  a  perma- 
nent system  of  coast  defence,  and  to  that  end  constituted  a  board  of  engineers,  with  in- 
structions to  make  examinations  and  plans,  subject  to  the  revision  of  the  chief  engineer 
and  the  sanction  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  And  it  Is  this,  the  third  system,  that  has  been 
ever  since  1816  in  the  course  of  execution,  and  is  now,  as  we  shall  see,  well  advanced. 

44  Whenever  the  examinations  of  the  board  of  engineers  included  positions  for  dock  yards, 
naval  depots,  &c.,  naval  officers  of  rank  and  experience  were  associated  with  them. 

"The  board  devoted  several  years  uninterruptedly  to  the  duty,  presenting  successive  re- 
ports, and  submitting,  first,  plans  of  the  fortifications  needed  at  the  most  important  points. 
Afterward  they  were  sufficiently  in  advance  ot  the  execution  of  the  system  to  apply  most  of 
their  time  to  the  duties  of  construction,  giving  in  occasionally  additional  reports  and  plans. 
In  rare  cases  it  has  happened  that  plans  have  been  made  under  the  particular  direction  of 
the  chief  engineer,  owing  to  difficulty,  at  moments,  of  drawing  the  widely-dispersed  mem- 
bers of  the  board  from  their  individual  trusts. 

"  The  board  and  the  chief  engineer  arianged  the  defences  into  classes,  according  to  their 
view  of  the  relative  importance  of  the  proposed  works,  in  the  order  of  time.  This  order 
ha«  been  generally  well  observed  in  the  execution  of  the  system,  with  the  exception  of 
gome  cases  in  which,  by  the  action  of  Congress,  certain  forts  were  advanced  out  of  the  order 
advised  by  the  board. 

"For  many  years  grants  for  fortifications  were  made  annually  by  Congress,  in  a  gross 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  3 

snm,  which  was  apportioned  according  to  the  discretion  of  the  President.  But  since  March 
3,  1821,  the  appropriations  have  been  specific,  the  grants  for  each  work  being  particularly 
stated.  For  many  years  every  new  fortification  has,  before  being  made  the  object  of  appro- 
priations, been  sanctioned  by  a  special  act  of  Congress,  upon  recommendation  of  the  Mili- 
tary Committee." 

MEANS  AND  MODE  OF  THE  DEFENSIVE  SYSTEM. 

The  committee  cannot  better  set  forth  the  means  and  mode  recom- 
mended by  the  board  of  engineers  for  the  defence  of  the  maritime 
frontiers  of  the  United  States,  and  adopted,  than  by  employing  the 
following  extract  from  a  report  made  in  1826  by  General  Bernard  and 
Colonel  Totten,  members  of  the  board  : 

"  We  proceed  to  consider  the  means  and  the  mode  of  the  defensive  system  which  it  is  for 
the  interest  of  the  United  States  to  adopt.  The  means  of  defence  for  the  seaboard  of  the 
United  States,  constituting  a  system,  may  be  classed  as  follows  :  First,  a  navy  ;  second, 
fortification  ;  third,  interior  communications  by  land  and  water  ;  and,  fourth,  a  regular 
army  and  well-organized  militia. 

"  The  navy  must  be  provided  with  suitable  establishments  for  construction  and  repair, 
stations,  harbors  of  rendezvous,  and  ports  of  refuge,  all  secured  by  fortifications,  defended  by 
regular  troops  and  militia,  and  supplied  with  men  and  materials  by  the  lines  of  intercom- 
munication. Being  the  only  species  of  offensive  force  compatible  with  our  political  institu- 
tions, it  will  then  be  prepared  to  act  the  great  part  which  its  early  achievements  have 
promised,  and  to  which  its  high  destiny  will  lead. 

""Fortifications  must  close  all  important  harbors  against  an  enemy,  and  secure  them  to 
our  military  and  commercial  marine.  Second,  must  deprive  an  enemy  of  all  strong  positions 
where,  protected  by  naval  superiority,  he  might  fix  permanent  quarters  in  our  territory, 
maintain  himself  during  the  war,  and  keep  the  whole  frontier  in  perpetual  alarm.  Third, 
must  cover  the  great  cities  from  attack.  Fourth,  must  prevent,  as  far  as  practicable,  the 
great  avenues  of  interior  navigation  from  being  blockaded  at  their  entrance  into  the  ocean. 
Fifth,  must  cover  the  coastwise  and  interior  navigation  by  closing  the  harbors  and  the 
several  inlets  from  the  sea  which  intersect  the  lines  of  communication,  and  thereby  further 
aid  the  navy  in  protecting  the  navigation  of  the  country  ;  and.  sixth,  must  protect  the  great 
naval  establishments. 

"Interior  communications  will  conduct  with  certainty  the  necessary  supplies  of  all  sorts 
to  the  stations,  harbors  of  refuge,  and  rendezvous,  and  the  establishments  for  construction 
and  repair,  for  the  use  both  of  the  fortifications  and  the  navy,  will  greatly  facilitate  and 
expedite  the  concentration  of  military  force  and  the  transfer  of  troops  from  one  point  to 
another  ;  insure  to  these  also  unfailing  supplies  of  every  description,  and  will  preserve  un- 
impaired the  interchange  of  domestic  commerce  even  during  periods  of  the  most  active 
external  warfare. 

"The  army  and  militia,  together  with  the  marine,  constitute  the  vital  principle  of  the 
system. 

"  From  this  sketch  it  is  apparent  that  our  system  of  defence  is  composed  of  elements 
whose  numerous  reciprocal  relations  with  each  other  and  with  the  whole  constitute  its  ex- 
cellence ;  one  element  is  scarcely  more  dependent  on  another  than  the  whole  system  is  on 
any  one.  Withdraw  the  navy,  and  the  defence  becomes  merely  passive  ;  withdraw  interior 
communications  from  the  system,  and  the  navy  must  cease,  in  a  measure,  to  be  active,  for 
want  of  supplies  ;  and  the  fortifications  can  offer  but  a  feeble  resistance  for  want  of  timely 
re-enforcements ;  withdraw  fortifications,  and  there  remains  only  a  scattered  and  naked 
navy." 

With  war  experiences  of  the  disadvantages  of  feebly-protected 
frontiers,  the  United  States,  though  laboring  under  the  burden  of  a 
heavy  debt,  commenced  the  above-described  system  immediately 
after  the  close  of  the  war.  The  board  of  engineers  who  planned  the 
present  system  was  constituted  for  that  purpose  at  the  very  first 
session  of  Congress  after  peace  was  proclaimed. 

Lists  of  the  fortifications  proposed  to  be  constructed  under  the  new 
system,  together  with  estimates  of  cost,  peace  and  war  garrisons,  &c. , 


4  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

will  be  found  attached  to  the  reports  of  the  engineers  printed  with 
this. 

The  interior  communications  desired  by  government  were  macadam- 
ized roads  j.  one  from  Washington  city,  along  the  Atlantic  coast  to  New 
Orleans  ;  another  between  the  same' points,  but  running  by  the  way 
of  Knoxville  ;  another  from  New  Orleans,  by  the  way  of  Tennessee 
and  Kentucky,  to  Buffalo  and  Lake  Erie  ;  and  a  fourth  from  Cum- 
berland to  St.  Louis.  These,  with  the  ordinary  roads  of  the  country, 
it  was  supposed,  would  greatly  facilitate  the  movement  of  troops  and 
supplies  in  the  event  of  war  to  the  fortifications  and  naval  depots  on 
the  several  water  frontiers.  Neither  of  the  four  was  ever  built, 
though  large  sums  of  money  were  expended  on  the  last  named  before 
it  was  finally  abandoned. 

In  the  detailed  plans  some  errors  were  made  which  occasioned 
some  injudicious  expenditures  on  the  fortifications.  These  are  indi- 
cated in  the  following  remarks  made  in  a  report  of  one  of  the 
engineers  in  1851  : 

' '  In  planning  the  new  works  it  seems  to  have  been  taken  for  granted,  in  many  instances, 
that  each  work  must  depend  on  itself,  without  chance  of  succor  from  forces  operating  on 
the  rear  and  flanks.  Works  were  thus  constructed  to  sustain  a  siege  from  ten  to  fifty  days, 
in  the  midst  of  a  population  from  which  relief  to  the  invested  work  could  be  drawn  in 
twenty-four  hours.  The  expensive  arrangement  of  these  land  defences  have  greatly  in- 
creased the  cost  of  the  works,  already  from  their  nature  very  costly  ;  and  at  this  day  ex- 
cite the  surprise  of  the  professional  examiner  acquainted  with  the  vast  means  of  collateral 
defence  possessed  by  the  United  States,  that  anything  more  should  have  been  required  for 
mcst  of  the  works  than  security  against  assault  by  escalade." 

But,  on  the  whole,  there  seems  to  be  little  to  regret.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  engineers  seem  to  have  shown  remarkable  competence  and 
aptitude  for  their  extensive  and  most  responsible  duties. 

Since  the  initiation  of  the  third  system  of  frontier  defences,  forty- 
six  years  have  passed  away.  In  that  period  the  condition  of  the 
country  has  been  greatly  changed — steamboats,  railroads,  canals, 
telegraphs,  steamships,  and  iron  ships,  increased  wealth,  and  increased 
population  give  new  elements  for  the  consideration  of  the  engineer. 
The  old  works  of  defence  on  our  coasts,  with  their  old  armaments, 
are  not  equal  to  the  new  means  of  attack.  Judging  from  the  ability 
of  our  unarmored  ships  to  destroy  the  fine  granite  forts  of  the  Chinese, 
it  seems  unlikely  that  any  considerable  number  of  our  fortifications 
could  long  resist  the  concentrated  fire  of  many  fifteen-inch  guns  of  a 
fleet  of  heavy  ships  thoroughly  iron-clad.  If  inadequate  to  such  re- 
sistance, our  nation  in  all  its  increased  strength  is  measurably  as 
defenceless  as  in  1816. 

What  is  necessary,  then,  to  make  our  defences  satisfactory — invul- 
nerable to  the  attacks  of  a  fleet  composed  of  as  many  iron-clad  vessels 
as  any  nation,  without  extraordinary  effort,  could  readily  concentrate 
against  them  ? 

1.  The  creation  of  adequate  means  to  exclude  from  our  harbors 
hostile  ships,  armored  vessels  included. 

2.  The  providing  of  suitable  means  to  detain  invading  armies  on 
shipboard,  when  near  important  ports,  a  sufficient  time  to  enable  an 
army  of  the  United  States  to  be  transported  to  the  point  assaulted. 

3.  The  construction  of  channels  in  which  to  convey  gunboats  from 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA- COAST   DEFENCES.  5 

the  Gulf  of  Mexico  up  the  Mississippi  and  Illinois  rivers,  and  from 
the  Atlantic  ocean  up  the  Hudson  river  into  the  lakes  ;  and  from  one 
lake  into  any  other. 

4.  The  creation  of  a  fortress  on  the  river  St.  Lawrence,  or  at  the 
foot  of  Lake  Ontario,  of  a  capacity  and   power  fully  equal  to    or  su- 
perior to  that  at  Kingston,  on  the  opposite  shore  ;  also,  fortifications 
on  the  Niagara  or  at  the  foot  of  Lake  Erie,  of  equal  capacity. 

5.  The  construction,  for  the  protection  of  the  Pacific  ocean  frontier, 
of  a  first-class  military  communication  between  the  river  Missouri  and 
the  bay  of  San  Francisco. 

6.  A  decided  increase  in  our  means   of    building   ami   repairing 
vessels- of- war  ;    of  manufacturing,  testing,   and   repairing  ordnance 
and  small  arms  of  all  grades  ;  and  of  making  and  testing  projectiles 
of  all  kinds  and  for  every  branch  of  the  service. 

7.  The  duplication  or  enlargement  of  the  Military  and  Naval  Acad- 
emies   immediately  after  the    extinction  of  the    rebellion    and   the 
re-establishment  of  peace.     And, 

8.  The  constitution  and  permanent  maintenance  of  an  army  and 
navy  sufficient  in  numbers  and  excellence  to  command  respect  both  at 
home  and  abroad — a  respect  based  on  reasonable  assurance  of  our 
physical  ability  to  promptly  repress    domestic    insurrection  and  to 
repel  foreign  aggression. 

Your  committee  invite  special  attention  to  each  of  these  points. 
They  will  be  considered  in  their  order. 

In  1851,  after  a  careful  survey  of  what  had  been  done,  one  of  the 
engineers  declared  in  an  official  report  that  an  examination  proved 
"that  the  United  States,  at  this  time,  possess  the  best  fortified  sea- 
coast  in  the  world.77  This,  probably,  no  longer  remains  true;  but  if 
still  true,  it  is  none  the  less  important  to  us  to  know  whether  our 
fortifications  have  sufficient  strength  to  endure  the  modern  tests  to 
which,  in  the  event  of  a  war  with  a  first-class  maritime  power,  they 
would  be  instantly  subjected?  Whether,  in  addition  to  protecting 
themselves,  they  can  shield  from  the  assaults  of  iron-clad  vessels  the 
cities  in  the  adjacent  harbors?  And  this  brings  us  to  the  considera- 
tion of  the  most  important  point  in  a  system  of  defences  constructed 
for  the  protection  of  a  water  frontier. 

STRENGTH    OF   THE   PRESENT  FORTIFICATIONS. 

1.  Will  the  fortifications  constructed  by  the  United  States  on  our 
Atlantic,  Pacific,  Gulf,  and  Lake  frontiers  certainly  exclude  a  large 
and  well-organized  fleet  of  armored  ships-of-war  from  our  harbors? 
Could  the  forts,  even  if  well  garrisoned  and  heavily  armed  with  the 
best  ordnance  hitherto  in  the  service,  prevent,  by  day  and  by  night, 
the  entrance  of  iron-clad  steam- vessels  (such  as  are  now  maintained 
on  Europeon  peace  establishments)  into  either  one  of  our  harbors, 
and  from  shelling  the  city  located  within  it  ? 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


IRON-CLAD   STEAMSHIPS   OF   WAR  MAY  RUN  BY  FORTS. 

It  was  very  clearly  shown  by  Lieutenant  Dahlgren,  of  the  navy, 
(in  a  report  made  by  him  in  1851,)  that  a  skilful  naval  commander  of 
a  powerful  fleet  of  steamships  of  the  line  could  pass  into  the  inner 
harbor  of  New  York  itself,  in  despite  of  the  utmost  opposition  that 
could  be  made  by  the  forts  located  at  the  Narrows.  Your  committee 
do  not  believe  that  the  increased  weight  and  range  since  given  to 
ordnance  placed  in  our  more  important  forts  has  increased  the  effec- 
tiveness of  the  forts  to  a  greater  degree  than  the  armoring  of  steam- 
ships has  increased  their  power  of  resistance.  Hence  it  is  consid- 
ered in  the  highest  degree  probable  that  if,  in  1851,  a  fleet  of  iron-clad 
steamships  of  the  line  could  force  a  passage  into  New  York  harbor, 
especially  if  their  commander  was  willing  to  sacrifice  a  few  of  them  to 
effect  the  passage,  a  fleet  of  armored  steamships,  by  a  similar  sacri- 
fice, (and  probably  single  ones  without  sacrifice,)  can  achieve  a  simi- 
lar result  in  1862. 

PRESENT   SYSTEM   OF   DEFENCES   DEFECTIVE. 

Here,  then,  is  the  first  defect  in  our  present  system  of  frontier  de- 
fence. It  is  vulnerable.  The  fortifications  cannot  shield  the  cities 
they  were  built  to  protect;  they  cannot  protect  the  objects  they  were 
specially  designed  to  shelter  against  the  assaults  of  even  a  few  ves- 
sels— perhaps,  not  against  one  or  two. 

So  far  as  can  now  be  discerned,  we  cannot  rely  on  our  fortifications 
for  reasonable  protection;  if  they  cannot  be  sufficiently  strengthened 
to  be  effective,  then  they  must  be  superseded  by  what  can  be  shown 
to  be  adequate.  A  remedy  for  this  defect  should  be  found  without 
unnecessary  delay;  our  cities  cannot  be  left  open  to  sudden  incursions 
from  every  petty  principality  which  has  money  or  credit  enough  to 
build  or  buy  an  iron-clad  ship.  We  cannot  fail  to  perceive  that  here- 
after leading  maritime  nations  will  maintain,  at  least  as  a  part  of  their 
ordinary  peace  establishments,  a  fleet  of  vessels  not  only  able  to  pass 
our  forts  uninjured,  but,  armed  with  the  fifteen  or  twenty-inch  guns 
now  likely  to  be  introduced,  able,  probably,  to  demolish  the  forts. 
In  all  ages  of  the  world  ambition  and  rapacity  have  found  occasion  to 
plunder  defenceless  cities.  To  be  able  to  maintain  our  independence, 
to  live  in  safety,  and  to  preserve  peace,  our  military  defences'  must 
be  adequate  to  afford  protection  against  all  attacks,  except  those  of 
unusual  and  extraordinary  power. 

ADDITIONAL   DEFENCES. 

Probably  the  remedying  of  the  defects  of  our  present  system  of 
defences,  which  recent  events  have  revealed  to  us,  will  not,  necessa- 
rily, be  very  expensive.  The  remedy  may  possibly  be  found  in  a  few 
additional  forts,  in  armoring  with  iron  both  the  old  and  the  new  ones, 
and  arming  them  with  the  heaviest  ordnance  attainable  by  art.  Be- 
sides these  changes,  it  may  be  found  necessary  to  add  iron-clad  float- 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  7 

ing  batteries  and  steam-rams  in  aid  of  the  forts;  and  also,  in  times  of 
danger,  to  anchor  rafts  entirely  across  the  channels  leading  into  the 
harbors,  or  close  them  with  chain  cables.  The  rafts,  properly  placed, 
would  arrest  the  progress  of  hostile  vessels  when  in  front  of  the  forts 
under  the  direct  fire  of  their  guns.  Thus  detained,  the  ships  m»st 
retire  or  consent  to  be  destroyed ;  for  it  is  not  at  all  likely  that  a  ship 
can  be  constructed  possessing  as  much  power  as  can  be  given  to  a 
first- class  fortification. — (See  extract  of  report  of  engineers  on  means 
of  obstructing  harbors,  hereto  annexed.) 

Possibly  an  entirely  new  system  of  defences  may  be  found  best; 
this,  however,  is  scarcely  to  be  expected,  even  in  this  age  of  won- 
derful mechanical  contrivances.  Being  purely  a  question  of  engineer- 
ing, and  the  United  States  having  a  corps  of  engineers  and  of  naval 
officers  eminently  worthy  of  confidence,  the  committee  recommend 
the  reference  of  the  subject  to  them,  with  directions  to  devise  a  plan 
which,  when  fully  executed,  will  enable  the  United  States  to  exclude 
hostile  fleets  from  all  important  harbors  on  our  several  water  frontiers. 

The  committee  will  not  withhold  an  expression  of  opinion  that 
powerful,  perhaps  entirely  adequate,  means  of  defence,  original  in 
character  and  simple  in  application,  may  be  found  to  repel  the  most 
powerful  fleets  and  armaments.  We  have  reason  to  believe  that  this 
will  be  found  to  be  true,  though  an  allusion  even  to  the  nature  and 
character  of  these  plans,  some  of  which  are  now  under  examination, 
would  be  premature. 

IMPORTANCE   OF   SUITABLE   DEFENCEfc. 

Said  Secretary  Poinsett: 

"We  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  destruction  of  some  of  the  important  points  on  the 
frontier  would  alone  cost  more  to  the  nation  than  the  expense  of  fortifying  the  whole  lino 
would  amount  to ;  while  the  temporary  occupation  of  others  would  drive  us  into  expenses 
far  surpassing  those  of  the  projected  defences." 

These  reflections  of  this  eminent  man  being  sound,  we  cannot  dis- 
pense with  defensive  works  merely  because  of  their  expense.  The 
only  question  really  open  to  discussion  is,  what  system  of  defences 
will  be  adequate  to  the  end  in  view  ? 

PRACTICABILITY  OF  CONSTRUCTING  ADEQUATE  NATIONAL  DEFENCES. 

It  is  ^objected  that  it  is  quite  impracticable  for  thirty  millions  of 
people  to  provide  defences  which  are  truly  invulnerable  for  frontiers 
so  extensive  as  those  of  the  United  States.  To  objections  of  this 
class,  Mr.  Secretary  Poinsett  replied  that — 

"It  would  appear,  on  a  superficial  view,  to  be  a  acigantic  and  almost  impracticable  pro- 
ject to  fortify  such  an  immense  extent  of  coast  as  that  of  the  United  States,  and  difficult, 
if  not  impossible,  to  provide  a  sufficient  force  to  garrison  and  defend  the  works  necessary 
for  that  purpose." 

But,  said  Mr.  Poinsett: 

"The  coast  of  the  United  States,  throughout  its  vast  extent,  has  but  few  points  which 
require  to  be  defended  against  a  regular  and  powerful  attack.  A  considerable  portion  of 
it  is  inaccessible  to  large  vessels,  and  only  exposed  to  the  depredations  of  parties  in  boats 
and  small  vessels-of-war ;  against  which  inferior  works  and  a  combination  of  the  same 
means,  and  a  well-organized  local  militia,  will  afford  sufficient  protection. 


8  FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

"The  only  portions  which  require  to  be  defended  by  permanent  works  of  some  strength 
are  the  avenues  to  the  great  commercial  cities,  and  to  naval  and  military  establishments, 
the  destruction  of  which  would  be  a  serious  loss  to  the  country,  and  be  regarded  by  an 
enemy  as  an  equivalent  for  the  expense  of  a  great  armament. 

"It  is  shown,  also,  that  the  number  of  men  required,  on  the  largest  scale,  for  the  de- 
fence of  the  forts — when  compared  with  the  movable  force  that  would  be  necessary  without 
thfm — is  inconsiderable.  The  local  militia,  aided  by  a  few  regulars,  and  directed  by  en- 
gineer and  artillery  officers,  may,  with  previous  training,  be  safely  intrusted  with  their 
defence  in  time  of  war. 

"It  cannot  be  too  earnestly  urged  that  a  much  smaller  number  of  troops  will  be  required 
to  defend  a  fortified  frontier  than  to  cover  one  that  is  entirely  unprotected ;  and  that  such 
a  system  will  enable  us,  according  to  the  spirit  of  our  institutions,  to  employ  the  militia 
effectually  for  the  defence  of  the  country." 

From  three  causes  the  number  of  important  points  open  to  attack 
has  increased  during  the  twenty-two  years  which  have  elapsed  since 
the  foregoing  cogent  reasons  were  presented;  but,  as  our  wealth  and 
population  have  proportionably  increased,  his  reply  is  as  complete 
to-day  as  it  was  then.  The  points  of  attack  have  increased,  first,  by 
the  springing  up  of  new  marts  of  commerce;  second,  by  the  acquisi- 
tion of  Texas  and  California;  and  third,  cities  in  shallow  harbors  now 
need  strong  defences  in  consequence  of  the  recent  adaptation  of  ves- 
sels of  light  draught  to  the  work  of  the  largest  ships-of-war. 
The  iron-clad  Monitor,  though  of  light  draught,  can  carry  as 
heavy  a  gun  as  the  Warrior,  and  can  as  safely  run  by  any  fort  in  her 
Majesty's  dominions,  anchor  in  the  harbor  beyond,  and,  in  defiance 
of  ancient  means  of  prevention,  commence  the  work  of  destruction. 
But  though  this  altered  condition  of  affairs  lays  open  to  attack  sev- 
eral important  points  not  heretofore  considered  exposed,  still,  as  just 
remarked,  our  increased  means  fully  equal  the  increased  demands 
upon  them.  Our  country  is  competent  to  the  task  of  placing  the 
frontier  in  a  complete  state  of  defence  without  being  at  all  distressed 
by  the  performance  of  it.  The  sum  of  our  present  expenses  would, 
probably  in  one  month,  far  more  than  suffice  to  place  our  frontiers  in 
a  perfectly  defensible  condition.  The  Pacific  frontier  is,  of  course, 
excepted  in  the  above  remark.  But  if,  on  scientific  investigation, 
the  engineers  and  naval  officers  shall  ascertain  that  adequate  national 
defences  cannot  be  constructed  except  at  great  cost,  the  works  will 
yet  have  to  be  built,  however  unwelcome  the  burden;  unless,  indeed, 
the  nation  is  prepared  to  renounce  its  time-honored  maxims,  and  con- 
sent to  owe  the  security  of  its  frontier  cities,  and  the  security  of  a 
commerce  which  has  become  as  wide-spread  as  the  world,  to  the 
mercy  and  forbearance  of  its  maritime  neighbors.  •  . 

Having  shown  that  the  first  step  to  take  to  secure  our  water  fron- 
tiers from  the  casualities  of  unexpected  assault  is  to  construct  de- 
fences, permanent  and  floating,  which  are  competent  to  resist  any 
sudden  attack  that  can  readily  be  made  with  such  means  as  are  ordi- 
narily in  the  possession  of  an  enemy,  your  committee  believe  that 
the  next  step,  in  importance  is : 

2.  To  provide  such  means  of  defence  of  the  coast  near  the  import- 
ant harbors  as  will  compel  hostile  vessels  to  seek  for  a  point  at  some 
distance  from  the  harbors  at  which  to  disembark  troops;  thus  afford- 
ing to  us  time  to  convey  our  troops  to  the  point  threatened  in  advance 
of  the  arrival  of  the  enemy. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  9 

When  our  roads  were  few  and  bad  the  importance  of  compelling 
an  enemy  to  land  a  day's  journey  from  important  points  was  not  so 
striking  as  now,  when  troops  can  be  placed  in  that  space  of  time  in 
large  numbers  between  the  point  threatened  and  an  invading  army. 
Informed  by  the  telegraph,  and  aided  by  the  railroads,  a  commander 
defending  a  country  possessing  so  many  soldiers  as  ours  can,  in  a  brief 
period  of  time,  confront  with  a  superior  force  more  armies  than  the 
entire  fleets  of  any  nation  can  transport  in  one  voyage  across  a  wide 
ocean.  This  is  an  advantage  in  the  defence  of  a  country  of  very 
great  moment.  To  achieve  it,  a  nation  situated  at  a  great  distance 
from  warlike  and  ambitious  governments,  would  be  justified  in  making 
very  large  expenditures.  If,  in  addition  to  this,  we  maintain  respect- 
able fleets  and  armies,  carefully  drill  a  well-organized  militia,  and 
take  care  to  keep  on  hand  abundant  munitions  of  war,  the  United 
States  would  be,  practically,  invulnerable. 

The  exceptions  to  the  general  remark,  that  an  invading  army,  land- 
ing at  any  important  point  in  the  United  States,  could  be  confronted 
in  a  few  hours  with  a  superior  force,  are  few,  and  can  be  found  only 
in  the  Gulf  and  Pacific  States,  and  in  those  bordering  on  Lakes 
Huron  and  Superior.  These  exceptions  are  rapidly  lessening  in  num- 
ber, and  in  a  few  years  will  disappear.  It  is  a  matter  of  just  pride 
and  great  national  consequence  that  no  country  of  the  size  of  one  of 
our  largest  States  has  such  facile  and  as  extensive  lines  of  water  and 
railroad  communications  as  the  United  States.  No  system  of  defence, 
therefore,  would  be  perfect  which  is  not  so  planned  as  to  render 
available,  to  its  greatest  extent,  this  power  of  concentrating  forces 
rapidly  upon  any  assailable  point — a  power  which  our  country  pos- 
sesses in  so  extraordinary  a  degree.  No  large  country,  either  in 
ancient  or  modern  times,  ever  possessed  such  ample  and  reliable 
means  for  rapidly  transferring  large  bodies  of  men  from  one  distant 
State  to  another  as  our  own;  and  because  the  great  power  of  such 
means  has  never  been  effectively  exhibited  in  a  great  war  of  a  defen- 
sive character  is  not  a  reason  for  us  to  disregard  it.  Its  inherent 
value  and  power  in  a  country  where,  as  all  nations  well  know,  the 
sudden  seizure  of  a  few  places,  however  valuable,  cannot  endanger 
its  integrity  or  seriously  cripple  its  movements,  are  obvious  to  the 
humblest  understanding.  Seizures,  achieved  at  great  risk,  and 
promising  no  decisive  results,  are  rarely  attempted  by  able  leaders. 
Thorough  defences,  constructed  with  direct  reference  to  a  full  develop- 
ment of  the  usefulness  of  our  interior  communications,  will  go  far  to 
insure  our  country  even  against  attempts  to  invade  it,  and  such  a 
result  is  the  highest  aim  of  a  system  of  military  defences. 

The  location  and  character  of  the  works  necessary  to  prevent  the 
landing  of  a  hostile  force  on  the  coast  near  important  harbors  can 
only  be  determined  by  engineers,  and  to  them  it  should  be  referred, 
with  instructions  to  erect  them. 

DEFENCES   OF   THE   NORTHERN   FRONTIER. 

3  and  4.  How  can  the  northern  or  lake  frontier  be  successfully 
defended,  especially  as  the  United  States  are  prohibited,  by  treaty 


10  FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

from  building  war  vessels  on  the  lakes?  On  the  shores  of  these  lakes 
the  United  States  have  many  cities  and  villages,  and  upon  their  waters 
an  immense  commerce;  these  are  unsheltered  by  any  defences  worthy 
of  special  notice,  but  they  are  as  open  to  incursion  as  was  Mexico 
when  invaded  by  Cortez.  A  small  fleet  of  light- draught,  heavily- 
armed,  iron-clad  gunboats  could,  in  one  short  month,  in  despite  of 
any  opposition  that  could  be  made  by  extemporized  batteries,  pass 
up  the  St.  Lawrence  into  the  lakes,  and  shell  every  city  and  village 
from  Ogdensburg  to  Chicago.  At  one  blow  it  could  sweep  our  com- 
merce from  that  entire  chain  of  waters.  Such  a  fleet  wouM  have  it  in 
its  power  to  inflict  a  loss  to  be  reckoned  only  by  hundreds  of  millions  of 
dollars,  so  vast  is  the  wealth  thus  exposed  to  the  depredations  of  a 
maritime  enemy.  To  be  able  to  strike  a  blow  so  Effective,  Great 
Britain  constructed  a  canal  around  the  great  Falls  of  Niagara.  By 
this  single  work  the  entire  chain  of  lakes  was  opened  to  the  entrance 
of  all  British  light-draught  ocean  vessels.  Perceiving  our  ability  to 
erect  fortifications  on  the  St.  Lawrence  that  might  command  its 
channel,  and  thus  neutralize  all  they  had  done,  Great  Britain  dug  a 
canal  from  the  foot  of  Lake  'Ontario,  on  a  line  parallel  to  the  river, 
but  beyond  the  reach  of  American  guns,  to  a  point  on  the  St.  Law- 
rence below,  beyond  American  jurisdiction,  thus  securing  a  channel 
to  and  from  the  lakes  out  of  our  reach. 

Occupied  by  our  own  vast  commercial  enterprises  and  by  violent 
party  conflicts,  our  people  failed  to  notice,  at  the  time,  that  the 
safety  of  our  entire  northern  frontier  had  been  destroyed  by  the  dig- 
ging of  two  short  canals.  Near  the  head  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  (at 
the  foot  of  Lake  Ontario,)  the  British,  to  complete  their  supremacy 
on  the  lakes,  have  built  a  large  naval  depot  for  the  construction  and 
repair  of  vessels,  and  a  very  strong  fortress  to  protect  the  depot  and 
the  outlet  of  the  lake — a  fort  which  cannot  be  reduced,  it  is  sup- 
posed by  them,  except  by  regular  approaches.  They  have  also 
strong  defences  of  the  St.  Lawrence  at  Montreal,  Quebec,  <fec.,  to 
make  the  all-important  channel  as  safe  as  possible  to  the  ingress  and 
egress  of  their  fleets.  As  things  now  are,  a  British  fleet  could  sail 
from  the  ocean  into  the  lakes,  devastate  the  cities  upon  the  shores, 
seize  the  commercial  vessels  on  their  waters,  and  then,  in  a  few  days, 
appear  off  Boston,  New  York,  or  New  Orleans,  to  aid  in  operations 
against  us  on  the  ocean  frontier.  To  place  our  frontier  in  like  good 
condition,  the  United  States  must  possess  as  good  an  inlet  to  the 
lakes,  and  must  possess  the  means  to  follow  an  enemy's  fleet  from  one 
lake  to  another  with  like  ease  and  certainty.  We  must  have  a  naval 
depot  of  corresponding  extent,  as  well  secured,  and  as  judiciously 
located  for  commercial  as  well  as  warlike  purposes.  In  addition  to 
these  we  should  have  defences  at  the  entrance  of  each  lake  which 
will  effectually  command  them.  On  the  St.  Lawrence  should  be 
fortifications  (aided  by  'floating  batteries  if  necessary)  competent  to 
control  the  channel,  however  numerous  the  hostile  fleet. 

To  defend  the  northern  frontier,  the  United  States  should  be  able 
to  place  a  strong  fleet  on  the  lakes  as  soon  as  an  opponent.  We 
should  have  adequate  means  of  transportation  at  command  to  be  able 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  11 

to  speedily  concentrate  on  the  .St.  Lawrence  a  force  of  acknowledged 
competency  to  take  possession  of  the  canal  and  of  Montreal,  and  hold 
them.  The  possession  by  the  United  States  of  the  outlets  of  Lake 
Ontario,  and  of  Montreal  and  its  communications,  would  cut  off  all 
supplies  from  the  Canadians,  and  leave  them  to  an  unsupported  and 
hopeless  conflict  with  all  our  forces.  Such  a  conflict  could  be  neither 
protracted  nor  dangerous. 

MILITARY  CANALS. 

Can  the  United  States  have  a  navigable  channel  from  the  ocean  to 
the  lakes  of  an  equal  value  with  that  possessed  by  Great  Britain? 
Undoubtedly;  and  a  better  one.  The  Erie  and  Hudson  canal  can 
readily  be  so  enlarged  as  to  allow  of  the  passage  of  a  vessel  of  fifteen 
hundred  or  even  of  two  thousand  tons  burden.  When  completed,  a 
vessel  could  enter  Lake  Erie  sooner  from  New  York  harbor  than  from 
the  mouth  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  and  without  the  delay  and  danger 
arising  from  rapids,  rocks,  and  ice.  The  Illinois  river  and  Lake 
Michigan  canal  can  be  still  more  readily  and  cheaply  enlarged  than 
the  Hudson  and  Erie,  and  would  allow  an  ocean  vessel  from  New  Or- 
leans to  enter  the  lakes  a  month  earlier  in  the  spring  than  one  entering 
by  the  way  of  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence.  A  canal  around  Niagara 
falls  can  be  readily  built  of  any  desirable  capacity.  Neither  of  these 
channels  would  be  within  reach  of  British  guns,  whereas  a  right  to 
plant  American  guns  upon  the  banks  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  the  only 
British  channel  to  the  lakes,  belongs  to  the  United  States. 

MILITARY  ADVANTAGES  OF  CANALS  FROM  THE  LAKES  TO  THE  GULF  OF  MEXICO, 
AND  TO  THE  NORTH  ATLANTIC. 

In  the  absence  of  ships-of-war  on  the  lakes,  and  of  all  means  to  con- 
vey them  there  from  the  ocean,  the  United  States,  upon  the  breaking 
out  of  war,  would,  without  navy  yards  and  suitable  docks,  have  to 
commence  the  building  of  a  fleet  upon  Lake  Ontario,  and  another  on 
the  upper  lakes,  one  British  fleet  answering  for  both.  The  United 
States  could  not  leave  the  valuable  cities  and  commerce  of  the  upper 
lakes  undefended,  nor  could  it  allow  the  British  war  vessels  to  domi- 
nate Lake  Ontario,  where  the  bulk  of  the  British  commerce,  wealth, 
and  military  and  naval  resources  are  to  be  found.  Hence,  two  fleets 
would  be  indispensable.  So  long  as  the  British  can  hold  Lake  Ontario 
and  its  outlets  to  the  ocean,  so  long  is  Canada  invulnerable,  and  so 
long  can  land  expeditions  be  sent  against  our  cities  from  Buffalo  to 
Utica,  and  naval  ones  to  every  port  on  the  upper  as  well  as  lower 
lakes.  And  so  long  as  the  British  ocean  fleet  can,  alone,  enter  the 
lakes,  by  what  means  could  ship  yards  on  our  shores  be  so  protected 
from  their  gunboats  as  to  make  it  safe  to  build  vessels  within  them  ? 
"Would  not  the  cost  and  defects  of  hasty  building,  and  of  thorough 
protection  of  ship  yards  from  the  attacks  of  iron- clad  fleets,  and  the 
loss  of  towns,  and  of  commercial  vessels,  and  the  pay  and  support  of 
extra  bodies  of  troops  along  the  whole  frontier,  greatly  exceed,  in 
three  months,  the  entire  cost  of  three  canals? 


12  FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

The  first  advantage  of  these  canals  to  the  United  States  would  be, 
then,  the  avoidance  of  those  otherwise  unavoidable  evils.  A  second 
advantage  would  be  found  in  our  ability  to  make  one  fleet  answer  for 
two.  A  third  advantage  would  be,  that  we  could  build  vessels  on 
the  Ohio,  Mississippi,  Missouri,  Illinois,  Hudson,  and  along  the  lines 
of  the  canals,  free  from  all  danger  of  attacks,  and  where  labor  and 
materials  would  be  abundant  and  cheap.  A  fourth  advantage  would 
be  equally  decided  ;  instead  of  being  useless  to  the  United  States, 
except  upon  the  lakes  where  built,  the  digging  of  the  canals  would 
enable  our  war  vessels  on  the  lakes,  in  ten  days  after  the  receipt  of 
orders,  to  make  their  appearance  at  New  Orleans  or  Mobile  for  naval 
movements  in  the  West  Indies,  or  at  New  York  to  operate  in  the  North 
Atlantic,  two  thousand  miles  further  to  the  northeast.  The  possession 
of  the  power  to  transfer  a  blockaded  fleet  by  a  safe  inland  route  from 
New  York  to  New  Orleans,  or  from  New  Orleans  to  New  York,  is,  of 
itself,  an  incalculable  advantage  in  times  of  war  with  a  strong  mari- 
time power.  A  fifth  advantage  might  arise  in  this  wise  :  should  the 
British  fleet  winter  at  the  naval  depot,  under  the  protection  of  the 
fortress,  as  its  safety  and  convenience  would  dictate,  our  fleet,  long 
after  the  British  fleet  was  ice-bound,  could  pass  down  the  Mississippi 
and  aid  our  forces  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  Caribbean  sea  a  third 
of  the  year,  and  yet  be  back  to  its  station  before  the  enemy  could 
sail  from  its  ice-bound  harbor. 

The  last  advantage  which  your  committee  will  name  at  this  time 
is  the  facilities  the  canals  would  afford,  in  times  of  peace,  to  agricul- 
ture, commerce,  manufactures,  and  the  mechanic  arts.  Practically 
the  navigable  channel  of  the  Hudson  is  extended  to  the  Mississippi. 
The  steamship  loaded  at  St.  Paul,  Omaha,  St.  Louis,  Louisville, 
Memphis,  or  Chicago,  would  transport  its  thousand,  fifteen  hundred, 
or  two  thousand  tons  of  produce  to  New  York,  Boston,  or  Philadel- 
phia, or  any  other  point  on  the  entire  coast,  at  the  pleasure  of  its 
owners,  and  exchange  it  for  every  fabric  known  to  the  merchant  and 
the  artisan.  This  would  infuse  new  vigor  into  all  industrial  pursuits, 
and  benefit  all  portions  of  this  great  country.  It  is  believed  that  if 
eighty-ton  horse  boats  can  afford  to  pay  tolls  high  enough  to  support 
shallow  canals,  two  thousand-ton  steamboats,  being  subjected  to  less 
expense  per  ton,  can  afford  to  pay  enough  higher  tolls  to  support 
deeper  canals  of  greater  cost ;  especially,  considered  in  connexion 
with  the  far  larger  amount  of  business  the  deep  canal  could  transact. 
They  ought,  within  a  reasonable  time,  to  reimburse  their  first  cost. 
Hence  no  reason  is  perceived,  from  the  money  point  of  view,  why 
these  exceedingly  important  military  channels  should  not  be  dug. 

These  and  other  considerations  which  need  not  be  enumerated, 
most  of  which  relate  directly  to  the  military  value  of  these  avenues, 
induce  your  committee  to  urge  the  construction  of  the  canal  from  the 
foot  of  Lake  Michigan-  to  the  Mississippi  river  and  around  the  Falls 
of  Niagara,  connecting  the  upper  and  the  lower  lakes.  It  is  not 
doubted  that  the  great  resources  of  the  State  of  New  York,  and  the 
interest  of  that  State  and  its  commercial  capital,  (which  is  also  the 
commercial  capital  of  the  nation,)  will  supply  the  means  and  a  motive 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  13 

for  the  enlargement  of  the  Erie  canal  on  a  scale  equal  to  the  other 
works,  and  as  soon  as  they  can  be  completed  by  the  general  govern- 
ment. 

This  chain  of  interior  water  communications,  which  can  so  easily 
be  established  from  the  bay  of  New  York  and  of  the  St.  Lawrence, 
stretching  through  the  lakes,  and  by  their  union  with  the  Mississippi 
river,  to  New  Orleans,  to  St.  Paul,  Pittsburg,  and  the  foothills  of  the 
Rocky  mountains,  discloses  a  remarkable  feature  in  the  geographical 
formation  of  our  country,  and  brings  to  mind  another  equally  singular 
and  important  fact  often  referred  to  by  our  engineers,  and  worthy  of 
consideration  in  this  connexion.  It  is  what  might  be  called  a  second 
coast-line,  created  by  making  a  navigable  channel  near  to  and  par- 
allel with  the  coasts  on  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf,  and  having  numerous 
connexions  with  those  waters.  Such  channel  would  possess  two  very 
valuable  properties  ;  it  would  enable  the  United  States  to  transfer 
our  ships-of-war,  by  a  safe  and  speedy  route,  in  the  presence  of  a 
superior  naval  force,  from  any  one  point  on  our  coast  to  any  other,  and 
it  would  preserve  our  vast  coasting  trade  in  unimpaired  activity 
throughout  the  war.  The  military  value  of  this  measure  was  urged 
by  the  engineers  more  than  forty  years  ago,  but  of  late  years  Con- 
gress seems  to  have  forgotten  its  importance.  Now  that  the  coasting 
trade  has  an  annual  value  of  more  than  three  hundred  millions  of  dollars, 
and  it  has  come  to  be  well  understood  that  unless  a  belligerent  power 
can  maintain  its  trade  and  commerce,  money  to  carry  on  the  war  will 
be  found  scarce  and  dear,  it  is  to  be  hoped  earnest  consideration  will 
be  bestowed  upon  the  importance  of  an  intra-coast  channel.  An  in- 
terior channel,  beginning  in  the  Mississippi  river,  above  New  Or- 
leans, opening  up  the  bed  of  the  Ibberville  river,  (closed  by  General 
Jackson  in  1812-' 15,  and  not  since  opened,)  may  be  continued  along 
the  coast  between  the  islands  and  the  main  land,  via  Mobile  and 
Pensacola,  (crossing  Florida  with  a  ship  canal, )  Savannah,  Charleston, 
Beaufort,  Norfolk,  near  Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  New  Brunswick, 
and  New  York,  (through  Long  Island  sound,  Narraganset  and  Buz- 
zard's bays,  and  by  a  short  canal,)  to  Massachusetts  bay.  Such  is  the 
opinion  of  the  engineers. 

Without,  at  this  time,  entering  into  the  details  of  the  feasibility 
and  cost  of  this  valuable  means  of  defence,  your  committee  will  be 
content  to  call  attention  to  a  practical  point  or  two.  There  is  at  this 
time  in  operation,  between  the  lower  waters  of  New  York  harbor 
and  the  Delaware  river,  a  canal — Delaware  and  Raritan — forty-three 
miles  long  and  seven  feet  deep.  It  is  navigated  by  small  propellers  and 
sloops.  The  Chesapeake  and  Delaware  canal  connects  Philadelphia, 
on  the  Delaware,  and  Baltimore,  on  the  Chesapeake.  It  is  only  thir- 
teen and  a  half  miles  long,  and  is  ten  feet  deep.  The  Dismal  Swamp 
canal  is  twenty-two  miles  long,  and  connects  Chesapeake  bay  with 
Albemarle  sound. 

Here,  then,  is  an  interior  channel  which,  when  the  coasts  have 
been  put  into  a  defensible  condition,  will  be  a  safe  one  along  an  ex- 
tensive and  exceedingly  important  part  of  our  coast,  from  New  Lon- 
don to  Beaufort,  directly  communicating  with  several  of  our  largest 
States  and  cities.  To  make  this  extensive  channel  available  both  in 


14  FORTIFICATIONS  AND    SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

peace  and  in  war  requires  an  enlargement  of  three  short  and  inexpen- 
sive canals,  of  an  aggregate  length  of  but  seventy-eight  and  a  half 
miles. 

Another  interior  channel  of  similar  importance  can  be  had  (by 
means  of  the  Ibberville  river  and  Lakes  Mauripas,  Pontchartrain,  and 
Borgne)  from  the  Mississippi  river  to  Pensacola.  This  would  connect 
all  of  the  cities  of  the  west  with  all  of  the  cities  of  the  Gulf  by  an  inte- 
rior and  protected  channel.  The  cost  of  this  would  be  even  less  than  the 
other,  and  both  might  ultimately  be  extended  so  as  to  become  one. 

Thus,  with  a  few  slight  interruptions  where  it  might  be  necessary 
to  venture  upon  the  open  sea,  an  interior  line  of  water  communications 
can  be  established  from  New  Orleans  to  New  York  and  to  Boston. 
These  interruptions,  even,  could  be  protected  by  powerful  floating  bat- 
teries, and  our  commerce  in  time  of  war,  even  with  the  most  powerful 
maritime  nations,  could  make  a  secure  and  peaceful  circuit  around 
the  country. 

The  enterprise  of  individuals  has  provided  us  with  this  almost 
complete  water  line  along  the  coast — we  can  safely  look  to  the  same 
source  for  the  accomplishment  of  much  more  where  nature  has  done 
so  great  a  share.  The  government  may  never  be  called  to  do  more 
than  sanction  by  its  authority,  in  order  to  insure  the  completion  of 
this  grand  design  ;  and  yet  the  very  struggle  which  we  are  now  en- 
during against  the  disseverance  of  the  Union,  marks  the  conviction 
of  the  mass  of  our  countrymen  of  the  essential  unity  of  our  country, 
and  the  dependence  of  the  whole  upon  every  part;  and  the  same  en- 
ergy, inspired  by  the  same  sentiment,  will  some  day  bind  this  new 
ligament  of  strength  around  the  nation  to  make  its  Union  perpetual. 

DEFENCE   OF   THE   PACIFIC    COAST. 

5.  In  addition  to  good  harbor  and  other  defences  upon  the  Pacific 
coast,  the  Pacific  States  and  Territory,  to  be  defensible  against  the 
attack  of  a  powerful  nation,  must  be  connected  with  the  States  lying 
to  the  east  of  their  mountains  by  a  good  military  road — by  a  first- 
class,  faithfully-constructed  railroad,  competent  to  the  ready  trans- 
portation of  the  heaviest  ordnance,  as  well  as  large  bodies  of  troops 
and  their  indispensable  supplies.  The  present  population  is  too 
small,  and  too  much  scattered,  to  be  able  to  defend  so  extensive  a 
frontier  against  the  attacks  of  a  well-organized  naval  and  land  force. 
Their  frontier  extends  from  the  thirty- second  to  the  forty-ninth  par- 
allel of  latitude,  seventeen  degrees,  excluding  the  indentations  and 
windings  of  the  coast.  To  defend  it  is  not  within  the  physical  power 
of  so  few  persons.  Many  years  hence  things  will  be  much  changed. 
The  war  of  1812-' 15  called  forth  considerable  effort;  yet  we  then  had 
eight  millions  of  people.  A  powerful  nation  could  easily  detail  for 
an  attack  upon  the  Pacific  States  a  much  larger  force  than  was  em- 
ployed against  us  in  1812. 

It  is  not  wise,  therefore,  to  stake  the  safety  and  independence  of 
the  Pacific  States  and  Territory  upon  their  infant  resources;  nor 
is  it  prudent  for  us  to  rely  upon  our  ability  to  send  them  troops 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  15 

and  supplies  by  sea,  around  Cape  Horn,  or  across  the  Isthmus 
through  the  territory  of  a  foreign  nation.  Such  a  reliance  would 
subject  us  to  too  much  delay  and  expense,  and  expose  our  re-enforce- 
ments to  too  many  casualties,  of  all  kinds.  A  good  road  would  be 
self-sustaining,  and  ultimately  might,  under  judicious  management, 
reimburse  a  portion  of  its  first  cost.  It  is  reassuring  to  reflect  that, 
if  its  great  cost  is  evident,  so  the  numerous  benefits  which  would 
flow  from  the  road  are  equally  indisputable.  Instead  of  repining  at 
the  necessity  which  demands  the  construction  of  three  canals  and  a 
railroad  to  render  our  national  defences  efficient,  the  nation  has  great 
cause  for  self-gratulation  at  having  occasion  to  construct  so  few — has 
great  reason  to  be  proud  of  that  individual  enterprise  and  energy, 
which,  without  national  aid,  has  created  so  many  thousand  miles  of 
commercial  communications  .of  the  first  order  of  completeness  and  effi- 
ciency, not  only  for  the  purposes  of  commerce,  but  also  so  admirably 
adapted  for  the  military  purposes  of  the  government.  The  unstim- 
ulated  efforts  of  peaceful  citizens  for  peaceful  ends  have  created  for 
the  United  States  a  greater  and  more  complete  system  of  communi- 
cations, well  located  and  well  suited  for  military  purposes,  than  any 
created  by  the  mightiest  military  nations  led  and  stimulated  by  the 
mightiest  warriors  of  any  age  of  the  world. 

While  so  much  has  been  done  for  the  government  by  its  citizens, 
and  so  much  more  is  likely  hereafter  to  be  done  by  them,  directly 
available  for  military  purposes,  the  government  has  abundant  cause 
of  thankfulness  that  so  little  of  consequence  remains  to  be  done  by 
itself,  and  should  proceed  to  the  execution  of  its  task  with  unhesita- 
ting alacrity. 

The  building  of  a  great  road  from  St.  Louis  to  San  Francisco  con- 
solidates the  power  of  the  United  States;  it  mobilizes  the  power  of 
the  United  States.  Not  only  so,  but  it  would  speedily  cause  to  be 
populated  those  numerous  fertile  valleys  existing  amid  those  wonder- 
ful mountain  ranges  which  our  maps  erroneously  represent  as  one 
vast  area  of  desolation;  it  would  thus  seriously  aid  in  providing  hardy 
mountaineers  not  likely  to  assist  at  a  surrender  of  the  keys  of  the 
Golden  Gate.  From  every  reason  that  can  be  properly  urged  in 
favor  of  placing  a  country  in  a  state  of  defence,  your  committee 
urge  the  early  construction  of  a  good  and  reliable  road  from  the 
Missouri  river  to  the  bay  of  San  Francisco. 

It  may  be  proper  to  say,  before  leaving  the  subject  of  coast  defences 
on  the  Pacific,  that  your  committee  consider  good  defensive  works  on 
Puget  sound  and  its  tributary  waters,  and  on  the  Rio  Colorado,  at 
the  head  of  the  Gulf  of  California,  as  indispensable  to  a  successful  de- 
fence of  the  immediate  Pacific  coast.  Judicious  measures  calculated 
to  secure  permanent  settlements  in  the  fertile  valleys  of  the  Colorado 
of  the  west,  and  upon  the  waters  of  Puget  sound,  are  also  impera- 
tively demanded  by  the  military  interests  of  this  interesting  ocean 
frontier.  Those  flank  defences,  supported  by  populations  of  respect- 
able numbers,  would,  in  the  event  of  a  large  war,  possess  great  value 
to  the  defenders  of  the  coast  on  the  Pacific  ocean.  Of  similar  value 
would  be  a  railroad  from  Los  Angelos,  via  the  Tulare  and  San  Joaquin 
valleys,  to  San  Francisco,  with  a  branch  from  a  point  a  few  miles  east 


16  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

of  San  Francisco,  along  the  banks  of  the  Sacramento,  and  northerly 
as  far  as  the  configuration  of  the  country  will  allow,  and  business  and 
population  would  justify;  such  a  road  would  greatly  increase  the  de- 
fensive ability  of  California,  by  conferring  on  it  the  power  to  quickly 
assemble  and  transfer  its  forces  to  repel  assaults;  it  would  be  second 
in  importance  only  to  the  road  to  the  Missouri  river,  and  is  well 
worthy  of  government  aid  should  the  people  of  that  State  decide  to 
build  it. 

INCREASE  OP  ARMS. 

6.  The  events  of  the  late  Russian  and  Austrian  wars,  as  well  as 
those  of  our  own,   reveal  to  us  in  a  striking  light  the  necessity  of  a 
decided  increase  of  the  capacity  of  the  several  navy  yards,  and  the 
establishment  of  one  upon  the  lakes;  the  establishment  of  a  few  first- 
class  arsenals  of  construction  at  points  as  safe   from  hostile  approach 
as  is  the  arsenal  at  Watervliet,  and  yet  accessible  by  both  boats  and 
railroad  alike  from  the  interior,  and  from  each  of  the  several  frontiers; 
a  good  national  foundery,  as  securely  located  and  as  accessible  as  the 
arsenals  of  construction;  another  national  armory,  located  as  above 
described;  a  large  increase  in  the  number,  quality,  weight,  and  range 
of  ordnance  for  arming-  forts  and  vessels;  a  large  increase  in  the 
number,  quality,  and  range  of  our  rifles,  muskets,  carbines,  and  pis- 
tols; an  increased  capacity  of  arsenals  of  repair  and  of  deposit.     A 
marked  increase  in  the  weight  and  range  of  ordnance  made  for  use 
in  fortifications  and  on  shipboard  is  particularly  desirable,  and,  it  is 
thought  by  many  who  have  given  the  subject  much  attention,  is  easily 
attainable.     If  good  twenty-inch  guns  can  be  fabricated,  it  is  seriously 
doubted  whether  ships  can  be  built  which  could  sustain,  for  any  con- 
siderable time,  the  concentrated  fire  of  a  large  fort  armed  with  them. 
Balls  of  a  half  ton  weight,  thrown  with  the  proper  velocity,  several 
striking  at  the  same  moment,  would  probably  soon  destroy  any  vessel 
hitherto  devised.     Special  experiments  with  this  class  of  ordnance, 
and  with  improved  projectiles,  should  be  authorized  by  Congress. 
The  knowledge  which  our  officers  on  land  and  sea  are  now  gaining 
relative  to  the  power  and  value  of  the  several  classes  of  improved 
ordnance,  specially   qualifies  them  to  pass   upon  the  merits  of  rival 
guns  and  projectiles  very  intelligently.     They  have  passed  from  the 
theories  of  the  closet  to  the  practical  tests  of  the  battle-field,  and 
will  return  with  matured  opinions  as  to  the  actual  value  of  the  several 
leading  features  which  distinguish  the  best  of  the  new  inventions. 
Solid  progress  has  been  made,  and  we  must  avail  ourselves  of  it  in  all 
that  we  do  hereafter.     Not  a  gun  should  be  made,  nor  a  ship  nor  a 
fortification  built,  but  in  strict  accordance  with  the  rules  of  the  mili- 
tary art,  as  modified  by  the  recent  revelations  of  experience.     All 
else  is  waste. 

MILITARY  AND  NAVAL  OFFICERS. 

7.  In  addition  to  the  construction  of  fortifications  and  ships  and 
the  accumulation  of  approved  arms  and  of  munitions  of  war,   we 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  17 

must,  to  insure  successful  defence,  secure  an  unfailing  supply  of 
scientific  and  thoroughly  trained  officers.  In  this  respect  it  would 
be  neither  creditable  nor  safe  to  fall  behind  any  other  nation.  The 
advantages  flowing  from  placing  fleets  and  armies  under  an  intelligent 
direction  need  not  be  enumerated  to  an  American  Congress  nor  to 
the  American  people.  The  only  question  is,  how  large  a  number 
ought  to  be  educated  in  the  best  manner  for  the  naval  and  military 
service  ?  This  is  a  difficult  question  to  answer.  It  may,  however, 
safely  be  affirmed,  in  general  terms,  that  twice  as  many  as  we  have 
heretofore  educated  will  be  wanted  hereafter.  The  casualties  have 
to  be  taken  into  account.  They  cannot  be  avoided.  We  deplore 
the  deaths  and  injuries  and  regret  the  resignations  of  accomplished 
and  useful  officers:  the  loss  by  resignation  is,  however,  partially  com- 
pensated by  the  consequent  benefits  to  manufactures  and  commerce 
and  by  the  formation  of  a  valuable  reserve.  Nearly  all  officers  who 
resign  do  so  to  enter  the  service  of  railroad  and  steamship  companies 
or  other  important  concerns,  which  enrich  and  strengthen  the  gov- 
ernment. In  these  resigned  officers  the  United  States  possess  a 
valuable  reserve  or  surplus,  from  which  to  draw  supplies  of  educated 
officers  in  times  of  war.  The  availability  and  military  value  of  this 
reserve  was  demonstrated  in  the  Mexican  as  well  as  in  the  present 
war.  The  moment  their  country  needed  their  services,  large  numbers 
of  these  resigned  officers  came  forward  with  alacrity  to  serve  the 
country  which  had  educated  them  for  its  military  purposes.  In  their 
retirement  many  had  organized  and  trained  volunteer  corps ;  when 
the  war  broke  out  they  had  acquired  an  influence  which  enabled  them 
to  easily  organize  large  volunteer  forces,  which  they  promptly  led  to 
the  field.  As  in  the  past  it  has  ever  been  thus,  it  is  reasonable  to 
believe  it  will  be  so  in  the  future.  The  frequency  of  resignation 
should  not,  therefore,,  deter  us  from  adhering  to  our  system,  though 
this  evil  may  call  for  preventives  in  certain  possible  contingencies. 

Before  leaving  this  subject  of  securing  for  the  United  States  edu- 
cated naval  and  military  talent  for  the  direction  of  our  forces  by  sea 
and  land,  your  committee  will  take  occasion  to  remark  that  the  grow- 
ing opinion  in  favor  of  allowing  parents  and  guardians  to  educate 
young  men  of  promising  talents  at  the  United  States  Military  and 
Naval  Academies,  at  their  own  expense,  seems  to  be  worthy  of  con- 
sideration. As  now  constituted,  no  citizen  is  permitted  to  educate 
his  son  or  ward  at  these  academies,  however  willing  he  may  be  to  de- 
fray the  entire  expense,  and  that  the  pupil  shall  in  all  respects  con- 
form to  all  their  rules  and  requirements,  unless  so  fortunate  as  to  ob- 
tain for  him  one  of  the  few  appointments  allowed  by  law.  An  able 
corps  of  officers,  of  all  grades,  and  of  both  arms  of  the  service,  is 
now  being  practically  educated  in  the  military  art ;  their  schooling  is 
conducted  in  the  field  and  on  the  sea  in  the  actual  presence  of  the 
enemy  ;  their  lessons  are  explained  and  demonstrated  by  frequent 
practical  examples  of  the  most  varied  and  instructive  character,  well 
calculated  to  fit  them  to  cope,  should  it  ever  become  necessary,  with 
the  leaders  of  the  armies  of  any  nations.  But,  in  the  course  of  na- 
ture, these  in  a  few  years  will  have  passed  away,  and  year  by  year 
H.  Rep.  Com.  86 2 


18  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

should  be  succeeded  by  young  men  well  qualified  by  a  thorough  pre- 
paratory training  to  take  their  places  ;  as  now  constituted,  the  two 
academies  are  unable  to  prepare  the  number  which  will  be  required 
by  the  future  exigencies  of  the  army  and  navy.  They  will  be  unable, 
inasmuch  as  commercial  men.  manufacturers,  mechanical  establish- 
ments, and  railroads,  as  the  business  and  wealth  of  the  country  ex- 
pand, will  make  increasing  demands  upon  educated  talent  ;  and  the 
better  we  prepare  cadets  for  duty  the  sharper  will  be  the  competi- 
tion against  the  government ;  the  abler  our  officers  the  more  attrac- 
tive will  be  the  inducements  held  out  to  them  to  exchange  the  public 
for  private  employment. 

Severe  legislative  enactments  will  not  remedy  the  evil,  but  an  in- 
creased supply  will.  To  this  latter  remedy  must  we  resort  if  we 
would  maintain  the  present  high  character  of  our  officers  for  scientific 
military  attainments.  The  committee,  therefore,  recommend  that 
another  military  academy  be  established,  to '  be  located  in  the  west, 
and  another  naval  academy  be  established,  to  be  located  in  the  north- 
east, or  that  the  capacity  of  the  present  establishments  be  enlarged, 
and  that  the  President  be  directed  to  submit  to  the  next  Congress 
the  best  plans  for  the  duplication  or  the  enlargement  of  such  institu- 
tions, together  with  estimates  of  cost ;  and  also  that  the  President 
further  report  as  to  the  expediency  of  opening  to  both  classes  of  ca- 
dets, as  well  those  who  shall  be  appointed  under  the  present  sys- 
tem and  those  who  may  be  educated  at  those  institutions  at  the  ex- 
pense of  their  parents  and  guardians,  the  opportunity  of  obtaining 
commissions  in  the  army  and  navy  at  the  end  of  their  academical  ca- 
reer by  requiring  a  certain  standard  of  merit  to  entitle  either  to  enter 
the  service  as  officers. 

8.  To  place  the  United  States  in  a  good  condition  of  defence  we 
must  also  constitute  and  maintain  an  army  and  navy  entirely  sufficient 
in  numbers  and  excellence,  in  personnel  and  materiel,  to  command  the 
respect  of  other  nations — a  respect  based  upon  a  consciousness  of  our 
being  prepared  to  promptly  punish  wanton  aggression. 

Hitherto,  instead  of  having  an  army  respectable  for  its  size,  it  had 
been  made  so  unpopular  (by  artful  appeals  to  our  national  dislike  to 
maintain  large  fleets  and  armies)  as  to  resist  all  efforts  to  increase  our 
military  strength  to  an  extent  equal  to  our  actual  wants,  that  traitors 
were  able  to  commence,  and  actually  did  commence  a  rebellion  at  a 
time  when  the  government  had  scarcely  one  thousand  soldiers  east  of 
the  Mississippi  river,  amid  a  population  of  more  than  twenty-five 
millions.  Forts  seemed  to  have  been  built  for  ornamental  rather 
than  useful  purposes.  The  idea  that  one  of  the  chief  objects  of 
establishing  the  Union  was  to  '  'insure  domestic  tranquility, ' '  had  come 
to  be  considered  a  "glittering  generality,"  quite  inconsistent  with 
State  rights.  The  stirring  events  and  trials  of  the  past  twelve 
months  have,  at  a  cost  of  rivers  of  blood  and  a  thousand  millions  of 
dollars,  thoroughly  dispelled  these  wretched  but  once  popular  delu- 
sions. We  now  clearly  see  how  wise  were  the  earnest  recommenda- 
tions of  our  military  authorities.  Had  they  been  heeded  in  1836, 
when  the* treasury  was  so  full  that  Congress  deemed  it  proper  to  di- 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  19" 

vide  a  considerable  portion  of  the  public  moneys  among  the  several 
States,  the  present  rebellion  probably  had  not  occurred.  We  should 
have  had  two  forts  where  we  now  have  one  ;  the  cost  of  all  would 
have  been  but  about  thirty-one  million  five  hundred  thousand  dollars 5 
their  peace  garrisons  would  have  been  five  thousand  nine  hundred' 
and  forty  soldiers  ;  their  war  garrisons  sixty-three  thousand  three' 
hundred  and  ninety-one.  With  our  forts  garrisoned,  traitors  would 
have  forborne  from  engaging  in  war  ;  but  if  otherwise,  how  readily 
could  they  have  been  seized.  How  small  the  cost  of  the  defences; 
how  small  the  cost  of  maintaining  the  garrisons,  compared  with  our 
present  expenditures. 

To  protect  our  immense  interior  territories  against  the  numerous 
Indian  tribes  who  roam  over  them  is  a  work  equal  to  the  utmost 
efforts  of  our  present  regular  forces,  and  more  than  they  have  hitherto 
been  able  properly  to  perform.  An  increase  of  the  regular  army  to 
an  extent  adequate  to  the  proper  garrisoning  of  our  frontier  defences, 
under  the  revised  estimates  which  have  become  necessary,  is  there- 
fore a  military  necessity  which  cannot  be  prudently  overlooked  nor 
neglected  by  Congress.  On  this  point  a  careful  estimate  should  be 
required  from  an  able  board  of  engineers  of  more  than  usual  experi- 
ence. The  preservation  of  peace  with  foreign  nations  is  not  a  greater 
blessing  than  the  maintenance  of  domestic  tranquillity  ;  and  the  main- 
tenance of  a  well  appointed  army  and  navy,  suitable  to  our  necessi- 
ties and  our  means,  will  powerfully  aid  us  in  the  preservation  of  both. 

Similar  views  naturally  present  themselves  in  relation  to  a  judicious 
increase  of  the  navy,  and  a  report  thereon  should  be  provided  for  at 
an  early  day;  much  of  its  present  force  is  entirely  temporary,  and 
will  disappear  with  the  occasion  which  demanded  its  accumulation, 
leaving  the  nation  with  a  navy  quite  inadequate  to  our  wants. 

Your  committee  have  endeavored  to  show,  at  some  length,  that  our 
frontier  defences  are  defective,  and  should  therefore  be  either  im- 
proved or  superseded,  so  as  to  afford  protection  of  a  character  upon 
which  we  can  rely.  It  has  been  urged  that  as  our  defences,  com- 
pared with  those  of  other  nations,  are  respectable,  and  the  great 
mass  of  our  people  ardently  love  peace,  and  therefore  in  this  age  of 
rapidly  advancing  civilization  not  likely  to  provoke  enmities  in  the 
breasts  of  reasonable  people  to  the  extent  of  hostilities,  why,  in  this 
time  of  heavy  taxation,  insist  upon  entering  upon  the  work  of  con- 
structing extensive  and  costly  defences  ?  Why  insist  upon  our  acting 
as  though  other  nations  were  actuated  only  by  a  spirit  of  rapine  and 
conquest  ? 

Your  committee  are  not  insensible  to  the  ameliorating  influences 
which  advancing  Christianity  and  civilization  are  steadily  and  bene- 
ficently working  among  the  leading  nations  of  our  age.  But  prudence 
forbids  us  to  be  blind  to  the  influences  which  ambition  and  com- 
mercial and  manufacturing  rivalry  still  exert  upon  the  minds  of  those 
who  control  the  great  governments  of  the  earth.  What  is  the  ex- 
ample set  us  by  the  enterprising  and  highly  enlightened  neighbor 
upon  whose  border  we  have  recommended  expensive  works  of  de- 
fence ?  What  mean  the  extensive  and  costly  naval  depots  at  Bermuda 


20  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

and  Halifax — the  opening  of  an  expensive  and  fortified  channel  for 
her  iron-clad  vessels  into  the  lakes  upon  our  defenceless  northern 
frontier  ?  If  in  the  history  of  Great  Britain  nothing  can  be  found  to 
justify  the  supposition  that  she  is  likely  to  make  Canada  an  inde- 
pendency, and  thus  give  us  a  weak  neighbor  against  the  possible  ag- 
gressions of  whom  it  would  not  be  seemly  to  strongly  guard,  it  might 
be  proper  to  disregard  the  wise  maxims  of  ages  and  leave  our  north- 
ern frontier  in  its  present  defenceless  and  exposed  condition.  But  if, 
on  the  contrary,  the  whole  world  believes  Great  Britian  seeks  to  in- 
crease instead  of  lessening  her  dominions,  and,  in  the  event  of  war, 
would  vigorously  defend  them,  then  it  becomes  us,  like  other  nations, 
to  put  our  frontiers  into  a  condition  of  security  more  in  accordance 
with  the  dictates  of  good  sense  and  a  sound  military  policy. 

The  friendship  existing  between  England  and  France  has  been 
more  intimate  and  co-operative  during  the  past  ten  years  than  proba- 
bly it  has  been  before  in  several  centuries.  They  have  united  in 
levying  war  against  Russia,  against  China,  and  against  Mexico;  and 
to  increase  their  intimacy  have  even  changed  the  tariff  systems  of  the 
respective  countries.  Yet  never,  in  ten  centuries,  had  the  channel 
between  them  been  so  carefully  studded  with  fortifications,  located 
and  built  so  regardful  of  military  science,  so  regardless  of  cost,  as 
during  the  past  ten  years.  Each  has  also  vied  with  the  other  in 
building  improved  and  novel  ships-of-war,  more  formidable  than  the 
world  ever  saw  before;  and  each  has  maintained  armies  at  home  and 
abroad,  the  soldiers  of  which  are  enumerated  only  by  hundreds  of 
thousands.  Such  is  friendship  among  the  most  highly  civilized  na- 
tions of  this  age,  even  when  it  assumes  the  form  of  intimacy.  As  in 
the  event  of  a  martial  contest  between  other  nations  each  of  these 
allies  would  unhesitatingly  pursue  the  path  indicated  by  its  national 
interest,  wheresoever  that  might  chance  to  lead,  they  may  be  said  to 
be  never  out  of  danger  of  collision.  Hence,  like  their  ships,  they 
are  ever  clad  in  armor;  and  each  of  them  seems  to  be  of  opinion  that 
the  more  complete  the  armor  of  both  the  more  likely  is  peace  to  be 
maintained,  and  the  more  likely  is  their  friendship  to  continue  inti- 
mate and  cordial.  To  keep  the  peace,  each  of  these  intimate  friends, 
instead  of  relying  on  the  civilization  and  Christianity  which  so  em- 
inently distinguish  their  people,  has  constructed  powerful  fortifica- 
tions, built  many  ships,  and  raised  and  maintained  many  soldiers, 
ready  to  fight  at  a  moment's  notice.  How  amazing  the  capacity  arid 
completeness  of  the  French  arsenals  of  construction  !  The 'British 
navy  yards  are  bewildering  in  their  immensity !  The  mere  barracks, 
hospitals,  and  storehouses  of  these  nations  have  been  erected  at  a 
cost  equal  to  that  of  all  our  fortifications  on  five  thousand  miles  of 
coast. 

Such  is  the  practice  among  the  wisest  nations  of  our  times,  and 
your  committee  consider  that  it  would  be  exceedingly  dangerous  to 
disregard  it,  and  weakly  allow  a  powerful  and  litigious  neighbor  ad- 
vantages against  which  good  sense  revolts.  We  must  make  available, 
at  an  early  day,  advantages  of  a  corresponding  value.  Instead  of  in- 
dolently repining  at  that  enterprise  which  has  opened  to  British  fleets 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  21' 

an  exclusive  and  a  fortified  channel  into  the  entire  chain  of  the  great 
North  American  lakes,  thus  uncovering  our  extended  northern  fron- 
tier, the  United  States  must  unhesitatingly  imitate  the  spirited  exam- 
ple. So,  also,  if  a  revolution  in  the  art  of  protecting  ships  against 
the  effect  of  shot  renders  our  forts  inadequate  to  the  duty  for  which 
they  were  designed,  instead  of  sitting  down  to  bewail  our  misfortune, 
or  halting  to  consider  whether  nations  have  not  become  so  good  and 
so  just  as  to  be  hereafter  incapable  of  doing  us  a  wrong,  we  must  en- 
large and  strengthen  our  works,  and  face  them  with  iron.  Good 
armor  and  upright  dealing  united  are  well  calculated  to  make  nations 
friends.  It  was  well  said,  at  an  early  day,  by  our  engineers,  that — 

"  Neither  our  geographical  position,  nor  our  forbearance,  nor  the  equity  of  our  policy, 
can  always  avail  under  the  relation  in  which  it  is  our  destiny  to  stand  to  the  rest  of  the 
world.  We  are  admonished  by  history  to  bear  in  mind  that  war  cannot  at  all  times  be 
avoided,  however  specific  and  forbearing  our  policy  ;  and  that  nothing  will  conduce  more 
to  an  uninterrupted  peace  than  that  state  of  preparation  which  exposes  no  weak  point  to 
the  hostility,  and  offers  no  gratification  to  the  cupidity,  of  the  other  nations  of  the  earth." 

Credulity,  procrastination,  and  helplessness,  have  ruined  many  na- 
tions as  well  as  individuals.  We  must  not  only  perceive  and  recog- 
nize what  is  proper  and  judicious  to  place  our  system  of  frontier  de- 
fences in  a  condition  calculated  to  insure  our  safety  and  independence, 
but  must  seriously  and  perseveringly  act  in  earnest  accordance  with 
our  matured  opinions.  Congress  must  not  only  make  appropriations, 
but  make  them  at  the  suitable  times,  and  in  sufficient  amounts;  to  be 
most  effective,  appropriations  must  be  not  only  adequate,  but  also 
timely  and  consecutive;  else,  idle  hands  and  waste  of  materials  will 
result,  as  heretofore,  in  unnecessary  losses.  In  the  construction  of 
sjnps  and  fortifications  delays  increase  their  cost.  Forethought  and 
promptitude,  faithfulness  and  integrity,  will,  at  an  early  day,  at  a 
reasonable  cost,  call  into  existence  admirable  defences,  of  the  excel- 
lence of  which  our  nation  will  be  proud. 

The  committee  report  herewith  several  bills  intended  to  carry  out 
such  of  their  recommendations  as  have  not  already  been  brought  be- 
fore the  House  by  this  and  its  other  committees,  and  ask  for  their 
recommendations  such  consideration  as  the  importance  of  the  subject 
demands. 


22  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


APPENDIX. 


No.  1. 

EXTRACT   FROM   A  REPORT   MADE   IN    1840  TO  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  BY 
THE   BOARD   OF   ENGINEERS  OF  THE   UNITED   STATES   ARMY. 

"  Means  of  obstructing  entrances  to  harbors. 

"  This  brings  us  to  consider  a  third  class,  consisting  of  establishments  of 
importance  situated  at  a  distance  up  some  river  or  bay,  there  being  intermediate 
space  too  wide  to  be  commanded  from  the  shores.  In  such  cases  the  defence 
must  be  concentrated  upon  the  narrow  passes,  and  must,  of  course,  be  apportioned 
in  armament  to  the  value  of  the  objects  covered.  When  the  value  is  not  very 
great,  a  stout  array  of  batteries  at  the  best  positions  would  deter  an  enemy  from 
an  attempt  to  force  the  passage,  since  his  advantage,  in  case  of  success,  would 
not  be  commensurate  with  any  imminent  risk.  But  with  the  more  valuable 
establishments  it  might  be  otherwise ;  the  consequence  of  success  might  justify 
all  the  risk  to  be  encountered  in  rapidly  passing  in  face  of  batteries,  however 
powerful.  This  condition  of  things  requires  peculiar  precaution  under  any  system 
of  defence.  If  after  having  occupied  the  shores,  in  the  narrow  places,  in  the 
best  manner,  with  batteries,  we  are  of  opinion  that  the  temptation  may  induce 
the  enemy,  notwithstanding,  to  run  tlie  gauntlet,  the  obstruction  of  the  channel 
must  be  resorted  to.  By  this  is  not  meant  the  permanent  obstruction  of  the 
passage;  such  a  resort,  besides  the  great  expense,  might  entail  the  ruin  of  the 
channel.  The  obstruction  is  meant  to  be  the  temporary  closing  by  heavy 
floating  masses. 

"There  is  no  doubt  that  a  double  line  of  rafts,  each  raft  being  of  large  size, 
and  anchored  with  strong  chains,  would  make  it  impossible  to  pass  without  first 
removing  some  of  the  obstructions,  and  it  might  clearly  be  made  impossible  to 
effect  this  removal  under  the  fire  of  the  batteries.  Such  obstructions  need  not 
be  resorted  to  until  the  breaking  out  of  a  war,  as  they  could  then  be  speedily 
formed,  should  the  preparation  of  the  enemy  be  of  a  threatening  nature. 

"  There  would  be  nothing  in  these  obstructions  inconsistent  with  our  use  of 
part  of  the  channel,  since  two  or  three  of  the  rafts  might  be  kept  out  of  line, 
ready  to  move  into  their  places  at  an  hour's  notice. 

"The  greatest  danger  to  which  these  obstructions  would  be  exposed  would 
be  from  explosive  vessels,  and  from  these  they  might  be  protected  by  a  boom 
or  a  line  of  smaller  rafts  in  front. 

"From  what  has  just  been  said  it  will  be  perceived  that,  when  the  induce- 
ments are  such  as  to  bring  the  enemy  forward  in  great  power,  and  efficient 
batteries  can  be  established  only  at  certain  points,  we  are  not  then  to  rely  on 
them  exclusively.  In  such  a  case,  the  enemy  should  be  stopped  by  some 
physical  impediments ;  and  the  batteries  must  be  strong  enough  to  prevent  his 
removing  these  impediments,  and  also  to  prevail  in  a  cannonade,  should  the 
enemy  undertake  to  silence  the  works. 

"The  conditions  these  obstructions  have  to  fulfil  are  these: 

"  1st.  They  must  be  of  a  nature  to  be  fixed  readily,  and  to  be   speedily  re-" 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  23 

moved  when  there  is  no  longer  occasion  for  them,  and  to  this  end  they  must  be 
afloat. 

"2d.  They  must  have  adequate  inertia  to  resist,. or  rather  not  to  be  destroyed 
or  displaced  by  the  shock  of  the  heaviest  ship ;  and  in  order  to  this  they  must 
be  held  by  the  heaviest  and  strongest  cables  and  anchors. 

"  3d.  They  must  be  secure  from  the  effects  of  explosive  vessels ;  and,  if  in 
danger  from  this  source,  must  be  covered  as  above  mentioned.  We  don't  say 
what  are  the  exact  circumstances  in  which  all  these  conditions  will  be  fulfilled, 
though  we  think  the  idea  long  ago  presented  by  the  board  of  engineers  will, 
with  modifications,  embrace  them  all. 

"  The  idea  is  this :  Suppose  a  line  (extending  across  the  channel)  of  rafts, 
separated  from  each  other  by  a  space  less  than  the  breadth  of  a  ship-of-war, 
each  raft  being  about  90  feet  long,  30  feet  wide  and  6  feet  deep,  formed  of 
strong  timbers,  crossed  and  braced  in  all  directions,  and  fastened  together  in  the 
strongest  manner.  A  long-scope  chain  cable  is  to  proceed  from  each  of  the 
four  corners,  two  obliquely  up  stream,  and  two  obliquely  down  stream,  to  very 
heavy  anchors ;  and  there  should  also  be  a  very  strong  chain  cable  passing  from 
one  raft  to  another.  Suppose  a  ship  striking  one  of  the  rafts  to  break  the 
chains  leading  down  the  stream ;  in  doing  this,  she  must  lose  much  of  her  mo- 
mentum. She  has  then  *  under  her  forefoot'  the  raft,  connected  by  a  strong 
chain  with  the  rafts  to  the  right  and  left ;  on  being  tightened,  this  chain  will 
throw  the  strain  upon  the  down-stream  cable  of  that  adjoining  raft  towards 
which  the  ship  happens  to  tend.  If  we  suppose  it  possible  for  these  chains  also 
to  be  parted  by  the  power  still  remaining  in  the  ship  or  by  impulses  received 
from  succeeding  vessels,  there  will  be  other  chains  still  to  break  in  the  same 
way.  After  the  down- stream  chains  are  all  parted,  the  rafts  will  '  bring  up'  in 
anew  position  (higher  up  the  channel)  by  the  anchors  that,  in  the  first  instance, 
were  pointed  up  stream.  Here  a  resistance,  precisely  like  that  just  overcome,  is 
to  be  encountered  by  vessels  that  have  lost  more  of  their  force  in  breaking  the 
successive  chains,  and  in  pushing  these  great  masses  of  timber  before  them 
through  the  water.  Should  there  exist  a  doubt  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  these 
remaining  anchors  and  chains,  or  should  it  be  deemed  most  prudent  to  leave 
nothing  uncertain,  a  second  similar  line  may  be  placed  a  short  distance  above 
the  first. 

"  The  best  proportions  and  dimensions  of  the  rafts  remain  to  be  determined, 
but  as  there  is  scarcely  a  limit  to  the  strength  that  may  be  given  to  the  rafts 
themselves,  and  to  the  means  by  which  they  are  to  be  held  to  their  position 
and  to  each  other,  the  success  of  a  well-arranged  obstruction  of  this  sort  can 
hardly  be  doubted. 

"  The  expense  would  not  be  great  in  the  first  instance,  and  all  the  materials 
would  be  available  for  other  purposes  when  no  longer  needed  for  this." 


No.  2. 
[Ho.  REPS.,  Ex.  Doc.  No.  153,  19iH  CONGRESS,  Isr  SESSION.] 

REVISED  REPORT  OF  THE  BOARD  OF  ENGINEERS  ON  THE  DEFENCE  OF  THE 

SEABOARD. 

WASHINGTON,  March  24,  1826. 

SIR  :  In  the  report  now  respectfully  submitted,  in  compliance  with  the  order 
of  the  engineer  department  of  the  25th  ultimo,  the  board  of  engineers  have  at- 
tempted to  enforce  all  those  leading  principles  which  relate  to  the  defence  of  the 
maritime  frontier  of  the  United  States.  In  doing  this,  in  describing  briefly  the 
several  sections  of  the  coast,  and  in  applying  those  principles  to  the  local  pecu- 


24  FORTI  ICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

liarities  thus  developed,  the  board  have  been  unavoidably  led  to  a  repetition  of 
much  that  is  contained  in  their  previous  reports.  The  tenor  of  the  order  under 
which  this  report  has  been  drawn  will,  however,  cover  this  objection,  if  it  be 
one,  while  the  report  will  have  the  decided  advantage  of  presenting  the  promi- 
nent features  of  the  whole  subject  from  a  single  point  of  view,  and  serving  at 
the  same  time  as  an  index  to  the  minute  details  comprehended  in  previous  com- 
munications. 

The  following  is  a  copy  of  the  order  above  referred  to  : 

"  ENGINEER  DEPARTMENT, 
"  Washington,  February  25,  1826. 

"  GENTLEMEN  :  As  much  information  with  regard  to  the  maritime  frontier 
has  been  obtained  since  the  report  of  the  board  of  February  7,  1821,  was  made, 
it  is  the  desire  of  the  Secretary  of  War  that  a  revision  of  that  report  and  a  new 
examination  of  the  subject  of  the  defence  of  the  seaboard,  including  the  Floridasr 
which  have  since  been  added  to  the  Union,  should  be  undertaken,  with  a  view 
to  the  classification  of  the  several  works,  including  those  which  have  been  con- 
structed and  those  which  will  probably  be  necessary  to  be  constructed,  and  also- 
stating  what  works  may  be  included  in  the  general  system  which  were  con- 
structed before  the  formation  of  the  board. 

"  It  is  desirable  that  the  report  be  as  full  and  explicit  as  possible,  setting  forth 
the  size,  number  of  guns,  garrisons  for  peace  and  war,  cost,  objects  to  be  de- 
fended, and  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  their  position  in  a  military  and 
commercial  point  of  view ;  the  militia  that  may  be  assembled  within  a  reason- 
able time  for  assisting  in  the  defence  of  the  several  positions,  and  including,  in 
general,  everything  that  is  worthy  of  consideration  in  the  general  estimate  of  the 
defence  of  the  seaboard  and  country  adjacent  or  dependent  thereon. 
"  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  gentlemen,  &c., 

"ALEX.  MACOMB, 
"Major  General,  Chief  Engineer. 

"To  General  BERNARD  and  Colonel  TOTTEN, 
"  Board  of  Engineers" 

The  United  States,  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  world  by  an  ocean  on  one 
hand  and  a  vast  wilderness  on  the  other,  pursuing  towards  all  nations  a  policy 
strikingly  characterized  by  its  pacific  tendency,  its  impartiality  and  justice ; 
contracting  no  political  alliances  ;  confining  her  intercourse  with  the  rest  of  the 
world  rigidly  to  the  letter  of  such  temporary  arrangements  as  are  dictated  by 
reciprocal  commercial  interests,  might  at  first  view  be  regarded  as  too  remote 
physically,  and  as  politically  too  insulated,  to  be  endangered  by  the  convulsions 
which  from  time  to  time  disturb  the  nations  of  the  earth. 

Neither  our  geographical  position,  however,  nor  our  forbearance,  nor  the  equity 
of  our  policy,  can  always  avail  us  under  the  relation  in  which  it  is  our  destiny 
to  starkl  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  . 

The  experience  of  the  last  quarter  of  a  century  has  shown  that  even  the  in- 
tercourse of  traffic,  much  as  it  conduces  to  our  prosperity,  and  which  we  might 
expect  would  cease  altogether  so  soon  as  it  ceased  to  be  mutually  advantageous, 
can  be  indulged  only  at  the  risk  of  obliging  the  nation  occasionally  to  assume  a 
belligerent  attitude,  and  of  surrendering  to  the  spirit  of  contention — which  seems 
to  govern  nations  as  it  does  the  natural  man — a  portion  of  its  fruits.  The  cer- 
tainty of  the  return  of  periods  of  embarrassment  and  strife,  similar  in  their  origin 
to  that  which  not  long  since  visited  the  nation,  affords  a  sufficient  reason  of 
itself  for  securing  ourselves  in  the  best  manner  against  the  more  serious  evils  of 
these  unavoidable  collisions. 

But  the  relation  in  which  this  nation  stands,  a  s  agreat  and  flourishing  republic, 
to  the  monarchies  of  the  transatlantic  world,  is  in  fact  the  hostile  array  of  liberty 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  25 

against  despotism.  A  separating  ocean,  while  it  has  hitherto  prevented  a  warfare 
in  which  we  must  necessarily  have  been  one  of  the  parties,  has  not  prevented  the 
conflict  of  sentiment,  nor  retarded  the  march  of  liberal  principles.  The  gov- 
ernments of  Europe  contend  with  each  other  no  longer.  The  personal  ambition 
of  kings  ;  the  desire  of  territorial  aggrandizement,  of  augmenting  national  wealth ; 
the  gratification  of  national  vanity ;  in  short,  every  motive  which  would  once 
suffice  to  deluge  the  earth  with  blood,  is  now  effectually  restrained  under  the 
conviction  of  impending  danger,  common  and  imminent.  The  obvious  interest 
the  coalesced  governments  have  in  destroying  or  poisoning  the  source  whence 
all  those  principles  adverse  to  their  supremacy  have  flowed,  and  in  demonstra- 
ting, by  our  disasters,  or  our  ruin,  the  inefficiency  of  a  popular  government,  af- 
fords good  ground  for  an  argument  in  favor  of  our  assuming  a  defensive  attitude,, 
not  only  precautionary  with  reference  to  our  security,  but  as  the  most  certain 
prevention  to  hostile  intention. 

The  progress  of  illumination  abroad,  depending,  as  it  must,  on  the  actual  state 
of  preparation  of  the  public  mind,  and  on  the  character  of  the  people — on  both 
of  which  the  several  nations  of  Europe  differ  more  even  than  in  their  language — * 
must  be  irregular  and  unequal.  Hence  the  contest  for  freedom  will  be  raging 
with  violence  in  one  quarter,  before  the  people  of  another  shall  have  fully  com- 
prehended the  subject  of  contention,  much  less  have  understood  its  necessity. 
These  partial  contests — attended  by  vacillating  success — protracted  because 
they  are  partial — producing  a  complication  of  interests  and  alliances,  diversify- 
ing and  adding  new  excitements  to  our  commercial  engagements — enlisting  on 
one  side  all  our  sympathies — causing  us  to  be  regarded  by  the  other  with  a  sus- 
picion even  provoking  to  hostility — can  only  produce  a  state  of  things  more  em- 
barrassing than  any  this  nation  has  yet  witnessed. 

And  while  a  participation,  more  or  less  intimate,  in  the  activity  of  that  pro- 
tracted struggle,  cannot  be  avoided,  it  becomes  us  to  be  prepared,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, both  to  avert  the  calamities  and  improve  the  blessings  which  may  result. 

The  subject  of  our  relations  with  other  countries  in  reference  to  the  cause 
of  war  which  may  grow  out  of  them,  is  full  of  interest  to  the  people  of  this 
country,  and  deserves  a  more  profound  and  detailed  examination.  With  the 
preceding  brief  remarks,  however,  naturally  suggesting  themselves  on  ap- 
proaching the  subject  of  the  defence  of  the  country,  and  bearing  in  mind  that 
war  cannot  at  all  times  be  avoided,  however  pacific  and  forebearing  our  policy, 
and  that  nothing  will  conduce  more  to  an  uninterrupted  peace  than  that  state 
of  preparation  which  exposes  no  weak  point  to  the  hostility,  and  offers  no  grati- 
fication to  the  cupidity,  of  the  other  nations  of  the  earth,  we  proceed  to  consider 
the  means  and  the  mode  of  the  defensive  system  which  it  is  for  the  interest  of 
the  United  States  to  adopt. 

The  means  of  defence  for  the  seaboard  of  the  United  States  constituting  a 
system  may  be  classed  as  follows :  first,  a  navy ;  second,  fortification ;  third,, 
interior  communications  by  land  and  water ;  and,  fourth,  a  regular  army  and 
well-organized  militia. 

The  navy  must  be  provided  with  suitable  establishments  for  construction  and 
repair,  stations,  harbors  of  rendezvous,  and  ports. of  refuge — all  secured  by  forti- 
fications, defended  by  regular  troops  and  militia,  and  supplied  with  men  and 
materials  by  the  lines  of  intercommunication.  Being  the  only  species  of  offen- 
sive force  compatible  with  our  political  institutions,  it  will  then  be  prepared  to 
act  the  great  part  which  its  early  achievements  have  promised,  and  to  which  its 
high  destiny  will  lead. 

Fortifications  must  close  all  important  harbors  against  an  enemy,  and  secure 
them  to  our  military  and  commercial  marine ;  second,  must  deprive  an  enemy 
of  all  strong  positions  where,  protected  by  naval  superiority,  he  might  fix  per- 
manent quarters  in  our  territory,  maintain  himself  during  the  war,  and  keep  the 
whole  frontier  in  perpetual  alarm ;  third,  must  cover  the  great  cities  from  at- 


26  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

tack ;  fourth,  must  prevent,  as  far  as  practicable,  the  great  avenues  of  interior 
navigation  from  being  blockaded  at  their  entrances  into  the  ocean ;  fifth,  must 
cover  the  coastwise  and  interior  navigation  by  closing  the  harbors  and  the  several 
inlets  from  the  sea  which  intersect  the  lines  of  communication,  and  thereby 
further  aid  the  navy  in  protecting  the  navigation  of  the  country ;  and,  sixth, 
must  protect  the  great  naval  establishments. 

Interior  communications  will  conduct  with  certainty  the  necessary  supplies  of 
all  sorts  to  the  stations,  harbors  of  refuge,  and  rendezvous,  and  the  establish- 
ments for  construction  and  repair  for  the  use  both  of  the  fortifications  and  the 
navy ;  will  greatly  facilitate  and  expedite  the  concentration  of  military  force  and 
the  transfer  of  troops  from  one  point  to  another ;  insure  to  these  also  unfailing 
supplies  of  every  description,  and  will  preserve  unimpaired  the  interchange  of 
domestic  commerce  even  during  periods  of  the  most  active  external  warfare. 

The  army  and  militia,  together  with  the  marine,  constitute  the  vital  principle 
of  the  system. 

From  this  sketch  it  is  apparent  that  our  system  of  defence  is  composed  of 
elements  whose  numerous  reciprocal  relations  with  each  other  and  with  the 
whole  constitute  its  excellence ;  one  element  is  scarcely  more  dependent  on  an- 
other than  the  whole  system  is  on  any  one.  Withdraw  the  navy,  and  the  de- 
fence becomes  merely  passive ;  withdraw  interior  communications  from  the 
system,  and  the  navy  must  cease  in  a  measure  to  be  active  for  want  of  supplies, 
and  the  fortifications  can  offer  but  a  feeble  resistance  for  want  of  timely  rein- 
forcements ;  withdraw  fortifications,  and  there  remains  only  a  scattered  and 
naked  navy. 

That  element  in  the  system  of  defence  to  which  it  is  the  more  immediate  duty 
of  the  board  to  direct  their  attention  in  this  report  is  the  fortification  of  the 
coast.  It  may  not,  therefore,  be  unprofitable,  while  on  this  part  of  the  subject, 
to  go  something  more  into  detail  as  to  the  relation  of  this  with  the  other  members 
of  the  system ;  the  rather,  as  the  reasons  for  some  conclusions  hereafter  to  be 
announced  by  the  board  will  be  more  apparent. 

It  is  necessary  to  observe,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  relation  of  fortifications 
to  the  navy  in  a  defensive  system  is  that  of  a  sheltering,  succoring  power,  while 
the  relation  of  the  latter  to  the  former  is  that  of  an  active  and  powerful  auxiliary ; 
-and  that  the  latter  ceases  to  be  efficient  as  a  member  of  the  system  the  moment 
it  becomes  passive,  and  should  in  no  case  (we  allude  to  the  navy  proper)  be  re- 
lied on  as  a  substitute  for  fortifications.  This  position  may  be  easily  established. 

If  our  navy  be  inferior  to  that  of  the  enemy,  it  can  afford,  of  course,  unaided 
by  fortifications,  but  a  feeble  resistance — single  ships  being  assailed  by  whole 
fleets :  if  it  be  equal,  or  superior,  having  numerous  points  along  an  extended 
frontier  to  protect,  and  being  unable  to  concentrate,  because  ignorartf  of  the  se- 
lected point  of  attack,  every  point  must  be  simultaneously  guarded ;  our  sepa- 
rate squadrons  may  therefore  be  captured  in  detail  by  the  concentrated  fleet  of 
the  attacking  power.  If  we  attempt  to  concentrate  under  an  idea  that  a  favor- 
ite object  of  the  enemy  is  foreseen,  he  will  not  fail  to  push  his  forces  upon  the 
places  thus  left  without  protection.  This  mode  of  defence  is  liable  to  the  fur- 
ther objections  of  being  exposed  to  fatal  disasters,  although  not  engaged  with 
an  enemy ;  and  of  leaving  the  issue  of  conflict  often  to  be  determined  by  acci- 
dent, in  spite  of  all  the  efforts  of  courage  and  skill.  If  it  were  attempted  to 
improve  upon  this  mode,  by  adding  temporary  batteries  and  field  works,  it  would  be 
found  that,  because  being  weak  and  inadequate  from  their  nature,  the  most  suitable 
positions  for  these  works  'must  often  be  neglected  under  a  necessary  condition  of 
the  plan  that  the  ships  themselves  be  defended ;  otherwise  they  must  either  take 
no  part  in  the  contest  or  be  destroyed  by  the  superior  adversary. 

We  pass  over  the  great  comparative  expense  of  such  a  mode  of  defence,  ren- 
dered clearly  apparent  by  a  little  reflection,  with  these  brief  remarks,  viz :  that 
the  defensive  expenditures  by  this  system  will,  in  the  first  instance,  greatly  ex- 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  27 

ceed  the  offensive ;  and  that  these  defences,  being  perishable  in  their  nature,  will 
require  frequent  renewal  and  repairs. 

The  proper  fortification  of  the  coast  preventing  the  possibility  of  a  blockade 
so  strict  as  not  to  offer  frequent  opportunities  for  our  vessels  to  leave  the  har- 
bors, the  navy,  no  longer  needed  for  passive  defence,  will  move  out  upon  its 
proper  theatre  of  action,  though  inferior  to  the  enemy,  with  confidence ;  know- 
ing that,  whether  victorious,  whether  suffering  under  the  violence  of  tempests, 
or  whether  endangered  by  the  vicinity  or  the  pursuit  of  a  superior  force,  they 
can  strike  the  extended  coast  of  their  country,  (avoiding  the  harbors  and  im- 
portant outlets  of  the  country  where  alone  a  blockading  force  may  be  supposed 
to  lie,)  at  numerous  points  where  succor  and  protection  await  them.  Hover- 
ing around  the  flanks  and  rear  of  blockading  fleets,  and  recapturing  their 
prizes,  falling  upon  portions  of  these  fleets,  separated  for  minor  objects,  or  by 
stress  of  weather;  watching  the  movements  of  convoys,  to  capture  strag- 
gling vessels ;  breaking  up  or  restraining  the  enemy's  commerce  in  distant  seas; 
meeting,  by  concert,  at  distant  points,  and  falling  in  mass  upon  his  smaller 
squadrons  or  upon  his  colonial  possessions,  and  even  levying  contributions  in 
the  unprotected  ports ;  blockading  for  a  time  the  narrow  seas,  and  harassing 
the  coasting  commerce  of  the  enemy's  home ; — these  are  objects  which  our  own 
history  shows  may  be  accomplished — although  contending  against  a  nation 
whose  marine  has  never  been  paralleled  as  to  force  and  efficiency,  with  a  navy 
apparently,  as  to  numbers,  insignificant.  Our  own  "history  shows,  besides,  that 
the  reason  why  our  infant  navy  did  not  accomplish  still  more,  was  that  the 
enemy  being  able  to  occupy  unfortified  harbors,  was  enabled  to  enforce  a  block- 
ade so  strict  as  to  confine  a  portion  within  our  waters.  That  this  portion,  in- 
deed that  all,  was  not  captured,  is  to  be  attributed  solely  to  a  respect,  so  misplaced 
that  it  could  only  have  been  the  fruit  of  ignorance,  for  the  then  existing  fortifi- 
cations ;  a  result,  notwithstanding,  amply  compensating  the  nation  for  the  cost 
of  these  works. 

It  would  be  difficult,  nay  impossible,  to  estimate  the  full  value  of  the  results 
following  the  career  of  our  navy,  when  it  shall  have  attained  its  state  of  man- 
hood, under  the  favorable  conditions  heretofore  indicated.  The  blockade  of 
many  and  distant  parts  of  our  coast  will  then  be  impossible,  or  rather  can  then 
only  be  effected  at  enormous  cost,  and  the  risk  of  the  several  squadrons  being 
successively  captured  or  dispersed ;  the  commerce  of  our  adversary  must  be 
nearly  withdrawn  from  the  ocean,  or  it  must  be  convoyed,  not  by  a  few  vessels, 
but  by  powerful  fleets.  In  fine,  the  war,  instead  of  resulting  in  the  conflagra- 
tion or  pillage  of  our  cities  and  towns,  in  the  destruction  of  our  scattered  and 
embayed  navy,  and  the  expensive  establishments  pertaining  to  it,  in  the  inter- 
ruption of  all  commercial  intercourse  between  the  several  sections  of  the  fron- 
tier; in  the  frequent  harassing  and  expensive  assemblage  of  the  militia  forces, 
thereby  greatly  lessening  the  products  of  industry,  and  infusing  amongst  this 
most  valuable  portion  of  our  population  the  fatal  diseases  and  the  demoralizing 
habits  of  a  camp  life ;  in  the  copious  flow  of  blood  which  a  war  raging  at  the 
doors  of  freemen  must  cause ;  and  in  a  natural  despondency,  unavoidably  con- 
sequent, and  leading,  perhaps,  as  a  lesser  evil,  to  the  relinquishment  of  national 
rights: — instead  of  these,  and  the  innumerable  other  evils  attendant  upon  a  con- 
flict within  our  borders,  we  shall  find  the  war  and  all  its  terrors  shut  out  from  our 
territory  by  our  fortresses,  and  transferred  by  our  navy  to  the  bosom  of  the 
ocean,  or  even  to  the  country  of  the  enemy,  should  he,  relying  on  a  different 
system,  have  neglected  to  fortify  the  avenues  by  which  he  is  assailable.  Our 
wars  thus  becoming  maritime,  will  be  less  costly  in  men  and  money,  and  more  in 
unison  with  our  institutions,  leaving  untouched  our  domestic  relations,  our  in- 
dustry, and  our  internal  financial  resources. 

It  is  truly  an  axiom  in  military  science  and  one  fully  illustrated  by  military 
history,  that  the  worst  mode  of  waging  war,  although  strictly  defensive,  is  to 
allow  its  field  of  action  to  be  within  the  borders,  and  that  the  best  is  that  which 


28  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

most  frequently  assumes  an  offensive  attitude.  In  our  case  war  can  only  be  ex- 
cluded from  our  territory  by  fortifications ;  and  we  can  only  assume  the  offen- 
sive through  our  navy.  The  construction  of  the  former  secures  the  means  of 
creating,  equipping,  and  repairing  the  latter,  and  leaves  it  unencumbered  with 
duties  which  it  imperfectly  performs,  to  the  full  exercise  of  its  important  and 
appropriate  functions. 

Since  the  great  improvement  in  the  implements  and  the  tactics  of  armies,  war 
has  cost  less  in  men  and  more  in  money  than  it  did  in  earlier  times.  But  though 
it  is  less  profuse  of  blood  nowadays,  losses  of  this  sort  are  more  severely  felt, 
because  of  the  great  multiplication  of  the  branches  of  productive  industry,  which, 
affording  employment  for  a  greater  proportion  of  the  population,  leaves  a  lesser 
disposable  for  war ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  if  it  is  more  expensive  in  money, 
the  existing  system  of  finance,  founded  on  the  resources  afforded  by  the  creation 
of  new  wants  and  the  development  of  new  species  of  industry,  produce  more 
ample  means  than  were  possessed  by  the  people  of  the  earlier  ages.  That  na- 
tion, therefore,  which  consumes  the  smallest  portion  of  its  disposable  population, 
and  which  is  the  least  liable  to  have  the  regular  operations  of  its  laboring  classes 
disturbed  by  its  quarrels,  will  enjoy  a  decided  superiority  over  every  other ; 
and  as  the  art  of  war  is  now  carried  among  all  civilized  nations  to  the  same 
degree  of  perfection,  that  nation  must  triumph  which  can  longest  keep  the  field 
possessed  of  these  means  of  warfare.  And  as  the  destruction  of  men  will  thereby 
be  always  less,  and  the  resources  derived  from  industry  always  greater,  the  ad- 
vantage must  always  rest,  everything  else  being  equal,  with  the  country  which, 
from  its  geographical  situation  and  its  natural  and  artificial  strength,  is  most 
secure  from  invasion. 

Should  France  ever  regain  for  boundaries  the  Alps,  the  Pyrenees,  the  sea, 
the  marshes  of  Holland  and  the  Rhine,  for  which  she  has  so  continually  labored — 
accessions  of  great  value  to  her  in  her  relations  with  Italy,  with  Spain,  and  with 
the  powers  of  Germany,  (countries  then  entirely  open  to  offensive  operations  on 
her  part) — still  her  situation  would  be  greatly  inferior,  under  this  point  of  view, 
to  the  insular  situation  of  Great  Britain. 

Since  the  union,  which  put  an  end  to  all  invasion  except  by  sea,  England  has 
effectually  guarded  herself  by  perseverance  in  the  augmentation  of  her  navy 
and  in  the  maintenance  and  increase  of  her  coast  defences ;  and  it  is  to  this 
system,  more  perhaps  than  to  her  institutions,  that  England  owes  her  present 
elevated  rank.  Securely  relying  for  protection  on  the  defence  the  government 
had  wisely  provided,  her  population,  although  surrounded  by  enemies,  calmly 
directed  its  genius,  its  enterprise,  and  its  industry  to  the  accumulation  of  indi- 
vidual wealth ;  giving  in  return  for  this  protection  ample  means  for  its  continu- 
ance, and  enabling  the  government,  by  disbursements  beyond  all  parallel  in 
actual  expenses  and  in  subsidies,  to  ward  off  from  their  territory,  and  to  termi- 
nate favorably  in  the  capital  of  their  enemy,  a  war  which  had  threatened  the 
existence  of  the  nation 

Another  advantage,  resulting  from  such  a  geographical  position  as  Warrants 
confiding  the  defence  to  coast  fortification  and  to  a  navy,  is,  that  the  destruc- 
tion of  men  in  naval  contests  being  much  less  than  in  those  between  armies,  a 
greater  number  is  left  to  carry  on  the  ordinary  and  profitable  pursuits  of  civil 
life.  Actions  on  the  ocean  are  short  and  decisive,  and  a  few  months  are  often 
sufficient  to  decide  the  superiority  for  the  rest  of  the  war.  Besides  that,  it  is 
rather  the  injury  sustained  by  the  vessels  than  the  loss  of  life  which  closes  the 
conflict ;  privations  among  sailors  are  not  often  severe,  and  diseases  are  rare. 
In  armies,  on  the  contrary,  the  loss  of  men  is  immense ;  skirmishes  happen 
daily,  battles  are  frequent ;  soldiers  are  exposed  to  wants  of  every  kind ;  to  the 
inclemencies  of  weather,  the  variety  of  climate,  and  to  the  ravages  of  epidemics — 
more  fatal  titan  the  swords  of  the  enemy. 

The  terminations  of  the  many  struggles  which  for  a  century  and  a  half  have 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 


29 


taken  place  between  France  and  England,  furnish  so  many  striking  proofs  of 
the  truth  of  the  principle  just  advanced.  In  their  long  and  bloody  contests,  the 
ratio  of  expense  of  men  by  France  and  England  was  as  four  to  one ;  and  when,  in 
consequence  of  these  losses,  the  French  armies  were  driven  back  into  their  own 
territory,  the  discouraged  people,  seeing  their  sources  of  finance  exhausted  and 
their  own  employments  suspended,  paralyzed,  by  their  loud  demands  for  peace 
at  this  critical  juncture,  the  last  efforts  of  the  government,  which  more  than  once 
was  obligeoj  to  subscribe  to  the  hardest  conditions. 

It  is  this  property  of  inaccessibility  by  land  at  which  the  United  States  should 
aim,  and  which  it  may  attain  by  well-contrived  permanent  works,  and  by  the 
gradual  increase  of  the  navy. 

Conceiving  that  we  have  enlarged  sufficiently  on  this  part  of  our  subject,  we 
shall  now  advert  briefly  to  the  correlative  influence  of  fortifications  and  interior 
communications. 

The  most  important  of  these  communications  in  reference  to  a  system  of  de- 
fences are,  first,  such  as  serve  to  sustain,  in  all  its  activity,  that  portion  of  our 
domestic  commerce  which,  without  their  aid,  would  be  interrupted  by  a  state  of 
war ;  and,  second,  such  as  serve,  besides  their  great  original  purposes,  to  conduct 
from  the  interior  to  the  scene  of  war  necessary  supplies  and  timely  relief.  The 
first,  which  are  amongst  the  most  important  national  concerns  of  this  nature,  lie 
parallel  to,  and  not  distant  from,  the  sea-coast ;  the  second,  which,  whenever 
they  cross  the  great  natural  partition  wall  between  the  east  and  the  west,  are 
equally  important,  lie  more  remote  from  the  coast,  and  sometimes  nearly  or  (juite 
parallel  to  it,  but  generally  fall  nearly  at  right  angles  to  the  line  of  the  seaboard 
into  the  great  estuaries,  where  in  some  cases  their  products  are  arrested,  or 
whence  in  others  they 'flow  on  unmingled  with  those  of  the  first.  To  fulfil  the 
object  of  the  first-mentioned  lines  of  communication  it  is  obviously  necessary  to 
prevent  an  enemy  from  reaching  them  through  any  of  the  numerous  inlets  from 
the  sea  which  they  traverse,  including,  of  course,  the  great  inlets  wherein  these 
unite  with  the  more  interior  communications.  The  security  of  these  lines,  there- 
fore, involves  the  security  of  the  other,  and  is  in  a  great  measure  necessary  to  it. 
From  what  has  been  before  stated  we  infer  that  for  the  security  here  required 
we  must,  as  in  the  case  of  cities,  harbors,  naval  establishments,  &c.,  look  to 
fortifications.  But  it  fortunately  happens,  as  will  appear  in  the  sequel,  that 
wherever  both  objects  exist  the  works  necessary  for  the  one  may  easily  be  made 
to  accomplish  both.  We  will  only  add,  in  reference  to  the  necessity  of  a  system 
of  defence  for  the  protection  of  these  lines  of  communication,  that  from  the 
facility  with  which  they  may  be  broken  up,  and  the  serious  evils  consequent 
thereon,  they  offer  great  inducements  to  enterprises  with  that  object  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy.  An  aqueduct,  an  embankment,  a  tide-lock,  or  a  dam  blown  up 
is  the  work  of  an  hour,  and  yet  would  interrupt  navigation  for  months. 

The  reciprocal  value  of  interior  communication  to  fortifications  has  been  al- 
ready distinctly  stated,  and  is  too  apparent  to  need  elucidation. 

The  necessity  of  a  regular  army,  even  in  time  of  peace,  is  a  principle  well 
established  by  our  legislation.  The  importance  of  a  well-organized  militia  is 
incident  to  the  nature  of  our  institutions,  well  understood  by  the  people,  and 
duly  appreciated  by  the  government.  The  board  have,  therefore,  nothing  to  re- 
mark on  these  subjects,  considered  as  general  principles.  They  may,  however, 
find  it  their  duty,  in  a  succeeding  part  of  this  report,  to  venture  a  suggestion  or 
two  touching  the  expediency  of  a  peculiar  local  organization  of  the  latter. 

Before  quitting  the  subject  which  has  hitherto  occupied  their  attention,  the  board 
find  it  convenient  to  be  more  explicit  as  to  the  sense  in  which  they  have  used  the 
terms  "  navy"  and  "  fortifications."  By  the  first  they  allude  to  that  portion 
only  of  our  military  marine  which  is  capable  of  moving  in  safety  upon  the  ocean, 
and  transferring  itself  speedily  to  distant  points.  Floating  batteries,  gunboats 
and  steam  batteries  they  consider  as  pertaining  to  fortifications,  being  always  useful 


30  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

and  sometimes  indispensable,  as  well  as  powerful  auxiliaries.  Under  the  term 
"fortifications,"  used  as  expressive  of  security  afforded  thereby  to  the  seaboard, 
have  been  included  permanent  and  temporary  fortifications — the  auxiliaries  just 
mentioned,  and  both  fixed  and  floating  obstructions  to  channels. 

The  board  now  proceed  to  a  concise  description  of  the  maritime  frontier,  con- 
sidered as  a  whole,  after  which  they  will  examine  the  several  sections  separately, 
applying  as  they  go  to  the  defensible  positions  the  works  projected  for  general 
arid  local  security.  In  this  part  of  their  report  it  will  be  necessary  to  refer  fre- 
quently to  preceding  reports  for  details. 

*The  sea-coast  of  the  United  States  is  comprised  within  the  24th  and  46th 
degrees  of  north  latitude,  and  spreads  over  27  degrees  of  longitude.  The  general 
direction  of  that  part  which  lies  on  the  Atlantic  north  of  the  peninsula  of  Flor- 
ida is  N.NE.  and  S.SW.;  this  peninsula  stretches  out  from  the  continent  ia 
a  direction  a  little  east  of  south ;  while  that  part  of  the  coast  which  lies  on  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  corresponds  nearly  with  the  30th  parallel  of  north  latitude.  With- 
out estimating  any  of  the  indentations  not  properly  belonging  to  it,  and  carry- 
ing our  measures  from  point  to  point,  wherever  these  breaks  are  at  all  abrupt, 
the  line  of  coast  may  be  stated  to  be  3,300  miles  in  length. 

Nearly  parallel  with  the  Atlantic  coast  extends  a  chain  of  mountains  separa- 
ting the  sources  of  rivers  flowing  on  the  one  hand  directly  into  the  ocean  from 
those  which  run  into  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  or  Gulf  of  Mexico.  In  the  most 
lofty  portions  of  this  chain  numerous  gaps  afford  facilities  for  crossing  it  by 
roads  or  railed  ways.  Occasional  expansions  at  high  elevations  or  depressions 
of  the  summit  present  sufficient  surface  to  collect  the  water  necessary  for  crossing 
by  canals,  and  in  other  places  the  rivers  themselves  have  severed  the  chain, 
leaving  no  impediments  to  communications  of  either  kind.  On  both  sides  of 
these  mountains  the  country  presents  numerous  natural  means  of  intercommu- 
nications, and  facilities  and  inducements  for  the  creation  of  artificial  ones  in  end- 
less combinations. 

From  this  description  it  appears  that  notwithstanding  the  great  extent  of  our 
seaboard,  the  safety  of  each  section  of  it  is  a  matter  not  devoid  of  interest  to- 
every  portion  of  the  people  however  remote  geographically,  at  least  so  long  as 
the  nation  shall  continue  her  commercial  relations  with  the  rest  of  the  world ; 
and  indeed  until  she  shall  find  it  her  interest  to  interdict  the  circulation  of  do- 
mestic commerce  through  the  avenues  which  nature  or  art  may  have  created — 
a  commerce  of  inestimable  value  at  all  times,  and  becoming  more  necessary  as 
well  as  more  valuable  on  every  interruption  of  foreign  traffic. 

As  being  in  close  connexion  with  the  coast  it  will  be  convenient  to  describe, 
briefly,  in  this  place  the  line  of  interior  communication  on  which,  in  time  of  war, 
reliance  must  be  placed  as  the  substitute  for  the  exterior  coasting  navigation. 

Beginning  in  the  great  bay  to  the  north  of  Cape  Cod  it  passes  over  land 
either  into  Narraganset  Roads  or  Buzzard's  bay ;  thence  through  Long  Island 
sound  to  the  harbor  of  New  York ;  thence  up  the  Raritan  overland  to  the  Del- 
aware ;  down  this  river  some  distance  ;  overland  to  the  Chesapeake ;  down  the 
Chesapeake,  up  Hampton  Roads  and  Elizabeth  river ;  through  the  Dismal 
Swamp  to  Albemarle  sound ;  thence  through  the  low  lauds,  swamps,  or  sounds 
of  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia  to  the  head  of  the  peninsula  of  Florida ;  overland 
to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico ;  and  thence  through  interior  sounds  and  bays  to  New 
Orleans.  Some  of  the  few  and  brief  natural  impediments  to  this  extensive  line 
have  already  been  removed ;  some  are  rapidly  disappearing  before  the  energy 
of  local  or  State  enterprises ;  and  to  the  residue  the  public  attention  is  directed 
with  an  earnestness  which  leaves  no  reason  to  fear  that  they  will  not  ere  long 
be  overcome. 


*  See  report  of  1819. 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  31 

*  Proceeding  now  to  a  minute  examination  of  the  coast,  we  find  it,  naturally 
divided  into  four  distinct  parts,  namely  :  The  Northeastern,  extending  from 
Nova  Scotia  to  Cape  Cod ;  the  Middle,  from  Cape  Cod  to  Cape  Hatteras ;  the 
Southern,  from  Cape  Hatteras  to  Cape  Sable;  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  frontier* 
from  Cape  Sable  to  the  mouth  of  the  Sabine  river. 

We  will  now  take  them  in  the  order  in  which  they  stand  above. 

TBE  NORTHEASTERN  SECTION  OF  THE  COAST. 

The  northeastern  section  is  characterized  by  its  serrated  coast  and  its  nu- 
merous harbors;  and  though  differing  in  these  respects  entirely  from  the 
other  sections,  is  no  less  distinguished  in  its  climate  by  the  prevalence,  at  cer- 
tain seasons,  of  dense  and  lasting  fogs.  The  extent  of  this  section,  measuring, 
where  the  breaks  in  the  coast  are  abrupt,  from  point  to  point,  is  about  500  miles ; 
while  a  straight  line  from  Cape  Cod  to  Quoddy  Head  is  hardly  half  that  dis- 
tance. The  eastern  half  of  this  coast  is  singularly  indented  by  deep  bays,  the 
shores  being  universally  rocky,  and  having  numerous  islands,  surrounded  by 
deep  water,  which  not  only  add  to  the  number  of  harbors  but  afford  an  interior 
navigation  perfectly  understood  by  the  hardy  sailors  of  the  country,  and  meas- 
urably secured  by  its  intricacies  and  the  other  dangers  of  this  foggy  and  boister- 
ous region  from  interruption  by  an  enemy.  The  western  half,  though  it  has  two- 
very  prominent  capes  and  a  few  deep  bays,  is  much  less  broken  in  its  outline 
than  the  eastern.  It  is  covered  by  few  islands  in  comparison,  but  contains^ 
nevertheless,  several  excellent  harbors. 

t  Considering  the  sparseness  of  the  population  in  the  eastern  part  of  the  State 
of  Maine,  the  little  comparative  value  of  any  existing  establishment  there,  the 
proximity  of  a  province  of  another  power,  within  which  is  situated  an  import- 
ant post  of  naval  rendezvous,  the  board  think  it  would  be  inexpedient  to  un- 
dertake, under  present  circumstances  at  least,  the  defence  by  permanent  works 
of  any  position  to  the  east  of  Mount  Desert  island ;  especially  as  the  capture 
of  any  work  there,  whereof  the  strength  would  be  proportionate  to  the  import- 
ance of  the  place  covered,  might,  owing  to  its  destitution  of  succor,  be  easily 
achieved  by  an  enemy,  who  would  not  fail  to  profit  of  its  situation  to  harass 
both  our  commercial  and  naval  operations. 

t  Mount  Desert  island,  situated  between  Frenchman's  and  Penobscot  baysr 
and  centrally  as  respects  the  Kennebeck  and  St.  Croix  rivers,  having  a  capa- 
cious and  safe  roadstead,  affording  anchorage  for  first  rate  vessels,  easily  accessi- 
ble from  the  sea,  and  being  easily  defended  by  batteries,  offers  a  station  superior 
to  all  others  on  this  portion  of  the  coast  for  a  navy  of  an  enemy.  From  this 
point  his  cruisers  can  act  with  great  effect  against  the  navigation  of  the  eastern 
coast,  especially  that  of  Maine ;  and  his  enterprises  of  every  kind  can  be  con- 
ducted, with  little  loss  of  time,  against  any  point  he  may  select.  These  consid- 
erations, added  to  the  advantages  which  would  result  from  possessing  ourselves 
of  a  naval  station  which  would  enable  us  to  assume  the  offensive,  should  our  po- 
litical relations  again  make  it  necessary,  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  a  formida- 
ble provincial  establishment  of  another  power ;  together  with  the  necessity  of 
providing  places  of  succor  on  a  part  of  the  coast  where  vessels  are  so  frequently 
perplexed  in  their  navigation  by  the  prevailing  fogs ;  lead  the  board  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  fortification  of  this  roadstead  in  a  strong  manner  is  indispensable. 

From  the  incomplete  state  of  the  surveys,  however,  they  are  not  at  present, 
able  to  state  the  particular  modes  nor  the  expense  of  the  defences. 

|  Penobscot  bay. — The  next  important  part  of  this  coast,  proceeding  westward,. 

*See  reports  of  1820  and  1821.  f  Report  of  1821. 

%  See  report  of  1821,  and  the  memoir  on  the  defences  of  the  narrows  of  the  Penobscot,  1825. 


32  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

is  Penobscot  bay.  Upon  this  bay,  and  upon  the  river  of  the  same  name  flowing 
into  it,  are  situated  several  flourishing  towns  and  villages.  Of  the  many  bays 
which  intersect  this  coast,  the  Penobscot  is  the  one  which  presents  the  greatest 
number  of  safe  and  extensive  anchorages ;  their  number,  indeed,  is  such  as  to 
render  it  inexpedient  to  attempt,  under  present  circumstances,  the  defence  of  any 
of  them.  Unless  all  were  fortified,  which  would  involve  an  expense  out  of  all 
proportion  to  the  objects  secured  thereby,  an  enemy  would  find  all  the  shelter 
he  could  desire  in  either  of  the  neglected  harbors,  while  the  local  interests  which 
would  be  covered  by  the  defence  of  either  are  not  regarded  as  being  yet  of  suffi- 
cient amount  to  excite  the  cupidity  of  an  enemy,  especially  considering  the  pro- 
tection afforded  by  an  establishment  at  Mount  Desert  island  against  all  minor 
enterprises. 

It  is  necessary,  however,  to  protect  the  valuable  commerce  of  the  bay  and 
river,  and  to  afford  a  secure  retreat  for  such  vessels  as,  endangered  by  an  enemy, 
may  be  enabled  to  place  themselves  under  the  protection  of  the  works  to  the 
right  or  left  of  the  bay.  The  lowest  point  at  which  this  object  can  be  accom- 
plished without  great  expense  is  at  the  narrows  of  the  river  opposite  Bucksport ; 
and  the  board  have  accordingly  presented  a  project  for  a  fort  at  that  position 
accompanied  by  a  memoir  and  estimate.  The  expense  is  estimated  at  $101,000. 

*  The  Sheep's  Cut. — About  thirty-five  miles  west  of  the  Penobscot  is  the 
Sheep's  Cut,  a  deep  and  capacious  indentation  of  the  coast,  on  which,  fourteen 
miles  from  the  ocean,  and  near  the  head  of  deep  water,  stands  the  town  of  Wis- 
casset.     This  town  is  of  considerable  importance  to  the  commerce  of  Maine,  and 
should  be  fortified ;  the  rather,  as  the  works  (placed  in  their  proper  situation 
from  four  to  seven  miles  below  the  town)  will  cover  a  very  excellent  harbor  of 
refuge  for  ships-of-war  as  well  as  merchantmen.     The  works  heretofore  erected, 
namely,  Fort  Edgecombe  and  a  battery  opposite,  are  too  weak,  and  are  placed 
too  near  the  town  to  fulfil  their  object.     The  surveys  here  not  being  completed, 
no  projects  have  yet  been  made  by  the  board. 

*  The  Kennebeck  river — This  river,  which  is  one  of  the  largest  in  the  eastern 
states,  enters  the  sea  nearly  midway  between  Cape  Cod  and  the  mouth  of  the  St. 
Croix.     It  rises  near  the  sources  of  the  Chaudier,  a  tributary  of  the  St.  Law- 
rence, and  may  one  day  serve  as  a  line  of  operations  against  Quebec.     The  situ- 
ation and  extent  of  this  river,  the  value  of  its  products,  and  the  active  commerce 
of  the  flourishing  town  of  Bath,  lying  about  twelve  miles  from  the  sea,  as  w^* 
as  the  excellence  of  the  harbor  within  its  mouth,  will  not  permit  us  to  neglect  its 
defence ;  the  surveys,  however,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Sheep's  Cut  and  Mount 
Desert  island,  being  in  an  unfinished  state,  no  projects  have  as  yet  been  made. 
The  present  fort,  which  is  on  the  west  bank  near  the  mouth,  is  very  small,  and 
is  commanded  by  a  ridge  within  pistol  shot. 

t  Portland. — A  little  to  the  northwest  of  Cape  Elizabeth,  and  at  the  mouth 
of  Fore  river,  is  the  town  of  Portland.  The  protection  of  the  town,  of  the 
merchantmen,  and  of  the  ships-of-war  which  may  be  stationed  there  to  guard 
the  coast,  or  which  may  enter  for  safety — all  of  them  important  objects — may 
be  secured,  as  an  inspection  of  the  map  of  the  town  and  harbor  will  show,  by 
occupying  Fort  Preble  Point,  House  island,  Hog  Island  ledge,  and  Fish  Point. 
At  the  same  time,  if  the  two  channels  to  the  west  and  east  of  Hog  Island  ledge, 
can  be  obstructed  at  small  expense,  which  is  hardly  a  matter  of  doubt,  although 
some  final  surveys  are  wanting  to  decide  this  point,  there  will  be  no  necessity 
for  a  battery  on  the  ledge ;  and  Fish  Point  need  only  be  occupied  by  such  works 
as  may  be  thrown  up  in  -time  of  war. 

The  projects  of  the  board  contemplate  the  preservation  of  Fort  Preble  and 

*  See  report  of  1821. 

t  See  reports  of  1820  and  1821,  and  memoir  on  the  defence  of  Portland,  1825. 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES..  33 

Fort  Scammi'l,  and  the  erection  of  new  works,  having  proper  relations  of  de- 
fence with  these. 

The  expense  of  the  new  works  is  stated  in  their  estimates  at  $135,000,  not 
including  the  defence  of  the  Hog  Island  channel,  the  mode  of  which  is  yet  unde- 
termined. 

*  Portsmouth  Harbor. — The  only  good  roadstead,  or  good  harbor,  between 
(Jape  Elizabeth  and  Cape  Ann,  is  Portsmouth  harbor,  within  the  mouth  of  Pis- 
cataqua  river.  Line-of-battle-ships  can  ascend  this  river  as  high  as  Fox  Point, 
s<>\vii  miles  above  the  town  of  Portsmouth.  Between  this  point  and  Shooting 
Point  is  a  branch  of  the  river  communicating  with  Great  Bay.  This  branch, 
which  is  one-third  of  a  mile  wide,  presents,  for  two  miles  in  length,  an  excellent 
cover  for  all  sorts  of  vessels.  This  situation  is  sufficiently  commodious  for  a 
secondary  depot,  designed  to  repair  such  vessels-of-war  as  may  be  constrained  to 
seek  an  asylum  in  this  river  ;  it  is  too  near  the  sea,  however,  for  a  great  naval 
depot,  and  in  other  respects  does  not  possess  the  advantage  of  Boston,  as  was 
^hovm  in  the  report  of  1820.  Nevertheless,  as  Portsmouth  is  an  excellent  sta- 
tion, and  as  it  is  indispensable  that  some  at  least  of  these  stations  be  provided 
with  the  necessary  establishments  for  reparation,  the  depot  in  this  river  should 
bi'  maintained. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  bay  to  the  south  of  Fox  Point  was  not  chosen 
as  the  site  for  the  navy  yard  instead  of  Fernal's  island.  Being  where  it  is  it 
will  be  necessary  in  time  of  war  to  make  such  dispositions  as  will  protect  the 
yard  from  an  attack  from  the  north  shore  of  the  river.  All  attacks  by  water 
may  be  effectually  prevented  by  defensive  works  at  the  mouth  of  the  river. 

The  position  of  Fort  Constitution  must  certainly  and  that  of  Fort  McCleary 
may  possibly  be  occupied  by  those  defences,  though  the  works  themselves, 
especially  the  former,  must  give  place  to  such  as  will  be  better  adapted  to  fulfil 
the  object.  The  other  positions  for  forts  are  Gerrish's  Point,  Fishing  island, 
and  Clarke's  island,  some  if  not  all  of  which  must  be  occupied.  The  final  sur- 
veys of  this  harbor  though  completed,  not  having  been  before  the  board,  the 
projects  and  estimates  have  not  been  made. 

t  Newburyport  Harbor. — This  is  the  next  port  south  of  Portsmouth.  The 
Merrimack  river,  the  mouth  of  which  forms  the  harbor,  is  obstructed  at  its  junc- 
tion with  the  sea  by  a  bar  on  which  there  is  at  low  tide  but  six  or  seven  feet 
water.  This  obstruction  to  the  use  of  this  harbor  by  vessels  of  much  draught, 
i\i\(\  the  circumstance  of  a  portion  of  the  trade  of  the  Merrimack  being  diverted 
to  Boston  by  the  Middlesex  canal,  induce  the  board  to  consider  it  inexpedient 
to  fortify  the  harbor  by  permanent  works. 

Gloucester  harbor. — The  board  are  unprepared  to  state  to  what  extent  and  at 
what  cost  this  harbor  should  be  fortified.  Its  position — near  the  extremity  of 
Cape  Ann,  and  in  close  relation  to  the  navigation  of  Massachusetts  bay — indicates 
clearly  that  it  is  of  an  importance  beyond  what  would  be  assigned  to  the  value 
of  its  existing  establishments.  Until  the  necessary  surveys  are  made  the  board 
cannot  state  in  what  degree  the  present  fort  may  be  made  useful  in  the  future 
defence  of  this  harbor. 

YBevcrly  harbor. — Beverly  is  in  some  sort  a  dependency  of  Salem,  as  the 
channel,  which  is  serpentine  and  narrow,  passes  within  200  yards  of  Salem  Neck. 
It  may  be  defended  by  temporary  batteries  erected  thereon,  and  rendered  utterly 
impassable  by  flowing  obstructions. 

|  Salem. — The  port  of  Salem  is  distant  from  Marblehead  harbor  only  two 
miles,  being  separated  therefrom  by  a  peninsula.  The  occupation,  of  the  ex- 
tremity of  Winter  island  (where  are  the  ruins  of  Fort  Pickering)  on  the  one 


;  Sec  reports  of  1820  and  1821.  f  See  report  of  1821. 

J  See  report  of  1821  and  memoir  on  the  defence  of  Salem,  1823, 

H.  Rep.  Com.  86 3 


34  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCE. 

side  and  of  Naugus  Head  on  the  other,  will  effectually  cover  this  harbor.     The 
cost  of  the  works  projected  with  that  view  by  the  board  is  estimated  at  $151,000. 

*  Marblettead  Harbor. — Besides,  covering  in  some  measure  the  establishment  * 
at  Boston,  the  harbors  of  Marblehead  and  Salem  possess  an  important  com- 
merce of  their  own,  and  also  afford  a  shelter  for  vessels  prevented  by  certain 
winds  from  pursuing  their  course  eastward,  or  from  entering  the  first  named  port. 
The  mode  of  defending  Marblehead  harbor  proposed  by  the  board  consists  in 
occupying  on  the  north  side  the  hillock  which  commands  the  present  Fort  Se- 
wall  (which  will  be  superseded  by  the  new  work)  and  on  the  south  the  position 
of  Jack's  Point,  The  two  works  will  cost  $212,000. 

t  Boston  Harbor. — We  come  now  to  the  most  important  harbor  in  the  eastern 
section  of  the  coast,  and,  considering  its  relations  to  general  commerce  and  to  the 
interests  of  the  navy,  to  one  of  the  most  important  in  the  Union.  After  a  careful 
examination  of  all  the  necessary  conditions  of  such  a  problem,  the  naval  com- 
missioners and  board  of  engineers,  in  their  joint  report  of  1820,  gave  this  har- 
bor the  preference  of  all  other  positions  to  the  east,  and,  inclusive  of  New  Yftrk 
bay  and  the  Hudson,  as  the  seat  of  the  great  northern  naval  depot;  for  the 
reasons  at  large  of  this  selection  reference  is  made  to  the  report  of  1820,  But 
even  should  the  recommendation  therein  contained  remain  unsanctioned,  Boston 
is  still  a  city  of  great  wealth,  possesses  an  extensive  and  active  commerce,  and 
contains  already  within  its  harbor  an  establishment  on  which  great  reliance  is 
placed  to  give  growth  and  energy  to  our  navy.  Excepting  Boston,  indeed,  and 
its  establishments,  the  eastern  coast  presents  no  objects,  to  an  enemy  of  such  im- 
portance as  to  induce  him  to  direct  against  them  any  operations  which  would 
very  materially  influence  the  results  of  a  war.  The  principal  towns  and  the 
mouths  of  the  great  communications  with  the  interior  being  fortified,  the  coun- 
try woody  and  hilly,  abounding  in  defiles,  cut  up  by  enclosures,  and  defended 
by  a  brave,  vigorous,  and  enterprising  people,  presents  so  many  obstacles  that  no 
attempts,  not  merely  predatory,  can  be  anticipated.  On  the  contrary,  the  people, 
undisturbed  by  apprehensions  for  their  homes,  having  numerous  and  excellent 
sailors,  a  great  number  of  safe  anchorages  along  their  coast,  and  a  great  cl/epot 
of  wealth  at  Boston  to  animate  and  sustain  every  species  of  enterprise  on  the 
ocean,  may  well  be  expected  to  take  an  active  offensive  part  in  any  future  war. 

The  present  forts  in  Boston  harbor  defend  merely  the  interior  basin  from  at- 
tacks by  water.  But,  as  it  often  happens  that  vessels  enter  Nantasket  Roads 
with  a  wind  too  scant  to  pass  the  Narrows,  or  are  detained  in  President  Roads 
by  light  winds  or  an  adverse  tide ;  as  the  former,  especially,  is  a  very  conve- 
nient anchorage  from  whence  to  proceed  to  sea ;  and  above  all,  as  Nantasket 
Roads  affords  the  best  possible  station  for  a  blockading  squadron,  it  is  deemed 
indispensable  to  place  permanent  defences  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  The 
project  of  defence  proposed  by  the  board  contemplates  leaving  the  existing 
works  as  a  second  barrier,  placing  a  permanent  fort  on  George's  island,  another 
at  Nantasket  Head,  having  two  advanced  works  on  the  Head,  and  one  on  Hog 
island,  reducing  the  altitude  of  Gallop  island  to  destroy  its  command  over 
George's  island,  and  filling  up  the  Broad  Sound  channel  so  as  to  leave  no  pas- 
sage for  ships-of-war.  These  works  will  cost  $1,279,429  51.  Besides  the 
works  of  a  permanent  character,  it  will  be  necessary  on  the  beginning  of  a  war 
to  erect  temporary  works  upon  Point  Aldaton,  Peddock's  island,  LovelPs  island, 
Apple  island,  Noddle  island,  the  heights  near  the  north  end  of  Chelsea  bridge, 
aiid  the  neck  near  the  termination  of  Middlesex  canal.  For  the  particular  ob- 
jects of  the  several  works  enumerated  above  the  board  refer  to  the  memoir  on 
the  defence  of  Boston  harbor  of  1823. 

^Plymouth  and  Provincetown  harbors. — These  are  the  only  harbors  on  the 

0  See  report  of  1821,  and  memoir  of  defence  of  Marblebead.  1823. 
f  See  reports  of  1820  and  1821,  and  memoir  on  the  defence  of  Boston  harbor,  1823. 

J  See  report  of  1821. 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  35 

eastern  coast  south  of  Boston.  They  have  a  commerce  of  some  consequence  of 
their  own,  but  they  are  particularly  interesting  in  reference  to  the  port  of  Boston 
and  to  the  transition  from  the  middle  to  the  eastern  section  of  the  coast,  in  which 
respects  they  would  become  still  more  important  should  the  proposed  canal  from 
Buzzard's  to  Barnstable  bay  ever  be  executed.  While  these  harbors  are  unde- 
fended, an  enemy's  squadron  blockading  Massachusetts  bay  has  ports  of  refuge 
under  his  lee,  of  which  he  would  not  fail  to  avail  himself  to  maintain  his  block- 
ade throughout  the  most  stormy  seasons,  knowing  that  the  winds  which  would  - 
compel  him  to  seek  shelter  would  be  adverse  to  outward  bound,  and  fatal, 
should  they  venture  near  the  coast,  to  inward  bound  vessels. 

In  possession  of  these  harbors  the  enemy  Avould  have,  in  fine,  constantly  under 
his  eye  the  harbor  of  Boston,  the  passage  outside  of  Cape  Cod,  and  that  through 
the  canal. 

To  these  considerations,  going  to  establish  the  necessity  of  securing  them  by 
proper  defences,  we  must  not  omit  to  add  that  without  the  shelter  now  afforded 
by  these  ports  an  enemy  would  be  unable  to  enforce  a  rigorous  investment.  In 
the  first  place,  lie  would  be  often  deterred  from  taking  a  station  near  the  land,  lest 
he  might  be  caught  embayed  by  the  violent  easterly  winds  prevailing  at  certain 
seasons ;  in  the  next  place,  he  would  always  seek  a  good  offing  on  every  indica- 
tion of  these  winds,  thereby  leaving  a  clear  coast,  to  be  improved  by  our  vessels 
at  the  first  instant  of  a  change  of  weather ;  and,  lastly,  our  vessels  being  cut  off 
from  Boston  by  the  position  of  the  enemy,  or  constrained  by  adverse  winds  to 
deviate  from  their  course,  would  find  to  the  south  a  shelter  equivalent  to  that 
provided  at  the  north  by  the  defence  of  Marblehead,  Salem,  Gloucester,  and 
Portsmouth. 

The  board  have  not  been  able  to  make  projects  for  the  defence  of  these  har- 
bors, the  surveys  not  being  completed. 

Should  the  proposed  canal  above  mentioned  be  executed,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  place  a  small  work  near  each  of  its  outlets  to  prevent  the  destruction  of  the 
means  by  which  the  transit  of  vessels  in  and  out  of  the  canal  must  be  accom- 
plished. 


The  coast  between  Cape  Cod  and  Cape  Hatteras  differs  from  the  northeastern 
section  in  possessing  fewer  harbors,  in  having  but  little  rocky  and  a  great  pro- 
portion of  sandy  shore,  in  which  it  resembles  the  southern  section  in  its  milder 
climate  and  in  its  clearer  atmosphere,  and  it  differs  from  all  the  other  portions  in 
the  depth  and  magnitude  of  its  interior  seas  and  sounds,  and  in  the  distance  to 
which  deep  tide  navigation  extends  up  its  numerous  large  rivers. 

The  circuit  of  the  coast,  not  including  the  shores  of  the  great  bays,  measures 
650  miles,  while  a  straight  line  from  one  of  the  above-named  capes  to  the  other, 
measures  about  520  miles. 

Martha's  Vineyard  sound. — A  little  to  the  south  of  Barnstable  (a  part  of  the 
projection  which  we  designate  as  Cape  Cod)  lie  the  islands  of  Nantucket  and 
Martha's  Vineyard,  which,  with  several  smaller  islands  on  the  south  and  the  pro- 
jection of  Cape  Malabar  on  the  east,  enclose  Martha's  Vineyard  sound.  The 
channels  through  this  sound  being  sufficient  for  merchant  vessels,  and  one  even 
allowing  the  passage  of  small  frigates,  are  not  only  the  constant  track  of  coast- 
ing vessels,  but  owing  to  the  relative  situation  of  Narragansett  roads  and  the 
existence  of  two  tolerable  sate  harbors  to  the  east  of  Gay  Head,  namely,  Tar- 
paulin Cove  and  Holmes's^Hole,  this  sound  is  generally  aimed  at  by  all  eastern 
vessels  bound  home  in  the  tempestous  seasons.  -There  are  certain  difficulties, 

*  See  report  of  1820. 


36  FORTIFICATIONS    AM)    SKA-COAST    DEFENCK>. 

however,  attending  the  navigation  of  this  sound,  resulting  from  want  of  a  har- 
bor near  the  eastern  extremity,  which  have  given,  rise  to  a  project  now  in  a 
course  of  investigation  for  forming  an  artificial  harbor  at  the  northeast  point  of 
Nantucket  island. 

In  the  present  state  of  things,  therefore,  although  the  board  are  fully  impressed 
with  the  necessity  of  providing  security  for  the  very  valuable  portion  of  com- 
merce frequenting  this  sound,  it  is  deemed  premature  to  enter  into  particulars  as 
to  the  most  suitable  mode  of  defence.  We  only  add,  in  reference  to  the  value 
of  this  commerce,  that  from  fifty  to  eighty  vessels,  engaged  chiefly  in  the  whale 
fishery,  are  owned  at  Nantucket  alone;  and  that  forty  or  fifty  vessels,  not  be- 
longing to  the  sound,  and  many  of  them  containing  the  richest  cargoes,  are  often 
seen  in  the  harbors,  waiting  a  favorable  change  of  weather  to  complete  their 
voyage. 

Buzzard's  bay* — Interposed  between  the  island  of  Martha's  Vineyard  and 
the  main  are  the  Elizabeth  islands,  bounding  Buzzard's  bay  on  the  south.  This 
bay,  although  of  importance  as  leading  to  the  proposed  canal  to  Bamstable  bay, 
as  covering  the  flourishing  town  of  New  Bedford,  and  as  being  one  of  the  natural 
harbors  to  be  used  by  an  enemy  in  enforcing  the  blockade  of  Narragansett  roads, 
cannot  be  defended  by  fortifications  owing  to  its  breadth.  Should  the  canal  be 
constructed,  it  must  be  defended  by  one  or  more  works  near  its  mouth. — (See 
page  28.) 

New  Bedford  harbor. — No  survey  having  been  made  of  this  harbor,  the  board 
are  unable  to  state  how  far  the  present;  fort  answers  the  necessary  conditions, 
or,  if  any,  what  new  works  are  required  to  afford  due  protection  to  the  valuable 
commerce  of  this  town. 

Narragansett  bay. — Referring  to  previous  reportsf  for  more  minute  informa- 
tion, the  board  will  advert  briefly  to  some  of  the  military  and  naval  properties 
of  this  important  roadstead.  First.  It  is  the  only  port  on  the  coast  accessible 
with  a  northwest  wind,  which  is  the  direction  of  the  most  violent  winter  storms ; 
and  as  the  same  winds  serve  for  entering  both  Boston  and  New  York  harbors, 
viz  :  N.NW.  to  S.SW.  round  by  the  east,  while  this  harbor  can  be  entered  with 
all  winds  from  NW.  to  E.  round  by  the  west,  it  follows  that  this  harbor  being 
secured  vessels  may  be  certain  of  making  a  harbor  on  this  part  of  the  coast  with 
all  winds  excepting  those  between  NW.  and  N.NW.  Second.  From  this  position 
the  navigation  of  Long  Island  sound,  and  especially  the  communication  between 
that  sound  and  Buzzard's  bay  or  Martha's  Vineyard  sound,  may  be  well  pro- 
tected. Third.  The  blockade  of  the  excellent  harbor  and  naval  station  of  New 
London  will  be  rendered  difficult.  Fourth.  From  this  station  the  navy  will  com- 
mand from  N.  to  S.,  as  from  Hampton  Roads  it  will  from  S.  to  N.,  the  great  in- 
ward curve  of  the  coast  between  Cape  Cod  and  Cape  Hatteras ;  the  influence  of 
which  command  over  the  blockading  operations  ot  an  enemy  will  be  apparent 
when  it  is  considered  that  the  only  harbors  of  refuge  he  will  have  will  be  Dela- 
ware, Gardiner's,  and  Buzzard's  bays.  Fifth.  This  harbor  is  the  connecting  link 
of  the  coast  to  the  south  with  that  to  the  north  of  Cape  Cod. 

If  Narragansett  bay  were  left  in  its  existing  state  as  to  defence  an  enemy 
would  seize  it  without  difficulty,  and  by  the  aid  of  naval  superiority  form  an 
establishment  in  Rhode  Island  for  the  war.  Occupying  this  island,  and  the 
position  of  Tiverton  heights  opposite  its  northern  extremity,  which  is  of  narrow 
front,  easy  to  secure  and  impossible  to  turn,  he  might  defy  all  the  forces  of  the 
eastern  States,  drive  the  United  States  to  vast  expense  of  blood  and  treasure, 
and  while  this  position  of  his  troops  would  keep  in  alarm  and  motion  all  the 
population  of  the  east,  feigned  expeditions  against  New  York  through  Long 

0  See  report  of  1820. 
f  Keo  reports  .of  1820  and  1821,  and  memoir  on  the  defence  of  Connanicut  island,  1822. 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  37 

Island  sound  or  against  more  southern  cities,  would  equally  alarm  the  country 
in  that  direction.  If,  in  short,  he  merely  contented  himself  with  menacing  the 
coast,  it  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  embarrassment  and  expense  into  which  he 
would  drive  the  government. 

Of  tlio  existing  forts,  viz :  Fort  Adams,  Dumpling  Tower,  fort  on  Rose 
island,  Fort  Wolcott*  and  Fort  Green,  the  two  latter  are  the  only  ones  retained 
in  the  projected  system  of  defence,  Fort  Adams,  besides  being  entirely  unsuited 
to  the  important  position  it  occupies,  is  in  ruins,  and  the  Dumpling  Tower,  and 
fort  on  Hose  island,  also  very  inconsiderable  works,  were  never  more  than  par- 
tially completed. 

The  project  of  defence  proposed  by  the  board  contemplates  for  the  middle 
channel  a  strong  fort  with  outworks  on  Brenton's  Point,  another  on  the  Dump- 
lings, a  smaller  fort  on  Rose  island,  and  the  preservation  of  Fort  Wolcott  and 
and  Fort  Green.  The  eastern  passage  is  already  shut  by  the  permanent  bridge 
at  Rowland's  ferry.  As  to  the  western  passage,  three  modes  present  themselves. 
First  Reducing  the  depth  of  water  by  an  artificial  ledge,  so  as  to  prevent  the 
passage  of  ships-of-war.  Second.  Relying  on  fortifications  alone  to  close  the 
passage  ;  or  third.  Resorting  in  part  to  one  and  in  part  to  other  means  just 
mentioned.  Being  the  least  expensive  and  most  certain,  the  board  have  founded 
the  estimate  on  the  first.  The  total  expense  of  Narragansett  defences  will  be 
$1,817,578  26. 

Stonington  harbor,  Connecticut,  and  Sag  Harbor,  New  York. — These  harbors 
have  not  been  surveyed,  and  the  board  are  therefore  unable  to  give  any  infor- 
mation as  to  the  kind  of  defences  they  require  or  their  probable  cost. 

Gardiner's  bay. — The  most  valuable  harbor  to  an  enemy  investing  this  part 
of  the  coast  is  probably  not  defensible  by  fortifications.  It  has  not,  however, 
been  surveyed;  and  at  some  future  day  it  may  be  a  very  interesting  question 
whether  by  steam  batteries,  under  the  protection  of  and  aided  by  fortifications, 
its  defence  may  not  be  accomplished. 

New  London  harbor* — New  London  harbor  is  very  important  to  the  com- 
merce of  Long  Island  sound,  and  as  a  port  of  easy  access,  having  a  great  depth 
of  water,  never  freezing  and  being  easily  defended,  it  is  an  excellent  station  for 
the  navy.  It  is  also  valuable  as  a  shelter  for  vessels  bound  out  or  home  and 
desirous  of  avoiding  a  blockading  squadron  off  Sandy  Hook. 

In  the  plan  of  defence  the  present  forts,  Trumbull  and  Griswold,  give  place 
to  more  efficient  works,  whereof  the  expense  is  estimated  at  $209,675  63. 

New  Haven  harbor.] — It  is  proposed  to  defend  this  harbor  by  improving  and 
enlarging  Fort  Hale,  and  substituting  a  new  work  for  the  slight  redoubt  erected 
during  the  late  war,  called  Fort  Wooster.  The  expense  of  both  will  be 
$59,609  18. 

New  York  harbor.\ — The  object  for  the  projected  works  for  the  vicinity  of 
New  York  are  to  cover  the  city  against  an  attack  by  land  or  sea,  to  protect  its 
numerous  shipping,  to  prevent  as  much  as  possible  the  blockade  of  this  great 
port,  which  will  soon  have,  added  to  the  immense  wealth  of  its  own  rivers,  the 
productions  of  the  boundless  regions  on  the  northern  and  western  lakes,  and  to 
cover  the  interior  communication  projected  to  unite  the  Raritan  with  the  Dela- 
ware. 

In  the  present  condition  of  that  harbor  as  regards  defence  an  enemy  would 
meet  but  little  opposition,  whether  his  attempt  were  made  by  land  or  water. 
Coming  by  the  sound  he  might  land  within  ten  miles  of  the  city,  upon  the  main 
or  upon  Long  Island  or  both ;  and  coming  into  the  lower  harbor  he  might  either 
force  the  passage  of  the  channel,  anchoring  in  the  Hudson  or  East  river,  or  he 


'.See  report  of  1821.  fSee  report  of   1820. 

jSce  reports  of  1820  am!  1821. 


38  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

might  land  in  Gravesend  bay,  eight  milts  from  the  city,  and  march  directly  to  Brook- 
lyn, where  he  would  find  the  navy  yard,  and  whence  lie  might  levy  a  contribution 
or  destroy  the  city.  The  only  mode  of  resistance  would  be  the  hamming,  ex- 
pensive, and  uncertain  one,  of  arraying  a  large  body  of  militia  upon  Harlem  and 
Brooklyn  heights,  and  this  could  be  resorted  to  only  in  the  event,  \iot  to  be 
anticipated,  of  having  received  timely  intelligence  of  his  design.  If  we  fortify 
Throgg's  Neck  and  Wilkins's  Point,  on  the  east  river,  and  if  we  complete  the 
works  at  the  Narrow**,  making  them  all  too  strong  to  be  carried  by  a  coup  de 
main,  we  shall  secure  the  means  of  transferring  the  neighboring  militia  upon 
the  flanks  and  rear  of  an  enemy  should  he  march  upon  Brooklyn,  while  we  shall 
secure  the  same  adArantage  should  he  pursue  the  route  by  Harlem,  besides  in- 
creasing the  length  of  his  march  through  an  intersected  country  to  twenty  miles. 

This  arrangement  of  defensive  works,  necessary  as  it  is,  still  leaves  the  lower 
harbor  open  to  an  enemy's  vessels,  where,  safe  at  all  seasons,  he  can  enforce  a 
strict  blockade,  cut  off  the  line  of  interior  communication  by  the  Raritan,  and 
where  he  has  a  landing  place  in  somewhat  dangerous  proximity  to  the  city.  In 
view  of  these  considerations,  the  board  projected  the  additional  works  on  the 
east  bank  and  middle  ground,  which  will  completely  protect  the  harbor,  compel 
an  enemy  on  tin's  side  to  land  upon  a  dangerous  coast  near  thirty  miles  from  his 
object,  and  to  enforce  his  blockade  by  riding  on  the  open  sea  with  a  dangerous 
coast  on  either  hand. 

Of  the  permanent  works  heretofore  erected  Castle  Clinton  ha-s  been  already 
ceded  to  the  city.  The  others  should  be  maintained  as  constituting  a  last  bar- 
rier, as.  affording  convenient  places  of  deposit  for  stores  and  munitions  of  all 
kinds,  and  of  rendezvous  for  recruits  and  good  positions  for  military  hospitals. 

The  total  cost  of  all  the  works  projected  by  the  board  is  estimated  at 
$5,201,834  28. 

Delaware  bay  and  city  of  Philadelphia* — The  coast,  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Hudson  to  the  Chesapeake,  as  well  as  that  on  the  south  side  of  Long  Island,  is 
low,  sandy,  covered  by  numerous  sandy  islands,  lying  near  and  parallel  to  the 
coast,  and  haA'ing,  besides  the  Delaware,  many  inlets  and  interior  basins,  but 
none,  with  this  exception, 'affording  water  enough  for  sea-going  vessels.  The 
Delaware  bay  itself  being  wide  and  full  of  shoals,  having  an  intricate  channel, 
and  being  much  obstructed  by  ice  at  certain  seasons,  affords  no  very  good  har- 
bor within  a  reasonable  distance  of  the  sea.  It  is,  however,  of  great  conse- 
quence that  the  deficiency  in  this  respect  should  be  remedied  by  artificial  means, 
not  only  on  account  of  the  value  of  the  commerce  of  the  upper  part  of  the  bay, 
which  is  hazarded  by  the  peculiar  dangers  of  the  lower,  but  also  on  account  of 
the  dangers  to  which  the  exterior  commerce  is  exposed  for  want  of  a  harbor  for 
so  great  an  extent  of  coast,  and  of  the  means  which  will  thereby  be  attained  of 
depriving  an  enemy  of  one  of  the  shelters  of  the  coast  not  othenvdse  defensible, 
and  of  rendering  the  blockade  of  this  and  the  neighboring  parts  of  the  coast 
more  difficult. 

Should  the  proposed  breakwater  near  Cape  Henlopen  be  constructed,  it  will 
be  necessary  to  provide  works  for  its  defence.  The  board  is  not,  however,  pre- 
pared to  present  a  plan  or  an  estimate  of  such  as  would  be  required. 

The  lowest  point  at  which  Philadelphia  is  defensible  is  at  Pea  Patch  island, 
about  forty-five  miles  below  that  city.  Fort  Delaware,  on  that  island,  now 
almost  completed,  together  with  a  permanent  work  on  the  Delaware  shore,  oppo- 
site a  temporary  work  on  the  Jersey  shore,  to  be  thrown  up  at  the  commence- 
ment of  a  war,  and  floating  obstructions  in  the  channel,  will  effectually  cover 
Philadelphia,  the  other  important  places  on  the  river,  and  the  outlet  of  the  canal 
connecting  the  Delaware  and  Chesapeake.  The  expense  of  the  permanent 
works  will  be  $817,025  45. 

9  See  report  of  1817  on  the  defence  of  the  Delaware ;  report  of  1820,  and  a  report  on  a  pro- 
jected breakwater  of  1821. 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  39 

Chesapeake  tiay* — The  naval  commissioners  and  board  of  engineers  en- 
trusted with  the  selection  of  sites  for  great  northern  and  southern  naval  depots 
recommended,  in  their  joint  reports  of  1819  and  1820,  BurwelFs  bay,  on  James 
river,  for  the  one,  and  Charlestown,  near  Boston,  for  the  other ;  they  also  re- 
commended Boston  harbor  andNarragansett  bay  at  the  north,  and  Hampton  Roads 
at  the  south,  as  chief  naval  rendezvous.  In  these  reports  the  commission  en- 
tered at  large  into  the  consideration  of  all  the  matters  relating  to  these  import- 
ant subjects.  The  board,  now  referring  to  those  reports  for  details  which  would 
too  much  encumber  this  more  condensed  communication,  will  first  briefly  advert 
to  the  objects  to  be  secured  by  defensive  works  in  the  Chesapeake,  and  next 
state,  in  their  order,  the  positions  to  be  occupied  and  the  mode  of  defence  pro- 
posed, so  far  at  least  as  these  have  been  determined. 

The  immediate  object  of  the  defence  of  Hampton  Roads,  near  the  mouth  of 
the  Chesapeake,  is  to  shut  this  roadstead  against  an  enemy,  and  secure  it  to  our- 
selves ;  to  cover  the  interior  navigation  between  the  Chesapeake  and  the  south- 
ern States ;  to  secure,  as  a  naval  place  of  arms,  a  point  serving  as  the  connect- 
ing link  between  the  middle  and  southern  coast,  whence  the  navy  may  protect 
the  exterior  trade  as  well  as  the  trade  of  the  bay ;  to  defend  the  public  estab- 
lishments at  Norfolk  and  such  as  may  be  made  at  James  river,  and  to  prevent 
an  enemy  from  making  a  permanent  lodgement  at  Norfolk.  Another  very  im- 
portant object,  but  more  remote,  as  requiring  all  great  temptations  to  be  placed 
•out  of  the  reach  of  an  enemy,  is  to  cover  the  coast  and  the  minor  settlements  of 
the  bay  from  predatory  attacks  ;  for  no  trifling  expeditions  would  ever  venture 
up  the  Chesapeake  while  a  portion  of  our  naval  force  occupied  the  road  at 
Hampton. 

The  object  of  other  fortifications  in  these  waters  is,  therefore,  to  cover  the  valu- 
able harbors,  cities,  and  trade  of  the  upper  part  of  the  Chesapeake. 

Hampton  Roads,  James  river,  and  Norfolk* — In  the  present  state  of  things 
an  enemy  may  land  in  Lynnhaven  bay,  and  in  one  or  two  days'  march  reach 
the  narrow  position  which  lies  to  the  east  of  Suffolk.  Bounded  on  one  side  by 
the  Dismal  Swamp,  and  on  the  other  by  Bennet's  creek,  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Nansemond,  this  position  cannot  be  turned,  and  may  be  easily  fortified.  Here 
he  might  defy  all  the  forces  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina.  Secure  of  a  re- 
treat so  long  as  his  fleet  occupied  Hampton  Roads,  he  could  only  be  driven  out 
by  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  involving  great  sacrifices  both  of  men 
and  money.  But  when  these  roads  are  fortified,  he  will  be  able  to  anchor  only 
in  Lynnhaven  bay  ;  his  march  then  upon  Suffolk  will  be  taken  in  flank  and  rear 
by  our  forces  crossing  Hampton  Roads,  and  he  will  therefore  find  it  impossible 
to  take  permanent  quarters  in  the  country. 

The  works  projected  for  the  defence  of  Hampton  Roads,  James  river,  and 
Norfolk,  are  :  First,  a  fort  and  advanced  lanette  at  Old  Point  Comfort ;  second, 
a  casemated  battery  on  the  Rip  Rap  shoals ;  and,  third,  a  line  of  floating  ob- 
structions extending  across  the  channel  between  these  works.  In  the  event  of 
a  great  naval  depot  being  fixed  on  James  river,  it  might  ultimately  be  advisable 
to  provide  additional  strength  by  adding  works  at  the  positions  of  Newport 
News,  Naseway  Shoal,  and  Craney  Island  flats.  Exclusive  of  these  the  cost  of 
the  projected  works  is  estimated  at  $2,164,147  69. 

The  existing  forts,  viz  :  Fort  Nelson  and  Fort  Norfolk  serve  for  the  defence 
of  Norfolk  and  the  navy  yard.  They  are  small  and  inefficient  works,  but  may 
be  made  useful  as  accessories  to  general  defensive  operations. 

Harbor  of  St.  Mary's.\ — The  central  situation  of  this  fine  basin  as  regards 
the  Chesapeake,  its  relation  to  the  Potomac,  its  depth  of  water,  and  the  facility 

*  See  reports  of  1819  and  1820. 
f  See  reports  of  1819  and  1821.  \  See  report  of  1819. 


40  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

wherewith  it  may  be  defended,  indicate  its  fitness  as  a  harbor'  of  refuge  for  the 
commerce  of  the  bay,  and  as  an  occasional,  if  not  constant  station  during  war. 
of  a  portion  of  our  naval  forces.  A  survey  of  the  harbor  and  the  surrounding 
country  has  been  made.  The  maps  are,  however,  not  yet  complete,  and  the 
board  are  unprepared  to  state  the  cost  of  the  defences. 

Patuxent  river.* — The  more  effectually  to  protect  the  city  of  Washington 
from  a  sudden  attack  by  troops  landed  at  the  head  of  navigation  of  the  Patuxent, 
and  to  provide  an  additional  shelter  for  vessels,  a  fort  has  been  projected  to 
occupy  Point  Patience,  and  another  Thomas's  Point,  about  six  miles  from  the 
Chesapeake.  Their  expense  will  be  $337,000. 

Annapolis  harbor.] — From  not  having  as  yet  been  able  to  consider  the  par- 
ticular subject  of  the  defences  of  this  harbor,  or  to  obtain  preliminarv  surveys, 
the  board  are  unable  to  state  whether  new  works  will  be  required. 

Harbor  of  Baltimore.] — The  proximity  of  Baltimore  to  the  bay  places  that 
city  in  a  dangerous  situation.  In  the  present  state  of  things  an  enemy  can,  in 
a  few  hours'  march,  without  being  exposed  to  a  separation  from  his  fleet,  after 
an  easy  landing,  make  himself  master  of  that  great  commercial  depot. 
.  Baltimore  requires  for  its  security  two  forts  in  the  Patapsco,  one  at  Haw- 
kins's Point  and  the  other  at  the  extreme  end  of  the  flat  on  Sollers's  Point.  Be- 
sides the  advantages  which  will  result  of  obliging  the  enemy  to  land  at  a  greater 
distance,  thereby  delaying  his  inarch,  gaining  time  for  the  arrival  of  militia,  and 
preventing  his  turning  the  defensive  position  our  forces  might  occupy,  it  will  be 
impossible  for  him  to  endanger  the  city  or  its  shipping  by  a  direct  attack  by 
water.  The  present  Fort  McHenry,  Redoubt  Wood,  and  Covington  battery 
should  be  retained  as  a  second  barrier. 

The  expense  of  the  fort  on  Sollers's  Point  flat  is  estimated  at. . .   S673,  205  44 
A  preliminary  estimate  of  fort  at  Hawkins's  Point  (to  be  corrected 
by  applying  the  project  with  more  accuracy  to  the  ground  than 
could  heretofore  be  done)  gives 244,  337  14 

Total 917,  542  58 


Mouth  of  Elk  river. — The  construction  of  the  Delaware  and  Chesapeake 
canal  will  make  it  necessary  to  place  a  small  work  somewhere  near  the  mouth  of 
the  Elk,  to  prevent  an  enemy  by  a  sudden  enterprise  destroying  the  works 
which  connect  that  canal  with  the  river.  Some  surveys  must  be  made  before 
the  most  suitable  location,  or  the  form,  or  the  cost  of  this  work  can  be  deter- 
mined. 

City  of  Washington,  Alexandria,  and  Georgetown.] — Fort  Washington,  a 
work  recently  completed,  covers  these  cities  from  any  attack  by  water,  and  will 
oblige  an  enemy  to  land  at  some  fifteen  or  eighteen  miles  from  Alexandria, 
should  that  city  be  his  object.  It  will  also  serve  the  very  valuable  purpose  of 
covering  the  troops  crossing  from  Virginia  with  a  view  to  fall  upon  the  flanks  of 
an  enemy  moving  against  the  metropolis.  All  these  objects  would  have  been 
better  fulfilled  had  the  work  been  placed  at  Lower  Cedar  Point ;  as.  it  is,  however, 
the  works  in  the  Patuxent  being  constructed,  and  the  militia  of  the  surrounding 
country  being  in  a  due  state  of  preparation,  an  enterprise  against  these  cities 
would  be  one  of  great  hazard.  The  cost  of  Fort  Washington  was  $446,467  37  ; 
a  small  work  should  nevertheless  be  placed  on  Lower  Cedar  Point. 

:sSee  report  of  1819,  and  memoir  on  the  defence  of  the  Patuxent,  1825. 
t  See  report  of  1819. 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND  SEA-  COAST  DEFENCES.        41 

From  the  mouth  of  the  Chesapeake  to  Cape  Hatteras  there  occurs  no  inlet 
navigable  by  sea-going'  vessels,  and  we  therefore  proceed  at  once  to  the 

SOUTHERN  SECTION  OF  THE  ATLANTIC  COAST.* 

This  coast  is  invariably  low,  and  for  the  greater  part  sandy,  much  resembling 
that  from  Cape  Hatteras  to  Montauk  Point.  A  ridge  of  sand,  occasionally  in- 
terrupted by  the  alluvion  of  the  rivers,  extends  throughout  its  whole  length  ; 
this  ridge  lies  in  certain  portions  on  the  main  land,  while  in  others  it  is  divided 
therefrom  by  basins  or  sounds  of  varying  width  and  depth,  and  is  cut  into 
islands  by  numerous  channels  of  greater  or  less  depth  connecting  these  interior 
waters  with  the  sea.  Wherever  this  ridge  is  broken,  its  place  is  supplied  by 
low  and  marshy  grounds,  bordering  the  principal  and  the  many  lesser  outlets  of 
the  rivers. 

The  nature  of  the  country  through  which  the  rivers  of  this  coast  flow  after 
leaving  the  mountains  is  such  that  the  banks  being  easily  abraded  by  the  cur- 
rent the  waters  are  always  turbid,  and  are  continually  transporting  new  supplies 
for  the  formation  of  alluvion  and  the  maintenance  of  extensive  submarine  banks, 
shoals,  and  bars ;  that  these  last  do  not  rapidly  increase  is  owing  to  the 
force  of  the  current,  the  action  of  the  sea,  and  the  mobility  of  the  particles  of 
matter.  It  is  to  this  cause,  viz  :  the  wearing  away  of  the  shores  of  the  rivers, 
that  is  to  be  attributed  the  want  of  harbors  on  this  coast  unobstructed  by  bars, 
and  which  as  a  coast  particularly  distinguishes  this  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
frontier  (where  similar  operations  have  been  going  on)  from  the  more  northern 
and  eastern  portions. 

The  board  have  not ,  examined  the  coast  of  East  Florida ;  their  description, 
therefore,  of  the  southern  coast  will  extend  no  further  than  Amelia  island  or 
mouth  of  St.  Mary's,  while  that  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  frontier  will  begin  at 
Pensacola. 

Ocracoke  Inlet,  Albemarle  and  Pamlico  Sounds.* — In  their  report  of  1821t 
the  board  adverted  to  a  project  then  if  not  now  in  agitation  to  open  a  navigable, 
direct  communication  from  Albemarle  sound  to  the  sea,  and  they  also  indicated, 
as  probably  a  less  expensive  and  a  less  dangerous  mode  of  transporting  the 
produce  of  the  Roanoke,  Tar,  and  Neuse  rivers  to  the  ocean,  a  canal  from  river 
to  river,  and  terminating  in  the  harbor  of  Beaufort,  North  Carolina.  If  the  first 
of  these  projects  be  executed,  defensive  works  would  be  necessary  at  the  new 
inlet ;  if  not,  no  others  will  be  needed  than  such  as  are  indispensable  in  any 
event  to  cover  the  important  harbor  of  refuge  at  Beaufort.  The  sjiallowness 
of  the  water  on  the  bars  at  Ocracoke  effectually  excludes  all  vessels-of-war  from 
the  harbors  within.  But  as  this,  in  the  present  state  of  things,  is  the  outlet  of 
an  extensive  commerce,  and  as  through  this  opening  attempts  might  be  made  in 
small  vessels  or  in  boats  to  interrupt  the  interior  line  of  communication  whereon 
so  much  would  depend  in  time  of  war,  it  would  be  proper  in  the  beginning  of  a 
war  to  throw  up  a  temporary  work  as  a  defence  against  all  minor  enterprises. 

Beaufort  harbor,  N.  C.f — Beaufort  harbor  and  the  mouths  of  Cape  Fear  river 
are  the  only  issues  navigable  by  vessels  of  more  than  a  light  draught  of  water, 
by  which  the  interior  of  North  Carolina  communicates  with  the  ocean.  They 
are  important  points  in  the  line  of  interior  navigation  to  be  sooner  or  later  opened 
from  the  Chesapeake  southwardly,  and  they  are  besides  the  only  harbors  of 
refuge  on  an  extent  of  coast  of  more  than  400  miles. 

The  fort  projected  for  the  defence  of  Beaufort  harbor  will  take  the  place  of 
the  ruins  of  Fort  Hampton.  Its  estimated  expense  is  $175,000. 

Mouths  of  Cape  Fear  river,  N.  C.f — It  is  proposed  to  defend  the  main  chan- 

*  See  report  of  1821. 

f  See  report  of  1821,  and  memoir  on  the  defence  of  Beaufort,  1824. 

j  See  report  of  1821,  and  memoir  on  the  defence  of  Cape  Pear  river,  of  1824. 


42  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

iiel  of  Gape  Fear  river  by  a  fort  on  Oak  island  and  another  on  Bald  Head,  and 
the  smaller  channel  by  a  redoubt  on  Federal  Point.  The  battery,  magazine, 
block-house,  quarters,  &c.,  &c.,  at  Smithville,  may  remain  as  accessories  ;  the 
cost  of  the  new  works  will  be  $251,000. 

As  the  board  have  not  hitherto  given  in  any  report  of  that  part  of  the  south- 
ern coast  which  lies  between  Cape  Fear  river  and  Amelia  island,  it  is  a  matter 
of  regret  that  they  cannot  at  once  give  the  full  and  accurate  account  of  the  in- 
teresting points  of  the  coast,  and  their  relation  to  each  other  and  to  the  country 
behind  them,  which  is  necessary  to  a  perfect  understanding  of  the  suitableness 
of  any  proposed  system  of  defence.  This  cannot  be  done,  however,  until  many 
surveys,  a  part  only  of  which  are  in  progress,  have  been  made.  The  board  will, 
nevertheless,  be  able  (from  their  personal  examinations  of  the  coast,)  to  point 
out  distinctly  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  points  requiring  defence.  Especially  as 
they  have  a  principle  to  guide  them  which  may  be  regarded  as  imperative, 
namely,  that  on  a  coast  possessing  few  harbors  like  this  it  is  at  the  same  time 
the  more  necessary  to  preserve  them  all  for  our  own  use,  and  the  more  easy  to 
deprive  an  enemy  of  that  shelter,  which  is  nearly  indispensable  to  a  continuous 
and  close  blockade. 

Georgetown  harbor. — The  first  inlet  of  any  consequence  south  of  Cape  Fear 
river  is  at  the  united  mouths  of  the  Waccamaw,  Pedee,  and  Black  rivers,  forming 
Georgetown  harbor.  The  two  latter  rivers  first  join  a  few  miles  above  George- 
town, (which  lies  at  the  mouth  of  Sampit  creek,  fifteen  miles  from  the  sea,)  and 
their  united  waters  mingle  with  those  of  the  Waccamaw,  opposite  that  town. 
Below  this  junction  the  waters  spread  out  to  a  considerable  width,  affording  a 
commodious  and  capacious  bay,  having  sufficient  depth  of  water  within  and 
upon  the  bar  near  the  mouth  for  merchant  vessels  and  small  vessels-of-war. 

It  is  probable  this  harbor  may  be  well  defended  by  a  work  placed  near  the 
mouth  of  Moschito  creek,  a  little  within  the  chaps  of  the  harbor,  or  perhaps  upon 
WinyaAv  Point.  The  present  fort,  situated  near  the  town  at  the  mouth  of 
'  Sampit  creek,  can  be  of  no  avail,  except  to  defend  the  approach  by  water  to  the 
town.  It  has  long  been  neglected,  and  is  in  ruins. 

Santec  river  and  Bull's  lay. — About  ten  miles  southwest  from  Georgetown 
.  entrance  are  the  mouths  of  the  Santce,  the  largest  river  in  South  Carolina. 
Whether  the  two  mouths  of  this  river  have  sufficient  water  on  their  bars  to 
permit  the  passage  of  vessels  of  any  draught,  the  board  are  not  informed  ;  should 
there,  as  is  believed,  be  too  little  water  for  sea-going  vessels,  there  can  be  little 
advantage  in  fortifying  them,  especially  as  the  greatest  proportion  of  the  valu- 
able products  of  this  river  are  now,  or  will  soon  be,  diverted  from  the  channel 
of  the  lower  part  of  the  river  by  canals  to  Charleston.  As  to  Bull's  bay,  the 
board  are  in  the  same  uncertainty  as  regards  the  depth  of  Avater  with  which  it 
is  accessible,  and  they  are  as  yet  doubtful  of  its  defensibility  if  accessible. 

Charleston,  S.  C. — The  city,  situated  at  the  junction  of  Ashley  and  Cooper 
rivers,  is  about  five  miles  in  a  direct  line  from  the  sea.  Between  ^it  and  the 
ocean  is  a  wide  and  safe  roadstead  for  vessels  of  any  draught.  Upon  the  bar, 
however,  lying  three  or  four  miles  outside  of  the  chaps  of  the  harbor,  there  is 
only  water  enough  for  large  sloops-of-war.  On  the  southwest  side  of  the  harbor 
is  James's  island,  through  which  are  several  serpentine  passages  more  or  less 
navigable  for  boats  or  barges  ;  some  of  these  communicate  directly  with  the  sea, 
and  some  with  Stono  river.  Whappoo  cut,  the  most  northerly  passage  from 
Stono  to  Charleston  harbor,  enters  the  latter  directly  opposite  the  city. 

Interior  natural  water  communications  also  exist  to  the  southwest  of  Stono 
river,  connecting  this  with  North  Edisto  river,  the  latter  with  South  Edisto  and 
St.  Helena  sound,  this  again  with  Broad  river,  and  finally  this  last  with  Savan- 
nah river.  On  the  north  side  of  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  lies  Sullivan's  island, 
separated  from  the  main  by  a  channel  navigable  to  small  craft.  To  the  north- 
east of  Sullivan's  island  an  interior  water  communication  extends  to  Bull's  bay 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES,  43 

and  even  beyond  to  the  harbor  of  Georgetown.  From  this  sketch  it  is  apparent 
that  it  will  not  suffice  to  defend  the  principal  entrance  to  the  harbor  "alone.  The 
lateral  avenues  must  also  be  shut.  Arid  it  is  probable  that  accurate  surveys 
will  show  that  the  best  mode  of  defending  these  latter  is  by  works  at  or  near 
the  mouths  of  the  inlets,  as  the  enemy  will  thereby  be  kept  at  a  greater  distance 
from  the  city,  the  lesser  harbors  formed  by  these  inlets  will  be  secured,  and  the 
line  of  interior  communication  will  be  inaccessible  from  the  sea. 
•  No  position  for  the  defence  of  the  principal  entrance  and  roadstead  can  be 
formed  nearer  the  ocean  than  the  western  extremity  of  Sullivan's  island.  This 
'is  at  present  occupied  by  Fort  Moultrie,  a  work  of  some  strength  but  by  no 
means  adequate  to  its  object,  its  battery  being  weak  and  the  scarp  so  low  as  to 
oppose  no  serious  obstacle  to  escalade.  How  far  this  work,  by  modifications  of 
its  plan  and  relief,  may  be  made  to  contribute  to  a  better  defence  of  the  harbor, 
cannot  now  be  determined.  The  northeast  point  of  James's  island,  projecting 
into  the  harbor  about  midway  between  Sullivan's  island  and  the  city,  is  the  site 
of  the  few  remains  of  old  Fort  Johnson ;  this  point  is  too  remote  from  Fort 
Moultrie  and  from  the  channel  to  be  occupied  by  a  new  work  if  a  better  posi- 
tion can  be  found.  The  probability  is  that  the  shoal  opposite  the  last  named 
fort  may  be  occupied  permanently  ;  and  if  so  the  fortification  of  the  harbor  may 
be  considered  as  an  easy  and  simple  problem.  Castle  Pinckney,  which  stands 
upon  a  small  island  a  little  below  the  city,  should  be  maintained  as  an  auxiliary 
in  the  defence  of  the  harbor,  and  as  serving  as  a  sort  of  citadel  in  case  of  inter- 
nal commotion. 

St.  Helena  sound. — The  board  must  wait  for  surveys  before  they  can  point 
out  the  defences  which  this  sound  should  receive.  Although  there  is  supposed 
to  be  no  great  depth  of  water  on  the  bar  at  the  mouth,  it  is  known  to  be  navi- 
gable by  the  smaller  class  of  merchantmen  and'to  have  a  navigable  communica- 
tion with  the  head  of  Broad  river,  or  Port  Royal.  Intersecting,  as  it  does,  the 
interior  navigation  between  Charleston  and  Savannah,  this  sound  will  require  de- 
fence, even  should  it  not  be  of  much  use  as  a  harbor  of  refuge  for  exterior  commerce. 

Broad  river,  or  Port  Royal  roads. — The  value  of  this  capacious  roadstead 
as  a  1) arbor  of  refuge  depends  on  the  depth  which  can  be  carried  over  the  bar, 
the  distance  of  this  bar  outside  the  line  of  coast,  and  the  means  which  may  be 
practicable  of  lessening  the  danger  of  crossing  it.  This  is  supposed  to  be  the 
deepest  bar  of  the  southern  coast.  Should  there  prove  to  be  water  enough  for 
small  frigates,  and  by  the  aid  of  light-houses  011  the  shore  and  lights,  or  other 
distinct  guides  on  the  bar,  should  the  passage  be  capable  of  being  rendered  easy 
and  safe,  this  road,  situated  as  it  is  within  sixty  miles  of  Charleston  and  twenty 
miles  of  Savannah  harbor,  and  intersecting,  as  it  does,  the  interior  navigation 
between  these  great  cities,  thereby  securing  the  arrival  of  supplies  of  every  kind, 
would  possess  a  very  high  degree  of  importance  as  a  naval  station  as  well  as  a 
harbor  of  refuge. 

The  survey  of  the  exterior  shoals,  constituting  the  bar,  should  be  made  with 
the  greatest  care  and  all  possible  minuteness.  It  is  only  when  this  shall  have 
been  done  that  the  true  relation  of  this  inlet  to  the  rest  of  the  coast  can  be 
known,  and  on  this  relation  the  position  and  magnitude  of  the  required  defences 
will  depend. 

Savannah  and  mouth  of  Savannah  river. — Mention  has  already  been  made 
of  the  natural  interior  water  communication  existing  along  the  coast  of  South 
Carolina.  A  similar  communication  extends  south  from  Savannah  river  as  far 
as  the  St.  John's,  in  East  Florida.  Owing  to  these  passages  the  city  of  Savan- 
nah, like  Charleston,  is  liable  to  be  approached  by  other  avenues  than  the  harbor 
or  river,  and  its  defences  must,  consequently,  have  relation  to  these  lesser  as  well 
as  to  the  principal  channels. 

The  distance  from  the  mouth  of  Warsaw  sound  or  even  of  Ossabaw  sound 
(both  to  the  southwest  of  the  river)  to  the  city  is  not  much  greater  than  from 


44  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

• 

the  mouth  of  the  river,  and  an  enterprise  may  be  conducted  the  whole  distance 
by  water,  or  part  of  the  way  by  water  and  part  by  land  from  either  or  both. 
As  in  the  case  of  the  like  channels  in  the  neighborhood  of  Charleston,  it  cannot 
now  be  determined  where  they  can  be  defended  most  advantageously. 

It  is  to  be  hoped,  however,  that  the  localities  may  prove  such  as  to  permit 
the  defences  to  be  placed  near  the  outlets  of  these  sounds,  where  they  will 
serve  the  double  purpose  of  protecting  the  city  and  covering  harbors  which,  in 
time  of  war,  cannot  but  be  very  useful. 

The  defence  of  Savannah  river  is  by  no  means  difficult.  A  fort  on  Cockspur 
island,  lying  just  within  the  mouth,  and  for  additional  security  perhaps  another 
on  Tybee  island,  which  forms  the  southern  cape  at  the  junction  of  the  river  with 
the  ocean,  would  effectually  prevent  the  passage  of  vessels  up  the  channel,  and 
cover  the  anchorage  between  Tybee  and  Cockspur.  The  present  Fort  Jackson, 
situated  about  four  miles  below  the  city,  should  be  maintained  as  a  second  bar- 
rier, both  as  respects  the  main  channel  and  the  passages  which  come  in  from  the 
south,  which  latter  would  not  be  at  all  controlled  by  works  at  Cockspur  or 
Tybee. 

The  surveys  required  preliminary  to  forming  a  system  of  defence  for  Savan- 
nah are  so  far  completed  as  to  enable  the  board  to  make  the  projects  and  esti- 
mates for  the  defence  of  the  main  channel  whenever  they  shall  be  ordered  to 
direct  then-  attention  to  them. 

A  few  months,  it  is  presumed,  will  suffice  to  complete  all  the  necessary  sur- 
veys from  Georgetown  to  Ossabaw  sound  inclusive,  excepting  the  bar  off  Port 
Royal  and  Bull's  bay  and  its  vicinity.  No  surveys  have  been  commenced  south 
of  Ossabaw  sound. 

South  of  Ossabaw  sound  on  the  coast  of  Georgia  are,  first,  St.  Catherine's 
sound,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Medway  river;  second,  Sapelo  sound;  third,  Doboy 
inlet;  fourth,  Alatamaha  sound,  at  the  mouth  of  the  great  river  of  the  same 
name ;  fifth,  St.  Simon's  sound,  at  the  mouth  of  Buffalo  creek ;  sixth,  St.  An- 
drew's sound,  at  the  united  mouths  of  the  Scilla  and  Santilla  rivers  ;  and,  seventh, 
Cumberland  sound,  at  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Mary's  river.  All  these  communi- 
cations with  the  ocean  are  highly  important  in  reference  to  the  interior  naviga- 
tion,, and  several  of  them  as  affording  access  to  excellent  harbors.  The  latter 
especially  is  known  to  be  navigable  by  the  largest  sloops-of-war  and  merchant- 
men, and  two  or  three  of  the  others  are  believed  to  be  little  if  at  all  inferior 
either  as  regards  depth  of  bar  or  safety  of  anchorage. 

Some  of  these  inlets  are  probably  easily  defended  by  forts,  others  may  re- 
quire floating  defences,  and  some  possibly  the  use  of  both  these  means. 

The  principle  to*  which  we  have  before  adverted  as  governing,  in  a  measure, 
the  defensive  system  of  the  whole  southern  coast,  is  enforced  in  relation  to  this 
particular  part  by  two  weighty  considerations,  namely:  its  remoteness  from  the 
nearest  naval  rendezvous,  the  Chesapeake,  which  is  on  a  mean  six  hundred  miles 
distant,  and  to  leeward,  both  as  to  wind  and  current ;  and  its  being  close  upon 
the  larboard  hand  as  they  enter  the  Atlantic,  of  the  great  concourse  of  vessels 
passing  at  all  seasons  through  the  Florida  channel.  While,  therefore,  this  part 
of  the  coast,  from  the  concentration  of  vessels  here,  is  in  great  need  of  protection 
of  some  sort,  naval  aid  can  be  extended  to  it  only  with  difficulty,  and  at  the  risk 
of  being  cut  off  from  all  retreat  by  a  superior  enemy. 

Accurate  and  minute  surveys,  which  will  enable  our  vessels,  whether  driven 
by  an  enemy  or  by  stress  of  weather,  to  shun  the  dangers  which  beset  the  nav- 
igation of  these  harbors,-  and  properly  arranged  defences  to  cover  them  when 
arrived,  seem  to  be  indispensable.  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  besides,  that  on  these 
harbors  being  fortified,  the  operation  of  investing  the  coast  and  watching  the 
great  outlet  of  commerce  through  the  Florida  gulf  would  be  a  difficult  and  haz- 
ardous one  to  an  enemy,  on  whose  part  no  perseverance  or  skill  could  avail  to 
maintain  an  uninterrupted  blockade,  or  to  avoid  the  occasional  shipwreck  of  his 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  45 

* 

cruisers;  while  on  the  part  of  our  small  vessels-of-war  and  privateers,  it  would 
at  all  times  be  easy  and  safe. 

Important  as  the  harbors  of  Georgia' now  are,  their  value  would  be  much  en- 
hanced by  the  execution  of  the  projected  canal  across  the  head  of  the  peninsula 
of  Florida. 

That  part  of  the  southern  coast  which  extends  from  the  St.  Mary's  to  the 
southern  extremity  of  East  Florida  is  said  not  to  possess  a  single  harbor  for  com- 
mon merchantmen. 

This  brings  us  to  the 

•GULF  OF  MEXICO  FRONTIER.* 

The  resemblance  of  this  portion  of  the  coast  to  that  which  we  have  denomi- 
nated the  southern  section  is  striking,  and  has  already  been  mentioned.  We 
may,  in  fact,  refer  to  the  description  we  have  given  of  the  principal  features  of 
the  latter  as  a  true  delineation  of  this.  In  respect  to  the  relation  of  the  coast 
with  the  interior  there  is,  however,  the  greatest  difference  between  these  two  fea- 
tures of  the  maritime  frontier.  For  Avhile,  in  the  case  we  are  now  to  consider, 
about  eight-tenths  of  the  whole  territory  of  the  United  States  is,  in  one  sense, 
tributary  to  the  coast,  in  the  other  not  more  than  one-tenth  is  connected  with 
the  seaboard  by  any  natural  ties. 

This  fact,  which  goes  to  show  the  very  deep  interest  which  a  large  propor- 
tion of  the  people  and  the  government  have  in  the  security  of  this  frontier,  is 
related  to  others,  which  hardly  have  an  alternative  as  to  the  mode  of  attaining 
that  security. 

From  the  relative  geographical  position  of  the  coast  and  the  country  interested 
in  its  safety ;  from  the  unhealthiness  of  its  climate,  the  nature  of  the  adjacent 
country,  the  mixed  character  and  diversity  of  interests  of  its  inhabitants,  it  will 
be  long  if  ever  before  that  portion  of  the  population  within  supporting  distance, 
whose  welfare  may  be  endangered  by  an  enemy,  will  be  competent  of  itself  to 
sustain  the  assaults  of  an  exterior  foe,  and  at  the  same  time  suppress  the  ener- 
gies of  a  more  powerful  and  vindictive  enemy  within.  Upon  the  Atlantic  sea- 
board the  Alleghanies  crowd  the  people  upon  the  coast,  and  surround  every 
alarm  post  of  the  frontier  with  a  more  and  more  dense  population,  and  the  ocean 
and  the  interior  parallel  navigation  enable  even  the  extremities  to  afford  mutually 
support  and  protection,  while  the  coast  of  the  Gulf,  although  weak  in  itself  and 
remote  from  succor  from  behind,  is  shut  out  by  its  peculiar  situation  and  its  dis- 
tance from  every  hope  of  lateral  assistance. 

Those  reasons,  therefore,  which  tend  to  establish  the  necessity  of  an  organized, 
a  permanent,  and  timely  system  of  defence  for  the  whole  seaboard  of  the  United 
States,  (some  of  which  were  advanced  in  the  commencement  of  this  report,) 
apply  to  this  portion  with  peculiar  force,  especially  if  we  consider  its  compara- 
tive feebleness  in  connexion  with  its  comparative  importance. 

The  interesting  and  vital  points  of  the  coast  and  the  mode  of  guarding  them 
will  be  pointed  out  as  we  proceed. 

It  has  already  been  observed  that  no  examination  had  been  made  by  the 
board  of  the  shore  between  the  southern  extremity  of  ^ast  Florida  and  Pensa- 
cola.  There  are,  however,  along  this  shore  and  in  the  Florida  reef  several  har- 
bors which  deserve  to  be  accurately  surveyed.  The  description  of  this  part  of 
the  coast,  as  well  as  that  on  the  east  side  of  the  peninsula  of  Florida,  and  that 
along  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas,  accompanied  by  plans  of  defence,  must  be  the 
subject  of  future  reports. 

•  Pensacola  lay. — The  upper  arms  of  this  considerable  bay  receive  the  Yellow- 


See  report  of  1817. 


46  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.' 

« 

water  or  Pea  river,  Middle  river,  and  Escambia  river,  the  tributaries  of  which 
latter,  interlocking  with  branches  of  the  Alabama  and  the  Chattahoochie,  indi- 
cate the  causes  whereby  at  some  future  day  canals  may  convey  a  part  of  the 
products  of  these  rivers  to  Pensacola. 

Santa  Rosa  sound  extends  eastward  from  the  lower  part  of  this  bay  into  Santa 
Rosa  bay,  whence  a  communication,  partly  natural,  partly  artificial,  may  possibly 
be  continued  eastward  to  the  Atlantic.  On  the  west  the  lagoons  of  Pensacola, 
Perdido,  and  Mobile  bays  respectively  interlock  in  such  a  manner  as  to  require 
but  a  few  miles  of  cutting  to  complete  a  navigable  channel  from  the  first  to  the 
last-named  bay,  and  thence  through  an  existing  interior  water  communication  to 
the  city  of  New  Orleans. 

The  contiguity  of  the  headwaters  of  the  large  rivers  emptying  into  this  part 
of  the  Gulf  to  the  upper  part  of  the  Tennessee  induces  the  belief  that  some  facile 
means  of  connecting  them  will  ere  long  be  discovered  and  applied. 

Thus  situated,  as  Pensacola  bay  is,  with  respect  to  the  country  on  either  hand, 
and  the  immense  regions  behind,  its  rare  properties  as  a  harbor  become  of  inap- 
preciable value.  Some  of  these  properties  we  will  enumerate :  first,  it  is  ac- 
cessible at  low  water  to  the  largest  class  of  sloops-of-war  and  small  frigates,  and 
as  the  bar  is  narrow  may,  perhaps,  be  made  to  admit  still  larger  vessels ;  second, 
its  bar  is  near  the  coast  and  the  channel  over  it  is  straight  and  easily  hit ;  third, 
it  is  perfectly  land-locked,  and  has  a  very  capacious  roadstead ;  fourth,  it  has 
excellent  positions  for  repairing,  building,  and  launching  vessels,  and  for  docks 
and  dock-yards,  in  healthy  situations  ;  fifth,  it  has  abundance  of  good  water  for 
the  supply  of  vessels ;  and  6th,  it  is  perfectly  defensible. 

As  these  and  other  properties,  in  conjunction  with  its  situation  as  respects  the 
coast  and  the  interior,  have  induced  the  government  to  fix  upon  it  as  a  naval 
station  and  place  of  rendezvous  and  repairs,  we  shall  for  the  future  consider  it 
in  that  character,  both  in  its  relations  to  the  commerce  of  the  Gulf  and  its  own 
proper  defences. 

Although  a  naval  station  nearer  the  extremity  of  East  Florida  might  possibly 
enable  our  vessels-of-war  the  better  to  watch  over  our  commerce  in  the  Florida 
stream,  still  no  deep  harbor  exists  to  the  south  of  Pensacola,  in  which  the  cir- 
cumstance of  an  entire  separation  from  all  relief  and  supplies  does  not  greatly 
outweigh  this  advantage,  if  indeed  it  be  more  than  imaginary. 

It  is,  however,  far  from  certain  that  the  Florida  stream  is  always  to  be  the' 
channel  of  communication  from  the  Gulf  to  the  Atlantic.  The  great  embarrass- 
ments and  losses  to  which  we  must  be  exposed  while  that  continues  to  be  the 
course  of  our  Gulf  trade,  so  long  at  least  as  we  have  not  the  mastery  on  the 
ocean,  and  in  fact,  so  long  as  the  island  of  Cuba  is  in  the  possession  of  another 
power,  to  say  nothing  of  the  natural  dangers  of  that  navigation,  have  directed 
the  public  attention  seriously  to  the  project  of  opening  a  shorter  and  safer  pas- 
sage through  the  head  of  the  Florida  peninsula.  No  obstacle  not  insuperable, 
it  is  presumed,  will  prevent  the  execution  of  this  grand  design ;  and  considered 
in  reference  to  such  an  outlet  Pensacola  is  most  happily  situated. 

But  the  object  of  a  naval  force  in  this  quarter  is  not  alone  to  watch  the  tran- 
sit of  commerce  to  and  from  the  Gulf,  it  has  the  coasting  trade  of  the  Gulf  to  pro- 
tect, it  has  piracies  to  suppress,  which  confine  themselves  to  no  particular  strait, 
and  above  all,  it  has  to  keep  an  uninterrupted  and  watchful  guard  over  the  place 
of  .deposit  as  well  as  the  issues  of  the  disposable  productions  of  a  region  with- 
out parallel  as  to  extent  and  fertility. 

Projecting  as  the  delta  of  the  Mississippi  does  into  the  Gulf,  the  position  of 
Pensacola  enables  it  to  direct  naval  operations  upon  the  rear  of  any  force  in- 
vesting or  moving  along  the  avenues  to  the  city  of  New  Orleans ;  and  at  the 
same  time  that  it  can,  almost  to  the  last,  with  the  help  of  a  fortified  line  of  in- 
terior navigation,  preserve  its  communication  with  that  city  unbroken ;  it  will  be 
at  no  moment  entirely  dependent  upon  that  line  for  the  supply  of  its  means  of 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  47 

defence  or  annoyance,  unless,  indeed,  the  proposed  artificial  connexions  with  the 
interior,  before  pointed  out,  should  be  found  impracticable. 

A  very  exact  survey  has  been  made  of  the  bay  of  Pensacola,  which  would 
suffice  for  forming  a  scheme  of  defence,  if  no  other  object  were  in  view  than  the 
security  of  the  town  and  harbor..  Considered,  however,  as  a  naval  station  and 
a  place  of  rendezvous  and  repairs,  further  surveys,  extending  a  greater  distance 
from  the  shores,  delineating  accurately  the  face  of  the  country,  and  showing  the 
several  avenues  by  land  and  water,  are  found  to  be  necessary. 

The  western  extremity  of  Santa  Rosa  island  is  nevertheless  so  situated  in  re- 
spect to  the  mouth  of  the  bay  as  to  require  in  part  the  same  works  in  either 
case,  and  the  board  can,  therefore,  whenever  ordered,  project  a  fort  for  this  posi- 
tion which  in  either  case  should  be  the  first  occupied. 

>  Per  dido  lay.* — This  bay  is  intimately  related  to  Pensacola  and  Mobile  bays 
both  as  regards  security  and  intercommunication,  and  should  be  surveyed  care- 
fully with  a  view  to  these  objects. 

Mobile  iay.t—rAs  the  subject  of  the  fortification  of  Mobile  bay  has  been 
treated  at  some  length  in  the  report  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  defences  made  in 
1817,  and  still  more  in  detail  in  a  special  report  of  1822,  the  board  referring  to 
these  communications,  especially  the  latter,  will  confine  themselves  here  to  a  few 
general  observations. 

This  bay  receives  at  its  head  the  two  rivers  Alabama  and  Tombeckbe,  which 
water  almost  the  whole  State  of  Alabama — a  State  the  fifth  in  the  Union  as  to 
extent  of  territory,  inferior  to  none  in  the  quality  of  its  soil,  and  hitherto  doubling 
its  population  every  four  years  since  its  admission  into  the  confederacy. 

The  probable  union  at  no  distant  day  of  the  rivers  discharging  into  Mobile 
bay  with  the  Tennessee,  whereby  this  bay  will  become  a  new  outlet  for  a  part 
at  least  of  the  productions  of  the  western  States,  independently  of  the  natural 
one,  the  great  distance  to  which  these  rivers  are  even  now  navigable  with  steam- 
boats, the  fertility  of  soil,  rapid  growth  of  population  and  trade,  the  close  lateral 
connexion  which  exists  with  New  Orleans  and  the  Mississippi  on  the  one  hand, 
and  Pensacola  bay  on  the  other,  serve  to  give  great  and  increasing  importance 
to  this  communication  with  the  Gulf. 

Referring  for  the  mode  of  defence  adopted  by  the  board  again  to  the  same  . 
reports  wherein  the  subject  will  be  found  treated  at  large,  we  now  only  add  that 
the  forts  on  Mobile  Point  and  Dauphin  island  and  the  tower  at  the  Pass  au 
Heron,  designed  to  defend  the  three  passages  into  the  bay  and  the  important 
anchorage  between  Dauphin 'and  Pelican  islands,  will  cost  $1,142,056  83. 

New  Orleans  and  the  delta  of  the.  Mississippi^ — It  is  altogether  unnecessary 
for  the  board  to  say  anything  in  this  report  with  a  view  to  illustrate  either  the 
amount  of  benefits  to  result  from  applying  a  well-adapted  system  of  defence  to 
this  part  of  the  coast  of  the  Gulf,  or  the  direful  consequences  flowing  from  leaving 
it  in  an  unprepared  and  defenceless  condition.  The  value  of  the  stake  is  now 
too  great,  is  too  rapidly  augmenting,  and  is  too  justly  appreciated,  for  the  nation 
to  suffer  its  safety  ever  again  to  hang  on  the  doubtful  issue  of  a  battle. 

We  pass  on,  therefore,  to  the  task  of  noticing  briefly  the  avenues  requiring 
defence  and  the  works  projected  to  attain  that  end,  refering  to  the  report  of  1817, 
as  embracing  all  the  relations  of  the  subject,  both  general  and  local. 

The  most  northern  water  communication  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Gulf 
is  by  the  passage  called  the  Rigolets,  connecting  Lake  Borgne  and  Lake  Pont- 
chartrain;  the  next  is  by  the  pass  of  Chef  Menteur,  (divided  from  the  former 
by  Isle  aux  Pine,)  also  uniting  the  same  lakes.  Through  these  passages  an 
enemy  entering  Lake  Pontchartrain  would,  at  the  same  time  that  he  intercepted 
all  water  communication  with  Mobile  and  Pensacola,  be  able  to  reach  New  Orleans 


0  See  report  of  1812.         f  See  reports  of  1817  and  1822.         J  See  report  of  1817. 


48  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

from  its   southern  shore,    or  he  might  continue  onward  through  Lake  Mair. 
Amite  river,  and  Iberville  river,  thereby  reaching  the  head  of  the  delta,  a  posi- 
tion which  he  could  easily  maintain ;  or  landing  within   the  mouths  of  Chef 
Menteur  he'  might  move  against  the  city  along  the  ridge  of  the  Geritilly  road. 

The  fort  for  the  defence  of  the  first  named  pass  is  completed  and  that  for 
Chef  Menteur  is  in  a  state  of  forwardness. 

To  the  southwest  of  the  latter  pass  and  at  the  head  of  Lake  Borgne  is  Bayou 
Bienvenu,  a  navigable  channel  (the  one  pursued  by  the  English  army  in  the  late 
war)  not  running  into  the  Mississippi,  but  having  shores  of  such  a  nature  as  to 
enable  troops  to  march  from  the  point  of  debarkation  to  the  city.  A  little  to  the 
south  of  this  is  Bayou  Dupre,  also  affording  easy  access  to  the  city.  The  few 
natural  difficulties  and  the  shortness  of  these  lines  of  operation  make  it  necessary 
to  place  a  fort  near  the  mouth  of  the  first,  and  a  tower  at  the  outlet  of  the  other. 

The  defences  of  the  Mississippi  itself  are  placed  at  Plaquemine  turn,  the  low- 
est position  which  can  be  occupied. 

Fort  Jackson,  now  building,  is  on  the  right  shore,  a  little  above  old  Fort  St. 
Philip.  This  last  work  it  was  intended  originally  to  improve,  and  an  estimate 
was  made  with  that  view;  from  a  recent  inspection,  however,  it  appears  to  be 
falling  too  rapidly  to  ruins  to  justify  such  an  undertaking.  It  is  nevertheli  — 
believed  that  that  estimate  will  suffice  for  a  new  work,  well  adapted  to  the  posi- 
tion. 

The  only  permanent  work  required  to  the  west  of  the  Mississippi  is  a  fort  to 
occupy  Grand  Terre  island,  for  the  purpose  of  defending  the  entrance  to  Barra- 
taria  bay,  an  excellent  harbor  for  a  floating  force  guarding  the  coasting  trade  on 
that  side,  and  whence  there  are  several  passages  leading  to  the  .Mississippi  near 
NCAV  Orleans. 

The  whole  cost  of  the  system  of  defence  for  New  Orleans  and  the  delta  of 
the  Mississippi  is  estimated  at  $1,566,515  42. 

None  of  the  old  forts  or  batteries  are  embraced  in  the  system. 
'  Before  leaving  this  part  of  our  subject  it  is  necessary  to  advert  to  the  import- 
ant uses  which  may  be  made  of  movable  floating  defences  in  aid  of  fortifications. 

The  applications  of  this  auxiliary  force  along  the  coast  of  the  United  States 
•might  be  numerous,  and,  as  has  been  before  remarked,  would  in  certain  cases_  be 
requisite  to  attain  full  security  for  all  the  objects  needing  protection.  In  'the 
instance  before  us,  for  example,  fortifications  will  enable  us  to  protect  the  city 
of  New  Orleans  even  from  the  most  serious  and  determined  efforts  of  an  enemy ; 
but  owing  to  the  great  width  of  the  passages  we  cannot  by  them  alone  deprive 
an  enemy  of  good  exterior  anchorages,  especially  the  very  excellent  one  west 
of  Chandeleur  island,  nor  ^cover  entirely  the  natural  interior  water  communication 
between  the  Rigolets  and 'Mobile. 

We  must  therefore  either  quietly  resign  those  powerful  means  of  annoying 
and  distressing  us  to  the  occupancy  of  an  adversary,  or  seek  their  preservation 
in  a  timely  preparation  of  a  floating  force  adapted  to  this  peculiar  navigation, 
and  capable,  under  favor  of  the  shelter  afforded  by  the  forts,  of  being  Always  on 
the  alert,  and  of  assuming  alternately  an  offensive  or  defensive  attitude  accord- 
ing to  the  designs,  the  conduct,  or  situation  of  the  enemy. 

As  these  means  of  defence  are,  however,  secondary  to  fortifications  in  every 
sense,  as  the  extent  to  which  they  may  be  needed  must  depend  on  the  relation 
of  our  naval  force  to  that  of  other  powers,  a  relation  continually  varying ;  and 
as  the  characteristics  of  this  species  of  'force  may  be  expected  to  be  modified  or 
even  radically  changed  in  this  age  of  rapid  advancement  in  all  the  arts,  it  is 
considered  premature  to  go  now  into  any  details  in  reference  to  its  application 
here  or  elsewhere. 

From  the  preceding  sketch  of  the  system  projected  for  the  defence  of  the 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  49 

-seaboard  of  the  United  States,*  it  will  appear  that  all  the  fortifications  proposed 
.are  not  of  the  same  pressing  necessity,  nor  of  like  importance ;  that  some  are 
required  immediately,  while  the  commencement  of  others  may  be  postponed. 
In  proceeding  to  class  them,  we  must  observe  that  the  works  of  the  most  urgent 
necessity  are  those  destined  to  prevent  an  enemy  from  forming  a  permanent  or 
even  momentary  establishment  in  the  country — those  which  will  defend  our  great 
naval  arsenals,  and  those  which  will  cover  our  chief  commercial  cities. 

In  the  second  class  we  will  place  such  as  defend  those  naval  stations  and 
cities  of  a  secondary  rank,  which,  either  from  natural  or  artificial  defences,  ex- 
isting works,  &c.,  are  not  entirely  without  protection,  and  can  wait  at  least 
until  the  more  important  points  are  secured  against  a  first  attack. 

Finally,  in  the  third  class  we  will  arrange  the  works  which  will  complete  the 
defensive  system  in  all  its  parts,  but  whose  construction  may,  without  great 
danger,  be  deferred  until  the  frontier  shall  have  received  all  the  successive  de- 
grees of  strength  resulting  from  the  gradual  erection  of  the  forts  of  the  first  and 
second  classes. 

A  fourth  class  is  added,  containing  such  works  as  will  be  necessary,  only  con- 
ditionally. 

Table  A,  joined  to  this  report,  has  been  drawn  up  on  these  principles,  and 
shows : 

First.  That  the  works  to  be  erected  during  the  first  period  will  cost 
$9,686,160  59,  will  require  2,610  men,  at  most,  to  garrison  them  in  time  of  peace, 
and  20,517  in  case  of  siege. 

Second.  That  the  works  of  the  second  class  will  cost  $2,314,309  47,^11  re- 
quire 666  men,  at  most,  to  garrison  them  in  peace,  and  6,841  in  case  of  siege. 

Third.  That  the  expense  of  the  works  belonging  to  the  third  class  will 
amount  to  $4,536,984  62  ;  their  garrisons  in  time  of  peace  to  635  men,  and  in 
case  of  siege  to  6,071  men. 

Fourth.  That  the  total  expense  of  completely  fortifying  the  maritime  frontier 
will  amount  to  $16,537,454  68;  the  troops  necessary  to  guard  these  fortifications 
in  peace  to  3,911  men,  at  most,  and  33,482  men  in  time  of  war,  supposing  them 
all,  which  cannot  happen,  besieged  at  once. 

The  time  required  to  construct  the  whole  system  must  depend  entirely  upon 
the  annual  appropriations  which  the  nation  may  grant  to  this  branch  of  the  pub- 
lic service.  All  that  can  be  said  upon  the  subject  is,  that  in  an  undertaking  of 
such  vital  importance  to  the  safety,  prosperity,  and  greatness  of  the  Union, 
there  should  be  no  relaxation  of  effort  and  perseverance.  A  work  of  such  mag- 
nitude must,  with  every  effort,  be  the  work  of  years  ;  and  however  long  it  may  be 
before  any  sensible  effects  are  produced,  the  final  result  is  not  the  less  certain. 
And  should  no  danger  threaten  the  republic  in  our  own  days,  future  generations 
may  owe  the  preservation  of  their  country  to  the  precaution  of  their  forefathers. 
France  was  at  least  fifty  years  completing  her  maritime  and  interior  defences, 
but  France,  on  more  than  one  occasion  since  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV,  has  been 
saved  by  the  fortifications  erected  by  the  power  of  that  monarch  and  the  genius 
of  Vauban. 

However  slow  the  progress  of  the  system  may  be,  from  the  necessity  of  a 
sparing  application  of  the  public  funds  to  this  purpose,  it  is  essential  to  disburse 
something  in  this  way  each  year,  so  as  to  give  to  the  frontier  an  annual  increase 
of  strength.  We  must,  therefore,  insist  011  the  advantage  of  dividing  the  course 
of  construction  into  several  periods,  according  to  the  greater  or  lesser  urgency ; 
of  beginning  the  works  successively,  agreeably  to  the  order  designated,  and  of 
rigidly  adhering  to  it.  By  this  mode  satisfactory  results  will  be  obtained  as 

*See  report  of  1821. 
H.  Rep.  Com.  86 4 


50  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

early  as  practicable,  while,  if  we  were  to  begin  all  at  once,  it  would  be  long  be- 
fore we  should  be  capable  of  defending  ourselves  anywhere. 

We  shall  now  enter  upon  the  subject  of  the  expense  of  erecting  these  works 
and  garrisoning  them  for  war,  and  compare  it  with  the  expense  of  defending  the 
coast  in  its  present  state.  To  clear  the  subject  as  much  as  possible  we  shall 
only  examine  it  with  respect  to  Boston,  Narraganset  bay,  New  York,  Phila- 
delphia, Baltimore,  Norfolk,  and  New  Orleans.  Charleston,  South  Carolina., 
and  Savannah,  Georgia,  would  also  be  included  if  we  knew  the  cost  of  the  de- 
fences and  the  amount  of  garrison  necessary. 

Supposing  an  enemy  had  concentrated  twenty  thousand  men  at  Halifax  or 
Bermuda,  the  government  must,  on  hearing  of  this  force,  at  once  prepare  to  re- 
sist it  at  all  the  points  mentioned  above ;  as  it  will  be  impossible  to  foresee  on 
which  the  first  blow  will  be  struck,  it  will  be  necessary  to  have  troops  encamped 
at  each.  And  to  meet  the  attack  with  a  force  not  less,  numerically,  than  that 
of  the  assailant,  the  troops  kept  constantly  under  arms  in  each  of  these  camp^ 
must  at  least  equal  one-half  of  the  hostile  expedition,  while  as  many  more  are 
kept  in  readiness  within  call.  These  points  are  so  immediately  accessible  in 
some  cases  and  so  remote  from  succor  in  others,  that,  after  the  point  of  attack  is 
announced  by  the  appearance  of  the  enemy  before  it,  there  will  remain  no  time 
for  re-enforcements  to  come  from  the  interior. 

By  manoeuvring  in  front  of  any  of  these  places  he  would  induce  us  to  con- 
centrate our  forces  there,  when,  suddenly  profiting  of  a  favorable  breeze,  he 
would  sail  to  another,  which  he  would  reach  in  a  few  hours,  and  would  not  fail 
to  seize  if  a  force  were  not  stationed  there  likewise  equal  to  his  own.  No  re-en- 
forcements can  in  this  case  arrive  from  the  interior  in  time,  for  all  the  troops- 
under  march  would  have  taken  up  a  direction  upon  the  point  he  had  just  quitted. 

Our  whole  coast  from  Maine  to  Louisiana  would  thus  be  kept  in  alarm  by  a 
single  expedition,  and  such  is  the  extent  and  exposure  of  the  seaboard  that  an 
enemy  would  ruin  us  by  a  war  of  mere  threatenings.  If  the  cities  are  not  gar- 
risoned they  will  become  his  prey  at  once ;  and  if  they  are,  the  treasury  will 
be  gradually  emptied,  the  credit  of  the  government  exhausted,  the  wearied  and 
starving  militia  will  desert  to  their  homes,  and  nothing  can  avert  the  direful 
consummation  of  tribute,  pillage,  and  conflagration. 

The  table  C  joined  to  this  report  shows  that  to  be  in  readiness  on  ^ach  of 
these  vulnerable  points  it  will  be  requisite  to  maintain  77,000  men,  encamped 
and  under  arms  at  the  seven  places  mentioned,  and  63,000  ready  to  inarch  and 
within  call. 

This  number  is  in  fact  below  that  which  would  be  required,  for  these  points 
being  exposed,  according  to  our  hypothesis,  to  an  attack  from  20,000  regular 
and  disciplined  troops,  20,000  militia  would  not  be  able  to  repel  them  unless 
aided  by  intrenchments,  requiring  a  time  to  construct  them  which  would  not  be 
allowed  us,  and  involving  expenses  which  we  do  not  comprise  in  our  estimate. 
Besides,  to  have  20,000  men,  especially  new  levies,  under  arms,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary, considering  the  epidemics  which  always  assail  such  troops,  to 'cany  the 
formation  of  these  corps  to  at  least  25,000  men. 

The  State  of  Louisiana  being  remote  from  succor  requires  a  larger  force  under 
arms  than  the  other  points ;  we  have  fixed  this  force  at  17,000,  considering  that 
the  State  might  furnish  3,000  within  call. 

Considering  all  expenses,  1,000  regular  troops,  including  officers,  cost  $300,000 
per  annum  and  $150  per  man  for  a  campaign  of  six  months ;  1,000  militia,  in- 
cluding officers,  cost  $400,000  per  annum,  $200  per  man  for  a  six  months* 
campaign. 

But  taking  into  consideration  the  diseases  which  invariably  attack  men  unac- 
customed to  a  military  life,  and  the  consequent  expense  of  hospital  establish- 
ments ;  the  frequent  movement  of  detachments  from  the  camp  to  their  homes  and 
from  the  interior  to  the  camp,  and  the  cost  of  camping  furniture,  utensils,  accou- 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  51 

trements,  &c.,.  which  is  the  same  for  a  short  campaign  as  for  a  year ;  the  cost  of 
a  militiaman  cannot  be  reckoned  at  less  than  $250  per  man  for  six  months. 

The  seventy-seven  thousand  militiamen  necessary  to  guard  the  above  men- 
tioned points,  in  the  present  situation  of  the  maritime  frontier,  will  therefore  cost, 
in  a  campaign  of  six  months,  $19,250,000. 

In  strict  justice  there  should  be  added  to  the  expense,  which  is,  we  believe, 
much  undervalued,  amongst  other  things,  the  loss  of  time  and  diminution  of 
valuable  products  resulting  from  draining  off  so  considerable  a  portion  of  efficient 
labor  from  its  most  profitable  occupation.  This,  besides  being  a  heavy  tax  on 
individuals,  is  a  real  loss  to  the  nation.  It  would  be  utterly  vain  to  attempt  an 
estimate  of  the  loss  to  the  nation,  from  the  dreadful  mortality  which  rages  in  the 
camps,  of  men  suddenly  exposed  to  the  fatigues  and  privations  of  military  life, 
or  to  compare  the  respective  values  in  society  of  the  citizen  and  the  soldier. 

The  total  expense  of  constructing  the  works  at  Boston,  Narraganset  bay, 
New  York,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  Norfolk,  and  New  Orleans,  will  amount  to 
$13,764,073  08,  (see  table  B,  and  previous  reports.)  Their  garrisons  may  con- 
sist of  the  same  number  of  regular  troops  in  time  of  war  as  in  time  of  peace, 
the  remainder  being  furnished  by  the  militia,  held  in  readiness  to  throw  them- 
selves into  the  forts  on  the  first  appearance  of  an  enemy.  By  this  arrangement 
2,980  regulars  and  24,000  militia,  either  in  the  works  or  in  small  corps  on  ad- 
vantageous positions,  making  26,980  men,  would  suffice  after  the  erection  of  the 
works ;  43,020  being  kept  in  readiness  to  march  when  called  upon. 

We  should,  therefore,  have  only  26,980  to  pay  and  support,  instead  of  77,000; 
and  the  expense  would  be  $6,447,000,  instead  of  $19,250,000.  The  difference, 
$12,803,000,  being  only  $961,073  08  less  than  the  whole  cost  of  the  fortifications, 
it  follows  that  the  expense  of  their  erection  will  be  nearly  compensated  by  the 
saving  they  will  cause  in  a  single  campaign  of  six  months. 

It  is  proper  to  add,  that  though  the  expense  of  these  works  will  be  great,  that 
expense  is  never  to  be  renewed ;  while  with  troops,  on  the  contrary,  the  expense 
is  annually  repeated,  if  not  increased,  until  the  end  of  the  war.  Besides,  the 
disbursements  for  fortifications  are  made  in  time  of  peace,  slowly,  and  to  an  ex- 
tent exactly  correspondent  with  the  financial  resources  of  the  country.  Armies 
are,  however,  most  wanted,  and  must  be  paid  in  periods  of  great  emergency, 
when  the  ordinary  sources  of  revenue  are  dried  up  and  when  the  treasury  can 
only  be  supplied  by  a  resort  to  means  the  most  disagreeable  and  burdensome  to 
the  people. 

The  defence  of  our  maritime  frontier  by  permanent  fortifications,  and  even  the 
disbursements  for  their  construction,  will  thus  tend  to  a  real  and  positive  econ- 
omy. The  vulnerable  points  being  reduced  to  a  small  number,  instead  of  wait- 
ing an  attack  on  every  point,  and  holding  ourselves  everywhere  in  readiness  to 
repel  it,  we  shall  force  an  enemy  to  direct  his  assaults  against  those  few,  which, 
being  well  understood  by  us,  will  of  course  have  received  a  timely  preparation. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  such  a  state  of  things  will  make  an  adversary 
more  reluctant  to  risk  his  expeditions,  and  that  we  shall  not  only  therefore  be 
better  able  to  resist  but  also  be  less  frequently  menaced  with  invasion. 

Some  prominent  military  writers  have  opposed  the  principle  of  fortifying  an 
extensive  land  frontier,  but  none  have  ever  disputed  the  necessity  of  fortifying 
a  maritime  frontier.  The  practice  of  every  nation,  ancient  and  modern,  has 
been  the  same  in  this  respect.  On  a  land  frontier  a  good,  experienced,  and  nu- 
merous infantry  may  in  some  cases  dispense  with  fortifications ;  but  though  dis- 
ciplined troops  may  cover  a  frontier  without  their  aid,  Undisciplined  troops 
cannot.  On  a  maritime  frontier,  however,  no  description  of  troops  can  supply 
the  place  of  strong  batteries  disposed  upon  the  vulnerable  points.  The  uncer- 
tainty of  the  point  on  which  an  enemy  may  direct  his  attack,  the  suddenness 
with  which  he  may  reach  it,  and  the  powerful  masses  which  he  can  concentrate 
at  a  distance  out  of  our  reach  and  knowledge,  or  suddenly,  and  at  the  very  mo- 


52  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES 

ment  of  attack,  require  that  every  important  point  be  duly  prepared  to  repel  his 
attempt  or  retard  it  until  re-enforcements  can  arrive  and  adequate  means  of  re- 
sistance be  organized.  By  land  we  are  acquainted  with  the  motions  of  an 
enemy,  with  the  movements  and  direction  of  its  columns ;  we  know  the  roads 
by  which  he  must  pass,  but  the  ocean  is  a  vast  plain  without  obstacle ;  there 
his  movements  are  made  out  of  our  sight,  and  we  know  nothing  of  his  approach 
until  he  is  already  within  the  range  of  the  eye.  In  a  word,  unless  the  vulnerable 
points  of  a  sea-coast  frontier  are  covered  by  permanent  fortifications,  their  only 
chance  of  safety  must  depend  on  the  issue  of  a  battle,  always  uncertain,  even 
when  disciplined  and  well-appointed  troops  inured  to  danger  have  made  all  pos- 
sible preparation  for  the  combat. 

As  for  the  garrisons  which  these  forts  will  require  in  time  of  war,  a  small 
portion  equal  in  number  to  the  peace  garrisons  should  be  of  regular  troops  :  the 
surplus  of  militia,  practiced  in  the  manoeuvres  and  drill  of  great  guns  ;  it  being 
necessary  that  the  greatest  part  of  the  troops  required  for  the  defence  and  ser- 
vice of  the  sea-coast  fortifications  should  be  artillery. 

This  brings  us  to  a  suggestion  or  two  in  relation  to  the  organization  of  the 
militia  forces.  Instead  of  the  present  small  proportion  of  artillery  the  States 
might  with  advantage  increase  the  amount  of  that  force  in  the  vicinity  of  each 
of  the  exposed  parts  of  the  coast,  so  as  to  be  equivalent  to  the  exigencies  and 
armament  of  the  works ;  substituting  for  the  usual  field  exercises  as  infantry, 
actual  drill  and  practice  in  the  batteries.  As  soon  as  a  movement  on  the  part  of 
the  enemy  would  threaten  the  frontier  of  the  State  this  force  should  throw  itself 
into  the  forts  and  there  remain  as  long  as  the  precise  point  of  attack  should  re- 
main uncertain.  In  most  parts  of  the  seaboard  it  would  also  be  advisable  to 
have  a  considerable  body  of  militia  horse  artillery,  as  being  an  useful  arm  in 
all  cases,  and  as  affording  a  defence,  always  applicable,  against  minor  and  pre- 
datory enterprises.  This  force  might,  in  part,  be  drawn  from  the  common  pro- 
portion of  cavalry. 

In  the  report  we  have  taken  no  account  of  the  interior  and  land  frontiers  of 
the  Union ;  they  have  not  yet  been  sufficiently  reconnoitred  to  enable  us  to  give 
an  exact  idea  of  the  system  of  defensive  works  they  may  require.  All  that  we  can 
say  by  anticipation  is,  that  from  their  general  topographical  features,  these  fron- 
tiers-can be  covered  at  a  very  moderate  expense  so  effectually  that  no  enemy 
will  be  able  to  invade  them  without  exposing  himself  to  disasters,  nearly  inevi- 
table ;  and  that  the  troops  of  the  United  States,  supposing  all  her  warlike  pre- 
parations well  arranged  beforehand,  will  be  able,  at  the  opening  of  the  first 
campaign,  to  carry  the  theatre  of  war  beyond  her  own  territory. 

If  to  our  general  system  of  permanent  fortifications  and  naval  establishments 
we  connect  a  system  of  interior  communications  by  land  and  water,  adapted 
both  to  the  defence  and  to  the  commercial  relations  of  the  country ;  if  to  these 
we  add  a  well  constituted  regular  army,  and  perfect  the  organization  of  our  mi- 
litia, the  nation  will  not  only  completely  secure  its  territory,  but  preserve  its  in- 
stitutions from  those  violent  shocks  and  revolutions  which,  in  every  age  and  in 
every  country,  have  been  so  often  incident  to  a  state  of  war. 

Table  A,  following,  contains  the  works  constituting  the  proposed  defensive 
system  for  the  maritime  frontier,  divided  into  four  classes. 

Table  B  contains  a  list  of  such  existing  works  as  it  is  contemplated  to  retain 
as  accessaries  to  the  system. 

Table  C  exhibits  a  comparison  of  the  cost  of  defending  certain  important 
parts  of  the  coast,  in  their  present  condition,  and  with  the  aid  of  the  projected 
works. 

Table  D  shows  a  possible  concentration  of  militia  forces,  in  eleven  days,  at 
Boston,  Massachusetts;  Newport,  Rhode  Island;  New  York,  New  York;  Phil. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  53 

adelphia,  Pennsylvania;  Baltimore,   Maryland;  Norfolk,  Virginia;  Charleston,. 
South  Carolina;  Savannah,  Georgia;  and  New  Orleans,  Louisiana. 
All  which  is  respectfully  submitted. 

BERNARD, 

Brigadier  General, 
JOSEPH  G.  TOTTEN, 
Major  Engineers,  Brevet  Lieutenant  Colonel, 

Members  of  the  Board  of  Engineer s- 
Brevet  Major  General  ALEX.  MACOMB, 

Colonel  Commanding  United  States  Engineers. 


54 


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'ort  at  narrows  of  the  Penobscot,  Maine  
^wer  at  Bayou  Dupre,  near  New  Orleans,  Louisian 
'ort  on  Dauphin  island,  mouth  of  Mobile  bay,  Alab 
ort  near  Provincetown,  Massachusetts,  fort  near  St 
cipal  fort  near  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire,  and  fo 
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ort  Griswold,  near  New  London,  Connecticut  .... 
ort  on  Nantasket  Head,  Boston  harbor,  Massachu 
ort  on  Hawkins's  Point,  near  Baltimore,  Maryland 
econdary  works  near  Pensacola,  Fla.,  Savannah,  Ga. 
ort  Sewall,  Marblehead  harbor,  Massachusetts  
ort  Preble,  Portland  harbor,  Maine  
'ort  on  House  island,  Portland  harbor,  Maine  
'ort  near  the  mouth  of  Kennebec  river,  Mainet  —  - 
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'ort  on  Jack's  Point,  Marblehead  harbor,  Massachu 
'ort  on  Cedar  Point,  Potomac  river,  Marylandt  — 
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THIRD  CLASS. 
Works  for  Mount,  Desert  island  and  Sheen's  Cut  river.  Maine*  .  . 

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Fort  on  Point  Patience,  Patuxent  river,  Maryland  . 
Fort  on  Thomas's  Point,  Patuxent  river,  Maryland. 
Fort  near  Beaufort,  North  Carolina  

Secondary  works  at  Portland,  Maine,  Portsmouth, 
Gloucester  harbor,  Massachusetts*  
Redoubt  for  Hog  island,  Boston  harbor,  Massachw 
Closing  Broad  Sound  passage,  Boston  harbor,  Mas 
Reducing  altitude  of  Gallop  island,  Boston  harbor, 
Works  for  New  Bedford  harbor,  Massachusetts*  .  . 
Closing  west  passage  of  Narraganset  roads,  Mass 
Works  for  Stonington  harbor,  Connecticut,  and  Sf 
Fort  Trumbull,  New  London  harbor,  Connecticut 
Fort  Hale,  New  Haven  harbor,  Connecticut  
Fort  Wooster,  New  Haven  harbor,  Connecticut  .  . 
Fort  on  Middle  Ground,  New  York  harbor,  New  1 
Fort  on  East  Bank,  New  York  harbor,  New  York 
Works  near  St.  Marv's.  Potomac  river.  Marvin  ml* 

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FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  61 


TABLE  B, 

Containing  a  list  of  the  existing  works  on  the  seaboard  which  it  is  advisable 
to  preserve  and  retain  as  accessories  to  the  proposed  system  of  defence 

DESIGNATION  OF  WORKS. 

Fort  at  WiscassetJ Maine. 

Fort  Preble,  Portland  harbor Maine. 

Fort  Scammel,  Portland  harbor Maine. 

Fort  McCleary,  Portsmouth  harbor J New  Hampshire. 

Fort  on  GloucesterJ Massachusetts. 

Fort  Independence,  Boston  harbor Massachusetts. 

Fort  Warren  and  dependencies,  Boston  harbor Massachusetts. 

Fort  at  New  Bedford J Massachusetts. 

'Fort  Wolcott,  Narraganset  roads Rhode  Island. 

Fort  Green,  Narraganset  roads Rhode  Island. 

Fort  at  Sag  HarborJ New  York. 

Fort  Hale,  New  Haven  harbor , . .  Connecticut. 

Fort  Columbus,  Governor's  island,  New  York  harbor New  York. 

Castle  Williams,  Governor's  island,  New  York  harbor New  York. 

South  Battery,  Governor's  island,  New  York  harbor New  York. 

Fort  Wood,  Bedloe's  island,  New  York  harbor New  York. 

Fort  Gibson,  Ellis's  island,  New  York  harbor New  York. 

Fort  Gansevoort,  City  of  New  York New  York. 

Battery,  Hubert  island,  City  of  New  York New  York. 

Fort  Lafayette,  narrows  of  New  York  harbor New  York. 

Fort  Mifflin,  Delaware  river Pennsylvania. 

Fort  McHenry ,  Baltimore  harbor Maryland. 

Fort  Madison,  Annapolis  harbor  J Maryland. 

Fort  Severn,  Annapolis  harbor  J Maryland. 

Fort  Washington,  Potomac  river Maryland. 

Fort  Norfolk,  Hampton  roads Virginia. 

Fort  Neilson,  Hampton  roads Virginia. 

Fort  Moultrie,  Charleston  harbor^ South  Carolina. 

Castle  Pinckney ,  Charleston  harbor South  Carolina. 

Fort  Jackson,  Savannah  river Georgia. 

Fort  St.  Philip,  Mississippi  river  J Louisiana. 

REMARKS. 

Some  of  these  will  be  modified  by  the  new  system,  and  some,  on  further  examination, 
may  have  to  give  place  to  new  works  ;  these  last  are  marked  thus  J 

It  is  probable  that  several  works,  deserving  a  place  in  this  list,  have  been  omitted. 

All  existing  works  on  the  eoa*t,  without  exception,  should  be  maintained  until  the  new 
system  is  applied  to  the  ground  they  occupy,  or  to  the  neighboring  coast. 


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Expense  of  the  troops  kept  under  pay 
with  the  proposed  works. 

PUB  s-iBinShu  jo  asiiiuJxg 

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Number  of  troops  necessary  with  the  existing  works  140,  000 
Number  of  troops  lequircd  with  the  projected  works,  under  pay  and  within  call  70,000 

Expense  of  defending  the  above-mentioned  points  during  a  campaign  of  six  months  with  the  existing  works  $19,250,000 
Expense  of  defending  the  above-mentioned  points  during  a  campaign  of  six  months  with  the  projected  works  6,447,000 

Difference...  12,803,000 

)f  expense  between  the  two  systems  will  amount  to  within  $961,073  08  of  the  whole  cost  of  the  projected  works.  The  expense 
ch  gives  for  the  cost  of  a  regular  soldier  $300  per  annum,  and  for  the  cost  of  a  militia  soldier  $500  per  annum,  the  expense  of 
he  made  of  the  enormous  contingent  expenses  in  assembling,  organizing,  and  providing  militia  forces,  of  hospitals,  waste  of 
>elow  the  truth.  The  forces  under  pay  necessary  for  defence,  with  the  proposed  works,  consist  of  pence  garrisons,  increased  by 
stationed  upon  the  lines  of  approach  of  an  enemy. 

osiii|«  all  militia  serving  six  mouths  and  costing  on  an  average  $250  per  in  (in, 

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FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA  COAST   DEFENCES. 


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•64  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

No.  3. 

[Ho.  HEPS.,  Ex.  Doc.  No.  243,  24TH  CONGRESS,   IST  SESSION] 

MESSAGE  FROM  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  TO  THE  SENATE  OF 
THE  UNITED  STATES,  ACCOMPANIED  WITH  REPORTS  FROM  THE  SECRETA- 
RIES OF  WAR  AND  NAVY,  RELATIVE  TO  THE  MILITARY  AND  NAVAL  DE- 
FENCES OF  THE  COUNTRY. 

To  the  Senate: 

I  transmit  herewith  reports  from  the  Secretaries  of  the  War  and  Navy 
Departments,  to  whom  were  referred  the  resolutions  adopted  by  the  Senate  on 
the  18th  of  February  last,  requesting  information  of  the  probable  amount  of 
appropriations  that  would  be  necessary  to  place  the  land  and  naval  defences  of 
the  country  upon  a  proper  footing  of  strength  and  respectability. 

In  respect  to  that  branch  of  the  subject  which  falls  more  particularly  under 
the  notice  of  the  Secretaiy  of  War,  and  in  the  consideration  of  which  he  has 
arrived  at  conclusions  different  from  those  contained  in  the  report  from  the 
Engineer  bureau,  I  think  it  proper  to  add  my  concurrence  in  the  views  expressed 
by  the  Secretary. 

ANDREW  JACKSON. 

WASHINGTON,  April  8,  1836. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  WAR,  April  7,  1836. 

SIR  :  In  conformity  with  your  instructions,  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  reports 
from  the  engineer  and  ordnance  departments,  furnishing  so  much  of  the  informa- 
tion required  by  the  resolution  of  the  Senate  of  February  18,  1836,  as  relates  to 
the  fortifications  of  the  country,  and  to  a  supply  of  the  munitions  of  war.  The 
former  branch  of  this  subject  has  required  laborious  investigations  on  the  part 
of  the  officers  charged  with  this  duty,  and  their  report  has  therefore  been  longer 
delayed  than,  under  other  circumstances,  would  have  been  proper;  but  the  whole 
matter  was  too  important  to  have  the  interests  involved  in  it  sacrificed  to  undue 
precipitancy. 

The  engineer  report  was  received  at  the  department  on  Friday  last,  and  I 
have  embraced  such  portions  of  the  intervening  time  as  other  official  calls  and 
a  slight  indisposition  would  allow  me  to  devote  to  its  examination.  I  did  not 
consider  that  any  suggestions  I  could  make  would  justify  a  further  delay  at  this 
advanced  stage  of  the  session,  while  at  the  same  time,  I  am  aware  that  this 
letter  will  need  all  the  allowance  which  these  circumstances  can  claim  for  it. 

It  is  obvious  that,  in  the  consideration  of  any  general  and  permanent  system 
of  national  defence,  comprehensive  views  are  not  only  necessary,  but  professional 
experience  and  a  knowledge  of  practical  details ;  such  information,  in  fact,  as 
must  be  obtained  by  long  and  careful  attention  to  the  various  subjects  which 
form  the  elements  of  this  inquiry.  Although,  therefore,  I  do  not  concur  in  all 
the  suggestions  contained  in  these  reports,  and  more  particularly  in  those  which 
relate  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  some  of  our  preparations,  still  I  have  thought 
it  proper  to  lay  them  before  you,  rather  than  to  substitute  any  peculiar  views  of 
my  own  for  them.  Both  furnish  facts  highly  interesting  to  the  community,  and 
if  they  anticipate  dangers  which  it  may  be  thought  are  not  likely  to  happen, 
and  suggest  preparations  which  future  exigencies  will  not  probably  require,  they 
are  still  valuable  documents,  presenting  the  necessary  materials  for  the  action 
of  the  legislature.  The  report  from  the  engineer  department,  in  particular 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  65 

evinces  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  whole  subject,  while,  at  the  same  time, 
its  general  views  are  sound  and  comprehensive.  I  consider  it  a  very  able 
document. 

Under  these  circumstances,  I  have  thought  it  proper  to  submit  some  general 
remarks,  explanatory  of  my  own  views,  concerning  a  practical  system  of  defence, 
and  which  will  show  how  far  the  plans  and  details  are  in  conformity  with  my 
opinion.  I  feel  that  this  course  is  due  to  myself. 

I  shall  confine  my  observations  to  the  maritime  frontier.  Our  inland  border 
rests,  in  the  southwest  and  northeast,  upon  the  possessions  of  civilized  nations, 
and  requires  defensive  preparations  to  meet  those  contingencies  only  which,  in 
the  present  state  of  society,  we  may  reasonably  anticipate.  In  the  existing 
intercourse  of  nations,  hostilities  can  scarcely  overtake  us  so  suddenly  as  not  to 
leave  time  to  move  the  necessary  force  to  any  point  upon  these  frontiers  threatened 
with  attack.  I  am  not  aware  of  any  peculiar  position  upon  either  of  these  lines 
of  separation  which  commands  the  approaches  to  the  country,  or  whose  posses- 
sion would  give  much  superiority  to  an  invading  or  defensive  force.  In  fact, 
the  division  is,  in  bpth  cases,  an  artificial  line  through  much  of  its  extent,  and  a 
portion  of  the  natural  boundary  offers  scarcely  any  impediment  to  military  opera- 
tions. Under  such  circumstances,  it  seems  altogether  inexpedient  to  construct 
expensive  fortifications,  which  would  do  little  more  than  protect  the  space  under 
cover  of  their  guns;  which  are  not  required  as  places  of  depot;  which  guard 
no  avenue  of  communication,  and  which  would  leave  the  surrounding  country 
penetrable  in.  all  directions.  Without  indulging  in  any  improper  speculations 
concerning  the  ultimate  destiny  of  any  portion  of  the  country  in  juxtaposition 
with  us,  or  looking  for  security  to  any  political  change,  we  may  safely  anticipate 
that  our  own  advance  in  all  the  elements  of  power  will  be  at  lea'st  equal 
to  that  of  the  people  who  adjoin  us ;  nor  does  the  most  prudent  forecast  dictate 
any  precautions,  founded  upon  the  opinion  that  our  relative  strength  will  de- 
crease and  theirs  increase.  The  lake  frontier,  indeed,  presents  some  peculiar 
consideration;  and  I  think  the  views  submitted  by  the  engineer  department, 
respecting  Lake  Ohamplain,  are  entitled  to  much  weight.  This  long,  narrow 
sheet  of  navigable  water  opens  a  direct  communication  into  the  States  of  New 
York  and  Vermont,  while  its  outlet  is  in  a  foreign  country,  and  is  commanded 
by  a  position  of  great  natural  strength.  It  is  also  within  a  few  miles  of  the 
most  powerful  and  populous  portion  of  Canada,  and  open  to  all  its  resources 
and  energies.  With  a  view,  perhaps,  to  possible  rather  than  to  probable  events, 
it  may  be  deemed  expedient  to  construct  a  work  at  some  proper  site  within  our 
boundary  which  shall  close  the  entrance  of  the  lake  to  all  vessels  ascending  its 
outlet.  As  such  a  work,  however,  would  be  an  advanced  post,  and,  from  cir- 
cumstances, peculiarly  liable  to  attack,  its  extent  and  defences  should  be  in 
proportion  to  its  exposure. 

There  is  already  a  considerable  commercial  marine  upon  the  four  great  lakes, 
Ontario,  Erie,  Huron,  and  Michigan,  which  are  open  to  the  enterprise  of  our 
citizens.  And  this  will  increase  with  the  augmenting  population  which  is  flowing 
in  upon  the  regions  washed  by  these  internal  seas.  It  is  obvious  that,  from 
natural  causes,  the  physical  superiority  will  be  found  upon  the  southern  shores 
of  these  lakes.  The  resolution  of  the  Senate  embraces  the  inquiry  into  the 
expediency  of  constructing  permanent  fortifications  in  this  quarter.  And  this 
inquiry  properly  divides  itself  into  two  branches  : 

1st.  The  policy  of  fortifying  the  harbors  on  the  lakes ;  and, 

2d.  The  policy  of  commanding,  by  permanent  works,  the  communications 
between  them. 

Both  of  these  measures  presuppose  that  the  naval  superiority  upon  tl*se 
waters  may  be  doubtful.  But  it  is  difficult  to  foresee  the  probable  existence  of 
any  circumstances  which  would  give  this  ascendency  to  the  other  party.  It  is 

H.  Rep.  Com.  86 5 


66  FORTIFICATIONS  AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

unnecessary  to  investigate  the  considerations  wliicli  bear  upon  this  subject,  as 
they  are  too  obvious  to  require  examination.  They  are  to  be  seen  and  felt  in 
all  those  wonderful  evidences  of  increase  and  improvement  which  are  now  in' 
such  active  operation.  A  victorious  fleet  upon  these  lakes  could  disembark  an 
army  at  almost  any  point.  If  a  harbor  were  closed  by  fortifications  they  would 
only  have  to  seek  the  nearest  beach,  and  land  their  men  from  boats,  so  that  no 
defences  we  could  construct  would  secure  us  against  invasion ;  and  temporary 
block-houses  and  batteries  would  probably  be  found  sufficiently  powerful  to 
repel  the  attacks  of  any  vessels  seeking  to  enter  the  narrow  harbors  upon  the 
lakes,  if  we  could  foresee  the  existence  of  any  circumstances  which  would 
induce  an  enemy  to  endeavor  to  force  an  entrance  into  them. 

As  to  the  communication  between  the  lakes,  the  inquiry,  from  geographical 
causes,  is  necessarily  restricted  to  that  from  Lake  Erie  to  Lake  Huron,  and  to 
the  straits  of  Michilimackinac.  Of  the  former,  almost  sixty  miles  consist  of  two 
rivers,  completely  commanded  from  their  opposite  banks,  while  the  entrance  into 
one  of  these,  the  river  St.  Glair,  is  impeded  by  a  bar,  over  which  there  are  but 
about  eight  feet  of  water.  No  armed  vessels  could  force  their  way  up  these 
rivers  while  the  shores  were  in  an  enemy's  possession,  who  might  construct  bat- 
teries at  every  projecting  point,  and  who,  in  fact,  might  in  many  places  sweep 
the  decks  with  musketry.  As  to  the  straits  of  Michilimackinac,  they  are  too 
broad  to  be  commanded  by  stationary  fortifications,  even  if  any  circumstances 
should  lead  to  the  construction  and  equipment  of  a  hostile  fleet  upon  the  bleak 
and  remote  shores  of  Matchedask  bay,  in  the  northeastern  extremity  of  Lake 
Huron. 

I  am  therefore  of  opinion  that  our  lake  frontier  requires  no  permanent  defences, 
and  that  we  may  safely  rely  for  its  security  upon  those  resources,  both  in  the 
personnel  and  materiel,  which  the  extent  and  other  advantages  our  country 
insures  to  us,  and  which  must  give  us  the  superiority  in  that  quarter. 

It  may,  perhaps,  be  deemed  expedient  to  establish  a  depot  for  the  reception  of 
munitions  of  war  in  some  part  of  the  peninsula  of  Michigan,  and  to  strengthen 
it  by  such  defences  as  will  enable  it  to  resist  any  coup  de  main  which  may  be 
attempted.  From  the'  geographical  features  of  the  country,  our  possessions  here 
recede  from  their  natural  points  of  support,  and  are  placed  in  immediate  contact 
with  a  fertile  and  populous  part  of  the  neighboring  colony.  In  the  event  of 
disturbances,  the  ordinary  communications  might  be  interrupted,  and  it  would 
probably  be  advisable  to  have  in  deposit  a  supply  of  all  the  necessary  means  for 
offensive  or  defensive  operations,  and  to  place  these  beyond  the  reach  of  any 
enterprising  officer  who  might  be  disposed,  by  a  sudden  movement,  to  gain  pos- 
session of  them.  The  expenditure  for  such  an  object  would  be  comparatively 
unimportant,  even  should  the  contingency  be  judged  sufficiently  probable  to 
justify  precautionary  measures. 

I  had  the  honor,  in  a  communication  to  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Military  Affairs  of  the  Senate,  dated  February  19,  1836,  a  copy  of  which  was 
sent  to  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  of  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives, to  suggest  the  mode  best  adapted,  in  my  opinion,  to  secure  our 
frontier  against  the  depredations  of  the  Indians.  The  basis  of  the  plan  was  the 
establishment  of  a  road  from  some  point  upon  the  upper  Mississippi  to  Red 
river,  passing  west  of  Missouri  and  Arkansas,  and  the  construction  of  posts  in 
proper  situations  along  it.  I  think  the  ordinary  mode  of  construction  ought  not 
to  be  departed  from.  Stockaded  forts,  with  log  block-houses,  have  been  found 
fully  sufficient  for  all  the  purposes  of  defence  against  Indians.  They  may  be 
built  speedily,  with  little  expense,  and,  when  necessary,  by  the  labor  of  the 
troops.  Our  Indian  boundary  has  heretofore  been  a  receding,  not  a  stationary 
one,  and  much  of  it  is  yet  of  this  character.  And  even  where  we  have  planted 
the  Indians  who  have  been  removed,  and  guaranteed  their  permanent  occupation 
of  the  possessions  assigned  to  them,  we  may  find  it  necessary,  in  the  redemption 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  67 

of  the  pledge  we  have  given  to  protect  them,  to  establish  posts  upon  their  exte- 
rior boundary,  and  thus  prevent  collisions  between  them  and  the  ruder  indige- 
nous tribes  of  that  region.  I  think,  therefore,  tlfat  no  works  of  a  more  permanent 
character  than  these  should  be  constructed  upon  our  Indian  frontier.  A  cordon 
established  at  proper  distances  upon  such  a  road,  with  the  requisite  means  of 
operation  deposited  in  the  posts,  and  with  competent  garrisons  to  occupy  them, 
would  probably  afford  greater  security  to  the  advanced  settlements  than  any 
other  measures  in  our  power.  The  dragoons  should  be  kept  in  motion  along  it 
during  the  open  season  of  the  year,  when  Indian  disturbances  are  most  to  be 
apprehended,  and  their  presence  and  facility  of  movement  would  tend  power- 
fully to  restrain  the  predatory  disposition  of  the  Indians ;  and  if  any  sudden 
impulse  should  operate  or  drive  them  into  hostilities,  the  means  of  assembling  a 
strong  force,  with  all  necessary  supplies,  would  be  at  hand,  and,  as  circumstances 
permit,  the  posts  in  the  Indian  country  now  in  the  rear  of  this  proposed  line  of 
operations  should  be  abandoned  and  the  garrisons  transferred  to  it. 

But  it  is  upon  our  maritime  frontier  that  we  are  most  exposed.  Our  coast 
for  three  thousand  miles  is  washed  by  the  ocean,  which  separates  us  from  those 
nations  who  have  made  the  highest  advances  in  all  the  arts,  and  particularly 
in  those  which  minister  to  the  operations  of  war,  and  with  whom,  from  our  in- 
tercourse and  political  relations,  we  are  most  liable  to  be  drawn  into  collision. 
If  this  great  medium  of  communication,  the  element  at  the  same  time  of  sepa- 
ration and  of  union,  interposes  peculiar  obstacles  to  the  progress  of  hostile  demon- 
strations, it  also  offers  advantages  which  are  not  less  obvious,  and  which,  to  be 
successfully  resisted,  require  corresponding  arrangements  and  exertions.  These 
advantages  depend  on  the  economy  and  facility  of  transportation,  on  the  celerity 
of  movement,  and  on  the  power  of  an  enemy  to  threaten  the  whole  shore 
spread  out  before  him,  and  to  select  his  point  of  attack  at  pleasure.  A  powerful 
hostile  fleet  upon  the  coast  of  the  United  States  presents  some  of  the  features 
of  a  war,  where  a  heavy  mass  is  brought  to  act  against  detachments  which  may 
be  cut  up  in  detail,  although  their  combined  force  would  exceed  the  assailing 
foe.  Our  points  of  exposure  are  so  numerous  and  distant  that  it  would  be  im- 
practicable to  keep,  at  each  of  them,  a  force  competent  to  resist  the  attack  of 
an  enemy,  prepared  by  his  naval  ascendency,  and  his  other  arrangements,  to 
make  a  sudden  and  vigorous  inroad  upon  our  shores.  It  becomes  us,  therefore, 
to  inquire  how  the  consequences  of  this  state  of  things  are  to  be  best  met  and 
averted. 

The  first  and  most  obvious,  and  in  every  point  of  view  the  most  proper, 
method  of  defence  is  an  augmentation  of  our  naval  means  to  an  extent  propor- 
tioned to  the  resources  and  the  necessities  of  the  nation.  I  do  not  mean  the 
actual  construction  and  equipment  of  vessels  only.  The  number  of  those  in 
service  must  depend  on  the  state  of  the  country  at  a  given  period ;  but  I  mean 
the  collection  of  all  such  materials  as  may  be  preserved  without  injury,  and  a 
due  encouragement  of  those  branches  of  interest  essential  to  the  growth:  of  a 
navy,  and  which  may  be  properly  nurtured  by  the  government ;  so  that,  on  the 
approach  of  danger,  a  fleet  may  put  to  sea,  without  delay,  sufficiently  powerful 
to  meet  any  force  which  will  probably  be  sent  to  our  coast. 

Our  great  battle  upon  the  ocean  is  yet  to  be  fought,  and  we  shall  gain  nothing 
by  shutting  our  eyes  to  the  nature  of  the  struggle,  or  to  the  exertions  we-  shall 
find  it  necessary  to  make.  All  our  institutions  are  essentially  pacific,  and  every 
citizen  feels  that  his  share  of  the  common  interest  is  affected  by  the  derange- 
ment of  business,  by  the  enormous  expense,  and  by  the  uncertain  result,  of  a 
war.  This  feeling  presses  upon  the  community  and  the  government  and  is<  a 
sure  guarantee  that  we  shall  never  be  precipitated  into  a  contest,  nor  embark  in 
one,  unless  imperiously  required  by  those  considerations  which  leave  no  alterna- 
tive between  resistance  and  dishonor.  Accordingly,  all  our  history  shows  that 
we  are  more  disposed  to  bear,  while  evils  ought  to  be  borne,  than,  to  seek  re- 


68  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

dress  by  appeals  to  arms ;  still,  however,  a  contest  must  come,  and  it  behooves 
us,  while  we  have  the  means  and  the  opportunity,  to  look  forward  to  its  attend- 
ant circumstances,  and  to  preparfc  for  the  consequences. 

It  is  no  part  of  my  object  to  enter  into  the  details  of  a  naval  establishment. 
That  duty  will  be  much  more  appropriately  and  ably  performed  by  the  proper 
department ;  but  as  some  of  the  views  I  shall  present  on  the  subject  of  our 
system  of  fortifications  must  be  materially  affected  by  any  general  plan  of  naval 
operations  which,  in  the  event  of  hostilities,  might  be  adopted,  I  am  necessarily 
led  to  submit  a  few  remarks,  not  professional,  but  general,  upon  the  extent  and 
employment  of  our  military  marine. 

There  is  as  little  need  of  inquiry  now  into  our  moral  as  into  our  physical 
capacity  tq  maintain  a  navy,  and  to  meet  upon  equal  terms  the  ships  and  sea- 
men of  any  other  nation.  Our  extended  commerce,  creating  and  created  by 
those  resources  which  are  essential  to  the  building  and  equipment  of  fleets,  re- 
moves all  doubt  upon  the  one  point,  and  the  history  of  our  naval  enterprise, 
from  the  moment  when  the  colors  were  first  hoisted  upon  the  hastily-prepared 
vessels  at  the  commencement  of  our  revolutionary  struggle  to  the  last  contest 
in  which  any  of  our  ships  have  been  engaged,  is  equally  satisfactory  upon  the 
other.  The  achievements  of  our  navy  have  stamped  its  character  with  the 
country  and  the  world.  The  simple  recital  of  its  exploits  is  the  highest  eulo- 
gium  which  can  be  pronounced  upon  it. 

With  ample  means,  therefore,  to  meet  upon  the  ocean,  by  which  they  must 
approach  us,  any  armaments  that  may  be  destined  for  our  shores,  we  are  called 
upon  by  every  prudential  consideration  to  do  so.  In  the  first  place,  though  all 
wars  in  which  we  may  be  engaged  will  probably  be  defensive  in  their  character, 
undertaken  to  repel  or  resent  some  injury,  or  to  assert  some  right,  and  rendered 
necessary  by  the  conduct  of  other  nations,  still  the  objects  of  the  war  can  be 
best  attained  by  its  rigorous  prosecution.  Defensive  in  its  causes,  it  should  be 
offensive  in  its  character.  The  greater  injury  we  can  inflict  upon  our  opponent 
the  sooner  and  the  more  satisfactory  will  be  the  redress  we  seek.  Our  principal 
belligerent  measures  should  have  for  their  aim  to  attack  our  antagonist  where 
he  is  most  vulnerable.  If  we  are  to  receive  his  assaults,  we  abandon  the  van- 
tage ground,  and  endeavor,  in  effect,  to  compel  him  to  do  us  justice  by  inviting 
his  descent  upon  our  shores,  and  by  all  those  consequences  which  mark  the 
progress  of  an  invading  force,  whether  for  depredation  or  for  conquest.  By  the 
ocean  only  can  we  be  seriously  assailed,  and  by  the  ocean  ^>nly  can  we  seriously 
assail  any  power  with  which  we  are  likely  to  be  brought  into  collision. 

But,  independently  of  the  policy  of  making  an  adversary  feel  the  calamities 
of  war,  it  is  obvious  that,  even  in  a  defensive  point  of  view  alone,  the  ocean 
should  be  our  great  field  of  operations.  No  one  would  advocate  the  project  of 
endeavoring  to  make  our  coast  impervious  to  attack.  Such  a  scheme  would  be 
utterly  impracticable.  A  superior  fleet,  conveying  the  necessary  troops,  could 
effect  a  landing  at  numerous  points  upon  our  shores,  even  if  the  best  devised 
plan  of  fortifying  them  were  consummated ;  and,  from  the  nature  of  maritime 
operations,  such  a  fleet  could  bring  its  whole  strength  to  bear  upon  any  particu- 
lar position,  and  by  threatening  or  assailing  various  portions  of  the  coast,  either 
anticipate  the  tardy  movements  of  troops  upon  land,  and  effect  the  object  before 
their  concentration,  or  render  it  necessary  to  keep  in  service  a  force  far  superior 
to  that  of  the  enemy,  but  so  divided  as  to  be  inferior  to  it  upon  any  given  point. 
These  dangers  and  difficulties  would  be  averted  or  avoided  by  the  maintenance 
of  a  fleet  competent  to  meet  any  hostile  squadrons  which  might  be  detached  to 
our  seas.  Our  coast  would  thus  be  defeRded  on  the  ocean,  and  the  calamities 
of  war  would  be  as  little  felt  as  the  circumstances  of  such  a  conflict  would 
permit. 

As  to  the  other  advantages  of  a  navy,  in  the  protection  of  commerce,  they 
do  not  come  within  the  scope  of  my  inquiries,  and  are  not,  therefore,  adverted 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  69 

to ;  nor  is  it  necessary,  or  indeed  proper,  that  I  should  present  those  considera- 
tions of  distance,  of  exposure,  and  of  station,  which  would  render  a  fleet  nu- 
merically inferior  in  the  aggregate  to  that  of  the  enemy,  yet  still  sufficiently 
powerful,  upon  our  own  coasts,  to  meet  and  overcome  any  armament  which 
could  probably  be  sent  here. 

It  seems  to  me,  therefore,  that  our  first  and  best  fortification  is  the  navy.  Nor 
do  I  see  any  limit  to  our  naval  preparations,  except  that  imposed  by  a  due  re- 
gard to  the  public  revenues  from  time  to  time,  and  by  the  probable  condition  of 
other  maritime  nations.  Much  of  the  materiel  employed  in  the  construction 
and  equipment  of  vessels  is  almost  indestructible,  or,  at  any  rate,  may  be  pre- 
served for  a  long  series  of  years  ;  and  if  ships  can  be  thus  kept  without  injury 
upon  the  stocks,  by  being  built  under  cover,  I  do  not  see  what  should  restrain 
us  from  proceeding  to  build  as  many  as  may  be  deemed  necessary,  and  as  fast 
as  a  due  regard  to  their  economical  and  substantial  construction  will  permit,  and 
to  collect  and  prepare  for  immediate  use  all  the  munitions  of  war,  and  other  arti- 
cles of  equipment  not  liable  to  injury  or  decay  by  the  lapse  of  time.  Nor  do  I 
see  that  these  preparations  should  be  strictly  graduated  by  the  number  of  sea- 
men who  would  probably  enter  the  service  at  this  time,  or  within  any  short 
period.  To  build  and  equip  vessels  properly  requires  much  time,  as  well  with 
reference  to  the  execution  of  the  work  as*  to  the  proper  condition  of  the  ma- 
terials employed.  And  the  costly  experiment  made  by  England,  when  she  too 
hastily  increased  her  fleet,  about  thirty  years  ago,  by  building  ships  with  im- 
proper materials  and  bad  workmanship,  ought  to  furnish  us  with  a  profitable 
lesson.  These  vessels  soon  decayed,  after  rendering  very  little  service.  Naval 
means  should  therefore  be  provided  at  a  period  of  leisure,  to  be  ready  for  im- 
mediate employment  in  a  period  of  exigency ;  and  a  due  regard  to  prudence 
dictates  that  these  means  should  so  far  exceed  the  estimated  demands  of  the 
service  as  to  supply,  in  the  shortest  time,  any  loss  occasioned  by  the  hazards  of 
the  ocean  and  the  accidents  of  war.  We  may  safely  calculate  that  the  number 
of  seamen  in  the  United  States  will  increase  in  proportion  to  that  rapid  augmen- 
tation which  is  going  on  in  all  the  other  branches  of  national  interest.  If  we 
assume  that  at  a  given  period  we  may  expect  to  embark  in  war,  our  capacity  to 
man  a  fleet  will  exceed  our  present  means  by  a  ratio  not  difficult  to  ascertain. 
And  even  then,  by  greater  exertions  and  perhaps  higher  wages,  a  larger  portion 
may  be  induced  to  enter  the  naval  service,  while  no  exertions  can  make  a  cor- 
responding addition  to  the  navy  itself,  but  at  a  loss  of  time  and  expense,  and  a 
sacrifice  of  its  permanent  interest. 

But  whatever  arrangements  we  may  make  to  overcome  any  naval  armaments 
sent  out  'to  assail  us,  we  are  liable  to  be  defeated  and  to  be  exposed  to  all  the 
consequences  resulting  from  the  ascendency  of  an  enemy.  And  the  practical 
question  is,  what  shall  be  done  with  a  view  to  such  a  state  of  things  ]  As  I 
have  already  remarked,  any  attempt  by  fortifications  to  shut  up  our  coast,  so 
that  an  enterprising  foe,  with  a  victorious  fleet,  conveying  a  competent  force,  and 
disposed  to  encounter  all  the  risk  of  such  an  expedition,  could  not  make  his 
descent  upon  the  shore,  would  be  useless  in  itself,  and  would  expose  to  just  cen- 
sure those  who  should  project  such  a  scheme.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
government  would,  if  possible,  be  still  more  censurable  were  our  important  mari- 
time places  left  without  any  defensive  works.  Between  these  extremes  is  a 
practical  medium,  and  to  ascertain  where  it  lies  we  must  briefly  look  at  the  vari- 
ous considerations  affecting  the  subject. 

What  have  we  to  apprehend  in  the  event  of  a  war  ?  Is  it  within  the  limits 
of  a  reasonable  cilculation  that  any  enemy  will  be  able  and  disposed  to  debark 
upon  our  coast  an  army  sufficiently  powerful  to  lay  siege  to  our  fortifications 
and  to  endeavor,  by  this  slow  and  uncertain  process,  to  obtain  possession  of 
them  ?  I  put  out  of  view  the  enormous  expense  attending  such  a  plan ;  the 
distance  of  the  scene  of  operations  from  the  points  of  supply  and  support,  with 


70  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

the  consequent  difficulties  and  dangers,  and  the  possibility  that  the  convoying 
fleet  might  be  overpowered  by  a  superior  force,  and  the  whole  expedition  cap- 
tured or  destroyed.  All  these  are  considerations  which  no  prudent  statesman, 
directing  such  an  enterprise,  will  overlook.  But  beyond  these  is  a  question 
bearing  still  more  directly  upon  the  point  under  examination.  Is  there  any  ob- 
ject to  be  attained  sufficiently  important  to  justify  the  risk  of  placing  a  body  of 
land  troops  before  one  of  these  works,  too  strong  to  be  carried  by  a  coup  de 
main,  and  endeavoring  to  destroy  the  defence  by  a  regular  investment  ?  I  think 
there  can  be  none. 

I  take  it  for  granted  that  no  nation  would  embark  in  the  quixotic  enterprise 
of  conquering  this  country.  Any  army,  therefore,  thrown  upon  our  coast  would 
push  forward  with  some  definite  object  to  be  attained  by  a  prompt  movement 
and  by  vigorous  exertions.  Our  experience,  more  than  half  a  century  ago,  de- 
monstrated that  an  invading  force  could  command  little  more  than  the  position 
it  actually  occupied.  The  system  of  fortifications  adopted  in  Europe  is  not  ap- 
plicable to  our  condition.  There  military  movements  must  be  made  upon  great 
avenues  of  communication,  natural  or  artificial,  and  these  are  closed  or  defended 
by  fortresses  constructed  with  all  the  skill  that  science  and  experience  can  sup- 
ply, and  with  all  the  means  that  wealth  and  power  can  command.  An  invading 
army  must  carry  these  positions  by  escalade  or  by  siege,  or  leave  sufficient  de- 
tachments to  blockade  them,  or  must  turn  them  and  move  on  with  all  the  diffi- 
culties attending  the  interruption  of  their  communication,  and  with  the  dangers 
which  such  a  force  in  their  rear  must  necessarily  occasion.  Works  of  this 
character  are  keys  to  many  of  the  European  states,  whose  political  safety  de- 
pends upon  their  preservation.  Their  possession  enables  their  governments  to 
meet  the  first  shock  of  war,  and  to  prepare  their  arrangements,  political  or  mili- 
tary, to  resist  or  avert  the  coming  storm.  And  although,  during  some  of  the 
wars  which  arose  out  of  the  French  revolution,  when,  from  causes  which  history 
is  now  developing,  the  armies  of  France  set  at  defiance  the  received  maxims  of 
military  experience,  and  justifying  their  apparent  rashness  by  success,  reduced, 
with  unexampled  facility,  or  carried  on  their  operations  almost  in  contempt  of 
the  strongest  fortifications,  the  subjugation  of  each  of  which  had  been  till  then 
the  work  of  a  campaign,  still  the  opinion  is  yet  entertained  by  many  that  this 
system  of  defence  is  best  adapted  to  the  condition  of  the  European  community. 

There  is  also  a  striking  difference  between  the  political  situation  of  those 
countries  and  that  of  ours,  which  give  to  these  defensive  preparations  a  character 
of  importance  which  can  never  apply  to  the  United  States.  The  possession  of 
a  capital  in  the  eastern  hemisphere  is  too  often  jthe  possession  of  the  kingdom. 
Habits  of  feeling  and  opinion,  political  associations,  and  other  causes,  combine 
to  give  the  metropolis  an  undue  ascendency.  Internal  parties,  contending 
for  superiority,  and  external  enemies,  aiming  at  conquest,  equally  seek  to  gain 
possession  of  the  seat  of  government.  And  the  most  careless  observer  of  the 
events  of  the  last  half  century  must  be  struck  with  the  fact  that  the  fate  of  the 
capitals  and  the  kingdoms  of  modern  Europe  are  closely  connected  together. 
Under  such  circumstances,  it  may  be  prudent,  by  powerful  fortresses,  to  bar  the 
approaches  to  these  favored  places,  and  frequently  to  construct  works  to  defend 
them  from  external  attack,  or  to  maintain  their  occupation  against  internal 
violence. 

But  there  is  nothing  like  this  in  our  country,  nor  can  there  be  till  there  is  a 
total  change  in  our  institutions.  Our  seats  of  government  are  merely  the  places 
where  the  business  of  the  proper  departments  is  conducted,  and  have  not  them- 
selves the  slightest  influence  upon  any  course  of  measures,  except  what  is  due 
to  public  opinion  and  to  their  just  share  of  it.  If  the  machine  itself  were  itiner- 
ant, the  result  would  be  precisely  the  same.  Or,  if  by  any  of  the  accidents  of 
war  or  pestilence,  the  proper  authorities  were  compelled  to  change  their  place  of 
convocation,  the  change  would  be  wholly  unobserved,  except  by  the  few  whose 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  71 

personal  convenience  would  be  affected  by  the  measure.  Nor  have  our  com- 
mercial capitals  any  more  preponderating  influence  than  our  political  ones.  And 
although  their  capture  by  an  enemy,  and  the  probable  loss  of  property,  and 
derangement  of  business,  which  would  be  the  result,  might  seriously  affect  the 
community,  yet  it  would  not  produce  the  slightest  effect  upon  the  social  or 
political  systems  of  the  country.  The  power  belongs  to  all,  and  is  exercised 
by  all. 

It  follows,  therefore,  that  an  enemy  could  have  no  inducement  to  hazard  an 
expedition  against  any  of  our  cities,  under  the  expectation  that  their  capture 
and  possession  would  lead  to  political  results  favorable  to  them.  Washington 
may  indeed  be  taken  again,  and  its  fall  would  produce  the  same  emotion  which 
was  everywhere  felt  when  its  former  capture  was  known.  But  an  enemy  would 
retire  from  it  with  as  few  advantages  as  marked  its  first  abondonment,  and  if 
his  course  were  the  same,  with  as  few  laurels  as  he  won  by  its  possession.  I 
make  these  remarks,  because  it  seems  to  me  that  some  of  the  principles  of  the 
European  system  of  fortifications  may  possibly  be  transferred  to  this  country, 
without  sufficient  attention  having  been  given  to  those  circumstances,  both  geo- 
graphical and  political,  which  require  a  plan  exclusively  adapted  to  our  own 
condition. 

I  consider  some  of  the  existing  and  projected  works  larger  than  are  now 
necessary,  and  calculated  for  exigencies  we  ought  not,  with  the  prospects  before 
us,  to  anticipate.  If  such  is  the  fact,  the  objection  is  not  only  to  the  expense 
of  their  construction  and  preservation,  but  also  to  the  greater  difficulty  of 
defending  them,  and  the  increased  garrisons  which  must  be  provided  and  main- 
tained. The  hypothesis  upon  which  their  extent  has  been  determined  is,  that 
they  may  be  exposed  to  investment,  both  seaward  and  landward,  and  that  they 
ought  to  be  capable  of  resisting  a  combined  attack,  or,  in  other  words,  that  their 
water  batteries  should  be  sufficient  to  repel  an  assailing  squadron,  and  that  their 
land  defences  should  be  sufficient  to  resist  a  besieging  army. 

It  is  certain  that  whatever  works  we  erect  should  be  so  constructed  as  to  be 
beyond  the  reach  of  any  coup  de  main  that  would  probably  be  attempted  against 
them ;  and  this  capacity  must  depend  upon  their  exposure  and  upon  the  facility 
with  which  they  can  be  relieved.  But  this  proposition  is  far  different  from,  one 
to  construct  them  upon  a  scale  of  magnitude  which  presupposes  they  are  to  be 
formally  invested  by  a  powerful  land  force,  and  which  provides  for  their  ability 
to  make  a  successful  resistance.  A  dashing  military  or  naval  officer  may  be 
willing  to  risk  something  to  get  possession  of  an  insulated  post  by  a  prompt 
movement,  expecting  to  accomplish  his  enterprise  before  his  adversary  can  be 
prepared,  or  succor  obtained;  and  this,  even  when  he  looks  to  no  other  advan- 
tage than  the  capture  of  the  garrison,  and  the  effect  which  a  brilliant  exploit  is 
calculated  to  produce,  and  when  he  is  aware  that  he  must  abandon  his  conquest 
with  as  much  celerity  as  he  attained  it.  But  formal  investments  of  fortified 
places,  with  all  their  difficulties,  and  expense,  and  uncertainty,  are  only  under- 
taken when  there  is  some  object  of  corresponding  importance  to  be  expected. 
We  have  works  constructed  which  it  would  require  armies  to  reduce.  Have 
we  any  reason  to  anticipate  that  they  will  be  assailed  by  a  force  proportioned 
to  their  magnitude] 

I  have  already  remarked  that  a  European  power  cannot  expect  to  retain 
permanent  possession  of  any  part  of  this  country.  If,  therefore,  he  succeed  in 
overcoming  or  eluding  our  fleets,  and  is  prepared  with  a  respectable  land  force, 
and  ready  to  risk  its  employment  upon  our  territory,  he*  can  land  at  many  points 
which  we  cannot  close  against  him.  His  debarkation  is  not  a  question  of 
practicability,  but  of  expediency.  If  a  safe  harbor  or  roadstead  offers  itself,  and 
there  is  no  defensive  work  to  prevent  his  approach,  he  will,  of  course,  land  at 
the  nearest  point  to  the  object  of  his  marauding  exterprise.  If  there  is  such  a 
work,  it  will  be  a  question  of  calculation  whether  it  is  better  to  attack  and  carry 


72  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

it,  or  to  seek  another,  though  more  distant,  point  of  debarkation.  I  think  there 
can  be  little  doubt  but  there  are  few,  if  any,  positions  in  our  country  which  an 
enemy  would  not  under  such  circumstances  avoid.  He  would  be  aware  of  the' 
facility  of  communication  which  our  rivers,  canals,  and  railroads  afford,  of  the 
powerful  use  we  should  be  prepared  to  make  of  steam  in  its  various  forms  of 
application,  and  of  the  immense  force  which  in  a  short  time  could  be  concentrated 
upon  a  given  point;  and  it  is  scarcely  within  the  limits  of  possibility  that  he 
would  venture  formally  to  besiege  one  of  our  forts,  or  if  he  did,  that  he  would 
not  repent  his  rashness.  Neither  the  co-operation  of  his  fleet,  nor  the  nearer 
proximity  of  the  place  of  landing  to  the  object  of  attack,  would  induce  him  to 
seek  these  advantages  at  the  cost  which  must  attend  the  slow  process  of  besieg- 
ing a  fort,  when,  by  removing  to  another  position,  he  would  land  in  safety,  and 
save  in  time,  in  promptness  of  movement,  and  in  his  escape  from  the  perils  of  a 
doubtful  contest,  more  than  he  would  lose  by  the  difference  in  distance. 

I  am  aware  it  may  be  objected  that  the  weakness  of  a  work  might  tempt  an 
enemy  to  attack  it,  and  that  it  may  be  supposed  the  power  of  some  of  our  forti- 
fications to  resist  a  siege  may  hereafter  furnish  the  true  reason  why  they  may 
not  be  compelled  to  encounter  one.  Certainly  the  stronger  a  work  is,  the  less 
will  it  be  exposed  to  danger.  But  this  would  not  furnish  a  sufficient  reason  for 
making  its  defences  out  of  reasonable  proportion  to  its  exposure.  The  true 
inquiry  is,  What  circumstances  will  probably  induce  and  enable  an  enemy  to 
assail  a  given  point,  and  with  what  force ;  and  how  can  we  best  meet  and  repel 
him  ?  And  I  believe  a  just  consideration  of  this  proposition  will  lead  to  the 
conclusion  that  there  are  scarcely  any  positions  in  our  country  where  an  enemy 
would  venture  to  set  down  before  a  work  too  strong  to  resist  a  coup  de  main. 
In  the  view,  therefore,  which  I  take  of  this  whole  subject,  it  will  be  perceived 
that  I  do  not  merely  suppose  an  enemy  will  not  invest  our  larger  works,  but 
that  they  would  not  do  so  were  these  works  much  inferior  to  what  they  are, 
both  in  their  dimensions  and  construction. 

What  object  would  justify  an  enemy  in  attempting  to  land  an  army  upon  our 
coast  ?  He  would  not  expect  to  lay  waste  the  country,  for  such  a  mode  of  war- 
fare is  not  to  be  anticipated  in  the  present  state  of  society.  All  that,  under  the 
most  favorable  circumstances,  he  could  accomplish,  would  be  to  gain  sudden 
possession  of  a  town  and  levy  contributions,  or  to  destroy  a  naval  establishment, 
commercial  or  military,  and  precipitately  retire  to  his  ships  before  his  operations 
could  be  prevented,  or  his  retreat  intercepted.  I  cannot,  therefore,  concur  in  the 
suggestion  made  in  the  engineer  report,  that  the  first  of  the  three  great  objects 
to  be  attained  by  the  fortifications  of -the  first  class  should  be  to  "prevent  an 
enemy  from  forming  a  permanent  or  even  a  momentary  establishment  in  the 
country."  It  is  not  suited  to  the  present  and  prospective  situation  of  the  United 
States.  I  understand  the  establishments  herein  contemplated  are  not  the  tem- 
porary occupation  of  naval  arsenals  and  cities  for  the  purpose  of  destruction  or 
plunder,  because  these  objects  are  specially  enumerated,  but  are  lodgements 
where  armies  may  be  stationed,  and  whence  they  may  issue  to  commit  inroads 
into  the  country. 

I  refer,  in  these  remarks,  to  our  maritime  coast  generally.  There  are,  no 
doubt,  certain  points  less  equal  to  self-defence  than  others,  and  where  the  prep- 
aration must  be  greater.  Of  this  class  is  the  delta  of  the  Mississippi,  not  only 
in  consequence  of  its  many  avenues  of  approach,  but  because  its  great  natural 
highway  does  not  at  present  allow  those  lateral  supplies  of  the  personnel,  which, 
from  geographical  formation,  and  from  the  state  of  the  .settlements,  can  be 
speedily  thrown  upon  most  other  points  of  the  country.  This  region,  however, 
is  admirably  adapted  to  the  use  of  steam  batteries,  and  they  will  form  its  prin- 
cipal means  of  defence. 

To  apply  these  remarks  to  the  plan  of  fortifications  partly  completed  and 
partly  projected.  Fort  Monroe,  at  Old  Point  Comfort,  covers  about  sixty-three 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  73 

acres  of  ground,  and  requires,  by  the  estimates  of  the  engineer  department,  two 
thousand  seven  hundred  men  to  garrison  it  in  time  of  war.  Its  full  armament 
consists  of  412  pieces  of  different  descriptions  and  calibre.  I  have  been  desirous 
of  comparing  its  superficial  extent  with  some  of  the  European  fortresses ;  but 
the  necessary  information  could  not  be  obtained  within  the  short  time  that  could 
be  allowed  for  the  inquiry.  I  understand  from  General  Gratiot,  however,  that 
it  is  probably  larger  than  almost  any  of  the  single  works  in  Europe  which  do 
not  enclose  towns  within  their  circuit.  Drinkwater,  in  his  history  of  the  siege 
of  Gibraltar,  states  that  572  guns  were  mounted  upon  that  fortress. 

The  object  to  be  attained  by  Fort  Monroe,  in  conjunction  with  Fort  Calhoun, 
intended  to  mount  232  guns,  is  to  prevent  an  enemy  from  entering  Hampton 
roads,  a  safe  and  convenient  roadstead.  This  object  is  important,  because  this 
bay  is  perfectly  landlocked,  and  has  sufficient  depth  of  water  for  the  largest 
vessels,  and  is,  withal,  so  near  the  capes  of  the  Chesapeake  that  it  furnishes  the 
best  station  which  an  enemy  could  occupy  for  annoying  our  commerce,  and  for 
committing  depredations  upon  the  shores  of  that  extensive  estuary.  But  these 
works  do  not  command  the  entrance  into  the  Chesapeake;  nor  is  Hampton 
roads  the  only  safe  anchorage  for  a  hostile  fleet.  Their  possession,  therefore, 
does  not  exclude  an  enemy  from  these  waters,  though  they  will  compel  him  to 
resort  to  less  convenient  positions  from  whence  to  cany  on  his  enterprises.  A 
hostile  squadron  reaching  the  Chesapeake,  and  finding  the  entrance  into 
Hampton  roads  guarded  by  sufficient  works,  though  much  less  extensive  than 
those  at  Fort  Monroe,  would  necessarily  consider  whether  the  possession  of  that 
roadstead  is  so  important  as  to  justify  the  debarkation  of  a  large  body  of  land 
troops,  and  to  attempt  to  carry  the  works  by  regular  approaches,  and  this  in 
the  face  of  the  strenuous  efforts  which  would  be  made  to  relieve  it  by  all  the 
aids  afforded  by  the  most  improved  facilities  of  communication,  and  by  the  light 
and  heavy  steam  batteries  which,  upon  the  approach  of  war,  would  be  launched 
upon  the  Chesapeake,  and  which,  during  periods  of  calm,  or  in  certain  winds, 
could  approach  the  hostile  ships  and  drive  them  from  their  anchorage,  or  compel 
them  to  surrender,  and  most  of  which,  from  their  draught  of  water,  could  take 
refuge  in  the  inlets  that  other  armed  vessels  could  not  enter.  And  even  if  the 
works  were  carried,  they  could  not  be  maintained  without  the  most  enormous 
expense,  nor,  in  fact,  without  efforts  which  no  government  three  thousand  miles 
off  could  well  make,  and  all  this,  while  Lynnhaven  bay,  York  bay,  the  Rappa- 
hannock,  Tangier  island,  the  mouth  of  the  Potomac,  and  many  other  places, 
furnish  secure  anchorage,  and  are  positions  from  which  an  enemy,  having  the 
superiority,  could  not  be  excluded,  and  while,  in  fact,  a  great  part  of  the  Ches- 
apeake may  be  considered  as  affording  good  anchorage  ground  for  large  ships. 
Neither  of  them  is  equal  to  Hampton  roads,  but  most  or  all  of  them  furnish 
stations  for  occupation  and  observation  which  would  render  it  unnecessary  to 
purchase  the  superior  advantages  of  Hampton  roads  by  the  sacrifice  and  hazard 
which  would  attend  the  effort.  The  occlusion  of  this  roadstead  does  not  secure 
Norfolk,  important  as  it  is  from  its  commerce  and  navy  yard.  It  only  prevents 
the  access  of  ships-of-war  to  it.  And  against  these  there  is  an  interior  line  of 
defence,  which  may  be  considered  as  accessory  to,  and,  if  necessary,  independent 
of,  the  other.  And  a  land  force,  deeming  the  destruction  of  the  navy  yard  at 
Norfolk  a  sufficient  object  to  justify  such  an  expedition,  would  not  sit  down  be- 
fore Fort  Monroe,  if  its  scale  of  defence  were  far  inferior  to  what  it  now  is,  but 
would  debark  at  Lynnhaven  bay,  where  there  is  no  impediment,  and  march  in 
five  or  six  hours  through  an  open  country  to  Norfolk. 

New  York  is,  in  every  point  of  view,  our  most  important  harbor,  and  its  de- 
fences should  provide  for  every  reasonable  contingency.  The  engineer  report 
recommends  three  classes  of  works  :  an  interior  one  for  the  protection  of  the 
harbor ;  an  exterior  one  to  shut  up  Raritan  bay ;  and  a  third  to  prevent  a  hos- 
tile fleet  from  approaching  the  city  through  the  sound  nearer  than  the  vicinity 


74  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES 

of  Throg's  Point.  The  importance  of  the  first  class  cannot  be  doubted.  That 
of  the  second  depends  on  the  value  of  Raritan  bay  to  an  enemy  as  an  anchorage 
ground,  and  on  the  utility  of  excluding  him  from  a  landing  at  Gravesend  bay, 
upon  Long  Island,  whence  an  army  could  march,  without  obstruction,  to  Brook- 
lyn and  New  York.  The  third  is  proposed  to  be  erected  in  order  to  bar  his 
access  to  the  lower  part  of  the  sound,  or,  more  accurately  speaking,  to  prevent 
his  reaching  Hell  Gate,  a  natural  barrier  which  no  fleet  could  pass,  and  which 
is  within  ten  miles  of  the  city.  Here,  if  his  aim  were  New  York,  he  would 
land,  and  would  find  no  works  to  prevent  his  approach.  The  two  forts  proposed 
to  be  erected  at  Throg's  Neck  and  Wilkin's  Point,  eight  miles  further  up  the 
sound,  would  compel  him  to  debark  beyond  the  reach  of  their  guns,  and  would 
thus  add  that  distance  to  his  march,  while  on  the  north  shore  Harlaem  river 
would  be  interposed  between  him  and  the  city.  On  the  Long  Island  side  there 
would  be  no  difference  but  that  occasioned  by  the  distance. 

It  is  obvious  then  that,  in  the  consideration  of  this  plan  involving  an  esti- 
mated expenditure  in  the  aggregate  of  $5,807,969,  and  efficient  garrisons  in 
time  of  war  of  nine  thousand  men,  a  close  investigation  should  be  made  into  all 
the  circumstances  likely  to  influence  the  operations  of  an  enemy.  Is  the  an- 
chorage ground  between  the  Narrows  and  Sandy  Hook  of  sufficient  value  to  an 
enemy,  looking  to  the  risk  of  his  occupation  of  the  coast  and  to  the  doubts  that 
may  be  reasonably  entertained  of  the  result  of  so  great  an  experiment  to  be 
carried  on,  in  fact,  in  the  sea,  to  authorize  the  commencement  of  these  works 
without  a  new  examination  ]  Or  is  the  probability  of  the  disembarkation  of  an 
army  at  Gravesend  bay  in  preference  to  some  other  point  upon  the  coast  of 
Long  Island,  if  a  convenient  one  exists,  so  great  as  to  require  these  preparations  ? 
The  same  questions  may  be  asked  respecting  Wilkin's  Point.  The  work  at 
Throg's  Point  is  in  the  process  of  construction,  and  as  the  river  is  only  about 
three-fourths  of  a  mile  wide  at  this  place  I  think  its  completion  would  be  suffi- 
cient for  this  line  of  defence  till  the  proposed  general  examination  can  take 
place. 

The  situation  of  New  York  affords  a  fine  theatre  for  the  operation  of  floating 
batteries,  and  whether  a  sufficient  number  of  them  would  secure  it  from  the  de- 
signs of  an  enemy  better  than  the  full  completion  of  the  extensive  system  of 
permanent  fortifications  recommended  is  a  question  deserving  investigation. 
Such  an  investigation  I  recommend,  and  after  all  the  necessary  facts  and  con- 
siderations are  presented  the  government  should  proceed  to  place  this  commercial 
metropolis  of  the  country  in  a  state  of  security. 

The  works  at  Newport  cover  about  twenty  acres  and  will  mount  four  hundred 
and  sixty-eight  guns,  and  will  need  for  their  defence  about  two  thousand  four 
hundred  men.  I  cannot  myself  foresee  the  existence  of  any  circumstances  which 
now  call  for  a  fortress  of  this  magnitude  in  the  very  heart  of  New  England ; 
constructed  not  merely  to  command  the  harbor  of  Newport,  but  to  resist  a  siege 
which  would  probably  require  nearly  twenty  thousand  men  to  carry  it  on.  I 
am  at  a  loss  to  conjecture  what  adequate  motive  could  induce  a  foreign  govern- 
ment to  detach  a  fleet  and  army  upon  this  enterprise.  The  expense  would  be 
enormous.  The  French  army  that  invaded  Egypt  was  less  than  forty  thousand 
men,  and  required  for  its  protection  and  transportation  between  five  and  six 
hundred  vessels.  The  army  that  conquered  Algiers  was  about  equal  in  force, 
and  required,  it  is  said,  about  four  hundred  transports  besides  the  ships-of-war. 
This  scale  of  preparation  for  enterprises  against  the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean 
may  enable  us  to  form  some  conception  of  the  arrangements  that  would  be 
necessary  to  send  across  the  ocean  to  this  country,  in  the  present  day  of  its 
power,  an  expedition  strong  enough  to  form  an  establishment  upon  our  shores, 
and  to  furnish  it  with  supplies  necessary  to  its  subsistence  and  operations. 

It  has  been  supposed,  indeed,  by  the  board  of  engineers,  that  an  enemy  would 
find  sufficient  reason  for  the  occupation  of  Rhode  Island  in  the  consideration 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  75 

that  it  would  afford  a  secure  lodgement,  whence  expeditions  could  be  sent  to 
every  part  of  our  coast.  But  it  is  to  be  observed  that  no  part  of  Narraganset 
bay  is  necessary  for  the  safety  of  a  hostile  fleet  watching  that  part  of  our  coast. 
Gardiner's  bay  in  that  vicinity  is  a  most  safe  and  convenient  station,  which  was 
occupied  by  the  British  during  almost  the  whole  of  the  late  war,  and  it  is  pretty 
clear  that  it  cannot  be  defended  by  any  stationary  fortifications  that  can  be 
constructed.  If  it  can  by  floating  batteries,  so  may  Narraganset  bay,  and  the 
enemy  thus  prevented  from  occupying  the  latter  also  without  these  extensive 
arrangements,  requiring,  after  Fort  Adams  shall  have  been  completed  at  an  ex- 
pense of  one  million  three  hundred  and  twelve  thousand  dollars,  four  other  forts 
and  a  sea-wall  to  be  constructed,  and  eleven  hundred  and  fifty-seven  thousand 
dollars  to  be  expended. 

I  do  not  think  that  the  most  prudent  forecast  ought  to  lead  to  the  apprehen- 
sion that  a  force  competent  to  seize  such  a  position  would  be  sent  to  our  country, 
or  that  any  circumstances  could  enable  them  to  maintain  it  in  the  face  of  the 
vigorous  efforts  that  would  be  made  to  recover  it,  and  in  the  midst  of  a  country 
abounding  in  all  the  means  to  give  effect  to  their  exertions.  But  perhaps  the 
most  striking  objection  to  the  completion  of  this  extensive  plan  is,  that  under 
no  possible  circumstance  can  it  effect  the  desired  object.  That  object,  if  I 
understand  it,  is  not  the  mere  exclusion  of  an  enemy  from  Rhode  Island,  but  it 
is  to  prevent  him  from  taking  possession  of  a  safe  and  convenient  position, 
whence  he  could  detach  his  forces  by  means  of  his  naval  superiority  to  any  other 
part  of  the  coast  which  would  thus  be  exposed  to  his  depredations. 

The  value  of  Gardiner's  bay  as  a  place  of  naval  renclezvous  I  have  already 
described.  Block  island,  in  its  neighborhood,  could  be  occupied  by  troops  de- 
siring only  a  lodgement,  and  so  could  Nantucket  island  and  Martha's  Vineyard, 
and  these  are  only  a  few  hours'  sail  from  Narraganset  bay.  Buzzard's  bay  is 
also  a  safe  and  capacious  harbor  which  cannot  be  defended,  and  Martha's  Vine- 
yard sound  affords  commodious  places  of  anchorage.  A  fleet  riding  in  these 
moorings  would  have  under  its  command  all  the  islands  in  this  group,  and  could 
secure  its  communications  with  its  land  forces  encamped  upon  them,  which 
would  thus  be  enabled,  at  any  proper  time,  to  throw  itself  upon  other  parts  of 
the  coast.  It  may  be  doubted,  if  there  were  not  a  cannon  mounted  upon  Rhode 
Isfand,  whether  an  enemy  acquainted  with  the  topography  and  resources  of  this 
country  would  select  it  as  his  place  of  arms,  if  I  may  so  term  it,  when  there  are 
islands  in  the  neighborhood  which  would  answer  this  purpose  nearly  as  well, 
and  where  he  would  be  in  perfect  safety  as  long  as  he  could  maintain  his  naval 
ascendency;  and  longer  than  that  he  could  not,  under  any  circumstances,  occupy 
Rhode  Island.  And  if  I  rightly  appreciate  the  strength  and  spirit  of  that  part 
of  the  country,  his  tenure,  in  any  event,  would  be  short  and  difficult.  I  do  not 
mean  to  convey  the  idea  that  Rhode  Island  should  not  be  defended.  I  think  it 
should  be ;  but  I  do  not  think  that  precautions  should  be  taken  against  events 
which  are  not  likely  to  happen.  As  there  is  no  naval  establishment  here,  it  is 
not  necessary  to  enter  into  any  question  concerning  defensive  arrangements 
exclusively  connected  with  that  object. 

It  will  be  perceived  also  that  it  is  proposed  to  fortify  Mount  Desert  island, 
on  the  coast  of  Maine,  and  that  the  expense  is  estimated  at  five  hundred  thou- 
sand dollars,  and  the  number  of  the  garrison  competent  to  maintain  it  at  -one 
thousand  men.  This  proposition  is  founded,  not  on  the  value  of  this  harbor  to 
us,  for  it  possesses  little,  and  is,  in  effect,  unoccupied,  but  on  account  of  its  im- 
portance to  the  enemy.  Were  there  no  other  secure  position  they  could  occupy 
in  that  quarter,  and  which  could  not  be  defended,  I  should  think  the  views 
submitted  upon  this  branch  of  the  subject  entitled  to  great  weight.  But  there 
are  many  indentations  upon  this  coast,  affording  safe  anchorage,  and  which  are 
either  not  capable  of  being  defended,  or  from  their  great  number  would  involve 
an  enormous  expense,  which  no  sound  views  of  the  subject  could  justify.  An 


76  FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

enemy,  therefore,  cannot  be  deprived  of  the  means  of  stationing  himself  upon 
this  coast.  And  before  this  expenditure  at  Mount  Desert  island  is  encountered, 
it  ought  to  be  clearly  ascertained  that  the  difference,  in  its  practical  advantages 
to  an  enemy,  between  the  occupation  of  Mount  Desert  island  and  that  of  some 
of  the  other  roadsteads  iii  this  quarter,  incapable  of  defence,  would  be  sufficiently 
great  to  warrant  this  measure.  My  present  impression  is  that  it  would  not. 

And  on  the  subject  of  roadsteads  generally,  with  a  few  exceptions,  depending 
on  their  local  positions,  I  am  inclined  to  the  opinion  that  any  attempt  to  fortify 
them  would  be  injudicious.  I  do  not  speak  of  harbors  and  inlets  which  are 
occupied  by  cities  and  towns,  but  of  mere  anchorage  grounds,  deriving  their 
value  from  the  shelter  they  afford.  If  all  could  be  defended,  and  an  enemy 
excluded  from  them,  the  advantages  would  justify  any  reasonable  expenditure. 
But  this  is  impracticable,  and  I  doubt  whether  the  circumstances,  in  which  most 
of  them  differ,  give  such  marked  superiority  to  those  we  can  defend  over  those 
we  cannot,  as  to  lead  to  any  attempt  to  fortify  them,  in  the  first  instance,  and 
to  maintain  garrisons  in  them  during  a  war. 

I  have  adverted  to  these  particular  cases  in  order  to  present  my  views  more 
distinctly  than  I  could  do  by  mere  general  observations.  Certainly  not  from 
the  remotest  design  of  criticising  the  reports  and  the  labors  of  the  able  profes- 
sional men  to  whom  the  subject  has  been  referred,  nor  of  pursuing  the  investi- 
gation into  any  further  detail. 

I  consider  the  duty  of  the  government  to  afford  adequate  protection  to  the 
sea-coast  a  subject  of  paramount  obligation ;  and  I  believe  we  are  called  upon 
by  every  consideration  of  policy  to  push  the  necessary  arrangements  as  rapidly 
as  the  circumstances  of  the  country  and  the  proper  execution  of  the  work  will 
allow.  I  think  every  town  large  enough  to  tempt  the  cupidity  of  an  enemy 
should  be  defended  by  works,  fixed  or  floating,  suited  to  its  local  position,  and 
sufficiently  extensive  to  resist  such  attempts  as  would  probably  be  made  against 
it.  There  will,  of  course,  after  laying  down  such  a  general  rule,  be  much  latitude 
of  discretion  in  its  application.  Upon  this  branch  of  the  subject  I  would  give 
to  the  opinion  of  the  engineer  officers  great  and  almost  controlling  weight,  after 
the  proper  limitations  are  established.  These  relate  principally  to  the  mag- 
nitude of  the  works,  and  if  I  am  correct  in  the  views  I  have  taken  of  this 
branch  of  the  subject,  a  change  in  the  system  proposed  is  necessary.  Works 
should  not  be  projected  upon  the  presumption  that  they  are  to  be  exposed  to 
and  must  be  capable  of  resisting  the  attacks  of  an  European  army,  with  its 
battering  train,  and  all  its  preparations  for  a  regular  siege.  Neither  our  relative 
circumstances,  nor  those  of  any  nation  with  which  we  shall  probably  be  brought 
into  conflict,  can  justify  us  in  such  an  anticipation.  All  the  defences  should  be 
projected  upon  a  scale  proportioned  to  the  importance  of  the  place,  and  should 
be  calculated  to  resist  any  naval  attack,  and  any  sudden  assault  that  a  body  of 
land  troops  might  make  upon  them.  But  further  than  this  it  appears  to  me  we 
ought  not  to  go.  The  results  at  Stonington,  at  Mobile  Point,, at  Fort  Jackson, 
and  at  Baltimore,  during  the  late  war,  show  that  formidable  armaments  may  be 
successfully  resisted  with  apparently  inferior  means.  These,  indeed,  do  not 
furnish  examples  to  be  followed  as  to  the  scale  of  our  preparations,  but  they 
show  what  stationary  batteries  have  done  in  our  country  against  ships-of-war. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  great  object  of  our  fortifications  is  to  exclude  a 
naval  force  from  our  harbors.  This  end  they  ought  fully  to  answer,  and  in  this 
problem  there  are  two  conditions  to  be  fulfilled : 

1.  That  they  be   able  to  resist  any  naval  batteries  that  will  probably  be 
placed  against  them ;  and 

2.  That  they  be  also  able  to  resist  any  coup  de  main  or  escalade  which  might 
be  attempted  by  land. 

An  open  battery,  under  many  circumstances,  might  fulfil  the  first  condition 
but  not  the  second,  and  therefore  these  works  should  be  closed  and  regularly 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  77 

constructed.  It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  the  proper  boundary  between  the  mag- 
nitude and  nature  of  the  works  necessary  to  attain  the  objects  indicated,  and 
those  required  to  resist  successfully  a  formal  investment,  will  sometimes 
become  a  matter  of  doubt ;  nor  that  circumstances  may  not  be  stated  which 
might  induce  an  enemy  to  open  his  trenches  against  one  of  these  works,  because 
its  capacity  for  defence  was  not  greater.  That  capacity,  however,  with  relation 
to  the  question  under  consideration,  has  a  far  more  intimate  connexion  with  the 
magnitude  than  with  the  form  of  the  works,  because,  if  unnecessarily  large, 
they  entail  upon  the  country  a  serious  evil  in  the  increased  means  for  their 
defence,  independently  of  the  additional  expense  in  their  construction.  It  is 
principally,  therefore,  in  the  latter  point  of  view  that  I  have  presented  the 
doubts  which  I  have  expressed  upon  this  point. 

Among  the  hypothetical  cases  heretofore  stated  by  the  board  of  engineers 
was  one  which  supposed  that  an  army  of  twenty  thousand  men  might  be 
assembled  upon  one  of  the  flanks  of  our  coast,  and  that  we  ought  to  be  pre- 
pared, at  every  important  point,  to  resist  the  first  shock  of  such  a  force.  I  have 
already  glanced  at  the  reasons,  geographical,  political,  financial,  and  prudential, 
which,  in  my  opinion,  leave  little  room  to  expect  that  any  enemy  will,  hereafter, 
project  an  enterprise  of  this  magnitude,  so  certain  in  its  expense,  so  uncertain 
in  its  result,  and  so  disproportioned  to  any  object  which  could  probably  be  at- 
tained. And  the  suggestion  which  was  made  by  the  board,  of  defending  the 
city  of  Washington  by  works  erected  near  the  mouth  of  the  Patuxent,  proceeds 
upon  similar  views.  Our  navy,  our  floating  batteries,  our  means  of  communi- 
cation and  concentration,  seem  to  me  far  better  adapted  to  the  defence  of  this 
city  than  forts  at  the  distance  of  nearly  fifty  miles,  whose  principal  effect,  if  an 
enemy  were  resolved  upon  the  enterprise,  would  be  to  compel  him  to  make  a 
detour  in  his  expedition,  or  which  would  send  him  to  some  part  of  the  coast  of 
the  bay  between  Patuxent  and  Annapolis,  or  into  the  Potomac,  where  his 
descent  would  be  uninterrupted,  and  where  he  would  be  but  little,  if  any,  further 
from  Washington  than  at  the  head  of  navigation  of  the  Patuxent. 

Even  during  the  last  war,  when  the  navy  of  Great  Britain  rode  triumphant 
upon  the  ocean,  but  one  serious  attempt  was  made  to  force  an  entrance  into  a 
fortified  harbor,  and  that  was  unsuccessful.  The  greatest  possible  force  which 
can  be  brought,  and  the  greatest  possible  resistance  which  can  be  applied,  do 
not  constitute  a  practical  rule  for  the  construction  of  our  fixed  defences.  Moral 
considerations  must  also  have  weight.  Probabilities  must  be  examined.  The 
power  of  the  permanent  batteries  is  one  of  the  elements  of  security.  So  are  the 
dangers  of  dispersion  and  shipwreck,  and  all  the  hazards  of  a  distant  expedi- 
tion, as  these  must  operate  on  the  councils  of  any  country  meditating  such  an 
enterprise,  the  efforts  of  our  navy,  the  co-operation  of  the  floating  defences,  and 
the  troops  which  may  be  ready  to  meet  the  enemy  upon  his  debarkation  or 
march. 

In  submitting  these  reflections,  I  am  desirous  only  of  discharging  the  duty 
confided  to  me.  I  am  gratified  that  the  whole  subject  will  be  presented  for  the 
consideration  of  Congress  in  a  systematic  form,  and  that  the  principles  of  its 
future  prosecution  can  now  be  settled.  The  plan  originally  devised  was  recom- 
mended upon  great  consideration,  and,  at  the  time  its  initiatory  measures  were 
adopted,  was  calculated  for  the  state  of  the  country.  We  had  just  come  out  of 
a  severe  struggle,  and  had  felt  the  want  of  adequate  preparation,  and,  above  all, 
we  had  seen  and  deplored  the  circumstances  which  gave  the  enemy  undisturbed 
possession  of  the  Chesapeake,  and  its  disastrous  consequences.  And  it  was  to 
be  expected  that  our  arrangements  for  future  defence  should  be  planned  upon 
the  then  existing  state  of  things.  I  imagine  there  were  few  who-  did  not  concur 
in  this  sentiment.  Because,  therefore,  some  of  our  works,  from  the  wonderful 
advancement  of  the  country  in  all  the  elements  of  power,  and  from  the  develop- 
ment of  new  means  of  annoyance,  are  larger  than  are  found  necessary  at  this 


78  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

time,  still  this  does  not  bring  into  question  the  wisdom  of  the  original  measure. 
And,  as  it  is,  they  are  most  valuable  and  useful ;  but  the  experience  we  have 
acquired  may  be  profitably  employed  in  re-examining  the  plans  proposed  for  the 
prosecution  of  the  system,  and  in  inquiring  whether  the  change  which  has  taken 
place  in  the  condition  of  the  country  will  not  justify  a  corresponding  change  in 
the  nature  of  our  preparations,  and  whether  we  may  not  depend  more  upon 
floating,  and  less  upon  stationary  defences. 

During  the  period  which  has  intervened  since  the  last  war,  we  have  nearly 
doubled  in  our  population,  and  all  our  other  resources  have  probably  increased 
in  a  still  greater  ratio.  Certainly,  some  of  the  facilities  and  means  of  defence 
are  augmented  beyond  any  rational  expectations.  The  power  of  transporting 
troops  and  munitions  of  war  has  already  opened  new  views  upon  this  subject, 
and  such  is  the  progress  and  probable  extent  of  the  new  system  of  intercom- 
munication that  the  time  will  soon  come  when  almost  any  amount  of  physical 
force  may  be  thrown  upon  any  point  threatened  by  an  enemy.  Nashville  may 
succor  New  Orleans  in  sixty  hours ;  Cincinnati  may  aid  Charleston  in  about  the 
same  time ;  Pittsburg  will  require  but  twenty-four  hours  to  relieve  Baltimore, 
and  troops  from  that  city  and  from  Boston  may  leave  each  place  in  the  morn- 
ing, and  meet  in  New  York  in  the  evening.  This  wonderful  capacity  for  move- 
ment increases,  in  effect,  some  of  the  most  important  elements  of  national  power 
It  neutralizes  one  of  the  great  advantages  of  an  assailing  force,  choosing  its 
point  of  attack,  and  possessing  the  necessary  means  of  reaching  it.  Detach- 
ments liable,  under  former  circumstances?  to  be  cut  off  in  detail,  may  now  be 
concentrated  without  delay,  and  most  of  the  garrisons  upon  the  seaboard  may 
be  brought  together,  and,  after  accomplishing  the  object  of  their  concentration, 
be  returned  to  their  stations  in  time  to  repel  any  attack  meditated  against  them. 

The  improvements  which  are  making  in  the  application  of  steam  have  fur- 
nished another  most  important  agent  in  the  work  of  national  protection.  There 
can  be  but  little  doubt  that  floating  batteries,  propelled  by  this  agent,  will  be 
among  the  most  efficient  means  of  coast  defence.  In  our  large  estuaries,  such 
as  the  bays  of  New  York,  of  the  Delaware,  and  of  the  Chesapeake,  they  will 
be  found  indispensable ;  and  one  of  the  most  important  advantages  to  be  antici- 
pated from  the  works  at  Old  Point  Comfort  is  the  security  they  will  afford  to 
the  floating  batteries  co-operating  with  them,  and  which  will  find  a  secure  shel- 
ter in  Hampton  roads.  A  hostile  fleet  about  to  enter  the  Chesapeake  would  cer- 
tainly calculate  the  means  of  annoyance  to  which  it  would  be  exposed  by  these 
formidable  vessels.  During  a  calm  they  would  take  a  distant  position,  insuring 
their  own  safety,  while,  with  their  heavy  guns,  they  might  cripple  and  destroy 
the  enemy ;  and  their  power  of  motion  would  enable  them,  under  almost  all  cir- 
cumstances, to  approach  the  fleet,  and  to  retire,  when  necesary,  where  they 
could  not  be  pursued.  I  think  it  doubtful  whether  a  squadron  would  anchor  in 
the  Chesapeake,  or  proceed  up  it,  if  a  competent  number  of  these  batteries  were 
maintained  and  placed  in  proper  positions. 

These  considerations  may  well  lead  us  to  doubt  the  necessity  of  such*  extensive 
permanent  works,  while  their  non-existence  at  the  time  the  system  was  adopted, 
justifies  the  views  which  then  prevailed;  and  without  advancing  any  rash  con- 
jecture, we  may  anticipate  such  improvements  in  this  branch  of  the  public  ser- 
vice as  will  make  it  the  most  efficient  means  of  coast  defence.  These  vessels, 
properly  constructed,  may  become  floating  forts  almost  equal  to  permanent  forti- 
fications in  their  power  of  annoyance  and  defence,  and  in  other  advantages  far 
superior  to  them.  Being  transferable  defences,  they  can.be  united  upon  any 
point,  and  a  few  of  them  be  thus  enabled  to  protect  various  places.  We 
have  been  brought  by  circumstances  to  a  more  rigid  investigation  of  our 
means  of  defence,  and  to  a  re-examination  of  the  whole  subject.  After  an  in- 
terval of  twenty  years  of  tranquillity,  public  sentiment  and  the  attention  of  the 
government  were,  by  unexpected  circumstances,  more  forcibly  directed  to  this 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  79 

matter.  The  result  cannot  fail  to  be  advantageous.  The  whole  subject  can  be 
now  re-examined  by  Congress,  with  all  the  benefits  which  much  experience  has 
brought,  and  with  the  advantage  of  adapting  a  system  to  the  advanced  state  of 
the  country. 

There  are  two  bills  for  fortifications  now  pending  before  Congress.  One  be- 
fore the  House,  amounting  to  $2,180,000,  and  intended  to  prosecute  works  actu- 
ally already  commenced.  The  estimates  for  this  bill  may  therefore  be  considered 
necessary  in  themselves,  under  any  view  of  the  general  subject,  and  not  unrea- 
sonable in  amount  for  the  present  year,  because  they  include  the  operations  of 
two  years.  The  incidental  expenses,  however,  may  be  safely  reduced  one-half, 
as  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  make  such  extensive  repairs  as  were  considered 
requisite  when  the  estimates  were  prepared. 

The  bill  pending  before  the  Senate  contains  appropriations  for  nineteen  new 
works,  and  for  the  sum  of  $600,000  to  be  expended  for  steam  batteries.  The 
estimates  on  which  this  bill  was  founded  were  prepared  at  a  time  when  prudence 
required  that  arrangements  should  be  made  for  a  different  state  of  things  from 
that  which  now  exists.  An  examination  of  the  general  system  of  defence  was 
not  then  expedient;  and  the  means  of  protecting  the  most  exposed  points, 
agreeably  to  information  previously  collected,  were  asked  of  Congress.  It  was 
no  time  then  to  stop,  and  instead  of  prosecuting  established  plans  vigorously, 
to  lose  the  period  of  action  by  surveys,  examinations,  and  discussions.  But  the 
opportunity  is  now  afforded,  without  danger  to  the  public  interest,  of  applying 
the  principles  suggested  to  the  works  under  consideration. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  but  that  fortifications  at  the  following  places  enumerated 
in  this  bill  will  be  necessary  : 

At  Penobscot  bay,  for  Jhe  protection  of  Bangor,  &c. 

At  Kennebec  river. 

At  Portland. 

At  Portsmouth. 

At  Salem. 

At  New  Bedford. 

At  New  London. 

Upon  Staten  Island. 

At  Sollers's  Flats. 

A  redoubt  on  Federal  Point. 

For  the  Barrancas. 

For  Fort  St.  Philip. 

These  proposed  works  all  command  the  approach  to  places  sufliciently  im- 
portant to  justify  their  construction  under  any  circumstances  that  will  probably 
exist.  I  think,  therefore,  that  the  public  interest  would  be  promoted  by  the 
passage  of  the  necessary  appropriations  for  them.  As  soon  as  these  are  made, 
such  of  these  positions  as  may  appear  to  require  it  can  be  examined,  and  the 
form  and  extent  of  the  works  adapted  to  existing  circumstances,  if  any  change 
be  desirable.  The  construction  of  those  not  needing  examination  can  commence 
immediately,  and  that  of  the  others  as  soon  as  the  plans  are  determined  upon. 
By  this  proceeding,  therefore,  a  season  may  be  saved  in  the  operations. 

The  other  works  contained  in  this  bill  are : 

For  Provincetown. — And  this  proposition  may  be  safely  submitted  to  another 
inquiry,  as  the  practicability  of  excluding  an  enemy  from  any  shelter  in  Massa- 
chusetts bay,  a  matter  of  deep  interest,  and  as  a  work  at  Provincetown,  are 
closely  connected. 

For  Rhode  Island,  Narraganset  bay. — This  work  may  await  the  result  of 
the  views  that  may  be  eventually  taken  on  the  subject  of  fortifying  this  bay. 

For  a  work  at  the  Delaivare  outlet  of  the  Chesapeake  and  Delaware  canal. — 
This  may  be  postponed  without  injury  till  next  season;  and  in  the  meantime  a 


80  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

project  for  the  floating  defences  of  the  Delaware  considered,  and  perhaps  the 
size  of  the  proposed  work  reduced. 

For  a  work  at  the  Breakwater. — Until  the  effect  of  the  deposits  which  are 
going  on  in  this  important  artificial  harbor  are  fully  ascertained,  I  consider  it 
injudicious  to  erect  a  permanent  work  for  its  defence.  Another  year  will,  per- 
haps, settle  the  question,  and  if  the  result  is  favorable,  an  adequate  fortification 
should  be  constructed  here  without  delay. 

For  a  fort  on  the  Patuxent  river,  and  a  fort  at  Cedar  Point. — Both  of  these 
works  are  liable  to  some  of  the  objections  stated,  and  I  think  they  had  better  be 
postponed  for  more  mature  consideration. 

For  fortifications  at  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Mary's,  Georgia. — This  proposition 
may  also  be  safely  submitted  to  examination. 

The  estimate  for  steam  batteries  may  be  reduced  to  $100,000.  That  sum  can 
be  profitably  employed. 

If  these  appropriations  are  early  made,  most  if  not  all  of  these  works  can  be 
put  in  operation  this  season,  and  the  money  usefully  applied,'  as  fast  as  their 
progress  will  justify.  And  I  think  the  measure  would  be  expedient.  But  it  is 
to  be  remembered  that  the  power  of  the  department  to  push  them,  during  the 
present  year,  will  depend  on  the  reorganization  of  the  corps  of  engineers.  If 
that  corps  is  not  increased,  it  will  be  unnecessary  to  make  th'e  appropriations  in 
the  bill  before  the  Senate,  as  the  objects  contained  in  the  other  bill  will  be  suffi- 
cient to  occupy  the  time  of  the  present  officers  of  the  corps. 

Should  it  be  deemed  proper  to  re-examine  the  subject  of  the  proposed  fortifi- 
cations generally,  I  would  then  recommend  that  an  appropriation  of  $30,000  be 
made  to  defray  the  expenses  of  a  board,  including  surveyors,  &c. 

My  reflections  upon  the  whole  subject  lead  to  the  Allowing  practical  sugges- 
tions on  the  great  subject  of  the  measures  for  the  defence  of  the  country : 

1.  An  augmentation  of  the  navy,  upon  the  principles  before  stated. 

2.  The  adoption  of  an  efficient  plan  for  the  organization  of  the  militia. 
Having  already,  in  two  of  the  annual  reports  I  have  had  the  honor  to  make 

to  you,  expressed  my  sentiments  upon  this  subject,  I  have  nothing  new  to  lay 
before  you,  either  with  relation  to  its  general  importance,  or  to  the  necessary 
practical  details.  I  consider  it  one  of  the  most  momentous  topics  that  can  en- 
gage the  attention  of  Congress ;  and  the  day  that  sees  a  plan  of  organization 
adopted,  suited  to  the  habits  of  our  people  and  the  nature  of  our  institutions,  and 
fitted  to  bring  into  action  the  physical  strength  of  the  country,  with  a  competent 
knowledge  of  their  duty,  and  just  ideas  of  discipline  and  subordination,  will  see 
us  the  strongest  nation,  for  the  purposes  of  self-defence,  on  the  face  of  the  globe. 
Certainly  such  an  object  is  worthy  the  attention  of  the  legislature. 

3.  The  cultivation  of  military  science,  that  we  may  keep  pace  with  the  im- 
provements which  are  made  in  Europe,  and  not  be  compelled  to  enter  into  a 
contest  with  an  adversary  whose  superior  knowledge  would  give  him  pre-eminent 
advantages.    War  is  an  advancing  science.    Many  an  original  genius  and  many 
an  acute  intellect  are  at  all  times  at  work  upon  it ;  and  the  European  communi- 
ties have  such  a  relation  to  one  another  that  the  profession  of  anus  is  peculiarly 
encouraged,  and  every  effort  made  to  place  their  military  establishments,  not  at 
the  highest  numerical  point,  but  in  the  best  condition  for  efficient  service,  both 
with  respect  to  its  morale  and  materiel.     It  is  not  by  the  mere  reading  of  pro- 
fessional authors  that  the  necessary  instruction  in  this  branch  of  knowledge  can 
be  obtained;  there  must  be  study  and  practice;  a  union  of  principles  and  details, 
which  can  best  be  obtained  by  a  course  of  education  directed  to  this  object. 
This,  I  think,  is  one  of  the  greatest  advantages  of  the  Military  Academy.     It 
cannot  have  escaped  the  recollection  of  those  who  were  upon  the  theatre  of  action 
at  the  commencement  of  the  last  war,  that  the  first  year  was  almost  spent  in  a 
series  of  disasters,  which,  however,  brought  their  advantages.     We  were  com- 
paratively ignorant  of  the  state  of  military  science,  and  we  did  not  fully  recover 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SE^- COAST   DEFENCES.  81 

our  true  position  till  we  had  received  many  severe  lessons :  at  what  an  expense 
of  life  and  treasure  need  not  be  stated. 

4.  The  skeleton  of  a  regular  establishment,  to  which  any  necessary  additions 
may  be  made,  securing,  at  the  same  time,  economy,  with  a  due  power  of  expan- 
sion, and  the  means  of  meeting  a  war  with  all  the  benefit  of  a  regularly  organized 
force.     This  object  is  attained  by  our  present  army. 

5.  The  preparation  and  proper  distribution  of  all  the  munitions  of  war,  agree- 
ably to  the  views  hereinafter  submitted. 

6.  I  think  all  the  defensive  works  now  in  the  process  of  construction  should 
be  finished,  agreeably  to  the  plans  upon  which  they  have  been  projected. 

7.  All  the  harbors  and  inlets  upon  the  coast,  where  there  are  cities  or  towns 
whose  situation  and  importance  create  just  apprehension  of  attack,  and  particu- 
larly where  we  have  public  naval  establishments,  should  be  defended  by  works 
proportioned  to  any  exigency  that  may  probably  arise. 

Having  already  presented  my  general  views  upon  this  branch  of  the  inquiry, 
I  need  not  repeat  the  practical  limitations  which  I  propose  for  adoption.  But 
before  any  expenditure  is  incurred  for  new  works,  I  think  an  examination  should 
be  made,  in  every  case,  in  order  to  apply  these  principles  to  the  proposed  plan 
of  operations,  and  thus  reduce  the  expense  of  construction  where  this  can  prop- 
erly be  done,  and,  also,  the  eventual  expense  of  maintaining  garrisons  required 
to  defend  works  disproportioued  to  the  objects  sought  to  be  attained.  I  would 
organize  a  board  for  this  object,  with  special  instructions  for  its  government. 

8.  Provision  should  be  made  for  the  necessary  experiments,  to  test  the  supe- 
riority of  the  various  plans  that  may  be  offered  for  the  construction  and  use  of 
steam  batteries;  I  mean  batteries  to  be  employed  as  accessories  in  the  defence 
of  the  harbors  and  inlets,  and  in  aid  of  the  permanent  fortifications. 

The  progressive  improvement  in  the  application  of  the  power  of  steam  renders 
it  inexpedient,  at  any  given  time,  to  make  extensive  arrangements,  connected 
with  this  class  of  works,  with  a  view  to  their  future  employment.  The  improve- 
ment of  to-day  may  be  superseded  by  the  experience  of  to-morrow ;  and  modes 
of  application  may  be  discovered  before  any  exigency  arises  rendering  a  resort 
to  these  defences  necessary,  which  may  introduce  an  entire  revolution  into  this 
department  of  art  and  industry.  *  Still,  however,  experiments  should  be  made, 
aiid  a  small  number  of  these  vessels  constructed.  Their  proper  draught  of  water, 
their  form  and  equipment,  the  situation  and  security  of  their  machinery,  the 
number,  calibre,  and  management  of  their  guns,  and  the  best  form  of  the  engines 
to  be  used,  are  questions  requiring  much  consideration,  and  which  can  only  be 
determined  by  experience.  And  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  suitable  rewards 
would  soon  put  in  operation  the  inventive  faculties  of  some  of  our  countrymen, 
and  lead  to  the  tender  of  plans  practically  suited  to  the  circumstances.  As  we 
acquire  confidence  by  our  experience,  arrangements  could  be  made  for  collecting 
and  preparing  the  indestructible  materials  for  the  construction  and  equipment  of 
these  vessels,  as  far  as  such  a  measure  may  not  interfere  with  any  probable 
change,  which  at  the  time  may  be  anticipated  in  the  application  of  the  power  of 
steam. 

9.  I  recommend  a  reconsideration  of  the  project  for  fortifying  the  roadsteads 
or  open  anchorage  grounds,  and  its  better  adaptation  to  the  probable  future  cir- 
cumstances of  the  country. 

And  I  would  suggest  that  the  works  which  are  determined  on  be  pushed  with 
all  reasonable  vigor,  that  our  whole  coast  may  be  placed  beyond  the  reach  of 
injury  or  insult  as  soon  as  a  just  regard  to  circumstances  will  permit.  No 


objections  can  arise  to  this  procedure  on  the  ground  of  expense,  because,  whatever 
system  may  be  approved  by  the  legislature,  nothing  will  be  gained  by  delaying 

ipletioii  beyond  the  time 

,  the  cost  will  be  greater 

H.  Rep.  Com.  86 6 


~j  ^  *,  ""',/     -   *      sr  JL j  v  v        <j 

its  completion  beyond  the  time  necessary  to  the  proper  execution  of  the  work. 
In  fact,  the  cost  will  be  greater  the  longer  we  are  employed  in  it,  not  only  for 


82  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

obvious  reasons,  arising  out  of  general  superintendence  and  other  contingencies, 
but  because  accidents  are  liable  to  happen  to  unfinished  works,  and  the  business 
upon  them  is  deranged  by  the  winter,  when  they  must  be  properly  secured ;  and 
the  season  for  resuming  labor  always  finds  some  preparations  necessary,  which 
would  not  have  been  required  had  no  interruption  happened. 

But  the  political  considerations  which  urge  forward  this  great  object  are  enti- 
tled to  much  more  weight.  When  once  completed  we  should  feel  secure.  There 
is  probably  not  a  man  in  the  country  who  did  not  look  with  some  solicitude 
during  the  past  season  at  our  comparatively  defenceless  condition,  when  the 
issue  of  our  discussions  with  France  was  uncertain,  and  who  did  not  regret  that 
our  preparations,  during  the  long  interval  of  peace  we  had  enjoyed,  had  not 
kept  pace  with  our  growth  and  importance.  We  have  now  this  lesson  to  add  to 
our  other  experience.  Adequate  security  is  not  only  due  from  the  government 
to  the  country,  and  the  conviction  of  it  is  not  only  satisfactory,  but  the  knowl- 
edge of  its  existence  cannot  fail  to  produce  an  influence  upon  other  nations,  as 
well  in  the  advent  of  war  itself,  as  in  the  mode  of  conducting  it.  If  we  ere 
prepared  to  attack  and  resist,  the  chances  of  being  compelled  to  embark  in  hos- 
tilities will  be  diminished  much  in  proportion  to  our  preparation.  An  unprotected 
commerce,  a  defenceless  coast,  and  a  military  marine  wholly  inadequate  to  the 
wants  of  our  service,  would  indeed  hold  out  strong  inducements  to  other  nations 
to  convert  trifling  pretexts  into  serious  causes  of  quarrel. 

There  are  two  suggestions  connected  with  the  prosecution  of  our  works  which 
I  venture  to  make  : 

First.  That  the  corps  of  engineers  should  be  increased.  The  reasons  for  this 
measure  have  been  heretofore  submitted,  and  the  proposition  has  been  recom- 
mended by  you  to  Congress.  I  will  merely  add,  upon  the  present  occasion,  that 
the  officers  of  this  corps  are  not  sufficiently  numerous  for  the  performance  of  the 
duties  committed  to  them  ;  and  that  if  an  augmentation  does  not  take  place,  the 
public  interest  will  suffer  in  a  degree  far  beyond  the  value  of  any  pecuniary 
consideration  connected  with  this  increase  ;  and, 

Secondly.  I  think  that  when  the  plan  of  a  work  has  been  approved  by  Con- 
gress, and  its  construction  authorized,  the  whole  appropriation  should  be  made 
at  once,  to  be  drawn  from  the  treasury  in  annual  instalments,  to  be  fixed  by  the 
law.  This  mode  of  appropriation  would  remedy  much  of  the  inconvenience 
which  has  been  felt  for  years  in  this  branch  of  the  public  service.  The  uncer- 
tainty respecting  the  appropriations  annually  deranges  the  business,  and  the 
delay  which  biennially  takes  place  in  the  passage  of  the  necessary  law  reduces 
the  alternate  season  of  operations  to  a  comparatively  short  period.  An  exact 
inquiry  into  the  effect  which  the  present  system  of  making  the  appropriations 
has  had  upon  the  expense  of  the  works  would  probably  exhibit  an  amount  far 
greater  than  is  generally  anticipated. 

The  report  from  the  ordnance  department  shows  the  quantity  and  nature  of 
the  munitions  of  war,  estimated  to  be  eventually  necessary,  and  their  probable 
cost,  including  new  establishments  necessary  for  their  fabrication  and  preserva- 
tion. The  conjectural  amount  is  $29,955,537. 

Believing  it  is  not  expedient  at  present  to  make  any  preparations  upon  a 
scale  of  this  magnitude,  I  have  deemed  it  proper  to  accompany  this  report  with 
a,  brief  statement  of  my  own  views,  where  I  depart  from  the  suggestions  that 
are  presented  in  this  document. 

As  our  fortifications-  are  constructed,  their  armaments  .  should  be  provided ; 
and  the  amount  in  depot  should  at  all  times  exceed  the  anticipated  demand,  to 
meet  the  casualties  of  the  service.  We  have  now  on  hand  1,818  new  cannon 
for  sea-coast  defence ;  and  about  1,000  others,  most  of  which  are  either  useless 
or  of  doubtful  character.  The  works  actually  finished,  or  so  far  completed  as 
to  admit  of  a  part  of  their  armament  being  placed  in  them,  require  about  2,000 
guns.  They  are  calculated  ultimately  to  mount  about  600  more.  Others  in 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  83 

the  process  of  construction  will  require  about  1,400.  So  far  we  have  certain 
data  for  our  estimates ;  unless,  indeed,  which  I  am  inclined  to  believe,  it  should 
not  be  found  necessary  ever  to  provide  the  full  complement  destined  for  the 
'largest  of  these  works.  Beyond  this,  the  subject  is  conjectural.  And  the 
quantity  needed  must  depend  upon  the  principles  that  may  be  adopted  in  the 
further  progress  of  the  system  of  fortifications.  There  are  four  private  foun- 
deries  at  which  the  public  cannon  are  cast.  These,  if  their  whole  attention 
were  devoted  to  the  object,  could  manufacture  from  1,200  to  1,500  annually. 
As  to  carriages  and  other  supplies,  the  amount  that  could  be  procured  within  a 
reasonable  period  is  almost  indefinite.  Iron  carriages  are  now  made  for  all  the 
casemate  batteries,  and  they  have  not  only  the  advantage  of  indestructibility 
from  the  atmosphere,  but,  requiring  no  seasoned  materials,  they  may  be  supplied 
by  the  founderies  through  the  country  to  almost  any  extent. 

We  have  two  armories  for  the  manufacture  of  small  arms,  and  there  are  seven 
private  establishments  which  fabricate  arms  for  the  government.  All  these  sup- 
plies are  of  the  best  description,  and  are  submitted  to  a  rigid  inspection,  which 
prevents  imposition.  The  armories  can  at  present  turn  out  about  27,000  arms 
annually,  and  probably  11,000  or  12,000  could  be  made  at  existing  private 
establishments.  Should  any  exigency  require  larger  supplies,  the  quantity  can 
be  much  increased.  We  have  now  on  hand  about  700,000  small  arms,  and 
there  must  have  been  issued  to  the  States  about  180,000  muskets,  25,000  rifles, 
30,000  pistols,  and  378  field  cannon  and  carriages,  under  the  act  for  arming  the 
militia.  If  100,000  of  these  muskets  and  rifles  are  preserved,  there  are  in  the 
country  800,000  of  those  species  of  arms  belonging  to  the  general  or  State 
governments. 

What  may  be  considered  a  proper  supply  is  a  question  admitting  much  dif- 
ference of  opinion.  It  will  be  seen  that  the  ordnance  department  fixes  the 
amount  at  about  600,000,  in  addition  to.  what  are  now  on  hand,  and  including 
the  number  necessary  to  arm  the  militia.  We  had,  at  the  commencement  of 
the  last  war,  240,000  muskets,  and  during  its  progress  60,000  more  were  made 
and  purchased.  At  its  termination  there  were  but  20,000  at  the  various  arsenals. 
The  residue  were  in  the  hands  of  the  troops,  or  had  been  lost  in  the  service. 
This  consumption  was  greater,  I  think,  than  was  necessary,  or  than  would 
probably  again  take  place.  A  plan  of  accountability  has  been  introduced,  by 
which  the  men  are  charged  with  the  arms  they  receive,  and  if  these  are  im- 
properly lost  or  injured,  the  value  is  deducted  from  their  pay.  The  paymasters 
cannot  settle  with  them  till  this  matter  is  adjusted. 

The  stock  of  small  arms  in  Great  Britain,  in  depot,  in  1817,  was. .  818,282 
In  the  public  service 200,974 


Total 1,019,256 

.     The  number  in  depot  in  France,  in  1811,  was  60,000,  not  including  the  great 
number  in  service. 

My  own  impression,  is  that  1,000,000  small  arms  may  be  considered  a  com- 
petent supply  for  the  United  States ;  and  if  so,  a  large  deduction  may  be  made 
from  the  estimate  of  the  ordnance  department  under  this  head  of  expenditure. 
Although  the  component  materials  of  these  arms  are  almost  imperishable,  still 
it  is  not  expedient  to  keep  a  stock  unnecessarily  large  on  hand ;  because  there 
is  not  only  some  risk  and  expense  in  their  preservation,  but  because,  like  every 
other  article  manufactured  by  man,  they  are  no  doubt  susceptible  of  great  im- 
provement. And  it  may  be  that  those  now  made  may  be  superseded  by  an 
improved  model,  which,  once  introduced,  must  be  adopted,  at  whatever  expense 
or  inconvenience,  by  all  nations.  And  the  ingenious  invention  lately  exhibited 
in  this  city,  by  which  a  series  of  balls,  in  separate  charges,  are  brought  by  a 


84  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

rotary  motion  to  a  common  place  of  discharge,  suggests  the  possibility  of  a 
revolution  in  the  form  of  our  fire-arms. 

On  the  subject  of  depots  for  these  arms,  I  accord  with  the  general  suggestions 
made  by  the  colonel  of  ordnance.  I  think  the  number  should  be  increased,  and 
arms  placed  in  every  part  of  the  country,  ready  to  be  used  as  circumstances  may 
require. 

It  will  be  observed  that,  in  the  estimate  I  have  made,  I  confine  myself  to  the 
armament  for  the  public  service,  connected  with  the  actual  defence  of  the  coun- 
try, whether  to  be  used  by  the  army  or  militia  in  time  of  war,  but  1  do  not 
extend  my  views  to  a  supply  for  arming  the  militia,  in  order  to  discipline  them 
in  time  of  peace.  The  extent  of  this  policy  is  a  question  not  necessary  in  the 
consideration  of  the  subject  before  me. 

As  the  arms  in  depot  approach  whatever  number  may  be  assumed  as  the 
proper  maximum,  the  necessity  for  additional  armories  becomes  less.  When  our 
stock  is  once  completed,  the  present  armories,  without  any  aid  from  the  private 
establishments,  will  be  able  to  supply  the  annual  consumption.  I  think,  there- 
fore, that  two  additional  armories,  as  suggested  by  the  ordnance  department, 
are  not  wanted.  And,  indeed,  although  there  are  considerations  attending  the 
transportation  of  the  rude  and  the  manufactured  article,  and  other  circumstances 
which  would  justify  the  establishment  of  a  new  armory  upon  the  western  waters 
at  present,  yet  if  the  measure  is  not  carried  into  effect  soon  its  importance  will 
annually  diminish. 

But  a  national  foundery  for  cannon,  both  for  the  military  and  naval  service, 
and  perhaps  two  in  different  sections  of  the  country,  should  be  erected  without 
delay.  The  best  interests  of  the  public  require  it.  But  I  have  nothing  to  add 
to  the  suggestions  made  upon  this  subject  in  my  last  annual  report. 

As  to  field  artillery,  the  extent  to  which  it  shall  be  provided  must  depend 
upon  the  views  of  the  legislature  concerning  the  expediency  of  issuing  it  to  the 
militia.  If  a  more  efficient  organization  does  not  take  place  I  think  the  ex- 
penditure on  this  account  may  well  be  saved  to  the  public  treasury.  I  consider 
all  attempts  to  improve  the  condition  of  the  militia  upon  the  present  plan  as  so 
nearly  useless  that  the  whole  system  has  become  a  burden  upon  the  public 
without  .any  corresponding  advantage.  The  principal  benefit  which  results 
from  the  existing  state  of  things  is  the  power  to  call  into  service  such  portions 
of  the  population  as  may  be  wanted.  But  this  may  be  attained  by  a  simple 
classification  without  the  cumbrous  machinery  which  at  present  creates  expense 
and  trouble,  and  which,  while  it  promises  little,  performs  still  less. 
Very  respectfully,  sir,  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  &c., 

LEWIS  CASS. 

The  PRESIDENT  of  the  United  States. 


ENGINEER  DEPARTMENT, 

Washington,  March  30,  1836. 

SIR  :  In  compliance  with  your  instructions,  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  here- 
with the  copy  of  a  report  prepared  in  fulfilment  of  the  requirement  of  the  first 
inquiry  contained  in  the  resolution  of  the  Senate  of  the  18th  of  February  last. 
The  views  presented  by  Colonel  Totten  on  the  subject  are  full  and  explicit,  and 
are  consonant  with  the  principles  heretofore  advocated  by  this  department. 
The  report  is  therefore  respectfully  submitted  without  any  further  comments. 
Very  respectfully,  sir,  your  most  obedient  servant, 

C.  GRATIOT, 

Chief  Engineer. 
Hon.  LEWIS  CASS,  Secretary  of  War. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  85 


WASHINGTON,  March  29,  1836. 

SIR:  In  compliance  with  your  request,  I  have  the  honor  to  hand  in  some 
remarks  on  the  fortification  of  the  frontier  of  the  United  States. 
And  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  most  obedient, 

JOS.  G.  TOTTEN, 
Lieut.  Col.  Eng.  Brevet  Colonel. 
Brig.  Gen.  CH.  GRATIOT, 

Chief  Engineer,  Washington. 


In  presenting  a  summary  statement  of  the  general  system  of  defence  of  the 
country  by  fortifications,  as  proposed  and  in-  part  executed,  it  is  proper  to  refer 
for  much  information  as  to  localities,  as  to  particular  projects,  and  for  statements 
and  arguments  somewhat  elaborate,  to  communications  made  at  different  times 
by  the  board  of  engineers  for  fortifications. 

These  communications,  of  a  nature  forbidding  too  great  publicity,  are  to  be 
found  in  the  records  of  the  War  Department  in  the  shape  of  reports  of  the 
board  of  engineers  of  1817,  1819,  1820,  1821,  1822,  1823,  1824,  and  1325. 
Reference  may  also  be  made  with  advantage  to  the  revised  report  of  the  board 
of  engineers  presented  in  1826,  and  published  as  document  No.  153  of  the 
state  papers  of  the  first  session  of  the  nineteenth  Congress.  The  report  of 
1826,  just  referred  to,  was  drawn  up  by  the  undersigned,  and  was  the  work  of 
much  research  and  of  mature  deliberation ;  and  in  giving  it  now  a  careful  peru- 
sal, he  thinks  that  the  information  now  called  for  by  the  Senate  cannot  be  better 
afforded,  at  least  by  him,  than  by  again  presenting  that  report,  occasionally 
condensing,  curtailing,  or  omitting  portions  of  the  argument  and  certain  descrip- 
tions, and  adding  such  new  facts  as  may  have  been  developed  by  further  re- 
search, or  made  more  prominent  and  interesting  by  the  progress  of  improvement 
in  the  country. 

The  elements  going  to  make  up  the  general  system  of  maritime  defence  are  a 
navy,  fortifications,  interior  communications  by  land  and  water,  and  a  regular 
army,  and  well  organized  militia. 

The  navy  must  be  provided  with  suitable  establishments  for  construction  and 
repair,  stations,  harbors  of  rendezvous,  and  ports  of  refuge.  All  these  must 
be  covered  by  fortifications  having  garrisons  of  regular  troops  and  militia,  and 
being  supplied  with  men  and  materials  through  the  lines  of  interior  communi- 
cations. Not  being  required  to  remain  in  the  harbors  for  their  defence,  the 
navy,  pre-eminent  as  an  offensive  arm,  will  be  prepared  to  transfer  the  war  to 
distant  oceans  and  to  the  shores  of  the  enemy,  and  to  act  the  great  part  which 
its  early  achievements  have  foretold,  and  to  which  its  high  destiny  will  lead. 

Fortifications  should,  1st,  close  all  important  harbors  against  an  enemy,  and 
secure  them  to  our  military  and  commercial  marine ; 

2d.  Should  deprive  an  enemy  of  all  strong  positions  where,  protected  by  naval 
superiority,  he  might  maintain  himself  during  the  war,  keeping  the  whole  fron- 
tier in  constant  alarm ; 

3d.  Must  cover  the  great  naval  establishments  from  attack ; 

4th.  Must  protect  the  great  cities  ; 

5th.  Must  prevent,  as  far  as  possible,  the  great  avenues  of  interior  navigation 
from  being  blockaded  at  their  entrances  to  the  ocean ; 

6th.  Must  cover  the  coastwise  and  interior  navigation,  by  closing  the  harbors 
and  the  several  inlets  which  intersect  the  lines  of  interior  communication,  thereby 
further  aiding  the  navy  in  protecting  the  navigation  of  the  country ;  and 

7th.  Must  shelter  the  smaller  towns  along  the  coast,  and  also  all  their  com- 


86  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

mercial  and  manufacturing  establishments  which  are  of  a  nature  to  invite  the 
enterprise  or  cupidity  of  an  enemy. 

Interior  communications  will  conduct,  with  certainty,  the  necessary  supplies- 
of  all  sorts  to  the  stations,  harbors  of  rendezvous  and  refuge,  and  the  establish- 
ments of  construction  and  repair  for  the  use  both  of  the  fortifications  and  of  the 
navy ;  will  greatly  facilitate  and  expedite  the  concentration  of  military  force, 
and  the  transfer  of  troops  from  one  point  to  another ;  will  insure  to  these  troops 
supplies  of  every  description,  and  will  preserve,  unimpaired,  the  interchange  of 
domestic  commerce,  even  during  periods  of  the  most  active  external  warfare. 

The  army  and  militia,  together  with  the  personnel  of  the  marine,  constitute 
the  vital  principle  of  the  system. 

It  is  important  to  notice  the  reciprocal  relation  of  these  elements  of  national 
defence ;  one  element  is  scarcely  more  dependent  on  another,  than  the  whole 
system  is  on  each  one.  Withdraw  the  navy,  and  the  defence  becomes  merely 
passive ;  we  expose  ourselves  the  more  to  suffer  the  evils  of  war,  at  the  time 
that  we  deprive  ourselves  of  all  means  of  inflicting  them.  Withdraw  interior 
communication,  and  the  navy  will  often  be  greatly  embarrassed  for  want  of 
supplies,  while  the  fortifications  will  be  unable  to  offer  full  resistance  for  want 
of  timely  re-enforcements.  Withdraw  fortifications,  and  the  interior  communi- 
cations are  broken  up,  and  the  navy  is  left  entirely  without  collateral  aid. 

That  element  in  the  system  of  defence,  which  is  now  to  be  attended  to,  is  the 
fortification  of  the  frontier.  It  may  not  be  unprofitable  here  to  go  somewhat 
more  into  detail,  as  to  the  relation  of  this  with  the  other  members  of  the  system  ; 
the  rather,  as  the  reasons  for  some  conclusions  hereafter  to  be  announced  will 
be  the  more  apparent. 

In  considering  the  relation  of  fortifications,  and  of  the  navy,  to  the  defence  of 
the  country,  it  will  appear  that  the  functions  of  the  latter  are  not  less  appropri- 
ately offensive  than  those  of  the  former  are  necessarily  defensive ;  the  latter 
loses  much  of  its  efficiency  as  a  member  of  the  system  the  moment  it  becomes 
passive,  and  should  in  no  case  (referring  now  to  the  navy  proper)  be  relied  on 
as  a  substitute  for  fortifications. 

The  position,  it  is  thought  may  be  easily  established. 

If  our  navy  be  inferior  to  that  of  the  enemy,  it  can  offer,  of  course,  without 
collateral  aids,  but  a  feeble  resistance,  single  ships  being  assailed  by  fleets  or 
squadrons.  Having  numerous  points  along  our  extended  frontier  to  protect,  all 
of  which  must  be  simultaneously  guarded,  because  ignorant  of  the  selected 
points  of  attack,  the  separate  squadrons  or  vessels  may  be  captured  in  detail, 
although  the  naval  force  be,  in  the  aggregate,  equal  or  superior  to  the  enemy's. 
Should  we  in  such  a  case  venture  to  concentrate,  under  the  idea  that  the  partic- 
ular object  of  the  adversary  was  foreseen,  he  could  not  fail  to  push  his  forces 
upon  the  places  thus  left  without  protection.  This  mode  of  defence  is  liable  to 
the  further  objection  of  being  exposed  to  fatal  disasters,  independent  of  assaults 
of  an  enemy,  and  of  leaving  the  issue  of  conflicts  to  be  determined  sometimes 
by  accident,  in  spite  of  all  the  efforts  of  courage  and  skill.  If  it  were. attempted 
to  improve  upon  this  mode,  by  combining  with  it  temporary  batteries  and  field- 
works,  it  would  be  found  that,  besides  being  weak  and  inadequate  from  their 
nature,  the  most  suitable  positions  for  these  works  must  often  be  neglected,  un- 
der the  unavoidable  condition  of  security  to  the  ships  themselves.  If  the  ships 
take  no  part  in  the  contest,  the  defence  is  of  course  relinquished  to  the  tempo- 
rary batteries  ;  if  the  ships  unite  in  the  defence,  the  batteries  must  be  at  hand 
to  sustain  them,  or  the  .ships  must  strike  to  the  superior  adversary.  Placing 
these  batteries  in  better  position,  and  giving  them  greater  strength,  is  at  once 
resorting  to  defence  by  fortifications ;  and  the  resort  will  be  the  more  effectual, 
as  the  positions  are  better  chosen,  and  the  works  better  adapted  to  the  circum- 
stances. 

On  the  great  comparative  expense  of  such  a  mode  of  defence,  which  will  be 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  87 

quite  apparent  after  a  little  reflection,  only  one  or  two  very  brief  remarks  will 
be  made,  viz. :  The  expense  incurred  by  the  nation  defending  itself  on  this  plan 
will,  from  the  first,  greatly  exceed  that  incurred  by  the  attacking  party ;  because, 
to  resist  a  single  fleet  threatening  the  coast,  there  must  be  provided  as  many 
equal  fleets  as  there  are  important  objects  inviting  the  attack  of  the  enemy,  and 
even  with  this  costly  preparation,  all  lesser  objects  are  thrown  upon  his  forbear- 
ance. These  defences,  moreover,  being  perishable  in  their  nature,  will  need 
frequent  removal  and  repair. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  proper  fortification  of  the  coast,  preventing  the  possi- 
bility of  a  blockade  so  strict  as  not  to  afford  frequent  opportunities  for  our  navy 
to  leave  the  harbors,  our  ships,  no  longer  needed,  for  passive  defence,  will  move 
out  upon  their  proper  theatre  of  action,  though  inferior  to  the  enemy,  with  con- 
fidence ;  knowing  that,  whether  victorious,  whether  suffering  from  the  violence 
of  tempests,  or  whether  endangered  by  the  vicinity  or  the  pursuit  of  a  superior 
force,  they  can  strike  the  extended  coast  of  their  country  (avoiding  the  more 
important  outlets,  where  alone  a  considerable  blockading  force  may  be  supposed 
to  lie)  at  numerous  points  where  shelter  and  relief  await  them ;  hovering  around 
the  flanks  and  in  the  rear  of  blockading  fleets,  and  recapturing  their  prizes  ; 
falling  upon  portions  of  these  fleets,  separated  for  minor  objects,  or  by  stress  of 
weather ;  watching  the  movements  of  convoys,  in  order  to  pick  up  straggling 
vessels ;  breaking  up  or  restraining  the  enemy's  commerce  in  distant  seas ; 
meeting  by  concert  at  remote  points  and  falling  in  mass  upon  his  smaller  squad- 
rons, or  upon  his  colonial  possessions,  and  even  levying  contributions  in  his  un- 
protected ports ;  blockading  for  a  time  the  narrow  seas,  and  harassing  the 
coasting  commerce  of  the  enemy's  own  shores.  These  are  objects  which  our 
own  history  shows  may  be  accomplished,  although  contending  by  means  of  a 
navy  as  to  numbers  apparently  insignificant,  against  a  marine  whose  force  and 
efficiency  have  never  been  paralleled.  Our  own  history  shows,  besides,  that  .the 
reason  why  our  infant  navy  did  not  accomplish  still  more,  was  that  the  enemy 
possessing  himself  of  unfortified  harbors,  was  enabled  to  enforce  a  blockade  so 
strict  as  to  confine  a  portion  of  it  within  our  waters.  That  this  portion,  how- 
ever, indeed,  that  all  was  not  captured,  can  be  attributed  only  to  respect — so 
misplaced  that  it  could  be  the  result  of  ignorance  only — for  the  then  existing 
fortifications ;  a  result  amply  compensating  the  nation  for  the  cost  of  those  im- 
perfect works.  It  would  be  difficult,  nay,  impossible,  to  estimate  the  full  value 
of  the  results  following  the  career  of  our  navy,  when  it  shall  have  attained  its 
state  of  manhood,  under  the  favorable  conditions  heretofore  indicated.  The 
blockade  of  many  and  distant  parts  of  our  coast  will  then  be  impossible,  or, 
rather,  can  then  be  effected  only  at  enormous  cost,  and  under  the  risk  of  the 
several  squadrons  being  successively  captured  or  dispersed ;  the  commerce  of 
our  adversary  must  be  nearly  withdrawn  from  the  ocean,  or  it  must  be  convoyed, 
not  by  a  few  vessels,  but  by  powerful  fleets.  In  fine,  the  war,  instead  of  result- 
ing in  the  pillage  and  conflagration  of  our  cities  and  towns,  in  the  destruction 
of  our  scattered  and  embayed  navy,  and  of  the  expensive  establishments  per- 
•  taining  to  it,  in  the  interruption  of  all  commercial  intercourse  between  the  sev- 
eral portions  of  the  maritime  frontier,  in  the  frequent  harassing,  and  expensive 
assemblage  of  militia  forces,  thereby  greatly  lessening  the  products  of  industry, 
and  infusing  among  this  most  valuable  portion  of  our  population  the  fatal  dis- 
eases and  the  demoralizing  habits  of  a  camp  life  ;  instead  of  these  and  innumer- 
able other  evils  attendant  upon  a  conflict  along  and  within  our  borders,  we  should 
find  the  war  and  all  its  more  serious  evils  shut  out  from  our  territory  by  our 
fortresses,  and  transferred  by  our  navy  to  the  bosom  of  the  ocean,  or  even  to 
the  country  of  the  enemy,  should  he,  relying  on  a  different  system,  have  neg- 
lected to  defend  the  avenues  by  which  he  is  assailable. 

Our  wars,  thus  becoming  maritime,  will  be  less  costly  in  men  and  money,  and 
at  the  same  time  more  in  unison  with  our  institutions — forging  no  weapon  for 


88  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

defence  capable  of  being  turned,  under  other  circumstances,  against  the  life  of 
the  State ;  and  keeping  our  domestic  industry  and  relations,  under  our  internal 
financial  resources,  beyond  the  reach  of  assault  from  without. 

It  is  an  incontestible  principle  in  military  science,  and  one  fully  illustrated 
by  military  history,  that  the  worst  mode  of  waging  war,  although  strictly  a  de- 
fensive one  in  its  origin  and  its  object,  is  to  permit  its  field  of  action  to  lie  within 
our  own  borders ;  and  that  the  best  mode  is  that  which  longest  sustains  an 
offensive  attitude.  In  our  own  case,  war  can  be  excluded  from  our  territory 
only  by  fortifications ;  and  we  can  assume  the  offensive,  with  the  greatest  por- 
tion of  mankind,  only  through  our  navy.  The  construction  of  the  former  secures 
the  means  of  creating,  equipping,  and  repairing  the  latter,  and  leaves  it  unen- 
cumbered with  duties  which  it  imperfectly  performs,  to  the  full  exercise  of  its 
great  and  appropriate  functions.  In  accordance  with  these  principles,  what,  in 
general  terms,  is  the  extent  to  which  the  government  may  be  called  on  to  pre- 
pare itself  in  fortifying  the  coast  and  in  building  up  the  navy  ] 

It  is  not  in  human  forecast  to  decide  upon  the  station  of  the  latter  a  genera- 
tion hence.  Political  events  may  force  the  nation  to  place  herself  more  nearly 
on  a  level  with  some  of  the  greatest  of  maritime  powers,  or  the  prevalence  of 
peaceful  relations  may  restrict  the  growth  of  the  navy  to  that  demanded  by  the 
increase,  rapid  and  extensive,  of  our  commercial  interests.  But  whatever  may 
be  the  amount  of  enlargement  of  the  naval  force,  whether  greater  or  less ;  or 
whatever  the  mode,  whether  progressive  and  regular,  or  by  sudden  expansion, 
its  increase  will  involve  no  corresponding  extension  in  the  number  or  strength 
of  the  fortifications,  because  these  must  be  adequate  to  their  object  of  them- 
selves, and  must  consequently  be,  with  some  exceptions,  as  numerous  and  as 
strong  while  the  navy  is  small,  as  when  the  navy  shall  have  attained  its  maxi- 
mum. A  considerable  enlargement  of  the  naval  force  might  build  up  new  naval 
establishments,  thereby,  in  raising  the  importance  of  certain  positions  calling 
for  stronger  defences. 

The  growth  of  the  country  in  wealth  and  numbers  will  convert  certain  places, 
now  presenting  no  inducements  to  the  enterprise  of  an  enemy,  into  rich  and 
populous  cities.  But,  with  the  exception  of  these  cases,  and  such  as  these,  it 
may  be  assumed  that  a  good  system  of  fortifications  applied  now  to  the  mari- 
time frontier  will  be  equal  to  its  object  in  all  future  times. 

Conceiving  it  unnecessary  to  enlarge  further  on  this  part  of  the  subject,  a 
few  remarks  will  be  offered  on  the  correlative  influence  of  fortifications  and  in- 
terior communications. 

The  most  important  of  these  communications,  in  reference  to  a  system  of  de- 
fence, are,  first,  such  as  serve  to  sustain,  in  all  its  activity,  that  portion  of  do- 
mestic commerce  which,  without  their  aid.  would  be  interrupted  by  a  state  of 
war ;  and  second,  such  as  serve,  besides  their  great  original  purposes,  to  conduct 
from  the  interior  to  the  theatre  of  war  necessary  supplies  and  timely  relief. 
The  first,  which  are  among  the  most  important  national  concerns  of  this  nature, 
lie  parallel  to,  and  not  far  from,  the  coast ;  the  second,  which,  when 'they  cross 
the  great  natural  partition- wall  between  the  east  and  the  west,  are  equally  im- 
portant, lie  more  remote  from  the  coast,  and  sometimes  nearly  or  quite  parallel 
to  it,  but  generally  fall,  nearly  at  right  angles  to  the  line  of  the  seaboard,  into 
the  great  estuaries,  where,  in  some  cases,  their  products  are  arrested,  or  whence, 
in  others,  they  flow  and  mingle  with  those  of  the  first.  To  fulfil  the  object  of 
the  first-mentioned  lines  of  communication,  it  is  obviously  necessary  to  prevent 
an  enemy  from  reaching  them  through  any  of  the  numerous  inlets  from  the  sea 
which  they  traverse,  including,  of  course,  the  great  inlets  wherein  these  unite 
with  the  communications  coming  from  the  interior.  The  security  of  the  coast- 
wise line,  therefore,  involves  the  security  of  the  other,  and  is,  in  a  great  measure, 
indispensable  to  it.  From  such  considerations  as  have  been  already  presented, 
it  is  inferred  that,  for  the  security  here  required,  we  must,  as  in  the  case  of 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  89 

cities,  harbors,  naval  establishments,  &c.,  look  to  fortifications.  But  it  fortu- 
nately happens,  as  will  appear  in  the  sequel,  that  wherever  both  objects  exist, 
the  works  necessary  for  the  one  may  often,  if  not  always,  be  made  to  accomplish 
both.  In  reference  to  a  system  of  defence  for  the  protection  of  these  lines  of 
communication,  it  must  be  observed  that,  from  the  facility  with  which  they  may 
be  broken  up,  and  the  serious  evils  consequent  thereon,  they  offer  to  the  enemy 
great  inducements  to  enterprises  of  that  nature.  An  aqueduct,  an  inclined 
plane,  a  tide-lock,  a  dam,  an  embankment  blown  up,  is  the  work  of  an  hour, 
and  yet  would  interrupt  the  navigation  perhaps  for  months. 

The  necessity  of  a  regular  army,  even  in  time  of  peace,  is  a  principle  well 
established  by  our  legislation.  The  importance  of  a  well-organized  militia  is 
incident  to  the  nature  of  our  institutions,  well  understood  by  the  people,  duly 
appreciated  by  the  government,  and  finely  illustrated  in  our  history.  Nothing, 
therefore,  need  be  said  on  these  subjects,  considered  as  general  principles.  It 
may,  however,  in  a  succeeding  part  of  this  communication,  be  deemed  proper  to 
hazard  a  conjecture  or  two  touching  the  expediency  of  a  peculiar  organization 
of  the  latter. 

Before  going  further,  it  is  proper  to  be  more  explicit  as  to  the  sense  in  which 
the  terms  "navy"  and  "fortifications"  have  been  employed. 

By  the  term  navy,  only  that  portion  of  our  military  marine  which  is  capable 
of  moving  in  safety  upon  the  ocean,  and  transferring  itself  speedily  to  distant 
points,  is  meant.  Floating  batteries,  gunboats,  steam  batteries,  &c.,  these,  and 
indeed,  all  other  modes  of  defence  which  are  restricted  in  their  sphere  of  action, 
tied  down  to  local  defence,  and  are  produced  chiefly  in  cases  where  the  localities 
deny  to  fortifications  their  best  action,  are  regarded  as  auxiliary  to  fortifications, 
and  as  falling  within  the  same  category.  Under  the  term  "fortifications,"  used 
as  expressive  of  security  afforded  thereby  to  the  seaboard,  have  been  included 
permanent  and  temporary  fortifications,  the  auxiliaries  just  mentioned,  and  both 
fixed  and  floating  obstructions  to  channels. 

The  circumstances  which  must  govern  in  framing  a  system  of  fortifications 
are — 

1st.  The  importance  of  the  objects  to  be  defended.  Great  naval  establish- 
ments, great  cities,  &c.,  invite  to  greater  preparation  on  the  part  of  an  enemy, 
and  demand  corresponding  means  of  resistance. 

2d.  The  natural  advantages  or  disadvantages  of  the  position  to  be  fortified. 
It  will  often  happen  that  the  defence  of  a  position  of  great  consequence  can  be 
effected  with  smaller  works,  and  at  less  expense,  than  a  place  of  much  less  value. 
It  will  not  follow,  therefore,  that  the  expense  of  fortifications  will  be  proportion- 
ate to  the  importance  of  the  object,  though  it  is  indispensable  that  the  strength 
should  be. 

3d.  The  species  of  attack  to  which  the  place  is  liable.     Some  places  will  be 
exposed  only  to  capture  by  assault;  others  by  siege;  others  to  reduction  by 
cannonade,  bombardment,  or  blockade ;  and  some  to  a  combination  of  any  or  all 
these  modes.     If  the  enemy  against  which  we  fortify  be  unprovided  with  artil 
lery,  the  mode  of  fortifying  becomes  peculiar. 

4th.  Whatever  may  be  the  circumstances,  it  is  of  vital  importance  that  all  the 
works  should  be  fully  adequate  to  the  object,  and  that  they  should,  even  with  a 
small  garrison,  be  perfectly  safe  from  a  coup  de  main. 

Proceeding  now  to  a  concise  description  of  the  maritime  frontier,  considered 
as  a  whole,  the  several  sections  will  be  afterwards  separately  examined,  apply- 
ing as  we  go  to  the  several  positions  the  works  already  projected,  and  pointing 
out  as  far  as  practicable  such  as  remain  to  be  planned.  The  sea-coast  of  the 
United  States  is  comprised  within  the  24th  and  46th  degrees  of  north  latitude, 
and  spreads  over  27  degrees  of  longitude.  The  general  direction  of  that  part 
which  lies  on  the  Atlantic,  north  of  the  peninsula  of  Florida,  is  N.NE.  and 
S.SW.  This  peninsula  stretches  out  from  the  continent  in  a  direction  a  little 


90  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA- COAST   DEFENCES. 

east  of  south;  while  that  part  which  lies  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  corresponds 
nearly  with  the  30th  parallel  of  north  latitude. 

Without  estimating  any  of  its  indentations  not  properly  belonging  to  its  out- 
line, and  carrying  our  measure  from  point  to  point  wherever  the  breaks  are  at 
all  abrupt,  the  line  of  coast  may  be  stated  to  be  3,300  miles  in  length. 

Nearly  parallel  with  the  Atlantic  coast  extends  a  chain  of  mountains  separa- 
ting the  sources  of  rivers  flowing,  on  the  one  hand,  directly  into  the  ocean  from 
those  which  run  into  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  or  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Even 
in  the  most  lofty  portion  of  this  chain  numerous  gaps  afford  facilities  for  crossing 
by  roads  or  railways. 

Occasional  expansions,  at  high  elevations,  present  sufficient  surface  to  afford 
the  water  required  for  crossing  by  canals;  and,  in  other  places,  the  rivers  them- 
selves have  severed  the  chain,  leaving  no  impediments  to  communications  of 
either  kind.  On  both  sides  of  these  mountains  the  country  offers  numerous 
natural  means  of  intercommunication,  and  facilities  and  inducements  for  the 
creation  of  artificial  ones  in  endless  combination. 

From  this  general  description  it  may  be  deduced  that,  notwithstanding  the 
great  extent  of  our  seaboard,  the  safety  of  each  section  of  it  is  a  matter  not  de- 
void of  interest  to  every  portion  of  the  people,  however  remote  geographically, 
at  least  so  long  as  the  nation  shall  continue  her  commercial  relations  with  the 
rest  of  the  world ;  and,  indeed,  until  she  shall  find  it  her  interest  to  interdict  the 
circulation  of  domestic  commerce  through  the  avenues  which  nature  or  art  may 
have  created — a  commerce  of  inestimable  value  at  all  times,  and  becoming  more 
necessary,  as  well  as  more  valuable,  on  every  interruption  of  foreign  traffic. 

As  lying  closely  connected  with  the  coast,  it  will  be  convenient  to  describe 
briefly  in  this  place  that  line  of  interior  communication  on  which,  in  time  of  war, 
reliance  must  be  placed  as  a  substitute,  in  part,  for  the  exterior  coasting  naviga- 
tion of  peace. 

Beginning  in  the  great  bay  to  the  north  of  Cape  Cod,  it  passes  overland  either 
into  Narraganset  roads  or  Buzzard's  bay ;  thence  through  Long  Island  sound  to 
the  harbor  of  New  York;  thence  up  the  Raritan,  overland  to  the  Delaware, 
down  this  river  some  distance,  overland  to  the  Chesapeake,  down  the  Chesa- 
peake, up  Hampton  roads  and  Elizabeth  river,  through  the  Dismal  swamp  to 
Albemarle  sound;  thence  through  the  low  lands,  swamps,  or  sounds  of  the 
Carolinas  and  Georgia  to  the  head  of  the  peninsula  of  Florida;  thence  overland 
to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico ;  thence  through  the  interior  sounds  and  bays  to  New 
Orleans,  and  thence  through  low  lands,  swamps,  and  bayous  to  the  western 
boundary.  Some  of  the  few  and  brief  natural  interruptions  of  this  extensive 
line  have  already  been  removed;  some  are  rapidly  disappearing  before  the 
energy  of  local  or  State  enterprise,  and  to  the  residue  the  public  attention  is 
directed  with  an  earnestness  which  leaves  no  reason  to  fear  that  they  will  not 
in  due  time  be  overcome.  In  all  cases  where  this  line  becomes  much  exposed 
to  an  enemy  from  the  difficulty  of  fortifying  broad  waters,  communications  more 
inland  are  even  now  afforded,  or  are  in  progress  by.  canals  or  railroads,  which 
will  be  perfectly  safe. 

Proceeding  now  to  a  more  minute  examination  of  the  coast,  it  will  be  conve- 
nient to  divide  it  into  four  distinct  parts,  namely :  the  northeastern,  extending 
from  the  English  province  of  New  Brunswick  to  Cape  Cod;  the  middle,  from 
Cape  Cod  to  Cape  Hatteras ;  the  southern,  from  Cape  Hatteras  to  Cape  Sable ; 
and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  frontier  from  Cape  Sable  to  the  Mexican  borders.  They 
will  be  taken  up  in  the  order  in  which  they  stand  above. 

THE  NORTHEASTERN  SECTION  OF  THE  COAST. 

The  northeastern  section  is  characterized  by  its  serrated  outline  and  its  nu- 
merous harbors ;  and,  though  differing  in  these  respects  entirely  from  the  other 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  91 

sections,  is  not  less  distinguished  in  its  climate  than  by  the  prevalence,  at  certain 
seasons,  of-dense  and  lasting  fogs.  The  extent  of  this  section,  measuring  from 
point  to  point  wherever  the  breaks  of  the  coast  are  abrupt,  is  about  five  hundred 
miles,  while  a  straight  line  from  Cape  Cod  to  Quoddy  Head  is  hardly  half  that 
distance.  The  eastern  half  of  this  coast  is  singularly  indented  by  deep  bays, 
the  shores  being  universally  rocky,  and  having  numerous  islands  surrounded  by 
deep  water,  which  not  only  add  to  the  number  of  harbors,  but  afford,  besides, 
an  interior  navigation  well  understood  by  the  hardy  coasters  of  this  section,  and 
measurably  secured  by  its  intricacies  and  the  other  dangers  of  this  foggy  and 
boisterous  region  from  interruption  by  an  enemy.  The  western  half,  though  it 
has  two  very  prominent  capes  and  a  few  deep  bays,  is  much  less  broken  in  its 
outline  than  the  eastern.  It  is  covered  by  few  islands,  in  comparison,  but  con- 
tains, nevertheless,  several  excellent  harbors. 

The  eastern  harbors  of  Maine  are  exposed  in  a  peculiar  manner.  They  are 
not  only  on  the  flank  of  our  line,  but  they  are  also  quite  near  to  public  estab- 
lishments of  the  greatest  maritime  powers ;  they  are,  moreover,  as  yet,  backed 
by  a  sparse  population  only,  and  are  consequently  both  weak  and  exposed.  The 
time  cannot  be  very  distant,  however,  when,  becoming  wealthy  and  populous, 
they  will  be  the  objects  of  a  full  portion  of  the  public  solicitude.  Works  de- 
signed for  these  harbors  must  therefore  be  calculated  for  the  future — must  be 
founded  on  the  principle  that  they  are  to  defend  places  much  more  important 
than  any  now  existing  there ;  that,  being  very  near  the  possessions  of  a  foreign 
power,  they  will  be,  in  a  particular  manner,  liable  to  sudden  and  to  repeated 
attacks ;  and  that,  lying  at  the  extremity  of  the  coast,  they  can  be  only  tardily 
succored.  The  works  erected  on  this  part  of  the  coast  should  be  so  strong  as 
to  resist  escalade,  and  to  hold  out  long  'enough  for  the  arrival  of  relief.  Feebler 
works  than  these  might  be  more  injurious  than  beneficial ;  their  weakness  would, 
in  the  first  place,  invite  attack,  and  it  being  a  great  advantage  to  occupy  fortified 
places  in  an  adversary's  territory,  the  enemy  would  prepare  himself  to  remedy 
the  military  deficiencies  of  these  forts  by  adding  temporary  works,  by  the  force 
of  his  garrisons  and  the  aid  of  his  vessels. 

No  surveys  have  been  made  of  these  harbors  and  no  plans  formed  for  their 
defence.  It  may  be  well  to  observe  here,  once  for  all,  that  much  confidence  is 
not  asked  for  the  mere  conjectures  presented  below  as  to  the  number  and  cost  of 
the  works  assigned  for  the  protection  of  the  harbors  which  have  not  yet  been 
surveyed.  In  some  cases  there  will  be  mistakes  as  to  the  number  of  forts 
needed,  and  in  others  the  errors  will  be  in  the  estimated  cost,  but  the  errors  will 
probably  as  often  lie  on  one  side  as  on  the  other,  so  that  the  sum  total  may  be  a 
sufficient  approximation  to  the  truth. 

This  is  the  place  to  state,  also,  that  the  early  estimates  furnished  for  the  pro- 
jected works  require  considerable  augmentation.  The  explanation  of  this  is 
easy.  In  preparing  those  estimates  the  board  of  engineers  obtained  lists  of 
prices  from  different  sections  of  the  country,  and  adopted  them  as  accurate. 
Whether  the  lists  thus  furnished  referred  to  materials  and  workmanship  of  in- 
ferior quality,  or  because  they  were  drawn  up  at  a  period  of  unusually  low 
prices,  it  has  been  found  by  experience  that  these  prices  were  almost  all  too  low. 
The  board  calculated  with  great  care  and  labor,  and  with  perfect  honesty  of  pur- 
pose, applying  the  prices  just  mentioned  to  all  the  quantities  susceptible  of  mea- 
surement and  calculation ;  and  they  applied  themselves  with  no  less  diligence 
and  good  faith  to  the  estimate  of  expenses  of  a  contingent  nature,  and,  for  the 
greater  part,  not  to  be  foreseen  with  accuracy,  either  as  to  amount  or  kind. 
Having  no  experience  in  large  constructions,  these  last  were  at  least  but  conjec- 
tures ;  and,  as  the  history  of  constructions  on  several  parts  of  the  coast  has  since 
shown,  they  were  much  too  small.  In  consideration  of  these  deficiencies,  of  the 
present  great  elevation  of  prices,  and  of  the  liability  to  great  increase  of  cost 
from  occasional  interruptions  of  progress  and  breaking  up  of  systems  of  opera- 


92  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

tions,  it  is  thought  that  about  fifty  per  centum  should  be  added  to  tho  amounts 
given  in  the  estimates. 

Eastport  and  Machias  may  be  brought  forward  as  places  that  will  unques-- 
tionably  be  thought  to  need  defensive  works  by  the  time,  in  the  order  of  relative 
importance,  the  execution  of  them  can  be  undertaken  by  the  government.  There 
are  several  small  towns  eastward  of  Mount  Desert  island  that  may,  at  that  pe- 
riod, deserve  equal  attention.  At  present,  however,  the  places  named  above  will 
be  the  only  ones  estimated  for,  and  $100,000  will  be  assumed  as  the  cost  of 
each. 

Mount  Desert  island,  situated  a  little  east  of  Penobscot  bay,  and  centrally  as 
regards  the  Kennebec  and  St.  Croix  rivers,  having  a  capacious  and  safe  road- 
stead, affording  anchorage  for  the  highest  "class  of  vessels,  and  easily  accessible 
from  sea,  offers  a  station  for  the  navy  of  an  enemy  superior  to  any  other  on  this 
portion  of  the  coast.  From  this  point  his  cruisers  might  act  with  great  effect 
against  the  navigation  of  the  eastern  coast,  especially  that  of  Maine,  and  his  en- 
terprises of  every  kind  could  be  conducted  with  great  rapidity  against  any  point 
he  might  select.  These  considerations,  added  to  the  advantages  which  would 
result  in  certain  political  events  from  our  occupying  so  advanced  a  station,  whence 
we  might  act  offensively,  together  with  the  propriety  of  providing  places  of 
succor  on  a  part  of  the  coast  where  vessels  are  so  frequently  perplexed  in  their 
navigation  by  the  prevailing  fogs,  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  fortification,  in 
a  strong  manner,  of  this  roadstead,  is  highly  necessary.  A  survey  of  this  island 
was  begun  many  years  ago,  but  the  party  being  called  off  to  other  duties,  it  was 
never  completed ;  the  project  of  defensive  works  has  not  been  formed.  The 
entire  cost  may  be,  as  assumed  by  the  engineer  department,  $500,000. 

Castine. — It  would  seem  to  be  impossible  on  this  coast  to  deprive  an  enemy, 
enjoying  naval  superiority,  of  harbors,  or  to  prevent  his  using  them  as  stations 
during  the  war,  insular  situations,  which  his  vessels  would  render  unapproach- 
able, being  so  numerous ;  but  it  seems  proper  that  those  positions  of  this  nature, 
which  are  at  the  same  time  the  sites  of  toAvns,  should  be  secured  against  his 
visitations.  During  the  last  war  the  English  held  the  position  of  Castine  for 
some  time,  and  left  it  at  their  own  pleasure.  It  is  probable  that  a  work  costing 
about  $50,000  would  deter  an  enemy  from  again  making  choice  of  this  position. 

Penobscot  bay. — Upon  this  bay,  and  upon  the  river  of  the  same  name  flowing 
into  it,  are  several  flourishing  towns  and  villages.  Of  the  many  bays  which  in- 
tersect this  coast,  the  Penobscot  is  the  one  which  presents  the  greatest  number 
of  safe  and  capacious  anchorages.  As  before  observed,  a  large  portion  of  these 
harbors  must,  for  the  present,  be  left  without  defences,  but  the  valuable  com- 
merce of  the  bay  and  river  must  be  covered,  and  to  afford  a  secure  retreat  for 
such  vessels  as  may  be  unable  to  place  themselves  under  protection  of  the  works 
to  the  east  or  west  of  the  bay,  the  passage  of  the  river  must  be  defended.  The 
lowest  point  at  which  this  can  be  done,  without  great  expense,  is  at  the  narrows 
opposite  Bucksport.  A  project  has  been  given  in  for  a  fort  at  that  position,  now 
estimated  at  $150,000. 

West  of  the  Penobscot  comes  St.  George's  bay,  Broad  bay,  Damariscotta, 
and  Sheepscot,  all  deep  indentations,  and  leading  to  towns,  villages,  and  various 
establishments  of  industry  and  enterprise  of  greater  or  less  present  value  and 
future  promise.  These  have  not  been  surveyed,  and,  of  course,  no  plans  have 
been  formed  for  their  defence;  $400,000  are  assigned  to  the  fortification  of  these 
waters.  The  Sheepscot  is  an  excellent  harbor  of  refuge  for  vessels  of  every 
class. 

Kennebec  river. — This  river,  one  of  the  largest  in  the  eastern  States,  enters 
the  sea  nearly  midway  between  Cape  Cod  and  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Croix.  It 
rises  near  the  source  of  the  Chaudierre,  a  tributary  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  and 
has  once  served  as  a  line  of  operations  against  Quebec.  The  situation  and  ex- 
tent of  this  river,  the  value  of  its  products,  and  the  active  commerce  of  several 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  93 

very  flourishing  towns  upon  its  banks,  together  with  the  excellence  of  the  har- 
bor within  its  mouth,  will  not  permit  its  defence  to  be  neglected.  Surveys 
incomplete — estimated  cost  of  defences,  as  formed  by  the  engineer  department, 
$300,000. 

Portland  harbor. — A  little  to  the  northwest  of  Cape  Elizabeth  is  the  harbor 
of  Portland.  The  protection  of  the  town,  of  the  merchantmen,  and  of  the  ships- 
of-war  that  may  be  stationed  there  to  guard  the  coast  or  that  may  enter  for 
shelter,  all  of  them  important  objects,  may  be  secured,  as  an  inspection  of  the 
map  of  the  town  and  harbor  will  show,  by  occupying  Fort  Preble  Point,  House 
island,  Hog  Island  ledge,  and  Fish  Point.  At  the  same  time,  if  the  two  channels 
to  the  west  and  east  of  Hog  Island  ledge  can  be  obstructed  at  small  expense, 
which  is  hardly  a  matter  of  doubt,  although  some  final  surveys  are  necessary 
to  decide  this  point,  there  will  be  no  necessity  for  a  battery  on  the  ledge ;  and 
Fish  Point  need  be  occupied  only  by  such  works  as  may  be  thrown  up  in  time 
of  war.  The  expense,  as  now  estimated,  of  the  works  planned  for  the  defence — 
not  including  the  defence  of  Hog  Island  channel,  of  which  the  mode  has  not 
been  settled — will  be  $155,000  for  Fort  Preble,  and  $48,000  for  House  island. 
For  Hog  Island  channel,  say  $135,000. 

The  mouths  of  the  Saco,  Kennebunk,  and  York. — Comparatively  small  works 
will,  it  is  thought,  adequately  cover  these  places,  and  $75,000  is  assumed  as 
their  aggregate  cost. 

Portsmouth  harbor. — The  only  good  roadstead,  or  good  harbor,  between  Cape 
Elizabeth  and  Cape  Ann,  is  Portsmouth- harbor,  within  the  mouth  of  Piscataqua 
river.  Line-of-battle  ships  can  ascend  this  river  as  high  as  Fox  Point,  seven 
miles  above  the  town  of  Portsmouth.  Between  this  point  and  Shooting  Point 
is  a  branch  of  the  river  communicating  with  Great  bay.  This  branch,  which  is 
one-third  of  a  mile  wide,  presents,  for  two  miles  in  length,  an  excellent  cover 
for  all  sorts  of  vessels.  This  situation,  sufficiently  commodious  for  a  secondary 
depot,  designed  to  repair  vessels-of-war  seeking  an  asylum  in  this  river,  is  too 
near  the  sea  for  a  great  naval  depot ;  and,  in  other  respects,  does  not  possess  the 
advantages  of  Boston,  as  was  shown  in  the  report  of  the  board  of  engineers, 
1820.  Still,  as  Portsmouth  is  an  excellent  harbor  and  station,  and  as  it  is  indis- 
pensable that  some,  at  least,  of  these  stations  be  provided  with  the  necessary 
establishments  for  repairs,  the  depot  in  this  river  should  b?  maintained.  It  is  to 
be  regretted  that  the  bay  to  the  south  of  Fox  Point  was'&ot  chosen  as  the  site 
of  the  navy  yard  instead  of  Fernal's  island.  Being  where  it  is,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary, in  time  of  war,  to  make  some  particular  dispositions  for  the  protection  of 
the  yard  from  an  attack  from  the  north  shore  of  the  river. 

The  position  of  Fort  Constitution  must  certainly,  and  that  of  Fort  McCleary 
may  possibly,  be  occupied  by  these  defences ;  though  the  works  themselves, 
especially  the  first  named,  must  give  place  to  such  as  will  better  fulfil  the  ob- 
ject. The  other  positions  for  forts  are  Gerrish's  Point, island,  and  Clark's 

island;  some,  if  not  all,  of  which  must  be  occupied.  Some  final  surveys  must 
be  made  before  the  necessary  works  can  be  accurately  determined  on,  and  be- 
fore estimates  can  be  made ;  but  there  is  reason  for  believing  that  the  entire  ex- 
pense of  fortifying  this  harbor  will  not  fall  short  of  $500,000. 

Newburyport  harbor. — This  is  the  next  port  south  of  Portsmouth.  The 
Merrimack  river,  the  mouth  of  which  forms  this  harbor,  is  obstructed  at  its  junc- 
tion with  the  sea  by  a  bar,  on  which  there  was  formerly  but  six  or  seven  feet  of 
water  at  low  tide.  This  entrance  has  since,  however,  been  thought  to  be  essen- 
tially important,  and,  at  any  rate,  it  leads  to  a  beautiful,  prosperous,  and  wealthy 
city.  The  points  forming  the  mouth  of  the  river  are  continually  changing  their 
form  and  position;  near  the  middle  of  the  present  channel  is  said  to  be  the  spot 
once  occupied  by  a  fort.  Under  such  circumstances,  it  seems  advisable  to  rely, 
for  the  defence  of  this  harbor,  on  forts  to  be  thrown  up  on  the  approach  of  war, 
unless  the  works  of  harbor  improvement  now  in  progress  shall  be  found  to  give 


94  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

stability  to  the  points  in  question.     It  is  thought  that  $100,000  would  defend 
this  entrance  adequately. 

Gloucester  harbor. — The  position  of  this  harbor,  near  the  extremity  of  Cape 
Ann,  places  it  in  close  relation  with  the  navigation  of  all  Massachusetts  bay, 
and  gives  it  an  importance  beyond  what  would  be  assigned  to  it  on  account  of 
its  local  interests.  No  surveys  have  yet  been  made,  but  it  is  believed  that  suffi- 
cient defences  may  be  provided  for  $200,000. 

Beverly  harbor. — This  harbor  will  be  defended  chiefly  by  a  portion  of  the 
works  designed  for  Salem;  $50,000,  in  addition,  will  secure  it. 

Salem  harbor. — The  port  of  Salem  is  distant  from  Marblehead  two  miles 
being  separated  therefrom  by  a  peninsula.  The  occupation  of  the  extremity  of 
Winter  island,  (where  are  the  ruins  of  Fort  Pickering,)  on  one  side,  and  of  Nau- 
gus  Head  on  the  other,  will  effectually  secure  this  harbor.  Projects  have  been 
presented  for  this  defence,  now  estimated  at  $225,000. 

Marblehead  harbor. — Besides  covering,  in  some  measure,  the  establishment 
at  Boston,  the  harbors  of  Marblehead  and  Salem  possess  an  important  commerce 
of  their  own,  and  also  afford  shelter  for  vessels  prevented  by  certain  winds  from 
entering  Boston  or  pursuing  their  course  eastward.  The  mode  of  defending 
Marblehead  harbor,  proposed  by  the  board  of  engineers,  consists  in  occupying, 
on  the  north  side,  the  hillock  which  commands  the  present  Fort  Sewall,  (which 
will  be  superseded  by  the  new  work,)  and  on  the  south,  the  position  of  Jack's 
Point.  The  two  works  will  cost  $318,000. 

Boston  harbor. — We  come  now  to  the  most  important  harbor  in  the  eastern 
section  of  the  coast,  and,  considering  its  relation  to  general  commerce  and  the 
interests  of  the  navy,  one  of  the  most  important  in  the  Union,  After  a  careful 
examination  of  all  the  necessary  conditions  of  such  a  problem,  the  board  of 
naval  officers  and  engineers,  in  their  joint  report  of  1820,  gave  this  harbor  a 
preference  over  all  other  positions  to  the  east,  and,  inclusive  of  New  York  bay 
and  the  Hudson,  as  the  seat  of  the  great  northern  naval  depot.  For  reasons,  at 
large,  for  this  selection,  reference  is  made  to  the  report  of  1820.  But,  even 
should  the  recommendation  therein  contained  remain  unsanctioned,  still  Boston 
is  a  city  of  great  wealth,  possesses  an  extensive  and  active  commerce,  and  con- 
tains already  within  its  harbor  an  establishment  on  which  great  reliance  is 
placed  to  give  growth  and  energy  to  our  navy.  The  present  forts  in  Boston 
harbor  defend  merely  the  interior  basin  from  attacks  by  water,  but  as  it  often 
happens  that  vessels  enter  Nantasket  roads  with  a  wind  too  scant  to  pass  the 
narrows,  or  are  detained  in  President  roads  by  light  winds  or  an  adverse  tide ; 
as  the  former,  especially,  is  a  very  convenient  anchorage,  from  whence  to  pro- 
ceed to  sea;  and  above  all,  as  Nantasket  roads  afford  the  best  possible  station 
for  a  blockading  squadron,  it  was  deemed  indispensable  to  place  permanent  de- 
fences at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  The  project  of  the  defence  regards  the  ex- 
isting works,  with  the  necessary  repairs  and  modifications,  as  constituting  a  sec- 
ond barrier ;  contemplates  placing  a  permanent  fort  on  George's  island ; 
another  at  Nantasket  Head,  having  two  advanced'works  on  the  head  and  one  on 
Hog  island;  reducing  the  latitude  of  Gallop  island,  in  order  to  destroy  its  com- 
mand over  George's  island ;  and  filling  up  the  Broad  Sound  channel,  so  as  to 
leave  no  passage,  in  that  direction,  for  ships-of-war.  These  are  estimated  to 
cost  $2,337,000.  Besides  the  works  of  a  permanent  character,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary, in  the  beginning  of  a  war,  to  erect  several  temporary  works  in  the  lower 
part  of  the  harbor,  in  order  to  make  that  defence  more  perfect,  and  also  on  cer- 
tain lateral  approaches  to  the  navy  yard. 

Plymouth  and  Provincetoivn  harbors. — These  are  the  only  harbors  on  the 
northeastern  section  of  the  coast  south  of  Boston.  They  have  a  commerce  of 
some  consequence  of  their  own ;  but  they  are  particularly  interesting  in  refer- 
ence to  the  port  of  Boston,  and  to  the  transition  from  the  middle  to  the  eastern 
section  of  the  coast,  in  which  respect  they  would  become  stil  more  important 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  95 

should  the  proposed  canal  from  Buzzard's  to  Barnstable  bay  ever  be  executed. 
While  these  harbors  are  undefended,  an  enemy's  squadron  blockading  Massa- 
chusetts bay  will  have  ports  of  refuge  under  his  lee  of  which  he  would  not  fail 
to  avail  himself  to  maintain  his  blockade,  even  throughout  the  most  stormy  sea- 
sons, knowing  that  the  wind  which  would  compel  him  to  seek  shelter  would  be 
adverse  to  outward-bound,  and  fatal,  should  they  venture  near  the  cape,  to  in- 
ward-bound vessels.  While  in  possession  of  these  harbors,  an  enemy  would 
have  constantly  under  his  eye  the  harbor  of  Boston,  the  passage  round  Cape 
Cod,  and  that  through  the  canal.  To  these  considerations,  going  to  establish 
the  necessity  of  securing  these  harbors  by  proper  defences,  it  must  be  added 
that,  being  thus  deprived  of  the  shelter  afforded  by  these  ports,  an  enemy  would 
be  unable  to  enforce  a  rigorous  investment.  In  the  first  place,  he  would  be  often 
deterred  from  taking  a  station  near  the  land,  lest  he  should  be  caught  embayed 
by  the  violent  easterly  winds  prevailing  at  certain  seasons  ;  in  the  next  place,  he 
would  always  take  a  good  offing  on  every  distinct  indication  of  these  winds, 
thereby  leaving  a  clear  coast  to  be  profited  of  by  our  own  vessels  at  the  first 
instant  of  a  change  of  weather.  Our  own  vessels,  coming  in  from  sea,  and  find- 
ing an  enemy  interposed  between  them  and  Boston,  or  being  turned  from  their 
course  by  adverse  winds,  would,  in  case  of  the  defence  of  these  harbors,  find  to 
the  south  of  Boston  a  shelter  equivalent  to  that  provided  to  the  north  by  the 
fortifications  of  Marblehead,  Salem,  Gloucester,  and  Portsmouth. 

The  surveys  of  these  harbors  have  not  been  handed  in,  and  no  plans  have 
been  formed  for  their  defence.  Plymouth  harbor  may  be  suitably  defended,  it 
is  thought,  by  the  occupation  of  Gurnet  Point,  and  at  no  great  expense ;  while 
it  is  thought  that,  to  fortify  Provincetown  harbor  in  such  a  way  as  to  cover  ves- 
sels taking  shelter  therein,  and  at  the  same  time  to  deprive  an  enemy  of  all  safe 
anchorages,  will  involve  considerable  expense,  probably  no  nearer  estimate  can 
be  formed  at  present  than  that  offered  by  the  engineer  department,  which  gave 
$100,000  to  Plymouth  and  $600,000  to  Provincetown. 

Should  the  canal  above-mentioned  be  executed,  it  will  be  necessary  to  place 
a  small  work  at  each  of  its  outlets,  to  prevent  the  destruction  of  the  means  by 
which  the  transit  of  vessels  in  and  out  of  the  canal  must  be  accomplished. 

MIDDLE    SECTION    OF    THE  COAST. 

The  coast  between  Cape  Cod  and  Cape  Hatteras  differs  from  the  northeastern 
section  in  possessing  fewer  harbors,  in  having  but  little  rocky  and  a  great  por- 
tion of  sandy  shore,  wherein  it  resembles  the  southern  section;  in  its  milder 
climate  and  its  clearer  atmosphere;  and  it  differs  from  all  the  other  portions  in 
the  depth  and  magnitude  of  its  interior  seas  and  sounds,  and  in  the  distance  to 
which  deep  tide  navigation  extends  up  its  numerous  large  rivers. 

The  circuit  of  the  coast,  not  including  the  shores  of  the  great  bays,  measures 
650  miles,  while  a  straight  line  from  one  of  the  above-named  capes  to  the  other 
measures  about  520  miles. 

Martha 's  Vineyard  sound. — To  the  south  of  Cape  Cod  lie  the  islands  of 
Nantucket  and  Martha's  Vineyard,  which  with  several  smaller  islands  on  the 
south,  and  the  projection  of  Cape  Malabar  on  the  east,  enclose  Martha's  Vine- 
yard sound.  The  channels  through  this  sound  being  sufficient  for  merchant 
vessels,  and  one  of  them  allowing  the  passage  even  of  small  frigates,  are  not 
only  the  constant  track  of  coasting  vessels,  but  owing  to  the  relative  situation  of 
Long  Island  sound  and  Narraganset  roads,  and  to  the  existence  of  two  tolerably 
safe  harbors  at  convenient -distances  east  of  Gay  head,  namely,  Tarpaulin  sound 
and  Holmes's  Hole,  the  sound  is  generally  aimed  at  by  all  eastern  vessels 
arriving  from  foreign  voyages  in  the  tempestuous  months.  There  are  certain 
difficulties,  however,  attending  the  navigation  of  this  sound,  arising  from  the 
want  of  a  harbor  near  the  eastern  extremity,  which  have  suggested  the  project 


96  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

of  an  artificial  harbor  at  the  northeast  point  of  Nantucket  island.  Besides  these 
harbors  on  the  direct  route  through  the  sound,  there  are  the  harbors  of  Nantucket, 
Edgartown,  and  Falmouth. 

In  addition  to  the  many  thousand  vessels  which  pass  this  water  annually,  of 
which  there  are  sometimes  forty  or  fifty,  a  portion  containing  the  most  valuable 
cargoes,  to  be  seen  in  the  harbors  awaiting  a  change  of  wind,  there  is  supposed 
to  be  at  least  40,000  tons  of  shipping  owned  in  the  towns  of  this  sound,  and 
employed  in  the  whale  fishery.  If  this  portion  of  the  coast  is  to  be  defended 
at  all,  it  must  be  by  fortifications,  for  there  is  no  population  scarcely,  except  that 
of  the  towns,  and  this  is  believed  to  be  entirely  without  military  organization. 

A  privateer  might  run  into  either  of  these  harbors  and  capture,  destroy,  or 
levy  contributions  at  pleasure;  $250,000  may  perhaps  suffice  for  the  defence  of 
all  these  places  against  the  kind  of  enterprises  to  which  they  are  exposed. 

Buzzard's  bay. — Interposed  between  the  island  of  Martha's  Vineyard  and 
the  main  are  the  Elizabeth  islands,  bounding  Buzzard's  bay  on  the  south.  This 
bay,  although  of  importance  as  leading  to  the  proposed  canal  to  Barnstable  bay, 
as  covering  the  flourishing  town  of  New  Bedford,  and  as  being  one  of  the 
natural  harbors  to  be  used  by  an  enemy  in  forcing  the  blockade  of  Narraganset 
roads,  cannot  be  defended  by  fortifications,  owing  to  its  great  breadth. 

New  Bedford  and  Fairkaven  harbor. — No  survey  has  been  made  of  this 
harbor,  which  covers  two  of  the  most  flourishing  towns.  It  is  certainly  defensi- 
ble, and  probably  for  the  amount  assumed  by  the  engineer  department,  namely, 
$300,000. 

Narraganset  bay. — The  properties  of  this  great  roadstead  will  be  here 
adverted  to  very  briefly ;  more  minute  information  may  be  obtained  by  reference 
to  reports  of  1820  and  1821. 

It  is  the  only  harbor  on  the  coast  accessible  with  a  northwest  wind,  which  is 
the  most  common  and  violent  of  the  most  inclement  season ;  and  as  winds  from 
N.NW.  to  S.SW.  round  by  the  east  serve  for  entering  both  Boston  and  New 
York  harbors,  while  this  harbor  can  be  entered  with  all  winds  from  northwest 
to  east  round  by  the  west,  it  follows  that,  while  we  possess  this  harbor,  vessels 
may  be  certain  of  making  shelter  on  this  part  of  the  coast  with  any  wind  that 
can  blow,  excepting  only  between  N.NW.  and  NW.  From  this  station  the 
navigation  of  Long  Island  sound,  and  especially  the  communication  between  that 
sound  and  Buzzard's  bay  or  Martha's  Vineyard  sound,  may  be  well  protected. 
The  blockade  of  the  excellent  harbor  and  naval  station  of  JS"ew  London  will  be 
rendered  difficult.  From  this  station  the  navy  will  command  southwardly,  as 
from  Hampton  roads  northwardly,  the  great  inward  curve  of  the  coast  between 
Cape  Cod  and  Cape  Hatteras;  the  influence  of  which  command  over  the  block- 
ading operations  of  an  enemy  will  be  apparent,  when  it  is  considered  that  the 
only  harbors  of  refuge  he  can  have  will  be  the  Delaware,  Gardiner's,  and  Bliz- 
zard's bays,  and  that  it  is  far  from  certain  that  improvements  in  the  auxiliaries 
of  fortifications  may  not  deprive  him  of  these  also. 

If  Narraganset  bay  were  without  defence,  an  enemy  would  occupy*  it  without 
difficulty,  and,  by  the  aid  of  naval  superiority,  form  a  lodgement  in  Rhode  Island 
for  the  war.  Occupying  the  island  alone,  or  connecting  therewith  the  position 
of  Tiverton  Heights,  opposite  the  northern  extremity  of  the  island,  a  position 
which  is  of  narrow  front,  easy  to  secure,  and  impossible  to  turn,  he  might  defy 
all  the  forces  of  the  eastern  States,  drive  the  United  States  to  vast  expense  of 
blood  and  treasure,  and  while  this  position  of  his  troops  would  keep  in  alarm 
and  motion  all  the  population  of  the  east,  feigned  expeditions  against  New  York, 
through  Long  Island  sound,  or  against  more  southern  cities,  would  equally  alarm 
the  country  in  that  direction;  and  thus,  although  he  might  do  no  more  than 
menace,  it  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  embarrassment  and  expense  into  which  he 
would  drive  the  government. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  97 

Of  old  forts,  some  of  which  were  never  finished,  Fort  Wolcott  and  Fort  Green 
are  the  only  ones  retained  in  the  projected  system  of  defence. 

The  project  of  defence  proposed  by  the  board  of  engineers  contemplates  for 
the  middle  channel,  on  Brenton's  Point,  a  strong  fort,  (now  well  advanced,)  with 
outworks ;  another  strong  fort  and  outworks  on  the  Dumplings ;  a  smaller  fort 
on  Rose  island,  and  the  repair  and  modification  of  Fort  Wolcott  and  Fort  Green. 
The  eastern  passage  is  already  shut  by  the  permanent  bridge  at  Howland's 
Ferry.  As  to  the  western  passage,  three  modes  present  themselves :  1st,  re- 
ducing the  depth  of  water  by  an  artificial  ledge,  so  as,  while  the  passage  shall 
be  as  free  as  now  for  merchant  vessels,  to  prevent  the  passage  of  ships-of-war ; 
2d,  relying  on  fortifications  alone  to  close  the  channel;  or,  3d,  resorting  in  part 
to  one  and  in  part  to  the  other  mode  just  mentioned.  Being  the  least  expensive 
and  most  certain,  the  estimate  was  founded  on  the  first. 

The  total  cost  of  the  Narraganset  defences  are  estimated  at  $2,500,000. 

Gardiner's  bay. — This  most  valuable  harbor  to  an  enemy  investing  this  part 
of  the  coast  is  probably  not  defensible  by  fortifications  alone.  It  has  not  been 
surveyed  however,  and  at  no  distant  day  it  will  be  an  interesting  question, 
whether  by  steam  batteries,  or  some  similar  means,  under  the  protection  of  and 
aided  by  fortifications,  its  defence  may  not  be  accomplished.  The  necessity  for 
fortifying  this  bay  will  be  more  evident,  should  the  railroad  through  Long  Island, 
in  contemplation,  (perhaps  in  progress,)  be  constructed. 

The  engineer  department  has  assumed  the  probable  cost  of  the  works  at 
$400,000. 

Sag  harbor,  New  York,  and  Stonington,  Connecticut. — Neither  of  these  have 
been  surveyed  with  reference  to  defence.  The  first  is  possessed  of  a  considerable 
tonnage ;  and  the  second,  besides  being  largely  engaged  in  commerce,  is  about 
to  be  the  termination  of  a  railroad  from  Boston.  $100,000  may  be  assigned  to 
the  first,  and  $200,000  to  the  other. 

New  London  harbor  is  very  important  to  the  commerce  of  Long  Island  sound; 
and  as  a  port  of  easy  access,  having  great  depth  of  water,  very  rarely  freezing, 
and  being  easily  defended,  it  is  an  excellent  station  for  the  navy.  It  is  also 
valuable  as  a  shelter  for  vessels  bound  out  or  home,  and  desirous  of  avoiding  a 
blockading  squadron  off  Sandy  Hook.  In  the  plan  of  defence,  the  present 
Forts  Trumbull  and  Griswold  give  place  to  more  efficient  works,  whereof  the 
expense  is  estimated  at  $314,515. 

Mouth  of  Connecticut  river. — This  river  has  been  shown  to  be  subject  to  the 
expeditions  of  an  enemy.  It  has  not  been  surveyed  in  order  to  determine  on 
the  mode  of  defending  it ;  and  $100,000  is  introduced  here  as  the  conjectural 
cost. 

New  Haven  harbor. — It  is  proposed  to  defend  this  harbor  by  improving  and 
enlarging  Fort  Hale,  and  substituting  a  new  work  for  the  slight  redoubt  erected 
during  the  last  war,  called  Fort  Wooster.  The  expense  of  both  may  be  stated 
at  $90,000. 

There  are  several  towns  between  New  Haven  and  New  York,  on  both  sides 
of  the  sound ;  none  of  them  are  very  large  as  yet,  though  most,  if  not  all,  are 
prosperous  and  rapidly  increasing.  Although  in  their  present  condition,  con- 
sidering their  local  situation,  it  might  not  be  deemed  necessary  to  apply  any 
money  to  permanent  defences,  yet,  as  part  of  the  present  object  is  to  ascertain 
as  near  as  may  be,  the  ultimate  cost  of  completely  fortifying  the  coast,  it  seems 
proper  to  look  forward  to  the  time,  perhaps  not  remote,  when  some  of  these 
towns  may  become  objects  of  considerable  predatory  enterprise.  Bearing  in 
mind  the  increase  of  population  in  the  mean  time,  and  the  manner  in  which  the 
places  generally  are  situated,  it  is  thought  that  $200,000  will  be  enough  to  de- 
fend them  all. 

New    York  harbor. — The  object  of  the  projected  works  for  the  vicinity  of 

H.  Eep.  Com.  86 7 


98  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

New  York  are  to  cover  the  city  against  an  attack  by  land  or  sea ;  to  protect  its 
numerous  shipping ;  to  prevent,  as  much  as  possible,  the  blockade  of  this  great 
port,  which  will  have  progressively  added  to  the  immense  wealth  of  its  own 
rivers,  greater  and  greater  amounts  of  the  productions  of  the  boundless  regions 
on  the  lakes ;  and  to  cover  the  interior  communication  uniting  the  Raritan  with 
the  Delaware.  In  the  present  condition  of  the  defences  of  this  harbor,  an 
enemy  would  encounter  no  great  opposition,  whether  his  attack  was  made  by 
land  or  water.  Coming  by  the  sound,  he  might  land  within  ten  miles  of  the 
city,  upon  the  main,  upon  Long  Island,  or  upon  both ;  and,  coming  into  the 
lower  harbor,  he  might,  while  the  works  on  Staten  Island  are  in  their  present 
condition,  risk  forcing  the  passage  of  the  Narrows,  as  well  as  the  upper  works, 
anchoring  in  the  Hudson  or  in  the  East  river ;  or  he  might  land  in  Gravesend 
bay,  eight  miles  from  the  city,  and  march  directly  to  Brooklyn,  where  he  would 
find  the  navy  yard  lying  at  his  mercy,  and  whence  he  might  levy  a  contribution 
or  destroy  half  the  city.  The  only  mode  of  resistance  would  be  the  expensive, 
harassing  and  uncertain  one  of  arraying  a  large  body  of  militia  upon  Harlem 
and  Brooklyn  Heights,  and  this  could  be  resorted  to  only  in  the  event,  by  no 
means  certain,  of  receiving  timely  intelligence  of  his  design. 

If  we  fortify  T/irog's  Neck  and  WilMns's  Point,  on  the  East  river,  and  if  we 
complete  the  works  at  the  narrows,  making  them  all  too  strong  to  be  carried  by 
a  c<,up  de  main,  we  shall  secure  the  means  of  transferring  the  neighboring 
militia  upon  the  flanks  and  rear  of  an  enemy  should  he  march  upon  Brooklyn ; 
while  we  shall  secure  the  same  advantage  should  he  pursue  the  route  by  Har- 
lem, besides  increasing  the  length  of  his  march  to  twenty  miles  through  an  in- 
tersected country. 

This  arrangement  of  defensive  works,  necessary  as  it  is,  still  leaves  the  lower 
harbor  open  to  an  enemy's  vessels,  in  which  harbor,  safe  at  all  seasons,  he  could 
enforce  the  strictest  blockade  ;  cut  off  the  lines  of  interior  communication  by  the 
Raritan,  and  avail  himself  at  any  moment  of  a  landing  place  in  dangerous  prox- 
imity to  the  city  and  navy  yard.  In  view  of  these  considerations,  the  board  of 
engineers  projected  additional  works :  one  for  the  East  Bank,  and  another  for 
the  Middle  Ground,  which  would  perfect  the  defences  of  the  harbor,  compelling 
an  enemy  attacking  on  this  side  to  land  upon  a  dangerous  coast,  near  thirty  miles 
from  his  object,  and  to  enforce  his  blockade  by  riding  on  the  open  sea,  with  a 
dangerous  coast  on  either  hand.  Before  determining  on  the  works  last  men- 
tioned, the  board,  went  into  much  research  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  the 
sand  banks  mentioned  were  unchangeable ;  and  it  was  thought  to  have  been 
very  fully  proved  that  there  had  been  no  material  change  in  more  than  sixty 
years.  This  apparent  stability  of  the  shoals  encouraged  them  to  devise  the 
projects  referred  to. 

Recent  surveys,  it  has  been  said,  have  discovered  a  new  channel.  If  this  be  so,  it 
may  not  be  prudent  to  resort  to  the  project,  and  it  may  become  necessary  to  de- 
vise other  means ;  but  whatever  they  may  be,  they  must,  from  the  nature  of  the 
case,  be  very  expensive ;  and  there  will  be  no  great  error,  probably,  in  taking 
the  estimated  cost  of  the  projected  batteries  as  the  cost  of  such  mode  of  defence 
as  may  be  finally  resolved  on.  The  cost  of  the  complete  defence  of  New  York 
remaining  to  be  incurred  is,  according  to  the  estimates,  $5,369,824. 

Delaware  bay  and  city  of  Philadelphia. — The  coast,  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Hudson  to  the  Chesapeake,  as  well  as  that  on  the  south  side  of  Long  Island,  is 
low,  sandy,  covered  by  numerous  sandy  islands  lying  near  and  parallel  to  the 
coast,  and  having,  be'sides  the  Delaware,  many  inlets  and  interior  basins,  but 
none,  excepting  the  one  named,  affording  water  enough  for  sea-going  vessels. 
The  Delaware  bay  itself  being  wide  and  full  of  shoals,  having  an  intricate 
channel,  and  being  much  obstructed  by  ice  at  certain  seasons,  affords  no  very 
good  natural  harbor  within  a  reasonable  distance  of  the  sea.  The  artificial 
harbor  now  in  course  of  construction  near  Cape  Henlopen  will,  it  is  hoped,  fully 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  99 

realize  the  expectations  of  its  projectors,  in  which  event  it  must  be  securely  for- 
tified. No  plans  have,  however,  as  yet  been  made  with  that  object ;  and  as  to 
the  probable  cost,  nothing  better  can  now  be  done  than  to  assume  the  conjectural 
estimate  of  the  engineer  department,  namely,  $600,000. 

The  lowest  point  at  which  Philadelphia  is  defensible  is  at  Pea  Patch  island, 
about  forty-five  miles  below  that  city.  A  fort  on  that  island  to  replace  the  one 
destroyed  by  fire ;  a  fort  opposite  the  Pea  Patch,  on  the  Delaware  shore  ;  a  tem- 
porary work  on  the  Jersey  shore,  to  be  thrown  up  at  the  commencement  of  war, 
and  floating  obstructions  placed  in  the  channel,  under  the  fire  of  these  works, 
will  effectually  cover  Philadelphia,  the  other  important  places  on  the  river,  and 
the  outlet  of  the  canal  connecting  the  Delaware  and  Chesapeake  bays.  The 
plans  and  estimates  for  a  fort  to  replace  Fort  Delaware  are  not  completed. 
Taking  the  expense  thereof  at  $600,000,  the  expense  of  the  system,  inclusive 
of  temporary  works,  will  be  $1,121,000. 

Chesapeake  bay. — The  board  of  naval  officers  and  engineers  intrusted  with 
the  selection  of  sites  for  great  northern  and  southern  naval  depots,  recommended 
in  their  joint  reports  of  1819  and  1820,  Burwell's  bay,  on  James  river,  for  the 
one,  and  Charles  town,  near  Boston,  for  the  other.  They  also  recommended 
Boston  harbor  and  Narraganset  bay  at  the  north,  and  Hampton  roads,  at  the 
south,  as  chief  naval  rendezvous.  In  those  reports  the  commission  entered  at 
large  into  the  consideration  of  all  the  matters  of  the.se  important  objects ;  and 
reference  is  now  made  to  those  reports  for  many  very  interesting  details. 

Hampton  roads,  James  river,  and  Norfolk. — The  works  projected  for  the 
defence  of  these  are,  1st,  a  fort  and  advanced  lunette  at  Old  Point  Comfort ;  2d, 
a  casemated  battery  on  the  Rip  Rap  shoals ;  and  3d,  a  line  of  floating  obstruc- 
tions extending  across  the  channel,  between  these  works.  In  the  event  of  a 
great  naval  depot  being  fixed  on  James  river,  it  might  ultimately  be  desirable 
to  provide  additional  strength,  by  adding  works  on  the  positions  of  Newport 
News,  Nasaway  shoals,  and  Craney  Island  flats.  Exclusive  of  these,  the  cost 
of  completing  the  works  is  estimated  at  $723,188. 

The  existing  fort,  viz  :  Fort  Norfolk,  will  aid  in  the  defence  of  the  city  of 
Norfolk  and  of  the  navy  yard.  It  is  a  small  and  inefficient  work,  but  may 
be  made  useful  as  an  accessory  to  the  general  defensive  operations. 

Harbor  of  St.  Mary's. — The  central  situation,  as  regards  the  Chesapeake, . 
of  this  fine  basin ;  its  relation  to  the  Potomac ;  its  depth  of  water,  and  the 
facility  with  which  it  may  be  defended,  indicates  its  fitness  as  a  harbor  of  refuge 
for  the  commerce  of  the  bay,  and  as  an  occasional  if  not  constant  station  during: 
war,  for  a  portion  of  the  naval  force.  A  survey  has  been  made,  but  no  projects 
have  been  formed.  The  engineer  department  has  conjectured  that  the  cost  may 
be  8300,000. 

Patuxent  river. — The  more  effectually  to  protect  the  city  of  Washington  from 

a  sudden  attack  by  troops  landed  at  the  head  of  navigation  of  the  Patuxent,  and 

to  provide  an  additional  shelter  for  vessels,  a  fort  has  been  planned  to  occupy 

,  Point  Patience,  and  another  to  occupy  Thomas's  Point,  both  about  six  miles 

from  the  Chesapeake.     Their  expense  will  be  $505,000. 

Annapolis  harbor. — No  surveys  or  plans  of  defence  have  been  made.  The 
existing  works  are  very  inefficient.  The  estimate  made  by  the  engineer  depart- 
ment, viz  :  $250,000,  is  adopted. 

Harbor  of  Baltimore. — The  proximity  of  Baltimore  to  the  bay  places  that 
city  in  a  dangerous  situation.  In  the  present  state  of  things,  an  enemy,  in  a 
few  hours'  march,  after  an  easy  landing,  without  being  exposed  to  a  separation, 
from  his  fleet,  can  make  himself  master  of  that  great  commercial  emporium. 

Baltimore  requires  for  its  security  two  forts  in  the  Patapsco  :  one  at  Hawkin's- 
Point,  and  the  other  at  the  extreme  end  of  the  flat,  off  Soller's  Point.  Besides 
the  advantages  which  will  result  of  obliging  the  enemy  to  land  at  a  greater 
distance,  thereby  delaying  his  march,  gaining  time  for  the  arrival  of  militia,  and 


100  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

preventing  his  turning  the  defensive  positions  our  troops  might  occupy,  it  will 
be  impossible  for  him  to  endanger  the  city  or  its  shipping  by  a  direct  attack  by 
water.  The  present  Fort  McHenry,  Redoubt  Wood,  and  Covington  battery, 
should  be  retained  as  a  second  barrier.  Allowing  $150,000  for  putting  these 
in  a  more  efficient  state,  the  expense  will  be  $1,517,000. 

Mouth  of  Elk  river. — The  completion  of  the  line  of  communication  from  the 
Delaware  to  the  waters  of  the  Chesapeake  makes  it  necessary  to  place  a  fort 
somewhere  near  the  mouth  of  the  Elk,  in  order  to  prevent  an  enemy  from 
destroying,  by  a  sudden  enterprise,  the  works  connecting  these  communications 
with  the  river.  There  have  been  no  surveys  made  with  a  view  to  establish  such 
protection,  but  the  engineer  department  estimates  the  cost  of  a  suitable  fort  at 
$300,000. 

City  of  Washington,  Georgetown,  and  Alexandria. — Fort  Washington  covers 
these  cities  from  any  attack  by  water,  and  will  oblige  an  enemy  to  land  at  some 
fifteen  or  eighteen  miles  from  Alexandria,  should  that  city  be  his  object.  It 
will  also  serve  the  very  important  purpose  of  covering  the  troops  crossing  from 
Virginia,  with  a  view  to  fall  on  the  flanks  of  an  enemy  moving  against  the 
capital.  All  these  objects  would  have  been  better  fulfilled  had  the  work  been 
placed  at  lower  Cedar  Point.  As  it  is,  however,  the  forts  in  the  Patuxent  being 
•constructed,  and  the  militia  of  the  surrounding  country  in  a  due  state  of  prepa- 
ration, an  enterprise  against  these  cities  would  be  one  of  great  hazard.  Still,  a 
work  on  Cedar  Point  should  on  no  account  be  omitted.  The  department  esti- 
mates its  cost  at  $300,000. 

From  the  mouth  of  the  Chesapeake  to  Cape  Hatteras  there  occurs  no  inlet 
.navigable  by  sea-going  vessels. 

SOUTHERN  SECTION  OF  THE  ATLANTIC  COAST. 

This  coast  is  invariably  low,  and,  for  the  greater  part,  sandy,  much  resembling 
tfche  coast  from  Cape  Hatteras  to  Montaug  Point.  A  ridge  of  sand,  here  and 
inhere  interrupted  by  the  alluvion  of  the  rivers,  extends  through  its  whole  length; 
ithie  ridge,  in  certain  portions,  lies  on  the  main  land,  while  in  others  it  is  divided 
itherefrom  by  basins  or  sounds  of  various  width  and  depth,  and  is  cut  up  into 
islands  by  numerous  channels  of  greater  or  less  depth,  connecting  these  interior 
-waters  with  the  sea.  Wherever  this  sand  ridge  is  broken,  its  place  is  occupied 
,by  low  and  marshy  grounds,  bordering  the  principal  and  the  many  lesser  outlets 
•  of  the  rivers. 

The  nature  of  the  country  through  which  the  rivers  of  this  coast  flow,  aftei 
leaving  the  mountains,  is  such  that  the  banks  being  easily  abraded  by  the  cur- 
rent, the  waters  are  always  turbid,  and  are  continually  transporting  new  supplies 
for  the  formation  of  alluvion  and  the  maintenance  of  extensive  submarine  banks 
shoals,  and  bars ;  that  these  do  not  rapidly  increase  is  owing  to  the  force  of  the 
current,  the  action  of  the  sea,  and  the  mobility  of  the  particles  of  matter.  Il 
.is  to  the  same  cause,  namely,  the  wearing  away  of  the  shores  of  the  rivers,  thai 
,is  to  be  attributed  the  want,  on  this  coast,  of  harbors  unobstructed  by  bars,  and 
which,  as  a  coast,  particularly  distinguish  this  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  frontiei 
(where  similar  operations  have  been  going  on)  from  the  more  northern  and  easterr 
portions. 

Ocracock  inlet. — The  shallowness  of  the  water  on  the  bars  at  Ocracocfe 
effectually  excludes  all  vessels-of-war  from  the  harbor  within.  But  as  this  is 
.now  an  outlet  of  an  -  extensive  commerce,  and  through  this  opening  attempts 
might  be  made  iu  small  vessels,  or  in  boats,  to  interrupt  the  line  of  interioi 
.communication,  whereon  so  much  might  depend  in  time  of  war,  timely  prepa- 
.ration  must  be  made  of  temporary  works  equal  to  defence  of  it  against  all  sucl: 
. minor  enterprises. 

Beaufort  harbor,  North  Carolina. — Work  completed. 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND  SEA- COAST  DEFENCES.       101 

Mouth  of  Cape  Fear  river. — The  defence  of  the  main  channel  of  Cape  Fear 
river  requires,  in  addition  to  the  work  nearly  completed  on  Oak  island,  another 
fort  on  Baldhead,  and  the  defence  of  the  smaller  channel  will  require  a  redoubt 
on  Federal  Point.  The  battery,  magazine,  block-house,  quarters,  &c.,  at  Smith- 
ville,  should  remain  as  accessories.  The  cost  is  set  down  at  $258,000. 

Georgetown  harbor. — The  first  inlet  of  any  consequence  south  of  Cape  Fear 
river  is  at  the  united  mouths  of  the  Waccamaw,  Pedee,  and  Black  rivers,  forming 
Georgetown  harbor,  which  is  a  commodious  and  capacious  bay,  having  suf- 
ficient water  within  and  upon  the  bar,  near  the  mouth,  for  merchant  vessels  and 
small  vessels-of-war.  A  survey  of  this  harbor,  begun  many  years  ago,  has 
never  been  completed,  and  no  projects  of  defence  have  been  made.  It  is  prob- 
able that  a  work  placed  near  Moscheto  creek  or  on  Winyaw  Point  would  give 
adequate  strength,  at  the  cost  of  about  $250,000. 

Santee  river  and  Bull's  bay. — About  ten  miles  south  from  Georgetown 
entrance  are  the  mouths  of  the  Santee,  the  largest  river  in  South  Carolina.  It 
is  not  known  whether  the  bars  at  the  mouths  of  this  river  have  sufficient  water 
for  sea-going  vessels ;  the  same  uncertainty  exists  as  to  the  depth  into  Bull's 
bay.  It  may  be  well,  however,  to  consider  them,  and  the  other  inlets  between 
Georgetown  and  Charleston,  as  calling  for  small  works  capable  of  resisting 
boat  enterprises,  and  to  assign  to  them  $100,000.  Should  they  prove  to  be 
navigable  for  privateers  they  will  need  a  larger  expenditure. 

Charleston,  South  Carolina. — The  city,  situated  at  the  junction  of  Ashley 
and  Cooper  rivers,  is  about  five  miles,  in  a  direct  line,  from  the  sea.  Between 
it  and  the  ocean  is  a  wide  and  safe  roadstead  for  vessels  of  any  draught.  Upon 
the  bar,  lying  three  or  four  miles  outside  of  the  harbor,  there  is,  however,  only 
water  enough  for  the  smaller  frigates  and  for  large  sloops-of-war.  On  the  south- 
west side  of  the  harbor  is  James's  island,  through  which  are  several  serpentine 
passages,  more  or  less  navigable  for  boats  and  barges ;  some  of  them  commu- 
nicate directly  with  the  sea  and  Stono  river.  Whappoo  cut,  the  most  northerly 
passage  from  Stono  to  Charleston  harbor,  enters  Ashley  river  opposite  the 
middle  of  the  city.  Interior  natural  water  communications  exist  also  to  the 
southwest  of  Stono  river,  connecting  this  with  North  Edisto  river,  the  latter 
with  South  Edisto  and  St.  Helena  sound;  this  again  with  Broad  river,  and, 
finally,  this  last  with  Savannah  river.  On  the  north  side  of  the  harbor  of 
Charleston  lies  Sullivan's  island,  separated  from  the  main  by  a  channel  navi- 
gable to  small  craft.  To  the  northeast  of  Sullivan's  island  an  interior  water 
communication  extends  to  Bull's  bay,  and  even  beyond,  to  the  harbor  of  George- 
town. 

From  this  sketch,  it  is  apparent  that  it  will  not  do  to  restrict  the  defences  to 
the  principal  entrance  to  the  harbor.  The  lateral  avenues  must  also  be  shut. 
And  it  is  probable  that  accurate  surveys  of  all  these  avenues  will  show  that  the 
best  mode  of  defending  the  latter  will  be  by  works  at  or  near  the  mouths  of  the 
inlets,  as  the  enemy  will  be  kept  thereby  at  a  greater  distance  from  the  city; 
.  the  lesser  harbors  formed  by  these  inlets  will  be  secured,  and  the  line  of  interior 
communication  will  be  inaccessible  from  the  sea. 

No  position  for  the  defence  of  the  principal  entrance  to  Charleston  harbor  can 
be  found  nearer  to  the  ocean  than  the  western  extremity  of  Sullivan's  island. 
This  is  at  present  occupied  by  Fort  Moultrie,  a  work  of  some  strength,  but  by 
no  means  adequate  to  its  object,  its  battery  being  weak,  and  the  scarp  so  low  as 
to  oppose  no  serious  obstacle  to  escalade.  How  far  this  work,  by  modification 
of  its  plan  and  relief,  may  be  made  to  contribute  to  a  better  defence  of  the  harbor, 
cannot  now  be  determined. 

On  a  shoal  nearly  opposite  Fort  Moultrie  the  foundation  of  a  fort  has  been 
begun,  which  will  have  a  powerful  cross-fire  with  Fort  Moultrie.  It  is  presumed 
that  about  $800,000  would  put  these  works  in  a  complete  state. 

Stono,  North  Edisto,  and  South  Edisto. — All  these  must  be  fortified,  at  least 


102  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

in  such  a  manner  as  to  secure  them  from  enterprises  in  boats  or  small  vessels. 
To  that  end  $50,000  may  be  assigned  to  each. 

St.  Helena  sound. — The  proper  defences  cannot  be  pointed  out  till  this  sound 
shall  have  been  surveyed. 

Although  there  is  supposed  to  be  no  great  depth  of  water  on  the  bar,  it  is 
known  to  be  navigable  by  the  smaller  class  of  merchantmen,  and  to  have  a  navi- 
gable communication  with  the  head  of  Broad  river  OF  Port  Royal,  intersecting 
the  interior  navigation  between  Charleston  and  Savannah.  This  sound  will 
require  defence,  even  should  it  not  be  of  much  use  as  a  harbor  of  refuge  for  ex- 
terior commerce.  $150,000  may  be  the  cost  of  the  defences. 

Broad  river  or  Port  Royal  roads. — The  value  of  this  capacious  roadstead, 
as  a  harbor  of  refuge,  depends  on  the  depth  which  can  be  carried  over  the  bar, 
on  the  distance  of  this  bar  outside  of  the  line  of  coast,  and  on  the  means  which 
may  be  applicable  of  lessening  the  danger  of  crossing  it.  This  is  supposed  to 
be  the  deepest  bar  of  the  southern  coast.  Should  there  prove  to  be  water 
enough  for  frigates,  and  by  light-houses  on  the  shore,  and  lights,  or  other  distinct 
guides,  on  the  bar,  should  it  be  practicable  to  make  the  passage  of  the  bar  safe 
and  easy,  this  road,  situated  within  sixty  miles  of  Charleston  and  twenty  of 
Savannah  river,  intersecting  the  interior  navigation  between  these  great  cities, 
thereby  securing  the  arrival  of  supplies  of  every  kind,  would  possess  a  very  high 
degree  of  importance,  not  only  as  a  harbor  of  refuge,  but  as  a  naval  station  also. 

The  survey  of  the  exterior  shoals,  constituting  the  bar,  should  be  made  with 
the  greatest  care,  and  all  possible  minuteness.  It  is  only  when  this  shall  have 
been  done  that  the  true  relation  of  this  inlet  to  the  rest  of  the  coast  can  be  known, 
and  on  this  relation  the  position  and  magnitude  of  the  required  defences  will 
depend.  For  the  present,  the  estimate  made  by  the  engineer  department  is 
adopted,  namely,  $300,000. 

Savannah  and  mouth  of  Savannah  river. — Mention  has  been  made  of  the 
natural  interior  water  communication  along  the  coast  of  South  Carolina.  A  sim- 
ilar communication  extends  south  from  the  Savannah  river,  as  far  as  St.  John's, 
in  East  Florida.  Owing  to  these  passages,  the  city  of  Savannah,  like  Charles- 
ton, is  liable  to  be  approached  by  other  avenues  than  the  harbor  or  river ;  and 
its  defences  must  consequently  have  relation  to  these  lesser  as  well  as  the  prin- 
cipal channels. 

The  distance  from  the  mouth  of  Wassaw  sound,  or  even  Ossabaw  sound,  (both 
to  the  southwest  of  Savannah  river,)  to  the  city,  is  not  much  greater  than  from 
the  mouth  of  the  river;  and  an  enterprise  may  be  conducted  the  whole  distance 
by  water,  or  part  of  the  way  by  water  and  part  by  land,  from  either  or  both. 
As  in  the  case  of  like  channels  in  the  neighborhood  of  Charleston,  it  cannot  now 
be  determined  where  they  can  be  defended  most  advantageously.  It  is  to  be 
hoped,  however,  that  the  localities  will  permit  the  defences  to  be  placed  near  the 
outlets  of  the  sound;  because  the  defences  thus  placed  will  serve  the  double 
purpose  of  guarding  the  city  of  Savannah  and  covering  these  harbors,  which,  in 
time  of  war,  cannot  but  be  very  useful. 

The  defence  of  Savannah  river  is  by  no  means  difficult.  A  fort  on  Cockspur 
island,  lying  just  within  the  mouth,  and  perhaps,  for  additional  security,  another 
on  Tybee  island,  which  forms  the  southern  cape  at  the  junction  of  the  river  with 
the  ocean,  would  effectually  prevent  the  passage  of  vessels  up  the  channel,  and 
cover  the  anchorage  lying  between  Tybee  and  Cockspur.  The  existing  Fort 
Jackson,  standing  about  four  miles  below  the  city,  should  be  maintained  as  a 
second  barrier,  both  as  respects  the  main  channel  and  the  passages  which  come 
into  the  river  from  the  south ;  which  last  would  not  at  all  be  controlled  by  works 
on  Cockspur  or  Tybee.  A  fort  projected  for  Cockspur  island  is  estimated  at 
$470,000.  To  defend  Tybee  island  may  require  $150,000,  and  $50,000  would 
put  Fort  Jackson  in  an  efficient  state,  making  a  total  of  $670,000.  South  of  the 
Savannah  are  Wassaw  sound,  Ossabaw  sound,  St.  Catharine's  sound,  at  the 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  103 

mouth  of  the  Medway  river ;  Sapelo  sound,  Doboy  inlet,  Altamaha  sound,  at  the 
mouth  of  the  great  river  of  the  same  name ;  St.  Simon's  sound,  at  the  mouth  of 
Buffalo  creek ;  St.  Andrew's  sound,  at  the  united  mouths  of  the  Scilla  and  Santilla 
rivers;  and  Cumberland  sound,  at  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Mary's  river  All  these 
communications  with  the  ocean  are  highly  important,  as  regards  the  line  of  inte- 
rior navigation,  and  several  of  them  as  affording  access  to  excellent  harbors. 
The  last,  especially,  is  known  to  be  navigable  by  the  largest  sloops-of-war  and 
merchantmen ;  and  two  or  three  of  the  others  are  believed  to  be  but  little,  if  at 
all  inferior,  either  as  regards  depth  of  bar  or  safety  of  anchorage. 

All  these  inlets  are  yet  to  be  surveyed.  Some  of  them  are  probably  easily 
•defensible  by  forts,  and  other  may  require  the  aid  of  floating  defences.  An 
important  principle  in  relation  to  the  defensive  system  of  the  whole  southern  coast, 
namely,  that,  on  a  coast  possessing  a  few  harbors,  it  is  at  the  same  time  the  more 
necessary  to  preserve  them  all  for  our  own  use,  and  the  more  easy  to  deprive  an 
enemy  of  that  shelter  which  is  nearly  indispensable  to  a  continuous  and  close 
blockade.  This  principle  is  enforced  as  touching  this  particular  part  of  the 
southern  coast  by  the  two  following  weighty  considerations:  its  remoteness 
from  the  nearest  naval  rendezvous,  the  Chesapeake,  which  is  on  a  mean  600 
miles  distant,  and  to  leeward,  both  as  to  wind  and  current;  and  its  being  close 
upon  the  larboard  hand,  as  they  enter  the  Atlantic,  of  the  great  concourse  of 
vessels  passing  at  all  seasons  through  the  Florida  channel. 

While,  therefore,  this  part  of  the  coast,  from  the  concentration  of  vessels  here, 
is  in  great  need  of  protection  of  some  sort,  naval  aid  can  be  extended  to  it  only 
with  difficulty,  and  at  the  risk  of  being  cut  off  from  all  retreat  by  a  superior 
enemy. 

Accurate  and  minute  surveys  which  will  enable  our  vessels,  whether  driven 
by  an  enemy  or  by  stress  of  weather,  to  shun  the  dangers  which  beset  the  navi- 
gation of  these  harbors,  and  properly  arranged  defences  to  cover  them  when 
arrived,  seem  to  be  indispensable.  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  besides,  that  when 
these  harbors  shall  be  fortified  the  operation  of  visiting  the  coast  and  watch- 
ing the  great  outlet  of  commerce  through  Florida  passage  will  .be  a  difficult  and 
hazardous  one  to  an  enemy,  on  whose  part  no  perseverance  or  skill  can  avail  to 
maintain  an  uninterrupted  blockade,  or  to  avoid  the  occasional  shipwreck  of  his 
cruisers  ;  while  on  the  part  of  our  small  vessels-of-war  and  privateers  the  same 
sort  of  supervision  will  at  all  times  be  easy  and  safe. 

Nothing  better  can  be  now  done  than  to  assume  $200,000  as  the  average  cost 
of  defending  each  of  the  nine  entrances,  giving  a  total  of  $1,800,000. 

The  board  of  engineers  have  not  examined  the  coast  from  the  mouth  of  the 
St.  Mary's  to  Pensacola,  but  in  order  that  the  chain  of  defence  for  the  coast 
may  be  here  exhibited  unbroken,  the  estimates  of  the  engineer  department  for 
the  places  and  positions  intermediate  between  Cumberland  sound  and  Pensacola 
will  be  inserted.  St.  Augustine,  $50,000  ;  Key  West  and  Tortugas,  $3,000,000 ; 
Charlotte  harbor,  Espiritu  Santa  bay,  Apalachicola,  Apalache  bay,  St.  Joseph's 
.  bay,  St.  Rosa  bay,  together,  $1,000,000. 

GULF  OF    MEXICO  FRONTIER. 

The  resemblance  of  this  part  of  the  coast  to  that  which  we  have  denominated 
the  southern  section  is  striking.  We  may,  indeed,  refer  to  the  description  herein 
given  of  the  principal  features  of  the  latter  as  a  true  delineation  of  this.  In 
respect  to  the  relation  of  the  coast  to  the  interior,  there  is,  however,  the  greatest 
difference  between  these  two  portions  of  the  maritime  frontier ;  for  while  about 
eight-tenths  of  the  whole  territory  of  the  United  States  is  in  one  sense  tributary 
to  a  part  only  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  portion,  in  the  southern  section  of  the 
coast  not  more  than  one-tenth  is  connected  with  the  seaboard  by  any  natural 
ties.  This  fact,  which  shows  the  very  deep  interest  which  a  large  portion  of 


104  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

the  people  and  the  government  have  in  the  security  of  this  portion,  is  related  to 
other  facts  which  hardly  leave  an  alternative  as  to  the  mode  of  attaining  that 
security. 

From  the  relative  geographical  position  of  this  part  of  the  coast,  and  the 
country  interested  in  its  safety ;  from  the  unhealthiness  of  the  climate,  nature 
of  the  adjacent  country,  and  mixed  character  of  the  inhabitants,  it  will  be  some 
time  before  that  portion,  within  supporting  distance,  whose  welfare  may  be  en- 
'dangered  by  an  enemy  will,  from  peculiar  circumstances,  be  competent  of  itself 
to  sustain  the  assaults  of  an  exterior  foe.  Upon  the  Atlantic  seaboard  the 
Alleghanies  crowd  the  people  upon  the  coast,  and  surround  every  alarm  post  of 
the  frontier  with  a  more  and  more  dense  population ;  and  the  ocean  and  the 
interior  parallel  communication  transmit  rapid  aid  to  the  right  and  left,  while 
the  coast  of  the  Gulf,  weak  in  itself  and  remote  from  succor  from  behind,  is 
almost  inaccessible  to  lateral  assistance. 

Those  reasons,  therefore,  which  tend  to  establish  the  necessity  of  an  organized, 
a  permanent,  and  a  timely  system  of  defence  for  the  whole  seaboard  of  the 
United  States  (some  of  which  were  advanced  in  the  commencement  of  this  com- 
munication) will  apply  to  this  part  of  it  with  a  peculiar  force  so  long  as  any 
portion  of  its  system  of  defence  is  incomplete. 

It  has  already  been  observed  that  the  board  of  engineers  have  made  no 
examination  between  Cumberland  sound,  in  Georgia,  and  Pensacola.  There 
are,  however,  along  that  shore  and  in  the  Florida  reef  several  very  important 
harbors  which  must  be  accurately  surveyed. 

Pensacola  bay. — The  upper  arms  of  this  considerable  bay  receive  the  Yellow- 
water  or  Pea  river,  Middle  river,  and  Escambia  river ;  and  while  the  tributaries 
of  the  last,  interlocking  with  branches  of  the  Alabama  and  the  Chattahoochie, 
seem  to  mark  the  courses  whereby,  at  some  future  day,  canals  will  convey  a 
part  of  the  products  of  these  rivers  to  Pensacola,  the  face  of  the  whole  region 
is  remarkably  adapted  to  the  application  of  railroads. 

Santa  Rosa  sound  extends  eastward  from  the  lower  part  of  this  bay  into 
Santa  Rosa  bay.  On  the  west  the  lagoons  of  Pensacola,  Perdido,  and  Mobile 
bays,  respectively,  interlock  in  such  a  manner  as  to  require  but  a  few  miles  of 
cutting  to  complete  a  navigable  channel  from  the  first  to  the  last-named  bay, 
and  thence  through  an  existing  interior  water  communication  to  the  city  of  New 
Orleans. 

Pensacola  bay  has  rare  properties  as  a  harbor.  It  is  accessible  to  the  largest 
class  of  sloops-of-war  and  to  small  frigates,  and  under  favorable  circumstances 
will  admit  even  large  frigates ;  and  there  is  reason  to  hope  that  the  bar  may  be 
permanently  deepened. 

The  bar  is  near  the  coast,  and  the  channel  through  it  is  straight  and  easily  hit. 

The  harbor  is  perfectly  land-locked,  and  the  roadstead  very  capacious.  There 
are  excellent  positions  within  it  for  repairing,  building,  and  launching  vessels, 
and  for  docks  and  dock-yards,  in  healthy  situations.  The  supply  of  good  water 
is  abundant.  It  is  perfectly  defensible.  These  properties,  in  connexion  with 
the  position  of  the  harbor  as  regards  the  coast,  have  induced  the  government  to 
fix  upon  it  as  a  naval  station  and  place  of  rendezvous  and  repairs. 

An  excellent  survey  has  been  made  of  the  bay  of  Pensacola,  sufficing  to 
form  the  scheme  of  defence,  while  no  other  objects  were  sought  than  the  security 
of  the  town  and  harbor.  Regarded,  however,  as  a  naval  station  and  place  of 
rendezvous  and  repairs,  further  surveys,  extending  a  greater  distance  from  the 
shores,  delineating  accurately  the  face  of  the  country  and  showing  the  several 
avenues  by  land  and  water  are  found  to  be  necessary. 

The  defences  of  the  water  passage,  as  projected,  are  nearly  completed,  8210,000 
being  asked  to  finish  them.  A  further  water  defence  at  the  position  of  the 
Barrancas,  and  the  works  that  are  indispensable  to  cover  the  navy  yard  from  a 
lateral  attack  through  the  western  bays — the  latter  requiring  the  further  surveys 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA- CO  AST    DEFENCES.  105 

above  mentioned — are  not  yet  planned.  The  Barrancas  work  may  be  taken  at 
$100,000,  and  the  others  at  $300,000,  making  a  total  for  Pensacola  of  $610,000. 

Perdido  bay. — This  bay  is  intimately  related  to  Pensacola  and  to  Mobile 
bays,  both  as  regards  security  and  intercommunication,  and  should  be  carefully 
surveyed,  with  a  view  to  these  objects.  It  must  be  forfeited,  and  the  cost  may 
be  $200,000. 

Mobile  bay. — The  plan  of  defence  for  this  bay  comprised  a  fort  at  Mobile 
Point,  which  has  been  finished ;  another  on  Dauphin  island,  and  a  tower  at  the 
Pass  au  Heron.  The  estimates  for  the  two  last  named  amount  to  $905,000. 

New  Orleans  and  the  delta  of  the  Mississippi. — The  most  northern  water 
communication  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Gulf  is  by  the  passage  called 
the  Rigolets,  connecting  Lake  Borgne  and  Lake  Pontchartrain.  The  next  is  by 
the  pass  of  Chef  Menteur,  also  connecting  these  lakes.  Through  these  passages 
an  enemy  entering  Lake  Pontchartrain  would,  at  the  same  time  that  he  inter- 
cepted all  water  communication  with  Mobile  and  Pensacola,  be  able  to  reach 
New  Orleans  from  the  southern  shore  of  the  lake,  or  might  continue  onward 
through  Lake  Maurepas,  Amite  river,  and  Iberville  river,  thereby  reaching  the 
Mississippi  at  the  head  of  the  delta ;  or,  landing  within  the  mouths  of  Chef 
Menteur,  he  might  move  against  the  city  along  the  ridge  of  the  Gentilly  road. 

To  the  southwest  of  Chef  Menteur,  and  at  the  head  of  Lake  Borgne,  is  Bayou 
Bienvenu,  a  navigable  channel,  (the  one  pursued  by  the  English  army  in  the 
last  war,)  not  running  into  the  Mississippi,  but  possessing  shores  of  such  a  nature 
as  to  enable  troops  to  march  from  the  point  of  debarkation  to  the  city.  A  little 
to  the  south  of  this  is  Bayou  Dupre,  also  affording  easy  access  to  the  city.  The 
avenues  just  named  are  defended  by  a  fort  at  the  Rigolets ;  another  at  Chef 
Menteur ;  another  at  Bayou  Bienvenu,  and  a  tower  at  Bayou  Dupre. 

The  defences  of  the  river  are  placed  at  the  Plaquemine  turn,  the  lowest  posi- 
tion which  can  be  occupied.  Fort  Jackson  is  on  the  right  shore,  and  Fort  St. 
Philip  a  little  lower  down,  on  the  left:  this  last  work  must  be  repaired  or  renewed. 
The  expense  is  estimated  at  $117,000. 

The  only  permanent  work  required  at  present,  west  of  the  Mississippi,  is  a 
fort  to  occupy  Grand  Terre  island,  for  the  purpose  of  defending  the  entrance  to 
Barrataria  bay,  an  excellent  harbor  for  a  floating  force  guarding  the  coasting 
trade  on  that  side,  and  whence  there  are  several  passages  leading  to  the  Missis- 
sippi, near  New  Orleans.  The  estimate  for  this  work  is  $400,000. 

Before  leaving  this  part  of  the  subject,  it  is  necessary  to  advert  to  the  import- 
ant uses  which  may  be  made  of  movable  floating  defences  in  aid  of  fortifications. 

The  applications  of  this  auxiliary  force  along  the  coast  of  the  United  States 
may  be  very  numerous,  and,  as  has  been  before  remarked,  would,  in  certain 
cases,  be  requisite  to  attain  full  security  for  all  the  objects  needing  protection. 
In  the  case  we  have  just  been  considering,  for  example,  fortifications  will  enable 
us  to  protect  New  Orleans,  even  from  the  most  serious  and  determined  efforts  of 
an  enemy ;  but,  owing  to  the  great  width  of  the  passages,  we  cannot,  by  fortifi- 
cations alone,  deprive  an  enemy  of  good  exterior  anchorages,  especially  the  very 
excellent  one  west  of  Chandeleur  island,  nor  entirely  cover  the  interior  water 
communications  between  the  Rigolets  and  Mobile.  We  must,  therefore,  either 
quietly  submit  to  all  the  annoyance  and  injury  which  an  enemy  in  possession  of 
these  passages  may  inflict,  or  avert  them  by  the  timely  preparation  of  a  floating 
force,  adapted  to  their  peculiar  navigation,  and  capable,  under  the  favorable 
shelter  of  the  forts,  of  being  always  on  the  alert,  and  of  assuming  an  offensive 
or  defensive  attitude,  according  to  the  designs,  conduct,  or  situation  of  the  enemy. 
As  these  means  of  defence  are,  however,  secondary  to  fortifications,  in  every 
sense ;  as  the  extent  to  which  they  may  be  needed  must  depend  on  the  relation 
of  our  naval  force  to  that  of  other  powers — a  relation  continually  varying  as  the 
shapes  which  these  auxiliaries  are  to  assume — the  materials  of  which  they  are 
to  be  formed,  the  weapons  they  are  to  use,  the  agent  which  is  to  give  them 


106  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

power,  are  points  on  which  every  ten  years  of  this  age  of  rapid  improvement  in 
the  arts  may  effect  complete  revolutions,  it  is  considered  premature  to  go  into 
details,*  and  premature  to  go  into  expense. 

From  the  preceding  sketch  of  the  system  projected  for  the  defence  of  the 
seaboard  of  the  United  States,  it  appears  that  all  the  fortifications  proposed  are 
not  of  the  same  pressing  necessity,  nor  of  like  importance.  Some  are  required 
immediately,  while  the  commencement  of  others  may  be  postponed.  In  pro- 
ceeding to  class  them,  it  must  be  observed  that  the  works  of  the  first  class  are 
those  destined  to  prevent  an  enemy  from  forming  a  permanent  or  even  a  mo- 
mentary establishment  in  the  country,  those  which  will  defend  the  great  naval 
arsenals,  and  those  which  will  cover  the  chief  cities  and  towns. 

In  the  second  class  will  be  placed  the  works  which  are  to  defend  those  naval 
stations  and  those  cities  of  a  secondary  rank,  which,  either  from  natural  or 
artificial  defences,  existing  works,  &c.,  are  not  entirely  without  protection,  and 
may,  therefore,  wait  until  the  more  important  points  are  secured  against  a  first 
attack ;  and  in  the  third  class  will  we  arrayed  the  works  which  complete  the 
defensive  system  in  all  its  parts,  but  of  which  the  construction  may,  without 
great  danger,  be  deferred  until  the  frontier  shall  have  received  all  the  successive 
degrees  of  strength  resulting  from  a  gradual  erection  of  the  forts  of  the  first  and 
second  classes.  A  fourth  class  is  added,  containing  such  works  as  will  be 
necessary  only  conditionally. 

Table  A,  joined  to  this  report,  contains  the  first  class,  and  shows  that  the 
works  of  this  class  will  cost  $11,609,444;  will  require  2,585  men  to  garrison 
them  in  time  of  peace,  and  30,966  in  case  of  siege. 

Table  B  contains  the  works  of  the  second  class,  showing  that  they  will  cost 
$5,873,000;  will  require  975  men  to  garrison  them  in  time  of  peace,  and  10,680 
in  case  of  siege. 

Table  0  contains  works  belonging  to  the  third  class,  showing  that  their  cost 
will  be  $14,078,824;  that  their  garrisons  in  time  of  peace  will  amount  to  2,380 
men,  and  in  time  of  siege  to  21,745  men;  showing,  also,  that  the  total  future 
expense  of  fortifying  the  maritime  frontier  will  amount  to  $31,561,268;  the 
troops  necessary  to  guard  these  fortifications  in  time  of  peace  to  5,940  men,  and 
63,391  men  in  time  of  war,  supposing  them  all  (which  cannot  happen)  besieged 
at  once. 

The  time  required  to  construct  the  whole  system  must  depend  upon  the  annual 
appropriation  which  the  nation  may  grant  to  this  branch  of  the  public  service. 
All  that  need  be  said  on  the  subject  is,  that  in  an  undertaking  necessarily  in- 
volving so  much  time,  and  of  such  vital  importance  to  the  safety,  prosperity,  and 
greatness  of  the  Union,  there  should  be  no  relaxation  of  effort  and  persever- 
ance. An  undertaking  of  such  magnitude  must,  with  every  effort,  be  the  work 
of  years.  But  it  may  be  too  much  hurried  as  well  as  too  much  delayed.  There 
is  a  rate  of  progress  at  which  it  will  be  executed  in  the  best  manner  and  at  the 
minimum  cost.  If  more  hurried,  it  will  be  defective  in  quality  and  more  costly 
if  delayed.  . 

France  was,  at  least,  fifty  years  completing  her  maritime  and  interior  defences. 

Some  remarks  will  now  be  offered  on  the  subject  of  the  expense  of  erecting 
a  system  of  defensive  works,  and  garrisoning  them  for  war,  comparing  it  with 
the  expense  of  defending  the  coast  without  fortifications.  To  simplify  the 
proposition,  the  defence  of  Portsmouth,  Boston,  Narragauset  roads,  New  York, 
Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  Norfolk,  Charleston,  Savannah,  and  New  Orleans,  only, 
will  be  taken. 

Supposing  an  enemy  had  concentrated  20,000  men  at  Halifax  or  Bermuda  ; 
the  government  must,  on  hearing  of  this  force,  at  once  prepare  to  resist  it  at  all 
the  points  mentioned  above.  As  it  will  be  impossible  to  foresee  on  which  the 
first  blow  will  be  struck,  it  will  be  necessary  to  have  troops  encamped  at  each ; 
and  to  meet  the  attack  with  a  force  not  less  numerically  than  that  of  the  assail- 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  107 

ant,  the  troops  kept  constantly  under  arms  must,  at  least,  equal  one-half  of  the 
hostile  expedition,  while  as  many  more,  ready  for  instant  service,  must  be 
within  call.  These  points  are  so  immediately  accessible  in  some  cases,  and  so 
remote  from  succor  in  others,  that,  after  the  point  of  attack  is  announced  by  the 
appearance  of  the  enemy  before  it,  there  will  be  no  time  for  reinforcements  to 
come  from  the  interior. 

By  manoeuvring  in  front  of  any  of  these  places  the  enemy  would  induce  us 
to  concentrate  forces  there;  when,  suddenly  profiting  of  a  favorable  breeze,  he 
would  sail  to  another,  which  he  would  reach  in  a  few  hours,  and  would  not  fail 
to  seize  if  a  force  were  not  stationed  there  likewise,  at  least,  equal  to  his  own. 
No  reinforcement  can,  in  this  case,  arrive  from  the  interior  in  time,  for  all  the 
troops  under  march  would  have  taken  up  a  direction  upon  the  point  he  has  just 
quitted. 

Our  whole  coast  from  Maine  to  Louisiana  would  thus  be  kept  in  alarm  by  a 
single  expedition ;  and  such  is  the  extent  and  exposure  of  the  seaboard  that  an 
enemy  might  ruin  us  by  a  war  of  mere  threatenings.  If  the  cities  and  other 
great  establishments  are  not  garrisoned,  they  will  become  a  prey  at  once;  and  if 
they  are  garrisoned,  the  treasury  will  be  gradually  emptied ;  the  credit  of  the 
government  exhausted ;  the  weary  and  starving  militia  will  desert  to  their  homes  ; 
nor  will  it  be  easy  to  avert  the  consummation  of  tribute,  pillage,  and  conflagra- 
tion. 

The  table  E,  joined  to  this  report,  shows  that,  to  be  in  readiness  on  each  of 
these  vulnerable  points,  it  will  be  requisite  to  maintain  107,000  men  encamped 
and  under  arms  at  the  ten  places  mentioned,  and  93,000  men  ready  to  march 
and  within  call. 

This  number  is,  in  fact,  below  that  which  would  be  required ;  for  these  points 
being,  according  to  our  hypothesis,  exposed  to  an  attack  from  20,000  regular 
and  disciplined  troops,  20,000  militia  would  not  be  able  to  repel  them,  unless 
aided  by  entrenchments,  requiring  a  time  to  construct  them  which  might  not  be 
allowed,  and  involving  expenses  which  are  not  included  in  the  estimate.  Be- 
sides, to  have  20,000  men,  especially  new  levies,  under  arms,  it  will  be  necessary, 
considering  the  epidemics  that  always  assail  such  troops,  to  carry  the  formation 
of  these  corps  to  at  least  25,000  men. 

The  State  of  Louisiana,  being  remote  from  succor,  requires  a  larger  force 
under  arms  than  the  other  points ;  this  force  is  fixed  at  17,000,  supposing  that 
the  State  may  supply  3,000  within  call. 

All  expenses  being  reckoned,  1,000  regular  troops,  including  officers,  cost 
$300,000  per  annum,  or  $150  per  man,  for  a  campaign  of  six  months.  1,000 
militia,  including  officers,  cost  $400,000  per  annum,  or  $200  per  man,  for  a  six 
months'  campaign.  But,  taking  into  consideration  the  diseases  which  invariably 
attack  men  unaccustomed  to  military  life,  and  the  consequent  expense  of 
hospital  establishments ;  the  frequent  movement  of  detachments  from  the  camp 
to  their  homes,  and  from  the  interior  to  the  camp ;  and  the  cost  of  camping 
furniture,  utensils,  accoutrements,  &c.,  which  is  the  same  for  a  short  campaign 
as  for  a  year;  regarding  all  these  things,  the  cost  of  militiamen  cannot  be 
reckoned  at  less  than  $250  per  man  for  six  months. 

The  107,000  militiamen  necessary  to  guard  the  above-mentioned  points,  the 
maritime  frontier  being  without  defence,  will  therefore  cost,  in  a  campaign  of 
six  months,  $26,750,000.  In  strict  justice,  there  should  be  added  to  this  ex- 
pense, which  is  believed  to  be  much  understated,  amongst  other  things,  the  loss 
of  time  and  the  diminution  of  valuable  products  resulting  from  drawing  off  so 
considerable  a  portion  of  efficient  labor  from  its  most  profitable  pursuits.  This, 
besides  being  a  heavy  tax  on  individuals,  is  a  real  loss  to  the  nation. 

It  would  be  utterly  vain  to  attempt  an  estimate  of  the  loss  to  the  nation  from 
the  dreadful  mortality  which  rages  in  the  camps  of  men  suddenly  exposed  to  the 
fatigues  and  privations  of  a  military  We. 


108  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

The  total  expense  of  constructing  the  fortifications  at  the  ten  places  before 
mentioned  will  amount  to  $21,767,656. — (See  table  E.) 

The  garrisons  of  these  fortifications  may  consist  of  the  same  number  of  regu- 
lar troops  in  time  of  war  as  in  time  of  peace,  the  remainder  being  furnished  by 
the  militia  held  in  readiness  to  throw  themselves  into  the  forts  on  the  first 
appearance  of  an  enemy.  By  this  arrangement  3,010  regulars  and  32,076 
militia,  either  within  the  works  or  in  small  corps  on  advantageous  positions, 
making  in  all  35,086  men,  would  suffice,  64,914  men  being  kept  in  readiness  to 
march  when  called  upon. 

We  should,  therefore,  have  only  35,086  to  pay  and  support  instead  of  107,000, 
and  the  expense  would  be  $8,430,500  instead  of  $26,750,000.  The  difference, 
namely,  $18,319,500,  being  only  $3,448,156  less  than  the  whole  cost  of  these 
defences.  It  follows  that  the  expense  of  their  erection  would  be  nearly  com- 
pensated by  the  saving  they  would  cause  in  a  single  campaign  of  six  months. 

It  is  proper  to  add  that,  although  the  expense  of  these  works  will  be  great, 
that  expense  is  never  to  be  renewed ;  while  with  troops,  on  the  contrary,  the 
expense  is  annually  repeated,  if  not  increased,  until  the  end  of  the  war.  Besides, 
the  disbursements  for  fortifications  are  made  in  time  of  peace,  slowly  and  to 
an  extent  exactly  correspondent  with  the  financial  resources  of  the  country. 
Armies  are  most  wanted,  and  must  be  paid,  in  periods  of  the  greatest  emer- 
gency, when  the  ordinary  sources  of  revenue  are  dried  up,  and  when  the 
treasury  can  only  be  supplied  by  a  resort  to  means  the  most  burdensome  and 
disagreeable  to  the  people. 

The  defence  of  the  maritime  frontier  by  permanent  fortifications,  and  the  dis- 
bursements for  their  construction,  will  thus  tend  to  a  real  and  positive  economy. 

The  vulnerable  points  being  reduced  to  a  small  number,  instead  of  waiting 
an  attack  on  every  point,  and  holding  ourselves  everywhere  in  readiness  to 
repel  it,  we  shall  force  an  enemy  to  direct  his  assaults  against  those  few  which, 
being  well  understood  by  us,  will,  of  course,  have  received  timely  preparation. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  such  a  state  of  things  will  make  an  adversary  more 
reluctant  to  risk  his  expeditions,  and,  therefore,  that  we  shall  not  only  be  better 
able  to  resist,  but  also  less  frequently  called  on  to  do  so. 

Some  prominent  military  writers  have  opposed  the  principle  of  fortifying  an 
extensive  land  frontier,  but  none  have  ever  disputed  the  necessity  of  fortifying 
a  maritime  border ;  the  practice  of  every  nation,  ancient  and  modern,  has  been 
the  same  in  this  respect.  On  a  land  frontier  a  good,  experienced,  and  numerous 
infantry  may,  in  some  cases,  dispense  with  fortifications ;  but  though  disciplined 
troops  may  cover  a  frontier  without  the  aid  of  fortifications,  undisciplined  troops 
cannot.  On  a  maritime  fronti;-r,  however,  no  description  of  troops  can  supply 
the  place  of  strong  batteries  d  Isposed  upon  the  vulnerable  points.  The  uncer- 
tainty of  the  point  on  which  an  enemy  may  direct  his  attack,  the  suddenness 
with  which  he  may  reach  it,  and  the  powerful  masses  which  he  can  concentrate 
at  a  distance  out  of  our  reach  and  knowledge,  or  suddenly,  and  at  ^the  very 
moment  of  attack  require  that  every  important  post  be  prepared  to  'repel  his 
attempt,  or  retard  it  until  reinforcements  can  arrive  and  adequate  means  of 
resistance  be  organized.  By  land  we  are  acquainted  with  the  motions  of  an 
enemy ;  but  the  ocean  is  a  vast  plain,  without  obstacle,  where  his  movements  are 
made  out  of  our  sight,  where  no  trace  is  left  of  his  path,  and  where  we  know 
nothing  of  his  approach  until  he  is  within  reach  of  the  eye.  In  a  word,  unless 
the  vulnerable  points  of  a  seaboard  are  covered  by  fortifications  their  only  chance 
of  safety  must  depend  upon  the  issue  of  a  battle,  always  uncertain,  even  when 
the  best  disciplined,  most  experienced,  and  best  appointed  troops  have  made  all 
possible  preparation  for  the  combat. 

As  for  the  garrisons  which  these  forts  will  require  in  time  of  war,  a  small 
portion,  about  equal  in  number  to  the  peace  garrisons,  should  be  of  regular  troops, 
the  remainder  of  militia,  practiced  in  the  manoeuvres  and  drill  of  great  guns,  it 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA  COAST   DEFENCES.  109 

being  indispensable  that  the  greatest  part  of  the  troops  required  for  the  defence 
and  service  of  the  sea-coast  fortifications  should  be  of  artillery. 

This  brings  us  to  a  suggestion  or  two  in  relation  to  the  organization  of  the 
militia  forces.  Instead  of  the  present  small  proportion  of  artillery  allowed  in 
th  e  militia  organization,  the  States  might,  with  great  advantage,  increase  the 
proportion  of  that  force  in  the  vicinity  of  each  of  the  exposed  parts  of  the  coast, 
so  as  to  be  equivalent  to  the  exigencies  and  armament  of  the  works,  substituting 
for  the  usual  field  exercises  as  infantry  actual  drill  and  practice  in  the  batteries. 
The  number  of  militia  artillery  in  each  case  would  be  determined  by  the  number 
of  guns  applied  to  the  defence  of  that  particular  place.  As  soon  as  a  movement 
on  the  part  of  the  enemy  should  threaten  the  frontier  of  the  State  this  force 
should  throw  itself  into  the  forts,  and  there  remain  so  long  as  the  precise  point 
of  attack  should  be  undetermined.  In  most  parts  of  the  seaboard  it  would  be 
advisable  to  have  also  a  considerable  body  of  militia  horse  artillery,  as  being 
a  very  useful  arm  in  all  cases,  and  as  affording  a  defence  always  applicable 
against  minor  and  predatory  enterprises.  This  force  might,  in  part,  be  drawn 
from  the  ordinary  proportion  of  cavalry. 

If  with  our  general  system  of  permanent  fortifications  and  naval  establish- 
ments we  connect  a  system  of  interior  communication  by  land  and  water,  adapted 
both  to  the  defence  and  to  the  commercial  relations  of  the  country ;  if  to  these 
we  add  a  well  constituted  regular  army,  and  a  militia  perfect  in  its  organization, 
the  nation  will  not  only  secure  its  territory  from  invasion  and  insult,  but  will 
preserve  its  institutions  from  those  violent  shocks  and  revolutions  which  have  so 
frequently,  in  every  age  and  in  every  country,  been  incident  to  a  state  of  war. 

Tables  A,  B,  C,  and  D,  following,  contain  the  works  constituting  the  proposed 
defensive  system  for  the  maritime  frontier,  arranged  in  four  classes. 

Table  E  exhibits  a  comparison  of  the  cost  of  defending  certain  important 
parts  of  the  coast  without  fortifications,  and  with  the  aid  of  the  projected  works. 

Table  F  shows  a  possible  concentration  of  militia  force  in  eleven  days  at 
Boston,  Newport,  R.  I.,  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  Norfolk,  Charles- 
ton, S.  C.,  Savannah,  Georgia,  and  New  Orleans. 

NORTHERN    FRONTIER. 

Not  having  been  the  subject  of  particular  care  and  study,  it  is  with  diffidence 
that  a  few  words  are  thrown  out  on  the  subject  of  the  defence  of  the  frontier 
which  separates  the  United  States  from  the  English  possessions. 

The  first  questions  that  arise  are  these :  Is  the  political  condition  of  the  coun- 
try lying  on  the  other  side  of  the  country  in  question,  viz :  the  condition  of 
colonies  of  a  trans-Atlantic  power  to  remain  altered?  Or  are  these  colonies  to 
become  independent  nations  'I  Or  is  any  other  important  change  to  be  wrought 
in  their  political  relations  1  These  questions  bear  directly  upon  the  matter  in 
hand.  A  generation  hence  and  there  may  be  no  more  room  for  jealousy  and 
watchfulness  along  that  line  than  there  now  is  along  the  imaginary  lines  which 
separate  our  contiguous  States.  Within  the  same  period  the  Canadas  may  have 
assumed  the  attitude  of  independent  and  separate  States;  and,  although  the 
United  States  may  recognize  in  these  northern  neighbors  a  youth  of  much 
promise  and  vigor,  the  period  when  the  relative  increase  shall  have  been  such 
as  to  make  their  proximity  a  source  of  much  precaution  and  solicitude  will  not, 
probably,  be  near  at  hand.  But  though  it  may  be  possible  that  the  colonial 
relations  may  be  thrown  off  within  the  period  for  which  it  is  our  duty  now  to 
provide ;  and  although  in  any  other  relation  the  United  States  might  rely  for 
security,  at  any  moment,  on  the  greater  power  which  she  might  at  any  moment 
develop,  can  it  be  distinctly  foreseen  that  the  existing  political  connexion  is  to 
be  soon  dissolved  ?  If  not — if  there  be  uncertainty  on  this  point,  does  it  become 
the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  proceed  at  once  to  the  task  of  securing  herself 


110  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

on  this  frontier,  regarding  it  as  separating  her  from  one  of  the  most  powerful  em- 
pires of  the  earth  ?  Or,  finally,  may  she  wait  and  watch,  relying  on  her  sagacity 
to  give  due  notice  of  impending  danger,  and  on  her  resources  to  supply  her,  in 
time,  with  appropriate  armor  ?  If  it  be,  indeed,  possible  to  apply,  within  a  brief 
state  of  time,  all  the  defences  that  can  be  needed  on  this  frontier,  the  course  last 
suggested  would  appear  to  be  the  best.  What,  therefore,  is  like  to  be  the  nature 
of  the  danger,  and  what  the  nature  of  the  defence  1 

Along  the  St.  Croix  river  only  local  establishments  could  require  to  be  cov- 
ered, as  there  are  no  objects  of  consequence  to  be  reached  by  an  enemy  pene- 
trating our  interior  from  that  border.  Then  comes  the  disputed  territory  and 
the  great  unsettled  regions  along  the  northern  margins  of  New  Hampshire  and 
Vermont. 

Upon  all  this  extent  of  frontier  the  exact  location  of  future  establishments,  of 
consequence,  cannot  be  foreseen  with  the  certainty  warranting  their  being  now 
provided  for  by  permanent  defensive  works.  This  region  is  to  become  populous 
and  wealthy ;  the  natural  means  of  communication  are  to  be  improved,  and  nu- 
merous artificial  means  of  communication  are  to  be  opened  by  roads,  canals,  and 
railways  ;  but  while  this  growth  in  wealth  may  invite  aggression,  the  growth  in 
numbers,  and  the  increased  facilities  of  intercommunication,  the  increased  power 
of  rendering  mutual  succor,  and  of  drawing  aid  from  the  interior,  would,  in  a  still 
greater  degree,  make  aggression  difficult  and  improper. 

Lake  Champlain  penetrates  the  territory  in  such  a  way  that  an  enemy,  having 
the  naval  mastery,  might  make  a  deep  inroad  and  greatly  harass  the  country 
along  the  shores,  although  no  enterprise,  even  in  the  present  state  of  population, 
could  be  carried  far  into  the  interior.  Were  it  only  to  relieve  a  long  line  of 
frontier  from  predatory  incursions,  access  to  this  lake  from  the  north  should  be 
denied.  But  there  are  other  very  strong  reasons  for  this  exclusion.  By  closing 
the  lake  at  its  northern  extremity  an  expensive  and  uncertain  strife  for  naval 
superiority  on  this  lake  would  be  avoided,  and  the  whole  lake  would  remain  in 
our  possession,  serving  as  the  best  possible  military  line  of  communication  in 
case  the  United  States  should  assume  offensive  operations  against  the  weakest 
point  of  the  Canadian  frontier. 

From  the  northern  end  of  this  lake  the  forces  of  the  United  States  should 
march  into  Canada  and  intercept  the  communication  by  the  St.  Lawrence,  either 
at  or  near  the  mouth  of  the  Richelieu  river,  as  Montreal  island,  at  some  point , 
where  the  ship  channel  of  the  river  could  be  commanded,  intermediate  between 
these  places,  or  at  any  two  or  at  all  these  places,  according  to  circumstances. 
Maintaining  any  or  all  these  positions  would  limit  the  defence  in  the  province 
above  to  the  consumption  of  the  means  then  in  store,  and  would  completely 
paralyze  its  offensive  power.  Although  no  other  object  were  in  view  than  the 
defence  of  the  frontier  upon  the  upper  lakes,  no  effort  necessary  to  secure  and 
maintain  this  position  should  be  spared,  because  it  is  only  thus  that  the  contest 
for  naval  superiority  on  the  lakes,  which,  if  once  suffered  to  begin,  is  both 
exhausting  and  interminable,  can  be  avoided. 

Without  aid  from  abroad,  Canada  cannot  contest  such  a  question  with  the 
United  States ;  and,  so  long  as  the  United  States  possess  that  superiority,  the 
defence  of  the  upper  portion  of  the  frontier  Avill  be  complete. 

From  being  the  most  expensive  of  all  modes  of  defence,  naval  superiority  in 
our  hands  may  thus  become  the  cheapest :  two  or  three  small  armed  vessels  on 
each  lake,  employed  as  convoys  to  the  ordinary  navigation,  and  to  the  transports 
bearing  troops  and  munitions,  being  all  that  would  be  needed. 

Military  enterprises  would,  in  this  way,  be  warded  off  from  the  numerous  rich 
and  populous  cities  and  towns  now  embellishing  our  border,  which  it  would  not 
be  easy  to  protect  from  the  calamities  of  war  by  mere  military  works,  without 
running  into  great  expense,  were  the  enemy's  naval  means  to  allow  his  approach- 
ing them  at  his  pleasure. 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  Ill 

In  the  case  of  the  offensive  movement  supposed  above,  the  fortified  position 
of  Isle  Aux  Noix,  and  any  other  upon  the  Richelieu,  should  be  at  first  left  in 
rear,  being  reached  or  mastered  by  suitable  bodies  of  troops,  and  should  be  sub- 
jected to  immediate  investment  and  vigorous  attack,  so  as  to  be  speedily  reduced, 
and  to  open  the  navigable  water  communication  within  twenty  miles  of  Montreal. 

If  the  preceding  remarks  be  well  founded,  it  would  appear  that  the  peace  and 
safety  of  the  parts  of  the  frontier  extending  along  the  river  St.  Lawrence,  Lakes 
Ontario,  Erie,  Huron,  and  Superior,  might  be  made  to  flow  from  military  opera- 
tions carried  on  against  Canada,  by  the  line  of  Lake  Champlain  and  the  river 
Richelieu;  and  in  order  to  this  military  operation  being  always  practical,  and  to 
be  taken  up  at  pleasure,  nothing  more  is  necessary  than  the  fortification  of  the 
outlet  of  Lake  Champlain.  It  might  have  been  before  remarked  that  the  offen- 
sive movement  in  question  is  not  deemed  to  be  difficult  or  hazardous,  nor  would 
it  be  necessarily  restricted  to  holding  positions  on  the  St.  Lawrence ;  active  op- 
erations against  Quebec,  to  which  this  is  the  most  convenient  road,  following  as 
a  matter  of  course  upon  these  first  successes. 

The  security,  therefore,  that  may  be  obtained  for  the  upper  frontier  by  mili- 
tary operations  on  the  lower,  may  at  least  justify  these  upper  portions  in  wait- 
ing the  progress  of  events. 

The  unexampled  increase  of  population  upon  these  very  borders,  the  hundred 
new  ways  already  finished  or  in  hand,  of  connecting  these  borders  with  the  heart 
of  the  country,  may  so  elevate  the  military  resources  of  the  region  that,  in  the 
event  of  war,  it  will  matter  little  in  which  of  the  political  conditions  first  sup- 
posed the  opposite  territory  may  be  found — a  resistless  torrent  sweeping  it  from 
end  to  end ;  and,  although  it  might  not  be  prudent  to  rely  in  such  a  matter  on 
the  mere  spread  of  wealth  and  numbers,  we  may  be  certain  that  there  will  exist 
ample  resources  to  create  all  such  artificial  military  aids  as  the  circumstances 
may  call  for,  and  we  may  infer  that  the  application  of  these  aids  would  now  be 
premature. 

The  military  consequences  of  the  occupation  of  the  outlet  of  Lake  Champlain 
are  so  obvious  that  it  must  not  be  supposed  they  are  not  perfectly  understood 
by  our  neighbor  across  the  border.  As  it  would  consequently  be  a  great  object 
with  him  to  avert  the  consequences  alluded  to,  he  would,  in  the  event  of  Avar, 
(often  breaking  out  suddenly,)  be  first,  if  possible,  in  taking  such  a  position  as 
would  prevent  our  commanding  the  issue  of  the  lake ;  and  hence  it  is  that,  in 
the  preparation  of  the  only  permanent  military  work  now  recommended  for  the 
northern  frontier,  it  seems  advisable  to  admit  no  unnecessary  delay. 

A  position  for  closing  the  lake,  selected  during  the  last  war,  and  of  which  the 
fortification  was  begun  soon  after  the  peace,  was  found,  after  some  progress  had 
been  made,  not  to  lie  within  our  territory,  and  was  abandoned.  There  is,  how- 
ever, a  position  equally  good  close  at  hand,  and  in  all  respects  admirably  adapted 
to  the  object  in  view. 

The  fortification  of  this  outlet  will  probably  cost  about  $600,000. 

All  of  which  is  respectfully  submitted. 


112 


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122  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


TABLE  E,  exhibiting  the  cost  of  certain  projected  fortifications,  Sfc. — Conti  nue.d 

Expense  of  defending  the  above-mentioned  points  during  a  cam- 

dgn  of  six  months  without  fortifications $26,  750,  000 

rith  the  projected  forts 8,  430,  500 

Difference 18,  319,  500 

Total  cost  of  the  projected  works 21,  767,  656 

Difference 3,  448, 156 


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pay  necessary  for  defence,  with  the  proposed  works,  consist  of  peace  garrisons, 
increased  by  a  proportion  of  militia,  the  residue  of  militia  under  pay  being 
stationed  upon  the  line  of  approach  of  the  enemy. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


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124  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 


ORDNANCE  OFFICE,  Washington,  Marvh  8,  1836. 

SIR  :  The  resolution  of  the  Senate  referred,  on  the  25th  ultimo,  to  this  offici 
has  been  duly  considered,  and,  in  answer,  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  the  fol 
lowing  report : 

1.    IN  RELATION  TO  ARMORIES. 

For  reasons  fully  set  forth  in  the  letter  to  you  from  this  office  of  Decembe 
28,  1832,  (and  as  will  also  appear  on  reference  to  the  report  of  Hon.  R.  M 
Johnson,  chairman  of  the  military  committee,  of  March  18,  1834,)  it  is  th< 
opinion  of  this  department  that,  with  a  view  to  keep  pace  in  some  measure  witl 
the  rapid  increase  of  the  militia,  and  the  consequent  demand  for  arms,  ther< 
should  be  established  at  least  one  additional  armory,  to  be  located  at  the  mos 
eligible  point  west  of  the  Alleghany  mountains. 

In  a  country  like  the  United  States,  where  the  population  is  spread  over  i 
territory  of  great  extent,  the  delay  necessarily  attending  the  transportation  o 
arms  to  distant  sections  may  at  times  materially  affect  the  public  interest;  it  ii 
therefore  suggested  that,  if  two  additional  armories  are  deemed  necessary  t( 
meet  the  exigencies  of  the  country,  one  should  be  provided  in  the  west  and  om 
in  the  south  Atlantic  States.  Including  those  now  at  Springfield  and  Harper's 
Ferry,  there  would  then  be  four  national  armories,  two  for  the  Atlantic  States 
and  two  for  the  west ;  that  is,  if  Harper's  Ferry  may  be  considered  sufficiently 
near  the  western  States  to  furnish  their  supplies  by  means  of  the  proposed 
extension  of  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  canal. 

Two  additional  armories  are  therefore  estimated  for,  at  $525,000  each — 
$1,050,000. 

This  estimate  is  based  on  the  report  of  the  commissioners,  dated  January  12 
1825,  who  were  appointed  under  the  authority  of  an  act  of  Congress,  passec 
March  3,  1823,  entitled  "An  act  to  establish  a  national  armory  on  the  westerr 
waters,"  and  directed  to  explore  the  western  country  with  a  view  to  the  selectior 
of  a  suitable  site. 

2.   IN   RELATION  TO   ARSENALS. 

It  has  been  urged  upon  the  department  by  many  whose  opinions  demand 
consideration,  that  every  state  should  have  an  arsenal  or  depot  of  arms  and 
munitions  within  its  territorial  limits.  Should  this  opinion  prevail  and  be  carried 
into  effect  by  legislative  authority,  it  would  be  necessary  to  construct  fourteen 
arsenals  or  depots,  including  the  one  proposed  for  the  State  of  North  Carolina, 
for  which  a  bill  has  been  reported  by  the  military  committee  of  the  House  of 
Representatives . 

A  prominent  advantage  to  the  public  interest  in  the  establishing  of  these  depots 
consists  in  their  use  for  the  safe-keeping  of  arms  issued  to  the  States,  under  the 
law  of  Congress,  passed  in  1808,  "for  arming  the  whole  body  of  the*  militia,"  to 
be  held  subject  to  the  orders  of  their  several  governors,  which  would  insure  their 
being  always  available  in  any  emergency. 

Some  additions  may  be  required,  from  time  to  time,  at  the  arsenals  already 
established,  which,  with  the  cost  of  the  fourteen  above  mentioned,  are  estimated 
at  $1,746,000. 

This  estimate  is  founded  on  the  supposition  that  the  new  arsenals  are  to  be, 
on  an  average,  of  a  medium  extent,  when  considered  in  relation  to  those  already 
established,  which  are  divided  into  four  classes,  as  may  be  seen  by  refenence  to  a 
tabular  exhibit  presented  herewith.  It  would  be  proper  to  arrange  every  new 
depot  in  such  manner  as  to  admit  of  its  increase  or  extension  in  case  the  public 
service  should  require  it.  It  could  then  be  passed  from  one  class  to  a  higher  by 
the  addition  of  such  buildings,  tools,  or  machinery  as  the  case  might  demand. 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  125 


3.   IN  RELATION  TO  FIELD  VRTILLERY. 

It  is  estimated  that  an  adequate  supply  of  field  artillery  for  arming  the  militia 
and  for  troops  in  service,  to  be  provided  within  ten  years,  will  amount  to  926 
pieces,  which,  with  their  carriages,  implements,  and  equipments,  will  cost  about 
$576,175. 

This  estimate  is  based  on  the  principle  stated  in  the  report  before  mentioned, 
and  contemplates  a  supply  proportionate  to  the  ratio  of  the  increase  of  the  militia, 
one  piece  of  artillery  being  allotted  to  every  2,000  men. 

4.    IN  RELATION  TO  ORDNANCE  AND  ORDNAMCE   STORES    REQUIRED  FOR  ARMING 

THE   FORTIFICATIONS. 

Agreeably  to  data  derived  from  two  statements  received  from  the  engineer 
department  on  the  llth  of  January  and  27th  of  February  last,  it  is  estimated 
that  the  expense  of  procuring  the  necessary  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores  for 
the  full  and  entire  armament  of  the  forts  which  are  erected,  together  with  those 
now  building,  and  others  which  are  contemplated  to  be  built  hereafter,  embracing 
cannon,  carriages,  implements,  and  equipments  complete,  and  ammunition,  after 
deducting  therefrom  the  quantity  of  similar  munitions  now  on  hand,  will  amount 
to  about  $17,840,249. 

This  estimate  is  founded  on  the  supposition  that  12,116  pieces  of  cannon,  with 
200  rounds  of  ammunition  for  each  gun,  will  be  ultimately  required  when  all  the 
forts  projected  shall  have  been  completed. 

It  should  be  stated,  however,  that  this  sum  may  be  considered  partly  conjec- 
tural, the  plans  for  the  defence  of  many  of  the  harbors  being  not  yet  matured  by 
the  board  of  engineers,  as  it  appears  by  a  letter  from  the  chief  of  that  depart- 
ment, dated  February  27  last.  There  are  likewise  many  other  points  along  the 
coast  which  may  require  defences,  the  cost  of  the  armament  for  which  has  not 
been  embraced  in  this  estimate,  nor  does  it  contain  any  item  for  the  defence  of 
the  Mexican  frontier. 

5.    IN  RELATION  TO  SMALL  ARMS. 

To  progress  with  the  arming  of  the  militia  to  a  reasonable  extent,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  settled  policy  of  the  country  and  its  civil  institutions,  a  consider- 
able addition  should  be  made  to  the  number  of  arms  on  hand.  Having  reference 
to  the  annual  increase  of  citizens  who  may  be  called  to  bear  arms,  there  will  be 
required  for  the  next  ten  years  an  expenditure  of  $7,721,233  for  muskets,  rifles, 
and  pistols,  and  $321,880  for  swords — total,  $8,043,113. 

This  last  sum  is  found  by  allotting  five  swords  to  every  one  hundred  muskets, 
or  their  equivalent  in  other  fire-arms. 

6.  IN  RELATION  TO  ACCOUTREMENTS  FOR  SMALL  ARMS. 

Fifty  thousand  sets  of  accoutrements  would  cost  $200,000. 

This  number  distributed  among  the  several  arsenals  would  afford  an  adequate 
supply  for  any  emergency ;  and  being  in  some  degree  perishable,  it  is  not  con- 
sidered advisable  to  provide  a  greater  quantity,  as  they  can  be  made  at  short 
notice,  or  as  occasion  may  require. 

7.    IN  RELATION  TO  FIELD  AMMUNITION  OF  ALL  KINDS. 

The  expense  of  providing  a  supply  of  gunpowder,  cartridge  paper,  and  other 
materials  for  field  service,  is  estimated  at  $200,000. 

This  amount  would  afford  at  all  times  a  supply  of  ammunition  for  30,000  men 
in  each  of  the  principal  divisions  of  the  country. 


126  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

The  foregoing  statements  comprise  all  the  estimates  for  the  ordnance  depart- 
ment, except  for  a  national  foundery.  The  amount  required  for  such  an  estab- 
lishment will  not  exceed  $300,000,  which  sum  includes  the  cost  of  materials  to 
be  consumed  in  casting  guns  during  the  first  year  after  commencing  operations. 
The  period  of  ten  years  is  taken  as  a  suitable  time  within  which  the  foregoing 
expenditures  may  be  completed. 

The  disbursements  for  the  various  objects  embraced  in  the  resolution  which 
pertain  to  the  ordnance  department  are  now,  annually,  little  short  of  $1,000,000. 
If  a  period  of  fifteen  years  is  assumed  for  the  accomplishment  of  these  purposes, 
the  annual  expenditure  will  be  only  double  what  it  is  at  present,  and  it  is  believed 
that  such  an  increase  could  be  made  with  much  advantage  to  the  service.  Indeed, 
that  portion  of  expense  which  pertains  to  the  manufacture  of  cannon  and  projec- 
tiles could  annually  be  more  than  quadrupled  with  safety  and  a  due  regard  to 
economy. 

Recapitulation. 

2  national  armories $1,  050,  000 

14  arsenals 1,  746,  000 

926  pieces  of  field  artillery,  with  carriages,  &c 576, 175 

Ordnance  and  ordnance  stores,  and  ammunition  for  fortifications . .  17,  840,  249 

Small  arms  and  accoutrements 8,  243, 113 

Ammunition  for  field  service 200,  000 

A  national  foundery 300,  000 


29, 955, 537 

The  resolution  of  the  Senate  is  returned  herewith. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  &c., 

GEO.  BOMFORD,  Colonel  of  Ordnance. 
Hon.  LEWIS  CASS,  Secretary  of  War. 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


127 


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FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 


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132  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 


REPORT  FROM  THE  NAVY  DEPARTMENT. 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  March  31,  1836. 

SIR  :  In  answer  to  so  much  of  the  resolutions  of  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States,  of  the  18th  ultimo,  as  required  information  as  to  the  probable  amount  of 
appropriations  that  may  be  necessary  to  supply  the  United  States  with  ord- 
nance, arms,  and  munitions  of  war,  which  a  proper  regard  to  self-defence  would 
require  to  be  always  on  hand,  and  the  probable  amount  that  would  be  necessary 
to  place  the  naval  defences  of  the  United  States  (including  the  increase  of  the 
navy,  navy  yards,  dock  yards,  and  steam  or  floating  batteries)  upon  the  footing 
of  strength  and  respectability  which  is  due  to  the  security  and  welfare  of  the 
Union,  I  have  the  honor  to  lay  before  you  a  report  of  the  board  of  navy  com- 
missioners, of  the  2d  instant,  which  contains  the  best  information  upon  the  sub- 
jects referred  to  in  possession  of  this  department,  which  is  respectfully  sub- 
mitted. 

MAHLON  DIOKERSON. 

The  PRESIDENT  of  the   United  States. 


IN  THE  SENATE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

January  21,  1836. 
The  following  resolutions  were  ordered  to  be  postponed  to  Monday  next : 

Resolved,  That  so  much  of  the  revenue  of  the  United  States,  and  the  divi- 
dends of  stock  receivable  from  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  as  may  be  neces- 
sary for  the  purpose,  ought  to  be  set  apart  and  applied  to  the  general  defence 
and  permanent  security  of  the  country. 

Resolved,  That  the  President  be  requested  to  cause  the  Senate  to  be  informed 

1.  The  probable  amount  that  would  be  necessary  for  fortifying  the  lake,  marl 
time,  and  Gulf  frontier  of  the  United  States,  and  such  points  of  the  land  frontiei 
as  may  require  permanent  fortifications. 

2.  The  probable  amount  that  would  be  necessary  to  construct  an  adequate 
number  of  armories  and  arsenals  in  the  United  State?,  and  to  supply  the  States 
with  field  artillery  (especially  brass  field  pieces)  for  their  militia,  and  with  side 
arms  and  pistols  for  their  cavalry. 

3.  The  probable  amount  that  would  be  necessary  to  supply  the  United  State; 
with  the  ordnance,  arms,  and  munitions  of  war,  which  a  proper  regard  to  self 
defence  would  require  to  be  always  on  hand. 

4.  The  probable  amount  that  would  be  necessary  to  place  the  naval  defence: 
of  the  United  States  (including  the  increase  of  the  navy,  navy  yards,  docl 
yards,  and  steam  or  floating  batteries)  upon  the  footing  of  strength  and  respect 
ability  which  is  due  to  the  security  and  to  the  welfare  of  the  Union. 

Passed  February  18,  1836. 


NAVY  COMMISSIONER'S  OFFICE,  March  2,  1836. 

SIR  :  The  board  of  navy  commissioners  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  tin 
receipt  of  your  letter  of  the  26th  ultimo,  requesting  a  "  report  on  the  probabL 
amount  that  would  be  necessary  to  supply  the  United  States  with  the  ordnance 
arms,  and  munitions  of  war  (so  far  as  may  be  wanted  for  the  purposes  of  th 
navy)  which  a  proper  regard  to  self-defence  would  require  to  be  always  on  hand 
and  on  the  probable  amount  that  would  be  necessary  to  place  the  naval  defence 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  133 

of  the  United  States  (including  the  increase  of  the  navy,  navy  yards,  dock  yards, 
and  steam  or  floating  batteries)  upon  the  footing  of  strength  and  respectability 
which  is  due  to  the  security  and  welfare  of  the  Union." 

In  conformity  to  these  instructions  the  board  respectfully  state,  with  respect 
to  the  ordnance  for  the  navy,  that  after  a  careful  examination  of  the  subject, 
taking  into  considertion  the  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores  now  on  hand,  and 
the  extent  of  force  for  which  it  may  be  expedient  to  make  early  provision,  they 
are  qf  opinion  that  the  sum  of  one  million  eight  hundred  thousand  two  hundred 
and  fifty  dollars  will  be  required  to  supply  the  ordnance,  arms,  and  munitions  of 
war  which  may  be  wanted  for  the  use  of  the  navy,  and  which  a  proper  regard 
to  self-defence  would  require  to  have  prepared  ready  for  use. — (See  paper  A 
annexed  for  the  detail.) 

The  board  beg  leave  respectfully  to  observe,  that  for  the  vessels  which  are 
now  built,  or  have  been  specially  authorized,  armaments  may  be  provided,  with 
some  partial  exceptions,  from  the  cannon  and  cannonades  already  provided,  and 
the  deficient  ordnance,  arms,  and  other  ordnance  stores  will  be  principally  required 
for  the  vessels  which  are  yet  to  be  authorized  or  built.  It  is  therefore  respect- 
fully recommended  that  any  appropriation  for  this  purpose,  instead  of  being 
special  or  separate,  should  be  included  in  an  appropriation  for  "  building  and 
repairing  vessels,  and  for  the  purchase  of  materials  and  stores  for  the  navy." 

The  second  object  of  inquiry,  as  to  "  the  probable  amount  that  would  be  neces- 
sary to  place  the  naval  defences  of  the  United  States  (including  the  increase  of 
the  navy,  navy  yards,  dock  yards,  and  steam  or  floating  batteries)  upon  the 
footing  of  strength  and  respectability  which  is  due  to  the  security  and  welfare 
of  the  Union,"  embraces  a  wide  range,  requires  an  examination  of  several  sub- 
jects of  great  importance,  and  the  expression  of  opinions  upon  which  differences 
of  opinion  may  and  probably  will  exist.  Before  any  estimate  can  be  formed  of 
the  probable  amount  that  would  be  necessary  for  the  purposes  proposed  an 
examination  must  be  had,  and  an  opionion  formed  of  the  nature  and  extent  of  the 
naval  force  which  is  "  necessary  to  place  the  naval  defences  of  the  United  States 
upon  the  footing  of  strength  and  respectability  which  is  due  to  the  security  and 
welfare  of  the  Union,"  and  the  time  within  which  it  ought  to  be,  or  might  be, 
advantageously  prepared. 

Taking  into  view  the  geographical  position  of  the  United  States,  with  reference 
to  other  nations  with  whom  we  are  most  likely  to  be  brought  into  future  collision  ; 
the  great  extent  of  our  maritime  frontier,  and  the  extreme  importance  of  securing 
the  communications  of  the  whole  valley  of  the  Mississippi,  through  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  and  the  intercourse  between  all  parts  of  the  coast ;  the  efficient  protection 
of  our  widely  extended  and  extremely  valuable  commerce,  under  all  circumstances ; 
and  the  great  naval  and  fiscal  resources  of  the  country,  the  board  consider  the 
proper  limit  for  the  extent  of  the  naval  force  to  be  that  which  can  be  properly 
manned  when  the  country  may  be  involved  in  a  maritime  war. 

In  estimating  this  extent  it  is  assumed  that  about  ninety  thousand  seamen 
.  are  employed  in  the  foreign  and  coasting  trade  and  fisheries,  As  the  navigation 
has  been  generally  increasing,  there  is  little  reason  to  apprehend  any  immediate 
diminution  during  peace.  In  any  war  which  would  require  the  employment  of 
all  our  naval  force,  it  is  believed  that  such  interruptions  would  occur  to  our 
commerce  as  would  enable  the  navy  to  obtain  without  difficulty  at  least  thirty 
thousand  seamen  and  ordinary  seamen ;  and  if  it  should  continue  long,  it  is  prob- 
able that  a  larger  number  might  be  engaged.  The  number  of  thirty  thousand, 
with  the  landsmen  who  may  be  safely  combined  with  them,  will  therefore  be 
assumed  as  the  number  for  which  vessels  ought  to  be  prepared  for  the  com- 
mencement of  a  state  of  hostilities. 

With  respect  to  the  nature  of  the  force  which  it  would  be  most  advantageous 
to  prepare,  there  will  undoubtedly  be  differences  of  opinion.  The  materials  for 
the  larger  vessels,  as  ships-of-the-line  and  frigates,  would  be  obtained  with  great 


134  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

difficulty,  under  circumstances  which  would  interfere  with  our  coasting  trade, 
whilst  sloop-of-war  and  smaller  vessels  could  be  built  with  greater  comparative 
facility  under  such  circumstances. 

The  preparation  of  a  considerable  number  of  steam  vessels,  ready  to  defend 
our  great  estuaries,  to  aid  in  the  operations  of  our  other  naval  force,  and  in  the 
concentration  or  movements  of  the  military  force,  as  circumstances  might  re- 
quire, is  believed  to  demand  serious  and  early  attention. 

Having  due  regard  to  these  and  other  considerations,  the  board  propose  that 
the  force  to  be  prepared,  ready  for  use  when  circumstances  may  require  it,  shall 
consist  of  fifteen  ships-of-the-line,  25  frigates,  25  sloops-of-war,  25  steamers,  and 
25  smaller  vessels,  and  that  the  frames  and  other  timber,  the  copper,  ordnance, 
tanks,  and  chain  cables  shall  also  be  prepared  for  10  ships-of-the-line  arid  10 
frigates. 

The  force  proposed  to  be  prepared,  ready  for  use,  will  employ  and  can  be 
manned  by  the  30,000  seamen  and  others  which  have  been  considered  available 
in  a  state  of  war.  The  materials  for  the  ten  ships-of-the-line  and  ten  frigates 
will  constitute  a  necessary  reserve  for  increasing  the  number  of  those  vessels 
should  they  be  required,  or  for  supplying  losses  from  decay  or  casualties. 

To  estimate  the  amount  necessary  to  prepare  this  force  it  is  proposed  to  ascer- 
tain the  whole  probable  cost,  including  ordnance,  by  the  average  cost  of  similai 
vessels  already  built,  (steam  vessels  excepted,)  and  of  materials  already  procured 
and  then  to  deduct  the  value  of  the  present  force,  and  all  other  present  availa- 
ble means. 

Total  cost  of  15  ships-of-the-line $8,  250,  OOC 

25  frigates 8,  750,  OOC 

55  sloops 3,  125,  OOC 

25  steamers 5,  625,  OOC 

25  smaller  vessels . .                              1,  250,  OOC 


Total  for  vessels 27,  000,  OOC 

For  the  proposed  materials,  as  a  reserve 3,  315,  OOC 

Total  amount  required 30,  315,  OOC 

Deduct  from  this  sum  the  value  of  the  present  force  and  avail- 
able means,  as  follows : 
In  vessels  afloat,  valued  at  $*$  of  original  value, 

about ' $4,  440,  000 

In  vessels  building,  at  actual  cost 2,  455,  000 

In  materials  collected  for  building  do 2,  945,  000 

In  treasury  for  these  purposes,  October  1,  1835 —     1,  215,  000 
For  three  years'  appropriation,  "  gradual  improve- 
ment," when  due 1,  500,  000 


Total  of  present  value  and  available  means 12,  555,  OOC 

Leaves  still  to  be  provided  for  vessels 17,  760,  OOC 

In  presenting  any  estimate  for  the  amounts  which  may  be  necessary  to  place 
the  different  navy  yards  in  a  proper  situation,  the  board  can  do  no  more  thac 
give  very  general  opinions,  as  the  objects  of  expenditure  are  foreign  to  theii 
own  professional  pursuits,  and  they  have  no  civil  engineer  to  whom  they  cai] 
refer  for  the  necessary  detailed  information. 

From  a  knowledge  of  the  cost  of  works  hitherto  completed  or  in  progress 
and  of  the  wants  at  the  respective  yards  for  the  proper  peservation  of  materials; 
and  for  extending  the  means  for  building,  preserving,  repairing,  and  equipping 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  135 

vessels,  they  are  satisfied,  however,  that  the  public  interests  would  be  greatly 
promoted,  and,  in  fact,  absolutely  require  an  average  annual  expenditure  of 
$500,000  for  years  to  come  upon  the  different  yards. 

In  New  York  the  necessity  for  a  dry  dock  is  severely  felt  already,  and  Hs 
importance  will  increase  with  any  increase  of  the  navy.  This,  with  its  de- 
pendencies, will  require  nearly  a  million  of  dollars.  At  Pensacola,  which  nature 
has  designated  as  one  of  the  naval  keys  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  of  the  im- 
mense commerce  of  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi,  large  expenditures  will  be 
necessary  to  secure  adequate  means  for  repairing  and  subsisting  a  naval  force 
upon  that  station,  and  thus  prevent  the  many  evils  which  would  be  severely 
felt  in  a  state  of  war,  if  the  vessels  were  obliged  to  resort  to  the  Atlantic  ports 
for  ordinary  repairs  or  supplies  of  any  kind.  In  other  yards  there  are  objects 
of  great  and  urgent  importance. 

Generally  the  proposed  arrangements  for.  the  preservation  of  all  materials 
and  vessels  should  precede  their  collection  or  construction.  Whilst,  therefore, 
the  board  propose  $500,000  as  the  average  annual  appropriation,  until  the  yards 
should  be  placed  in  proper  order,  they  would  also  state  that  appropriations  of 
$700,000,  annually,  for  the  next  four  or  five  years,  and  a  less  sum  than  $500,000 
afterwards,  would,  in  their  opinion,  be  most  judicious. 

The  next  subject  for  consideration  is  the  nature  and  extent  of  force  proper  to 
be  kept  employed  in  a  time  of  peace  for  the  protection  of  our  commercial  in- 
terests, and  to  prepare  the  officers  and  others  for  the  efficient  management  of  the 
force  proposed  for  a  state  of  war: 

Our  commerce  is  spread  over  every  ocean ;  our  tonnage  is  second  only  to  that 
of  Great  Britain,  and  the  value  of  articles  embarked  is  believed  by  many  to  be 
fully  equal  to  those  transported  by  the  ships  of  that  nation.  In  the  safety  and 
prosperity  of  this  commerce  all  the  other  interests  of  the  United  States  are 
deeply  interested.  It  is  liable  to  be  disturbed  and  injured  in  various  modes, 
unless  the  power  of  the  country,  exerted  through  its  naval  force,  is  ready  to 
protect  it.  It  is  therefore  proposed  that  small  squadrons  should  be  employed 
upon  different  stations,  subject  at  all  times,  however,  to  such  modifications  as 
circumstances  may  require. 

Of  these  squadrons,  one  might  be  employed  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  attend 
to  our  interests  on  the  west  coasts  of  Spain  and  Portugal,  and  southward  to  the 
western  coast  of  Morocco  and  Madeira. 

One  in  the  Indian  ocean  to  visit,  successively,  the  most  important  commercial 
points  east  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  to  China,  then  to  cross  the  Pacific,  visit 
the  northern  whaling  stations  and  islands,  cruise  some  time  upon  the  west  coast 
•of  America,  and  return  by  way  of  Cape  Horn,  the  coast  of  Brazil,  and  the 
Windward  West  India  islands. 

One  in  the  Pacific,  ocean  to  attend  to  our  interests  upon  the  west  coast  of 
America ;  keeping  one  or  more  vessels  at  or  near  the  Sandwich  and  other  islands 
which  are  frequented  by  our  whale  ships  and  other  vessels,  and,  in  succession, 
cross  the  Pacific,  visiting  the  islands  and  southern  whaling  stations,  China,  and 
other  commercial  places,  and  return,  by  the  way  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  to 
the  United  States. 

A  squadron  upon  the  coast  of  Brazil,  or  east  coast  of  South  America,  might 
be  charged  with  attention  to  our  interests  on  the  whole  of  that  coast,  and  upon 
the  north  coast  so  far  as  to  include  the  Orinoco.  If  a  ship-of-the-line  should 
be  employed  on  this  station,  it  might  be  occasionally  sent  round  to  the  Pacific. 

A  squadron  in  the  West  Indies  and  Gulf  of  Mexico  will  be  necessary  for, 
an<J  may  be  charged  with,  attention  to  the  protection  of  our  commerce  amongst 
the  West  India  islands  and  along  the  coast  of  South  America,  from  the  Orinoco 
round  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

A  small  coast  squadron  upon  our  Atlantic  coast  might  be  very  advantageously 
employed  in  making  our  officers  familiarly  and  thoroughly  acquainted  with  all 


136 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


our  ports  and  harbors,  which  would  be  very  useful  in  a  state  of  war.  The  ves- 
sels would  also  be  ready  for  any  unexpected  service,  either  to  transmit  informa- 
tion or  orders ;  to  reinforce  other  squadrons,  or  to  visit  our  eastern  fisheries. 
Besides  this  cruising  force,  it  is  recommended  that  a  ship-of-the-line  be  kept  in 
a  state  of  readiness  for  service,  men  excepted,  at  Boston,  New  York,  and  Norfolk, 
and  used  as  receiving  ships  for  the  recruits  as  they  are  collected ;  this  would 
give  the  means  of  furnishing  a  considerable  increase  of  force  with  a  very  small 
addition  to  the  current  expense. 

For  the  nature  and  distribution  of  this  force,  the  following  is  proposed  : 


Line. 

Frigates. 

Sloops. 

Steamers 

Smaller. 

Total. 

Mediterranean 

1 

2 

2 

2 

7 

Indian  ocean 

1 

2 

1 

4 

Pacific 

2 

3 

2 

7 

Brazil 

1 

1 

2 

2 

6 

"\Vest  Indies 

1 

4 

1 

2 

8 

Home 

*3 

1 

2 

3 

1 

10 

Total 

5 

8 

15 

4 

10 

42 

°  As  receiving  ships. 

Considering  this  force  with  reference  to  its  power  of  giving  experience  to  the 
officers,  and  qualifying  them  for  the  management  of  the  force  proposed  for  war, 
it  appears  that  for  the  force  proposed  to  be  actually  employed  at  sea,  in  peace 
and  in  war,  the  peace  force  will  require  and  employ  about  two-thirds  the  number 
of  commanders  of  squadrons  ;  about  one-third  of  the  captains  and  forty  one-hun- 
dredths  of  the  commanders  and  lieutenants  and  masters,  which  the  proposed  war 
force  would  demand,  and  midshipmen  sufficient  to  supply  the  additional  number 
of  these  last  classes  which  a  change  to  a  state  of  war  would  require. 

Supposing  the  foregoing  force  to  be  that  which  is  to  be  kept  in  commission, 
the  next  question  is,  what  force  will  be  necessary  to  keep  afloat,  to  provide  the 
necessary  reliefs  ?  The  board  believe  that  this  force  should  be  the  least  which 
will  answer  the  object  proposed,  as  every  vessel  when  launched  is  exposed  to  a 
decay  which  is  much  more  rapid  than  when  left  under  the  cover  of  a  tight  ship- 
house. 

We  have  already  six  ships-of-the-line  afloat,  which  will  be  fully  equal  to  our 
present  wants,  when  they  are  repaired.  A  reserve  of  three  frigates  may  be  re- 
quired, but  only  to  be  launched  when  the  necessity  for  it  shall  arise ;  for  the 
sloops-of-war  and  smaller  vessels,  it  will  probably  be  sufficient  to  merely  keep 
up  the  cruising  force  as  proposed,  except  some  extraordinary  demand  should 
The  force  of  steam  vessels  proposed,  when  distributed  at  Boston,  New 


arise. 


York,  Norfolk,  and  Pensacola,  would  probably  meet  all  the  demands  of  a  state 
of  peace,  and  furnish  useful  schools  for  officers,  to  prepare  them  for  the  proper 
management  of  others,  when  they  are  required.  The  force  to  be  kept  afloat, 
then,  will  be  assumed  at  six  ships-of-the-line,  eleven  frigates,  fifteen  sloops-of- 
war,  four  steamers,  and  ten  smaller  vessels.  The  annual  amount  necessary  to 
keep  this  force  in  a  state  of  repair,  and  to  supply  the  wear  and  tear  of  stores  of 
cruising  vessels,  is  estimated  at  $950.000. 

The  estimated  expense  of  the  force  which  is  proposed  to  be  kept  in  commis- 
sion, exclusive  of  the  repairs  as  above  stated,  and  for  the  pay  of  officers  at  navy 
yards,  rendezvous,  receiving  vessels,  of  superintendents,  and  civil  officers  at  all 
the  shore  establishments,  and  at  the  present  cost  of  those  establishments,  is  : 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  137 

For  pay  of  officers  and  seameii  in  commission,  superintendents  and 

civil  officers,  and  all  others,  at  all  the  establishments,  about. .     $2,  500,  000 

For  provisions 750,  000 

For  medicines  and  hospital  stores 60,  000 

For  ordnance  stores,  powder,  &c 120,  000 

For  contingencies  of  all  kinds 390,  000 


Total  for  the  navy  branch 3,  850,  000 


If  the  marines  are  continued  as  a  part  of  the  naval  establishment,  instead  of 
substituting  ordinary  seamen  and  landsmen  for  them  in  vessels,  and  watchmen 
in  navy  yards,  and  transferring  the  marines  to  the  army  as  artillery,  as  has 
sometimes  been  suggested,  the  sum  of  about  $400,000  annually  will  be  required 
for  that  corps. 

To  determine  the  annual  amount  which  it  may  be  necessary  to  appropriate  to 
prepare  the  vessels  and  reserve  frames  and  other  materials  which  have  been 
proposed,  some  time  must  be  assumed  within  which  they  shall  be  prepared. 
Believing  that  reference  to  the  ability  of  the  treasury  to  meet  the  probable  de- 
mands upon  it,  for  all  the  purposes  of  the  government,  must  necessarily  be  con- 
sidered in  determining  what  amount  may  be  allotted  to  the  navy,  the  board  have 
examined  the  reports  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  and  respectfully  propose 
to  establish  the  ordinary  annual  appropriation  for  the  navy,  including  the  ord- 
nance, at  seven  millions  of  dollars. 

The  operation  of  such  annual  appropriations  may  be  seen  by  the  following 
recapitulation  of  the  proposed  heads  of  expenditure : 

For  the  force  in  commission  and  its  dependencies,  as  before  stated  $3,  850,  000 

The  average  appropriation  for  navy  yards 500,  000 

For  the  repairs  and  wear  and  tear  of  vessels 950,  000 

For  building  vessels  and  purchase  of  materials 1,  300,  000 

Total  for  the  navy  proper 6,  600,  000 

For  the  marine  corps 400,  000 

7,  000,  000 


By  the  adoption  of  this  gross  sum  for  the  navy  and  its  dependencies,  and  the 
other  items  as  proposed,  $1,300,000  would  be  annually  applied  to  increasing  the 
number  of  our  vessels  and  the  purchase  of  materials  ;  and,  with  this  annual  ex- 
penditure, the  deficiency  of  $17,760,000  would  not  be  supplied  sooner  than 
between  thirteen  and  fourteen  years,  or  at  about  the  year  1850.  The  board 
consider  this  as  the  most  remote  period  at  which  the  proposed  force  ought  to  be 
ready,  and  are  of  opinion  that  it  might  be  prepared  much  sooner,  should  Con- 
gress deem  it  necessary  or  advisable  to  make  larger  appropriations  than  have 
been  suggested. 

The  board  have  expressed  the  opinion  that  no  more  vessels  should  be  launched 
than  are  absolutely  necessary  to  meet  the  demands  for  the  force  to  be  kept  in 
commission ;  but,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  they  recommend  that  the  other 
additional  force  should  be  in  such  a  state  of  readiness  that  it  may  be  launched 
and  equipped  by  the  time  that  men  could  be  obtained  for  it.  This  arrangement 
renders  an  early  attention  to  the  completion  of  all  the  building-slips,  ship-houses, 
and  launching  ways  at  the  different  yards,  so  that  the  ships  may  be  built,  and 
that  our  docks,  wharves,  workshops,  and  storehouses  should  be  finished ;  that 
our  ships  may  be  equipped  with  the  greatest  economy  and  despatch  whenever 
they  may  be  required. 


138  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

Before  concluding  this  report  the  board  would  respectfully  offer  some  re- 
marks upon  the  form  of  the  appropriations,  and  suggest  some  attention  to  ex- 
isting acts  of  Congress. 

By  the  separate  acts  for  the  gradual  increase  of  the  navy ;  for  the  gradual 
improvement  of  the  navy ;  for  building  and  rebuilding  different  vessels,  alto- 
gether seven  in  number ;  each  appropriation  is  rendered  separate  and  distinct, 
although  the  general  object  is  the  same,  and  requires  the  use  of  the  same  kinds 
of  materials.  It  is  necessary,  in  conformity  to  the  law  of  the  3d  of  March, 
1809,  that  the  vouchers,  receipts,  expenditures,  and  accounts  of  each  should  be 
kept  separately ;  and,  in  strictness,  no  article  purchased  for  one  can  be  applied 
to  the  use  of  another,  however  desirable  or  economical  such  use  may  be. 

It  is  suggested,  therefore,  for  consideration,  whether  it  might  not  be  very  ad- 
vantageous for  Congress  to  determine,  by  some  general  act  or  resolution,  the 
number  and  classes  of  vessels  which  the  President  might  be  authorized  to  have 
built,  or  for  which  materials  might  be  procured,  and  then  appropriate  specially 
the  amounts  which  might  be  devoted  to  those  objects,  and  for  keeping  the  force 
afloat  in  repair,  under  the  general  head  of  "  For  building  and  repairing  vessels, 
and  for  purchase  of  materials  and  stores." 

The  adoption  of  some  such  plan,  and  removing  the  special  restrictions  which 
now  exist,  and  requiring,  as  at  present,  detailed  estimates  for  the  current  repairs 
and  reports  of  proceedings  in  building  vessels  and  for  purchase  of  materials, 
would,  it  is  believed,  greatly  simplify  and  diminish  the  number  of  accounts  at 
the  Treasury  Department  and  in  all  the  navy  yards,  without  infringing  in  any 
degree  the  principle  of  special  appropriations ;  would  furnish  to  Congress  all 
the  information  they  now  receive,  and  would  enable  us  at  all  times  to  use  those 
materials  which  are  best  prepared  and  most  appropriate  for  the  different  objects 
for  which  they  might  be  wanted. 

The  board  beg  leave,  also,  respectfully  to  state  their  opinion  of  the  necessity 
for  the  services  of  a  competent  civil  engineer  for  the  navy  to  furnish  plans  and 
estimates  for  all  hydraulic  and  civil  -objects,  and  to  have  a  general  superintend- 
ence of  their  construction  under  the  direction  of  the  department.  The  particular 
character  of  these  works  requires  the  supervision  of  such  a  person,  not  less  from 
motives  of  economy  in  the  ordinary  expenditures  than  from  the  more  important 
consideration  of  their  proper  arrangement,  solidity  of  construction,  and  dura- 
bility. 

All  which  is  respectfully  submitted. 

JNO.  RODGERS. 

Hon.  M.  DICKERSON, 

Secretary  of  the  Navy. 


A. 

Upon  the  supposition  that  the  naval  force  to  be  so  prepared  that  it'  might  be 
equipped  for  sea  at  short  notice  shall  consist  of  15  ships-of-tlie-line,  25  frigates, 
25  sloops-of-war,  25  steamers,  and  25  smaller  vessels ;  and  that  the  frames  and 
other  durable  materials  shall  be  provided  for  10  ships-of-the-line  and  10  frigates 
as  a  reserve.  The  following  statement  shows  the  total  number  and  character  of 
the  armaments  which  the  whole  force  will  require,  the  number  which  can  be 
furnished  from  the  ordnance  on  hand,  and  the  number  which  will  be  still  re- 
quired : 

For  ships  of  line.     Frigates.     Sloops.     Steamers.     S.  V. 

Total  number  required 25  35  25  25  25 

Onhandfor 11  22  16  00 

Deficient.  .14  13  9  25  13. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  139 

Besides  the  bomb-cannon,  guns,  and  carronades  for  these  armaments,  there 
would  be  required  shot,  shells,  small  arms,  pistols,  and  cutlasses,  and  a  supply 
of  powder  sufficient  for  equipping  a  strong  force  in  case  of  a  sudden  emergency. 

The  cost  of  these  objects  may  be  estimated  as  follows : 

Armaments  for  14  ships-of-the-line,  at  $45,000  each $630,  000 

Armaments  for  13  frigates,  at  $16,500  each 214,  500 

Armaments  for    9  sloops,  at  $6,000  each 54,  000 

Armaments  for  25  steamers,  at  $3,000  each 75,000 

Armaments  for  13  smaller  vessels,  at  $1,500  each 19,  500 


.  993,  000 
For  guns,  bomb-cannon,  and  carronades,  100  shot  to  each  gun,  and 

200  shells  to  each  bomb-cannon,  and  shells  for  guns 427,  000 

8,000  muskets 100,  000 

3,500  pairs  of  pistols 43,  750 

8,000  cutlasses 34,  000 

9,000  barrels  of  powder. 202,  500 

1,  800, 250 


No.  4. 
[Ho.  REPS.,  Ex.  Doc.  No.  206,  26TH  CONGRESS,  IST  SESSION.] 

LETTER  FROM  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR,  TRANSMITTING,  IN  COMPLIANCE 
WITH  THE  RESOLUTION  OF  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES,  A  SYSTEM 
OF  NATIONAL  DEFE>-CE  AND  THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  NATIONAL  FOUN- 
DERIES. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  May  12,  1840. 

SIR  :  In  reply  to  so  much  of  the  resolution  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
of  the  9th  ultimo,  requesting  the  Department  of  War  "to  lay  before  this  House, 
as  soon  as  practicable,  a  report  of  a  full  and  connected  system  of  national  de- 
fence, embracing  steam  and  other  vessels-of-war,  and  'floating  batteries'  for 
coast  and  harbor  defence,  and  national  founderies,  and  the  internal  means,  aux- 
iliary to  these,  for  transportation  and  other  warlike  uses,  by  land,  and  that  he 
be  requested  to  furnish  this  House  with  the  reports  submitted  to  his  department 
at  any  time  by  Major  General  Edmund  P.  Gaines,  or  other  person  or  persons 
of  professional  experience,  of  their  'plans  of  defence,'  if  any  such  have  been 
submitted,  with  the  views  of  the  Secretary  of  War  thereon;  and  that  the 
Secretary  furnish  an  estimate  of  the  expenses  of  his  own  and  other  plans  he 
may  report,  distinguishing  such  parts  of  plans  as  ought  to  be  immediately 
adopted  and  prosecuted,  with  the  probable  cost  and  time  of  their  prosecution 
and  completion :"  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  the  accompanying  reports  of  a 
board  of  officers,  assembled  to  examine  the  subject,  and  to  present  a  connected 
plan  of  defence  for  the  maritime  and  inland  frontiers  of  the  United  States. 

On  submitting  these  reports,  I  should  have  considered  my  duty  discharged, 
had  not  the  resolution  required  me  to  give  an  opinion  with  regard  to  the  several 
plans  of  national  defence  presented  to  the  department,  and  to  furnish  a  compar- 
ative statement  of  the  cost  of  each.  The  plan  presented  to  Congress  by  Major 
General  Gaines,  which  will  be  found  in  the  accompanying  printed  document, 
and  that  now  submitted  from  the  board  of  officers,  are  the  only  ones  that  have 
been  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  department.  On  the  subject  of  the  former,  I 


140  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA- COAST    DEFENCES. 

beg  leave  to  state  that,  with  every  respect  for  the  experience  of  the  gallant 
author,  I  am  constrained  to  differ  from  him  when  he  proposes  to  abandon  the 
system  of  permaneni  defences  as  obsolete,  and  to  rely  entirely  upon  the  expe- 
dients of  vast  floating  batteries  and  extensive  lines  of  railroads.  The  accom- 
panying reports  of  the  board  of  navy  commissioners  and  the  chief  topographical 
engineer  exhibit  the  probable  cost  of  carrying  out  the  general's  plans,  which  far 
exceeds  that  of  constructing  permanent  works  of  defence,  without  being  in  any 
manner  so  well  calculated  to  protect  the  country. 

After  a  careful  and  anxious  investigation  of  a  subject  involving  in  so  high  a 
degree  the  safety  and  honor  of  the  country,  I  fully  concur  in  the  opinions  ex- 
pressed by  the  board  of  the  superiority  of  permanent  works  of  defence  over  all 
other  expedients  that  have  yet  been  devised,  and  of  their  absolute  necessity  if 
we  would  avoid  the  danger  of  defeat  and  disgrace — a  necessity  rather  increased 
than  diminished  by  the  introduction  of  steam  batteries  and  the  use  of  hollow 
shot.  It  would,  in  my  opinion,  prove  a  most  fatal  error  to  dispense  with  them, 
and  to  rely  upon  our  navy  alone,  aided  by  the  number,  strength,  and  valor  of 
the  people  to  protect  the  country  against  the  attacks  of  an  enemy  possessing 
great  naval  means.  To  defend  a  line  of  coast  of  three  thousand  miles  in  extent, 
and  effectually  to  guard  all  the  avenues  to  our  great  commercial  cities  and  im-' 
portant  naval  depots,  the  navy  of  the  United  States  must  be  very  superior  to 
the  means  of  attack  of  the  most  powerful  naval  power  in  the  world,  which  will 
occasion  an  annual  expense  this  country  is  not  now  able  to  bear ;  and  this  large 
naval  armament,  instead  of  performing  its  proper  function  as  the  sword  of  the 
state  in  time  of  war,  and  sweeping  the  enemy's  commerce  from  the  seas,  must 
be  chained  to  the  coast  or  kept  within  the  harbors. 

It  has  been  clearly  demonstrated  that  the  expense  of  employing  a  sufficient 
body  of  troops,  either  regulars  or  militia,  for  a  period  of  even  six  months,  for  the 
purpose  of  defending  the  coast  against  attacks  and  feints  that  might  be  made  by 
an  enemy's  fleet,  would  exceed  the  cost  of  erecting  all  the  permanent  works 
deemed  necessary  for  the  defence  of  the  coast.  One  hundred  thousand  men 
divided  into  four  columns,  would  not  be  more  than  sufficient  to  guard  the  vul- 
nerable points  of  our  maritime  frontier,  if  not  covered  by  fortifications.  An 
amount  of  force  against  an  expedition  of  20,000  men,  which,  if  composed  of 
regulars  would  cost  the  nation  $30,000,000  per  annum,  and  if  militia,  about 
$40,000,000  ;  and,  supposing  only  one-half  the  force  to  be  required  to  defend 
the  coast  with  the  aid  of  forts  properly  situated  and  judiciously  constructed,  the 
difference  of  expense  for  six  months  would  enable  the  government  to  erect  all 
the  most  necessary  works.  This  calculation  is  independent  of  the  loss  to  the 
nation  by  abstracting  so  large  an  umount  of  labor  from  the  productive  industry 
of  the  country,  and  the  fearful  waste  of  life  likely  to  result  from  such  a  costly, 
hazardous,  and  harassing  system  of  defence. 

It  must  be  recollected,  too,  that  we  are  not  called  upon  to  try  a  new  system, 
but  to  persevere  in  the  execution  of  one  that  has  been  adopted  after  mature  de- 
liberation, and  that  is  still  practiced  in  Europe  on  a  much  more  axten'sive  scale 
than  is  deemed  necessary  here ;  so  much  more  so,  that  there  exist  there  single 
fortresses,  each  of  which  comprises  more  extensive  and  stronger  works  than  is 
here  proposed  for  the  whole  line  of  our  maritime  frontier.  We  must  bear  in 
mind,  also,  that  the  destruction  of  some  of  the  important  points  on  that  frontier 
would  alone  cost  more  to  the  nation  than  the  expense  of  fortifying  the  whole 
line  would  amount  to,  while  the  temporary  occupation  of  others  would  drive  us 
into  expenses  far  surpassing  those  of  the  projected  works  of  defence. 

The  organization  of  permanent  defences  proposed  by  the  board  for  cur  fron- 
tiers is  not  upon  military  and  naval  considerations  alone,  but  is  calculated  to 
protect  the  internal  navigation  of  the  country.  The  fortifications  proposed,  at 
the  same  time  that  they  protect  our  coast  from  the  danger  of  invasion,  and  de- 
fend the  principal  commercial  avenues  and  naval  establishments,  cover  the 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  141 

whole  line  of  internal  navigation,  which,  in  time  of  war,  will  contribute  in  so 
essential  a  manner  to  the  defence  of  the  country  by  furnishing  prompt  and 
economical  means  of  transportation  ;  so  that,  while  the  main  arteries  which  con- 
duct our  produce  to  the  ocean  are  defended  at  their  outlets,  the  interior  naviga- 
tion, parallel  to  the  coast,  is  protected,  and  a  free  communication  kept  up  be- 
tween every  part  of  the  Union. 

Although  this  department  is  fully  aware  of  the  importance  of  affording  per- 
manent and  as  perfect  protection  as  may  be  possible  to  the  whole  coast,  it 
regards  that  section  embraced  by  the  shores  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  as  the  most 
exposed  and  the  most  important.  It  is  true  that  the  coast  to  the  eastward  of 
Cape  Hatteras  possesses  points  that  may  attract  the  attention  of  an  enemy,  and 
that,  in  the  present  state  of  things,  the  chances  of  success  would  justify  a  hostile 
enterprise,  and  are  much  greater  than  a  wise  provision  would  allow  to  exist.  It 
is  equally  so,  that,  however  difficult  of  access  the  coast  may  be  from  Cape  Hat- 
teras to  Florida,  the  nature  of  a  part  of  its  population,  and  the  facility  afforded 
to  an  enemy  by  its  present  neglected  condition  to  blockade  and  annoy  the  prin 
cipal  outlets  of  the  valuable  exports  of  .that  important  portion  of  our  country, 
require  our  early  attention ;  still,  the  means  of  defence  from  Maine  to  Florida 
may  be  united  together,  and  the  parts  may  afford  mutual  succor  to  each  other. 
But  the  coast  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  on  the  contrary,  is  insulated  and  apart,  and 
must  depend  altogether  upon  its  own  resources.  It  constitutes  the  maritime 
frontier  not  only  of  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  Alabama,  and  of  West  Florida,  but 
of  Arkansas,  Tennessee,  Kentucky,  Ohio,  Missouri,  Indiana,  and  Illinois,  and 
the  Territories  of  Wisconsin  and  Iowa,  embracing  nearly  three-fourths  of  the 
territory  of  the  United  States ;  and  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  evils 
which  would  result  from  the  temporary  occupation  of  the  delta  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, or  from  a  successful  blockade  of  the  coast  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  would 
not  only  injure  the  prosperity  of  these  States,  but  would  deeply  affect  the  in- 
terests of  the  whole  Union ;  and  no  reasonable  expense,  therefore,  ought  to  be 
spared  to  guard  against  such  a  casualty. 

Although  it  would  appear  on  a  superficial  view,  to  be  a  gigantic  and  almost 
impracticable  project  to  fortify  such  an  immense  extent  of  coast  as  that  of  the 
United  States,  and  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  provide  a  sufficient  force  to 
garrison  and  defend  the  works  necessary  for  that  purpose,  yet  the  statements 
contained  in  the  reports  of  the  board  remove  these  objections  entirely.  The 
coast  of  the  United  States  throughout  its  vast  extent  has  but  few  points  which 
require  to  be  defended  against  a  regular  and  powerful  attack.  A  considerable 
portion  of  it  is  inaccessible  to  large  vessels,  and  only  exposed  to  the  depreda- 
tions of  parties  in  boats  and  small  vessels-of-war ;  against  which  inferior  works 
and  the  combination  of  the  same  means  and  a  well-organized  local  militia  will 
afford  sufficient  protection.  The  only  portions  which  require  to  be  defended  by 
permanent  works  of  some  strength  are  the  avenues  to  the  great  commercial 
cities  arid  naval  and  military  establishments,  the  destruction  of  which  would 
prove  a  serious  loss  to  the  country,  and  be  regarded  by  an  enemy  as  an  equiva- 
lent for  the  expense  of  a  great  armament.  It  is  shown,  also,  that  the  number 
of  men  required,  on  the  largest  scale,  for  the  defence  of  these  forts,  when  com- 
pared with  the  movable  force  that  would  be  necessary  without  them,  is  incon- 
siderable. The  local  militia,  aided  by  a  few  regulars,  and  directed  by  engineer 
and  artillery  officers,  may,  with  previous  training,  be  safely  intrusted  with  their 
defence  in  time  of  war. 

It  cannot  be  too  earnestly  urged  that  a  much  smaller  number  of  troops  will 
be  required  to  defend  a  fortified  frontier  than  to  cover  one  that  is  entirely  un- 
protected, and  that  such  a  system  will  enable  us,  according  to  the  spirit  of  our 
institutions,  to  employ  the  militia  effectually  for  the  defence  of  the  country.  It 
is  no  reproach  to  this  description  of  force,  and  no  imputation  on  their  courage,  to 
state  what  the  experience  of  two  wars  has  demonstrated — that  they  cannot 


142  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

stand  the  steady  charge  of  regular  forces,  and  are  disorded  by  their  mano3uvres 
in  the  open  field ;  whereas,  their  fire  is  more  deadly  from  behind  ramparts. 

The  principles  of  defence  recommended  by  the  board  for  the  maritime  fron- ' 
tier  of  the  United  States  are  applicable  to  the  northern  or  lake  frontier  and  to 
that  of  the  west.     Some  few  sites  are  recommended  to  be  occupied  by  fortifica- 
tions, both  to  afford  protection  to  places  fast  growing  up  into  important  cities, 
and  to  furnish  a  refuge  and  rallying  point  for  our  naval  and  land  forces. 
Very  respectfully,  your  most  obedient  servant. 

J.  R.  POINSETT. 
Hon.  R.  M.  T.  HUNTER, 

Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 


WASHINGTON,  May  10,  1840. 

SIR  :  The  board  of  officers  to  whom  the  subject  of  the  military  defences  of 
the  country  was  committed  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report,  viz : 

1st.  Report  on  the  defence  of  the  Atlantic  frontier,  from  Passamaquoddy  to 
the  Sabine.  This  is  divided  into  two  distinct  portions,  viz :  the  coast  from  Pas- 
samaquoddy to  Cape  Florida,  and  the  coast  from  Cape  Florida  to  the  Sabine  bay. 

2d.  Report  on  the  defence  of  the  northern  frontier,  from  Lake  Superior  to 
Passamaquoddy  bay. 

3d.  Report  on  the  western  frontier,  from  the  Sabine  bay  to  Lake  Superior. 

Connected  with  these  reports  are  tabular  statements,  showing  the  "  permanent 
defence  commenced,  completed,  projected,  or  deemed  necessary;"  with  conjectu- 
ral estimates  of  "  the  probable  expense  of  constructing  or  completing  such  works 
as  may  not  yet  have  been  completed  or  commenced," 

4th.  Reports  "on  the  armories,  arsenals,  magazines,  and  founderies,  either 
constructed  or  deemed  necessary;  with  a  conjectural  estimate  of  the  expense  of 
constructing  such  of  said  establishments  as  may  not  yet  be  completed  or  com- 
menced, but  which  may  be  deemed  necessary." 

Hon.  J.  R.  POINSETT, 

Secretary  of  War. 


Report  on  the  defence  of  the  Atlantic  frontier,  from  Passamaquoddy  to  the 

Sabine. 

So  entirely  does  this  board  concur  in  the  views  presented  on  several  occasions, 
within  the  last  twenty  years,  by  joint  commissions  of  naval  and  military  officers, 
by  the  board  of  engineers  for  fortifications,  and  by  individual  officers  who  have 
at  various  times  been  called  on  to  treat  the  same  subject,  that  in  quoting  their 
opinions  we  should,  for  the  greater  part,  express  our  own.  But  though  these 
reports  are,  some  of  them,  comprehensive  and  elabprate,  we  suppose  that  an 
explicit  statement  of  our  views,  at  least  as  to  the  great  principles  on  which  the 
system  of  defence  should  be  erected,  is  expected  from  us,  especially  as  the 
system  now  in  progress  has  been  the  subject  of  a  criticism  which,  considering 
the  high  official  source  whence  it  emanated,  may  be  supposed  to  have  disturbed 
the  confidence  of  the  public  therein. 

The  nature  and  source  of  that  criticism,  attacking  as  it  does  fundamental 
principles,  and  inculcating  doctrines  which  we  believe  to  be  highly  dangerous, 
will  lead  us  at  times  into  amplifications  that  we  fear  may  prove  tedious  This, 
however,  we  must  risk,  trusting  to  the  importance  of  the  subject  for  excuse,  if 
not  for  justification. 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  143 

The  principal  errors,  as  we  conceive,  in  the  document*  referred  to  are — 

1.  That  for  the  defence  of  the  coast  the  chief  reliance  should  be  on  the  navy. 

2.  That,  in  preference  to  fortifications,  floating  batteries  should  be  introduced 
wherever  they  can  be  used. 

3.  That  we  are  not  in  danger  from  large  expeditions ;  and,  consequently, 

4.  That  the  system  of  the  board  of  engineers  comprises  works  which  are  un-' 
necessarily  large  for  the  purposes  they  have  to  fulfil. 

On  these  topics,  together  with  other  errors  of  the  same  nature,  we  shall  feel 
constrained  to  enlarge. 

The  first  question  that  presents  itself  is  this :  What,  in  general  terms,  shall 
be  the  means  of  defence  ? 

We  have  a  sea-coast  line  of  more  than  three  thousand  miles  in  extent,  along 
which  lie  scattered.all  the  great  cities,  all  the  depots  of  commerce,  all  the  estab- 
lishments of  naval  construction,  outfit,  and  repair,  and  towns,  villages,  and  es- 
tablishments of  private  enterprise  without  number.  From  this  line  of  sea-coast 
navigable  bays,  estuaries,  and  rivers,  the  shores  of  which  are  similarly  occupied, 
penetrate  deep  into  the  heart  of  the  country. 

How  are  the  important  points  along  this  extended  line  to  be  secured  from 
hostile  expeditions,  especially  since  one  of  the  prominent  causes  of  the  prosperity 
of  these  various  establishments,  namely,  facility  of  access  from  the  ocean,  is,  as 
regards  danger  from  an  enemy,  the  chief  cause  of  weakness  1 

Shall  the  defence  be  by  a  navy  exclusively  ? 

The  opinion  that  the  navy  is  the  true  defence  of  the  country  is  so  acceptable 
and  popular,  and  is  sustained  by  such  high  authority,  that  it  demands  a  careful 
examination. 

Before  going  into  this  examination  we  will  premise  that  by  the  term  "navy" 
is  here  meant,  we  suppose,  line-of-battle-ships,  frigates,  smaller  sailing  vessels, 
and  armed  steamships,  omitting  vessels  constructed  for  local  uses  merely,  such  as 
floating  batteries. 

For  the  purpose  of  first  considering  this  proposition  in  its  simplest  terms,  we 
will  begin  by  supposing  the  nation  to  possess  but  a  single  seaport,  and  that  this 
is  to  be  defended  by  a  fleet  alone. 

By  remaining  constantly  within  this  port  our  fleet  would  be  certain  of  meeting 
the  enemy,  should  he  assail  it.  But  if  inferior  to  the  enemy,  there  would  be  no 
reason  to  look  for  a  successful  defence ;  and  as  there  could  be  no  escape  for  the 
defeated  vessels,  the  presence  of  the  fleet,  instead  of  averting  the  issue,  would 
only  render  it  the  more  calamitous. 

Should  our  fleet  be  equal  to  the  enemy's,  the  defence  might  be  complete,  and 
it  probably  would  be  so.  Still,  hazard — some  of  the  many  mishaps  liable  to 
attend  contests  of  this  nature — might  decide  against  us ;  and,  in  that  event,  the 
consequences  would  be  even  more  disastrous  than  on  the  preceding  supposition. 
In  this  case  the  chances  of  victory  to  the  two  parties  would  be  equal,  but  the 
consequences  very  unequal.  It  might  be  the  enemy's  fate  to  lose  his  whole 
fleet,  but  he  could  lose  nothing  more;  while  we,  in  a  similar  attempt,  would  lose 
not  only  the  whole  fleet,  but  also  the  object  that  the  fleet  was  designed  to 
protect. 

If  superior  to  the  enemy,  the  defence  of  the  port  would  in  all  respects  be 
complete.  But,  instead  of  making  an  attack,  the  enemy  would,  in  such  case, 
employ  himself  in  cutting  up  our  commerce  on  the  ocean ;  and  nothing  could  be 
done  to  protect  this  commerce  without  leaving  the  port  in  a  condition  to  be  suc- 
cessfully assailed. 

In  either  of  the  above  cases  the  fleet  might  await  the  enemy  in  front  of  the 
harbor,  instead  of  lying  within.  But  no  advantage  is  apparent  from  such  an 


*See  Senate  document  No.  293,  vol.  4,  p.  1,  24th  Congress,  1st  session. 


144  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

arrangement,  and  there  would  be  superadded  the  risk  of  being  injured  by  tem- 
pests, and  thereby  disqualified  for  the  duty  of  defence,  or  of  being  driven  off 
the  coast  by  gales  of  wind;  thus,  for  a  time,  removing  all  opposition. 

In  the  same  cases,  also,  especially  when  equal  or  superior  to  the  enemy,  our 
fleet,  depending  on  having  correct  and  timely  notice  as  to  the  position  and  state 
of  preparation  of  the  enemy's  forces,  might  think  proper  to  meet  him  at  the 
outlet  of  his  own  port,  or  intercept  him  on  the  way,  instead  of  awaiting  him 
within  or  off  our  own  harbor.  Here  it  must  be  noticed  that  the  enemy,  like 
ourselves,  is  supposed  to  possess  a  single  harbor  only ;  but  having  protected  it 
by  other  means,  that  his  navy  is  disposable  for  offensive  operations.  If  it  were 
attempted  thus  to  shut  him  within  his  own  port,  he,  in  any  case  but  that  of  de- 
cided inferiority,  would  not  hesitate  to  come  out  and  risk  a  battle ;  because,  if 
defeated,  he  could  retire,  under  shelter  of  his  defences,  to  refit,  and,  i£  successful, 
he  could  proceed  with  a  small  portion  of  his  force — even  a  single  vessel  would 
suffice — to  the  capture  of  our  port,  now  defenceless ;  while,  with  the  remainder, 
he  would  follow  up  his  advantage  over  our  defeated  vessels,  not  failing  to  pursue 
them  into  their  harbor,  should  they  return  thither. 

Actual  superiority  on  our  part  would  keep  the  enemy  from  volunteering  a 
battle  ;  but  it  would  be  indispensable  that  the  superiority  be  steadily  maintained, 
and  that  the  superior  fleet  be  constantly  present.  If  driven  off  by  tempests,  or 
absent  from  any  other  cause,  the  blockaded  fleet  would  escape,  when  it  would 
be  necessary  for  our  fleet  to  fly  back  to  the  defence  of  its  own  port.  Experience 
abundantly  proves,  moreover,  that  it  is  in  vain  to  attempt  to  shut  a  hostile 
squadron  in  port  for  any  length  of  time.  It  seems,  then,  that  whether  we  de- 
fend by  remaining  at  home,  or  by  shutting  the  enemy's  fleet  within  his  own 
harbor,  actual  superiorty  in  vessels  is  indispensable  to  the  security  of  our  port. 

With  this  superiority  the  defence  will  be  complete,  provided  our  fleet  remain 
within  its  harbor.  But  then  all  the  commerce  of  the  country  upon  the  ocean 
must  be  left  to  its  fate ;  and  no  attempt  can  be  made  to  react  offensively  upon 
the  foe,  unless  we  can  control  the  chances  of  finding  the  enemy's  fleet  within 
his  port,  and  the  still  more  uncertain  chance  of  keeping  him  there ;  the  escape 
of  a  single  vessel  being  sufficient  to  cause  the  loss  of  our  harbor. 

Let  as  next  see  what  will  be  the  state  of  the  question  on  the  supposition  of 
numerous  important  ports  on  either  side,  instead  of  a  single  one ;  relying,  on 
our  part,  still,  exclusively  on  a  navy. 

In  order  to  examine  this  question,  we  will  suppose  our  adversary  to  be  forti- 
fied in  all  his  harbors,  and  possessed  of  available  naval  means  equal  to  our  own. 
This  is  certainly  a  fair  supposition ;  because  what  is  assumed  as  regards  his 
harbors  is  true  of  all  maritime  nations,  except  the  United  States ;  and  as  re- 
gards naval  means,  it  is  elevating  our  own  strength  considerably  above  its  pre- 
sent measure,  and  above  that  it  is  likely  to  attain  for  years. 

Being  thus  relatively  situated,  the  first  difference  that  strikes  us  is  that  the 
enemy,  believing  all  his  ports  to  be  safe,  without  the  presence  of  his  vessels, 
sets  at  once  about  making  our  seas  and  shores  the  theatre  of  operations,  while 
we  are  left  without  choice  in  the  matter;  for  if  he  think  proper  to  come,  and 
we  are  not  present,  he  attains  his  object  without  resistance. 

The  next  difference  is,  that  while  the  enemy  (saving  only  the  opposition  of 
Providence)  is  certain  to  fall  upon  the  single  point,  or  the  many  points  he  may 
have  selected,  there  will  exist  no  previous  indications  of  his  particular  choice, 
and,  consequently,  no  reason  for  preparing  our  defence  on  one  point  rather  than 
another ;  so  that  the  chances  of  not  being  present  and  ready  on  his  arrival  are 
directly  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  our  ports,  that  is  to  say,  the  greater  the 
number  of  ports  the  greater  the  chances  that  he  will  meet  no  opposition  whatever. 

Another  difference  is,  that  the  enemy  can  choose  the  mode  of  warfare,  as  well 
as  the  plan  of  operations,  leaving  as  little  option  to  us  in  the  one  case  as  in  the 
other.  It  will  be  necessary  for  us  to  act,  in  the  first  instance,  on  the  supposition 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  145 

that  an  assault  will  be  made  with  his  entire  fleet ;  because,  should  we  act  other- 
wise, his  coming  in  that  array  would  involve  both  fleet  and  coast  in  inevitable 
defeat  and  ruin.  Being  in  this  state  of  concentration,  then,  should  the  enemy 
have  any  apprehensions  as  to  the  result  of  a  general  engagement ;  should  he  be 
unwilling  to  put  any  thing  at  hazard ;  or  should  he,  for  any  -other  reason,  prefer 
acting  by  detachments,  he  can,  on  approaching  the  coast,  disperse  his  force  into 
small  squadrons  and  single  ships,  and  make  simultaneous  attacks  on  numerous 
points.  These  enterprises  would  be  speedily  consummated;  because,  as  the 
single  point  occupied  by  our  fleet  would  be  avoided,  all  the  detachments  would 
be  unopposed ;  and  after  a  few  hours  devoted  to  burning  shipping,  or  public 
establishments,  and  taking  in  spoil,  the  several  expeditions  would  leave  the 
coast  for  some  convenient  rendezvous,  whence  they  might  return,  either  in  fleet 
or  in  detachments,  to  visit  other  portions  with  the  scourge. 

Is  it  insisted  that  our  fleet  might,  notwithstanding,  be  so  arranged  as  to  meet 
these  enterprises  1 

As  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  enemy  may  select  his  point  of  attack  out  of 
the  whole  extent  of  coast,  where  is  the  prescience  that  can  indicate  the  spot  ? 
And  if  it  cannot  be  foretold,  how  is  that  ubiquity  to  be  imparted  that  shall 
always  place  our  fleet  in  the  path  of  the  advancing  foe  1  Suppose  we  attempt  to 
cover  the  coast  by  cruising  in  front  of  it,  shall  we  sweep  its  whole  length  ? — 
a  distance  scarcely  less  than  that  which  the  enemy  must  traverse  in  passing  from 
his  coast  to  ours.  Must  the  Griilf  of  Mexico  be  swept,  as  well  as  the  Atlantic  ? 
or  shall  we  give  up  the  Gulf  to  the  enemy  1  Shall  we  cover  the  southern  cities, 
or  give  them  up  also  ?  We  must,  unquestionably,  do  one  of  two  things  :  either 
relinquish  a  great  extent  of  coast,  confining  our  cruisers  to  a  small  portion  only, 
or  include  so  much  that  the  chances  of  intercepting  an  enemy  would  seem  to  be 
out  of  the  question. 

On  the  practicability  of  covering  even  a  small  extent  of  coast  by  cruising  in 
front  of  it — or,  in  other  words,  the  possibility  of  anticipating  an  enemy's  opera- 
tions ;  discovering  the  object  of  movements  of  which  we  get  no  glimpse,  and 
hear  no  tidings ;  and  seeing  the  impress  of  his  footsteps  on  the  surface  of  the 
ocean — it  may  be  well  to  consult  experience. 

The  Toulon  fleet,  in  1798,  consisting  of  about  twenty  sail  of  line-of-battle 
ships  and  frigates,  about  twenty  smaller  vessels-of-war,  and  nearly  two  hundred 
transports,  conveying  the  army  of  Egypt,  slipped  out  of  port  and  surprised 
Malta.  It  was  followed  by  Nelson,  who,  thinking  correctly  that  they  were 
bound  for  Egypt,  shaped  his  course  direct  for  Alexandria. 

The  French,  steering  toAvards  Canclia,  took  the  more  circuitous  passage,  so 
that  Nelson  arrived  at  Alexandria  before  them ;  and,  not  finding  them  there,  re- 
turned, by  the  way  of  Garamania  and  Candia,  to  Sicily,  missing  his  adversary 
in  both  passages.  Sailing  again  for  Alexandria,  he  found  the  French  fleet  at 
anchor  in  Aboukir  bay ;  and,  attacking  them,  achieved  the  memorable  victory 
of  the  Nile. 

When  we  consider  the  narrowness  of  this  sea ;  the  very  numerous  vessels  in 
the  French  fleet ;  the  actual  crossing  of  the  two  fleets  on  a  certain  night ;  and 
that  Nelson,  notwithstanding,  could  see  nothing  of  the  enemy  himself,  and  hear 
nothing  of  them  from  merchant  vessels,  we  may  judge  of*  the  probability  of 
waylaying  our  adversary  on  the  broad  Atlantic. 

The  escape  of  another  Toulon  fleet  in  1805 ;  the  long  search  for  them  in  the 
Mediterranean  by  the  same  able  officer ;  the  pursuit  in  the  West  Indies ;  their 
evasion  of  him  amongst  the  islands  ;  the  return  to  Europe ;  his  vain  efforts,  sub- 
sequently, along  the  coast  of  Portugal,  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  and  off  the  English 
channel ;  and  the  meeting  at  last  at  Trafalgar — brought  about  only  because  the 
combined  fleets,  trusting  to  the  superiority  that  the  accession  of  several  re-en- 
forcements had  given,  were  willing  to  try  the  issue  of  battle  :  these  are  instances 
H.  Rep.  Com.  86 10 


146  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

of  many  that  might  be  cited,  to  show  how  small  is  the  probability  of  encounter- 
ing, on  the  ocean,  an  enemy  who  desires  to  avoid  a  meeting ;  and  how  little  the 
most  untiring  zeal,  the  most  restless  activity,  the  most  exalted  professional  skill 
and  judgment,  can  do  to  lessen  the  adverse  chances.  For  more  than  a  year 
Nelson  most  closely  watched  his  enemy,  who  seems  to  have  got  -out  of  port  as 
soon  as  he  was  fully  prepared  to  do  so,  and  without  attracting  the  notice  of  any 
of  the  blockading  squadron.  When  out,  Nelson,  perfectly  in  the  dark  as  to  the 
course  Villeneuve  had  taken,  sought  for  him  in  vain  on  the  coast  of  Egypt. 
Scattered  by  tempests,  the  French  fleet  again  took  refuge  in  Toulon ;  whence  it 
again  put  to  sea,  when  refitted  and  ready,  joining  the  Spanish  fleet  at  Cadiz. 

On  the  courage,  skill,  vigilance,  and  judgment  acceded  on  all  hands  to  belong, 
in  a  pre-eminent  degree,  to  the  naval  profession  in  this  country,  this  system  of 
defence  relies  to  accomplish,  against  a  string  of  chances,  objects  of  importance 
so  great  that  not  a  doubt  or  misgiving  as  to  the  result  is  admissible.  It  demands 
of  the  navy  to  do  perfectly,  and  without  fail,  that  which  to  do  at  all  seems 
impossible.  The  navy  is  required  to  know  the  secret  purposes  of  the  enemy,  in 
spite  of  distance  and  the  broken  intercourse  of  a  state  of  Avar,  even  before  these 
purposes  are  known  to  the  leader  who  is  to  execute  them ;  nay,  more,  before  the 
purpose  itself  is  formed.  On  an  element  where  man  is  but  the  sport  of  storms, 
the  navy  is  required  to  lie  in  wait  for  the  foe  at  the  exact  spot  and  moment,  in 
spite  of  weather  and  seasons ;  to  see  him  in  spite  of  fogs  and  darkness.  Finally, 
after  all  the  devices  and  reliances  of  the  system  are  satisfactorily  accomplished, 
and  all  difficulties  subdued,  it  submits  to  the  issue  of  a  single  battle,  on  equal 
terms,  the  fate  of  the  war,  having  no  resource  or  hope  beyond. 

It  may  here  be  alleged  that  the  term  navy,  as  applied  to  the  defence  of  the 
country,  means  more  than  the  sea-going  vessels  we  have  enumerated ;  that  it 
means,  also,  gunboats,  floating  batteries,  and  steam  batteries  ;  and  that  the  true 
system  of  defence  for  the  coast  requires  us  to  provide  all  our  harbors  with  some 
or  all  of  these  vessels,  according  to  local  circumstances  ;  leaving  to  the  sea-going 
vessels  the  duty  of  destroying  the  enemy's  commerce,  carrying  the  war  into  the 
enemy's  seas,  and  contending  for  the  mastery  of  the  ocean. 

But  such  a  proposition  is  totally  distinct  from  that  we  have  been  considering. 
This  is  one  that  we  regard  as,  in  part,  perfectly  sound ;  as  containing,  though 
not  true  throughout,  the  great  principle  on  which  the  present  glory  of  the  navy 
proper  has  been  built,  and  its  future  glory  will  depend. 

We  are  aware  that  some  of  our  ships  have  been  blockaded  within  our  harbors, 
but  we  are  not  aware  that  any  of  the  high  distinction  achieved  by  that  service 
has  been  gained  in  these  blockaded  ships. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  know  that,  instead  of  lying  in  harbor  and  contenting 
themselves  with  keeping  a  few  more  of  the  enemy's  vessels  in  watch  over  them 
than  their  own  number — instead  of  leaving  the  enemy's  commerce  in  undisturbed 
enjoyment  of  the  sea,  and  our  own  commerce  without  countenance  or  aid — they 
scattered  themselves  over  the  wide  surface  of  the  ocean,  penetrated  to  the  most 
remote  seas,  everywhere  acting  with  the  most  brilliant  success  against  the  ene- 
my's navigation.  And  we  believe,  moreover,  that  in  the  amount  of  enemy's 
property  thus  destroyed,  of  American  property  protected  or  recovered,  and  in 
the  number  of  hostile  ships  kept  in  pursuit  of  our  scattered  vessels — ships, 
evaded  if  superior,  and  beaten  if  equal — they  rendered  benefits  a  thousand  fold 
greater,  to  say  nothing  of  the  glory  they  acquired  for  the  nation  and  the  char- 
acter they  imparted  to  it,  than  any  that  would  have  resulted  from  a  state  of 
passiveiiess  within  the  'harbors. 

Confident  that  this  is  the  true  policy  as  regards  the  employment  of  the  navy 
proper,  we  doubt  not  that  it  will,  in  the  future,  be  acted  on  as  it  has  been  in  the 
past,  and  that  the  results,  as  regards  both  honor  and  advantage,  will  be  expanded 
commensurately  with  its  own  enlargement. 

In  order,  however,  that  the  navy  may  always  assume  and  maintain  that  active 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  147 

and  energetic  deportment  in  offensive  operations,  which  is  at  the  same  time  so 
consistent  with  its  functions  and  so  consonant  with  its  spirit,  we  have  shown 
that  it  must  not  be  occupied  with  mere  coast  defence. 

But  if  the  navy  is  to  be  relieved  from  this  home  duty  some  other  reliance 
must  be  substituted ;  the  navy  itself  requiring,  for  its  own  establishments,  not 
less  than  the  towns  and  harbors,  that  the  defence  be  complete.  And  this  brings 
us  to  consider  whether  the  floating  defences  mentioned  above,  namely,  gunboats, 
floating  batteries,  and  steam  batteries,  constitute  the  best  reliance. 

After  considering  these  defensive  means,  we  will  examine  the  properties  of 
forts  and  land  batteries,  these  being  the  only  other  well-tried  resort ;  and  that  a 
comparison  may  be  instituted,  we  will  confine  ourselves  to  cases  where  the  latter 
are  properly  applicable. 

There  are  doubtlesss,  situations  where  it  may  be  necessary  for  us  to  present  a 
defensive  array,  at  the  same  time  that  to  do  so  by  fortifications  alone  would  be 
impracticable ;  and  it  is  not,  therefore,  prejudging  the  question  we  are  about  to 
examine ;  it  is  neither  underrating  fortifications,  nor  overrating  these  floating 
defences,  to  say  that  these  last  are,  some  or  all  of  them,  indispensable  in  such 
positions. 

Any  very  broad  water,  where  deep  soundings  may  be  carried  at  a  distance 
from  the  shores  greater  than  effective  gun  range,  and  where  no  insular  spot, 
natural  or  artificial,  can  be  found  or  formed  nearer  the  track  of  ships,  will  present 
such  a  situation ;  and  we  may  take  some  of  our  great  bays  as  examples. 

Broad  sounds  and  wide  roadsteads,  affording  secure  anchorage  beyond  good 
gun  range  from  the  shores,  will  afford  examples  of  another  sort ;  and  harbors 
with  very  wide  entrances  and  large  surface  exhibit  examples  of  still  another 
kind. 

As,  in  all  such  cases,  fortifications  alone  will  be  ineffectual,  and,  nevertheless, 
recourse  to  defences  of  some  sort  may  be  unavoidable,  it  has  not  failed  to  be  a 
recommendation  in  the  several  reports  on  the  defence  of  the  coast,  since  1818, 
that  there  should  be  a  suitable  and  timely  provision  of  appropriate  floating 
defences.  And  until  the  invention  of  man  shall  have  caused  an  entire  revolution 
in  the  nature  of  maritime  attack  and  defence,  these  or  kindred  means  must  be 
resorted  to  ;  not,  however,  because  they  are  means  intrinsically  good,  or  suitable 
under  other  circumstances,  but  because  they  are  the  only  means  applicable. 

In  the  circumstances  just  referred  to  there  is  no  alternative,  and  therefore  no 
point  to  be  discussed.  The  remaining  question  is,  whether  these  floating  defences 
are  to  be  relied  on  in  cases  that  admit  of  defence  by  fortifications. 

And,  first,  as  to  gunboats.  Although  of  undoubted  use  in  peculiar  circum- 
stances, it  will  hardly  be  contended  that  gunboats  afford  a  safe  reliance  in 
harbors  that  can  be  entered  by  vessels  of  magnitude.  Ships  becalmed  or 
aground  might  be  sorely  harassed,  if  not  destroyed,  by  a  spirited  attack  from 
this  force,  and  there  are  other  situations  wherein  it  would  be  very  effective. 
But  harbors  defended  by  gunboats  will  not  be  attacked  in  calms  nor  with  ad- 
verse winds ;  and  it  is  not  easy  to  believe  that  any  probable  array  of  these  craft 
would  impede  or  hinder  for  a  moment  the  advance  of  a  hostile  fleet.  Nelson, 
at  Trafalgar,  bore  down  in  two  divisions  upon  the  combined  fleet,  each  division 
being  exposed  to  a  raking  fire ;  and,  although  suffering  considerably  from  that 
fire,  he  was  able,  notwithstanding,  to  break  the  hostile  line  and  defeat  his  supe- 
rior adversary.  What,  comparatively  with  the  raking  fire  of  the  combined 
fleet,  would  be  the  fire  of  a  fleet  of  gunboats  ?  Opposing  no  effectual  obstacle 
to  approach  or  entrance,  these  small  vessels,  scattered  and  driven  upon  the 
shoals,  would  be  kept,  by  the  broadside  of  a  few  active  vessels,  at  too  great  a 
distance  to  produce  any  serious  effect  upon  the  main  attack  by  their  desultory- 
fire. 

Although  they  might  afford  useful  means  of  annoyance  during  a  protracted 
occupation  by  the  enemy  of  harbors  that  contained  extensive  shoal  grounds  and 


148  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

shallow  bays  and  inlets,  they  would  be  nearly  useless  in  resisting  the  first 
assault,  and  in  preventing  the  brief  operation  of  levying  contributions,  or  burning 
or  spoiling  national  establishments. 

The  true  reason  of  this  feeble  defence  must  not,  however,  be  misunderstood. 
It  is  not  that  the  boats  do  not  carry  guns  enough  or  men  enough  for  the  object, 
but  it  is  because,  from  the  comparative  weakness  of  the  vessels,  the  guns  and  the 
men  cannot  be  kept  in  an  effective  position. 

There  are,  moreover,  many  harbors  requiring  defence  in  which  there  are  no 
shoals  whereon  these  boats  could  take  refuge,  and  in  such  their  capture  or  de- 
struction would  be  inevitable  should  there  be,  at  the  same  time,  no  river  up 
which  they  might  fly,  or  lateral  issue  through  which  they  could  escape  to  a  safe 
distance. 

Floating  batteries,  of  which  good  use  might  be  sometimes  made  in  peculiar 
situations,  would,  we  suppose,  differ  from  gunboats  in  being  larger,  containing 
many  guns,  and  in  being  stronger — that  is  to  say,  having  thicker  sides  or  bul- 
warks ;  and  it  has  sometimes  even  been  proposed  to  construct  them  with  ball 
proof  parapets,  and  with  platforms  open  above,  like,  in  these  respects,  batteries 
upon  the  shore.  But,  in  whatever  way  formed,  it  is  necessarily  a  part  of  the 
idea  that  they  be  strong  and  massive ;  and,  consequently,  that  they  be  unwieldy, 
incapable  of  sudden  change  of  place,  and  incapacitated  either  to  advance  upon 
a  defeated  foe  or  to  evade  a  victorious  one.  We  are  not,  of  course,  now  speak- 
ing of  batteries  moved  by  steam. 

Being  denied  the  power  of  locomotion,  at  least  for  any  purpose  of  mancEuvring 
in  face  of  the  enemy,  we  are  to  consider  these  batteries  as  moored  in  position 
and  awaiting  his  advance.  Should  the  batteries  be  large,  requiring  deep  water 
to  float  them,  or  should  they  be  placed  across  or  near  the  channel  for  the  sake 
of  proximity  to  the  track  of  ships,  the  enemy  would  engage  them  at  close 
quarters.  All  advantages  of  mobility — of  concentrating  his  whole  fleet  upon 
one  or  two  points,  to  which,  under  these  circumstances,  no  relief  can  be  sent — 
of  greater  elevation  and  command,  would  be  on  the  side  of  the  assailant,  with 
no  countervailing  advantage  to  the  batteries,  but  greater  thickness  of  bulwarks, 
Whether  this  excess  of  thickness  should  be  considered  a  material  advantage, 
since  the  introduction  of  large  bomb-cannon  into  the  armament  of  ships,  is  a 
doubtful  matter.  The  batteries,  if  anchored  across  the  channel,  would  have  the 
further  advantage  of  a  raking  fire :  but  we  have  seen  that  the  raking  fire  of  one 
squadron  of  ships  upon  another  advancing  is  by  no  means  decisive.  The 
power  of  throwing  the  whole  assailing  force  upon  one  or  two  points,  of  pouring 
upon  the  decks  of  the  batteries  a  greatly  superior  force  of  boarders,  would,  of 
themselves,  seem  to  leave  little  room  to  doubt  as  to  the  issue. 

If  now  we  suppose  these  floating  batteries  to  be  smaller,  so  that,  having  a 
lighter  draught,  they  might  be  placed  near  the  shores  or  upon  the  shoals,  they 
might  certainly  be  thereby  saved  from  the  kind  of  attack  which  would  prove  so 
fatal  if  anchored  more  boldly  in  deep  water ;  but  they  would,  at  the  same  time, 
lose  much  of  their  efficiency  from  their  remoteness,  and  positions  wherein  they 
would  be  secure  from  being  laid  alongside,  while  they  would  be  in  a  proper  at- 
titude to  contribute  materially  to  the  defence  of  the  harbor,  are  afforded  but 
rarely.  It  is  doubtful  whether,  as  a  general  rule,  these  smaller  floating  batter- 
ies, notwithstanding  their  greater  capability  of  endurance,  would  afford  a  better 
defence,  gun  for  gun,  than  gunboats ;  or,  in  other  words,  whether  this  capability 
of  endurance  in  the  one  would  be  more  than  a  compensation  for  the  power  of 
locomotion  in  the  other. 

But  whether  near  the  shore  or  in  the  channel,  whether  large  or  small,  this 
description  of  defence,  owing  to  its  fixedness,  connected  with  the  destructibility 
of  the  material  of  which  it  must  be  made,  will  be  exposed  to  attacks  analagous 
to  those  made  by  gunboats  on  ships  aground.  The  enemy,  knowing  of  what 
the.  defensive  arrangements  consist,  will  come  provided  with  the  requisite  mini-. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  149 

ber  of  sailing  or  steam  vessels,  armed  with  bomb-cannon,  against  which  the 
thicker  bulwarks  of  the  floating  batteries  would  avail  nothing.  He  would,  be- 
sides, hardly  fail  to  provide  himself  with  bomb-ketches  armed  with  heavy  sea- 
mortars  ;  and  as  there  could  be  no  guarding  against  the  effects  of  the  long  ranges 
of  these,  a  few  such  vessels  would,  with  great  certainty,  constrain  the  floating 
batteries  to  quit  their  position,  abandoning  every  disposition  approaching  to  a 
concentrated  array.  Not  to  mention  other  modes  of  attack  which  would  seem 
to  leave  the  chances  of  success  with  the  enemy,  it  will  be  noticed  that  this  kind 
of  defence,  whether  by  gunboats  or  floating  batteries,  has  the  same  intrinsic 
fault  that  an  inactive  defence  by  the  navy  proper  has ;  that  is  to  say,  the  enemy 
has  it  in  his  power  to  bring  to  the  attack  a  force  of  the  same  nature,  and  at  least 
as  efficacious  as  that  relied  on  for  defence ;  hence  the  necessity  not  of  mere 
equality,  but  of  superiority,  on  the  part  of  the  defence  at  every  point  liable  to 
be  attacked ;  and  hence,  also,  the  necessity  of  having  an  aggregate  force  as 
many  times  larger  than  that  disposable  by  the  enemy  as  we  have  important 
places  to  guard.  Should  we,  for  example,  have  ten  such  places,  and  the  enemy 
threaten  us  with  twenty  ships-of-the-line,  we  must  have  in  all  these  places  an 
aggregate  of  gunboats  and  floating  batteries  more  than  equivalent  to  two  hun- 
dred ships-of-the-line ;  for  it  will  be  hardly  contended  that  these  defences  can  be 
transported  from  one  place  to  another  as  they  may  be  respectively  in  danger. 

But  what  will  be  the  relative  state  of  the  parties  if,  instead  of  gunboats  or 
floating  batteries,  we  resort  to  steam  batteries  ?  Although  much  has  been  said 
of  late  of  the  great  advantage  that  defence  is  to  derive  from  this  description  of 
force,  we  have  not  been  able  to  discover  the  advantages ;  nor  do  we  see  that 
sea-coast  defence  has  been  benefitted  in  any  particular  by  the  recent  improve- 
ment in  steam  vessels,  except  that,  in  the  case  before  adverted  to,  where,  from 
the  breadth  of  the  waters,  defence  from  the  shore  would  be  unavailing,  a  more 
active  and  formidable  defence  than  by  gunboats  and  floating  batteries  is  pro- 
vided. It  must  be  remembered  that  by  far  the  greatest  improvement  in  steam 
vessels  consists  in  having  adapted  them  to  ocean  navigation ;  and  one  inevitable 
consequence  of  this  improvement  will  be  that,  if  the  defence  of  harbors  by 
steam  batteries  be  regarded  as  securing  them  from  the  attacks  of  ships  of  the 
line  and  frigates,  or,  at  least,  of  placing  the  defence  quite  above  that  kind  of 
attack,  they  will  no  longer  be  attacked  by  sailing  vessels,  but  by  steam  vessels, 
similar  in  all  warlike  properties  to  those  relied  on  for  defence. 

Not  only  is  there  no  impediment  to  transferring  these  vessels  across  the  ocean, 
but  the  rapidity  and  certainty  of  these  transfers  are  such  as  to  enjoin  a  state  of 
the  most  perfect  readiness  everywhere  and  at  all  times,  and  also  a  complete  in- 
dependence of  arrangement  at  each  particular  point ;  both  the  state  of  prepara- 
tion and  the  independence  of  arrangement  being  much  more  important  than 
when  the  enemy's  motions  were  governed  by  the  uncertain  favor  of  winds  and 
weather. 

It  is  not  easy  to  conceive  of  any  important  properties  belonging  to  steam 
batteries  acting  defensively  that  the  attacking  steam  vessels  may  not  bring  with 
them,  or,  at  least,  may  not  have  imparted  to  them  on  their  arrival  upon  the 
coast,  unless  it  should  be  thought  proper  to  give  to  the  former  a  greater  thick- 
ness of  bulwark  than  would  be  admissible  in  sea-going  vessels. 

But  the  peculiar  advantage  conferred  by  steam  lies  in  the  facility  of  moving 
with  promptitude  and  rapidity ;  and  any  attempts  to  strengthen  the  harbor  ves- 
sels by  thickening  their  bulwarks  considerably  would  unavoidably  lessen  their 
mobility,  thereby  partially  neutralizing  the  advantage  sought.  At  the  same 
time,  it  is  extremely  doubtful  whether  any  benefit  would  be  derived  from  the 
thicker  sides.  It  is  probable  that  the  best  kind  of  bulwark  for  these  vessels 
and  all  others  is  that  which  will  be  just  proof  against  grape  and  canister  shot 
fired  from  moderate  distances ;  because,  with  such  bulwarks,  a  shell  fired  from  a 
bomb-cannon  within  a  reasonable  distance  would  pierce  both  sides ;  that  is  to 


150  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

say,  would  go  in  at  one  side  of  the  ship  and  out  at  the  opposite,  producing  no 
greater  effect  than  a  solid  shot  of  the  same  calibre,  while,  with  thickened  sides, 
every  shell  would  lodge  in  the  timbers,  and  produce  terrible  ravages  by  bursting. 

In  the  practice  with  these  missiles  in  this  country  it  has  been  found  difficult 
to  lodge  a  shell  in  thin  targets,  ev^n  when  the  load  of  the  gun  was  so  reduced 
as  to  increase  materially  the  uncertainty  of  aim.  As  it  is  probable,  therefore, 
that  the  protection  from  solid  shot  afforded  by  massive  bulwarks  would  be  more 
than  counterbalanced  by  the  greater  injury  horizontal  shells  would  inflict  by 
means  of  these  bulwarks,  we'may  conclude  that  the  harbor  steam  battery  will 
not  differ  in  this  respect  materially  from  the  attacking  steamships,  and,  if  they 
do  differ  in  having  more  solid  and  impervious  bulwarks,  that  no  advantage  over 
the  enemy  will  result  therefrom.  We  come,  therefore,  to  the  same  result  as 
when  considering  the  application  of  the  other  kinds  of  floating  force  to  the  de- 
fence of  harbors ;  and  this  result  is,  that  there  is  no  way  of  placing  the  coast  in 
a  condition  of  reasonable  security  but  by  having  at  any  point  the  enemy  may 
happen  to  select  a  force  in  perfect  readiness  which  shall  be  superior  to  that 
brought  to  the  attack. 

The  reason  of  this  coincidence  of  result  is,  that  no  peculiarity  in  form  or  de- 
tails can  disguise  the  difficulties  or  essentially  modify  the  conditions  inseparable 
from  the  nature  of  a  floating  force. 

Buoyancy  is  a  condition  necessary  to  every  variety  of  the  force,  and  to  ob- 
serve this  condition  a  common  material  must  be  used  in  each — a  material  that  is 
combustible,  weak,  and  penetrable  to  missiles.  If  the  weakness  and  penetra- 
bility be  in  part  remedied  by  an  increase  of  the  quantity  of  the  material,  it 
must  be  at  the  sacrifice  of  buoyancy,  activity,  and  speed — properties  of  great 
value.  If  a  small  draught  of  water  be  desired,  it  can  only  be  obtained  at  the 
expense  of  that  concentration  of  power  which  is  a  great  and  almost  character- 
istic quality  of  naval  armament. 

It  might  not  be  strictly  true  to  say  that  as  much  would  be  lost  in  one  respect 
as  would  be  gained  in  another ;  but,  though  modifications  of  this  floating  force, 
made  with  a  view  to  adapt  it  to  .peculiar  services,  will  somewhat  disturb  the 
equilibrium  of  the  several  kinds,  there  will  still  be  no  great  disparity  when 
acting  in  their  appropriate  way,  and  a  little  superadded  force  to  the  weaker 
party  will  restore  the  balance.  None  of  these  modifications,  it  should  be  ob- 
served, touch,  on  the  one  hand,  the  means  whereby  injury  is  inflicted,  nor,  on 
the  other,  the  susceptibility  to  injury.  All  are  still  timber  structures,  carrying 
a  common  armament. 

The  necessity  of  having  at  each  point  a  force  at  least  equal  to  the  attacking 
force  will  require  large  preparations  on  any  supposition.  With  the  navy  proper, 
however,  with  gunboats  and  floating  batteries,  something  has  already  been 
done ;  the  existing  navy  will  be  an  important  contribution.  Small  vessels  sup- 
plied by  commerce  would  afford  tolerable  substitutes  for  gunboats,  and  from  the 
class  of  merchant  ships  many  vessels  might  be  drawn  for  service  as  floating 
batteries;  still  there  will  remain  great  efforts  to  be  made  and  great  amounts  to 
be  expended  to  complete  the  defensive  array.  But  a  reliance  on  steam  batteries 
would  lead  to  expenditure  vastly  greater,  because  with  them  all  has  yet  to  be 
provided.  Having  at  present  no  force  of  this  kind  on  hand,  (or  next  to  none,) 
the  preparation  by  the  enemy  of  (say)  twenty  steam  frigates  would  require  the 
construction  of  two  hundred  of  equal  force  on  our  part,  supposing  that  we  de- 
sign to  cover  but  ten  of  our  principal  harbors,  leaving  all  others  at  his  mercy. 

Having  shown  that  steam  batteries  cannot  be  substituted  for  shore  defences, 
we  will  here  add  that  they  will,  on  the  other  hand,  in  certain  cases  necessarily 
increase  the  number  of  these  defences,  and  in  other  cases  augment  their  force. 
Channels  which  admitted  only  small  vessels-of-war  would,  in  peculiar  positions, 
need  no  defence;  in  other  positions  their  defence  might  be  safely  trusted  to 
works  of  moderate  force.  The  introduction  of  these  vessels  of  small  draught 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  151 

and  great  power  requires,  however,  that  these  passages  should  be  defended  and 
defended  adequately. 

We  should  not  have  gone  so  much  at  length  into  a  branch  of  our  subject 
wherein  the  general  conclusions  appear  to  be  so  obvious  and  incontrovertible, 
but  for  the  prevalence  of  opinions  which  we  consider  not  erroneous  merely,  but 
highly  dangerous,  and  which,  we  think,  must  give  way  before  a  full  exhibition 
of  the  truth.  We  do  not  anticipate  any  formidable  objections  to  the  positions 
assumed  nor  to  the  illustrations ;  but  even  should  all  these,  in  the  form  we  have 
presented  them,  be  objected  to,  we  may  still  challenge  opposition  to  the  follow- 
ing broad  propositions,  namely : 

1st.  If  the  sea-coast  is  to  be  defended  by  naval  means  exclusively,  the  defen- 
sive force  at  each  point  deemed  worthy  of  protection  must  be  at  least  equal  in 
power  to  the  attacking  force. 

2d.  As,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  there  can  be  no  reason  for  expecting  an 
attack  on  one  'of  these  points  rather  than  on  another,  and  no  time  for  transferring 
our  state  of  preparation  from  one  to  another  after  an  attack  has  been  declared, 
each  of  them  must  have  assigned  to  it  the  requisite  means ;  and, 

3d.  Consequently  this  system  demands  a  power  in  the  defence  as  many  times 
greater  than  that  in  the  attack  as  there  are  points  to  be  covered. 

Believing  that  a  well-digested  system  of  fortifications  will  save  the  country 
from  the  danger  attending  every  form  of  defence  by  naval  means,  and  the  in- 
tolerable expense  of  a  full  provision  of  those  means,  we  will  now  endeavor  to 
show  that  such  a  system  is  worthy  of  all  reliance. 

There  has  been  but  one  practice  among  nations  as  to  the  defence  of  ports  and 
harbors ;  and  that  has  been  a  resort  to  fortifications.  All  the  experience  that 
history  exhibits  is  on  one  side  only ;  it  is  the  opposition  of  forts,  or  other  works 
comprehended  by  the  term  fortification,  to  attack  by  vessels ;  and  although 
history  affords  some  instances  wherein  this  defence  has  not  availed,  we  see  that 
the  resort  is  still  the  same.  No  nation  omits  covering  the  exposed  points  upon 
her  seaboard  with  fortifications,  nor  hesitates  in  confiding  in  them. 

In  opposition  to  this  mode  of  defence  much  stress  is  laid  on  certain  successful 
attacks  that  have  been  made  by  ships  on  works  deemed  strong.  We  have  no 
doubt  that  all  such  results  might  be  accounted  for  by  circumstances  independent 
of  the  naked  question  of  relative  strength ;  but  at  any  rate,  when  carefully  con- 
sidered, how  little  do  these  results  prove,  in  comparison  with  numerous  other 
instances,  in  which  there  was  an  immense  disparity  of  force  in  favor  of  vessels 
that  have  been  signally  defeated.  These  latter  instances  are  those  that  should 
be  received  as  a  test  of  the  actual  relation  between  the  two  kinds  of  force ;  not 
certainly  because  they  were  successful,  but  because  the  smaller  the  work,  its 
armament,  its  garrison,  the  less  the  probability  that  any  extraneous  influence 
has  been  in  operation.  A  single  gun  behind  a  parapet,  provided  its  position  be 
a  fair  one,  and  the  parapet  be  proof,  need,  as  regards  its  contest  with  ships,  owe 
nothing  else  to  the  art  of  fortification ;  and  its  effect  will  be  the  same  whether 
the  battery  were  fresh  from  the  hands  of  the  ablest  engineer  of  the  age,  or  were 
erected  at  the  dawn  of  the  art.  The  gun  is  in  a  position  to  be  used  with  effect  ; 
the  men  are  as  fully  protected  by  the  parapet  as  the  service  of  the  gun  will 
allow ;  they  are  brave  and  skilful,  and  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  their  doing 
their  duty  to  the  utmost.  These  are  all  conditions  easily  fulfilled,  and  therefore 
likely  to  be  so.  The  state  of  things  is  not  less  just  and  fair  toward  the  vessel  ; 
she  chooses  her  time  and  opportunity ;  the  battery  goes  not  to  the  ship,  but  the 
ship  to  the  battery ;  taking  the  wind,  the  tide,  the  sea — all,  as  she  would  have 
them ;  her  condition  and  discipline  are  perfect,  and  her  crew  courageous  and 
adroit.  Nothing,  under  such  circumstances,  can  prevent  the  just  issue  of  battle 
but  some  extraordinary  accident — possible,  indeed,  to  either  party,  but  easily 
recognized  when  occurring. 

The  contest  between  larger  works  and  heavy  squadrons  may  be  much  more 


152  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES 

complicated  affairs,  the  cause  of  disaster  to  tlie  former  being  often  traceable  to 
potent,  though  not  always  obvious,  influences.  The  fortifications  may  have 
been  absurdly  planned  originally  or  badly  executed,  for  there  has  at  all  times 
been  in  this  profession,  as  in  others,  much  scope  given  to  quackery ;  they  may 
have  been  erected  at  a  time  when  the  ships-of-war,  against  which  they  were 
provided,  were  very  different  things  from  the  lofty  line-of-battle-ships  of  modern 
times ;  a  long  peace  or  long  impunity  may  have  left  them  hi  a  state  wholly  un- 
prepared for  the  sudden  use  of  their  strength ;  the  command  may  have  been 
intrusted  to  persons  ignorant  alike  of  the  amount  of  power  in  their  hands  and 
of  the  mode  of  exercising  it ;  the  garrison  may  have  been  undisciplined  or  mu- 
tinous— the  populace  discontented  or  disloyal ;  the  clamor  of  frightened  citizens 
may  have  caused  a  premature  surrender  :  all  these,  or  any  of  them,  may  have 
produced  the  issue,  leaving  the  question  of  relative  power  untouched. 

While  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  these  and  other  deteriorating  influences 
may  have  occasionally  operated  to  the  prejudice  of  fortifications,  and  that  these 
were  likely  to  be  more  numerous  and  more  controlling  as  the  works  were  more 
extensive,  it  is  certain  that  there  can  be  no  influence  acting  in  a  reverse  direction 
upon  them ;  that  is  to  say,  none  making  them  stronger  and  more  efficient  than 
they  ought  to  be.  There  can  be  no  favorable  influence  of  such  a  nature,  for 
example,  as  to  make  the  simple  one-gun  battery  before  mentioned  equivalent  to 
a  battery  (say)  ten  times  as  large. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  from  what  we  have  said  in  relation  to  larger  fortifi- 
cations, that  their  magnitude  necessarily  involves  imperfection  or  weakness ; 
nor,  because  we  have  considered  small  and  simple  works  as  affording  the  best 
solution  to  the  question  of  relative  force,  must  it  be  inferred  that  small  works 
are  suited  to  all  circumstances.  We  speak  here  in  reference  merely  to  the 
judgment  we  are  entitled  to  form  of  the  relative  power  of  these  antagonist 
forces  from  their  contests  as  exhibited  in  history.  In  instances  of  the  latter 
sort  there  cannot,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  be  any  important  influence 
operating  of  which  we  are  ignorant,  or  for  which  we  cannot  make  due  allow- 
ances ;  while,  in  examples  of  the  former  kind,  we  may  be  in  the  dark  as  to  many 
vital  matters. 

These  observations  have  been  deemed  necessary  because,  in  judging  of  this 
matter,  it  might  not  be  so  obvious  that  certain  brilliant  and  striking  results 
should  not  be  adopted  as  affording  the  true  test  of  relative  power.  It  would  be 
more  natural  to  turn  to  Copenhagen  and  Algiers,  as  indicating  where  the  power 
lies,  than  to  Charleston  and  Stoningtou ;  and  yet  these  latter,  as  indices,  would 
be  true,  and  the  former  false. 

We  will  now  turn  to  certain  examples  : 

"The  name  of  Martello  tower  was  adopted  in  consequence  of  the  good  de- 
fence made  by  a  small  round  tower  in  the  Bay  of  Martello,  in  Corsica,  in  the 
year  1794,  which,  although  armed  with  one  heavy  gun  only,  beat  off  one  or  two 
British  ships-of-war  without  sustaining  any  material  injury  from  their  fire.  But 
this  circumstance  ought  merely  to  have  proved  the  superiority  which  guns  on 
shore  must  always,  in  certain  situations,  possess  over  those  of  shipping,  no 
matter  whether  the  former  are  mounted  on  a  tower  or  not.  That  this  is  a  just 
decision  will,  perhaps,  be  readily  allowed  by  all  who  are  acquainted  with  the 
following  equally  remarkable,  but  less  generally  known  fact,  which  occurred 
about  twelve  years  afterwards  in  the  same  part  of  the  world."* 

"  Sir  Sidney  Smith,  in  the  Poinpe'e,  an  eighty-gun  ship,  the  Hydra,  of  thirty- 
eight  guns,  Captain  Manby,  and  another  frigate,  anchored  about  eight  hundred 
yards  from  a  battery  of  two  guns,  situated  on  the  extremity  of  Cape  Licosa,  and 
protected  from  assault  by  a  tower  in  which  were  five  and  twenty  French  soldiers, 
commanded  by  a  lieutenan  . 

*  Parley's  Course,  vol.  iii. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  153 

"  The  line-of-battle-sliip  and  the  frigates  fired  successive  broadsides  till  their 
ammunition  was  nearly  expended  ;  the  battery  continually  replying  with  a  slow 
but  destructive  effect.  The  Pompee,  at  which  ship  alone  it  directed  its  fire  had 
forty  shot  in  her  hull ;  her  mizen  topmast  carried  away ;  a  lieutenant,  midship- 
man, and  five  men  killed,  and  thirty  men  wounded.  At  length,  force  proving 
ineffectual,  negotiation  was  resorted  to,  and  after  some  hours'  parley,  the  officer* 
a  Corsican,  and  relative  of  Napoleon,  capitulated.  It  then  appeared  that  the 
carriage  of  one  of  the  two  guns  had  failed  on  the  second  shot,  and  the  gun  had 
subsequently  been  fired  lying  on  the  sill  of  the  embrazure ;  so  that  in  fact  the 
attack  of  an  eighty-gun  ship  and  two  frigates  had  been  resisted  by  a  single 
piece  of  ordnance." — (Journal  of  Sieges,  by  Colonel  John  T.  Jones.) 

The  Corsican  tower  above  mentioned,  which  had,  in  like  manner,  completely 
baffled  a  naval  cannonade,  was  very  soon  found  to  surrender  when  attacked  by 
land ;  not,  however,  before  a  small  battery  had  been  made  [erected]  to  reduce 
it." — (Paslei/s  Course,  vol.  iii.) 

Here  are  two  examples  : 

1st.  A  single  heavy  gun,  mounted  on  a  tower,  beat  off  one  or  two  British  ships. 

2d.  A  barbette  battery,  containing  two  guns,  beat  off  a  British  eighty-gun  ship 
supported  by  two  frigates. 

It  would  seem  that  no  exception  can  possibly  be  taken  to  either  instance,  as 
trials  of  relative  power.  There  is  no  complication  of  circumstances  on  one  side 
or  the  other ;  nothing  to  confuse  or  mislead ;  all  is  perfectly  simple  and  plain. 
A  small  body  of  artillery,  judiciously  posted  on  the  shore,  is  attacked  by  armed 
vessels  bearing  forty  or  fifty  times  as  many  guns;  and  the  ships,  unable  to  pro- 
duce any  effect  in  consequence,  are  beaten  off  with  loss. 

The  cases  present  no  peculiar  advantage  on  the  side  of  the  batteries  either  as 
regards  position  or  quality ;  for  both  works  were  immediately  reduced  by  a  land 
attack ;  that  which  the  eighty-gun  ship  and  two  frigates  were  unable  to  effect, 
being  immediately  accomplished  by  landing  two  field-pieces,  with  a  very  small 
portion  of  the  crew  of  one  of  the  vessels. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  was  no  peculiar  disadvantage  on  the  part  of  the 
ships,  as  the  time  and  mode  of  attack  were  of  their  own  choice. 

In  order  that  there  might  be  no  unjust  disparagement  of  the  vessels,  in  the 
manner  of  representing  the  affairs,  the  language  of  British  military  writers  (the 
ships  being  British)  had  been  exactly  quoted. — (See  Pasley's  Course  of  Elemen- 
tary Fortifications,  vol.  ii,  and  Journal  of  Sieges,  by  Colonel  John  T.  Jones.) 

Had  the  representation  of  these  actions  been  taken  from  the  victorious  party, 
the  result  would  have  appeared  still  more  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  ships. 

The  circumstances  attending  the  attack  and  defence  of  Copenhagen,  in  April, 
1801,  seem  to  have  been  the  following : 

On  the  northeast  side  of  the  city  (the  only  side  exposed  to  attack  from  heavy 
ships)  there  lies  a  shoal  spreading  outward  from  the  walls,  about  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  in  the  narrowest  part.  Through  this  shoal  there  runs,  in  a  northeast 
and  by  north  direction,  a  narrow  channel  connecting  the  basin,  in  the  heart  of 
the  city,  with  deep  water.  Were  it  not  for  this  shoal,  vessels  might  approach 
even  to  the  walls  of  the  city,  on  a  length  of  about  one  and  a  half  mile ;  as  it  is, 
they  can  get  no  nearer,  in  any  place,  than  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile,  with- 
out following  the  channel  just  mentioned.  As  the  edge  of  the  shoal  lies  nearly 
north  and  south,  and  the  channel  passes  through  it  in  a  northeast-by-north 
direction,  the  great  mass  of  the  shoal  is  to  the  southward,  or  on  the  right  hand 
side  of  the  channel.  We  will  call  this  the  southern  shoal.  The  "  Three-crown 
battery  "  is  situated  upon  this  southern  shoal  and  near  the  channel. 

The  Danish  defences  consisted — 

1st.  Of  the  fortifications  on  this  side  of  the  city,  including  the  Three-crown 
battery;  Nelson  estimated  the  batteries  supporting  the  Danish  vessels  at  about 
ninety  guns. 


154  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

2d.  Of  four  sail  of  the  line,  mounting  282  guns,  and  one  frigate  and  two  sloops, 
mounting  76  guns;  making  358  guns.  All  these  vessels  lying  in  the  channel 
before -mentioned,  and  some  of  them  near  its  mouth  ;  they  constituted  the  left  of 
the  Danish  floating  defences,  and  were  thus  posted  to  defend  the  entrance  to  the 
inner  harbor  or  basin. 

3d.  Of  a  line  of  floating  defences,  of  various  kinds,  moored  near  the  edge  of  the 
southern  shoal.  They  were  eighteen  in  number,  as  follows,  counting  from  the 
right  or  southern  extremity:  1st,  a  block-ship  of  56  guns;  2d,  a  block-ship  of 
48  guns;  3d,  a  praam  of  20  gun;  4th,  a  praam  of  20  guns;  5th,  a  block-ship  of 
48  guns;  6th,  a  raft  of  20  guns;  7th,  a  block-ship  of  22  guns;  8th,  a  raft  of  20 
guns ;  9th,  a  block-ship  of  62  guns  ;  10th,  a  small  vessel  of  6  guns;  llth,  a  raft 
of  24  guns;  12,  a  praam  of  20  guns;  13th,  a  ship-of-the-line  of  74  guns;  14th, 
a  block-ship  of  26  guns;  15th,  a  raft  of  18  guns;  16th,  a  ship  of  the  line  of  60 
guns;  17th,  a  block-ship  of  64  guns;  18th,  a  "frigate"  of  20  guns;  total  in 
this  line  628  guns.  These  vessels  were  moored  in  a  line  extending  south  from 
a  point  outside  and  a  little  to  the  southward  of  the  Three-crown  battery ;  and 
the  part  of  the  line  nearest  the  walls  was  not  less  than  three-quarters  of  a  mile 
distant. 

Lord  Nelson  carried  to  the  attack  the  Elephant,  74  guns;  Defiance,  74; 
Monarch,  74;  Bellona,  74;  Edgar,  74;  Eussell,  74;  Ganges,  74;  Glutton,  54; 
Isis,  50;  Agamemnon,  64;  Polyphemus,  74;  Ardent,  64;  Amazon,  38;  De- 
siree,  38;  Blanche,  36;  Alcmene,  32;  Dart,  30;  Arrow,  18;  Cruiser,  18; 
Harpy,  18;  Zephyr,  14;  Otter,  14;  Discovery,  16;  Sulphur,  10;  Hecla,  10; 
Explosion,  8;  Zebra,  16;  Terror,  10;  Volcano,  8;  making  a  total  of  1,074 
guns,  besides  a  few  in  gunboats.  The  Agamemnon  did  not  get  into  action; 
which  reduces  the  force  employed  to  1,010  guns.  The  Bellona  and  Russell 
grounded ;  but  Lord  Nelson  says,  "  although  not  in  the  situation  assigned  them, 
yet  they  were  so  placed  as  to  be  of  good  service." 

With  this  force  Lord  Nelson  engaged  the  line  of  floating  defences  that  was 
moored  near  the  edge  of  the  southern  shoal.  He  approached  from  the  south 
with  a  fair  wind ;  and  as  his  leading  vessel  got  abreast  of  the  most  southern  of 
the  Danish  line  she  anchored  by  the  stern.  The  second  English  vessel  passed 
on  until  she  had  reached  the  next  position,  when  she  anchored,  also,  in  the  same 
way;  and  thus,  inverting  his  line  as  he  extended  it,  he  brought  his  whole  force 
against  the  outer  and  southern  part  of  the  Danish  force.  His  line  did  not  reach 
as  far  northward  as  the  Three-crown  battery,  and  mouth  of  the  channel ;  for,  he 
says,  in  speaking  of  the  grounding  of  the  Bellona,  Russell,  and  Agamemnon : 
"  These  accidents  prevented  the  extension  of  our  line  by  the  three  ships  before 
mentioned,  who  would,  I  am  confident,  have  silenced  the  Crown  islands,  (Three- 
crown  battery,)  the  outer  ships  in  the  harbor's  mouth,  and  prevented  the  heavy 
loss  in  the  Defiance  and  Monarch." 

Concentrating,  as  he  did,  the  force  of  1,010  guns  upon  a  portion  of  the  Danish 
array,  not  only  inferior  to  him  by  382  guns,  but  so  situated  as  to  be  beyond  the 
scope  of  succor,  and  without  a  chance  of  escape,  Lord  Nelson  had  no  reason  to 
doubt  that  signal  success  would  crown  his  able  arrangement.  Every  vessel  in 
this  outer  Danish  line  was  taken  or  destroyed,  except  one  or  two  smaller  vessels, 
which  cut  and  ran  in  under  shelter  of  the  fortifications. 

The  vessels  lying  in  the  narrow  channel  could  participate  in  no  material 
degree  in  the  action,  l^cause  the  British  line  did  not  reach  abreast  of  them ;  and 
because,  not  being  advanced  beyond  the  general  direction  of  the  Danish  line, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  retired  behind  it,  they  could  not  act  upon  any  of  the 
British  vessels,  except,  perhaps,  obliquely  upon  two  or  three  of  the  most  northern 
ships.  But  had  all  the  Danish  vessels  that  were  lying  in  the  narrow  channel 
been  mingled,  from  the  first,  with  the  line  that  was  destroyed,  the  result  would 
probably  have  been  still  more  to  the  advantage  of  the  assailants ;  that  is  to  say, 
these  vessels,  also,  would  have  been  captured  or  destroyed;  because,  not  only  - 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  155 

would  the  aggregate  Danish  force  of  986  gnns  have  been  inferior  to  the  1,010 
guns  of  the  British,  but  it  would  also  have  been  without  the  ability  to  counter- 
act the  power  of  concentration  possessed  by  the  latter,  whereby  the  whole  force 
would  have  acted  on  parts  of  the  Danish  line  in  succession. 

For  the  same  reason  that  the  squadron  which  lay  in  the  narrow  channel  could 
not  materially  aid  in  resisting  the  attack  made  on  the  line  of  floating  defences 
anchored  along  the  edge  of  the  shoal,  the  action  of  the  Three-crown  battery,  and 
the  guns  on  the  shore  must  have  been  greatly  restricted.  Situated  upon  the 
shoal,  the  Three-crown  battery  was  behind  the  Danish  line,  which  consequently 
masked  it,  and  also  the  shore  batteries,  from  a  view  of  the  English  line.  Under 
such  circumstances  it  is  not  conceivable  that  the  batteries  could  be  used  with 
effect ;  and  the  commander  of  the  Danish  forces  says  expressly  that  the  Three- 
crown  battery  "did  not  come  at  all  into  action;"  and  a  chronicler  of  the  times 
states  that  the  fortifications  of  the  town  "were  of  no  service  while  the  action 
lasted  ;  they  began  to  fire  when  the  enemy  took  possession  of  the  abandoned  ships, 
but  it  was" at  the  same  time  that  the  parley  appeared"  In  proportion  as  the 
Danish  vessels  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  English,  as  some  were  burnt,  and 
others  blown  up,  the  scope  of  the  batteries  would  enlarge,  and  their  power  be 
felt ;  but  just  as  all  impediment  of  this  sort  had  been  removed,  Lord  Nelson 
himself  proposed  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  and  the  action  ceased.  It  might  be 
profitable  to  discuss  the  probable  consequences  of  a  continuance  of  the  action ; 
to  inquire  why  it  was  that  Lord  Nelson,  after  he  had  conquered  two-thirds  of 
the  986  floating  guns  opposed  to  him,  did  not  pursue  his  advantage,  and  concen- 
trate his  1,010  guns  upon  the  358  guns,  which  were  all  that  remained  of  the 
floating  defences  of  the  Danes,  especially  as  the  wind  was  in  favor  of  such  a 
manoeuvre.  But  having  already  devoted  too  much  space  to  this  peculiar  con- 
test, we  will  suppose  some  dictate  of  policy,  perhaps  of  humanity,  induced  him 
to  close  the  contest,  relying  on  the  severe  blow  he  had  already  inflicted,  and  the 
commanding  tone  it  enabled  him  to  assume  for  such  a  termination  of  the  pending 
negotiation  as  the  interest  or  policy  of  Great  Britain  demanded. 

It  is  important,  however,  yet  to  notice  that,  as  soon  as  the  negotiation  opened, 
Lord  Nelson's  vessels  passed  out  of  the  reach  of  the  Three-crown  battery  as  fast 
as  they  could  be  withdrawn.  Lord  Nelson  himself  states  that  this  battery  was 
not  silenced. 

A  British  writer,  speaking  of  this  crisis,  says :  "It  must  not,  however,  be  con- 
cealed that  Lord  Nelson,  at  the  time  he  dictated  this  note  to  the  Dane,  was 
placed  in  rather  awkward  and  difficult  circumstances ;  the  principal  batteries,  as 
well  as  the  ships  which  were  stationed  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  were  still 
unconquered;  two  of  his  own  vessels  were  aground,  and  exposed  to  a  heavy 
fire;  others,  if  the  battle  continued,  might  be  exposed  to  a  similar  fate;  while 
he  found  it  would  be  scarcely  practicable  to  bring  off  the  prizes  under  the  fire 
of  the  batteries.  These  considerations,  undoubtedly,  influenced  him  in  resolving 
to  endeavor  to  put  a  stop  to  hostilities,  in  addition  to  the  instructions  he  had  to 
spare  the  Danes,  and  the  respect  he  might  have  felt  for  their  brave  defence." — 
(Campbell's  Naval  History,  vol.  vii,  p.  203.) 

The  circumstances  above  detailed  show  clearly : 

1st.  That  the  battle  of  Copenhagen  was  fought  between  an  English  fleet, 
mounting  1,010  guns,  and  a  Danish  line  of  floating  defences,  mounting  628  guns; 
and  that  all  the  latter  were  conquered.  e 

2d.  That  the  Danish  line  wab  attacked  in  such  a  manner  that  none  of  the 
fixed  batteries  in  the  system  of  defence  could  participate  in  the  contest,  which 
was  carried  on  up  to  the  surrender  of  the  Danish  line,  almost  exclusively  between 
vessels.  It  appears  that  a  few  of  the  smaller  vessels,  under  Captain  Riou, 
occupying  the  northern  extremity  of  the  English  line,  were  under  the  fire  of  the 
Three-crown  battery.  The  loss  being  very  severe,  he  was  obliged  to  retreat. 


156  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

3d.  That  as  soon  as  the  batteries  were  unmasked  and  began  to  act  the  battle 
was  closed,  by  Nelson  opening  a  parley. 

4th.  That,  consequently,  it  was  in  no  sense  a  contest  between  ships  and 
batteries,  or  a  triumph  of  ships  over  batteries,  and  affords  no  ground  for  judging 
of  their  relative  power. 

5th.  That  it  illustrates,  strikingly,  the  advantage  that  a  fleet  possesses  over 
a  stationary  line  of  floating  defences.  Lord  Nelson  was  superior  to  the  whole  of 
his  adversary's  floating  force ;  but  not  being  disposed  to  run  any  unnecessary 
hazard  he  directed  all  his  force  upon  a  part  of  the  Danish  line,  which  was,  of 
course,  defeated ;  and  had  there  been  no  other  than  a  floating  force  present,  so 
of  course  would  have  been  the  remainder;  had  it  been  of  twice  the  strength  it 
was.  This  example  fully  confirms  what  we  have  before  urged  on  this  topic. 

In  estimating  the  respective  forces  above,  we  have  set  down  the  vessels  of 
both  parties  at  their  rate :  that  is  to  say,  a  ship  called  seventy-four  we  have 
reckoned  at  74  guns. 

We  now  proceed  to  examine  a  great  instance  of  naval  success,  in  which  there 
is  no  room  to  cjoubt  the  extent  to  which  fortifications  were  engaged;  this  instance 
is  the  attack  on  Algiers  in  1816. 

The  attack  was  made  by  the  combined  English  and  Dutch  fleets,  mounting 
about  one  thousand  guns,  under  the  command  of  Lord  Exmouth. 

In  the  fortifications  that  looked  towards  the  water,  there  are  enumerated  in  a 
plan,  supposed  to  be  authentic,  320  guns;  but  not  more  than  200  of  these  could 
act  upon  the  fleet  as  it  lay.  The  ratio  of  the  forces  engaged,  therefore,  as  ex- 
pressed by  the  numder  of  guns,  (saying  nothing  of  the  calibres,  of  which  we 
know  nothing,)  was  about  as  5  to  2.  The  action  continued  from  a  quarter  before 
three  until  nine,  without  intermission,  and  did  not  cease  altogether  until  half- 
past  eleven. 

It  is  very  certain  that  the  effects  of  the  fire  upon  the  Algerine  shipping  and 
town  were  very  severe,  because  we  know  that  all  the  shipping  was  destroyed 
excepting  some  small  vessels ;  and  we  know  also  that  Lord  Exmouth  dictated 
the  terms  of  the  treaty  that  followed. 

Honorable  as  this  result  was  to  the  combined  fleets,  and  happy  as  it  was  foi 
the  cause  of  humanity,  there  are,  nevertheless,  technical  circumstances  connected 
with  it  that  excite  doubts  as  to  how  much  of  the  final  result  was  due  to  physi- 
cal chastisement,  to  moral  effect,  to  inherent  defects  in  the  defences,  and  to 
ignorance  in  the  use  of  these  defences,  such  as  they  were.  That  the  loss  ir 
killed  and  wounded  in  the  city  and  works  was  great  is  probable,  because  w( 
are  informed  that  a  very  great  addition  had  been  made  to  the  garrison,  in  pre 
paration  for  the  attack,  under  some  impression,  no  doubt,  that  a  landing  woulc 
be  attempted.  For  the  service  of  the  guns  there  were  needed  but  3,000  or  4,00( 
men,  at  the  utmost.  An  accumulation  beyond  that  number  would  add  nothing 
to  the  vigor  of  defence,  while,  by  causing  an  increase  of  the  casualties,  it  woulc 
heighten  the  terrors  of  the  combat.  The  depressing  effect  of  this  loss  of  life  ir 
the  batteries,  and  of  the  burning  of  buildings  within  the  town  and  about  th( 
mole,  was  of  course  increased  by  the  entire  destruction  of  the  Algerine  fleet,  an 
chored  within  the  mole. 

We  have  no  means  of  judging  of  the  actual  condition  of  the  works ;  nor  o: 
their  fitness  for  the  task  of  contending  with  the  heavy  ships  of  modern  times. 

The  forts  and  batteries  on  the  shore  were  probably  too  elevated  to  be  com 
manded  even  by  the  largest  of  the  assailing  ships ;  and,  provided  these  gun; 
were  covered  with  a  proof  parapet,  they  may  be  regarded  as  being  well  situated 

But  more  than  half  of  the  guus  engaged  were  in  the  Mole-head  battery ;  anc 
the  mode  ojP  attack  adopted,  especially  by  the  Queen  Charlotte,  of  110  guns,  wai 
calculated  to  test,  in  the  severest  manner,  the  principles  on  which  this  work  hac 
been  planned.  She  so  placed  herself  within  "fifty  yards"  of  the  extremity  o 
this  battery,  that  she  could  either  rake  or  take  in  reverse  every  part  of  it.  I 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  157 

slie,  at  the  same  time,  commanded  the  battery — that  is  to  say,  if,  from  her  spar 
deck,  she  could  look  down  upon  its  platform — then  she  must  at  once,  with  her 
grape  and  canister,  have  driven  the  garrison  from  that  platform,  leaving  only 
the  lower  and  covered  tier  of  guns,  if  there  were  such  a  tier,  for  service.  With 
our  imperfect  knowledge  of  the  fortifications,  all  this  must  however,  be  left  to 
conjecture. 

But  there  are  matters  connected  with  the  service  of  the  batteries  which  are 
not  conjecture.  Not  a  shot  was  fired  until  the  Queen  Charlotte  had  anchored. 

What  a  different  vessel,  when  she  anchored,  might  not  this  ship  have  been, 
if  the  Mole-head  battery  had  employed  its  fire  of  more  than  100  guns  in  raking 
her,  from  the  time  she  arrived  within  a  mile  and  a  half  until  she  had  anchored 
within  fifty  yards  1  How  different  might  have  been  the  condition  of  the  fleet, 
generally,  if  they  had  been  subjected,  during  the  approach,  and  while  assuming 
their  stations,  to  the  raking  fire  of  all  the  200  guns  ? 

It  does  not  appear  that  a  single  hot  shot  was  fired  from  the  batteries. 
We  might  also  rest  on  this  fact,  and  assert  that  a  defence  which  had  failed 
to  provide  itself  with  this  auxiliary  means,  .must  have  been  carried  on  in  disre- 
gard, if  not  in  violation,  of  all  rules,  all  knowledge,  and  all  experience ;  that  it 
was  probably  without  plan  or  combination,  and,  not  less  probable,  without 
preparation  in  other  particulars  of  importance  scarcely  inferior. 

Before  leaving  this  example  it  may  be  well  to  inquire  what,  after  all,  was  the 
effect  of  these  batteries  upon  the  ships,  compared  with  the  effect  of  ships  upon 
ships. 

In  the  battle  of  the  Nile,  the  French  fleet,  rated  at  1,190  guns,  caused  a  loss 
in  Nelson's  fleet  of  895  killed  and  wounded ;  which  is  in  the  proportion  of  ten 
French  guns  to  less  than  eight  Englishmen  killed  and  wounded.  In  the  battle 
of  Trafalgar  the  French  fleet  carried  not  less  than  3,000  guns,  and  they  caused 
a  loss  to  the  English  of  1,587  killed  and  wounded ;  which  is  in  the  proportion 
of  ten  guns  to  less  than  six  killed  and  wounded.  In  this  affair  of  Algiers,  with 
a  force  not  ex  Ceding  200  guns,  the  batteries  caused  a  loss  of  883  killed  and 
wounded,  beinf^n  the  proportion  of  10  guns  to  44  men;  and,  if  we  take  into 
account  every  *or  that  was  pointed  upon  the  bay,  (say  350  guns,)  the  propor- 
tion will  be  ir.a^oa^  to  25  men ;  being  an  effect  more  than  three  times  as  great 
as  that  produ  v^a  snijhe  French  ,ships  at  the  battle  of  the  Nile,  and  more  than 
four  times  a?  v  T^lv.  tjia{.  pro^uced  by  the  ships  of  the  same  nation  at  Tra- 
falgar.  .ced^ '  ^o 

While  ref  '  circumstances  of  this  battle  the  mind  is  not  satisfied 

with  any  rea^c^^.^"p  resent  themselves  for  the  withdrawal  of  Lord  Exmouth, 
the  moment  the  land  wind  enabled  him  to  do  so.  On  the  supposition  of  entire 
success  on  his  part,  it  is  not  understood  why  he  should  feel  the  great  anxiety 
he  states  himself  to  have  been  under  that  this  wind  should  spring  up.  "Provi- 
dence at  this  interval,"  (between  10  and  11  at  night,)  "gave  to  my  anxious 
wishes  the  usual  land  wind,  common  in  this  bay ;  and  my  expectations  were 
•  completed.  We  were  all  hands  employed  in  warping  and  towing  off,  and,  by  the 
help  of  the  light  air,  the  whole  were  under  sail,  and  came  to  anchor  out  of  the 
reach  of  shells  about  two  in  the  morning,  after  twelve  hours  incessant  labor." 

Now,  if  anything  had  been  decided  by  the  action,  it  must  have  been  one  of 
two  things :  either  the  ships  were  victorious,  or  the  batteries  were  so.  If  the 
ships  were  completely  victorious,  it  would  seem  to  have  been  judicious  for  them 
to  remain  where  they  were,  in  order,  if  there  was  to  be  any  more  fighting,  to  be 
ready  to  press  their  advantage;  and,  especially,  in  order  to  maintain  the 
ascendency,  by  preventing  the  remounting  of  guns,  repairing  of  batteries,  and 
resupplying  them  munitions,  &c. 

Had  the  people  possessed  the  inflexibility  report  ascribed  to  the  Dey,  and  had 
they  set  zealously  about  the  work  of  preparation  for  a  new  contest,  it  might  not 
have  been  easy  for  Lord  Exmouth,  in  the  condition  to  which  his  ships  are  ac- 


158  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

knowledged,  by  authentic  accounts,  to  have  been  reduced,  to  enforce  his  demands. 
It  is  not  understood,  therefore,  why,  if  he  had  been  so  successful  as  to  be  certain 
that  his  end  was  attained,  he  should  be  so  anxious  to  get  out  of  gunshot,  when, 
by  so  doing,  he  involved  the  issue  in  more  or  less  doubt  and  hazard. 

He  relied  on  the  effects  produced  on  the  people  by  his  dreadful  cannonade, 
and  the  result  proves  that  he  was  right ;  but  his  anxiety  to  clear  the  vessels 
from  the  contest  shows  that  there  was  a  power  still  unconquered,  which  he 
thought  it  better  to  leave  to  be  restrained  by  the  suffering  population  of  the  city, 
than  keep  in  a  state  of  exasperation  and  activity  by  his  presence.  What  was 
this  power  but  an  unsubdued  energy  in  the  batteries  ] 

The  true  solution  of  the  question  is,  then,  not  so  much  the  amount  of  injury 
done  on  the  one  side  or  the  other — particularly  as  there  was,  on  the  one  side,  a 
city  to  suffer,  as  well  as  the  batteries — as  the  relative  efficiency  of  the  parties 
when  the  battle  closed  at  about  eleven  o'clock.  All  political  agitation  and  pop- 
ular clamor  aside,  what  would  have  been  the  result  had  the  fight  been  continued, 
or  even  had  Lord  Exmouth  renewed  it  next  morning  ? 

These  are  questions  that  can  be  answered  only  on  conjecture ;  but  the  manner 
the  battle  ended  certainly  leaves  room  for  many  doubts  whether,  had  the  subse- 
quent demands  of  Lord  Exmouth  been  rejected,  he  had  it  in  his  power  to  enforce 
them  by  his  ships :  whether,  indeed,  if  he  had  renewed  the  fight,  he  would  not 
have  been  signally  defeated. 

On  the  whole,  we  do  not  think  that  this  battle,  although  it  stands  pre-eminent 
as  an  example  of  naval  success  over  batteries,  presents  any  arguments  to  shake 
the  confidence  which  fortifications,  well  situated,  well  planned,  and  well  fought, 
deserve,  as  the  defences  of  a  seaboard. 

GIBRALTAR. 

The  attack  on  the  water  batteries  of  Gibraltar  in  September,  1782,  by  the 
French  and  Spanish  floating  batteries,  is  a  well  known  instanc^of  the  power  of 
guns  on  shore. 

These  floating  batteries  had  been  rendered,  as  was  suppchapj  ^ot-proof  and 
shell-proof,  by  several  additional  thicknesses  of  timber  tumst  "e  .des,  and  by 
covering  the  decks  with  a  roof  of  sloping  timbers.  csultj 

They  mounted  142  guns  on  the  engaged  side,  with  "in  *  »*&  §ve  to  replace 
any  that  might  be  dismounted.  They  were  anchored 'o  {n  lince  cf  about 
1,000  yards  from  the  walls,  and  were  opposed  by  aV ••"  at  the  Sfsf- 

After  a  protracted  cannonade,  nine  of  the  floating'?&L85  guns.  C*kurnt  by  hot 
shot  from  the  shore,  and  the  tenth,  having  been  taken  pos&vL  .on  of  by  the 
victors,  was  set  on  fire  by  them. 

No  material  injury  was  done  to  the  works  of  the  town  by  their  fire;  and  only 
eighty-five  men  and  officers  were  killed  and  wounded  by  the  fire  from  these 
vessels,  together  with  a  very  violent  cannonade  and  bombardment,  from  the 


siege  batteries. 


BATTLE  OF  ALGESIRAS. 


On  the  6th  July,  1801,  the  French  Admiral  Lenois  was  lying  at  anchor  off 
the  town  of  Algesiras  with  two  ships  of  80  guns,  one  of  74  guns,  and  one  frigate. 
To  the  south  of  him,  on  a  small  island,  was  a  battery  called  the  Green  Island 
battery,  mounting  seven  18  and  24-pounders;  and  to  the  north  of  him,  on  the 
main,  another  battery  called  St  Jaques's  battery,  mounting  five  18-pounders. 
There  were,  besides,  fourteen  Spanish  gunboats  anchored  near,  making  a  total 
of  306  guns  afloat  and  12  guns  in  battery — altogether,  318  guns. 

Sir  James  Saumarez,  hearing  that  Lenois  was  in  this  position,  advanced 
against  him  from  Cadiz  with  two  ships  of  80  guns,  four  of  74  guns,  one  frigate, 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  159 

and  a  lugger — in  all,  502  guns.  On  his  approach,  Lenois,  who  was  anchored  in 
a  line  nearly  north  and  south,  at  some  distance  from  the  shore,  cut  his  cables 
and  ran  into  shoal  water,  to  prevent  being  doubled  upon  by  the  British  line ; 
this  manoeuvre,  at  the  same  time,  entirely  unmasked  the  fire  of  the  batteries. 

The  Hannibal,  one  of  the  British  74's,  in  attempting  to  close  with  the  French 
admiral,  touched  the  ground  and  could  not  be  floated  off.  She,  however,  con- 
tinued the  fight  with  great  obstinacy,  even  for  a  considerable  time  after  she  was 
deserted  by  her  consorts.  Not  being  able  to  double  upon  the  French  line,  an 
attempt  was  made  to  assault  the  Green  Isle  battery,  which,  being  badly  served 
by  the  Spaniards,  had  nearly  ceased  firing.  But  this  attempt  was  anticipated 
by  the  arrival  at  the  island  of  a  party  sent  from  the  French  frigate  lying  near, 
and  the  assault  was  defeated,  with  the  loss  to  the  English  of  one  boat  sunk  and 
another  taken,  the  Frenchmen  renewing  with  vigor  the  fire  of  the  battery.  At 
the  north  end  of  the  line  the  French  admiral  was  aided  by  seven  gunboats, 
which  took  so  active  a  part  in  the  fight  that  five  of  them  were  sunk  or  rendered 
unserviceable.  The  St.  Jaques  battery  being,  however,  served  sluggishly  by 
the  Spaniards,  the  French  sent  a  party  from  the  Dessaix  to  impart  greater 
activity  and  effect. 

After  the  combat  had  continued  about  six  hours,  the  British  squadron  drew 
off  greatly  damaged,  leaving  the  Hannibal  74  alone  and  aground;  and  she,  after 
suffering  great  loss,  was  obliged  to  strike.  The  French  insist  that  the  Pompee, 
an  English  ship  of  80  guns,  had  struck  her  colors,  but,  as  they  could  not  take 
possession,  she  drifted  off  and  was  then  towed  away ;  it  is  believed  she  was 
entirely  dismasted. 

We  do  not  know  the  loss  in  the  French  squadron,  but  the  killed,  wounded, 
and  missing  in  the  English  fleet  amounted  to  375  men,  being  more  than  twelve 
men  for  every  ten  guns  against  them,  and  being  twice  as  great,  in  proportion,  as 
the  English  loss  in  the  battle  of  Trafalgar. 

In  this  battle  of  Algesiras  there  were  502  English  guns  afloat,  acting  against 
306  French  guns  afloat.  As  the  English  chose  their  own  time  for  the  attack, 
and  had  the  wind,  it  is  only  reasonable  to  suppose  that  306  of  the  English  guns 
were  a  match  for  the  306  guns  in  the  French  vessels.  This  will  leave  196 
English  guns  afloat  opposed  to  the  12  guns  in  the  batteries,  or,  reckoning  one 
side  only  of  each  ship,  it  shows  98  guns  in  the  British  fleet  to  have  been  over- 
matched by  the  twelve  guns  in  the  batteries. 

There  never  was  a  more  signal  and  complete  discomfiture ;  and  it  will  admit 
of  no  other  explanation  than  that  just  given,  namely,  that  the  two  small  batteries, 
one  of  5  and  the  other  of  7  guns,  partly  18  and  partly  24-pounders,  more  than 
compensated  for  the  difference  in  favor  of  the  British  fleet  of  196  guns. 

The  Hannibal  got  aground,  it  is  true,  but  she  continued  to  use  her  guns  with 
the  best  effect  until  she  surrendered ;  and,  even  on  the  supposition  that  this  ship 
was  useless  after  she  grounded,  the  British  had  still  an  excess  of  122  guns  over 
the  French  fleet  and  batteries. 

These  batteries  were  well  placed,  and  probably  well  planned  and  constructed, 
but  there  was  nothing  extraordinary  about  them ;  their  condition  before  the  fight 
was  complained  of  by  Admiral  Lenois ;  and  they  were  badly  fought  in  the  early 
part  of  the  action;  still  the  12  guns  on  shore  were  found  to  be  more  than  equiva- 
lent for  two  seventy-fours  and  one  frigate. 

BATTLE  OF  FUENTERABIA. 

This  recent  affair  introduces  steam  batteries  to  our  notice. 

On  the  llth  July,  1836,  six  armed  steamers,  together  with  two  British  and 
several  Spanish  gunboats,  attacked  the  little  town  of  Fuenterabia.  The  place 
is  surrounded  only  by  an  old  wall ;  and  two  guns  of  small  calibre,  to  which,  on 
the  evening  of  the  attack,  a  third  gun  of  larger  calibre  was  added,  formed  the 


160  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

entire  of  its  artillery.  The  squadron  cannonaded  this  place  during  a  whole  day, 
and  effected  absolutely  nothing  beyond  unroofing  and  demolishing  a  few  poor 
and  paltry  houses,  not  worth  perhaps  the  ammunition  wasted  in  the  attack. 
What  may  have  been  the  number  of  guns  and  weight  of  metal  which  the  assail- 
ants brought  is  unknown;  though  the  superiority,  independent  of  the  superior 
weight  of  metal,  must  have  been  at  least  ten  to  one ;  but  not  the  slightest  mili- 
tary result  was  obtained. — (See  United  Service  Journal,  August,  1836,  page 
531.) 

We  will  now  turn  to  affairs  of  a  similar  character  on  our  own  coast. 

In  June,  1776,  Sir  Peter  Parker,  commanding  a  squadron  of  two  ships  of  50 
guns,  four  of  28  guns,  two  of  20  guns,  and  a  bomb-ketch — in  all  (according  to 
their  rate)  252  guns — attacked  Fort  Moultrie,  in  Charleston  harbor,  South 
Carolina. 

It  is  stated  that  the  fort  mounted  "  about  thirty  pieces  of  heavy  artillery." 
Three  of  the  smaller  vessels  were  aground  for  a  time  during  the  action ;  and  one 
of  them  could  not  be  floated  off,  and  was,  in  consequence,  burnt  by  the  English. 
Deducting  this  vessel  as  not  contributing  to  the  attack,  and  supposing  that  the 
other  two  were  engaged  but  half  the  time,  the  English  force  may  be  estimated 
at  200  guns ;  or,  reckoning  on  broadside  only,  at  100  guns  against  30  guns. 

The  English  were  defeated  with  great  loss  of  life,  and  injury  to  the  vessels  ; 
while  the  fort  suffered  in  no  material  degree,  and  lost  but  30  men.  The  killed 
and  wounded  in  the  squadron  were  reported  by  the  commodore  to  be  205,  being 
for  every  ten  guns  employed  against  them  more  than  68  men  killed  and  wounded, 
a  loss  more  than  eleven  times  as  great,  in  proportion  to  the  opposing  force,  as 
the  loss  at  the  battle  of  Trafalgar. 

In  September,  1814,  a  squadron  of  small  vessels,  consisting  of  two  ships  and 
two  brigs,  mounting  about  90  guns,  attacked  Fort  Boyer,  at  the  mouth  of  Mo- 
bile bay.  A  false  attack  was  at  the  same  time  made  by  a  party  of  marines, 
artillery,  and  Indians,  on  the  land  side.  The  fort  was  very  small,  and  could 
not  have  mounted  more  than  twenty  guns  on  all  sides,  nor  more  than  fifteen  guns 
on  the  water  fronts.  The  action  continued  between  two  and  three  hours,  when 
one  of  the  ships  being  so  injured  as  to  be  unmanageable,  drifted  ashore  under 
the  guns,  and  was  abandoned  and  burnt  by  the  English ;  the  other  vessels  re- 
treated after  suffering  severely.  There  were  ten  men  killed  and  wounded  in  the 
fort ;  the  loss  on  the  other  part  is  not  known. 

The  affair  of  Stonmgton  during  the  last  war  affords  another  instance  of  suc- 
cessful defence  by  a  battery.  In  this  case  there  were  only  two  guns,  (eighteen- 
pounders,)  in  a  battery  which  was  only  three  feet  high  and  without  embrasures. 
The  battery,  being  manned  exclusively  by  citizen  volunteers  from  the  town, 
repelled  a  persevering  attack  of  a  sloop-of-war,  causing  serious  loss  and  damage, 
but  suffering  none. 

The  only  other  instance  we  will  adduce  is  that  of  the  late  attack  on  the  castle 
of  St.  Juan  de  Ulloa.  Having  before  us  a  plan  of  this  work,  made  on  the  spot 
after  the  surrender,  by  a  French  engineer  officer  who  was  one  of  the  expedition ; 
having  also  his  official  account  of  the  affair,  as  well  as  narratives  by  several  eye- 
witnesses, we  can  fully  understand  the  circumstances  attending  the  operations, 
and  are  liable  to  no  material  errors. 

On  the  27th  of  November,  1838,  Admiral  Baudin  anchored  at  the  distance  of 
about  seven-eighths  of  a  mile  in  a  northeast  direction  from  the  castle,  with  the 
frigates  La  Nureide,  of  52  guns,  La  Glorie,  of  52  guns,  and  L'Iphigenie,  of  60 
guns,  and,  after  being  a  short  time  in  action,  he  was  joined  by  La  Creole,  of  24 
guns ;  in  all,  188  guns,  according  to  the  rate  of  the  ships.  In  a  position  nearly 
north  from  the  castle,  and  at  a  distance  of  more  than  a  mile,  two  bomb-ketches, 
carrying  each  two  large  mortars,  were  anchored.  The  wind  being  adverse,  all 
the  vessels  were  towed  into  position  by  two  armed  steamboats  belonging  to  the 
squadron.  "  It  was  lucky  for  us,"  says  the  reporter,  "  that  the  Mexicans  did 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  161 

not  disturb  this  operation,  which  lasted  near  two  hours,  and  that  they  permitted 
us  to  commence  the  fire."  He  further  says  :  "  We  were  exposed  to  the  fire  of 
one  24-pounder,  five  16-pounders,  seven  12-pounders,  one  8-pounder,  and  five 
18-pounder  carronades — in  all,  19  pieces  only"  In  order  the  better  to  judge 
of  these  batteries,  we  will  convert  them,  in  proportion  to  the  weight  of  balls,  into 
24-pounders ;  and  we  find  these  19  guns  equivalent  to  less  than  12  guns  of  that 
calibre.  But  we  must  remark  that,  although  this  simplifies  the  expression  of 
force,  it  presents  it  greatly  exaggerated;  it  represents,  for  example,  three 
8-pounders  as  equivalent  to  one  24-pounder ;  whereas,  at  the  distance  the  parties 
were  engaged,  (an  efficient  distance  for  a  24-pounder,)  the  8-pounders  would  be 
nearly  harmless.  It  represents  also  the  18-pounder  carronades  as  possessing 
each  three-fourths  the  power  of  a  long  24-pounder ;  whereas  at  that  distance 
they  would  not  be  better  than  the  8-pounders,  if  so  good.  Although  the  above 
estimate  of  the  force  of  the  batteries  is  too  great  by  full  one-third,  we  will, 
nevertheless,  let  it  stand  as  representing  that  force. 

There  were,  then,  twelve  24-pounders  engaged  against  94  guns,  (estimating 
for  one  broadside  only  of  each  ship)  and  4  sea-mortars.  During  the  action  a 
shell  caused  the  magazine  in  the  cavalier  to  explode,  whereby  three  of  the  nine- 
teen guns  were  destroyed,  reducing  the  force  to  about  ten  24-pounders. 

Considering  the  manner  in  which  this  work  was  defended,  it  would  not  have 
been  surprising  if  the  ships  had  prevailed  by  mere  dint  of  their  guns  ;  but  our 
author  states,  expressly,  that  though  the  accident  just  mentioned  completely  ex- 
tinguished the  fire  of  the  cavalier,  still  "  the  greater  part  of  the  other  pieces 
which  could  see  the  ships,  to  the  number  of  sixteen,  continued  to  fire  till  tlpe 
end  of  the  action."  They  were  not  dismounted,  therefore,  and  the  loss  of  life 
at  them  could  not  have  been  great.  What,  then,  was  the  cause  of  the  surrender 
of  the  castle  ? 

Much  has  been  said  of  the  great  use  made  by  the  ships  of  horizontal  shells, 
or  shells  fired  at  low  angles  from  large  guns  ;  and  it  is  a  prevailing  idea  that  the 
work  was  torn  to  pieces,  or  greatly  dilapidated  by  these  missiles.  This  engineer 
officer  states  that,  on  visiting  the  castle  after  the  cannonade,  he  found  "  it  had 
been  more  injured  by  the  French  balls  and  shells  than  he  had  expected ;  still 
the  casemates  in  the  curtains,  serving  as  barracks  for  the  troops,  were  intact." 
"Of  187  guns  found  in  the  fort,  102  were  still  serviceable;  29  only  had  been 
dismounted  by  the  French  fire.  The  heaviest  injury  was  sustained  by  the 
cavalier"  (where  a  magazine  exploded)  "in  bastion  No.  2  ;  in  battery  No.  5," 
(where  another  magazine  was  blown  up,)  "  and  the  officers'  quarters."  They 
found  in  the  castle  twenty-five  men  whose  wounds  were  too  severe  to  permit 
their  removal  with  the  rest  of  the  garrison. 

Of  the  twenty-nine  guns  dismounted,  five  were  thrown  down  with  the  cava- 
lier ;  the  remaining  twenty-four  guns  were  no  doubt  situated  in  parts  of  the  work 
opposite  to  the  attack,  being  pointed  in  other  directions,  and  were  struck  by 
shots  or  shells  that  had  passed  over  the  walls  facing  the  ships.  There  is  reason 
to  suppose  that  of  the  remaining  sixteen  guns  pointed  at  the  French  none  were 
dismounted ;  and  we  know  that  most  of  them  continued  to  fire  till  the  end  of 
the  action. 

The  two  explosions  may  certainly  have  been  caused  by  shells  fired  at  low 
angles  from  Paixhan  guns.  But  it  is  much  more  likely  they  were  caused  by 
shells  from  the  sea-mortars,  because  these  last  were  much  larger,  and  therefore 
more  likely  to  break  through  the  masonry ;  because,  being  fired  at  high  angles, 
they  would  fall  vertically  upon  the  magazines,  which  were  less  protected  on  the 
top  than  on  the  sides ;  and  because  there  were  more  of  these  large  shells  fired 
than  of  the  small  ones,  in  the  ratio  of  302  to  117. 

But  considering  that  the  cannonade  and  bombardment  lasted  about  six  hours, 
and  that  8,250  shot  and  shells  were  fixed  by  the  French,  it  is  extraordinary 
that  there  were  no  more  than  two  explosions  of  magazines,  and  that  no  greater 
H.  Rep.  Com.  86 11 


162  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

injury  was  done  the  fort,  since  it  is  certain  that  there  were  no  less  than  six 
other  similar  magazines  situated  on  the  rampart,  in  different  parts  of  the  work, 
not  one  of  which  was  shell-proof.  The  surrender,  after  these  explosions,  was ' 
a  very  natural  event,  with  a  governor  and  garrison  who  seem  to  have  known  as 
little  about  the  proper  preparation  for  such  contests  as  about  the  mode  of  con- 
ducting them.  The  second  explosion  must  have  satisfied  them,  if  the  first  did 
not,  that  they  had  introduced  within  their  own  precincts  much  more  formidable 
means  of  destruction  than  any  it  was  in  the  power  of  the  French  to  send  from 
gun  or  mortar. 

The  important  points  to  be  noticed  in  this  contest  are  these : 

1.  The  French  took  such  a  position  that  their  94  guns  were  opposed  by  the 
equivalent  of  10  or  12  guns  only. 

2.  In  proof  of  the  inefficiency  of  the  Mexican  guns  generally,  it  may  be  stated 
that  although  the  three  French  frigates  were  struck  in  their  hulls  about  three 
hundred  times,  they  lost  but  thirty-three  men  in  killed  and  wounded.     The 
Iphigenie  was  hulled  160  times,  and  yet  had  but  thirteen  men  hurt.     Very  few, 
therefore,  of  these  160  balls  could  have  passed  through  her  sides. 

3.  It  appears  that  very  few,  if  any,  of  the  guns  exposed  to  the  direct  action 
of  the  French  broadsides  were  dismounted  or  silenced  by  their  fire. 

4.  The  narratives  of  the  day  contain  exaggerated  statements  of  injury  inflicted 
on  the  walls  by  shells  fired  from  guns ;  the  professional  report,  above  quoted, 
of  the  chief  engineer  of  the  expedition,  neither  speaks  of  nor  alludes  to  any 
such  injury.     After  deducting  from  the  parts  of  the  work  said  to  be  most 
injured — the  cavalier  and  also  battery  No.  5,  in  each  of  which  a  magazine 
exploded — there  remain,  as  having  suffered  most,  the  quarters  of  the  officers  and 
bastion  No.  2.     As  to  the  first,  if  it  was  elevated  above  the  walls,  as  is  probable, 
it  would  of  course  suffer  severely,  because  the  walls  of  mere  barracks  or  quarters 
are  never  made  of  a  thickness  to  resist  shot  or  shells  of  any  kind ;  and  if  not 
elevated  above  the  walls,  but  covered  by  them,  the  injury  resulted,  most  proba- 
bly, from  shells  fired  at  high  angles  from  the  sea-mortars,  and  not  from  shells 
fired  nearly  horizontally  from  the  Paixhan  guns.     Whether  the  injury  sustained 
by  bastion  No.  2  was  the  effect  of  shot  and  shells  upon  the  face  of  the  walls,  or 
of  shells  falling  vertically  within  the  bastion,  is  not  stated.     It  was  probably 
due  in  part  to  both.     If  there  had  been  any  extraordinary  damage  done  by  the 
horizontal  shells,  we  may  reasonably  suppose  special  mention  would  have  been 
made  of  it,  because  it  was  the  first  time  that  this  missile^  had  been  tried,  in  a 
large  way,  in  actual  warfare.     That  anything  like  a  breach  could  have  been 
effected  with  solid  shot,  at  that  distance  and  in  that  time,  we  know  to  be  im- 
possible; but  it  is  neither  unreasonable  to  suppose,  nor  unlikely,  that  many  of 
the  heavy  vertical  shells  may  have  fallen  in  the  bastion  and  caused  much  injury. 
Whatever  may  have  been  the  cause  of  the  damage,  or  its  amount,  it  did  not,  we 
have  reason  to  believe,  extinguish  the  fire  of  any  of  the  five  16-pounders  that 
were  pointed  from  the  bastion  against  the  ships. 

5.  So  far  as  effects  were  produced  by  the  direct  action  of  the  Fre'nch  arma- 
ment, whether  guns,  bomb-cannon,  or  sea-mortars,  it  does  not  appear  that  there 
was  the  slightest  reason  for  the  submission  of  the  fort.     There  is  little  doubt 
that  the  8,250  shot  and  shells  fired  at  the  castle  must  have  greatly  marred  the 
surface  of  the  walls,  and  it  is  not  unlikely  that  three  or  four  striking  near  each 
other  may  have  made  deep  indentations,  especially  as  the  stone  is  soft,  beyond 
any  material  applied  to  building  in  any  part  of  the  United  States.     But  these 
are  not  injuries  of  material  consequence,  however  they  may  appear  to  the  inex- 
perienced eye,  and  we  should  risk  little  in  asserting  that,  abstracting  the  effects 
of  the  explosion,  the  castle  was  as  inaccessible  to  assault  after  the  cannonade 
as  before  it ;  that,  so  far  as  regards  the  levelling  of  obstacles  lying  in  the  way 
of  a  sword  in  hand  attack,  the  8,250  shot  and  shells  might  as  well  have  been 
fired  in  the  opposite  direction. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  163 

6.  The  explosion,  however,  of  two  deposits  of  powder  in  the  castle,  one  of 
which  is  reported  to  have  buried  sixty  men  in  its  ruins,  showed  the  defenders 
that,  although  they  might  evade  the  vertical  fire,  and  their  works  might  cover 
them  from  the  horizontal  fire  of  the  French,  there  was  no  protection  against,  no 
evasion  of,  the  dreadful  ravages  of  exploding  magazines.     With  this  ruin  around 
them,  and  a  sixfold  greater  ruin  likely,  at  every  moment,  to  burst  upon  their 
heads,  it  is  not  surprising  that  a  garrison,  found  in  circumstances  so  unmilitary, 
doubted  their  power  of  protracted  resistance. 

7.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  explosions  have  nothing  to  do  either 
with  the  question  of  relative  strength  or  with  the  peculiarities  of  the  French 
attack.     No  defences,  with  such  management,  can  be  effective,  and  no  attack 
can  fail.     The   French,  not   dreaming  of  such  culpable,   such   inconceivable 
negligence  on  a  point  always  receiving  the  most  careful  attention,  entered  upon 
the  cannonade  with  no  other  purpose,  as  is  avowed,  than  that  of  somewhat 
weakening  the  defences  and  dispiriting  and  fatiguing  the  garrison,  before  pro- 
ceeding to  an  assault,  which  was  to  have  followed  at  night,  and  for  which  all 
preparations  had  been  made.     Had  the  Mexicans  thrown  all  the  powder  of 
these  eight  magazines  into  the  sea,  or  had  they  transported  it  to  their  barracks, 
and  every  man,  making  a  pillow  of  a  keg,  slept  through  the  whole  cannonade, 
as  might  have  been  done  safely,  in  their  quarters  in  the  curtain  casemates,  the 
castle  of  St.  Juan  de  Ulloa  would,  we  doubt  not,  have  been  as  competent  to 
resist  the  projected  assault  as  it  was  when  the  French  first  arrived  before  it 

8.  The  number  of  killed  and  wounded  in  the  French  vessels,  in  proportion 
to  the  guns  acting  against  them  was,  for  ten  guns,  more  than  twenty-seven 
men,  being  upwards  of  four  times  as  great  as  the  loss  sustained  by  the  English 
at  the  battle  of  Trafalgar. 

In  concluding  this  reference  to  facts  in  military  history,  we  will  add  that  we 
do  not  see  how  it  is  possible  to  avoid  making  the  following  deduction,  namely : 
that  fixed  batteries  upon  the  shore  are  capable  of  resisting  the  attacks  of  ships, 
even  when  the  armament  of  the  latter  is  by  far  the  most  numerous  and  heavy. 

There  are  several  reasons  for  this  capacity  in  batteries,  of  which  the  principal 
may  be  thus  stated;  and  these  reasons  apply  to  vessels  of  every  size  and  every 
sort,  to  small  or  large,  to  vessels  moved  by  wind  or  steam.  This  ship  is  every- 
where equally  vulnerable,  and,  large  as  is  her  hull,  the  men  and  the  guns  are 
very  much  concentrated  within  her;  on  the  other  hand,  in  the  properly  con- 
structed battery  it  is  only  the  gun  itself,  a  small  part  of  the  carnage,  and  now 
and  then  a  head  or  an  arm  raised  above  the  parapet  that  can  be  hurt,  the  ratio 
of  the  exposed  surfaces  being  not  less  than  fifteen  or  twenty  to  one.  Next, 
there  is  always  more  or  less  motion  in  the  water,  so  that  the  ship-gun,  although 
it  may  have  been  pointed  accurately  at  one  moment,  at  the  next  will  be  thrown 
entirely  away  from  the  object,  even  when  the  motion  in  the  vessel  is  too  small 
to  be  otherwise  noticed ;  whereas,  in  the  battery  the  gun  will  be  fired  just  as  it 
is  pointed,  and  the  motion  of  the  ship  will  merely  vary  to  the  extent  of  a  few 
inches,  or  at  most  two  or  three  feet,  the  spot  in  which  the  shot  is  to  be  received. 
In  the  ship  there  are,  besides,  many  points  exposed  that  may  be  called  vital 
points;  by  losing  her  rudder,  or  portions  of  her  rigging,  or  of  her  spars,  she 
may  become  unmanageable  and  unable  to  use  her  strength;  she  may  receive 
shots  under  water  and  be  liable  to  sink ;  she  may  receive  hot  shot  and  be  set  on 
fire ;  and  these  damages  are  in  addition  to  those  of  having  her  guns  dismounted 
and  her  people  killed  by  the  shot  which  pierce  her  sides  and  scatter  splinters 
from  her  timbers,  while  the  risks  of  the  battery  are  confined  to  those  mentioned 
above,  namely,  the  risk  that  the  gun,  the  carnage,  or  the  men  may  be  struck. 
That  the  magazines  should  be  exposed,  as  were  those  of  the  castle  St.  Juan  de 
Ulloa,  must  never  be  anticipated  as  possible. 

While  on  this  part  of  our  subject,  it  is  proper  to  advert  to  the  use  of  horizontal 
shells,  or  hollow  shot,  or  Paixhan's  shells,  (as  they  are  variously  called,)  it 


164  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

having  been  argued  that  the  introduction  of  these  missiles  is  seriously  to  impair 
the  utility  of  fortifications  as  a  defence  of  the  sea-coast. 

We  fully  believe  that  the  free  use  of  these  shells  will  have  an  influence  of 
some  importance  on  the  relative  force  of  ship  and  battery,  but  that  influence 
must  be  the  very  reverse  of  such  predictions.  How  are  the  batteries  to  be 
affected  by  them  ?  It  can  be  but  in  two  ways :  first,  the  ship-gun  having  been 
pointed  so  as  to  strike  a  vital  point — that  is  to  say,  a  gun  or  a  carnage — the 
shell  may  explode  at  the  instant  of  contact.  This  explosion  may  possibly  hap- 
pen thus  opportunely,  but  it  would  happen  against  all  chances,  and  if  happen- 
ing, would  probably  do  no  more  than  add  a  few  men  to  the  list  of  killed  and 
wounded.  For  reasons  that  will  soon  appear,  it  is  to  be  doubted  whether  the 
probability  of  dismounting  the  gun  would  be  so  great  as  if  the  missile  were  a 
solid  32-pounder  shot.  Secondly,  if  it  be  not  by  dismounting  the  guns  or  killing 
the  garrison,  the  effect  anticipated  from  these  missiles  must  result  from  the  in- 
jury they  do  the  battery  itself.  Now,  we  are  perfectly  informed  by  military  ex- 
perience as  to  the  effects  of  these  shells  upon  forts  and  batteries,  for  the  shells 
are  not  new,  although  the  guns  may  be  so — the  8-inch  and  the  10-inch  shells 
having  always  been  supplied  in  abundance  to  every  siege-train,  and  being  per- 
fectly understood,  both  as  to  their  effects  and  the  mode  of  using  them. 

Were  it  a  thing  easily  done,  the  blowing  away  of  the  parapets  of  a  work,  (a 
very  desirable  result  to  the  attacking  party,)  would  be  a  common  incident  in  the 
attacks  of  fortifications ;  but  the  history  of  attacks  by  land  or  water  affords  no 
such  instance.  The  only  practicable  way  yet  discovered  of  demolishing  a  forti- 
fication being  by  attaching  a  miner  to  the  foot  of  the  wall,  or  by  dint  of  solid 
shot  and  heavy  charges  fired  unremittingly  during  a  long  succession  of  hours 
upon  the  same  part  of  the  wall,  in  order  not  only  to  break  through  it,  but  to 
break  through  in  such  a  manner  that  the  weight  and  pressure  of  the  incumbent 
mass  may  throw  large  portions  of  the  wall  prostrate.  This,  the  shortest  and 
best  way  of  breaching  a  wall,  requires,  in  the  first  place,  perfect  accuracy  of 
direction,  because  the  same  number  of  shots  that,  being  distributed  over  the 
expanse  of  wall,  would  merely  peel  off  the  face,  would,  if  concentrated  in  a 
single  deep  cut,  cause  the  wall  to  fall ;  and  it  requires,  moreover,  great  power  of 
penetration  in  the  missile — the  charge  of  a  breaching  gun  being  for  that  reason 
one-third  greater  than  the  common  service  charges.  Now,  the  requisite  pre- 
cision of  firing  for  this  effect  is  wholly  unattainable  in  vessels,  whether  the  shot 
be  solid  or  hollow ;  and  if  it  were  attainable,  hollow  shot  would  be  entirely  use- 
less for  the  purpose,  because  every  one  of  them  would,  break  to  pieces  against 
the  wall,  even  when  fired  with  a  charge  much  less  than  the  common  service  charge. 
This  is  no  newly  discovered  fact ;  it  is  neither  new  nor  doubtful.  Every  hollow 
shot  thrown  against  the  wall  of  fort  or  battery  if  fired  with  a  velocity  affording 
any  penetration,  will  unquestionably  be  broken  into  fragments  by  the  shock. 

After  so  much  had  been  said  about  the  effect  of  these  shells  upon  the  castle 
of  St.  Juan  de  Ulloa,  it  was  deemed  advisable,  although  the  result  of  European 
experiments  were  perfectly  well  known,  to  repeat  in  our  own  service  sonle  trials 
touching  this  point.  A  target  was  therefore  constructed,  having  one-third  part 
of  the  length  formed  of  granite,  one-third  of  bricks,  and  the  remaining  third  of 
freestone.  This  was  fired  at  by  a  Paixhan  gun  and  by  a  32-pounder  from  the 
distance  of  half  a  mile,  and  the  anticipated  results  were  obtained,  namely : 

1st.  Whether  it  was  the  granite,  the  brick,  or  the  freestone  that  was  struck, 
the  solid  32-pounder  shot  penetrated  much  deeper  into  the  wall,  and  did  much 
more  damage  than  the  8-inch  hollow  shot;  and — 

2d.  These  last  broke  against  the  wall  in  every  instance  that  the  charge  of  the 
gun  was  sufficient  to  give  them  any  penetration. 

The  rupture  of  the  shell  may  often  cause  the  explosion  of  the  powder  it  con^ 
tains,  because  the  shell,  the  burning  fuse,  and  the  powder  are  all  crushed  up 
together ;  but  the  shell  having  no  penetration,  no  greater  injury  will  be  done  to 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  165 

the  wall  by  the  explosion  than  would  be  caused  by  the  bursting  of  a  shell  that 
had  been  placed  against  it. 

From  all  this  it  appears,  incontrovertibly,  that,  as  regards  the  effects  to  be 
produced  upon  batteries  by  ships,  solid  shot  are  decidedly  preferable  to  hollow 
shot ;  and  the  ship  that,  contemplating  the  destruction  of  batteries,  should  change 
any  of  her  long  24  or  32-pounder  guns  for  Paixhan  guns  would  certainly 
weaken  her  armament.  Her  best  missiles,  at  ordinary  distances,  are  solid  shot; 
and,  if  she  can  get  near,  grape  shot  to  fire  into  the  embrasures  and  over  the 
walls.  The  best  shells  against  batteries  are  the  sea-mortar  shells,  fired  at  high 
elevations ;  which,  being  of  great  weight  and  falling  from  a  great  height,  pene- 
trate deeply,  and  containing  a  considerable  quantity  of  powder  cause  material 
ravage  by  their  explosion.  Such  shells,  however,  can  only  be  fired  by  vessels 
appropriately  fitted. 

The  use  of  these  same  hollow  shot  by  batteries  against  vessels  is,  however, 
an  affair  of  different  character.  The  shells  do  not  break  against  timber,  but 
penetrating  the  bulwarks  they,  in  the  first  place,  would  do  greater  damage  than 
hollow  shot,  by  making  a  larger  hole  and  dispersing  more  splinters  ;  and  having,. 
as  shot,  effected  all  this  injury,  they  would  then  augment  it  many  fold  by  ex- 
ploding. 

In  all  cases  of  close  action  between  ship  and  battery,  the  shells  will  pass 
through  the  nearer  side,  and  if  not  arrested  by  some  object  on  the  deck,  will 
probably  lodge  and  explode  in  the  further  side ;  causing,  by  the  explosion,  a 
much  greater  loss  among  the  crew,  and  greater  injury  to  the  vessel,  than  by  their 
mere  transit  across  the  vessel.  As  before  suggested,  the  vessel  would  suffer 
less  injury  were  her  sides  made  so  thin  as  not  to  retain  the  shell,  permitting  it 
to  pass  through  both  sides,  unless  fired  with  a  small  velocity.  It  is  not  impos- 
sible that  an  extensive  use  of  these  horizontal  shells  may  lead  to  a  reduction  in 
the  thickness  of  ships'  bulwarks. 

In  the  facts  quoted  above,  there  is  no  illustration  of  the  effects  of  hot  shot, 
except  in  the  case  of  Gibraltar.  In  that  attack  the  floating  batteries  were  made 
proof  against  cold  shot,  and,  as  was  thought  by  the  constructor,  proof  against 
hot  shot  also ;  and  so,  indeed,  for  a  time,  it  seemed.  It  was  conceived  that  the 
hot  shot,  when  buried  deep  in  the  closely-jointed  timbers,  would  scarcely  com- 
municate flame ;  and  that  it  would  not  be  difficult,  by  the  use  of  the  fire-engines 
provided,  to  subdue  so  stifled  a  combustion. 

By  making  these  floating  batteries  impenetrable  to  shot,  it  was  supposed  they 
had  been  rendered  equal,  in  perfectly  smooth  Avater,  to  land  batteries,  gun  for 
gun ;  and  so  they  might  then  have  been,  nearly,  had  the  incumbustibility  of  the 
latter  been  imparted  to  them.  But  now  resistance  to  fire  would  not  suffice ; 
these  floating  batteries  must  either  repel  these  horizontal  shells  from  their  bul- 
warks, or,  if  that  be  impossible,  permit  them  to  pass  through  both  sides.  Noth- 
ing can  be  better  calculated  to  exhibit  the  tremendous  effects  of  these  shells 
than  a  vessel  so  thick-sided  as  to  stop  every  shell,  allowing  it  to  burst  when 
surrounded  by  several  feet  of  timber ;  and  there  can  be  no  greater  mistake  than 
supposing  that  by  thickening  the  bulwarks  of  vessels-of-war,  or  fitting  up  steam 
batteries  with  shot-proof  sides,  the  effects  of  land  batteries  are  to  be  annulled, 
or  in  any  material  degree  modified. 

We  will  sum  up  this  branch  of  our  subject  with  the  remark  that  the  facts  of 
history,  and  the  practice  of  all  warlike  nations,  are  in  perfect  accordance  with 
the  conclusions  of  theory.  The  results  that  reason  anticipated  have  occurred 
again  and  again.  And  so  long  as,  on  the  one  side,  batteries  are  formed  of  earth 
and  stone ;  and,  on  the  other,  ships  are  liable  to  be  swallowed  up  by  the  element 
on  which  they  float,  or  to  be  deprived  of  the  means  by  which  they  move ;  so 
long  as  they  can  be  penetrated  by  solid  shot,  set  on  fire  or  blown  up  by  hot  shot, 
or  torn  piecemeal  by  shells,  the  same  results  must,  inevitably,  be  repeated  at 
each  succeeding  trial. 


166  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

But,  after  all,  it  may  be  urged  that  the  general  principle  herein  contended  for, 
namely,  the  superiority  of  batteries  in  a  contest  with  ships,  might  be  admitted ; 
and  still  it  would  remain  to  show  that  batteries  constitute  the  kind  of  defence 
best  adapted  to  our  peculiar  wants.  This  is  true  ;  and  we  will  now  proceed  to 
consider,  severally,  the  cases  to  which  defence  must  be  applied. 

It  may  be  well,  however,  first  to  recall  the  general  scope  of  the  preceding 
argument.  It  has  been  contended  that  floating  defences  should  not  be  relied 
on,  not  because  they  are  actually  incompetent  to  the  duty,  but  because  they 
cannot  fulfil  this  duty  unless  provided  in  inordinate  numbers,  and  at  a  boundless 
expense;  and  we  have  endeavored  to  show  that  this  remark  is  generally  true, 
whether  the  defensive  fleet  be  made  up  of  sea-going  vessels  of  floating  batteries, 
or  of  steam  batteries.  We  have  next  urged  the  point  that  properly  planned  and 
constructed  batteries  are  an  overmatch  for  vessels-of-war,  even  when  greatly 
inferior  to  them  in  armament — sustaining  our  opinion  by  many  striking  exam- 
ples, and  explaining  satisfactorily  the  only  instances  that  have  cast  any  doubt 
on  such  contests.  If  the  facts  and  reasonings  we  have  presented  do  not  convey 
•  the  same  strong  convictions  that  sway  our  own  minds,  it  must  be  because  we 
have  obscured  rather  than  illustrated  them ;  for  it  would  seem  to  be  impossible 
that  facts  could  be  more  unexceptionable,  or  reasons  more  beyond  the  reach  of 
cavil.  However  that  may  be,  we  now  leave  them  to  candid  and  dispassionate 
revisal,  and  proceed  to  examine  the  mode  of  applying  these  defences  to  our  own 
coast. 

It  may  be  well  to  divide  these  into  several  distinct  classes : 

1.  There  will  be  all  the  smaller  towns  upon  the  coast,  constituting  a  very 
numerous  class. 

At  the  same  time  that  no  one  of  these,  of  itself,  would  provoke  an  enterprise  of 
magnitude,  it  is  still  necessary  to  guard  each  and  all  against  the  lesser  attacks. 
A  small  vessel  might  suffice  to  guard  against  single  vessels  that  would  other- 
wise be  tempted  by  facility  to  burn  the  shipping  and  exact  a  contribution ;  but 
something  more  than  this  is  necessary,  since  the  amount  of  temptation  held  out 
by  a  number  of  these  towns  would  be  apt  to  induce  operations  on  a  larger  scale. 
It  might  often  happen,  moreover,  that  our  own  vessels-of-war  would  be  con- 
strained to  take  refuge  in  these  harbors,  and  they  should  find  cover  from  the 
pursuer. 

Although  the  harbors  of  which  we  now  speak  afford  every  variety  of  form 
and  dimension,  there  are  few,  or  none,  wherein  one  or  two  small  forts  and 
batteries  cannot  be  so  placed  as  to  command  all  the  water  that  a  ship-of-war 
can  lie  in,  as  well  as  the  channel  by  which  she  must  enter.  While  the  circum- 
stances of  no  two  of  them  are  so  nearly  alike  as  not  to  modify  the  defences  to 
be  applied  to  them  severally,  all  should  fulfil  certain  common  conditions,  namely  : 
the  passage  into  the  harbors  should  be  strongly  commanded ;  the  enemy  should 
find  no  place,  after  passing,  wherein  he  would  be  safe  from  shot  and  shells ;  and 
the  works  should  be  inaccessible  to  sudden  escalade — that  is  to  say, -a  small 
garrison  should  be  able  to  repel  such  an  assault.  With  works  answering  to 
these  conditions,  and  of  degrees  of  strength  in  accordance  with  the  value  of 
their  respective  trusts,  this  class  of  harbors  may  be  regarded  as  secure.  We 
cannot,  however,  here  avoid  asking  what  would  be  the  mode  of  defence,  if 
purely  naval,  of  these  harbors?  Suppose  the  circumstances  are  deemed  to 
require  the  presence  of  a  frigate,  or  a  steam  frigate,  or  an  equivalent  in  gun- 
boats ;  would  not  two  hostile  frigates,  or  two  steam  frigates,  infallibly  arrive  in 
quest  ?  Could  there  be  devised  a  system  more  certain  to  result  in  the  capture 
of  our  vessels,  and  the  submission  of  our  towns  1 

2.  Another  class  will  consist  of  great  establishments,  such  as  large  cities, 
naval  depots,  &c.,  situated  in  harbors  not  of  too  great  extent  to  admit  of  good 
defence  at  the  entrance,  and  also  at  every  successive  point;  so  that  an  enemy 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  167 

could  find  no  spot  within  in  which  he  could  safely  prepare  for  operations  ulte- 
rior to  the  mere  forcing  an  entrance. 

In  this  class  are  to  be  found  objects  that  are,  in  every  sense,  of  the  highest 
value.  On  the  one  hand,  accumulations  of  military  and  naval  material,  and 
structures  for  naval  accommodation,  that  could  not  be  replaced  during  a  war, 
which  are  of  indispensable  necessity,  and  of  great  cost ;  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  untold  wealth  of  great  cities.  As  these  objects  must  be  great  in  the  eyes  of 
the  enemy — great  for  him  to  gain,  and  for  us  to  lose — corresponding  efforts  on 
his  part  must  be  looked  for  and  guarded  against.  If  he  come  at  all,  it  will  be 
in  power ;  and  the  preparations  on  our  part  must  be  commensurate. 

The  entrance  to  the  harbor,  and  all  the  narrow  passes  within  it,  must  be 
occupied  with  heavy  batteries ;  and  if  nature  does  not  afford  all  the  positions 
deemed  requisite,  some  must,  if  practicable,  be  formed  artificially.  Batteries 
should  succeed  each  other,  along  the  channel,  so  that  the  enemy  may  nowhere 
find  shelter  from  effective  range  of  shot  and  shells  while  within  the  harbor,  even 
should  he  succeed  in  passing  the  first  batteries. 

Provided  the  shores  admit  this  disposition,  and  the  defences  be  supplied  with 
an  armanent,  numerous,  heavy,  and  selected  with  reference  to  the  effects  on 
shipping,  the  facts  we  have  quoted  from  history  show  that  these  defences  may 
be  relied  on. 

If  the  mere  passing  under  sail,  with  a  leading  wind  and  tide,  one,  or  even 
two  sets  of  batteries,  and  then  carrying  on  operations  out  of  the  reach  of  these, 
or  any  other,  were  all,  the  enemy  might  perhaps  accomplish  it;  but  our  present 
supposition  is,  that  with  this  class  his  ulterior  proceedings,  and  finally  his  return, 
are  to  be  subject  to  the  incessant  action  of  the  defences. 

3.  This  brings  us  to  consider  a  third  class,  consisting  of  establishments  of 
importance  situated  at  a  distance  up  some  river  or  bay,  there  being  intermediate 
space  too  wide  to  be  commanded  from  the  shores.  In  such  cases  the  defence 
must  be  concentrated  upon  the  narrow  passes,  and  must,  of  course,  be  appor- 
tioned in  armament  to  the  value  of  the  objects  covered.  When  the  value  is  not 
very  great,  a  stout  array  of  batteries  at  the  best  positions  would  deter  an  enemy 
from  an  attempt  to  force  the  passage,  since  his  advantage,  in  case  of  success, 
would  not  be  commensurate  with  any  imminent  risk.  But  with  the  more  valua- 
ble establishments  it  might  be  otherwise;  the  consequence  of  success  might 
justify  all  the  risk  to  be  encountered  in  rapidly  passing  in  face  of  batteries, 
however  powerful.  This  condition  of  things  requires  peculiar  precautions, 
under  any  system  of  defence.  If,  after  having  occupied  the  shores,  in  the  nar- 
row places,  in  the  best  manner,  with  batteries,  we  are  of  opinion  that  the  temp- 
tation may  induce  the  enemy,  notwithstanding,  to  run  the  gauntlet,  the  obstruc- 
tion of  the  passage  must  be  resorted  to.  By  this  is  not  meant  the  permanent 
obstruction  of  the  passage;  such  a  resort,  besides  the  great  expense,  might 
entail  the  ruin  of  the  channel.  The  obstruction  is  meant  to  be  the  temporary 
closing  by  heavy  floating  masses. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  a  double  line  of  rafts,  each  raft  being  of  large  size 
and  anchored  with  strong  chains,  would  make  it  impossible  to  pass  without 
first  removing  some  of  the  obstructions,  and  it  might  clearly  be  made  impossible 
to  effect  this  removal  under  the  fire  of  the  batteries.  Such  obstructions  need 
not  be  resorted  to  until  the  breaking  out  of  a  war,  as  they  could  then  be  speedily 
formed,  should  the  preparation  of  the  enemy  be  of  a  threatening  nature. 

There  would  be  nothing  in  these  obstructions  inconsistent  with  our  use  of 
part  of  the  channel,  since  two  or  three  of  the  rafts  might  be  kept  out  of  line, 
ready  to  move  into  their  places  at  an  hour's  notice. 

The  greatest  danger  to  which  these  obstructions  would  be  exposed  would  be 
from  explosion  vessels ;  and  from  those  they  might  be  protected  by  a  boom,  or 
a  line  of  smaller  rafts  in  front. 

From  what  has  just  been  said,  it  will  be  perceived  that,  when  the  inducements 


168  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

are  such  as  to  bring  the  enemy  forward  in  great  power,  and  efficient  batteries 
can  be  established  only  at  certain  points,  we  are  not  then  to  rely  on  them  'ex- 
clusively. In  such  a  case,  the  enemy  should  be  stopped  by  some  physical  im- 
pediments ;  and  the  batteries  must  be  strong  enough  to  prevent  his  removing 
these  impediments,  and  also  to  prevail  in  a  cannonade  should  the  enemy  under- 
take to  silence  the  works. 

The  conditions  these  obstructions  have  to  fulfil  are  these : 

1st.  They  must  be  of  a  nature  to  be  fixed  readily,  and  to  be  speedily  re- 
moved when  there  is  no  longer  occasion  for  them ;  and,  to  this  end,  they  must 
be  afloat. 

2d.  They  must  have  adequate  inertia  to  resist,  or  rather  not  to  be  destroyed 
or  displaced  by,  the  shock  of  the  heaviest  ship  ;  and,  in  order  to  this,  they  must 
be  held  by  the  heaviest  and  strongest  cables  and  anchors. 

3d.  They  must  be  secure  from  the  effects  of  explosive  vessels ;  and,  if  in 
danger  from  this  source,  must  be  covered  as  above  mentioned. 

We  do  not  say  what  are  the  exact  circumstances  in  which  all  these  conditions 
will  be  fulfilled,  though  we  think  the  idea  long  ago  presented  by  the  board  of 
engineers  will,  with  modifications,  embrace  them  all. 

The  idea  is  this  :  Suppose  a  line  (extending  across  the  channel)  of  rafts,  sep- 
arated from  each  other  by  a  space  less  than  the  breadth  of  a  ship-of-war,  each 
raft  being  about  90  feet  long,  30  feet  wide,  and  6  feet  deep,  formed  of  strong 
timbers,  crossed  and  braced  in  all  directions,  and  fastened  together  in  the  strong- 
est manner.  A  long-scope  chain  cable  is  to  proceed  from  each  of  the  four  cor- 
ners, two  obliquely  up  stream  and  two  obliquely  down  stream,  to  very  heavy 
anchors ;  and  there  should  also  be  a  very  strong  chain  cable  passing  from  one 
raft  to  another.  Suppose  a  ship,  striking  one  of  the  rafts,  to  break  the  chains 
leading  down  the  stream :  in  doing  this,  she  must  lose  much  of  her  momentum. 
She  has,  then,  "under  her  fore  foot,"  the  raft  connected  by  a  strong  chain  with 
the  rafts  to  the  right  and  left ;  on  being  tightened,  this  chain  will  throw  the 
strain  upon  the  down  stream  cable  of  that  adjoining  raft  towards  which  the  ship 
happens  to  tend.  If  we  suppose  it  possible  for  these  chains  also  to  be  parted  by 
the  power  still  remaining  in  the  ship,  or  by  impulses  received  from  succeeding 
vessels,  there  will  be  other  chains  still  to  break  in  the  same  way.  After  the 
down  stream  chains  are  all  parted,  the  rafts  will  "  bring  up  "  in  a  new  position, 
(higher  up  the  channel,)  by  the  anchors  that,  in  the  first  instance,  were  pointed 
up  stream.  Here  a  resistance,  precisely  like  that  first  overcome,  is  to  be  en- 
countered by  vessels  that  have  lost  most  of  their  force  in  breaking  the  successive 
chains,  and  in  pushing  these  great  masses  of  timber  before  them  through  the 
water.  Should  there  exist  a  doubt  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  these  remaining 
anchors  and  chains,  or  should  it  be  deemed  most  prudent  to  leave  nothing  un- 
certain, a  second  similar  line  may  be  placed  a  short  distance  above  the  first. 

The  best  proportions  and  dimensions  of  the  rafts  remain  to  be  determined ; 
but  as  there  is  scarcely  a  limit  to  the  strength  that  may  be  given  to,  the  rafts 
themselves,  and  to  the  means  by  which  they  are  to  be  held  to  their  positions, 
and  to  each  other,  the  success  of  a  well  arranged  obstruction  of  this  sort  can 
hardly  be  doubted. 

The  expense  would  not  be  great  in  the  first  instance,  and  all  the  materials 
would  be  available  for  other  purposes,  when  no  longer  needed  for  this. 

It  may  be  repeated  here,  that  such  expedients  need  not  be  resorted  to,  except 
to  cover  objects  of  the  highest  importance  and  value,  such  as  would  induce  an 
enemy  to  risk  a  large  expedition.  For  objects  of  less  importance,  batteries 
would  afford  ample  protection.  It  will  be  remembered  that  this  last  power  is, 
when  once  established  in  any  position,  a  constant  quantity ;  and,  although  it 
should  be  incompetent  to  effect  decisive  results  when  diffused  over  a  large  fleet, 
may  be  an  overmatch  for  any  small  force  upon  which  it  should  be  concentrated. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  169 

At  the  same  time,  therefore,  that  there  is  the  less  liability  to  heavy  attacks, 
there  will  be,  iu  the  batteries,  the  greater  capacity  of  resistance  to  others. 

It  must  not  be  urged,  as  a  reproach  to  fortifications,  that,  in  the  case  we  are 
considering,  they  are  obliged  to  call  in  aid  from  other  sources,  so  long  as  these 
aids  are  cheap,  efficient,  and  of  easy  resort.  By  the  mode  we  have  suggested, 
the  defence  will  undoubtedly  be  complete,  every  chance  of  success  being  on  the 
side  of  the  defence ;  that  is  to  say,  if  any  confidence  is  to  be  placed  in  the  les- 
sons of  experience.  How,  on  the  other  hand,  will  the  same  security  be  attained 
by  naval  means  ?  Only,  as  before  shown,  by  keeping  within  the  harbor  a  fleet 
or  squadron,  or  whatever  it  may  be,  which  shall  be  at  all  times  superior  to  the 
enemy. 

In  a  naval  defence  there  will  be  no  advantage  in  obstructions  of  any  sort,  for 
there  can  be  no  lessening  of  the  array  of  guns  in  consequence  of  such  obstruc- 
tions ;  because,  if  these  obstructions  are  under  the  fire  of  the  floating  defences, 
the  enemy  will  first  subdue  that  fire,  and  then  remove  the  obstructions  at  his 
leisure.  If  this  fire  prove  too  powerful  for  the  enemy,  the  obstructions  will 
have  been  unnecessary,  and  will  serve  only  to  shut  up  our  own  fleet,  preventing 
the  prompt  pursuit  of  a  beaten  foe. 

4.  There  is  a  fourth  class,  consisting  of  harbors,  or  rather  bays  or  estuaries, 
of  such  expanse  that  batteries  cannot  be  made  to  control  the  passage.  These 
have  been  before  spoken  of.  If  the  occupation  of,  or  passage  through  these 
must  be  defended,  it  must  be  by  other  means  than  batteries  upon  the  shore. 
The  reliance  must,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  be  a  floating  defence,  of  magni- 
tude at  least  equal  to  the  force  the  enemy  may  bring.  The  complete  defence 
of  each  of  these  bays  would,  therefore,  involve  very  great  expense ;  certainly, 
in  most  cases,  greater  than  the  advantages  gained.  The  Chesapeake  bay  can- 
not, for  instance,  be  shut  against  a  fleet  by  fortifications ;  and  if  the  entrance 
of  the  enemy  is  to  be  interdicted,  it  must  be  by  the  presence  of  a  not  inferior 
fleet  of  our  own.  Instead  of  such  a  system,  it  will  be  better  to  give  up  the  bay 
to  the  enemy,  confining  our  defences  to  the  more  important  harbors  and  rivers 
that  discharge  into  the  bay.  By  this  system,  not  only  will  these  harbors  be 
secure,  but  the  defences  will  react  upon  the  bay  itself,  and,  at  any  rate,  secure 
it  from  predatory  incursions ;  because  while  Hampton  roads  and  the  navy  yard 
at  Norfolk  are  well  protected,  no  enemy  would  proceed  up  the  bay  with  any 
less  force  than  that  which  could  be  sent  out  from  the  navy  yard. 

In  certain  cases  of  broad  waters,  wherein  an  enemy's  cruisers  might  desire 
to  rendezvous  in  order  to  prosecute  a  blockade,  or  as  a  shelter  in  tempestuous 
weather,  there  may  be  positions  from  which  sea-mortars  can  reach  the  whole 
anchorage,  although  nothing  could  be  done  with  guns.  A  battery  of  sea-mor- 
tars, well  secured  from  escalade,  would,  in  such  a  case,  afford  a  good  defence, 
because  no  fleet  will  lie  at  anchor  within  the  range  of  shells. 

In  thus  distributing  the  various  exposed  points  of  the  sea-coast  into  general 
classes,  according  to  the  most  appropriate  modes  of  defence,  we  do  not  find  that 
anything  can  be  substituted  for  fortifications,  where  fortifications  are  applicable, 
and  we  find  them  applicable  in  all  the  classes  but  the  last ;  and  in  the  last  we 
shall  find  them  indispensable  as  auxiliaries.  In  this  last  class  there  are,  no 
doubt,  some  cases  where  naval  means  must  constitute  the  active  and  operative 
force ;  and  it  is  probable  that  steam  batteries  may,  of  all  floating  defences,  be 
the  most  suitable. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten,  however,  that  the  very  qualities  which  recommend 
this  particular  kind  of  force  will  equally  characterize  the  steam  vessel  of  the 
enemy ;  nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that,  whether  steam  vessels  or  sailing  vessels, 
or  both,  are  relied  on,  unless  there  are  well-secured  points  on  the  shore,  under 
which  they  can  take  refuge,  they  will  themselves  constitute  an  object  inviting 
the  superior  force  of  an  enemy. 

If,  for  example,  we  were  to  deem  one  of  the  open  harbors  of  such  importance 


170  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

as  to  assign  eight  or  ten  steam  batteries  for  its  protection,  we  should  thereby 
place  within  reach  of  the  enemy  an  object  worthy  of  the  efforts  of  a  squadron, 
or  twelve  or  fifteen  vessels  of  the  same  description.  Even,  therefore,  in  the 
cases  where  naval  means  must  be  resorted  to  for  defence  upon  the  water,  there 
should  be  works  upon  the  shore  behind  which,  if  overpowered,  they  can  retire. 

It  has  been  before  remarked  that  the  steam  batteries  are  in  no  way  more  for- 
midable to  shore  batteries  than  sailing  vessels  are :  armed  with  Paixhan  guns 
they  would  be  less  so.  And  they  would  be  less  formidable,  also,  on  account  of 
their  comparatively  small  number  of  guns ;  for  there  is  no  reason  why  the  firing 
should  be  more  accurate  than  from  ships;  and  the  chances  of  inflicting  injury 
would  be  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  missiles. 

The  only  material  effect  the  introduction  of  this  description  of  vessel  can 
have  upon  a  system  of  defence  by  fortifications  is,  that  owing  to  their  less 
draught  of  water,  it  will  be  necessary  to  secure  channels  that,  not  being  navi- 
gable by  vessels  of  the  line  and  frigates,  might  otherwise  be  left  unguarded. 
Some  of  these  channels  may  have  the  draught  of  water  lessened  by  an  artificial 
ridge  of  stones,  so  as  to  be  impracticable  even  to  steam  vessels;  and  this  may 
often  be  done  at  small  expense,  and  without  detriment  to  the  harbors ;  others 
will  need  additional  fortifications.  But  the  instances  are  not  numerous  where 
any  such  shallow  channels  exist. 

In  opposition  to  an  opinion  not  uncommon,  that  modern  improvements  in 
steam  vessels  will  tend  to  lessen  the  necessity  for  fortifications,  we  here  see  that 
the  tendency  is  rather  to  increase  their  number. 

Throughout  this  whole  discussion  the  argument  has  turned  on  the  relative 
efficiency  of  fixed  and  floating  defences.  The  great  relative  economy  of  the 
former,  we  suppose,  will  be  conceded.  If  not,  we  would  ask,  as  conclusive,  or 
at  least  as  leading  to  calculation  entirely  satisfactory,  that  the  following  infor- 
mation be  obtained  from  authentic  sources,  namely :  the  first  cost,  when  com- 
plete in  all  respects,  of  the  frigates  United  States,  Constitution,  and  Congress, 
and  also  the  entire  expense  of  each  of  said  vessels  up  to  this  time;  specifying, 
as  to  each,  the  year  of  the  several  expenditures  and  the  amounts  thereof,  under 
the  heads,  as  far  as  practicable,  of  first  cost,  repairs  or  rebuilding,  and  improve- 
ments and  alterations ;  and  distinguishing — 1st.  The  expense  bestowed  upon 
the  hull.  2d.  The  expense  bestowed  upon  the  masts,  spars,  sails,  anchors, 
cables,  and  rigging.  3d.  The  expense  bestowed  upon  the  armament;  and  4th. 
The  expense  bestowed  upon  all  other  matters,  (as  boats,  ballast,  tanks,  paint, 
&c.,)  necessarily  connected  with  the  preservation  or  the  ordinary  service  of  the 
vessel. 

Before  we  proceed  to  describe  the  several  positions  on  the  coast  requiring  for- 
tifications, we  have  something  still  to  say  on  the  general  subject,  though  on 
another  branch.  We  now  refer  to  the  kind  of  fortifications,  or  rather  to  their 
magnitude  and  strength.  That  this  particular  topic  should  be  embraced  by  our 
remarks  is  the  more  necessary  since  views  hostile  to  the  system  of  works  now 
in  progress  have  been  urged  from  a  high  source. 

The  present  system  is  founded  on  this  principle,  to  wit :  that  the  fortifications 
should  be  strong  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  the  objects  to  be  secured.  The 
principle  will  not,  we  suppose,  be  controverted,  but  only  the  mode  of  apply- 
ing it. 

There  will  hardly  be  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  mode  of  guarding  the 
less  important  points.  There  being  no  great  attraction  to  an  enemy,  works 
simple  in  their  features,  requiring  small  garrisons  only,  containing  a  moderate 
armament,  but  at  the  same  time  inaccessible  to  the  dashing  enterprises  that  ships 
can  so  easily  land,  and  which  can  be  persevered  in  for  a  few  hours  with  much 
vigor,  will  suffice.  Circumstances  must,  however,  materially  modify  the  proper- 
ties of  these  works,  even  when  the  points  to  be  guarded  are  of  equal  value.  In 
one,  the  disadvantage  of  position  must  be  compensated  by  greater  power ;  in. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  171 

another,  natural  strength  may  need  little  aid  from  art ;  in  another,  greater  width 
in  the  guarded  channel  may  demand  a  larger  armament ;  and  in  a  fourth,  peculiar 
exposure  to  land  attack  may  exact  more  than  usual  inaccessibility.  But  all 
these  varieties  lie  within  limits  that  will  probably  be  conceded. 

As  to  the  larger  objects,  it  has  been  contended  that  there  has  been  exaggera- 
tion in  devising  works  to  cover  these,  the  works  having  been  calculated  for  more 
formidable  attacks  than  they  will  be  exposed  to.  It  is  easy  to  utter  vague 
criticisms  of  this  nature,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  rebut  them  without  going  into  an 
examination  as  minute  as  if  the  criticism  were  ever  so  precise  and  pertinent. 

But  let  us  look  a  little  at  the  material  facts.  What  is  the  object  of  an  enemy? 
What  are  his  means  1  What  should  be  the  nature  of  our  defences  ? 

The  object  may  be  to  lay  a  great  city  under  contribution,  or  to  destroy  one 
of  our  naval  depots,  or  to  take  possession  of  one  of  our  great  harbors,  &c.  It 
was  estimated  that  in  the  great  fire  in  the  city  of  New  York,  in  the  year  1835, 
the  property  destroyed  within  a  few  hours  was  worth  upwards  of  seventeen 
millions  of  "dollars,  although  the  fire  was  confined  to  a  very  small  part  of  the 
city,  and  did  not  touch  the  shipping.  Is  it  easy,  then,  to  estimate  the  loss  that 
would  accrue  from  the  fires  that  a  victorious  enemy  could  kindle  upon  the 
circuit  of  that  great  city  when  no  friendly  hand  could  be  raised  to  extinguish 
them  ?  or  is  it  easy  to  overrate  the  tribute  such  a  city  would  pay  for  exemption 
from  that  calamity  1  Can  we  value  too  highly  the  pecuniary  losses  that  the 
destruction  of  one  of  the  great  navy  yards  would  involve,  and  the  loss,  beyond 
all  pecuniary  value,  of  stores  and  accommodations  indispensable  in  a  state  of 
war,  and  that  a  state  of  war  can  hardly  replace  ? 

But  what  are  the  enemy's  means  ?  They  consist  of  his  whole  sea-going 
force,  which  he  concentrates  for  the  sake  of  inflicting  the  blow.  In  the  language 
of  the  critic:  "From  the  nature  of  maritime  operations,  such  a  fleet  could  bring 
its  whole  strength  to  bear  upon  any  particular  position,  and,  by  threatening  or 
assailing  various  portions  of  the  coast,  either  anticipate  the  tardy  movements  of 
troops  upon  land,  and  effect  the  object  before  their  concentration,  or  render  it 
necessary  to  keep  in  service  a  force  far  superior  to  that  of  the  enemy,  but  so 
divided  as  to  be  inferior  to  it  on  any  one  point." 

We  have,  then,  objects  of  sufficient  magnitude,  and  the  means  of  the  enemy 
consist  in  the  concentration  of  his  whole  force  upon  one  of  these  objects. 

With  the  highest  notion  of  the  efficiency  of  fortifications  against  shipping, 
these  are  not  cases  where  any  stint  in  the  defensive  means  are  admissible. 
Having,  therefore,  under  a  full  sense  of  the  imminent  danger  to  which  the  great 
objects  upon  the  coast  are  exposed,  applied  to  the  approaches  by  water  an  array 
of  obstacles  worthy  of  confidence,  we  must  carefully  explore  all  the  avenues  by 
land,  in  order  to  guard  against  approaches  that  might  be  made  on  that  side  in 
order  to  evade  or  capture  the  works  guarding  the  channels.  But  before  deciding 
on  the  defences  necessary  to  resist  these  land  attacks,  it  will  be  proper  to  esti- 
mate more  particularly  the  means  that  an  enemy  may  be  expected  to  bring  for- 
ward with  a  view  to  such  land  operations. 

History  furnishes  many  examples,  and  the  expedition  to  Flushing,  commonly 
called  the  Walcheren  expedition,  may  be  cited  as  peculiarly  instructive. 

From  an  early  day  Napoleon  had  applied  himself  to  the  creation  of  a  maritime 
force  in  the  Scheldt,  and,  in  1809,  he  had  provided  extensive  dock  yards  and 
naval  arsenals  at  Flushing  and  at  Antwerp.  On  his  invasion  of  Austria  this 
year,  he  had  drawn  off  the  mass  of  his  troops  that  had  before  kept  jealous 
watch  over  these  naval  preparations,  relying  now  on  forts  and  batteries,  and  on 
the  fortifications  of  Flushing  and  Antwerp  for  the  protection  of  the  naval  estab- 
lishments, and  of  a  fleet  containing  several  line-of-battle-ships  and  frigates,  and 
a  numerous  flotilla  of  smaller  vessels. 

The  great  naval  establishment  at  Flushing,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Scheldt, 
and  of  Antwerp,  some  sixty  or  seventy  miles  up  the  river,  with  the  vessels 


172  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

afloat  on  the  river  or  in  progress  in  the  yards,  presented  an  object  to  England 
worthy  of  one  of  her  great  efforts. 

The  troops  embarked  on  this  expedition  consisted  of  upwards  of  33,000  in- 
fantry, 3,000  cavalry,  more  than  3,000  artillery,  and  some  hundreds  of  sappers 
and  miners — constituting  an  army  of  about  40,000  men.  The  naval  portion 
consisted  of  35  sail  of  the  line,  23  frigates,  33  sloop s-of- war,  28  gun,  mortar, 
and  bomb  vessels,  36  smaller  vessels,  and  82  gunboats ;  making  a  total  of  155 
ships  and  other  armed  vessels  and  82  gunboats.  The  guns,  mortars,  &c.,  pro- 
vided for  such  bombardments  and  sieges  as  the  troops  might  have  to  conduct 
amounted  to  158  pieces,  with  the  suitable  supplies  of  ammunition  and  stores  of 
every  kind. 

The  idea  of  sailing  right  up  to  their  object,  in  spite  of  the  forts  and  batteries, 
seems  not  to  have  found  favor,  notwithstanding  the  power  of  the  fleet.  The 
plan  of  operations,  therefore,  contemplated  the  landing  a  portion  of  the  army  on 
the  island  of  Walcheren,  to  carry  on  the  siege  of  Flushing,  while  another 
portion  proceeded  up  the  Scheldt  as  high  as  Fort  Bartz,  which  was  to  be  taken, 
after  which  the  army  would  push  on  by  land  about  twenty  miles  further,  and 
lay  siege  to  Antwerp ;  all  which,  it  was  thought  might  be  accomplished  hi 
eighteen  or  twenty  days  from  the  first  landing. 

The  execution  did  not  accord  with  the  design.  Flushing,  it  is  true,  was 
reduced  within  fifteen  days,  and  in  less  than  a  week  from  the  debarcation  (which 
was  on  the  31st  of  July)  Fort  Bartz.  was  in  possession  of  the  English,  having 
been  abandoned  by  the  garrison.  But  it  was  twenty-five  days  before  the  main 
body,  with  all  necessary  supplies  for  a  siege,  were  assembled  at  this  point  and 
ready  to  take  up  the  line  of  march  against  Antwerp.  Since  the  first  descent  of 
the  British  matters  had,  however,  greatly  changed.  The  French  were  now  in 
force;  they  had  put  their  remaining  defences  in  good  condition;  they  had 
spread  inundations  over  the  face  of  the  country ;  and  not  only  would  there  be 
little  chance  of  further  success,  but  the  safety  of  the  expedition,  formidable  as 
it  was,  might  have  been  compromised  by  a  further  advance.  It  was  therefore 
decided  in  council  to  abandon  the  movement  against  Antwerp.  The  troops  ac- 
cordingly returned  to  the  island  of  Walcheren,  which  they  did  not  finally  leave 
till  the  end  of  December. 

The  failure  in  the  ultimate  object  of  the  expedition  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the 
omission  to  seize,  in  the  first  instance,  the  south  shore  of  the  river,  and  capture 
the  batteries  there,  as  was  originally  designed,  and  which  was  prevented  by  the 
difficulty  of  landing  enough  troops  at  any  one  debarcation,  in  the  bad  weather 
then  prevailing.  The  capture  of  these  batteries  would  have  enabled  the  expe- 
dition to  have  reached  Fort  Bartz  during  the  first  week ;  and,  in  the  then  unpre- 
pared state  of  the  French,  the  issue  of  a  dash  upon  Antwerp  can  hardly  be 
doubted. 

The  dreadful  mortality  that  assailed  the  British  army  is  wholly  unconnected 
with  the  plans,  conduct,  or  issue  of  the  enterprise,  as  a  military  ^movement ; 
unless,  indeed,  it  may  have  frustrated  a  scheme  for  occupying  the  island  of 
Walcheren  as  a  position  during  the  war. 

Possession  was  held  of  the  island  for  five  months  ;  and  it  was  finally  aban- 
doned from  no  pressure  upon  it  by  the  French,  although,  after  the  first  six 
weeks,  the  British  force  consisted,  in  the  aggregate,  of  less  than  17,000  men ; 
of  which,  for  the  greater  part  of  the  time,  more  than  half  were  sick — effectives 
being  often  reduced  below  5,000  men. 

We  see,  therefore,  that  an  effective  force  of  less  than  10,000  men  maintained 
possession  of  the  island,  in  the  face  of,  and  in  close  proximity  to,  the  most  for- 
midable military  power  in  Europe,  for  more  than  three  months  ;  and  no  reason 
can  be  perceived  why  it  might  not  have  remained  an  indefinite  period,  while 
possessed  of  naval  superiority. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  173 

The  proximity  of  England  undoubtedly  lessened  the  expense  of  the  expedi- 
tion, but  it  influenced  the  result  in  no  other  way  material  to  the  argument. 

We  will  allude  to  no  other  instances  of  large  expeditions  sent  by  the  English 
to  distant  countries,  than  the  two  expeditions,  each  of  about  10,000  men,  sent  in 
the  year  1814  against  this  country  :  one  by  the  way  of  Canada,  the  other  to  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico.  United  in  a  single  force  of  20,000  men  against  our  sea-coast, 
the  expense  would  have  been  less,  and  the  results  more  certain. 

The  French,  notwithstanding  their  constant  naval  inferiority,  have  found 
opportunities  to  embark  in  great  undertakings  of  the  same  nature.  In  1802, 
Leclerc  proceeded  to  St.  Domingo  with  34  line-of-battle  ships  and  large  frigates, 
more  than  20  small  frigates  and  sloops,  and  upwards  of  20,000  men. 

We  learn  from  these  points  in  history  what  constitutes  an  object  worthy  of 
vast  preparations ;  and  it  is  impossible  to  resist  the  fact,  that  our  own  coast,  and 
rivers,  and  bays,  possess  many  establishments  not  lees  inviting  to  an  enemy  than 
Flushing  and  Antwerp. 

•We  are  taught,  moreover,  what  constitutes  a  great  expedition ;  in  other  words, 
what  is  the  amount  of  force  we  must  prepare  to  meet ;  and,  more  than  all,  we  are 
taught  that  such  an  expedition,  seizing  a  favorable  moment,  when  the  military 
arrangements  of  a  country  are  incomplete — when  the  armies  are  absent,  or  im- 
perfect in  their  organization  or  discipline — does  not  hesitate  to  land  in  the  face 
of  the  most  populous  districts,  and,  availing  of  the  local  peculiarities,  and  covered 
and  supplied  by  a  fleet,  to  undertake  operations  which  penetrate  deep  into  the 
country,  and  consume  considerable  time. 

It  seems,  therefore,  that  whenever  the  object  we  are  to  cover  possesses  a  value 
likely  to  provoke  the  cupidity  of  an  enemy,  or  to  stimulate  his  desire  to  inflict  a 
serious  blow,  it  is  not  enough  that  the  approaches  by  water  are  guarded  against 
his  ships ;  it  will  be  indispensable  to  place  safeguards  against  attacks  by 
land  also.  A  force  considerable  enough  for  very  vigorous  attacks  against  the 
land  side  of  the  fortifications  may  be  thrown  upon  the  shore ;  and  if  these  yield, 
a  way  is  opened  for  the  ships,  and  the  enemy  carries  his  object. 

In  certain  positions,  the  local  circumstances  would  favor  the  land  operations 
of  an  enemy ;  permitting  him,  while  operating  against  the  fortifications,  to  be 
aided  by  the  fleet,  and  covered  from  the  reaction  of  the  general  force  of  the 
country.  In  other  positions,  the  extreme  thinness  of  the  population  in  the 
neighborhood  would  require  the  forts  to  rely,  for  a  considerable  time,  on  their 
own  strength.  In  all  such  cases  a  much  greater  power  of  resistance  would  be 
requisite  than  in  circumstances  of  an  opposite  nature.  In  all  such  circumstances 
the  works  should  be  of  a  strength  adequate  to  resist  an  attack,  although  perse- 
vered in  vigorously  for  several  days.  But  when  these  land  operations  lead  away 
from  the  shipping,  or  when  the  surrounding  population  is  considerable,  or  the 
enemy  is  unable  to  shelter  his  movements  by  local  peculiarities,  then  it  will 
suffice  if  the  works  be  competent  to  resist  attacks,  vigorous  also,  of  a  few  hours 
only. 

.  The  magnitude  and  strength  of  the  works  will  depend,  therefore,  on  the  joint 
influence  of  the  value  of  the  object  covered,  the  natural  strength  of  the  position, 
and  the  succor  to  be  drawn  from  the  neighborhood.  We  may  introduce,  as 
instances,  New  York  and  Pensacola.  The  former  is  as  attackable  as  the  latter : 
that  is  to  say,  it  equally  requires  artificial  defences ;  and,  owing  to  its  capacious 
harbor  and  easy  entrance,  it  is  not  easy  to  place  it  in  a  satisfactory  condition  as 
to  the  approaches  by  water.  But  while  an  enemy,  in  approaching  any  of  the 
principal  works  by  land,  could  not  well  cover  himself  from  the  attacks  of  the 
concentrated  population  of  the  vicinity,  the  rapid  means  of  communication  from 
the  interior  would  daily  bring  great  accessions  to  the  defence.  A  land  attack 
against  the  city  must,  consequently,  be  restricted  to  a  few  days ;  and  the  works 
will  fulfil  their  object,  if  impregnable  to  a  coup  de  main. 

Pensacola,  an  object,  in  many  respects,  of  the  highest  importance,  and  growing 


174  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

in  consequence  every  day,  is  capable  of  being  defended  as  perfectly  as  the  city 
just  mentioned.  The  principal  defences  lie  on  a  long  sandy  island,  which  closes 
in  the  harbor  from  the  sea.  An  enemy  landed  on  this  island  (Santa  Rosa)  would 
be  in  uninterrupted  communication  with  his  fleet ;  could,  owing  to  the  sparseness 
of  the  population,  have  nothing  to  apprehend,  for  some  time,  from  any  re-enforce- 
ments arriving  at  the  place ;  and  would  be  well  protected,  by  position,  from  the 
effects  of  this  succor,  when  it  should  arrive.  While  in  possession  of  naval  supe- 
riority, he  might,  therefore,  not  unreasonably  calculate  on  being  able  to  press  a 
siege  of  many  days  of  the  work  which  occupies  the  extremity  of  the  island,  and 
guards  the  entrance  to  the  harbor.  And  even  before  coming  into  possession  of 
this  work  his  gun  and  mortar  batteries,  on  the  same  island,  would  destroy  every 
thing  not  bomb-proof  and  incombustible  at  the  navy  yard.  An  attack  not  less 
persevering,  and  with  equal  chances  of  success,  might  be  made  from  the  other 
side  of  the  harbor  also. 

If,  therefore,  the  power  to  resist  a  coup  de  main  be  all  that  is  conferred  on 
the  works  at  Pensacola,  their  object  will  be  obtained  only  through  the  forbear- 
ance of  the  enemy ;  it  being  obviously  indispensable  that  the  principal  of  these 
works  be  competent  to  resist  a  short  siege.  If  this  liability  resulted  from  the 
thinness  of  the  neighboring  population,  it  would  still  be  many  years  before  this 
state  of  things  would  be  materially  altered.  But  it  does  not  depend  on  this 
alone ;  the  peculiar  topographical  features  will  continue  this  liability  in  spite  of 
increasing  numbers,  and  ever  so  easy  and  rapid  communication  with  the  interior; 
it  having  been  proved  that  a  fleet  may  lie  broad  off  this  shore  and  hold  daily 
communication  therewith  during  the  most  tempestuous  season.  The  English 
fleet  of  men-of-war  and  transports  lay,  during  the  last  war,  from  the  7th  of 
February  to  the  15th  of  March,  1814,  anchored  abreast  of  Dauphin  island  and 
Mobile  Point,  where  the  exposure  is  the  same  as  that  off  Pensacola. 

Between  the  cases  cited,  which  may  be  regarded  as  of  the  class  of  extreme 
cases,  (a  class  comprising,  however,  many  important  positions,)  almost  every 
conceivable  modification  of  the  defence  will  be  called  for,  to  suit  the  various 
conditions  of  the  several  points. 

The  fortifications  of  the  coast  must  therefore  be  competent  to  the  double  task 
of  interdicting  the  passage  of  ships  and  resisting  land  attacks — two  distinct  and 
independent  qualities.  The  first  demands  merely  an  array  in  suitable  numbers 
and  in  proper  proportions  of  heavy  guns,  covered  by  parapets  proof  against  shot 
and  shells;  the  second  demands  inacessibility.  As  there  is  nothing  in  the 
first  quality  neceessarily  involving  the  last,  it  has  often  happened,  either  from 
.the  little  value  of  the  position,  or  from  the  supposed  improbability  of  a  land 
attack,  or  from  the  want  of  time  to  construct  proper  works,  that  this  property 
of  inaccessibility  has  been  neglected. 

Whenever  we  have  an  object  of  sufficient  value  to  be  covered  by  a  battery, 
we  should  bear  in  mind  that  the  enemy  will  know  the  value  of  the  object  as 
well  as  ourselves.  That  it  is  a  very  easy  thing  for  him  to  land  a  party  of  men 
for  an  expedition  of  an  hour  or  two ;  and,  unless  we  take  the  necessary  pre- 
ventive measures,  his  party  will  be  sure  to  take  the  battery  first ;  after  which 
nothing  will  prevent  his  vessels  consummating  the  design  it  was  the  purpose  of 
the  battery  to  prevent. 

In  general,  the  same  fortifications  that  guard  the  water  approaches  will  pro- 
tect the  avenues  by  land  also,  but  in  certain  cases  a  force  may  be  so  landed  as 
to  evade  the  channel  defences,  reaching  the  object  by  a  route  entirely  inland. 
Of  course  this  danger  must  be  guarded  against  by  suitable  works. 

After  the  preceding  exposition  of  our  views  on  the  general  subject  of  the  de- 
fences of  the  coast,  it  may  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  indicate  the  mode  by 
which  the  system  of  fortifications  on  which  we  could  rely  can  be  manned  and 
served  without  an  augmentation  for  that  particular  purpose  of  the  regular  army. 

The  force  that  should  be  employed  for  this  service  in  time  of  war  is  the  militia, 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  175 

(using  the  term  in  a  comprehensive  sense;)  the  probability  being  that,  in  most 
of  the  defended  points  on  the  seaboard,  the  uniformed  and  volunteer  companies 
will  supply  the  garrisons  needed.  And  it  may  be  shown  that  it  is  a  service  to 
which  militia  are  better  adapted  than  any  other. 

The  prominent  defect  of  a  militia  force  results  from  the  impossibility  of  so 
training  the  men  to  field  movements  in  the  brief  period  of  their  service  as  to 
give  them  any  confidence  in  themselves  as  manoeuvrers  in  the  face  of  regular 
troops  ;  the  little  they  learn  merely  suffices  to  show  them  that  it  is  but  little  ; 
every  attempt  of  the  kind  proving,  by  the  disorder  that  they  know  not  how  to 
avoid,  how  much  greater  would  be  the  disorder  if  in  face  of  an  enemy  and 
under  fire. 

Without  the  knowledge  to  be  obtained  only  by  long  and  laborious  practice, 
the  militiaman  knows  that  he  is  no  match  in  the  field  for  the  regular  soldier, 
and  it  is  not  surprising  that  he  should  desire  to  avoid  an  encounter.  But  there 
is  no  such  difficulty  in  the  service  of  fixed  batteries.  The  militiaman  has  to  be 
taught  merely  the  service  of  a  single  gun,  than  which  nothing  can  be  more 
simple.  He  must  learn  to  use  the  rammer  and  the  sponge,  the  handspike  and 
the  linstock,  to  load,  and  to  run  to  battery,  to  trail  and  to  fire ;  these  are  all. 
Each  of  these  operations  is  of  the  utmost  simplicity,  depending  on  individual 
action  and  not  on  concert,  and  they  may  all  be  taught  in  a  very  short  time. 
There  is  no  manoeuvring,  no  marching,  no  wheeling.  The  squad  of  one  gun 
may  be  marched  to  another,  but  the  service  of  both  is  the  same.  Even  the  art 
of  pointing  cannon  is,  to  an  American  militiaman,  an  art  of  easy  attainment, 
from  the  skill  that  all  our  countrymen  acquire  in  the  use  of  fire-arms — "drawing 
sight,  or  aiming,"  being  the  same  art,  modified  only  by  the  difference  in  the  gun. 

The  mode  of  applying  this  force  may  be  illustrated  by  the  case  of  any  of  our 
cities  on  the  seaboard.  The  forts  and  batteries,  being  put  in  perfect  condition, 
should  be  garrisoned,  (at  least  the  more  important  ones)  by  a  small  body  of 
regular  artillery,  such  as  our  present  militrry  force  could  supply,  and  sufficient 
for  the  preservation  of  the  public  property,  and  to  afford  indispensable  daily 
guards  ;  to  these  should  be  added  two  or  three  men  of  the  ordnance  department, 
especially  charged  with  the  condition  of  the  armament  and  ammunition,  and 
two  or  three  engineer  soldiers,  whose  sole  duty  it  would  be  to  attend  to  the  con- 
dition of  the  fortifications;  keeping  every  part  in  a  state  of  perfect  repair.  In 
certain  important  works,  however,  that  would  be  exposed  to  siege,  or  to  analo- 
gous operations,  it  would  be  prudent,  especially  in  the  beginning  of  a  war,  to 
keep  up  a  more  considerable  body  of  regular  troops. 

The  volunteer  force  of  the  city  should  then  be  divided  into  detachments 
without  disturbing  their  company  organization,  and  should  be  assigned  to  the 
several  works,  according  to  the  war  garrisons  required  at  each ;  from  four  to  six 
men,  according  to  circumstances,  being  allowed  to  each  gun. 

The  larger  works  might  require  ten,  fifteen,  or  even  twenty  companies ;  the 
smaller,  one,  two,  three,  or  more  companies ;  and,  in  some  cases,  even  a  platoon 
might  suffice.  Being  thus  assigned,  each  portion  of  the  city  force  would  have 
its  definite  alarm-post,  and  should  be  often  taken  to  it,  and  there  exercised  in  all 
the  duties  of  its  garrison,  and  more  especially  in  the  service  of  its  batteries  and 
in  its  defence  against  assault.  The  multiplicity  of  steamboats  in  all  the  cities 
would  enable  the  volunteers  to  reach  even  the  most  distant  alarm-posts  in  a 
short  time. 

In  order  that  all  these  troops  may  become  expert  in  their  duty,  one  of  the 
works  most  convenient  to  the  city,  besides  being  the  alarm-post  of  some  partic- 
ular portion  of  the  volunteers,  should,  during  peace,  be  the  ordinary  school  of 
drill  for  all ;  and  in  this  the  detachments  should,  in  turn,  assemble  and  exercise. 

Besides  the  mere  manual  of  the  gun  and  battery,  there  should  be  frequent 
target  practice,  as  being  not  only  necessary  to  the  proper  use  of  the  battery, 
but  as  imparting  interest  and  excitement  to  the  service. 


176  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

It  might  be  necessary  for  a  time  to  submit  the  volunteers  to  the  drill  of  a 
competent  officer  or  non-commissioned  officer  of  the  regular  artillery ;  and,  in 
particular,  to  conduct  the  practice  with  shot  and  shells  under  such  instruction. 

The  portion  of  the  military  force  of  the  city  not  stationed  in  the  fixed  bat- 
teries would  constitute,  under  an  impending  attack,  a  reserve,  posted  either  in 
one  or  several  bodies,  according  to  circumstances,  ready  to  cover  exposed  points, 
to  co-operate  in  offensive  movements,  or  to  relieve  exhausted  garrisons :  this 
portion  having  connected  with  it  the  mounted  force,  the  field  artillery,  and  the 
heavy  movable  guns. 

This  appropriation  of  the  volunteer  force  to  the  immediate  defence  of  the  city 
would  operate  in  the  most  favorable  way  upon  that  force,  superadding  to  the 
impulses  of  patriotism  every  feeling  connected  with  family,  property,  and  social 
and  civil  relations,  and,  while  making  military  service  the  first  of  duties,  reliev- 
ing it  of  hardship  and  privation.  It  would  be  a  peculiar  feature  in  this  kind 
of  service  that  the  governing  motive  in  the  choice  of  officers  would  be  favorable 
to  the  condition  of  the  troops,  every  man  feeling  that  the  safety  of  his  dearest 
concerns  depended  on  the  efficiency  and  courage  of  his  officers.  The  same 
motive  would  prompt  him,  moreover,  to  desire,  and  contribute  to,  the  highest 
state  of  efficiency  in  the  corps. 

The  organization  of  volunteer  force  here  contemplated  may  comprehend  the 
whole  maritime  frontier;  and  be  applicable,  also,  at  the  more  populous  points 
upon  the  inland  borders. 

This  arrangement,  while  it  might  be  an  enduring  one,  would  be  the  least 
expensive  by  far  of  any  that  would  be  efficient. 

The  days  of  exercise,  drill,  and  encampment  should  be  fixed  and  invariable, 
in  order  that  they  may  the  less  interfere  with  the  private  occupations  of  the 
volunteers.  During  an  impending  attack,  greater  or  less  portions  should  be 
constantly  at  these  posts ;  but  still  the  service  would  comprise  but  a  very  small 
portion  of  the  year. 

According  to  the  value  of  the  interest  to  be  defended,  and  the  extent  of  the 
works  to  be  occupied,  would  be  the  rank  of  the  chief  command ;  which  should 
be  intrusted  to  an  officer  of  the  regular  army,  whose  control  might  often  be 
extended,  advantageously,  over  a  certain  extent  of  seaboard  to  the  right  and 
left,  constituting  a  maritime  department. 

In  the  tables  to  be  presented  at  the  end  of  this  report,  we  shall  give  .the 
whole  number  of  men  required  for  the  complete  defence  of  each  of  the  works. 

We  now  proceed  to  examine  the  coast  in  detail ;  and,  in  order  to  conform  to 
the  Senate's  resolution,  we  shall  divide  the  whole  sea-coast  of  the  United  States 
into  two  great  portions :  the  first  portion  extending  from  Passamaquoddy  bay 
to  Cape  Florida;  the  second  from  Cape  Florida  to  the  mouth  of  the  Sabine. 
In  our  description  we  shall,  without  any  other  than  this  general  acknowledg- 
ment, quote  largely  from  a  report  presented  to  Congress  in  April,  1836,  and  to 
be  found  in  the  Senate  documents  of  the  1st  session  24th  Congress,  No.  293, 
vol.  4.  This  report  contains  an  argument  on  the  general  subject,  embodying 
many  important  considerations,  which  we  have  thought  best  not  to  repeat  in  this 
lengthened  report,  but  to  refer  to  as  worthy  of  perusal. 

We  will  conduct  the  examination  geographically  beginning  at  the  northeastern 
extremity,  and  referring  in  every  case  to  accompanying  tables  which  exhibit 
the  several  works  in  the  order  of  relative  importance  as  to  time. 

COAST    FROM    PASSAMAQUODDY    BAY   TO    CAPE    FLORIDA. 

The  extreme  northeastern  section  of  this  coast,  extending  from  Quoddy  Head 
to  Cape  Cod,  is  characterized  by  its  serrated  outline  and  its  numerous  harbors, 
and,  at  certain  seasons,  by  its  foggy  atmosphere.  The  extent  of  this  section, 
measuring  from  point  to  point  wherever  the  breaks  of  the  coast  are  abrupt,  is 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  177 

about  500  miles ;  while  a  straight  line  from  one  of  the  above-mentioned  capes  to 
the  other  is  hardly  half  that  distance.  The  eastern  half  is  singularly  indented 
by  deep  bays;  the  coast  being  universally  rocky  and  possessing  numerous 
islands  surrounded  by  deep  water,  which  islands  not  only  increase  the  number 
of  harbors,  but  cover,  besides,  an  interior  navigation  well  understood  by  the 
hardy  coasters  and  measurably  secured  by  its  intricacies,  and  the  other  dangers 
of  this  boisterous  and  foggy  region,  from  interruption  by  an  enemy.  The  western 
half  is  much  less  broken ;  it  is  covered  by  few  islands  in  comparison,  but  con- 
tains several  excellent  harbors. 

The  eastern  harbors  of  Maine  are  exposed  in  a  peculiar  manner.  They  are 
not  only  on  the  flank  of  our  line,  but  they  are  also  quite  near  the  public  estab- 
lishments of  the  greatest  maritime  power.  They  are,  moreover,  as  yet  backed 
by  only  a  thin  population;  and  are,'  consequently,  weak  as  well  as  exposed. 
The  time  may  not,  however,  be  very  distant  when,  becoming  wealthy  and 
populous,  they  will  be  objects  of  a  full  portion  of  the  national  solicitude.  Works 
designed  for  these  harbors  must  therefore  be  calculated  for  the  future ;  must  be 
founded  on  the  principle  that  they  must  defend  places  much  more  important  than 
any  now  existing  there ;  that,  being  near  the  possessions  of  a  foreign  power, 
they  will  be  in  a  particular  manner  liable  to  sudden  and  repeated  attacks ;  and 
that,  lying  at  the  extremity  of  the  coast,  they  are  liable  to  be  tardily  succored. 
The  works  must  consequently  be  competent  to  resist  escalade,  and  to  hold  out 
for  a  few  days.  Feebler  works  might  be  more  injurious  than  beneficial ;  their 
weakness  would  in  the  first  place  invite  attack;  and  it  being  often  a  great 
advantage  to  occupy  fortified  places  in  an  adversary's  territory,  the  enemy  could 
prepare  himself  to  remedy  the  deficiencies  of  the  forts  after  they  should  fall  into 
his  hands,  by  adding  temporary  works,  by  providing  strong  garrisons,  and  by 
aiding  the  defence  with  his  vessels. 

No  surveys  have  been  made  of  these  harbors,  and  no  plans  formed  for  their 
defence.  It  may  be  well  to  observe  here,  once  for  all,  that  much  confidence  is 
not  asked  for  the  mere  conjectures  presented  below,  as  to  the  number  and  cost 
of  the  works  assigned  for  the  protection  of  the  harbors  which  have  not  yet  been 
surveyed :  in  some  cases  there  may  be  mistakes  as  to  the  number  of  forts  and 
batteries  needed ;  in  others,  errors  will  exist  in  the  estimated  cost. 

Eastport  and  Mackias  may  be  mentioned  as  places  that  will  unquestionably 
be  thought  to  need  defensive  works  by  the  time,  in  the  order  of  relative  im- 
portance, the  execution  of  them  can  be  undertaken  by  the  government.  There 
are  several  small  towns  eastward  of  Mount  Desert  island  that  may,  at  that  period, 
deserve  equal  attention ;  at  present,  however,  the  places  mentioned  will  be  the 
only  ones  estimated  for;  and  $100,000  will  be  assumed  as  the  cost  at  each. — 
(Statement  1,  table  F.) 

Mount  Desert  island,  situated  a  little  east  of  Penobscot  bay,  having  a  capa- 
cious and  close  harbor,  affording  anchorage  for  the  highest  class  of  vessels,  and 
.  easily  accessible  from  sea,  offers  a  station  for  the  navy  of  an  enemy  superior  to 
any  other  on  this  part  of  the  coast.  From  this  point  his  cruisers  might  act  with 
great  effect  against  the  navigation  of  the  eastern  coast,  especially  that  of  Maine  ; 
and  his  enterprises  could  be  conducted  with  great  rapidity  against  any  points  he 
might  select.  These  considerations,  added  to  the  very  great  advantage  in  certain 
political  events,  of  our  occupying  a  naval  station  thus  advanced,  whence  we 
might  act  offensively,  together  with  the  expediency  of  providing  places  of  suc- 
cor on  a  part  of  the  coast  where  vessels  are  so  frequently  perplexed  in  their 
navigation  by  the  prevailing  fogs,  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  fortification,  in 
a  strong  manner,  of  this  roadstead  may  before  long  be  necessary.  A  survey  of 
this  island  was  begun  many  years  ago ;  but  the  party  being  called  off  to  other 
duties  it  was  never  completed.  The  project  of  defensive  works  has  not  been 
H.  Kep.  Com.  86 12 


178  FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

made.     The  entire  cost  may  be,  as  assumed  by  the  engineer  department  some 
years  ago,  $500,000.--— (Statement  1,  table  F.) 

Castinc. — It  would  seem  to  be  impossible,  on  this  coast,  to  deprive  an  enemy 
enjoying  naval  superiority  of  harbors,  or  prevent  his  using  them  as  stations 
during  a  war — insular  situations,  which  his  vessels  would  render  unapproach- 
able, being  so  numerous ;  but  it  seems  proper  that  such  of  these  positions  as  are 
the  sites  of  towns  should  be  secured.  During  the  last  war  the  English  held  the 
position  of  Oastine  for  some  time,  and  left  it  at  their  pleasure.  It  is  probable  a 
work  costing  about  $50,000  would  deter  an  enemy  from  again  making  choice  of 
this  position. — Statement  1,  table  F.) 

Penobscot  bay. — Upon  this  bay,  and  upon  the  river  of  the  same  name  flowing 
into  it,  are  several  flourishing  towns  and  villages.  Of  the  many  bays  which 
intersect  the  coast  the  Penobscot  is  the  one  which  presents  the  greatest  number 
of  safe  and  capacious  anchorages.  As  before  observed  a  large  portion  of  these 
harbors  must,  for  the  present,  be  left  without  defences,  but  the  valuable  com- 
merce of  the  bay  and  river  must  be  covered ;  and  to  afford  a  secure  retreat  for 
such  vessels  as  may  be  unable  to  place  themselves  under  the  protection  of  the 
works  to  the  east  or  west  of  the  bay,  the  passage  of  the  river  must  be  defended. 
The  lowest  point  at  which  this  can  be  done  without  great  expense  is  opposite 
Bucksport  at  the  "narrows."  A  project  has  been  given  in  for  a  fort  at  that 
position  estimated  at  $150,000. — (Statement  1,  table  D.) 

St.  George's  bay,  Broad  bay,  Damariscotta,  and  Sheepscut. — West  of  the 
.Penobscot  occur  the  above-mentioned  bays,  all  being  deep  indentations  leading 
to  towns,  villages,  and  various  establishments  of  industry,  and  enterprise.  The 
bays  have  not  been  surveyed,  and  of  course  no  plans  have  been  formed  for  their 
defence.  $400,000  are  assigned  to  the  defence  of  these  waters.  The  Sheeps- 
cut is  an  excellent  harbor  of  refuge  for  vessels  of  every  size. — (Statement  1, 
table  F.) 

Kcnnebcck  river. — This  river  (one  of  the  largest  in  the  eastern  States)  enters 
the  sea  nearly  midway  between  Cape  Cod  and  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Croix.  It 
rises  near  the  source  of  the  Chaudiere,  which  is  a  tributary  of  the  St.  Lowrence, 
and  has  once  served  as  a  line  of  operations  against  Quebec.  The  situation  and 
extent  of  this  river,  the  value  of  its  products,  and  the  active  commerce  of  sev- 
eral very  flourishing  towns  upon  its  banks,  together  with  the  excellence  of  the 
harbor  within  its  mouth,  will  not  permit  its  defence  to  be  neglected.  The  sur- 
veys begun  many  years  ago  were  never  finished.  The  estimated  cost  of  de- 
fences, as  formerly  reported  by  the  engineer  department,  was  $300,000.  Posi- 
tions near  the  mouth  will  permit  a  secure  defence. — (Statement  1,  table  D.) 

Portland  harbor. — The  protection  of  the  town,  of  the  merchantmen  belong- 
ing to  it,  and  of  the  ships-of-war  that  may  be  stationed  in  this  harbor  to  watch 
over  this  part  of  the  coast,  or  that  may  enter  for  shelter,  (all  of  them  important 
objects,)  may  be  secured,  as  an  inspection  of  the  map  of  the  harbor  will  shore, 
by  occupying  Fort  Preble  Point,  House  island,  Hog  Island  ledge,  and  Fish 
Point, 

If  the  two  channels  to  the  west  and  east  of  Hog  island  can  be  obstructed  at 
small  expense  (to  decide  which  some  surveys  are  yet  necessary)  there  will  be 
no  necessity  for 'a  battery  on  the  ledge,  and  Fish  Point  need  be  occupied  only 
by  such  works  as  may  be  thrown  up  in  time  of  war.  The  expense,  as  now 
estimated,  of  the  works  planned  for  this  defence,  will  be  $155,000  for  Fort 
Preble,  and  $48,000  for  House  island;  for  Hog  Island  channel  say,  $135,000. — 
(Statement  1,  tables  A,  D,  E,  and  F.)  In  addition  there  must  be  repairs  im- 
mediately applied  to  the  old  works  at  an  expense  of  $6,600. 

Saco,  Kcnnebunk  and  York. — Small  works  comparatively  will  cover  these 
places;  $75,000  is  assumed  as  the  aggregrate  cost. — (Statement  1,  table  F.) 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  179 

"Portsmouth  harbor  and  navy  yard. — The  only  good  roadstead  or  harbor 
between  Cape  Elizabeth  and  Cape  Ann  is  Portsmouth  harbor,  within  the  mouth 
of  Piscataqua  river.  Line-of-battle  ships  can  ascend  as  high  as  Fox  Point, 
seven  miles  above  the  town.  This  situation,  sufficiently  commodious  for  a  sec- 
ondary naval  depot  designed  to  repair  vessels  of  war,  should  be  maintained ;  but 
it  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  bay  to  the  south  of  Fox  Point  was  not  chosen  as 
the  site  of  the  navy  yard  instead  of  Fernald's  island.  Being  where  it  is,  it  will 
be  necessary,  in  time  of  war,  to  make  some  particular  dispositions  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  navy  yard  from  an  attack  from  the  north  shore  of  the  river. 

The  position  of  Fort  Constitution  will  certainly,  and  that  of  Fort  McCleary 
vill  probably,  be  occupied  by  the  defences,  though  the  works  themselves  should 
•ive  place  to  those  that  will  better  fulfil  the  object.  The  other  positions  for 
iorts  or  batteries  are  Gerrishe's  Point,  Fishing  island,  and  Clark's  island,  some, 
if  not  all,  of  which  must  be  occupied.  Surveys  are  required  before  the  projects 
can  be  formed,  or  before  estimates  can  be  made ;  but  there  is  reason  for  believing 
that  the  entire  cost  of  fortifying  this  harbor  will  not  fall  short  of  $300,000. — 
(Statement  1,  table  D.) 

Ncwburyport  harbor. — The  points  forming  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  are  con- 
tinually changing,  and  it  seems  necessary,  therefore,  to  rely,  for  the  defence  of 
the  harbor,  on  works  to  be  thrown  up  during  a  war.  There  is  only  a  shoal 
draught  of  water.  It  is  thought  $100,000  will  defend  this  harbor  adequately. — 
(Statement  1,  table  F.) 

Gloucester  harbor. — The  position  of  this  harbor,  near  the  extremity  of  Cape 
Ann,  places  it  in  close  relation  with  the  navigation  of  all  Massachusetts  bay  and 
imparts  to  it  considerable  importance.  No  surveys  have  yet  been  made,  but  it 
is  believed  that  sufficient  defence  may  be  provided  for  $200,000. — (Statement  1, 
table  E.)  Should  there  be  any  occasion  for  defensive  works  before  the  proposed 
new  works  can  be  commenced,  an  expenditure  of  $10,000  in  repairs  of  the  old 
fort  will  be  required. — (table  A.) 

Beverly  harbor. — This  harbor  will  be  defended  chiefly  by  a  portion  of  the 
works  designed  for  Salem.  $50,000  in  addition  will  secure  it. — (Statement  1, 
table  F.) 

Salem  harbor. — The  port  of  Salem  is  distant  from  Marblehead  two  miles,  and 
separated  therefrom  by  a  peninsula.  The  occupation  of  the  extremity  of  Win- 
ter island  (where  are  the  ruins  of  Fort  Pickering)  on  one  side,  and  Naugus 
Head  on  the  other,  will  effectually  secure  this  harbor.  Projects  have  been  pre- 
sented for  this  defence,  estimated  to  cost  $225,000. — (Statement  1,  tables  D  and 
F.)  On  a  sudden  emergency,  old  Fort  Lee  may  be  put  in  an  effective  state  for 
$2,000.— (table  A.) 

Marblehead  harbor. — Besides  covering,  in  some  measure,  the  harbor  of  Bos- 
ton, Salem  and  Marblehead  harbors  possess  an  important  commerce  of  their 
own,  and  also  afford  shelter  for  vessels  prevented,  by  certain  winds,  from  enter- 
ing Boston,  or  pursuing  their  course  eastward.  The  proposed  mode  of  defend- 
ing Marblehead  harbor  consists  in  occupying,  on  the  north  side,  the  hillock 
which  commands  the  present  Fort  Sewall,  (which  will  be  superseded  by  the 
new  work,)  and,  on  the  south,  the  position  of  Jack's  Point.  The  two  works 
will  cost  $318,000. — (Statement  1,  tables  D  and  F. 

To  repair  old  Fort  Sewall,  which  may  be  necessary,  if  the,  new  works  are  not 
soon  begun,  will  require  $10,000.— (Table  A.) 

Boston  harbor. — We  come  now  to  the  most  important  harbor  in  the  eastern 
section  of  the  coast;  and,  considering  the  relation  to  general  commerce,  and  the 
interests  of  the  navy,  one  of  the  most  important  in  the  whole  Union.  • 


180  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES 

After  a  careful  examination  of  all  the  necessary  conditions  of  such  a  problem, 
the  board  of  naval  officers  and  engineers,  in  their  joint  report  of  1820,  gave  this 
harbor  a  preference  over  all  other  positions  to  the  east  and  inclusive  of  New 
York  bay  and  the  Hudson,  as  the  seat  of  the  great  northern  naval  depot;  and 
the  government,  by  the  great  additions  and  improvements  that  have  from  year 
to  year  been  since  made  to  the  navy  yard  on  the  Charlestown  side,  have  virtually 
sanctioned  the  recommendation  of  the  board.  But,  independent  of  the  navy 
yard,  Boston  is  a  city  of  great  wealth,  and  possesses  an  extensive  and  active 
commerce. 

The  old  works  defended  merely  the  interior  basin  from  attacks  by  water; 
but,  as  it  often  happens  that  vessels  enter  Nantasket  roads  with  a  wind  too  scant 
to  take  them  to  the  city,  or  are  detained  in  President  roads  by  light  winds  or  an 
adverse  tide ;  as  the  former,  especially,  is  a  very  convenient  anchorage  whence 
to  proceed  to  sea ;  and,  above  all,  as  Nantasket  roads  affords  the  best  possible 
station  for  a  blockading  squadron,  it  was  deemed  indispensable  to  place  perma- 
nent defences  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  The  project  of  defence  regards  the 
existing  works,  with  the  necessary  repairs  and  modifications,  as  constituting  a 
second  barrier. 

Besides  a  permanent  work,  now  well  advanced,  on  George's  island,  it  contem- 
plates permanent  works  on  Nantasket  Head;  filling  up  the  Broad  Sound  chan- 
nel, so  as  to  leave  no  passage  in  that  direction  for  ships-of-war. 

Until  the  best  draught  for  steam  vessels  of  war  shall  be  well  ascertained,  it 
will  not  be  safe  to  say  to  what  depth  the  Broad  Sound  channel  should  be  re- 
stricted ;  nor,  indeed,  can  it  be  positively  asserted  that  this  description  of  vessel 
can  be  conveniently  excluded  by  such  means.  Other  vessels  can,  however,  be 
thus  excluded;  and  steam  vessels  passing  this  channel  would  still  have  to  pass 
the  inner  barrier.  The  estimated  cost  of  the  works  for  this  harbor  is  $2,040,000. 

Besides  the  works  of  a  permanent  character,  it  will  be  necessary,  in  the  be- 
ginning of  a  war,  to  erect  several  temporary  works  on  certain  positions  in  the 
harbor,  and  on  the  lateral  approaches  to  the  navy  yard.- — (Statement  1,  tables 
A,  E,  and  F.) 

Plymouth  and  Provincetown  harbors. — These  harbors  have  a  commerce  of 
some  consequence  of  their  own,  but  they  are  particularly  interesting  in  reference 
to  the  port  of  Boston.  While  these  are  undefended,  an  enemy's  squadron  block- 
ading Massachusetts  bay  will  have  ports  of  refuge  under  his  lea,  which  would 
enable  him  to  maintain  his  blockade,  even  throughout  the  most  stormy  seasons — 
knowing  that  the  winds  which  would  force  him  to  seek  shelter  would  be  adverse 
to  outward-bound,  and  fatal  to  such  inward  vessels  as  should  venture  near  the 
Cape.  Were  the  enemy  deprived  of  these  harbors,  he  would  be  unable  to  enforce 
a  rigorous  investment,  as  he  would  be  constrained  to  take  an  offing  on  every 
approach  of  foul  weather.  Our  own  vessels  coming  in  from  sea,  and  finding  an 
enemy  interposed  between  them  and  Boston,  or,  being  turned  from  their  course 
by  adverse  winds,  would,  in  case  of  the  defence  of  these  ports,  find  to  the  south 
of  Boston  shelters  equivalent  to  those  provided  in  the  east,  at  Marblehead,  Salem, 
Gloucester,  and  Portsmouth.  Plymouth  harbor  has  not  been  fully  surveyed. 
Provincetown  harbor  has  been  surveyed,  but  the  projects  of  defence  have  not 
been  formed.  The  former,  it  is  thought,  may  be  suitably  covered  by  a  work  of 
no  great  cost  on  Garnett  Point ;  while,  to  fortify  Provincetown  harbor  in  such  a 
way  as  to  cover  vessels  taking  shelter  therein,  and  at  the  same  time  deprive  an 
enemy  of  safe  anchorages,  will  involve  considerable  expense.  Probably  no 
nearer  estimate  can  be  formed  at  present  than  that  offered  by  the  engineer  de- 
partment some  years  ago,  which  gave  $100,000  for  Plymouth,  and  $600,000  for 
Provincetown. — (Statement  1,  tables  D  and  E.) 

The  coast  between  Cape  Cod  and  Cape  Hatteras  differs  from  the  northeastern 
f  section  in  possessing  fewer  harbors,  in  having  but  little  rocky  and  a  great  portion 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  181 

of  sandy  shore,  in  its  milder  climate  and  clearer  atmosphere;  and  it  differs  from 
all  the  other  portions  in  the  depth  and  magnitude  of  its  interior  seas  and  sounds, 
and  in  the  distance  to  which  deep  tide  navigation  extends  up  its  numerous  large 
rivers.  The  circuit  of  the  coast,  not  including  the  shores  of  the  great  bays, 
measures  650  miles,  while  a  straight  line  from  one  of  the  above-named  capes  to 
the  other  measures  about  520  miles. 

Martha's  Vineyard  sound. — To  the  south  of  Cape  Cod  lie  the  islands  of  Nan- 
tucket  and  Martha's  Vineyard,  which,  with  several  smaller  islands  on  the  south, 
and  the  projection  of  Cape  Malabar  on  the  east,  enclose  the  above-named  sound. 
The  channels  through  this  sound,  being  sufficient  for  merchant  vessels,  and  one 
of  the  channels  permitting  the  passage  even  of  small  frigates,  are  not  only  the 
constant  track  of  coasting  vessels,  but  also  of  large  numbers  of  vessels  arriving 
in  the  tempestuous  months  from  foreign  voyages.  There  are  within  the  sound 
the  harbors  of  Tarpaulin  Cove,  Holmes' s  Hole,  Edgartown,  Falmouth,  Hyan- 
nis,  and  Nantucket,  besides  small  anchorages. 

In  addition  to  the  many  thousand  vessels  passing  this  water  annually,  (of 
which  there  are  sometimes  forty  or  fifty,)  a  portion  containing  very  valuable 
cargoes,  to  be  seen  in  the  harbors  awaiting  a  change  of  wind,  there  is  supposed 
to  be  at  least  40,000  tons  of  whaling  vessels  owned  in  the  towns  of  this  sound. 

If  the  harbors  just  named  are  to  be  defended  at  all,  it  must  be  by  fortifications. 
There  is  little  or  no  population  except  in  the  towns,  and  even  this  is  believed  to 
be  entirely  without  military  organization.  A  privateer  might  run  into  either  of 
these  harbors,  and  capture,  destroy,  or  levy  contributions  at  pleasure.  The  use 
of  the  sound  itself,  as  an  anchorage  for  vessels-of-war,  cannot  be  prevented  by 
fortifications  alone.  $250,000  may,  perhaps,  suffice  for  the  defence  of  all  the 
harbors  against  the  kind  of  enterprise  to  which  they  are  exposed. — (Statement 
1,  table  F.) 

New  Bedford  and  Fairhaven  harbor. — No  survey  has  been  made  of  this 
harbor,  on  which  lie  two  of  the  most  flourishing  towns.  It  is  easily  defensible, 
and  the  amount  formerly  assumed  by  the  engineer  department  will  probably 
suffice,  namely,  $300,000. — (Statement  1,  table  D.) 

Buzzard's  ~bay. — Interposed  between  the  main  and  the  island  of  Martha's 
Vineyard,  are  the  Elizabeth  islands,  which  bound  Buzzard's  bay  on  the  south. 
This  bay  covers  the  harbor  of  New  Bedford,  and  might  be  used  as  an  anchorage 
by  an  enemy's  fleet;  but  it  is  too  wide  to  be  defended  by  fortifications. 

Narraganset  bay. — The  properties  of  this  great  roadstead  will  be  here  briefly 
adverted  to.  More  minute  information  may  be  obtained  by  reference  to  reports 
of  1820  and  1821. 

As  a  harbor,  this  is  acknowledged  by  all  to  be  the  best  on  the  whole  coast  of 
the  United  States ;  and  it  is  the  only  close  man-of-war  harbor  that  is  accessible 
with  a  northwest  wind,  the  prevailing  and  most  violent  wind  of  the  inclement 
season.  Numerous  boards  and  commissions,  sometimes  composed  of  naval 
officers,  sometimes  of  army  officers,  sometimes  of  officers  of  both  services,  have, 
at  different  times,  had  the  subject  of  this  roadstead  under  consideration;  and  all 
have  concurred  in  recommending,  in  strong  terms,  that  it  be  made  a  place  of 
naval  rendezvous  and  repair,  if  not  a  great  naval  depot ;  one  or  more  of  these 
commissions  preferring  it,  for  the  latter  purpose,  to  all  other  positions.  These 
recommendations  have  not  been  acted  on ;  but  it  is  next  to  certain  that  a  war 
would  force  their  adoption  upon  the  government. 

With  the  opening  of  this  anchorage  properly  defended,  hardly  a  vessel-of-war 
would  come,  either  singly  or  in  small  squadrons,  upon  the  coast,  in  the  boisterous 
season,  without  aiming  at  this  port,  on  account  of  the  comparative  certainty  of 
an  immediate  entrance.  And  this  would  be  particularly  the  case  with  vessels 


182  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

injured  by  heavy  weather,  or  in  conflict  with  an  enemy;  with  vessels  bringing 
in  prizes,  or  pursued  by  a  superior  force. 

This  use  of  the  port  would  almost  necessarily  bring  with  it  the  demand  for 
the  means  of  repairing  and  refitting;  and  the  concentration  of  these  upon  some 
suitable  spot  would  be  the  beginning  of  a  permanent  dock  yard. 

For  the  same  reason  that  ships-of-war  would  collect  here,  it  would  be  a  favorite 
point  of  rendezvous  for  privateers  and  their  prizes,  and  a  common  place  of  refuge 
for  merchantmen. 

From  this,  as  a  naval  station,  the  navigation  of  Long  Island  sound,  and  the 
communication  between  this  and  Martha's  Vineyard  sound,  or  Buzzard's  bay, 
might  be  well  protected ;  New  London  harbor  would  be  covered ;  the  navy  yard 
would  command  southwardly,  as  from  Hampton  roads  northwardly,  the  great 
inward  curve  of  the  coast  between  Cape  Cod  and  Cape  Hatteras ;  the  influence 
of  which  command  over  the  blockading  operations  of  an  enemy  will  be  apparent, 
when  it  is  considered  that  the  only  harbors  of  refuge  left  to  him  will  be  the 
Delaware,  Gardiner's,  and  Buzzard's  bays,  and  Martha's  Vineyard  sound. 

The  bays  first  mentioned  belong  to  the  class  before  alluded  to,  which,  being 
too  wide  for  complete  defence  by  batteries,  must  call  in  such  auxiliary  defences 
as  the  navy  may  supply ;  and  in  reference  to  their  defence  by  these  means, 
nothing  can  be  more  important  than  the  fortification  of  Narraganset  roads,  be- 
cause all  but  the  first  of  the  bays  just  named  (including  an  anchorage  for  ships- 
of-war  under  Block  island)  would  be  commanded  by  a  single  squadron  of  those 
floating  defences  lying  in  these  roads.  To  a  squadron  of  steam  batteries,  for 
instance,  lying  under  the  fortifications,  it  would  be  a  matter  of  little  consequence 
into  which  of  the  above  anchorages  an  enemy  should  go — all  being  within  reach  in 
three  or  four  hours,  and  some  within  sight.  We  will  here  observe,  by  the  way, 
that  this  use  of  floating  defences  is  in  accordance  with  the  principle  before  in- 
sisted on ;  they  are  not  expected  to  close  the  entrance  into  these  several  bays, 
that  would  require  a  squadron  for  each  at  least  equal  to  the  enemy's ;  but  as  the 
enemy  goes  in  merely  for  rest  or  shelter,  and  there  is  no  object  that  he  can  in- 
jure, he  may  be  permitted  to  enter,  and  our  squadron  will  assail  him  only  when 
the  circumstances  of  wind,  weather,  &c.,  give  all  the  advantages  to  the  attack. 
The  fortification  of  Narraganset  roads  is  therefore,  in  effect,  a  most  important 
contribution  toward  the  defence  of  all  the  neighboring  anchorages. 

But  the  same  properties  that  make  Narraganset  roads  so  precious  to  us  would 
recommend  them  to  the  enemy  also ;  and  their  natural  advantages  will  be  en- 
hanced in  his  eyes  by  the  value  of  all  the  objects  these  advantages  may  have 
accumulated  therein. 

If  this  roadstead  were  without  defence  an  enemy  could  occupy  it  without  op- 
position, and,  by  the  aid  of  naval  superiority,  form  a  lodgement  on  the  island  of 
Rhode  Island  for  the  war.  Occupying  this  island  with  his  troops,  and  with  his 
fleets  the  channels  on  either  side,  he  might  defy  all  the  forces  of  the  eastern 
States  ;  and  while,  from  this  position,  his  troops  would  keep  in  alarm  and  motion 
the  population  of  the  east,  feigned  expeditions  against  New  York,  or- against 
more  southern  cities,  would  equally  alarm  the  country  in  that  direction ;  and 
thus,  though  he  might  do  no  more  than  menace,  it  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  em- 
barrassment and  expense  into  which  he  would  drive  the  government. 

It  has  been  alleged  that  similar  consequences  would  flow  from  the  occupation 
of  other  positions,  (such,  for  instance,  as  are  afforded  in  the  bays  just  mentioned,) 
and  that,  therefore,  the  defence  in  a  strong  manner  of  Narraganset  roads  is  use- 
less. 

Even  allowing  that  there  are  other  advantageous  and  inaccessible  positions 
whereon  an  enemy  might  place  himself,  is  it  a  reason  because  the  foe  can  in 
spite  of  us,  possess  himself  of  comparatively  unsafe  and  open  harbors,  that  we 
should  not  apply  to  our  own  uses,  but  yield  up  to  him  the  very  best  harbor  on 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  183 

the  coast;  that  we  should  submit  to  capture  and  destruction  the  valuable  objects 
that  accumulate  in  consequence  of  the  properties  of  the  harbor  1 

But  it  is  believed  that  none  of  the  outer  and  wider  harbors  will  answer  for 
such  an  establishment  as  we  have  supposed,  nor  for  any  other  purpose  than  an 
occasional  anchorage  of  ships-of-war;  and  for  these  reasons,  amongst  others: 
that  although  ships-of-war  might  possibly  ride  in  these  broad  waters  at  all  sea- 
sons, it  would  seem  to  be  a  measure  of  great  temerity  for  transports  to  attempt 
it,  except  in  the  mildest  seasons ;  and  there  can  be  but  little  doubt  that  a  hostile 
expedition  would  resort  to  no  harbor  as  a  place  of  rendezvous,  unless  it  afforded 
sure  protection  to  its  transports ;  these  being  the  only  means  by  which  ulterior 
purposes  could  be  executed,  or  final  retreat  from  the  country  effected. 

If,  moreover,  Narraganset  roads  be  fortified  and  become  a  naval  station,  or  at 
least  the  station  of  a  floating  force  designed  to  act  against  these  outer  waters, 
such  an  establishment  by  any  enemy  would  at  once  be  put  upon  the  defensive, 
and  require  the  constant  presence  of  a  superior  fleet,  thus  measurably  losing  the 
object  of  the  establishment. 

Independent  of  the  qualities  of  the  harbor,  however,  none  of  these  bays  would 
answer  our  purpose :  1st.  Because  they  cannot  be  securely  defended ;  and,  2d. 
Because  they  are  difficult  of  access  from  the  main — the  communication  with  them 
being  liable  to  interruption  by  bad  weather,  and  liable  to  be  cut  off  by  the  enemy. 

The  defence  adopted  for  Narraganset  roads  must  be  formidable  on  the  impor- 
tant points,  because  they  will  be  exposed  to  powerful  expeditions.  Although 
the  possession  of  this  harbor,  the  destruction  of  the  naval  establishment,  the 
capture  of  the  floating  defences,  and  the  possession  of  the  island  as  a  place  of 
debarkation  and  refreshment  should  not  be  considered  as  constituting,  of  them- 
selves, objects  worthy  a  great  expedition,  they  might  very  well  be  the  prelimi- 
nary steps  of  such  expedition;  and  defences  weak  in  their  character  might 
tempt,  rather  than  deter  it;  for,  although  unable  to  resist  his  enterprise*  they 
might  be  fully  competent,  after  being  captured  and  strengthened  by  such  means 
as  he  would  have  at  hand,  to  protect  him  from  offensive  demonstrations  on  our 
part. 

There  are,  besides,  in  the  local  circumstances,  some  reasons  why  the  works 
should  be  strong.  The  channel  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  island  being  perma- 
nently closed  by  a  solid  bridge,  requires  no  defensive  works;  but  this  bridge 
being  at  the  upper  end  of  the  island,  the  channel  is  open  to  an  enemy  all  along 
the  eastern  shore  of  the  island.  Works  erected  for  the  defence  of  the  channel 
on  the  west  side  of  the  island  cannot,  therefore,  prevent,  nor  even  oppose,  a 
landing  on  the  eastern  side.  The  enemy,  consequently,  may  take  possession, 
and  bend  his  whole  force  to  the  reduction  of  the  forts  on  the  island,  which  can- 
not be  relieved  until  a  force  has  been  organized,  brought  from  a  distance,  con- 
veyed by  water  to  the  points  attacked,  and  landed  in  the  face  of  his  batteries ; 
all  this  obviously  requiring  several  days,  during  which  the  forts  should  be  capa- 
ble of  holding  out.  To  do  this  against  an  expedition  of  10,000  or  20,000 
men  demands  something  more  than  the  strength  to  resist  a  single  assault. 

Unless  the  main  works  be  competent  to  withstand  a  siege  of  a  few  days,  they 
will  not  therefore  fulfil  their  trust,  and  will  be  worse  than  useless. 

It  must  here  be  noticed  that,  although  the  works  do  not  prevent  the  landing 
of  an  enemy  on  Rhode  Island,  they  will,  if  capable  of  resisting  his  efforts  for  a 
few  days,  make  his  residence  on  the  island  for  any  length  of  time  impossible ; 
since  forces  in  any  number  may  be  brought  from  the  main  and  lauded  under  the 
cover  of  the  fire  of  the  works. 

To  come  now  to  the  particular  defences  proposed  for  this  roadstead.  It  must 
be  stated  that  there  are  three  entrances  into  Narraganset  roads : 

1st.  The  eastern  channel,  which  passes  up  on  the  east  side  of  the  island  of 
Rhode  Island.  This,  as  before  stated,  being  shut  by  a  solid  bridge,  needs 


184  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

no  defence  by  fortifications,  other  than  a  field-work  or  two,  which  may  b«  thrown 
up  at  the  opening  of  a  war. 

2d.  The  central  channel,  which  enters  from  sea  by  passing  between  Rhode 
Island  and  Canonicut  island.  This  is  by  far  the  best  entrance,  and  leads  to  the 
best  anchorage ;  and  this  it  is  proposed  to  defend  by  a  fort  on  the  east  side  of 
the  entrance,  designed  to  be  the  principal  work  in  the  system.  This  work, 
called  Fort  Adams,  is  nearly  completed.  On  the  west  side  of  the  entrance  it  is 
proposed  to  place  another  work ;  and  on  an  island,  called  Rose  island,  facing  the 
entrance,  a  third  Avork.  It  is  also  proposed  to  repair  the  old  fort  on  Goat  island, 
just  within  the  mouth ;  and  also  old  Fort  Green,  which  is  a  little  higher  up,  and 
on  the  island  of  Rhode  Island. 

3d.  As  to  the  western  passage,  three  modes  present  themselves ;  first,  by  re- 
ducing the  depth  of  water  by  an  artificial  ledge,  so  as  while  the  passage  shall 
be  as  free  as  it  is  now  for  the  coasting  trade,  it  shall  be  shut  as  to  the  vessels  of 
war,  including  steam  vessels;  second,  by  relying  on  fortifications  alone  to  close 
the  channel ;  or,  third,  by  resorting  in  part  to  one  and  in  part  to  the  other  mode 
just  mentioned.  Either  is  practicable ;  but  being  the  least  expensive  and  most 
certain,  the  estimates  are  founded  on  the  first. 

The  total  cost  of  the  Narraganset  defences  is  estimated  at  $1,817,482. — 
(Statement  1,  tables  A.  B,  D,  E,  and  F.) 

Gardiner's  bay. — It  is  uncertain  whether  this  harbor,  which  would  be  a  very 
valuable  one  to  an  enemy  investing  this  part  of  the  coast,  is  defensible  by  forti- 
fications alone.  After  it  shall  have  been  surveyed,  it  may  appear  that  from  one 
or  more  positions  the  whole  anchorage  may  be  controlled  by  heavy  sea  mortars. 
In  such  a  case,  the  defensive  works  would  not  be  costly.  If  it  be  found  expe- 
dient to  fortify  some  particular  portion  of  the  bay,  as  an  anchorage  for  steam 
batteries,  (which,  however,  is  not  anticipated,)  the  expense  would  probably  be 
as  great  as  was  anticipated  some  years  since  by  the  engineer  department,  viz  : 
$400,000.— (Statement  1,  table  F.) 

Sag  harbor,  New  York,  and  Stonington,  Connecticut. — Neither  of  these  har- 
bors has  been  surveyed  with  reference  to  defence.  The  first  is  possessed  of 
considerable  tonnage ;  and  the  second,  besides  being  engaged  in  commerce,  is 
the  terminus  of  a  railroad  from  Boston.  $100,000  may  be  assigned  to  the  first, 
and  $200,000  to  the  other. — (Statement  1,  tables  E  and  F.) 

New  London  harbor  is  very  important  to  the  commerce  of  Long  Island  sound ; 
and,  as  a  port  of  easy  access,  having  great  depth  of  water,  rarely  freezing,  and 
being  easily  defended,  it  is  an  exellent  station  for  the  navy.  It  is  also  valuable 
as  a  shelter  for  vessels  bound  out  or  home,  and  desirous  of  avoiding  a  blockading 
squadron  off  Sandy  Hook. 

In  the  plan  of  defence,  the  present  forts  (Trumbull  and  Griswold)  give  place 
to  more  efficient  works,  whereof  the  expense  is  estimated  at  $441,000. — (State- 
ment 1,  tables  C  and  F.) 

Mouth  of  Connecticut  river. — This  river  has  been  shown  to  be  subject  to  the 
expeditions  of  an  enemy.  No  survey  has  been  made  with  a  view  to  its  de- 
fences ;  $100,000  is  introduced  here  as  the  conjectural  cost. — (Statement  1, 
table  F,) 

New  Haven  harbor. — It  is  proposed  to  defend  this  harbor  by  improving  and 
enlarging  Fort  Hale,  and  substituting  a  new  work  for  the  slight  redoubt  erected 
during  the  last  war,  called  Fort  "Wooster.  The  expense  of  both  may  be  set 
down  at  $90,000,  exclusive  of  $5,000  for  immediate  repairs  of  old  Fort  Hale. — 
(Statement  1,  table  F.) 

There  are  several  towns  between  New  Haven  and  New  York,  on  both  sides 
of  the  sound ;  none  of  them  are  very  large  as  yet,  still,  most,  if  not  all,  are  pros- 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  185 

porous  and  increasing.  Although,  in  their  present  condition,  it  might  not  be 
deemed  necessary  to  apply  any  money  to  permanent  defences,  yet,  as  part  of 
the  present  object  is  to  ascertain,  as  near  as  may  be,  the  ultimate  cost  of  com- 
pletely fortifying  the  coast,  it  seems  proper  to  look  forward  to  the  time  when 
some  of  these  towns  may  become  objects  of  predatory  enterprises  of  some  mag- 
nitude. Bearing  in  mind  the  probable  increase  of  population  in  the  mean  time, 
and  the  situation  of  the  places  generally,  it  is  thought  that  $200,000  will  be 
enough  to  provide  defences  for  all. — (Statement  1,  table  F.) 

New  York  harbor. — The  objects  of  the  projected  works  for  the  security  of 
New  York  are  to  cover  the  city  from  an  attack  by  land  or  sea ;  to  protect  its 
numerous  shipping ;  to  prevent,  as  far  as  possible,  the  blockade  of  this  great 
port ;  and  to  cover  the  interior  communication  uniting  this  harbor  with  the  Del- 
aware. In  the  present  condition  of  the  defences  an  enemy  would  encounter  no 
great  opposition,  whether  his  attack  were  made  by  land  or  water. 

There  are  two  avenues  to  the  city,  namely  :  one  by  the  main  channel,  direct 
from  sea,  and  one  by  the  sound.  If  an  enemy  come  by  the  way  of  the  sound, 
he  may  now  land  his  forces  on  the  New  York  side,  at  Hell  Grate,  within  less  than 
ten  miles  of  New  York,  and  the  next  day,  at  the  latest,  be  in  the  city ;  or  he 
may  land  on  the  Long  island  side  at  the  same  distance,  and  in  the  same  time  be 
master  of  the  navy  yard  and  of  Brooklyn  heights,  whence  the  city  of  New  York 
is  perfectly  commanded ;  or  he  may  divide  his  forces  and  reach  both  objects  at 
the  same  moment. 

The  projected  system  of  defence  closes  this  avenue  at  the  greatest  distance 
possible  from  the  city,  namely,  at  Throg's  Point.  The  occupation  of  this  point 
will  force  the  enemy  to  land  more  than  twenty  miles  from  the  city  on  one  side, 
and  still  further  from  the  navy  yard  on  the  other. 

A  work  now  in  progress  at  Throg's  Point  will  probably  prevent  any  attempt 
to  force  this  passage.  It  will,  as  we  have  seen,  oblige  an  enemy  to  land  at  a 
considerable  distance  from  the  object ;  and,  as  he  will  then  be  unable  to  turn  the 
strong  position  afforded  by  Harlem  river,  the  cover  on  the  New  York  side  will 
be  sufficient.  , 

But  should  he  land  on  the  Long  Island  side  he  might,  by  leaving  parties  on 
suitable  positions  with  a  view  to  prevent  our  crossing  the  river  and  falling  on 
his  rear,  make  a  dash  at  the  navy  yard,  having  no  obstacle  in  his  front.  To 
prevent  this  effectually,  and  also  to  accomplish  other  objects,  a  work  should  be 
erected  on  Wilkins's  Point,  opposite  Throg's  Point.  This  work,  besides  com- 
pleting the  defence  of  the  channel,  would  involve  a  march  against  the  navy  yard 
from  this  quarter  in  great  danger ;  since  all  the  forces  that  could  be  collected  on 
the  New  York  shore  might,  under  cover  of  this  work,  be  crossed  over  to  Long 
Island,  and  fall  on  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  cutting  off  his  communication  with 
the  fleet.  The  two  works  on  Throg's  and  Wilkins's  Points  may,  therefore,  be 
regarded  as  perfectly  protecting,  on  that  side,  the  city  and  navy  yard. 

Against  an  attack  by  the  main  channel  there  are — 

1st.  The  works  in  the  vicinity  of  the  city,  which  would  act  upon  an  enemy's 
squadron  only  after  its  arrival  before  the  place.  They  consist  of  Fort  Colum- 
bus, Castle  Williams,  and  South  Battery,  on  Governor's  island ;  Fort  Wood,  on 
Bedlow's  island ;  and  Fort  Gibson,  on  Ellis's  island. 

It  is  necessary  that  these  works  be  maintained,  because,  in  the  event  of  the 
lower  barrier  being  forced,  these  would  still  afford  a  resource.  It  is  a  disad- 
vantage of  their  positions,  however,  that  the  destruction  of  the  city  might  be 
going  on  simultaneously  with  the  contest  between  these  forts  and  the  fleet. 
They  cannot,  however,  be  dispensed  with,  until  the  outer  barriers  are  entirely 
completed,  if  even  then. 

2d.  At  the  NaiTows,  about  seven  miles  below  the  city,  the  passage  becomes 
so  contracted  as  to  permit  good  disposition  to  be  made  for  defence.  On  the  Long 


186  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

Island  side  of  the  Narrows  is  Fort  Lafayette,  which  is  a  strong  water-battery 
standing  on  a  reef  at  some  distance  from  the  shore ;  and  immediately  behind  it, 
011  the  top  of  the  bank,  is  a  small  but  strong  work,  called  Fort  Hamilton.    Some  ' 
repairs  being  applied  to  these  works  this  position  may  be  regarded  as  well 
occupied. 

On  the  west  side,  or  Staten  island  side  of  the  Narrows,  are  the  following  works 
belonging  to  the  State  of  New  York,  viz :  Fort  Richmond,  which  is  a  water- 
battery  ;  Battery  Hudson,  which  is  at  some  height  above  the  water ;  Battery 
Morton,  which  is  a  small  battery  on  the  top  of  the  hill ;  and  Fort  Tomkins, 
which  is  also  on  the  top  of  the  hill,  and  is  the  principal  work.  All  these  need 
great  repairs ;  but,  being  once  in  proper  order,  would  afford  a  very  important 
contribution  to  the  defence-  of  the  passage ;  nothing  further,  indeed,  being  con- 
templated for  this  position,  except  the  construction  of  a  small  redoubt  on  a  com- 
manding hill,  a  little  to  the  southwest.  The  repairs  of  these  works  cannot  too 
soon  be  taken  in  hand ;  and  it  is  hoped  some  arrangement  may  soon  be  made 
with  the  State  authorities  to  that  end. 

With  the  Narrows  thus  defended,  and  the  works  near  the  city  in  perfect  order, 
New  York  might  be  regarded  as  pretty  well  protected  against  an  attack  by  water 
through  this  passage. 

But  there  lies  below  the  Narrows  a  capacious  bay,  affording  good  anchorage 
for  any  number  of  vessels-of-war  and  transports.  An  enemy's  squadron  being 
in  that  bay,  into  which  entrance  is  very  easy,  would  set  a  seal  upon  this  outlet 
of  the  harbor.  Not  a  vessel  could  enter  or  depart  at  any  season  of  the  year. 
And  it  would  also  intercept  the  water  communication,  by  the  way  of  the  Raritan, 
between  New  York  and  Philadelphia. 

The  same  squadron  could  land  a  force  on  the  beach  of  Gravesend  bay,  (the 
place  of  the  landing  of  the  British,  which  brought  on  the  battle  of  Long  Island 
in  the  revolutionary  war,)  within  seven  miles  of  the  city  of  Brooklyn,  of  its 
commanding  height,  and  of  the  navy  yard,  with  no  intervening  obstacle  of  any 
sort. 

This  danger  is  imminent,  and  it  would  not  fail,  in  the  event  of  war,  to  be  as 
fully  realized  as  it  was  during  the  last  war,  when,  on  the  rumor  of  an  expedition 
being  in  preparation  in  England,  27,000  militia  were  assembled  to  cover  the  city 
from  an  attack  of  this  sort.  It  is  apparent  that  the  defences  near  the  city,  and 
those  at  the  Narrows,  indispensable  as  they  are  for  other  purposes,  cannot  be 
made  to  prevent  this  enterprise,  which  can  be  thoroughly  guarded  against 
only  by — 

3d.  An  outer  barrier  at  the  very  mouth  of  the  harbor.  This  would  accom- 
plish two  objects  of  great  consequence,  namely,  rendering  a  close  blockade  of 
the  harbor  impossible ;  and  obliging  an  enemy,  who  should  design  to  move 
troops  against  the  navy  yard,  to  land  at  a  distance  of  more  than  twenty  miles 
from  his  object,  upon  a  dangerous  beach ;  leaving,  during  the  absence  of  the 
troops,  the  transports  at  anchor  in  the  ocean,  and  entirely  without  shelter.  The 
hazards  of  such  a  land  expedition  would,  moreover,  be  greatly  enhanced  by  the 
fact  that  our  own  troops,  by  passing  over  to  Long  Island  under  cover  of  the  fort 
at  Wilkins's  Point,  could  cut  off  the  return  of  the  enemy  to  his  fleet,  which  must 
lie  at  or  somewhere  near  Rockaway ;  time,  distance,  and  the  direction  of  the 
respective  marches,  would  make,  very  naturally,  such  a  manoeuvre  a  part  of  the 
plan  of  defence.  Against  an  enemy  landing  in  Gravesend  bay,  no  such  ma- 
noeuvre could  be  effectual,  on  account  of  the  shortness  of  his  line  of  march,  as 
well  as  of  its  direction. . 

In  view  of  these  considerations,  the  board  of  engineers  projected  additional 
works — one  for  the  east  bank  and  another  for  the  middle  ground  ;  these  posi- 
tions being  on  shoals  on  either  hand  of  the  bar,  outside  of  Sandy  Hook.  Before 
determining  on  the  works  last  mentioned,  the  board  went  into  much  research  in 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  187 

order  to  ascertain  whether  these  shoals  were  unchangeable,  and  it  was  thought 
to  have  been  fully  proved  that  there  had  been  no  material  alteration  in  more 
than  sixty  years.  This  apparent  stability  of  the  shoals  encouraged  the  board 
to  devise  the  project  referred  to. 

Recent  surveys  have,  however,  discovered  a  new  or  rather  another  channel. 
If  it  be  indeed  a  new  channel,  it  shows  a  want  of  stability  in  the  shoals  that 
forbids  any  such  structures  as.  the  contemplated  batteries,  and  it  may  be  neces- 
sary to  resort  to  other  means.  Suitable  means  exist,  unquestionably,  though  it 
may  not  be  best  to  decide  on  them  until  all  doubt  as  to  the  fixed  or  changing 
nature  of  the  channel  shall  be  removed,  especially  as  it  must  necessarily  be 
some  time  before  the  completion  of  more  indispensable  works  will  allow  the 
commencement  of  these.  This  may,  however,  be  said  with  certainty,  namely : 
that  all  other  means  failing,  works  may  be  erected  on  Sandy  Hook  which  will 
have  a  good  action  upon  the  channel,  and  under  cover  of  which  bomb  ketches 
or  steam  batteries,  or  both,  -may  lie.  With  such  an  arrangement  there  would  Jbe 
little  probability  of  the  lower  bay  being  occupied  as  a  blockading  station. 

To  recapitulate :  The  security  of  the  city  of  New  York  and  the  navy  yard 
requires,  first,  defences  on  the  passage  from  the  sound,  namely,  the  completion 
of  Fort  Schuyler  on  Throg's  Point,  and  the  erection  of  a  fort  on  Wilkins's 
Point — cost  of  both  $976,000 ;  second,  the  repair  of  works  on  Governor's 
island,  on  Bedloe's  island,  and  on  Ellis's  island — estimated  .cost  $170,897 ; 
third,  the  repair  of  the  works  at  the  Narrows,  including  the  works  belonging  to 
the  State — cost,  8475,000 ;  and,  fourth,  the  erection  of  outer  defences  on  or 
near  Sandy  Hook — estimated  by  the  board  of  engineers  to  cost  $3,362,824. 

The  total  cost,  exclusive  of  these  last,  will  therefore  be  $1,621,897,  or,  in- 
cluding these,  $4,984,721. — (Statement  1,  tables  A,  C,  and  F.) 

Delaware  bay,  Fort  Delaware,  Fort  Mifflin,  Delaware  breakwater. — The 
coast  from  the  mouth  of  the  Hudson  to  the  Chesapeake,  as  well  as  that  on  the 
south  side  of  Long  Island,  is  low  and  sandy,  and  is  penetrated  by  several  inlets  ; 
but  not  one  besides  the  Delaware  is  navigable  by  sea-going  vessels.  The  Dela- 
ware bay  itself,  being  wide  and  full  of  shoals,  having  an  intricate  channel,  and 
being  much  obstructed  by  ice  in  the  winter,  affords  no  very  good  natural  harbor 
within  a  reasonable  distance  of  the  sea. 

The  artificial  harbor  now  in  course  of  construction  near  Cape  Henlopen  will, 
it  is  hoped,  fully  supply  this  need,  in  which  event  it  must  be  securely  fortified. 
No  plans  have,  however,  as  yet  been  made  with  that  object,  and  as  to  the  pro- 
bable cost,  nothing  better  can  now  be  done  than  to  assume  the  conjectural  esti- 
mate made  some  years  since  in  the  engineer  department,  namely,  $600,000. — 
(Statement  1,  table  F.) 

The  lowest  point  at  which  the  bay  is  defensible  is  at  Pea  Patch  island,  about 
forty-five  miles  below  the  city  of  Philadelphia.  A  fort  on  that  island,  to  re- 
place the  one  destroyed  by  fire  ;  a  fort  opposite  the  Pea  Patch,  on  the  Delaware 
shore,  to  assist  in  commanding  the  Delaware  channel,  and  at  the  same  time  pro- 
•  tect  the  mouth  of  the  Delaware  and  Chesapeake  canal ;  a  temporary  work  on 
the  Jersey  shore,  to  be  thrown  up  at  the  commencement  of  a  war,  to  assist  in 
closing  the  channel  on  that  side ;  together  with  floating  obstructions,  to  be  put 
down  in  moments  of  peril,  will  effectually  cover  all  above  this  position — in- 
cluding Philadelphia  and  its  navy  yard,  Wilmington,  Newcastle,  the  canal  be- 
fore mentioned,  and  the  Philadelphia  and  Baltimore  railroad. 

The  commencement  of  the  rebuilding  of  Fort  Delaware  being  delayed  by 
difficulties  attending  the  settlement  of  new  claims  to  the  island  on  which  it  is 
to  stand,  Fort  Mifflin,  which  is  an  old  work  about  seven  miles  below  the  city  of 
Philadelphia,  has  been  put  in  good  order.  This  work  is  ready  to  receive  its 
armament  and  its  garrison. 


188  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

The  expense  of  the  work  on  Fort  Delaware  may  be  estimated  at  $491,000, 
and  of  the  fort  opposite,  $521,000. — (Statement  1,  tables  C  and  F.) 

Chesapeake  bay. — The  board  of  naval  officers  and  engineers  intrusted  with 
the  selection  of  sites  for  a  great  northern  and  a  great  southern  naval  depot, 
recommended  in  their  joint  reports  of  1819  and  1820  Burwell's  bay,  on  James 
river,  for  the  one,  and  Charlestown,  in  Boston  harbor,  for  the  other.  They  also 
recommended  Boston  harbor  and  Narraganset  bay,  at  the  north,  and  Hampton 
roads,  at  the  south,  as  chief  naval  rendezvous.  In  those  reports  the  commis- 
sioners entered  at  large  into  the  consideration  of  all  the  matters  relating  to  these 
important  objects,  and  reference  is  now  made  to  those  reports  for -many  interest- 
ing details. 

Hampton  roads,  James  river,  Norfolk,  and  the  navy  yard. — The  works  pro- 
jected for  the  defence  of  these  are,  1st,  a  fort  at  Old  Point  Comfort — this  is 
called  Fort  Monroe ;  2d,  a  casemated  battery,  called  Fort  Calhoun,  on  the  Rip 
Rap  shoals,  opposite  Old  Point  Comfort ;  and  3d,  a  line  of  floating  obstruc- 
tions extending  across  the  channel  from  one  of  these  works  to  the  other.  It 
was  the  opinion  of  the  commission  above  mentioned  that,  in  the  event  of  a  great 
naval  depot  being  fixed  on  James  river,  it  might  ultimately  be  proper  to  provide 
additional  strength  by  placing  works  on  the  positions  of  Newport  News,  Was- 
saw  shoals,  and  Craney  Island  flats.  Such  an  expansion  has,  however,  since 
then  been  given  to  the  present  navy  yard  at  Gosport,  (opposite  Norfolk,)  that 
there  is  little  probability  of  any  other  position  on  these  waters  being  occupied 
for  such  purposes. 

The  great  importance  of  retaining  Hampton  roads  during  a  war,  and  of  cover- 
ing the  navy  yard,  is  conceded  on  all  hands.  The  bearing  of  this  harbor  upon 
the  general  defence  of  the  Chesapeake  bay  is,  perhaps,  equally  well  understood, 
it  being  very  evident  that  a  small  hostile  force  would  reluctantly  venture  up  the 
bay,  or  into  York  river,  or  the  Rappahannock,  or  any  of  the  upper  harbors, 
leaving  behind  them  a  great  naval  station,  and  the  common  rendezvous  of  the 
southern  coast — a  station  seldom  in  time  of  war  without  the  presence  of  a  num- 
ber of  vessels  just  ready  for,  or  just  returned  from,  sea. 

A  very  important  bearing  upon  the  security  of  Norfolk  and  the  navy  yard, 
independent  of  the  closing  the  channel  to  those  places,  is,  however,  not  generally 
understood,  and  has  been  entirely  overlooked  in  the  oflicial  animadversions 
(before  mentioned)  on  the  system  of  defence  of  the  board  of  engineers. 

If  we  suppose  no  defences  at  the  mouth  of  the  roadstead,  or  only  such  as  can 
be  disregarded  or  easily  silenced,  an  enemy  might  debark  his  troops  in  Lynn- 
haven  bay,  and  despatch  them  against  Norfolk,  while  his  fleet  would  pass  up 
the  harbor  to  the  vicinity  of  the  town,  not  only  covering  the  flank  of  his  troops, 
but  landing  parties  to  turn  any  position  that  might  be  taken  by  the  army  at- 
tempting to  defend  the  place ;  or,  instead  of  landing  in  the  bay,  he  might  at  his 
option  land  the  main  body  quite  near  to  Norfolk ;  and,  having  possession  of 
James  river,  he  would  prevent  the  arrival  of  any  succor  in  steamboats  or  other- 
wise by  that  channel. 

There  are  two  or  three  defiles  on  the  route  from  Lynnhaven  bay  to  Norfolk, 
caused  by  the  interlocking  of  streams,  that,  with  the  aid  of  field-works,  would 
possess  great  strength ;  and  being  occupied  in  succession,  would  undoubtedly 
delay,  if  not  repulse,  an  enemy  assailing  them  in  front.  Since  the  naval  depot 
seems  fixed  at  Gosport,  these  must,  indeed,  be  chiefly  relied  on  for  its  security 
from  land  attacks  ;  and  timely  attention  must  be  given,  on  the  breaking  out  of  a 
war,  to  the  occupying  of  these  defiles  with  appropriate  defences.  These  posi- 
tions possess  no  value  whatever  if  they  can  be  turned,  and  without  adequate 
fortifications  at  the  outlet  of  Hampton  roads,  there  would  seem  to  be  no  security 
for  Norfolk  or  the  navy  yard,  except  in  the  presence  of  a  large  military  force. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  189 

On  the  completion  of  the  projected  defences,  the  circumstances  will  be  very 
different.  Then,  those  denies  must  be  attacked  in  front,  because  no  part  of  the 
enemy's  force  can  be  landed  above  the  mouth  of  the  roads.  But  this  is  not  all. 
The  moment  an  enemy  advances  towards  Norfolk  from  this  point  of  debarka- 
tion, his  communication  with  his  fleet  will  be  jeoparded,  because,  as  the  denies 
do  not  require  a  large  body  to  defend  them  against  an  attack  in  front,  the  greater 
part  of  the  reinforcements  arriving  from  above,  by  way  of  the  river,  may  be 
lauded  upon  his  flanks,  or  in  his  rear.  An  offensive  land  movement  by  the 
enemy,  under  such  circumstances,  could  be  justified  only  in  the  case  of  his 
finding  an  entire  want  of  preparation,  caused  by  the  unexpected  commencement 
of  hostilities.  In  connexion  with  this  disposition  for  defence,  it  may  be  expe- 
dient on  the  opening  of  a  war,  to  throw  up  a  field-work  on  the  shore  opposite 
the  position  of  Fort  Calhoun,  which  would,  besides,  contribute  to  the  exclusion 
from  the  roadstead  of  vessels  of  small  draught. 

The  above  remarks  show  that  the  fortifications  in  progress  are  not  less  neces- 
sary to  the  security  of  the  navy  yard  and  the  city  of  Norfolk  from  a  land  at- 
tack than  from  an  attack  by  water,  and  that  both  these  important  functions  are 
superadded  to  the  task  of  defending  the  only  good  roadstead  of  the  southern 
coast,  and  of  contributing,  in  a  very  important  degree,  towards  the  defence  of 
the  Chesapeake  bay. 

As  in  the  case  of  Narraganset  roads,  it  has  been  objected  to  this  system  of 
defence  that,  although  it  may  shut  up  this  anchorage  it  leaves  others  in  this 
region  open.  May  we  suppose,  then,  that  if  there  were  no  other  than  this  har- 
bor, its  defence  would  be  justifiable?  If  so,  it  would  seem  that  the  objection 
rests  on  the  principle  that  in  proportion  as  nature  has  been  bountiful  to  us,  we 
must  be  niggard  to  ourselves  ;  that,  having  little,  we  may  cherish  it,  but,  having 
much,  we  must  throw  all  away.  I 

The  same  criticism  complains  of  the  unreasonable  magnitude  of  one  of  these 
works,  (Fort  Monroe,)  and  we  concede  that  there  is  justice  in  the  criticism. 
But  it  has  long  been  too  late  to  remedy  the  evil.  It  may  not,  however,  be  im- 
proper to  avail  of  this  opportunity  to  remove  from  the  country  the  professional 
reproach  attached  to  this  error.  When  the  system  of  coast  defence  was  about 
to  be  taken  up,  it  was  thought  best  by  the  government  and  Congress,  to  call 
from  abroad  a  portion  of  that  skill  and  science  which  a  long  course  of  active 
warfare  was  supposed  to  have  supplied.  Fort  Monroe  is  one  of  the  results  of 
that  determination.  It  was  not  easy,  probably,  to  come  down  from  the  exag- 
gerated scale  of  warfare  to  which  Europe  was  then  accustomed ;  nor  for  those 
who  had  been  brought  up  where  wars  were  often  produced,  and  always  magni- 
fied by  juxtaposition  or  proximity,  to  realize  to  what  degree  remoteness  from 
belligerent  nations  would  diminish  military  means  and  qualify  military  objects. 
Certain  it  is,  that  this  experiment,  costly  as  it  was  in  the  case  of  Fort  Monroe, 
would  have  been  much  more  so  but  for  the  opposition  of  some  whose  more 
moderate  opinions  had  been  moulded  by  no  other  circumstances  than  those  pe- 
.culiar  to  our  own  country. 

The  mistake  is  one  relating  to  magnitude,  however,  not  to  strength.  Magni- 
tude in  fortifications  is  often  a  measure  of  strength ;  fcut  not  always,  nor  in  this 
instance.  Fort  Monroe  might  have  been  as  strong  as  it  is  now  against  a  water 
attack,  or  an  assault,  or  a  siege,  with  one-third  its  present  capacity,  and  per- 
haps at  no  more  than  half  its  cost.  We  do  not  think  this  work  too  strong  for 
its  position,  nor  too  heavily  armed ;  and  as  the  force  of  the  garrison  will  depend 
mainly  on  the  extent  of  the  armament,  the  error  has  caused  an  excess  in  the 
first  outlay  chiefly,  but  will  not  involve  much  useless  expense  after  completion. 

Although  there  is  much  important  work  to  be  done  to  complete  the  fort,  it  is 
even  now  in  a  state  to  contribute  largely  to  the  defence  of  the  roadstead,  and 
there  is  no  doubt  that  in  a  very  short  time  all  the  casemated  parts  may  be  per- 

ctly  ready  to  recieve  the  armament. 


190  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

This  work  will  be  found  in  statement  1,  table  C  ;  $223,367  being  required  to 
complete  it. 

Fort  Calhoun  cannot  yet  be  carried  forward  for  want  of  stability  in  the  foun- 
dation. The  artificial  mass  on  which  it  is  to  stand  having  been  raised  out  of 
the  water,  the  walls  of  the  battery  were  begun  some  years  since,  but  it  was  soon 
found  that  their  weight  caused  considerable  subsidence.  On  an  inspection  by 
engineer  officers,  it  was  then  decided  to  keep  the  foundations  loaded  with  more 
than  the  whole  weight  of  the  finished  work  until  all  subsidence  had  ceased. 
The  load  had  hardly  been  put  on,  however,  before  it  was  injudiciously  deter- 
mined to  take  it  off  and  begin  to  build,  although  the  settling  was  still  going  on. 
Happily  a  better  policy  prevailed  before  the  construction  was  resumed,  but  not 
before  the  very  considerable  expense  of  removing  the  load  had  been  incurred, 
and  the  further  expense  of  replacing  it  rendered  necessary.  It  is  hoped  the 
whole  load  will  be  replaced  early  the  present  year. — (Statement  1,  table  C.) 
Required  to  complete  the  work  $416,000. 

It  may  be  expedient,  in  time  of  war,  by  way  of  providing  interior  barriers, 
to  erect  batteries  on  Craney  island,  at  the  mouth  of  Elizabeth  river,  and  to  pu1 
in  condition  and  arm  old  Fort  Norfolk,  which  is  just  below  the  city. 

Harbor  of  St.  Mary's. — The  central  situation  (as  regards  the  Chesapeake)  o: 
this  fine  basin,  its  relation  to  the  Potomac,  its  depth  of  water,  and  the  facility 
with  which  it  may  be  defended,  indicate  its  fitness  as  a  harbor  of  refuge  for  tht 
commerce  of  the  Chesapeake  bay,  and  as  an  occasional,  if  not  constant,  statioi 
during  war  of  a  portion  of  the  naval  force.  A  survey  has  been  made,  but  n< 
project  has  been  formed.  The  engineer  department,  some  years  ago,  conjee 
tured  that  the  cost  of  defences  in  this  harbor  might  amount  to  $300,000.— 
(Statement  1,  table  F.) 

Annapolis  harbor. — No  surveys  or  plans  of  defence  have  been  made.  Th< 
existing  works  are  inefficient  and  quite  out  of  repair.  A  former  estimate  mad< 
by  the  engineer  department,  amounting  to  $250,000,  is  adopted  here. — (Statemen 
1,  table  F.) 

Harbor  of  Baltimore. — The  proximity  of  the  city  to  Chesapeake  bay  greath 
endangers  the  city  of  Baltimore.  In  the  present  state  of  things,  an  enemy  in  i 
few  hours'  march,  after  an  easy  landing,,  and  without  having  his  communicatio] 
with  his  fleet  seriously  endangered,  can  make  himself  master  of  that  great  em 
porium  of  commerce.  There  are  required  for  its  security  two  forts  on  the  Pa 
tapsco — one  at  Hawkins's  Point,  and  the  other  opposite  that  point,  at  the  extrem 
end  of  the  flat  that  runs  off  from  Sollers's  Point ;  these  being  the  lowest  posi 
tions  at  which  the  passage  of  the  Patapsco  can  be  defended.  Besides  the  ad 
vantages  that  will  result,  of  obliging  the  enemy  to  land  at  a  greater  distance- 
thereby  gaining  time,  by  delaying  his  march,  for  the  arrival  of  succor,  and  prc 
venting  his  turning  the  defensive  positions  which  our  troops  might  occupy — i 
will  be  impossible  for  him  to  endanger  the  city  by  a  direct  attack  by  water. 

The  present  Fort  McHenry,  Redoubt  TVood,  and  Covington  battery  should  b 
retained  as  a  second  barrier.  The  first  mentioned  is  now  in  good  condition,  an 
the  repairs  required  for  the  others  may  be  applied  at  the  beginning  of  a  war. 

The  fort  on  Sollers's  Point  flats,  which  should  be  first  commenced,  is  estimate 
to  cost  $1,000,000. — (Statement  1,  table  D.) 

The  fort  on  Hawkins's  Point,  (to  be  found  in  statement  1,  table  F,)  will  cos 
it  is  supposed,  $376,000. 

Mouth  of  Elk  river. — The  completion  of  the  line  of  water  communicatio 
from  the  Delaware  to  the  waters  of  the  Chesapeake  makes  it  proper  to  place 
fort  somewhere  near  the  mouth  of  Elk  river,  in  order  to  prevent  an  enemy  froi 
destroying,  by  a  sudden  enterprise,  the  works  forming  this  outlet  of  the  cana 
There  have  been  no  surveys  made  with  a  view  to  establish  such  protectioi 
which  are  estimated  at  $50,000. — (Statement  1,  table  F.) 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  191 

Cities  of  Washington,  Geogetown,  and  Alexandria. — Fort  Washington' 
covers  these  cities  from  any  attack  by  water,  and  will  oblige  an  enemy  to  land 
at  some  eight  or  ten  miles  below  Alexandria,  should  that  city  be  his  object,  and 
about  twice  as  far  below  Washington.  It  will  also  serve  the  very  important 
purpose  of  covering  troops  crossing  from  Virginia  with  a  view  to  fall  on  the 
flanks  of  an  enemy  moving  against  the  capital  from  the  Patuxent  or  the  Chesa- 
peake. To  put  the  necessary  repairs  on  Fort  Washington  will  cost  about 
$20,000.— (See  statement  1,  table  A.) 

Cedar  Point,  Potomac  river. — But  all  these  objects  would  have  been  better 
fulfilled  had  the  work  been  placed  at  Lower  Cedar  Point.  As  it  is,  however, 
the  contemplated  works  being  constructed  in  the  Patuxent,  and  the  militia  of 
the  surrounding  country  in  a  due  state  of  preparation,  an  enterprise  against 
Washington  would  be  a  hazardous  one. 

As  giving  complete  security  to  the  towns  in  the  District,  covering  more  than 
sixty  miles  in  length  of  the  Potomac,  and  a  large  tract  of  country  lying  between 
the  Potomac  and  the  Patuxent,  the  work  on  Cedar  Point  should  not  be  omitted. 
There  have  been  no  surveys  made  of  the  ground,  nor  projects  of  the  fort,  which, 
in  a  conjectural  estimate  of  the  engineer  department,  was  set  down  at  $300,000. — 
(Statement  1,  table  E.)  f 

Patuxent  river. — The  more  effectually  to  protect  the  city  of  Washington  from 
a  sudden  attack  by  troops  landed  at  the  head  of  navigation  in  the  Patuxent, 
and  to  provide  additional  shelter  for  vessels  in  the  Chesapeake,  a  fort  has  been 
planned  to  occupy  Point  Patience,  and  another  to  occupy  Thomas's  Point,  both 
a  short  distance  up  the  river.  The  work  on  Thomas's  Point  is  (in  statement  1, 
table  D)  estimated  to  cost  $250,000;  and  the  work  on  Point  Patience,  (in  state- 
ment 1,  table  F,)  estimated  to  cost  $246,000. 

It  will  be  perceived  that  the  system  of  defence  for  Washington  contemplates, 
first,  defending  the  Potomac  on  Cedar  Point  and  maintaining  a  second  barrier  at 
Fort  Washington ;  second,  defending  flie  mouth  of  the  Patuxent.  This  system 
is  criticised  in  the  document  before  referred  to  in  a  way  to  induce  the  suspicion 
that  it  was  not  understood. 

During  the  last  war  there  was  no  fort  in  the  Patuxent ;  and  the  consequence 
was,  that  the  British  approached  by  that  avenue  and  occupied  the  whole  river 
as  high  as  Pig  Point — nearly  fifty  miles  from  its  mouth,  and  less  than  twenty 
miles  from  the  capital ;  while,  in  consequence  of  there  being  no  forts  in  the  Po- 
tomac, they  occupied  thatr  iver  as  high  as  Alexandria,  inclusive;  by  this  latter 
occupation  perfectly  protecting  the  left  flank  of  the  movement  during  its  whole 
advance  and  retreat.  Both  flanks  being  safe,  the  British  had  nothing  to  fear 
except  from  a  force  in  front ;  and  that  this  risk  was  not  great,  in  the  short  march 
of  less  than  twenty  miles  from  his  boats,  was  proved  by  the  issue. 

On  the  ninth  day  from  that  on  which  the  fleet  entered  the  Chesapeake  the 
English  army  was  in  possession  of  the  capital,  having  penetrated  near  fifty  miles 
beyond  the  point  of  debarkation.  On  the  twelfth  day  from  the  time  of  landing, 
the  troops  were  again  on  shipboard  near  the  mouth  of  the  river.  This  attack, 
exceedingly  well  conceived  and  very  gallantly  executed,  owed  its  success  en- 
tirely to  the  want  of  defences,  such  as  are  now  proposed. 

Let  us  suppose  both  rivers  fortified  as  recommended,  and  an  enemy  landed  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Patuxent.  If  now  he  attempt  this  enterprise  his  march  will 
be  prolonged  by  at  least  four  days ;  that  is  to  say,  it  will  require  more  than  six- 
teen days,  during  which  time  he  will  be  out  of  communication  with  his  fleet,  as 
regards  supplies  and  assistance. 

The  opposition  to  his  invasion  will  begin  at  the  landing,  because  our  troops, 
having  now  nothing  to  fear  as  to  their  flank,  either  from  the  Potomac  or  Pa- 
tuxent, will  dispute  every  foot  of  territory;  and  although  he  should  continue  to 
advance,  it  must  be  at  a  slower  rate. 


192  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

While  he  is  thus  pursuing  his  route  towards  Washington,  the  forces  of  Vir- 
ginia will  be  crossing  the  Potomac  and  concentrating  at  Port  Tobacco,  or  some  . 
position  between  that  place  and  Fort  Washington,  preparatory  to  falling  on  his 
flank  and  rear.  This  would  seem  to  be  conclusive;  for  it  is  difficult  to  conceive 
of  troops  persevering  in  an  expedition  when  every  moment  will  not  only  place 
them  further  from  succor,  but  greatly  increase  their  need  of  it.  Railroads  reach 
from  near  the  crossing  places  of  the  Potomac  to  the  very  heart  of  the  country 
south;  and  a  very  few  days  would  bring  forward  a  large  force,  all  of  which 
would  arrive  upon  the  rear  of  the  enemy. 

It  is  said  in  the  criticism  that,  if  shut  out  of  the  Patuxent,  the  enemy  might 
land  between  the  mouth  of  that  river  and  Annapolis,  and  thence  proceed  against 
Washington.  But  the  same  difficulties  belong  to  this  project,  and  a  new  diffi- 
culty is  added.  The  Virginia  forces  arrive,  as  before,  and  assail  his  flank  either 
between  the  Potomac  and  Patuxent,  or  between  the  Patuxent  and  the  Chesa- 
peake ;  and  there  is,  besides,  the  Patuxent  for  the  enemy  to  cross  both  in  going 
and  returning — itself  a  formidable  military  obstacle. 

It  is  said,  also,  that  the  landing  may  be  made  in  the  Potomac ;  but  this  only 
proves  that  the  system  animadverted  on  had  not  been  studied,  it  being  a  fun- 
damental principle  of  the  system  that  such  landing  must  be  prevented  by  forti- 
fying the  rivers  as  low  down  as  possible 

The  southern  coast,  stretching  from  Cape  Hatteras  to  the  southern  point  of 
Florida,  is  invariably  low,  and  for  the  greater  part  sandy;  much  resembling^ 
the  coast  from  the  above-mentioned  cape  to  Montauk  Point,  on  the  east  end  of 
Long  Island. 

A  ridge  of  sand,  here  and  there  interrupted  by  the  alluvion  of  the  rivers,  ex- 
tends through  its  whole  length.  This  ridge,  in  certain  portions,  lies  on  the 
main  land,  while  in  others  it  is  divided  therefrom  by  basins  or  "sounds"  of 
various  width  and  depth,  and  is  cut  up  into  islands  by  numerous  channels  which 
connect  these  interior  waters  with  the  sea.  Wherever  this  sand  ridge  is  inter- 
rupted its  place  is  occupied  by  low  and  marshy  grounds,  bordering  the  principal 
and  the  many  lesser  outlets  of  the  rivers. 

Ocracock  inlet,  N.  C. — The  shallowness  of  the  water  on  the  bars  at  this  inlet 
effectually  excudes  all  vessels-of-war — at  least,  all  moved  by  sails.  But  as 
this  is  an  outlet  of  an  extensive  commerce,  and  as,  through  this  opening,  attempts 
might  be  made  in  small  vessels,  barges,  or  the  smaller  class  Df  steam  vessels,  to 
destroy  this  commerce,  or  to  interrupt  the  line  of  interior  water  communication, 
timely  preparation  must  be  made  of  temporary  works  equal  to  defence  against 
all  such  minor  enterprises. 

Beaufort  7iarbor,  N.  C. — A  work  called  Fort  Macon  has  been  erected  for  the 
defence  of  this  harbor,  which  will  require  some  repairs.  Some  operations  are 
also  called  for  to  protect  the  site  from  the  wearing  action  of  the  sea. — (State- 
ment 1,  table  A.)  Estimate,  $10,000. 

Mouths  of  Cape  Fear  river,  N.  C. — The  defence  of  the  main  channel  of 
Cape  Fear  requires,  in  addition  to  Fort  Caswell,  (now  nearly  completed,)  on 
Oak  island,  another  fort  on  Bald  Head.  And  the  defence  of  the  smaller  channel 
will  require  a  redoubt  on  Federal  Point.  The  battery  magazine,  block-house, 
&c.,  at  Smith ville,  should  remain  as  accessories.  Fort  Caswell,  Oak  island, 
(statement  1,  table  C,)  requires  $6,000  to  complete  it ;  the  fort  on  Bald  Head 
(statement  1,  table  F)  will  require  $180,000;  the  redoubt  on  Federal  Point 
(statement  1,  table  F)  will  require  $18,000 ;  and  the  battery,  &c.,  called  Fort 
Johnston,  at  Smithville,  (statement  1,  table  A,)  $5,000. 

Georgetown  harbor,  S.  C. — The  first  inlet  of  any  consequence  south  of  Cape 
Fear  river  is  at  the  united  mouths  of  the  Waccamaw,  Pedee,  and  Black  rivers, 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  193 

forming  Georgetown  harbor ;  which  is  a  commodious  and  capacious  bay,  having 
sufficient  water  within,  and  also  upon  the  bar  near  the  mouth,  for  merchant 
vessels  and  small  vessels-of-war.  A  survey  of  this  harbor  was  begun  many 
years  ago,  but  never  completed,  and  no  projects  for  defence  have  been 
made.  It  is  probable  that  a  work  placed  near  Moscheto  creek,  or  on  Winyaw 
Point,  would  give  adequate  strength,  at  the  cost  of  about  $250,000. — (Statement 
1,  table  E.) 

Santee  river  and  Bull's  bay. — About  ten  miles  south  from  Georgetown  are 
the  mouths  of  the  Santee,  the  largest  river  in  South  Carolina.  It  is  not  known 
whether  the  bars  at  the  mouths  of  this  river  have  sufficient  water  for  sea-going 
vessels.  The  same  uncertainty  exists  as  to  the  depth  into  Bull's  bay.  It  may  be 
sufficient  to  consider  these  and  the  other  inlets  between  Georgetown  and  Charles- 
ton as  calling  for  small  works  capable  of  resisting  boat  enterprise,  and  to 
assign  as  the  cost  $100,000.  Should  they  prove  to  be  navigable  for  privateers 
they  will  require  a  larger  expenditure. — (Statement  1,  table  F.) 

Charleston  S.  C. — This  city,  situated  at  the  junction  of  Ashley  and  Cooper 
rivers,  is  about  five  miles,  in  a  direct  line  from  the  sea.  Between  it  and  the 
ocean  there  is  a  wide  and  safe  roadstead  for  vessels  of  any  draught.  Upon  the  bar, 
lying  three  or  four  miles  outside  of  the  harbor,  there  is,  however,  only  water 
enough  for  smaller  frigates  and  sloops-of-war.  On  the  southwest  side  of  the 
harbor  is  James's  island,  in  which  are  several  serpentine  passages,  more  or  less 
navigable  for  boats,  barges,  and  small  steam  vessels ;  some  of  them  communi- 
cate directly  with  the  sea  and  Stono  river.  Whappoo  cut,  the  most  northerly 
passage  from  the  Stono  to  Charleston  harbor,  enters  Ashley  river  opposite  the 
middle  of  the  city. 

Interior  natural  water  communications  exist,  also,  to  the  southwest  of  Stono 
river,  connecting  this  with  North  Edisto  river ;  the  latter  with  South  Edisto 
and  St.  Helena  sound ;  this  again,  with  broad  river ;  and,  finally,  this  last  with 
Savannah  river. 

On  the  north  side  of  the  harbor  of  Charleston  lies  Sullivan's  island,  sepa- 
rated from  the  main  by  a  channel  navigable  only  by  small  craft.  On  the  north- 
west side  of  this  island  is  an  interior  water  communication,  which  extends  to 
Bull's  bay,  and  even  beyond,  to  the  harbor  of  Georgetown. 

From  this  sketch  it  is  apparent  that  it  will  not  do  to  restrict  the  defences  to 
the  principal  entrance  of  the  harbor.  The  lateral  avenues  must  also  be  shut. 
And  it  is  probable  that  accurate  surveys  of  all  these  avenues  will  show  that  the 
best  mode  of  defending  them  will  be  by  works  at  or  near  the  mouths  of  the 
inlets,  as  the  enemy  will  be  kept  thereby  at  a  greater  distance  from  the  city;, 
the  lesser  harbors  formed  by  these  inlets  will  be  protected,  and  the  line  of  interior 
water  communication  will  be  inaccessible  from  the  sea. 

No  position  for  the  defence  of  the  principal  entrance  to  Charleston  harbor 
can  be  found  nearer  to  the  ocean  than  the  western  extremity  of  Sullivan's 
island.  This  is,  at  present,  occupied  by  Fort  Moultrie — a  work  of  some  strength, 
but  by  no  means  adequate  to  its  object,  its  battery  being  weak,  and  the  scarp 
so  low  as  to  oppose  no  serious  obstacle  to  escalade.  How  far  this  work,  by  a 
modification  of  its  plan  and  relief,  may  be  made  to  contribute  to  a  full  defence 
of  the  harbor,  has  not  yet  been  determined.  But  so  long  as  it  is  the  only  work 
at  this  the  principal  point  of  defence,  it  must  be  kept  in  good  condition  for  ser- 
vice ;  and  no  alterations  that  will  disturb  this  efficiency  should  be  undertaken. 
The  repairs  now  indispensable  will  cost  $10,000. — (Statement  1,  table  A.) 

On  a  shoal  nearly  opposite  to  Fort  Moultrie  the  foundation  of  a  fort  has 
been  begun,  which  will  have  a  powerful  cross-fire  with  Fort  Moultrie.     This-  is 
called  Fort  Sumter. — (Statement  1,  table  C.)     To  complete  this  work  will  re- 
quire, it  is  estimated,  $286,000. 
H.  Rep.  Com.  86 13 


194  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

In  the  upper  part  of  the  harbor  is  Castle  Pinckney,  on  Shuter's  Folly  island. 
This  requires  some  repairs,  estimated  at  $7,000. — (Statement  1,  table  A.) 

Stono,  North.  Edisto,  and  South  Edisto. — All  these  must  be  fortified,  at  least 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  protect  these  inlets  from  enterprises  in  boats  or  small  ves- 
sels. To  that  end,  $50,000  may  be  assigned  to  each. — (Statement  1,  table  F.) 

St.  Helena  sound. — The  proper  defences  cannot  be  pointed  out  till  the  sound 
shall  have  been  surveyed.  Although  there  is  supposed  to  be  no  great  depth  of 
water  on  the  bar,  it  is  known  to  be  navigable  for  the  smaller  class  of  merchant- 
men and  for  steamboats,  and  to  have  a  navigable  communication  with  the  head 
of  Broad  river,  or  Port  Royal,  intersecting  the  interior  navigation  between 
Charleston  and  Savannah.  The  estimate  is  $150,000. — (Statement  1,  table  F.) 

Broad  river,  or  Port  Royal  roads. — The  value  of  this  capacious  roadstead 
as  a  harbor  of  refuge  depends  on  the  depth  that  can  be  carried  over  the  bar ;  on 
the  distance  of  this  bar  beyond  the  line  of  coast,  and  on  the  means  that  may  be 
applicable  of  lessening  the  danger  of  crossing  it.  This  is  supposed  to  be  the 
deepest  bar  on  the  southern  coast.  Should  there  prove  to  be  water  enough  for 
frigates,  and  should  it  be  practicable  to  make  the  passage  over  the  bar  safe  and 
easy,  by  the  erection  of  light-houses  on  the  shore  and  lights,  or  other  distinct 
guides  on  the  bar,  this  harbor,  situated  within  sixty  miles  of  the  city  of  Charles- 
ton and  twenty  of  Savannah  river,  intersecting  the  interior  water  commu- 
nication between  these  cities,  thereby  securing  the  arrival  of  supplies  of 
every  kind,  would  possess  a  high  degree  of  importance,  not  only  as  a  harbor  of 
refuge,  but  also  as  a  naval  station. 

The  survey  of  the  exterior  shoals,  constituting  the  bar,  should  be  made  with 
the  greatest  care  and  all  possible  minuteness.  Only  when  this  shall  have  been 
done  can  the  true  relation  of  this  inlet  to  the  rest  of  the  coast  be  known,  and 
on  this  relation  the  position  and  magnitude  of  the  required  defences  well  depend. 
For  the  present,  the  estimate  made  some  years  ago  by  the  engineer  department 
is  adopted,  namely,  $300,000.— (Statement  1,  table  E.) 

Savannah,  and  mouth  of  Savannah  river,  Georgia. — Mention  has  been  made 
of  the  natural  interior  water  communication  along  the  coast  of  South  Carolina. 
A  similar  communication  extends  south  from  the  Savannah  river  as  far  as  the 
St.  John's,  in  Florida.  Owing  to  these  passages  the  city  of  Savannah,  like 
Charleston,  is  liable  to  be  approached  by  other  avenues  than  the  harbor  or  river, 
and  accordingly  its  defences  must  have  relation  to  these  lesser  as  well  as  great 
channels. 

The  distance  from  the  mouth  of  Wassaw  sound,  or  even  Ossabaw  sound, 
(both  to  the  southward  of  Savannah  river,)  to  the  city  is  not  much  greater  than 
from  the  mouth  of  the  river,  and  an  enterprise  may  proceed  the  whole  distance 
by  water,  or  part  of  the  way  by  water  and  part  by  land,  from  either  inlet  or 
from  both.  As  in  the  case  of  like  channels  in  the  neighborhood  of  .Charleston, 
it  cannot  now  be  determined  where  they  can  be  defended  most  advantageously. 
It  is  hoped,  however,  that  the  localities  will  permit  the  defences  to  be  placed 
near  the  inlets,  because  thus  placed  they  will  serve  the  double  purpose  of  guard- 
ing the  city  of  Savannah  and  covering  these  harbors,  which,  in  time  of  war, 
cannot  but  be  very  useful. 

The  defence  of  Savannah  river  is  not  difficult.  A  fort  on  Cockspur  island, 
lying  just  within  the  mouth,  and  perhaps  for  additional  security  another  on 
Tybee  island,  which  forms  the  southern  cape  at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  would 
prevent  the  passage  of  vessels  up  the  channel  and  cover  the  anchorage  between 
Tybee  and  Cockspur. 

Old  Fort  Jackson,  standing  about  four  miles  below  the  city,  should  be  main- 
tained as  a  second  barrier,  both  as  respects  the  main  channel  and  the  passages 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  195 

which  come  into  the  river  from  the  south,  which  last  would  not  at  all  be  controlled 
by  works  on  Cockspur  or  Tybee.  Fort  Pulaski,  on  Cockspur  island,  is  well  ad- 
vanced, and  to  a  certain  extent  is  even  now  efficient,  measures  being  now  in 
hand  for  mounting  the  lower  tier  of  guns  ;  $215,000  are  required  to  complete 
the  works  and  the  outworks  and  appendages. — (Statement  1,  table  C.)  To 
fortify  Tybee  island  may  require  $120,000,  (statement  1,  table  E,)  and  to  re- 
pair Fort  Jackson  $50,000. — (Statement  1,  table  A.) 

Wassaw  sound,  Ossabaw  sound,  St.  Catherine's  sound,  at  the  mouth  of  Med- 
way  river  ;  Sapelo  sound,  Doby  inlet,  Altamaha  sound,  at  the  moutli  of  Alta- 
maha  river  ;  St.  Simon's  sound,  at  the  mouth  of  Buffalo  creek  ;  St.  Andrew's 
sound,  at  the  united  mouths  of  the  Scilla  and  Santilla  rivers  ;  and  Cumberland 
sound,  at  the  mouth  of  St.  Mary's  river. — All  these  communications  with  the 
ocean  are  highly  important  as  regards  the  line  of  interior  navigation,  and  several 
of  them  as  affording  access  to  excellent  harbors.  The  last,  and  one  or  two 
others,  are  known  to  be  navigable  to  the  largest  sloops-of-war  and  merchant- 
men, and  some  of  the  others  are  but  little  inferior,  as  regards  depth  of  entrance 
or  safety  of  anchorage. 

All  these  openings  have  yet  to  be  surveyed ;  some  of  them  are  probably  easily 
defensible  by  forts  and  batteries,  while  others  may  require  the  aid  of  floating 
defences. 

It  is  an  important  principle,  bearing  peculiarly  on  the  defence  of  the  whole 
southern  coast,  that  on  a  shore  possessing  few  harbors  it  is  at  the  same  time 
more  necessary  to  preserve  them  all  for  our  own  use,  and  more  easy  to  deprive 
an  enemy  of  that  shelter  without  which  a  close  blockade  cannot  be  maintained. 
This  principle  is  enforced  in  the  instance  of  our  southern  coast  by  the  two  fol- 
lowing weighty  considerations,  namely :  first,  its  remoteness  from  the  nearest 
naval  rendezvous,  the  Chesapeake,  which  is  on  a  mean  600  miles  distant,  and 
to  leeward  both  as  to  wind  and  current ;  and  second,  its  being  close  upon  the 
larboard  hand  as  they  enter  the  Atlantic  of  the  great  concourse  of  vessels  pass- 
ing at  all  seasons  through  the  Florida  channel.  While,  therefore,  this  part  of 
the  coast,  from  the  concentration  of  vessels  here,  is  in  great  need  of  protection 
of  some  sort,  naval  aid  can  be  extended  to  it  only  with  difficulty,  and  at  the  risk 
of  being  cut  off  from  all  retreat  by  a  superior  enemy. 

Accurate  and  minute  surveys,  which  will  enable  our  vessels,  whether  pursued 
by  an  enemy  or  suffering  by  stress  of  weather,  to  shun  the  dangers  which  beset 
the  navigation  of  these  harbors,  and  properly  arranged  defences  to  cover  them 
when  arrived,  seem  to  be  indispensable. 

When  these  harbors  shall  be  fortified,  the  operation  of  investing  the  coast 
and  watching  the  great  outlet  of  commerce  through  the  Florida  passage  will  be 
a  difficult  and  hazardous  one  to  an  enemy,  to  whom  no  perseverance  or  skill  can 
avail  to  maintain  a  continuous  blockade,  while,  on  the  part  of  our  small  vessels- 
of-war,  steam  frigates,  and  privateers,  the  same  sort  of  supervision  will  be  at  all 
times  easy  and  safe. 

Nothing  better  can  now  be  done  than  to  assume  $200,000  as  the  average  cost 
of  defending  each  of  the  nine  entrances ;  giving  a  total  of  $1,800,000. — (State- 
ment 1,  tables  E  and  F.) 

St.  Augustine,  Florida. — This,  the  most  southern  of  the  harbors  on  the 
Atlantic,  and  the  key  to  the  eastern  portion  of  Florida,  is  accessible  to  the 
smaller  class  of  merchantmen,  to  privateers,  and  to  steam  vessels,  and  requires 
a  certain  amount  of  protection  from  attacks  by  war.  It  is,  therefore,  proposed 
to  put  that  part  of  the  old  Spanish  fort  (Fort  Marion)  that  commands  the  harbor 
in  a  serviceable  state,  which  will  require  $50,000. — (Statement  1,  table  A.) 

Having  now  passed  along  the  whole  Atlantic  coast,  from  Passamaquoddy  to 
Cape  Florida,  pointed  out  every  harbor  of  any  consequence,  and  specified  every 


196  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

work  that  a  thorough  system  of  defence  will  require,  we  will,  in  order  to  give  a 
comprehensive  view  of  the  number,  cost,  armament,  and  garrisons  of  the  works, 
refer  to  statement  1,  accompanying  this  report.  In  that  statement  the  works 
are  divided  into  tables,  showing  separately,  1st,  (table  A,)  the  old  works  already 
repaired  and  those  proposed  to  be  repaired  and  retained  in  the  system  of  de- 
fence ;  2d,  (table  B,)  new  works  completed ;  3d,  (table  C,)  works  under  con- 
struction ;  4th,  (table  D,)  works  to  be  first  commenced ;  5th,  (table  E,)  works 
to  be  commenced  next  after  those  in  table  D ;  6th,  (table  F,)  works  to  be  last 
commenced. 

The  most  essential  works  on  the  Atlantic  coast  are  included  in  the  first  five 
tables,  and,  it  appears  from  the  recapitulation,  that  for  these  there  will  be  re- 
quired, for  garrisons,  in  time  of  war,  28,720  men;  for  the  armament,  5,748 
pieces  of  ordnance  of  every  kind;  and  for  the  expense  yet  to  be  incurred, 
$9,476,767. 

We  consider  it  to  be  our  duty  to  estimate  for  the  last  class  of  works  also, 
(table  F,)  although  it  must  be  a  long  time  before  permanent  works  for  these 
positions  can  be  commenced.  For  these  there  will  be  required,  in  addition,  for 
war  garrisons,  25,545  men ;  for  armament,  4,790  pieces  of  ordnance ;  and  for 
the  expense  of  erection,  $14,241,824. 

It  must  be  here  stated  that,  as  to  a  few  of  the  works  in  table  F,  fuller  infor- 
mation may  require  them  to  be  elevated  into  some  of  the  earlier  classes. 

SEA-COAST  FROM  CAPE  FLORIDA  TO  THE  MOUTH  OF  THE  SABINE. 

The  first  positions  that  present  themselves,  on  doubling  around  Cape  Florida 
into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  are  Key  West  and  the  Dry  Tortugas. 

This  board  concur  in  the  opinions  heretofore  expressed  in  favor  of  these  fine 
harbors,  and  they  beg  leave  to  refer,  for  very  interesting  statements,  in  relation 
to  the  latter  harbor  especially,  to  a  letter  from  Commodore  Eodgers  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Navy,  July  3, 1829,  (Senate  documents,  1st  session  21st  Congress, 
vol.  1,  No.  1,  page  236,)  and  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  March  25, 
1830,  (Senate  documents,  1st  session  21st  Congress,  vol  2,  No.  Ill,  page  1.) 

A  naval  force,  designed  to  control  the  navigation  of  the  Gulf,  could  desire  no 
better  position  than  Key  West  or  the  Tortugas.  Upon  the  very  wayside  of 
the  only  path  through  the  Gulf,  it  is  at  the  same  time  well  situated  as  to  all  the 
great  points  therein.  It  overlooks  Havana,  Pensacola,  Mobile,  the  mouths  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  both  the  inlet  and  outlet  of  the  Gulf. 

The  Tortugas  harbors  in  particular  are  said  to  afford  perfect  shelter  for  vessels 
of  every  class,  with  the  greatest  facility  of  ingress  and  egress.  And  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  an  adversary  in  possession  of  large  naval  means  would,  with 
great  advantage,  make  these  harbors  his  habitual  resort  and  his  point  of  gen- 
eral rendezvous  and  concentration  for  all  operations  on  this  sea.  With  an 
enemy  thus  posted,  the  navigation  of  the  Gulf  by  us  would  be  imminently 
hazardous,  if  not  impossible,  and  nothing  but  absolute  naval  superiority  would 
avail  anything  against  him.  Mere  military  means  could  approach  no  nearer 
than  the  nearest  shore  of  the  continent. 

It  is  believed  that  there  are  no  harbors  in  the  Gulf  at  all  comparable  with 
these  that  an  enemy  could  resort  to  with  his  larger  vessels.  To  deprive  him 
of  these  would  therefore  be  interfering  materially  with  any  organized  system  of 
naval  operations  in  this  sea.  The  defence  of  these  harbors  would,  however,  do 
much  more  than  this.  It  would  transfer  to  our  own  squadron,  even  should  it 
be  inferior,  these  most  valuable  positions,  and  it  would  afford  a  point  of  refuge 
to  our  navy  and  our  commerce  at  the  very  spot  where  it  would  be  most  neces- 
sary and  useful. 

In  this  report,  already  too  much  extended,  we  forbear  to  enlarge  on  this  topic, 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  197 

merely  adding  that  the  complete  and  certain  defence  will  not  be  difficult.  By 
occupying  two,  or  at  most  three,  small  "islands,  the  harbors  of  the  Dry  Tortugas 
(there  being  an  inner  and  an  outer  harbor)  may  be  thoroughly  protected.  The 
works  must  be  adequate  to  resist  escalade,  bombardment,  and  cannonade  from 
vessels,  and  to  sustain  a  protracted  investment;  but  as  they  will  not  be  exposed 
to  any  operation  resembling  a  siege,  there  can  be  no  difficulty  in  fulfilling  the 
conditions.  They  must  have  capacious  store-rooms,  be  thoroughly  bomb-proof, 
and  be  heavily  armed. 

The  fortification  of  Key  West  should  be  of  a  similar  character. 

No  details  can  be  given  until  all  these  positions  have  been  minutely  surveyed 
with  reference  to  defence. 

The  sum  of  $3,000,000  was,  some  years  ago,  assumed  by  the  engineer  de- 
partment as  necessary  to  provide  defences  for  the  Tortugas  and  for  Key  West, 
and  this  estimate  may  now  be  taken  as  ample. — (Statement  2,  table  F.) 

Turning  now  to  the  shore  of  the  Gulf,  we  find  a  portion,  namely,  from  Cape 
Florida  to  Pensacola,  that  has  never  been  examined  with  particular  reference 
to  the  defence  of  the  harbors.  Within  this  space  there  are  Charlotte  harbor, 
Espiritu  Santo  bay,  Apalachicola  bay,  Apalacliie  bay,  St.  Joseph's  bay,  and 
Santa  Rosa  bay.  Nothing  better  can  now  be  done  than  to  assume  for  these 
the  estimate  formerly  presented  by  the  engineer  department,  viz :  $1,000,000 
for  all. — (Statement  2,  table  F.) 

It  may  be  remarked,  as  applying  to  the  whole  Gulf  coast,  that,  from  the 
relative  geographical  position  of  this  part  of  the  seaboard,  and  the  country  in- 
terested in  its  safety,  from  the  unhealthiness  of  the  climate,  nature  of  the  adjacent 
country,  and  mixed  character  of  the  inhabitants,  it  will  be  some  time  before 
that  portion  within  supporting  distance,  whose  welfare  may  be  endangered  by 
an  enemy,  will  be  competent,  of  itself,  to  sustain  a  serious  attack  from  without. 
Upon  the  Atlantic  seaboard  the  Alleghanies  crowd  the  people  down  upon  the 
shore,  every  important  point  on  the  coast  being  surrounded  by  a  population 
dense  now  and  every  day  rapidly  increasing  in  numbers,  while  the  ocean  and 
the  interior  parallel  communications  transmit  rapid  aid  to  the  right  and  left. 
The  coast  of  the  Gulf,  however,  is  thinly  peopled  in  itself,  is  remote  from  succor 
from  behind,  and  is  almost  inaccessible  to  lateral  assistance.  Those  reasons, 
therefore,  which  tend  to  establish  the  necessity  of  an  organized,  permanent, 
and  timely  system  of  defence  for  the  whole  seaboard  of  the  United  States, 
apply  to  this  part  of  it  with  peculiar  force. 

We  now  pass  on  to  the  remaining  points  of  defence  on  the  Gulf. 

Pensacola  bay. — The  upper  arms  of  this  considerable  bay  receive  the  Yellow 
Water  or  Pea  river,  Middle  river,  and  Escambia  river.  The.  tributaries  of  the 
last,  interlocking  with  the  Alabama  and  the  Chattahoochie,  seem  to  mark  the 
routes  whereby,  at  some  future  day,  canals  will  convey  a  part  of  the  products 
of  these  rivers  to  Pensacola,  while  the  qualities  and  position  of  the  harbor  and 
the  favorable  nature  of  the  country  have  already  marked  out  lines  of  railroad 
communication  with  a  vast  interior  region. 

Santa  Rosa  sound  extends  eastward,  from  the  lower  part  of  the  bay,  into 
Santa  Rosa  bay.  On  the  west  the  lagoons  of  Pensacola,  Perdido,  and  Mobile 
bays,  respectively,  interlock  in  such  a  manner  as  to  require  but  a  few  miles  of 
cutting  to  complete  a  navigable  channel  from  the  first  to  the  last  named  bay, 
and  thence,  through  an  existing  interior  water  communication,  to  the  city  of 
New  Orleans. 

.  Pensacola  bay  has  rare  properties  as  a  harbor.     It  is  now  accessible  to 
frigates,  and  there  is  reason  to  hope  that  the  bar  may  be  permanently  deepened. 

The  bar  is  near  the  coast,  and  the  channel  across  it  straight  and  easily  hit. 
The  harbor  is  perfectly  landlocked,  and  the  roadstead  very  capacious.  There 
are  excellent  positions  within  for  repairing,  building,  and  launching  vessels, 
and  for  docks  and  dock  yards  in  healthy  situations.  The  supply  of  good  water 


198  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

is  abundant.  The  harbor  is  perfectly  defensible.  These  properties,  in  con- 
nexion with  the  position  of  the  harbor  as  regards  the  coast,  have  induced  the 
government  to  select  it  as  a  naval  station  and  place  of  rendezvous  and  repair. 

An  excellent  survey  has  been  made  of  the  bay  of  Pensacola,  sufficing  to 
form  the  scheme  of  defence  for  the  town  and  harbor.  Regarded,  however,  as 
an  important  naval  station  and  place  of  rendezvous  and  repair,  which  it  now  is, 
further  surveys,  extending  a  greater  distance  back  from  the  shores,  delineating 
accurately  the  face  of  the  country  and  showing  the  several  avenues  by  land 
and  water,  are  found  to  be  necessary. 

The  defences  of  the  water  passage,  as  projected,  are  nearly  complete,  $22,000 
being  asked  to  finish  them.  A  work  is  just  begun  at  the  position  of  the  Bar- 
rancas. It  is  indispensable,  in  connexion  with  one  or  two  other  small  works 
designed  to  cover  the  navy  yard  from  a  lateral  attack  through  the  western 
bays.  The  Barrancas  work  may  require  $100,000,  and  the  others  $200,000 ; 
making  a  total  for  Pensacola  of  $322,000. — (Statement  2,  tables  A,  C,  and  F.) 

Perdido  lay. — This  bay  is  intimately  related  to  Pensacola  and  Mobile  bays, 
both  as  regards  security  and  intercommunication,  and  should  be  carefully  sur- 
veyed with  a  view  to  these  objects.  It  must  be  fortified,  and  the  cost  may  be 
$200,000.— (Statement  2,  table  F.) 

Mobile  bay. — The  plan  of  defence  for  this  bay  comprises  a  fort  (now  needing 
some  repairs)  for  Mobile  Point.  Another  fort  is  projected  for  Dauphin  island, 
and  a  tower  for  the  defence  of  Pass-au-Heron.  The  estimates  for  all  require 
$915,000. — (Statement  2,  tables  A,  E,  and  F.) 

New  Orleans  and  the  delta  of  the  Mississippi. — The  most  northern  water 
communication  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Gulf  is  by  the  passage  called 
the  Rigolets,  connecting  Lake  Borgne  and  Lake  Pontchartrain.  The  next  is 
the  pass  of  Chef  Menteur,  also  connecting  these  lakes.  Through  these  passages 
an  enemy,  entering  Lake  Pontchartrain,  would,  at  the  same  time  that  he  inter- 
cepted all  water  communication  with  Mobile  and  Pensacola,  be  able  to  reach 
New  Orleans  from  the  southern  shore  of  the  lake ;  or  he  might  continue  onward 
through  Lake  Maurepas,  Amite  river,  and  Iberville  river,  thereby  reaching  the 
Mississippi  at  the  very  head  of  the  delta;  or,  landing  within  the  mouths  of  the 
Chef  Menteur,  he  might  move  against  the  city  along  the  ridge  of  the  G-entilly 
road. 

To  the  southwest  of  Chef  Menteur,  and  at  the  head  of  Lake  Borgne,  is  Bayou 
Bienvenue,  a  navigable  channel,  (the  one  followed  by  the  English  army  in  the 
last  war,)  not  running  quite  to  the  Mississippi,  but  bounded  by  shores  of  such 
a  nature  as  to  enable  troops  to  march  from  the  point  of  debarkation  to  the  city. 

These  avenues  are  defended  by  Fort  Pike  at  the  Eigolets ;  by  Fort  Wood  at 
Chef  Menteur;  by  a  small  fort  at  Bayou  Bienvenue,  and  by  a  tower  at  Bayou 
Dupre. 

The  defences  of  the  Mississippi  are  placed  at  the  Plaquemine  turn,  about 
seventy  miles  below  New  Orleans — the  lowest  position  that  can  be  occupied. 
Fort  Jackson  is  on  the  right  bank,  and  Fort  St.  Philip,  a  little  lower  down,  on 
the  left. 

All  these  forts  have  been  abandoned  for  several  years,  and,  having  received 
no  attention  in  the  way  of  timely  repairs,  now  require  repairs  somewhat  exten- 
sive, especially  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip,  on  the  Mississippi.  The  follow- 
ing sums,  it  is  believed,  will  be  required  to  place  all  these  works  in  perfect 
order,  viz :  Fort  Pike,  $5,000  ;  Fort  Wood,  $3,580  ;  fort  on  Bayou  Bienvenue, 
$2,500 ;  Tower  Dupre,  $400 ;  Fort  Jackson,  $20,000,  and  Fort  St.  Philip, 
$3,300. — (Statement  2,  table  A.) 

The  most  western  avenue  by  which  New  Orleans  is  approachable  from  the 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  199 

sea  passes  on  the  west  side  of  the  island  of  Grand  Terre  into  Barrataria  bay, 
which  is  an  excellent  harbor  for  a  floating  force  guarding  the  coasting  trade  on 
that  side  of  the  Mississippi.  From  this  bay  there  are  several  passages  leading 
to  New  Orleans.  The  estimate  for  a  work  which  is  now  about  to  be  begun  on 
Grand  Terre  island  is  $325,000. — (Statement  2,  table  C.) 

Several  times  in  this  report  we  have  alluded  to  circumstances  which  would 
demand  the  employment  of  floating  defences,  in  addition  to  fixed  defences  upon 
the  shore.  We  have  here  an  instance  in  which  that  kind  of  defence  would  be 
very  useful.  Fortifications  will  enable  us  to  protect  New  Orleans  even  from  the 
most  serious  and  determined  efforts  of  an  enemy ;  but  owing  to  the  great  width 
of  some  of  the  exterior  passages,  we  cannot,  by  fortification  alone,  deprive  an 
enemy  of  anchorages,  (especially  that  of  Chandeleur  island,)  nor  cover  entirely 
the  exterior  water  communication  between  the  Kigolets  and  Mobile.  We  must, 
therefore,  either  quietly  submit  to  the  annoyance  and  injury  that  an  enemy  in 
possession  of  these  passages  may  inflict,  or  avert  them  by  a  timely  preparation 
of  a  floating  force  adapted  to  their  peculiar  navigation,  and  capable,  under  the 
shelter  of  the  forts,  of  being  always  on  the  alert,  and  of  assuming  an  offensive 
or  defensive  attitude,  according  to  the  designs,  conduct,  or  situation  of  the 
enemy. 

Our  examination  of  the  coast  from  Cape  Florida  to  the  Sabine  having  now 
been  completed,  we  will,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Atlantic  coast,  refer,  for  a  com- 
prehensive view  of  the  number,  cost,  armament,  and  garrison  of  the  works,  to 
statement  2,  wherein  the  works  are  divided  into  tables  similar  to  those  of  state- 
ment 1. 

The  more  essential  works  on  the  Gulf  coast,  included  in  the  first  five  tables, 
will  require  for  garrison,  in  time  of  war,  4,420  men ;  for  the  armament,  794 
pieces  of  ordnance  of  every  kind ;  and  for  the  expense  yet  to  be  incurred, 
$516,780. 

The  works  comprised  in  the  last  table  (F)  are  generally  such  as  may  be  post- 
poned to  a  late  day.  But  among  them  have  been  placed  some  (as,  for  example, 
those  for  Tortugas  and  Key  West)  as  to  which  the  examination  has  not  been 
sufficiently  minute  to  decide  to  what  class  they  really  appertain. 

In  this  age  of  great  improvements  in  the  means  of  locomotion,  it  would  be 
unwise  to  decide,  without  pressing  need,  on  the  details  of  the  floating  force 
required  at  certain  points  on  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  of  Mexico  coasts — perhaps 
even  on  the  nature  of  the  moving  power.  Although  the  probability  undoubtedly 
is,  that  the  power  will  be  steam,  genius  may,  in  the  interim,  devise  something 
still  better  than  steam. 

And  we  may  here  remark,  in  relation  to  the  preparation  of  steam  vessels  for 
warlike  purposes  generally,  that  wisdom  would  seem  to  direct  a  very  cautious 
and  deliberate  progress.  Every  new  vessel  may  be  expected  to  surpass,  in  im- 
portant particulars,  all  that  had  preceded ;  and,  to  surpass  the  more,  as  each 
succeeding  vessel  should  be  the  result  of  careful  study  and  trial  of  the  pre- 
ceding. 

It  may  be  considered  unreasonable  to  expect  that  steam  itself  will  give  way 
to  some  agent  still  more  potent,  and  at  the  same  time  not  less  safe  and  manage- 
able. But  it  certainly  is  no  more  than  probable  that  steam  vessels  now  under 
construction  may  be  regarded  almost  as  incumbrances  within  ten  years. 

A  deliberate  advance  in  this  branch  ot  naval  construction  is  recommended  the 
more  by  our  ability  to  construct  these  vessels  in  large  numbers  when  needed, 
the  timber  being  collected  in  the  meantime. 

Referring  now  to  the  statements  which  accompany  this  report : 

Statement  I  includes  all  works  from  Passamaquoddy  to  Cape  Florida ;  state- 
ment 2,  all  works  from  Cape  Florida  to  the  mouth  of  the  Sabine ;  each  state- 
ment comprising  six  tables,  as  before  mentioned. 


200  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

In  relation  to  every  work  executed,  in  progress,  or  merely  projected,  the 
tables  show  the  garrison,  the  ordnance  of  every  description,  the  sums  already 
expended,  and  the  final  cost. 

As  to  works  not  yet  planned,  a  portion  of  the  same  particulars  are  exhibited, 
founded  on  conjecture  merely ;  of  course,  without  laying  claim  to  accuracy,  but 
still  as  approximations,  affording  some  indication  of  the  final  result. 

It  may  be  well  to  give  here  a  summary  of  all  these  tables. 

The  works  which  are  likely  to  be  erected  on  the  Atlantic,  within  a  reasonable 
time,  and  which  are  regarded  as  necessary  to  a  good  system  of  defence,  will 
require  war  garrisons,  amounting  to  28,720  men ;  and  they  will  require  a  further 
expenditure  of  $9,176,767.  Works  called  for  in  like  manner  upon  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  coast  will  need  4,420  men  to  garrison  them,  and  a  further  expenditure 
of  $516,780.  Of  the  whole  coast,  therefore,  the  garrisons  will  amount  to 
33,140  men,  and  the  expenditures  to  $9,993,547. 

The  remaining  works  comprised  in  table  F,  of  both  statements,  will  require 
30,695  men,  and  cost  $19,521,824. 

Making  the  grand  total  for  the  whole  sea-coast  of  the  United  States  in  gar- 
risons for  the  works  63,835  men,  and  in  cost  $29,515,371. 

In  addition  to  these  statements  as  to  the  fortifications,  there  are  two  corre- 
sponding statements  of  the  cost  of  the  ordnance,  of  the  carnages,  and  of  a  certain 
supply  of  powder  and  shot  or  shells  for  each  piece,  one  statement  relating  to 
the  Atlantic  coast,  and  the  other  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  coast.  From  these  it 
appears  that  for  the  works  likely  to  be  erected  on  the  Atlantic  coast  within  a 
reasonable  time,  (that  is  to  say,  for  the  works  comprised  in  the  first  five  tables, 
A,  B,  C,  D,  and  E,)  there  will  be  needed  2,483  pieces  of  ordnance  and  4,511 
carriages,  which  will  cost  $2,252,290. 

For  similar  works  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  coast,  there  will  be  needed  296 
pieces  of  ordnance,  and  495  carriages,  at  a  cost  of  $240,720. 

The  remaining  works  named  in  tables  F,  of  both  statements,  will  require,  in 
addition,  5,447  guns  and  5,554  carnages,  which  will  cost  $3,735,330. 

Making  the  grand  total  required  for  the  whole  sea-coast  8,226' guns  and 
10,560  carriages,  at  a  cost  of  $6,228,340. 

The  time  required  to  construct  and  put  in  order  the  whole  system  must  depend 
on  the  amount  of  the  annual  appropriation.  All  that  need  now  be  said  on  the 
subject  is,  that  in  an  undertaking  necessarily  involving  so  much  time,  and  of 
such  vital  importance,  there  should  be  no  relaxation  of  diligence.  With  all 
diligence,  many  years  must  necessarily  be  consumed.  But  the  work  may  be 
too  much  hurried,  as  well  as  too  much  delayed.  There  is  a  rate  of  progress  at 
which  it  will  be  executed  in  the  best  manner,  and  at  the  minimum  cost.  If 
more  hurried  it  will  be  defective  in  quality,  and  more  costly  if  delayed. 

France  was  at  least  fifty  years  completing  her  maritime  and  interior  defences. 

In  the  report  presented  by  the  engineer  department,  in  March,  1836,  (Senate 
document,  1st  session  24th  Congress,  vol.  4,  No.  293,)  there  is  a  demonstration 
of  the  actual  economy  that  will  result  from  an  efficient  system  of  'sea-coast 
defence,  which  is  to  the  following  effect,  referring  to  the  document  itself  for 
details. 

There  is  first  supposed  to  be  an  expedition  of  20,000  men  at  Bermuda  or 
Halifax  ready  to  fall  upon  the  coast.  This  will  make  it  necessary,  if  there  be 
no  fortifications,  to  have  ready  a  force  at  least  equal  at  each  of  the  following 
points,  namely :  1st.  Portsmouth  and  navy  yard.  2d.  Boston  and  navy  yard. 
3d.  Narraganset  roads.  -  4th.  New  York  and  navy  yard.  5th.  Philadelphia 
and  navy  yard.  6th.  Baltimore.  7th.  Norfolk  and  navy  yard.  8th.  Charleston, 
South  Carolina.  9th.  Savannah;  and  10th.  New  Orleans;  to  say  nothing  of 
other  important  places. 

At  each  of  these  places,  except  the  last,  10,000  men  drawn  from  the  interior, 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  201 

and  kept  under  pay,  will  suffice,  the  vicinity  being  relied  on  to  supply  the 
remainder.  At  New  Orleans,  17,000  men  must  be  drawn  from  a  distance.  In 
a  campaign  of  six  months,  the  whole  force  will  cost  at  least  $26,750,000. 

The  garrisons  necessary  to  be  kept  under  pay  for  the  fortifications  in  these 
places  will  cost  for  the  same  time  $8,430,500.  The  difference  ($18,319,500) 
will  then  be  only  $3,448,156  less  than  the  whole  expense  of  building  these 
defences,  viz :  $21,767,656.  Whence  it  follows  that  the  expense  of  these 
erections  would  be  nearly  compensated  by  the  saving  they  would  cause  in  a 
single  campaign. 

All  which  is  respectfully  submitted. 
For  the  board : 

JOS.  G.  TOTTEN, 

Colonel  of  Engineers. 


202 


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Fortifications  to  be  last  constructed.— 
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Fortifications  to  be  next  constructed.—  Table  E. 

Fortifications  to  be  last  constructed.  —  Table  F. 

H.  Rep.  Com.  86 14 


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V 

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A.  —  Old  works  repaired  and  those  proposed  to  be. 
repaired,  with  the  amounts  expended,  and  the 
amounts  required  to  put  them  in  a  serviceable 
condition. 

Fort  Barrancas,  Pensacola,  Fla  250  11  10  5  3  3  8 
Fort  St.  Philip,  Mississippi,  La  100  16  
Fort  Pickens,  Pensacola  harbor,  Fla  .... 
Fort  Morgan,  Mobile  Point,  Ala  
Fort  Pike,  Rinolets,  La  
Fort  Wood,  Chef  Menteur,  La  
Battery  Bienvenue,  La  
Tower  at  Bayou  Oirpre,  La  

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B.  —  2Vew;  worAs  completed. 

Fort  Pickens,  Pensacola,  Fla  1,260  63  17  49  5  13  6  28 
Port  Morgan,  Mobile  Point,  Ala  700  14  52  34  6  26 
Fort  Pike,  Rigolets,  La  300  28  ...  6  ...  9 
Fort  Wood,  Chef  Menteur,  La  300  28  3  6  ....  9 
Battery  Bienvenue,  La  :  100  8  ...  3  
Tower  at  Bayou  l>upre,  La.  50  4  

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FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


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FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


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218  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


REPORT  ON  THE  NORTHERN  FRONTIER. 

This  frontier  extends,  as  described  by  the  terms  of  the  resolution,  from 
Lake  Superior  to  Passamaquoddy  bay,  a  distance  of  somewhat  more  than  two 
thousand  miles,  binding  all  the  way  on  the  British  American  Provinces. 

Whether  we  regard  the  strongly  marked  geographical  features  of  this  frontier, 
presenting,  as  it  does,  for  the  most  part,  a  chain  of  great  lakes  or  inland  seas, 
stretching  along  the  border,  the  common  property  of  both  nations,  and  affording 
facilities  for  an  extensive  commerce,  almost  rivalling  that  of  the  ocean  itself;  or 
whether  we  look  to  the  growing  strength  of  our  colonial  neighbors,  fostered  by 
the  immense  power  and  resources  of  the  mother  country;  its  vast  importance 
cannot  fail  to  impress  us  with  the  necessity  of  being  prepared,  not  only  for  de- 
fence along  that  line,  but  also  to  act  offensively,  with  decisive  effect,  in  the 
event  of  our  being  involved  in  a  conflict. 

From  the  peculiar  character  of  this  frontier,  its  defence  must  necessarily  par- 
take somewhat  of  the  system  applicable  to  the  seacoast;  for,  although  it  is  de- 
nominated inland,  in  contradistinction  to  the  latter,  it  is,  nevertheless,  maritime 
in  many  of  its  features,  and  must  be  treated  accordingly  for  purposes  of  defence. 

So  important  is  the  mastery  on  the  lakes,  in  any  military  operations  in  that 
quarter,  that  it  is  scarcely  to  be  doubted  that,  in  the  event  of  war,  there  will  be 
some  naval  preparations  on  both  sides,  and  a  struggle  for  the  ascendancy  on 
those  waters.  Whichever  power  shall  acquire  that,  even  temporarily,  will  have 
the  means  of  assailing  his  adversary  with  great  effect  along  the  shores  of  the 
lakes,  in  the  absence  of  fortifications,  by  occupying  the  harbors,  destroying  the 
towns,  (some  of  which  are  fast  advancing  to  the  rank  of  cities,)  and  controlling 
the  commercial  operations  of  which  those  lakes  constitute  the  principal  channel. 
These  considerations  render  it  highly  expedient — indeed,  necessary — to  fortify 
the  larger  harbors  on  the  lakes,  as  well  as  the  more  important  passes  on  the 
straits  and  rivers  by  which  they  are  connected. 

Without  entering  fully  into  the  military  details  of  the  subject,  which  might 
be  deemed  somewhat  out  of  place  here,  regarding  the  object  of  the  resolution, 
which  seems  to  look  rather  to  the  expense  involved,  the  board  will  proceed  to 
enumerate  the  works  of  defence  deemed  necessary  on  the  northern  frontier, 
beginning  at  Lake  Superior;  merely  glancing  at  the  effects  and  advantages 
which  are  likely  to  result  from  the  establishment  of  those  works. 

1.  Fort  at  Falls  of  St.  Mary, — A  fort  here  will  control  the  communication 
between  Lake  Huron  and  Lake  Superior,  and,  at  least,  prevent  an  enemy  from 
availing  itself  of  it  for  purposes  of  communication  and  for  the  transportation  of 
supplies,  if  it  does  not  secure  those  important  advantages  to  us,  which  it  would 
do,  unless  counteracted  by  a  work  on  the  British  side  of  the  line.    In  that  event, 
almost  certain  to  occur,  it  would  be  neutralized,  but  would  still  serve  to  cover 
and  protect  our  settlements  along  the  St.  Mary,  and  form  a  rallying  point  for 
local  defence  in  times  of  alarm. 

Estimated  expense  of  fort,  barracks,  &c '  $75,000 

2.  Fort  at  Mickilimackinac. — Although  this  position  is  some- 
what interior,  it  is  regarded  of  high  importance  from  its  geographi- 
cal relations.     A  fort  here,  in  conjunction  with  floating  batteries, 
may  be   made  to  command,  effectually,  the   approach   to   Lake 
Michigan,  and  shut  out  an  enemy  who  might  possess  a  naval 
ascendancy  on  Lake  Huron ;  thus  protecting  the  entire  circumfer- 
ence of  Lake  Michigan  from  attacks  to  which  it  would  otherwise 
be  exposed,  even  from  a  small  force,  and  securing  it  to  ourselves 
as  a  safe  channel  of  communication  with  the  rich  and  productive 
States  in  the  rear,  whose  shores  it  washes. 

Estimated  expense 50,000 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  219 

3.  Fort  at  thejoot  of  Lake  Huron. — A  work  here  will  control 
the  outlet  of  Lake  Huron,  and  interrupt  the  navigation  between 
that  and  Lake  St.  Clair  and  the  river  Detroit.     It  will  serve  also 
to  cover  the  settlements  on  that  part  of  the  frontier,  and  form  a 
rallying  point  for  the  neigeboring  militia  for  local  defence. 

Estimated  expense $50,  000 

4.  Fort  and  barrack  establishment  at  Detroit. — In  the  event 
of  war,  Detroit  would  undoubtedly  be  a  point  of  considerable  con- 
centration of  troops,  not  merely  for  the  defence  of  that  portion  of 
the  frontier,  but  for  such  offensive  operations  as  might  be  deemed 
expedient  in  that  quarter.     It  may  be  regarded  as  the  centre  of 
the  upper  section  of  the  northern  frontier,   and  has  important 
relations,  both  geographical  and  military.     Although  true  policy 
would,  in  such  a  case,  dictate  that  our  chief  efforts  should  be 
directed  against  the  vital  points  of  the  enemy's  possessions  as  low 
down  the  line  as  practicable,  still  it  might  become  expedient,  with 
a  view  to  distract  his  attention  and  divide  his  forces,  to  menace 
him  above ;  and  this  is  one  of  .the  points  from  which  he  might  be 
assailed  by  minor  expeditions,  especially  if  he  should  relax  his 
measures  of  defence  in  looking  to  his  safety  elsewhere. 

Estimated  expense  of  barracks  for  one  regiment,  including 
site $150,  000 

Estimated  expense  of  fort  at  Spring  Wells,  including 

site 100,  000 

250, 000 

5.  Field-work  and  barrack  establishment  at  or  near  Buffalo. — 
The  wealth  and  commercial  importance  of  Buffalo,  and  its  close 
proximity  to  the  Britsh  line,  will  make  it  an  object  of  attack  in 
time  of  war,  unless  it  be  protected  by  the  presence  of  a  respecta- 
ble force  there.     It  may  also  become  a  point  of  concentration  of 
troops  for  minor  offensive  movements,  by  way  of  diverson ;  and 
is  thus,  in  every  view,  entitled  to  seasonable  attention.     An  ex- 
tensive barrack  establishment,  defended  by  field-works,  would  be 
sufficient  for  all  necessary  objects. 

Estimated  expense 150,  000 

6.  Fort  Niagara  to  be  rebuilt. — A  fort  at  this  position  is 
important,  on  the  assumption  (admitting,  it  is  believed,  of  but 
little  doubt)  that  in  time  of  war  there  would  be  some  naval  prepa- 
rations on  Lake  Ontario.     It  commands  the  entrance  into  the 
Niagara  river ;  and  a  work  here  will  shut  the  enemy's  vessels  out 
from  that  harbor,  while  it  will  afford  protection  under  which  ours 
may  take  shelter  in  case  of  need. 

Estimated   expense   of    completing    the    work    now    in   pro- 
gress  .' $27,  500 

For  repairs  of  buildings  and  new  barracks  there 37,  500 

65, 000 

7.  Fort  at  Oswego. — The  growing  importance  of  Oswego,  the 
relation  it  bears  to  the  great  line  of  internal  communication  to  the 
west,  and  its  exposed  situation,  directly  on  the  shore  of  the  lake, 
from  whence  it  might  be  assailed  by  armed  vessels  without  the 
co-operation  of  a  land  attack,  call  for  works  of  defence  to  protect 
the  harbor,  and  thus  secure  a  safe  retreat  for  our  vessels  in  case 
of  need,  while  we  shut  out  those  of  the  enemy.     Besides,  this 


220  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

place  possesses  many  advantages  for  naval  preparations  for  vessels 
of  light  draught  of  water,  and  would  probably  be  made  a  subordi- 
nate depot  in  time  of  war. 

Estimated  expense  of  completing  the  works  now  in  pro- 
gress   $20,  000 

For  barracks,  quarters,  storehouses,  and  magazine 25,  000 

8.  Fort  at  Sackett's  Harbor. — In  the  event  of  naval  arma- 
ments of  any  considerable  extent   being   resorted  to  on  Lake 
Ontario,  Sackett's  Harbor,  from  its  bold  water,  and  its  excellency 
as  a  harbor,  would  at  once  become  a  depot  of  great  importance ; 
the  safety  of  which   should  be  insured  against  the  enterprises 
of  the  enemy  by  the  timely  construction  of  appropriate  works  of 
defence.     Situated  directly  opposite  to  the  strong  post  of  Kings- 
ton, on  the  Canadian  side,  and  adjacent  to  the  head  of  the  St. 
Lawrence,  it  is  one  of  the  points  at  which  a  concentration  of 
troops  may  become  expedient  for  the  defence  of  that  portion  of 
the  frontier  and  the  protection  of  the  naval  depot.     The  barrack 
accommodations  already  established  there  are  deemed  sufficient, 
and  it  remains  to  fortify  the  approach  to  the  harbor. 

Estimated  expense  of  fort  and  barracks  within 

9.  Fort  at  the  narrows  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  below  Og dens- 
burg. — The  chief  object  of  a  work  here  would  be  to  cut  off  the 
enemy's   communication   by  the   river,   between   Montreal   and 
Kingston,  and  thus  prevent  him  from  availing  himself  of  that 
channel  for  the  transportation  of  troops  and  supplies  if  we  cannot 
entirely  secure  it  to  ourselves.     By  this  obstruction  on  the  St. 
Lawrence  he  would  be  thrown  altogether  upon  his  back  line  of 
communication  by  the  Ottawa,  which,  although  it  has  the  merit 
of  being  more  secure  from  interruption,  is  longer  and  more  diffi- 
cult,   especially   in   seasons   of  drought.     This   would   also   be 
another  point  from  which  the  enemy  might  be  menaced,  and 
from  which  auxiliary  movements  might  be  made  in  aid  of  the 
chief  attack. 

Estimated  expense  of  fort  and  barracks ' 

10.  Fort  near  the  line  on  Lake   Champlain. — A  work  here 
may  be  made  to  command  the  pass  of  the  lake,  and  is  considered 
by  far  the  most  important  of  any  proposed  on  the  whole  line  of 
frontier. 

The  position  of  Lake  Champlain  is  somewhat  peculiar.  "While 
Ontario,  Erie,  Huron,  and  Superior  stretch  their  whole  length 
directly  along  the  border,  (forming,  in  fact,  the  boundary,)  Cham- 
plain  extends  deeply  into  our  territory,  at  right  angles  with,  the 
line  of  the  frontier;  and,  while  its  southern  extremity  reaches 
almost  to  the  Hudson,  it  finds  its  outlet,  to  the  north,  in  the  St. 
Lawrence,  nearly  midway  between  Montreal  and  Quebec,  the  two 
great  objects  of  attack. 

This  is  undoubtedly  the  avenue  by  which  the  British  posses- 
sions may  be  most  effectually  assailed ;  while,  at  the  same  time, 
it  would  afford  to  the  enemy  possessing  a  naval  ascendancy  equal 
facilities  for  bringing  the  war  within  our  own  borders  if  it  be  left 
unfortified.  It  therefore  becomes  important  to  fortify  a  point  as 
near  the  line  as  practicable,  so  as  to  shut  out  the  enemy's  vessels, 
and  thus  effect  the  double  object  of  protecting  the  interior  shores 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  221 

of  the  lake  from  the  predatory  attacks  to  which  they  would  other- 
wise be  exposed,  and  of  securing  it  to  ourselves  as  the  great 
channel  by  which  our  troops  and  supplies  may  be  rapidly  thrown 
forward  to  the  points  of  attack  or  defence. 

For  a  permanent  work  on  Stony  Point,  (N.  Y.,)  including  pur- 
chase of  site $300,000 

For  a  permanent  work  on  Windmill  Point,  (Vt.,)  inclu- 
ding purchase  of  site 300,000 

$600, 000 

11.  Barrack  establishment  and  depot  at  Plattsburg. — In  the 
event  of  war,  Plattsburg  will  become  the  great  depot  for  the 
operations  on  the  Champlain  frontier,  the  point  of  concentration 
of  troops  preparatory  to  any  offensive  movements,  and  the  station 
of  the  reserve  to  sustain  those  movements,  and  the  posts  that 
may  be  established  in  advance.    Even  in  time  of  peace  a  respect- 
able force  should  be  posted  here,  especially  during  the  continuance 
of  the  boundary  question  and  border  disturbances.    Barracks  for 
a  regiment,  at  least,  with  suitable  storehouses,  are  recommended 
to  be  erected,  on  a  plan  admitting  of  extension,  if  required,  and 
also  of  suitable  defensive  arrangements. 

Estimated  expense  of  completing  the  works  in  progress  on  the 
scale  here  suggested 150,  000 

12.  From  Lake  Champlain,  eastward,  the  geographical  features 
of  the  frontier  materially  change  character,  and  require  a  corres- 
ponding modification  of  the  means  of  defence.    The  line  no  longer 
intersects  great  lakes,  admitting  of  naval  preparations,  nor  binds 
on  straits  and  rivers,  the  navigation  of  which  may  be  controlled 
or  interrupted  by  fortifications.     It  is  altogether  inland  until  it 
reaches  the  St.  Oroix,  where  the  principles  that  have  been  applied 
to  other  portions  of  the  frontier  similarly  situated  will  again  be- 
come applicable.     Running  on  a  parallel  of  latitude  to  the  Con- 
necticut river,  and  thence  along  a  chain  of  highlands,  not  yet 
clearly  defined,  to  the  Province  of  New  Brunswick,  the  board  are 
not  aware  that  there  are  any  points  immediately  on  the  frontier 
sufficiently  commanding,  of  themselves,  to  call  for  the  establish- 
ment and  maintenance  of  fortifications  or  works  of  defence. 

Should  it  ever  become  necessary  to  sustain  by  force  our  title  to 
the  territory  now  in  dispute,  it  must  be  done,  not  by  isolated  forts 
along  the  frontier,  commanding,  probably,  nothing  beyond  the 
range  of  their  own  guns,  but  by  an  active  army,  competent  not 
only  to  occupy  the  country  and  hold  it,  but  also  to  assume  the 
offensive,  if  necessary,  and  carry  the  war  beyond  our  borders. 

But  while  it  is  not  deemed  expedient  to  construct  a  chain  of 
forts  along  this  portion  of  the  frontier,  the  board  consider  it  a 
proper  measure  of  precaution,  in  the  present  state  of  our  relations 
with  the  British  provinces,  that  positions  should  be  selected  and 
preparatory  arrangements  made  for  the  establishment  of  depots 
of  supplies  at  the  head  of  navigation  on  the  Kennebunk  and 
Penobscot.  In  the  event  of  movements  in  that  quarter,  these 
would  be  proper  points  for  the  concentration  of  troops,  and  would 
serve  as  a  base  of  operations,  whether  these  should  be  offensive 
or  defensive  in  their  character. 

Estimated  expense  of  storehouses  and  other  accommodations. .  150,  000 


222  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

13.  Fort  at  Calais,  on  tlie  St.   Croix  river. — A  work  here, 
while  it  will  serve  to  cover  that  part  of  the  State  of  Maine  from 
the  attacks  to  which  it  would  otherwise  be  exposed,  may,  from  its 
advanced  position,  be  made  to  act  an  important  though  indirect 
part  in  the  defence  of  the  more  northern  portion  of  the  frontier. 
Calais  appears  to  be  a  very  eligible  point  for  the  concentration  of 
troops  with  reference  to  existing  circumstances.     A  strong  force 
stationed  here,  threatening  the  enemy's  posts  on  the  lower  St. 
John's,  and  held  ready  to  strike  in  that  direction  in  case  of  move- 
ments from  New  Brunswick  towards  the  disputed  territory,  could 
not  fail  to  have  a  decisive  influence  on  such  movements;  since  it 
is  obvious  that  they  could  not  be  made  with  safety  while  exposed 
to  attack  in  flank  and  rear,  and  to  have  their  line  of  communica- 
tion intercepted  and  their  depots  seized,  by  a  prompt  movement 
on  our  part  from  the  St.  Croix. 

Estimated  expense  of  fort  and  barracks 

14.  In  reference  to  the  northern  frontier  generally,  it  is  the  de- 
cided opinion  of  the  board  that,  besides  the  defences  which  have 
been  suggested  along  the  border,  chiefly  for  purposes  of  local 
protection,  there  should  be  a  great  central  station  at  some  position 
in  the  interior  at  which  troops  might  be  assembled  for  instruction, 
and  where  they  would  still  be  within  supporting  distance  of  the 
more  exposed  parts  of  the  frontier. 

Turning  our  views  inland  in  search  of  some  single  position  at 
which  preparations  might  be  made  for  extended  operations  on  this 
frontier,  and  from  which  aid  and  succor  could  always  be  speedily 
derived,  some  position  which,  while  it  shall  be  equally  near  to 
many  important  points  of  the  enemy's  possessions,  shall  afford  at 
no  time  any  indication  of  the  direction  in  which  our  efforts  are  to 
be  made ;  which  will,  if  it  be  possible,  unite  the  opposite  qualities 
of  being  at  the  same  time  remote  and  proximate  far  as  to  distance, 
but  near  as  to  time ;  which,  while  it  brings  a  portion  of  the  mili- 
tary resources  of  the  country  to  the  support  of  the  inland  frontier, 
and  places  them  in  the  best  attitude  for  operations  in  that  quarter, 
whether  defensive  or  offensive,  at  the  same  time  takes  them  not 
away  from  the  sea-coast.  Looking  for  these  various  properties, 
we  find  them  all  united  in  a  remarkable  degree  in  the  position  of 
Albany. 

From  this  place,  by  steamboat,  canal  boat,  or  railroad  car,  troops 
and  munitions  could  be  transported  in  a  short  time  to  Buffalo,  or 
onward  to  Detroit,  to  Oswego,  to  Sackett's  Harbor,  to  Plattsburg, 
to  Boston,  and  along  the  coast  of  New  England;  to  New  York 
by  steamboat  now,  and  soon  by  railroad  also ;  and  thence  onward 
to  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  Washington,  and  the  heart  of  the 
southern  country  if  necessary.  In  a  word,  Albany  is  a  great 
central  position,  from  which  radiate  the  principal  lines  of  com- 
munication to  the  north,  to  the  south,  to  the  east,  and  to  the  west  ; 
arid  combines  so  many  advantages  for  a  military  depot  that  the 
expediency  of  occupying  it  and  thus  availing  ourselves  of  those 
advantages  would  seem  to  be  manifest. 

Estimated  expense  of  the  purchase  of  land,  and  the  construc- 
tion of  barracks  and  other  buildings 


Total  for  northern  frontier 2,  160,  000 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  223 

The  board  beg  leave  to  observe,  in  conclusion,  that,  in  the  preparation  of  the 
estimates  submitted,  they  have  not  attempted  to  aim  at  precision.  Hence  the 
amounts  stated  for  the  various  objects  are  to  be  regarded  only  as  approximations. 
They  could  not  be  anything  more,  on  the  data  used,  which,  for  want  of  minute 
surveys  and  reconnoissances,  were  necessarily  vague.  It  is  believed,  however, 
that  the  results  presented  will  be  found  sufficiently  accurate  for  the  general 
purposes  contemplated  by  the  resolution  under  which  this  report  has  been  pre- 
pared. 

For  the  board, 

JOS.  G.  TOTTEN, 

Colonel  of  Engineers. 


224 


FOETIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


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FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


225 


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For  the  board, 
WASHINGTON,  April  23, 

H.  Rep.  Com.  86 15 


226  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


REPORT    ON    THE   WESTERN    FRONTIER,    FROM   THE  SABINE  BAY  TO   LAKE 

SUPERIOR. 

The  principles  which  should  govern  in  fortifying  the  seaboard  are  not  con- 
sidered applicable  to  our  inland  frontier,  which  will  very  rarely  be  found  to  call 
for  regular  fortifications.  Hence,  in  relation  to  that  portion  of  the  frontier  now 
under  consideration,  the  duty  of  the  board  will  be  performed  by  indicating  the 
military  positions  or  stations  which  should,  in  their  opinion,  be  occupied  by 
troops,  in  order  to  accomplish  the  objects  in  view,  and  in  presenting  estimates 
of  the  probable  cost  of  constructing  the  necessary  barracks,  quarters,  and  store- 
houses, combined  with  such  works  of  defence  as  circumstances  may  appear  to 
require,  to  insure  their  protection  against  the  attacks  to  which  they  may  be  ex- 
posed. 

The  want  of  personal  knowledge,  on  the  part  of  the  board,  of  our  extensive 
western  frontier,  and  the  very  limited  surveys  which  have  been  made  in  that 
quarter,  have  somewhat  embarrassed  them  in  the  selection  of  positions;  but 
they  desire  to  be  understood  as  merely  designating  places  in  a  geographical 
sense,  leaving  the  particular  sites  on  which  the  works  should  be  erected  to  be 
determined  hereafter,  by  minute  examinations  of  the  country  at  and  around 
those  positions;  which  become  the  more  important,  inasmuch  as  the  original 
locations  of  some  of  the  places  that  will  be  recommended  to  be  retained  have 
been  considered  faulty. 

The  southern  section  of  this  frontier,  extending  from  the  Sabine  bay  to  the 
Red  river,  borders  all  the  way  on  Texas,  and  has,  it  is  believed,  little  or  nothing 
to  apprehend  from  Indian  aggressions.  The  Comanches,  the  only  tribe  of  any 
power  in  that  quarter,  are  represented  as  gradually  receding  to  the  westward, 
and  the  progress  of  the  Texan  settlements  will  tend  to  push  them  further  from 
our  border.  But  our  relations  with  the  Texan  republic,  however  amicable  they 
may  be  at  present,  would  seem  to  require  that  some  military  force  should  be 
stationed  on  or  near  the  boundary  line;  and  the  board  therefore  recommend 
the  establishment  of  two  small  posts  on  the  Sabine  river,  suppressing  Fort 
Jesup,  which  is  considered  too  far  within  the  frontier,  or  retaining  it  merely  as 
a  healthy  cantonment. 

As  these  wonld  be  posts  of  observation,  having  reference  to  national  police 
more  than  to  military  defence,  they  ought  to  be  established  on  the  river  where 
the  principal  roads  cross  it,  by  which  we  should  be  enabled  to  supervise  the 
chief  intercourse  with  our  neighbors  by  land,  and,  at  the  same  time,  control  the 
navigation  of  the  Sabine.  The  points  where  the  Opelousas  and  Natchitoches 
roads,  leading  to  Texas,  strike  the  river,  are  therefore  recommended  as  the  po- 
sitions which  should  be  occupied,  and  at  which  barracks  for  two  or  three  com- 
panies, defended  by  light  works,  should  be  constructed. 

The  middle  section,  which  extends  from  the  Red  river  to  the  Missouri,  is  by 
far  the  most  important  portion  of  the  whole  of  our  western  frontier.  It  is  along 
this  line  that  the  numerous  tribes  of  Indians  who  have  emigrated  from  the  east 
have  been  located;  thus  adding  to  the  indigenous  force  already  in  that  region 
an  immense  mass  of  emigrants,  some  of  whom  have  been  sent  thither  by  coer- 
cion, with  smothered  feelings  of  hostility  rankling  in  their  bosom,  which,  proba- 
bly, waits  but  for  an  occasion  to  burst  forth  in  all  its  savage  fury.  These  con- 
siderations alone  would  seem  to  call  for  strong  precautionary  measures ;  but  an 
additional  motive  will  be  found  in  our  peculiar  relations  with  those  Indians. 

We  are  bound,  by  solemn  treaty  stipulations,  to  interpose  force,  if  necessary, 
to  prevent  domestic  strife  among  them,  preserve  peace  between  the  several  tribes, 
and  to  protect  them  against  any  disturbances  at  their  new  homes  by  the  wild 
Indians  who  inhabit  the  country  beyond.  The  government  has  thus  contracted 
the  two-fold  obligation  of  intervention  among,  and  protection  of,  the  emigrant 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  227 

tribes,  m  addition  to  the  duty  which  it  owes  to  its  own  citizens  of  providing  for 
their  safety. 

It  appears  to  the  board  that  this  obligation  can  only  be  properly  fulfilled  by 
maintaining  advanced  positions  in  the  Indian  country  with  an  adequate  re- 
straining military  force,  and  that  the  duty  of  protecting  our  own  citizens  will 
be  best  discharged  by  establishing  an  interior  line  of  posts  along  the  western 
border  of  the  States  of  Arkansas  and  Missouri  as  auxiliaries  to  the  advanced 
positions,  and  to  restrain  the  intercourse  between  the  whites  and  the  Indians, 
and  serve  as  rallying  points  for  the  neighboring  militia  in  times  of  alarm. 

With  these  views,  they  would  recommend  the  maintenance  of  Fort  Towson, 
on  Red  river,  and  Fort  Gibson,  on  the  Arkansas,  and  the  establishment  of  a 
post  at  the  head  of  navigation  on  the  Kansas,  and  one  at  Table  creek,  on  the 
Missouri,  below  the  mouth  of  the  Big  Platte,  as  constituting  the  advanced 
positions  on  this  portion  of  the  frontier. 

For  the  secondary  line  intended  for  the  protection  of  the  border  settlements 
the  board  would  adopt  the  positions  which  have  been  selected  by  a  commission 
of  experienced  officers  along  the  western  boundary  of  Arkansas  and  Missouri, 
at  some  of  which,  it  is  understood,  works  are  already  in  progress,  namely:  Fort 
Smith,  on  the  Arkansas  river ;  Fort  Wayne,  on  the  Illinois;  Spring  river  and 
Marais  de  Cygne ;  terminating  to  the  north  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  on  the  Mis- 
vsouri.  They  would  also  recommend  the  establishment  of  one  or  two  intermediate 
posts  between  the  Arkansas  and  Red  rivers,  if,  on  further  examination  of  the 
country,  suitable  positions  can  be  selected  near  the  State  line.  It  is  not  deemed 
advisable  to  establish  those  posts  on  the  route  of  the  road  lately  surveyed,  which 
(especially  the  southern  portion)  is  considered  too  far  in  advance  of  the  border 
settlements  to  accomplish  the  object  in  view ;  but  if  eligible  positions  cannot  be 
found  along  the  line,  then  a  post  on  the  road  where  it  crosses  the  Poteau  river, 
which  is  not  very  remote  from  the  settlements,  might  have  a  salutary  influence. 
On  the  northern  portion  of  this  frontier,  extending  from  the  Missouri  river  to 
Lake  Superior,  the  board  would  recommend  the  establishment  of  a  post  near 
the  upper  forks  of ,  the  Des  Moines  river,  the  maintenance  of  Fort  Snelling,  on 
the  Mississippi,  and  the  ultimate  establishment  of  a  post  at  the  western  ex- 
tremity of  Lake  Superior.  The  last  is  suggested  with  some  qualification  for 
want  of  the  necessary  information  by  which  to  determine  the  channel  of  commu- 
nication to  that  remote  position.  Whether  it  shall  be  through  Lake  Superior 
or  by  the  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries,  it  would  in  either  case  be  difficult  in 
peace  and  next  to  impracticable  in  time  of  war.  As  the  position  has,  however, 
important  geographical  relations,  and  would  enable  us  to  extend  our  influence 
and  control  over  the  Indians  in  our  territory,  and  afford  protection  to  our  traders 
in  that  remote  region,  it  would  seem  to  be  worthy  of  early  occupation  if  its 
maintenance  can  be  rendered  secure — a  point  which  can  only  be  determined  by 
a  careful  examination  of  the  country. 

It  is,  nevertheless,  recommended  to  retain  Fort  Crawford,  at  Prairie  du  Chien, 
•Fort  Winnebago,  at  the  portage  of  the  Fox  and  Wisconsin  rivers,  and  Fort 
Howard,  at  Green  bay.  These  posts  are  deemed  necessary  to  protect  that  por- 
tion of  our  frontier,  while  at  the  same  time  they  serve  to  cover  an  important  line 
of  intercommunication  between  the  northern  lakes  and  the  western  waters. 

It  has  not  been  thought  expedient  to  continue  the  interior  line  of  defence 
suggested  for  the  middle  section  of  this  frontier  across  from  the  Missouri  to  the 
Mississippi  river.  Our  Indian  relations  in  that  quarter  assume  a  different  aspect. 
There  is  no  special  guarantee  of  perpetual  occupation  of  that  country  by  the 
tribes  who  now  inhabit  it,  nor  can  it  be  doubted  that  they  will  ultimately  be 
pushed  by  the  advance  of  our  population  to  the  west  of  the  Missouri  river. 
Under  those  circumstances,  it  is  believed  that  the  intermediate  post  recommended 
to  be  established  on  the  Des  Moines  river,  co-operating  with  the  posts  on  the 
Missouri  and  those  on  the  Upper  Mississippi,  will  afford  adequate  protection  to 


228  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

the  border  settlements  against  any  attacks  to  which  they  are  likely  to  be  ex- 
posed. 

The  board  have  not  felt  called  upon  by  the  terms  of  the  resolution  under 
which  they  act  to  project  a  plan  of  operations  for  the  western  frontier,  nor  to 
go  into  an  estimate  of  the  military  force  that  will  be  required  there,  further  than 
was  necessary  to  determine  the  extent  of  accommodations  to  be  erected  and  the 
expense  which  these  will  involve.  They  would,  however,  observe  that  the 
positions  which  have  been  designated  will  not  of  themselves  have  the  desired 
influence  in  restraining  the  Indian  tribes  and  protecting  our  border  settlements 
without  the  aid  of  a  respectable  force,  of  which  a  full  proportion  should  be 
mounted  and  held  disposable  at  all  times  for  active  service  in  the  field.  To 
effect  this  the  works  should  be  so  constructed  that,  while  they  will  afford  ade- 
quate accommodations  for  all  the  troops  when  they  are  not  actively  employed, 
their  defence  may  be  safely  intrusted  to  a  small  force.  With  these  precautionary 
measures,  and  the  co-operation  of  small  but  effective  reserves  posted  within 
sustaining  distances  of  the  several  sections  of  the  frontier,  it  is  believed  that 
peace  may  be  preserved  and  the  first  onset  of  war  met  until  the  militia  of  the 
neighboring  country  could  be  embodied  and  brought  into  the  field. 

It  only  remains  to  recapitulate  the  positions  which  have  been  recommended 
to  be  occupied,  apportion  the  requisite  force,  and  present  a  conjectural  estimate 
of  the  cost  of  erecting  the  accommodations  and  defences  deemed  necessary  at 
each. 

1.  For  quarters  for  100  men  at  the  post  on  the  Sabine  where  the 

Opelousas  road  crosses  that  river,  including  defences $20,  000 

2.  For  quarters  for  100  men  at  the  post  on  the  Sabine  where  the 

Natchitoches  road  crosses,  including  defences 20,  000 

3.  For  permanent  quarters  and  other  accommodations  for  500  men 

at  Fort  Towson,  including  defences 100,  000 

4.  For  permanent  quarters  and  other  accommodations  for  1,000  men 

at  Fort  Gibson,  including  defences 180,  000 

5.  For  quarters  for  300  men  at  the  post  on  the  Kansas  river,  in- 

cluding defences 60,  000 

6.  For  quarters  and  other  accommodations  for  500  men  at  the  post 

at  Table  creek,  near  the  mouth,  of  the  Platte,  on  the  Missouri, 

including  defences 75,  000 

7.  For  quarters  and  other  accommodations  for  400  men  at  the  post 

on  the  Des  Moines  river,  including  defences 60,  000 

8.  For  the  enlargement  and  repair  of  Fort  Snelling,  to  fit  it  for  the 

accommodation  of  300  men,  including  defences 30,  000 

9.  For  quarters  for  400  men  at  the  post  at  the  western  extremity  of 

Lake  Superior,  including  defences 50,  000 


INTERIOR    LINE. 

10.  For  quarters  for  200  men  at  the  post  between  the  Red  and 

Arkansas  rivers,  including  defences 50,  000 

11.  For  completing  quarters  and  other  accommodations  for  200  men 

at  Fort  Smith,  including  defences 50,  000 

12.  For  completing  quarters  and  other  accommodations  for  200  men 

at  Fort  Wayne,  including  defences 50,  000 

13.  For  quarters  and  other  accommodations  for  200  men  at  the  post 

•         at  Spring  river,  including  defences 50,  000 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  229 

14.  For  quarters  and  other  accommodations  for  200  men  at  the  post 

at  Marais  de  Cygne,  including  defences ..,...,, , . . .        $50,000 

15.  For  completing  quarters  and  other  accommodations  in  progress 

for  400  men  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  including  defences, , ,  F . . , .  50,000 

Total  for  western  frontier , , , ,..,,,        895,000 

All  which  is  respectfully  submitted. 
For  the  board, 

JOS,  a.  TOTTEN, 

Colonel  of  Engineers, 


230  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES, 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  231 


REPORT  ON  THE  ARMORIES,  ARSENALS,  MAGAZINES,  AND  FOUNDERIES,  WHICH 
ARE  MENTIONED  IN  THE  THIRD  SECTION  OF  THE  RESOLUTION  OF  THE 
SENATE  IN  THE  FOLLOWING  WORDS,  VIZ  : 

"The  armories,  arsenals,  magazines,  and  founderies,  either  constructed  or 
deemed  necessary,  with  a  conjectural  estimate  of  the  expense  of  constructing 
such  of  said  establishments  as  may  not  yet  be  completed  or  commenced,  but 
which  may  be  deemed  necessary." 

The  necessary  arsenals  and  magazines  will  be  first  considered,  as  armories 
and  founderies,  being  manufactories  of  arms  destined  for  general  distribution, 
do  not  pertain  exclusively  to  any  particular  frontier.  Arsenals  and  ordnance 
depots  will  be  understood  to  include  magazines  in  the  general  sense  of  the  term; 
and  these  establishments  will  be  rated,  according  to  their  relative  importance  or 
magnitude,  in  three  classes  : 

I.  Arsenals  of  construction,  which  embrace  also  repairs,  and  for  deposit. 

II.  Arsenal  for  repairs  arid  for  deposit. 

III.  Depots,  or  places  for  deposit  and  safe-keeping  of  arms,  and  other  ord- 
nance stores. 

I.  On  tlie  nothern  frontier,  from  Lake  Superior  to  Passamaquoddy  Imy. — 
An  arsenal  or  ordnance  depot  will  be  required  at  some  suitable  point  on  the 
Upper  Mississippi ;  and  Fort  Crawford,  at  Prairie  Du  Chien,  offers  a  good  posi- 
tion, particularly  with  reference  to  supplying  the  line  or  tract  of  country  extend- 
ding  southwesterly  from  Fort  Snelling,  through  the  Territory  of  Iowa,  towards 
the  Des  Moines  river,  as  well  as  northwardly  toward  Lake  Superior,  and  east- 
wardly  through  the  Territory  of  Wisconsin  to  Lake  Michigan.  The  expense 
of  constructing  this  depot,  on  a  scale  commensurate  with  the  probable  import- 
ance that  must  be  given  to  it,  will  be  not  less  than $70,  000 

forming  an  arsenal  of  the  third  class. 

The  Detroit  arsenal,  on  the  river  Rouge,  twelve  miles  from  De- 
troit, now  nearly  finished,  is  an  arsenal  of  the  second  class,  des- 
tined to  supply  the  lake  frontier  from  the  Sault  de  St.  Marie,  the 

outlet  of  Lake  Superior,  to  Lake  Michigan  and  Lake  Erie 20,  000 

will  effect  the  completion  of  this  arsenal. 

Allegheny  arsenal,  at  Pittsburg,  an  establishment  of  the  first 
class,  is  also  available  for  the  supply  of  the  lake  frontier,  as  well 
as  the  western  frontier,  through  the  western  arsenals. 

Rome  arsenal,  of  the  third  class,  is  the  place  for  deposit  for 
stores  required  at  the  posts  on  Lake  Ontario. 

Champlain  arsenal,  at  Vergennes,  Vermont,  also  of  the  third 
class,  will  supply  the  posts  on  Lake  Champlain  and  the  northern 
part  of  Vermont.  But  the  whole  lake  frontier,  and  the  arsenals 
in  that  region,  may  be  supplied  from  the  Watervliet  arsenal,  near 
Albany,  which  is  an  establishment  of  the  first  class,  and  admira- 
bly located  for  the  preparation  and  sending  forth  of  ordnance 
stores,  not  only  to  the  northern,  but  likewise  to  the  maritime' 
frontier.  The  periods  of  free  navigation  of  the  New  York  canals 
and  the  Hudson  river  are  used  for  the  distribution  from  Water- 
vliet of  such  supplies  as  may  be  required  in  the  winter  season. 

The  Kennebec  arsenal,  at  Augusta,  Maine,  of  the  second  class, 
is  designed  to  supply  the  northern  and  eastern  frontiers  of  that 
State,  and  part  of  New  Hampshire ;  but  arms  would  be  furnished 
to  the  frontier  of  the  latter  State  from  Springfield  armory,  and 


232  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

ordnance  stores  would  be  passed  up  the  valley  of  the  Connecticut 
from  arsenals  either  east  or  west  of  that  river. 

It  may  become  necessary  to  establish  a  depot  on  the  Penob- 
scot,  at  Bangor.  But  this  point  is  only  sixty  miles  from  Augusta ; 
and  no  estimate  of  the  cost  is  furnished,  as  the  deposit  would 
probably  be  temporary. 

II.  The  maritime  frontier  from  Passamaquoddy  bay  to  Cape 
Florida. — The  Kennebec  arsenal  is  the  place  of  deposit  for  the 

'  greater  part  of  the  sea-coast  of  Maine ;  the  sum  of $30,  000 

will  finish  the  additions  required. 

The  Watertown  arsenal,  five  miles  in  the  rear  of  Boston,  also 
of  the  second  class,  will  supply  the  westerly  part  of  Maine,  the 
sea-coast  of  New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  and  Rhode  Island ; 

and 25,  000 

will  be  required  for  additional  buildings  and  enclosures. 

Both  the  Kennebec  and  Watertown  arsenals  are  of  considerable 
extent,  with  every  facility  for  being  converted  into  arsenals  of  the 
first  class ;  and  the  construction  of  gun-carnages,  necessary  for 
arming  the  forts  and  batteries  within  the  limits  above  stated,  may 
be  effected  at  both  or  either.  The  Watervliet  arsenal,  before 
mentioned,  is,  however,  the  principal  one  relied  on  for  supplies  re- 
quired, not  only  from  Cape  Cod  to  the  capes  of  Delaware  bay, 
but  for  much  of  the  maritime  as  well  as  the  lake  frontier.  Addi- 
tional quarters  and  storehouses  at  this  post  will  cost 50,  000 

A  depot  in  the  harbor  of  New  York  receives  articles  from  Wa- 
tervliet, during  the  season  of  navigation,  which  are  transhipped, 
in  time  of  peace,  to  all  parts  of  the  coast  and  to  the  Mississippi. 
During  a  war,  supplies  would  be  furnished  from  arsenals  in  the 
more  immediate  vicinity  of  the  sea-coast  defences,  viz  :  Frankford 
arsenal,  six  miles  above  Philadelphia,  is  of  the  second  class,  and 
will  supply  works  on  Delaware  bay  and  river ;  Pikesville  arsenal, 
of  the  third  class,  four  miles  from  Baltimore ;  Washington  arsenal 
and  Fort  Monroe  arsenal,  both  of  the  first  class,  will  furnish  what 
may  be  required  for  the  sea-coast  defences  of  Chesapeake  bay  and 
Potomac  river.  The  last  mentioned  was  established  with  special 
reference  to  the  construction  of  the  gun-carriages  required  at  that 
post  and  at  Fort  Calhoun.  It  has  been  found  advantageous,  how- 
ever, to  construct  there  carriages  for  other  southern  forts;  but  it  can- 
not be  considered  as  a  permanent  establishment  of  the  first  class,  to 
be  kept  up  after  the  occasion  which  called  for  it  shall  have  passed 

by- 

The  North  Carolina  arsenal,  at  Fayetteville,  on  Cape  Fear 
river,  is  under  construction,  and  was  originally  intended  to  be 
made  one  of  the  first  class.  Doubts  have  been  entertained 
whether  it  ought  to  exceed  those  of  the  second  class ;  but  the 
plan  is  such  that  it  can  at  any  time  be  extended  according  to  the 
original  design.  The  sum  of  eighty  thousand  dollars  will  be  re- 
quired to  finish  it  as  one  of  the  second  class 80,  000 

Charleston  depot  is  at  present  of  diminutive  capacity.  It  is 
proper  to  enlarge  it,  and  'thirty  thousand  dollars  will  make  it  use- 
ful as  a  place  of  deposit 30,  000 

Augusta  arsenal,  at  Augusta,  Georgia,  is  of  the  second  class,  and 
with  the  two  last  mentioned  will  furnish  supplies  required  from 
Chesapeake  bay  to  Cape  Florida. 

The  Augusta  arsenal  has  its  powder  magazine  detached  and 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  233 

located  at  an  inconvenient  distance,  beyond  the  control  of  the  force 
at  the  post.  For  the  construction  of  a  new  magazine,  and  other 
necessary  additions  to  this  establishment,  sixty  thousand  dollars 

will  be  required $60,  000 

Several  of  the  arsenals  have  been  built  upwards  of  20  years, 
and  require  extensive  repairs  and  additions,  which  it  is  supposed 
may  be  effected,  from  time  to  time,  by  the  aid  of  annual  appropri- 
ations, amounting  in  all  to  about 180,  000 

III.  "  The  Gulf  frontier,  from  Cape  Florida  to  Saline  bay" — 
Appalachicola  arsenal,  at  Chattahoochee,  just  below  the  junction 
of  the  Chattahoochee  and  Flint  rivers  ;  Mount  Vernon  arsenal,  on 
the  Mobile  river ;  and  Baton  Rouge  arsenal,  on  the  Mississippi, 
are  all  establishments  of  the  second  class,  and  destined  to  supply  the 
whole  Gulf  frontier,  and  the  forts  below  New  Orleans,  on  the  Mis- 
sippi.     About  sixty  thousand  dollars  will  be  required  to  com- 
plete them,  and  erect  some  additional  buildings  at  Baton  Rouge—  60,  000 

IV.  "  The  western  frontier,  from  Saline  bay  to  Lake  Supe- 
rior.— Baton   Rouge    arsenal,   already   mentioned,    will   furnish 
supplies  for  posts  on  the  Sabine  and  Red  rivers. 

Little  Rock  arsenal,  just  commenced,  will  be  the  source  of  sup- 
plies for  posts  on  the  Arkansas,  and  along  the  western  border  of 
that  State.  It  will  necessarily  become  at  first  an  arsenal  of  the 
second  class,  with  the  depot  at  Memphis  as  subsidiary,  and  will 
require  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  to  complete  it 100,  000 

St.  Louis  arsenal  is  a  large  establishment  of  the  second  class,  but, 
with  very  little  expense  can  be  raised  to  the  first  class ;  with  the 
subsidiary  depot  at  Liberty,  on  the  Missouri,  it  wil}  supply  the 
posts  on  that  river,  the  western  border  of  the  State,  the  posts  on 
the  Des  Moines,  and  the  Upper  Mississippi. 

A  depot  at  Prairie  du  Chien,  mentioned  in  relation  to  supplies 
required  in  the  direction  of  Lake  Superior,  and  southwesterly, 
through  the  Territory  of  Iowa,  would  be  sustained  by  the  St. 
Louis  arsenal,  and  completes  the  chain  upon  the  several  frontiers 
embraced  in  the  resolution. 

Total  amount  required  for  constructions,  additions,  and  repairs 

to  arsenals  and  depots 705,  000 


Armories. 

The  two  national  armories  at  Springfield,  Massachusetts,  and  Harper's  Ferry, 
Virginia,  are  the  only  public  establishments  for  the  manufacture  of  small  arms. 
They  furnish  about  twenty-five  thousand  stand  of  arms  yearly.  This  number 
might  be  extended ;  but  it  has  been  an  object  of  solicitude  with  the  government 
for  nearly  twenty  years  past  to  establish  an  armory  west  of  the  Alleghanies. 

Commissioners  were  employed  in  1823  to  examine  the  western  waters,  with  a 
view  to  the  location  of  an  armory.  Many  sites  were  surveyed,  and  careful  epti- 
mates  made  of  the  cost  of  an  armory  at  each,  with  an  exhibit  of  their  several 
advantages  and  disadvantages.  The  result  of  their  investigations  may  be  found 
at  large  in  Gales  &  Seaton's  reprint  of  American  State  Papers,  folios  729 -to  790 
inclusive,  volume  2,  Military  Affairs. 

It  is  perhaps  fortunate  that  the  place  then  selected  was  not  adopted  by  Con- 
gress ;  for,  since  that  period,  the  immense  increase,  not  only  of  population  and 
the  general  resources  of  the  western  region,  but  of  the  particular  articles  required 
for  the  manufacture  of  arms,  by  the  discovery  of  masses  of  coal,  and  the  exten- 


234  FORTIFICATIONS    AXD    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

sive  working  of  iron  mines,  where  nothing  of  the  kind  was  then  found,  has 
shown  that  an  armory  should  be  located  much  further  west. 

The  data  collected  by  the  commissioners  in  1823  may  be  usefully  applied  in 
estimating  the  probable  cost  of  an  armory  at  the  present  day,  making  suitable 
allowances  for  the  increased  price  of  everything  connected  with  such  an  estab- 
lishment. This  cost  will  be  found  to  vary,  according  to  localities  of  positions, 
from  $280,000  to  $500,000  for  an  armory  capable  of  furnishing  twelve  thousand 
muskets  per  year.  It  will  therefore  be  stated  at  the  mean  of  $390,000,  to  which 
twenty  per  cent,  should  be  added ;  making  the  sum  of $468,  000 

Another  mode  of  proceeding  proposed  consists  of  forming  an 
establishment  complete  in  itself,  of  limited  extent,  and  having  the 
great  mass  of  component  parts  of  arms  manufactured  by  the  piece 
in  private  workshops,  and  only  the  inspecting,  assembling,  and 
finishing  be  done  at  the  public  works.  This  course  would  mate- 
rially reduce  the  first  cost,  or  necessary  expenditure  for  buildings 
and  tools.  It  also  admits  of  extension  to  a  great  amount  of  fab- 
rication, with  but  little  additional  cost  of  permanent  fixtures. 
But,  whichever  mode  is  followed,  or  whatever  site  may  be 
selected  for  its  location,  there  can  be  no  question  of  the  necessity 
for  an  armory  on  the  western  waters ;  and  as  regards  a  proper 
location,  it  may  be  observed,  that,  to  consider  the  relations  of  an 
armory  in  the  same  light  as  that  of  an  arsenal  or  magazine,  would 
be  an  error ;  the  means  of  production  being  the  principal  requisite 
for  the  one,  and  those  of  transportation  or  distribution  for  the 
others. 

Total  required  for  an  armory  on  the  western  waters 468,  000 


Founderies. 

The  United  States  own  no  cannon  foundery.  Although  possessing  some  ore 
beds,  from  which  iron  of  approved  quality  for  casting  cannon  has  long  been  made, 
yet  artillery  of  every  description  is  procured  from  private  founderies.  This 
subject  has  been  so  recently  before  Congress,  and  so  ably  treated,  that  nothing 
will  be  said  further  than  to  state  the  probable  cost  of  such  an  establishment ; 
and,  here  again,  so  much  depends  upon  the  location,  that  only  an  approximation 
will  be  attempted.  A  report  from  the  War  Department  made  to  the  24th  Con- 
gress, 1st  session,  Doc.  No.  106,  states  the  cost  of  a  foundery,  to  be  located  at 
Georgetown,  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  at  $312,000.  If  this  estimate  is  cor- 
rect, (and  it  is  known  that  great  care  was  bestowed  on  its  preparation,)  it  may 

be  assumed  that  about $300,  000 

will  be  required  for  a  foundery  when  favorably  located  for  the  use 
of  water  power.  Should  steam  power  be  adopted,  the  first  cost 
of  the  establishment  would  be  less,  while  the  annual  expenditure 
would  be  greater  than  for  water  power. 

As  regards  a  suitable  location  for  a  foundery,  the  great  weight 
and  bulk  of  the  raw  materials  used  in  the  manufacture  of  cannon, 
and  the  weight  of  heavy  guns,  which  are  required  for  use  only  on 
the  seaboard,  would  seem  to  demand  that  particular  attention 
should  be  given  to  the  means  of  transportation  both  to  and  from 
the  foundery. 

Total  amount  required  for  a  foundery 300,  000 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  235 


Recapitulation. 

Total  amount  required  for  constructions,  additions,  and  repairs  to 

arsenals  and  depots $705,  000 

Total  amount  required  to  establish  an  armory  on  the  western 

waters 468,  000 

Total  amount  required  to  establish  a  national  foundery 300,  000 

Total..  1,473,000 


All  which  is  respectfully  submitted. 
By  order  of  the  board, 

JOS.  G,  TOTTEN, 

Colonel  of  Engineers. 


MEMORIAL  OF  EDMUND  P.  GAINES. 

To  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the   United  States  of  America 

in  Congress  assembled: 

The  memorial  of  Edmund  Pendleton  Gaines,  a  major  general  in  the  army  of 
the  United  States,  commanding  the  western  division,  respectfully  sliowetli : 
That,  believing  the  federal  and  State  constitutions  guarantee  and  consecrate  to 
every  free  citizen  capable  of  bearing  arms  the  right  and  duty  of  participating 
alike  in  the  civil  and  military  trusts  of  trie  republic,  solemnly  requiring  the 
soldier  to  exert  his  every  faculty  "  in  peace  to  prepare  for  war"  so  that 
on  the  recurrence  of  war  he  may  be  well  qualified  to  fight  the  battles  of  his 
country  in  the  greatest  possible  triumph,  and  at  the  least  possible  cost  of  blood 
and  treasure ;  requiring  him,  moreover,  to  study  and  respect  her  political  and 
social  institutions ;  and  requiring  the  statesman  to  discipline  his  mind  for  the 
state  and  national  defence,  by  adapting  his  civil  acts  and  occasional  military 
studies  to  the  purposes  of  the  national  defence  and  protection,  as  well  against 
foreign  enemies  in  war  as  against  the  home  incendiary  and  other  criminal  offenders 
in  peace ;  thus  rendering  the  statesman  and  soldier  equally  familiarized  with 
their  common  kindred  duties  of  self-government  and  self-defence  :  by  a  knowl- 
edge of  which  our  independence  was  achieved,  and  without  which  this  inestima- 
ble blessing  cannot  be  preserved ; — your  memorialist,  a  native  Virginian,  a  citi- 
zen of  Tennessee,  schooled  in  her  cabins  and  her  camps  to  the  profession  of 
arms,  has,  within  the  last  seventeen  years,  matured  a  system  of  national  defence, 
to  which  he  now  respectfully  solicits  your  attention  and  support :  a  system  of 
national  defence  which  the  late  giant  strides  of  invention  and  improvement  in 
the  arts  have  rendered  indispensable  to  the  preservation  of  the  Union;  a  system 
of  national  defence  which  recommends  itself  peculiarly  to  the  central,  southern, 
and  Atlantic  States,  as  well  as  to  those  of  the  north  and  west ;  as  it  assures  to 
our  isolated  central  States  of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  and  to  all  the  western 
States  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Missouri,  and  Arkansas,  in  peace,  commercial 
advantages  equal  to  those  enjoyed  by  the  most  favored  eastern,  Atlantic,  or 
southern  States  ;  and  in  war,  giving  to  the  disposable  fighting  men  of  these  cen- 
tral and  western  States  the  inestimable  privilege  of  flying  with  unprecedented 
certainty,  celerity,  and  comfort  to  any  of  our  vulnerable  seaports,  to  aid  our 
brethren  of  the  border  States  to  repel  the  invading  foe ;  and  to  accomplish  this 
essential  duty  in  one-tenth  part  of  the  time,  and  one-tenth  part  of  the  expense 


236  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

that  would  attend  such  an  operation  over  our  present  bad  roads.  But,  above 
all,  to  accomplish  these  great  and  good  objects,  by  means  that  will  more  than 
double  the  value  of  our  State  and  national  domain,  and  without  expending  a 
dollar  that  may  not  be  insured  to  be  replaced  in  the  public  coffers  in  from  seven 
to  ten  years  after  the  completion  of  the  work  here  recommended. 

Your  memorialist  is  admonished  by  the  universal  employment  of  steam  power, 
and  its  applicability  to  every  description  of  armament  hitherto  moved  upon  the 
sea  by  wind  and  canvas,  or  upon  the  land  by  animal  power,  that  an  epoch  is 
at  hand  in  which  the  art  of  war,  in  whatever  regards  the  attack  and  defence  of 
seaports,  has  undergone  an  unparalleled  revolution. 

Hitherto  the  transition  from  peace  to  war  between  neighboring  nations, 
though  sometimes  sudden  and  unexpected,  was  usually  preceded  by  some  sig- 
nificant note  of  preparation  not  easily  mistaken ;  and  after  the  actual  commence- 
ment of  hostilities  there  were  frequent  opportunities  and  ample  time  for  the 
belligerents,  and  more  particularly  for  the  nation  acting  upon  the  unerring 
principle  of  self-defence,  to  complete  the  work  of  preparation  for  war  before  the 
work  of  destruction  upon  her  principal  seaport  towns  had  been  begun  by  the 
invading  foe.  Hitherto  the  enemy's  fleets  were  to  be  seen  for  weeks,  often, 
indeed,  for  months  in  succession,  "  standing  off  and  on,"  waiting  for  suitable 
winds  and  weather  to  enable  them  to  enter  and  attack  the  destined  port,  and 
then,  in  case  of  accident,  to  carry  them  safely  out  again — winds  such  as  could 
never  be  calculated  on  with  anything  like  certainty.  Hence  the  great  and 
unavoidable  delay  in  the  attack  by  fleets  propelled  by  wind  and  sails  has  often 
enabled  the  people  of  the  threatened  seaports  to  throw  up  works  of  defence ; 
and  after  slowly  marching  their  interior  volunteers  and  other  forces  at  the  rate 
of  twenty  miles  a  day,  they  would  in  time  be  so  well  prepared  for  action  that 
the  menacing  invaders  have  but  seldom  ventured  to  attack  places  of  much  im- 
portance, but  have  usually  condescended  to  vent  their  prowess  in  a  petty  border 
war  against  villages  and  private  habitations,  as  upon  the  Chesapeake  bay  and 
the  Georgia  sea-coast  in  the  war  of  1812,  1813,  and  1814. 

If  the  obvious  effect  of  steam  power,  in  the  rapid  movement  of  everything 
to  which  it  has  been  applied  around  us,  has  not  been  sufficient  to  convince  us  of 
the  expediency  and  transcendent  advantages  in  war  and  in  peace  of  the  pro- 
posed immediate  work  of  preparation,  by  steam  power,  to  guard  against  the 
incalculable  disasters  that  must  otherwise  attend  the  sudden  outbreak  of  war 
with  any  of  the  great  nations  of  Europe  able  to  send  against  us  even  a  small 
fleet  propelled  by  steam  power,  it  would  seem  obvious  that  the  late  naval  and 
military  operations  in  the  harbor  of  Vera  Cruz  were  sufficient  to  prove  clearly, 
that  to  bring  a  hostile  fleet  inside  the  breakers  of  a  seaport  of  the  country  in- 
vaded, and  within  the  desired  range  of  the  best  of  cannon  and  mortars  for 
red-hot  shot  and  shells  of  one  of  the  strongest  castles  in  America,  was  the  work 
of  but  two  hours  ;  and  that  the  utter  destruction  of  that  castle  by  three  small 
ships-ofrwar  required  but  four  hours  more. 

To  provide  for  the  defence  of  our  seaports,  and  thus  effectually  to  obviate 
the  possibility  of  a  sudden  calamity  like  that  which  has  befallen  the  castle  of 
San  Juan  de  Ulloa,  and  to  enable  us  to  repel  by  the  agency  of  steam  power 
every  invasion  suddenly  forced  upon  us  by  fleets  propelled  by  steam  power, 
I  now  submit  for  the  consideration  of  the  national  legislature  the  project  and 
explanatory  views  which  follow  : 

ART.  I.  Floating  batteries  for  the  defence  of  the  seaports  and  harbors  of  the 
United  States. 

1.  Your  memorialist  proposes  the  immediate  construction  of  from  two  to  four 
large  floating  batteries  for  the  defence  of  each  navigable  pass  into  the  Mississippi 
river,  and  from  two  to  five  others  for  the  defence  of  every  other  navigable  inlet 
leading  into  any  of  the  principal  seaports  of  the  United  States.  Each  floating 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  237 

battery  to  be  from  200  to  300  feet  long,  and  from  90  to  150  feet  wide — the 
bottom  to  be  as  nearly  flat  as  the  best  tested  principles  of  naval  architecture 
will  allow,  consistently  with  the  great  weight  of  timber  and  metal  to  be  pro- 
vided for,  with  the  requisite  facility  of  the  movement  that  will  be  required  over 
shoal  water.     Each  floating  battery  to  be  secured  in  the  bottom  and  sides  with 
copper  sheeting,  and  copper  or  iron  bolts ;  and  on  the  upper  parts,  exposed  to 
the  enemy's  shot  and  shells,  with  the  thickest  sheet  iron,  and  iron  bolts ;  and 
otherwise  made  capable  of  sustaining  a  heavier  broadside  than  the  largest  of 
our  ships-of-war  is  capable  of  sustaining ;  to  carry  from  one  hundred  and  twenty 
to  two  hundred  heavy  cannon — say  long  24  and  32-pounders,  with  some  80- 
pounders  for  carrying  hollow  shot,  together  with  some  mortars  for  throwing 
shells;   with  a  furnace  for  heating  red-hot  shot  for  illuminating  the  enemy's 
fleets  and  transports.     Each  floating  battery  to  have  state-rooms  for  the  com- 
fortable accommodation  of  from  600  to  1,000  men,  with  storerooms  for  all  the 
munitions  of  war,  requisite  for  that  force  for  six  to  eight  months'  service.     Each 
floating  battery  to  be  attended  and  propelled  by  such  number  of  tow-boats  as 
the  exigencies  of  the  service  shall  from  time  to  time  demand — to  be  permanently 
stationed  in  each  harbor  in  time  of  peace,  and  in  war  as  many  tow-boats  to  be 
chartered  as  the  commanding  officer  may  deem  .necessary  to  render  the  floating 
batteries  in  the  highest  degree  efficient.     As  in  war  tow-boats  will  seldom  be 
needed  for  the  merchant  service,  an  ample  supply  of  them,  particularly  in  our 
large  seaports,  may  be  chartered  on  moderate  terms  :  for  example,  in  the  harbor 
of  New  Orleans  it  is  believed  that  twelve  tow-boats,  with  several  steamboats 
having  the  best  of  engines  to  be  converted  into  tow-boats,  would  be  thrown  out 
of  employment  during  a  state  of  war.     These  could  be  usefully  employed  in 
the  United  States  service,  in  aid  of  the  public  tow-boats  and  floating  batteries. 
But  should  this  reliance  be  deemed  unsafe,  we  can  readily  adopt  the  obvious 
alternative  of  having  each  floating  battery  supplied  with  two  tow-boats  of  great 
power,  as  in  war  they  would  be  needed  near  the  batteries,  ready  to  wield  them 
in  the  event  of  an  attack,  and  at  other  times  to  act  as  tenders  in  supplying  them 
with  men  and  munitions  of  war.     In  a  state  of  peace  the  floating  batteries,  it 
is  believed,  would  require  but  one  tow-boat  each,  excepting  when  employed  in 
deepening  the   ship  channels — a  work  which  may  be  accomplished  with  the 
most  perfect  ease  and  to  any  desirable  extent,  wherever  the  bottom  of  the  chan- 
nel consists  of  mud  and  sand,  as  in  all  the  outlets  of  the  Mississippi.     This 
important  work  will  be  done  by  attaching  to  the  bottom  of  each  floating  battery 
a  framework  of  ploughs  and  scrapers  of  iron,  made  to  let  down  and  raise  up  at 
pleasure,  according  to  the  hardness  or  softness  of  the  clay  and  sand,  or  mud,  of 
which  the  bar  or  bottom  of  the  channel  may  be  composed.     If  very  hard  or 
tough,  the  ploughs  and  scrapers  might  not  break  up  and  take  off  more  than  two 
to  four  inches  in  depth  at  one  movement;  but  where  the  bar  is  composed  entirely 
of  soft  mud,  as  that  at  Balize  and  the  Northeast  and  Southwest  passes  have 
often  been,  from  four  to  six  inches  in  depth,  it  is  believed,  may  be  earned  off  at 
once — wherever  the  bar  is  very  narrow,  and  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  very 
deep  water,  which  would  be  the  reservoir  or  place  of  deposit  to  which  the  mud 
and  sand  would  be  removed.    But  in  a  state  of  peace,  when  the  batteries  should 
not  be  employed  in  deepening  the  ship  channels,  their  extra  tow-boats  might  be 
advantageously  employed  in  the  merchant  service. 

2.  Floating  batteries  such  as  are  here  proposed,  constitute,  as  your  memorialist 
verily  believes,  the  only  sure  means  of  defence  of  the  passes  into  our  seaports 
against  ships-of-war  propelled  by  steam  power — means  of  defence  without  which 
it  is  in  the  power  of  any  nation,  or  community  of  men,  or  pirates,  capable  of 
fitting  out  ten  or  even  five  such  steamship s-of- war  as  those  employed  in  the 
destruction  of  the  castle  of  San  Juan  de  Ulloa,  to  destroy  the  city  of  New 
York  or  New  Orlans  by  fire,  with  the  newly  invented  80-pound  cannon  shot 
and  shells,  in  a  single  day,  at  any  season  of  the  year;  approaching  them  in  the 


238  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

night,  and  taking  them  by  surprise:  as  with  such  a  fleet,  well  manned  and 
supplied,  either  city  could  be  fired  in  five  hundred  places  in  one  hour;  and  in  a 
few  hours  more  thousands  of  the  most  splendid  edifices,  by  which  these  mag- 
nificent cities  are  embellished,  would  be  reduced  to  ruin  and  desolation. 

3.  This  opinion  has  not  been  formed  without  a  full  knowledge  of  the  fact  that 
both  New  York  and  New  Orleans  number  among  their  citizens  many  men  and 
volunteer  corps  of  military  science,  patriotism,  and  unsurpassed  chivalry.     But 
these  fine  volunteer  corps,  attacked  by  means  and  by  weapons  hitherto  unknown 
to  them,  or  unprovided  for,  and  thus  taken  by  surprise,   may  share  the  fate  of 
the  heroic  Danes  at  Copenhagen,  when  attacked  by  Nelson ;  with  this  striking 
difference  in  their  favor,  and  against  us,  the  Danes  were  not  taken  by  surprise. 
A  protracted  negotiation  with  England  preceded  the  attack ;  and  after  the  British 
fleet  had  made  its  appearance  on  the  coast  of  Denmark,  and  in  sight  of  their 
harbor,  they  had  some  three  or  four  days  for  preparation ;  they  had  a  fleet  nearly 
equal  to  that  brought  into  action  against  them  by  Nelson,  together  with  an  army 
of  some  thousands  of  men,  seamen,  soldiers,  and  volunteers,  with  several  fortifi- 
cations on  land,  aided  by  some  floating  batteries — presenting  altogether  an  arma- 
ment of  upwards  of  1,000  cannon,  with  an  immense  supply  of  small  arms  and 
every  requisite  munition  of  waj.     In  this  state  of  preparation  the  harbor  of 
Copenhagen  was  entered  in  open  day  by  twelve  ships  of  the  line — three  of  which 
were  rendered  nearly  useless  by  having  got  aground ;  with  nine  ships  of  the  line, 
therefore,  Nelson  sustained  a  close  action  for  four  hours,  during  which  time  his 
loss  was  less  than  one  thousand,  while  the  loss  of  the  Danes  was  near  six  thousand 
men,  together  with  their  fleet — to  say  nothing  of  the  losses  sustained  by  the 
inhabitants  of  the  city.     This  was  the  result  of  an  attack  with  nine  ships  of  the 
line,  propelled  by  wind  and  sails,  upon  the  seaport  of  Copenhagen,  when  strongly 
fortified  and  defended  by  large  naval  and  land  forces.     What  then  must  be  the 
fate  of  such  a  city  as  New  York  or  New  Orleans,  without  any  effective  means 
of  defence,  attacked  by  ten,  or  even  five  ships-of-war,  armed  with  the  newly 
invented  80-pounders,  and  propelled  by  steam  power  ?     We  know  that  a  fleet 
consisting  of  this  description  of  ships-of-war  may  cross   the  Atlantic  from  a 
European  port  to  New  York  in  the  short  space  of  fourteen  day's  time,  and  that 
it  may  enter  our  harbors  in  the  night,  and  be  seen  at  our  wharves,  with  matches 
lighted  ready  for  action,  at  daylight  in  the  morning — ready  to  take  or  destroy 
money  or  property  amounting  to  ten  times  as  much  as  all  the  floating  batteries 
and  railroads  embraced  in  the  proposed  system  of  national  defence  would  cost. 
In  the  outrageous  attack  on  Copenhagen,  England  was  fighting  for  the  dominion 
of  the  sea.     Denmark  and  Sweden,  with  Russia  and  France,  were  then  nobly 
opposing  that  lawless  pretension,  as  we,  the  United  States,  have  long  opposed  it. 
Nelson,  on  embarking  in  the  expedition,  is  reported  to  have  said  to  his  com- 
mander, Admiral  Parker,  "I  hope  we  shall  give  our  northern  enemies  that  hail- 
storm of  bullets,  which  gives  our  dear  country  the  dominion  of  the  sea  ;  we  have 
it,  and  all  the  devils  in  the  north  cannot  take  it  from  us  if  our  wooden  walls  have 
fair  play."     This  is  the  language  of  a  truehearted  British  seaman  and  soldier. 
Such  was  the  noble  bearing  of  our  own  Decatur,  when  he  exclaimed,  "Our 
country  !  in  her  intercourse  with  foreign  nations  may  she  always  be  right ;  but 
in  war  may  she  always  triumph — right  or  wrong  !" 

In  the  memorable  attack  on  Copenhagen,  it  is  worthy  of  remark  here  that 
the  experienced  Admiral  Nelson,  who  had  won  more  great  naval  victories  than 
any  other  commander  had,  previous  to  the  action  stated  to  the  commander-in- 
chief  the  following  opinion :  "If  the  wind  is  fair,  and  you  determine  to  attack 
the  ships  and  Crown  islands,  you  must  expect  the  natural  issue  of  such  a  battle — 
ships  crippled,  and  perhaps  one  or  two  lost ;  for  the  wind  which  carries  you  in 
will  most  probably  not  bring  out  a  crippled  ship"  Nelson,  however,  had  the 
good  fortune,  after  taking  and  destroying  a  fleet  nearly  equal  to  his  own,  and 
killing  six  times  as  many  men  as  he  lost  in  action,  to  sail  out  of  the  harbor,  which 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  239 

he  had  filled  with  wrecks,  without  the  loss  of  a  single  British  vessel,  though  he 
had  several  greatly  damaged. 

4.  With  floating  batteries,  such  as  are  here  proposed,  it  is  more  than  probable 
that  the  brave  Banes  would  have  destroyed  the  whole  of  Nelson's  fleet  without 
sustaining  the  loss  of  a  vessel,  a  battery,  or  one  hundred  men.  The  floating 
batteries  of  the  Danes,  like  those  of  the  French  and  Spaniards  at  the  siege  of 
Gibraltar  in  the  year  1783,  were  inefficient,  simply  because  they  were  unwieldy. 
No  effective  means  for  wielding  floating  batteries,  when  large  enough  to  be  for- 
midable, had  ever  been  discovered  previous  to  the  discovery  by  Robert  Fulton 
of  that  development  of  steam  power  applicable  to  ships  and  all  other  floating 
structures.  With  regard  to  the  ten  great  floating  batteries,  especially  con- 
structed for  the  memorable  siege  against  Gibraltar,  it  is  obvious  to  every  man 
of  military  mind  that,  however  formidable  such  batteries  might  have  been,  even 
without  tow-boats,  or  steam  power  in  any  other  form,  employed  in  the  defence 
of  a  high  rock  fort  like  that  of  Gibraltar,  such  floating  batteries  could  never  be 
relied  on  as  effective  means  of  attack  upon  a  high  rock  fort  of  that  description, 
as  the  immense  strength  of  the  position  and  of  the.  work,  with  the  great  eleva- 
tion of  the  cannon  of  the  work  attacked,  would  insure  the  destruction  of  float- 
ing batteries,  or  render  an  attack  by  them  unavailing.  It  is  a  well  ascertained 
fact,  however,  not  generally  known,  as  but  few  historians  have  noticed  it,  that 
the  floating  batteries  employed  in  the  siege  of  Gibraltar  were  manned  princi- 
pally with  convicts.  This  fact  may  be  considered  as  the  most  conclusive  among 
the  principal  causes  of  their  failure,  as  well  as  of  the  opinion  entertained  and 
expressed  by  the  French  and  Spanish  commanders,  that  most  of  these  batteries 
were  set  on  fire  by  the  men  on  board,  whose  duty  it  was  to  defend  them.  Be 
this  as  it  may,  a  minute  examination  of  the  military  history  of  the  terrible 
siege  of  Gibraltar  is  respectfully  referred  to  by  your  memorialist  as  evidence  in 
favor  of  his  proposition  for  the  immediate  construction  of  floating  batteries  for 
the  defence  of  our  ports  and  harbors ;  inasmuch  as  it  is  obvious  that,  if  the 
commander  of  Gibraltar  had  been  supplied  with  ten  floating  batteries,  such  as 
are  here  proposed,  with  our  present  means  of  tow-boats,  with  steam  power  to 
wield  them,  he  would  have  destroyed  the  whole  of  the  combined  fleets  employed 
against  him,  or  at  least  have  kept  them  out  of  the  bay  or  harbor  of  Gibraltar. 
To  the  siege  of  Gibraltar  and  the  attack  on  Copenhagen,  two  of  the  most  terrible 
and  extraordinary  events  known  to  modern  history,  in  reference  to  the  attack 
and  defence  of  seaports,  an  event  known  to  your  memorialist  and  many  other 
officers  now  in  service  will  be  added,  to  show  the  utter  impracticability  of  locking 
up  a  navigable  river  or  inlet,  or  of  arresting  the  movement  of  a  fleet  thereon, 
by  fortifications  with  cannon  placed  on  the  banks  of  such  river  or  inlet.  On 
the  night  of  the  6th  of  November,  1813,  the  flotilla,  under  the  command  of 
Major  General  Wilkinson,  consisting  of  nearly  300  boats,  sloops  and  schooners, 
passed  the  fort  of  Prescott,  upon  the  Canada  side  of  the  river  St.  Lawrence, 
under  a  constant  fire  of  the  cannon  of  the  fort,  manned  by  the  best  of  British 
artillerists,  without  the  loss  of  a  boat  or  other  vessel,  and  with  the  loss  of  but 
one  man  killed  and  two  wounded;  notwithstanding  the  flotilla  was  nearly  one 
hour  in  the  act  of  passing  the  fort,  during  the  whole  of  which  time  the  fire  of 
the  enemy's  cannon  was  incessant,  and  the  line  formed  by  the  flotilla  in  its 
movement  was  deemed  to  be  within  pointblank  shot  of  the  fort — say  from  600 
to  800  yards'  distance !  This  fact  was  proven  by  the  whistling  of  the  enemy's 
shot,  many,  probably  hundreds,  of  which  passed  apparently  from  20  to  50  feet 
above  our  heads,  while  on  board  the  boats  in  their  slow  passage,  for  they  were 
propelled  by  oars,  upon  a  gentle  current,  which  enabled  us  to  move  at  the  rate 
of  not  more  than  three  miles  an  hour.  This  movement  was  effected  in  the 
night,  tolerably  clear,  but  without  moonlight.  With  the  history  of  these  three 
events  before  us,  it  would  seem  to  be  the  height  of  imprudence  in  us  to  perse- 


240  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

vere  in  the  construction  of  costly  forts,  with  the  vain  hope  of  protecting  our 
seaports  against  fleets  propelled  by  steam  power,  without  the  employment  of 
floating  batteries,  such  as  are  here  recommended,  with  railroads  to  sustain  them 
by  timely  reinforcements.  % 

5.  But  it  has  been  contended  by  men  of  high  pretensions  in  theory,  if  not  in 
the  practical  science  of  war,  that,  in  place  of  the  floating  batteries  here  proposed 
as  means  of  harbor  defence,  we  should  direct  our  attention  mainly  to  the  con- 
struction of  steamships  of  war.     In  reply  to  this  theoretical  suggestion,  it  is 
only  necessary  to  say  that  we  must,  indeed,  ultimately  have  steamships  of  war, 
or  we  must   give  up  the  whole  of  our  foreign  commerce ;  but,  if  we  desire  to 
preserve  our  seaports  and  commercial  emporiums,  we  must  have  for  their  pro- 
tection floating  batteries,  which  constitute,  in  the  present  state  of  the  arts,  the 
natural  link  in  the  great  chain  of  national  defence  between  the  land  and  naval 
means  of  service ;  and,  as  these  floating  batteries  are  not  designed  for  going  to 
sea,  (excepting  near  our  ports  and  harbors  in  calm  weather,)  they  properly  be- 
long to  the  land   service.     The  fact  that  our  seaports  are  rendered  more  than 
ever   liable  to   sudden   and  unlocked  for  attacks  by  fleets  propelled  by  steam 
power,  renders  it  all-important  to  their  security  that  our  means  of  harbor  defence 
should  never,  even  for  a  single  day,  be  left  exposed  to  an  assault,  when  that 
assault  may,  in  all  human  probability,  result  in  "the  destruction  of  one  of  our 
most  vital  points  of  military  and  commercial  operations.     If,  however,  steam- 
ships of  war  should  be  preferred  to  the  proposed  floating  batteries,  a  solemn  act 
of  Congress  should  be  passed,  forbidding  any  officer  from  removing  them  beyond 
the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  harbor  to  which  they  may  be  assigned;  as  it  must 
be  obvious  that  our  seaports  cannot  be  protected  without  every  requisite  means 
of  protection  is  held  ready  for  action  within  our  harbors,  respectively.     The 
floating  batteries,  it  is  believed,  will  cost  but  little  more  than  the  timber,  iron, 
copper,  and  other  materials  for  their  construction,  if  they  are  built,  as  they 
should  be,  by  the  troops  intended  to  defend  them,  aided  by  some  ship-carpenters 
to  give  them  tight  bottoms. 

6.  With  three  to  five  of  the  proposed  floating  batteries  placed  in  the  form  of 
a  crescent   across  the  Mississippi  river,  with  the   concave  side  of  the  crescent 
down  the  river,  and  this  curved  line  of  floating  batteries  flanked  by  a  small 
temporary  fort  on  each  bank  of  the  river,  so  as  to  bring  the  cannon  of  each  fort 
or  battery  to  bear  on  any  fleet  or  vessel  ascending  the  river  from  the  sea,  we 
should   be   certain  thus  to  give  each  of  the  enemy's  leading  vessels  a  double 
cross-fire — raking  them  in  front  and  on  each  side  at  one  and  the  same  time,  with 
several  of  our  heavy  guns  from  each  one  of  our  floating  batteries  and  adjacent 
forts,  with  red-hot  shot — a  description  of  defence  Avhich  would  to  a  certainty,  in 
99  cases  out  of  100,  be  fatal  to  any  fleet  that  could  possibly  be  brought  against 
our  line  of  batteries.     But,  "to  make  assurance  doubly  sure,"  we  could  have 
our  floating  batteries    occasionally   connected  together  by   chain   cables  and 
chevaux-defrise,  which  might  sometimes  bring  us  in  close  contact  with  a  daring 
foe,  as  Nelson  or  our  own  Decatur  and  Perry  were  in  the  mode  of  attack  which 
characterized  those  chivalric  naval  commanders.     But  the  contact  thus  produced 
would  insure  to  us  the  moral  and  physical  effect  of  our  efforts  being  in  self- 
defence,  with  the   superior  strength  of  our  batteries,  bulwarks,  and  weight  of 
metal — advantages  which  we  should  enjoy  from  the  moment  the  invading  foe 
comes  within  the  range  of  our  long  and  heavy  cannon,  until  he  finds  himself 
entangled  in,  and  arrested  by,  our  chevaux-de-frise,  where  the  contact  would  be  so 
close  as  to  enable  us  to'  throw  into  his  ships  hand  grenades   and  incendiary 
shells,   with  an  occasional  supply   of  heated  steam ;  while  our  own  batteries 
would  be  preserved  from  a  similar  annoyance  by  their  superior  width,  strength, 
and  peculiar  structure  of  their  upper  works,  which  are  proposed  to  be  secured 
by  sheet-iron  of  immense  thickness  ;  a  description  of  work  which  it  is  believed 
could  not  be  so  effectually  applied  to  vessels  of   anything  like  the  ordinary 
model  of  ships-of-war  designed  for  sea  service. 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  241 

But  again:  "to  make  assurance  doubly  sure,"  we  should  not  risk  sucli  places 
as  New  York  and  New  Orleans — by  far  the  most  vital,  and  in  a  civil  and  (the 
latter  more  especially)  in  a  military  point  of  view,  the  most  important  seaports 
in  America — without  at  least  two  curved  lines  of  defence — one  at  or  near  the 
entrance  of  the  harbor,  and  the  other  at  the  next  narrow,  strong,  interior  point, 
fortified  as  above  suggested,  with  the  curved  line  of  floating  batteries  flanked  by 
a  fort  on  each  side  of  the  river  or  channel ;  for  example,  for  the  harbor  of  New 
York,  the  Narrows ;  and  for  the  Mississippi,  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip. 

7.  Floating  batteries,  such  as  are  here  proposed,  constitute  the  only  effective 
means  of  defence  against  fleets  propelled  by  steam  power,  in  a  nation  situated 
as  the  United  States  are,  covering  a  large  extent  of  country,  bordered  by  a  sea- 
board of  near  4,000  miles  in  extent,  indented  by  many  fine  seaports,  with  great 
cities  filled  with  the  wealth  of  a  lucrative  commerce  with  every  quarter  of  the 
globe,  together  with  our  own  agricultural  products,  fully  capable  of  sustaining 
our  expansive  commerce,  until  it  surpasses  that  of  any  other  part  of  the  globe : 
provided  we  take  care  to  maintain  an  attitude  of  honest  defiance  towards  the 
licensed  as  well  as  the  unlicensed  pirates  of  every  quarter  of  the  world,  by 
which  they  will  clearly  understand  that  we  desire  to  be  at  peace,  to  do  equal 
and  impartial  justice  to  all  nations,  and  to  engage  in  entangling  alliances  with 
none ;  and  above  all,  if  we  are  attacked,  we  should  be  prepared  speedily  to  con- 
centrate at  the  point  of  attack  sufficient  force  and  supplies  to  overwhelm  the  in- 
vader with  irretrievable  defeat  before  he  will  have  it  in  his  power  to  destroy  any 
of  our  means  of  defence,  or  our  seaport  towns.  Our  lawless  neighbors  will  thus 
be  taught  that  if  they  attack  us  they  do  it  at  their  peril,  and  at  the  risk  of 
leaving  their  armies  to  enrich  our  plantations, 

8.  So  much  for  their  uses  in  a  state  of  war ;  then,  on  the  return  of  peace, 
when  the  most  expensive  fixed  fortifications  are  absolutely  useless,  and,  more- 
over, a  heavy  burden  to  the  country  to  keep  them  in  repair,  floating  batteries 
will  be  usefully  employed  as  barracks  and  hospitals,  and  in  deepening  the  chan- 
nels, liable  to  be  filled  up  by  clay,  and  loam,  and  sand,  as  those  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Mississippi  river  are  often  filled  up.     As  floating  barracks  and  hospitals,  the 
proposed  batteries  would  be  of  essential  benefit  to  the  service  everywhere,  inas- 
much as  the  outlets  of  our  rivers  and  seaports  are  generally  healthy  positions ; 
and  they  will  form  the  most  appropriate  asylums  for  our  convalescent  or  slightly 
disabled  soldiers  or  seamen,  most  of  whom  will  render  essential  service  in  pre- 
paring fixed  ammunition,  and  in  the  instruction  of  the  young  and  inexperienced, 
and  in  holding  them  ready  for  action.     Above  all,  in  a  state  of  peace  the  pro- 
posed floating  batteries  will  be  of  immense  utility  to  the  service  for  all  purposes 
of  military  schools,  to  which  the  aspiring  youth  of  our  country  of  the  commu- 
nity will  gladly  repair,  for  the  attainment  of  military  knowledge,  where  it  can 
be  acquired  both  in  theory  and  in  practice,  and  where  its  study  and  practice 
will  be  rendered  most  delightful  and  praiseworthy  by  the  simple  process  of  the 
students  rendering  immediate  and  important  public  service  in  return  for  the  pub- 
lic instruction  received  by  them.     The  military  education  of  our  youth  should 
commence  at  the  age  of  sixteen,  and  be  completed  at  the  age  of  twenty-one  or 
twenty-two.     If  our  youth  are  educated  upon  floating  batteries  at  the  entrance 
of  our  harbors,  near  the  Balize,  Sandy  Hook,  or  the  Narrows;  otherwise,  if  the 
youth  of  each  Atlantic  or  southern  State  are  educated  at  the  entrance  of  the 
principal  seaport  of  such  State,  the  graduate,  after  finishing  his  education,  would 
have  the  proud  satisfaction  of  exhibiting  to  his  parents  or  guardian,  on  his  re- 
turn home,  the  gratifying  evidence  of  his  having  performed  five  years'  honorable 
service,  while  acquiring  attainments   qualifying  him  for  a  high,  perhaps  the 
highest,  command  in  the  army;  attainments,  too,  tending  to  qualify  him  in  no 
small  degree  for  the  highest  stations  recognized  by  the  free  institutions  of  our 
country,  and  exonerating  him  forever  after  from  any  other  than  mere  voluntary 
service. 

H.  Rep.  Com.  86 16 


242  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

9.  Shall  we  bo  told  by  the  advocates  of  our  obsolete  systems  of  national  de- 
fence that  the  risk  of  health  and  comfort  is  too  great  to  have  the  youth  of  our 
country  educated  upon  our  floating  batteries  at  the  entrance  of  our  harbors,  or 
at  the  mouths  of  our  rivers,  where  the  swell  of  the  sea  and  the  turbid  waters  of 
our  overflowing  Mississippi  and  other  rivers  may  too  sensibly  affect  the  nerves 
and  disturb  the  meditations  of  the  students  on  whom  the  defence  and  fate  of  the 
republic  must  soon  depend?     Will  our  opponents   point  to  the  United  States 
Military  Academy,  and  contend  that  the  graduates  of  that  institution  are  the 
better  for  the  serene  stillness,  quiet,  and  comfort  of  the  interior  position  of  that 
institution?     We  may  answer,  no!  no!     The  only  great  defect  to  be  found  in 
that  institution  consists  in  the  quiet  and  almost  exclusively  sedentary  mode  of 
living  which  has  long  marked  the  character  of  that  otherwise  admirable  institu- 
tion ;  a  mode  of  living  which  contributes  too  much  to  sacrifice  the  vigor  of  con- 
stitution necessary  to  a  real  hard-duty  soldier,  to  the  attainment  of  that  litera- 
ture and  science,  with  the  social  habits  and  enjoyments  more  befitting  a  country 
gentleman  of  affluent  fortune,  than  a  thoroughbred  soldier,  statesman,  or  man  of 
business : 

"The  life  of  fame  is  ACTION  understood  ; 

That  action  must  be  virtuous,  great  and  good." 

Habits  of  action,  of  mind  and  body,  should  be  formed  in  childhood,  or  at 
least  before  the  seal  of  manhood  is  fixed  upon  the  student.  Why  is  the  seaman 
placed  on  duty  on  board  the  ship-of-war  at  the  age  of  twelve  to  sixteen,  and 
required  to  perform  his  practical  labors  from  the  moment  he  takes  his  first  les- 
sons in  the  theoretical  duties  of  his  profession?  It  is  to  facilitate  his  attain- 
ments of  both  in  the  shortest  possible  time,  and  to  the  greatest  possible  extent 
of  perfection.  His  health  and  habits  are  perfected  upon  the  precise  element, 
and  in  exposures  to  the  climates  and  weather,  to  which  his  duties  will  call  him, 
and  often  confine  him  during  a  state  of  war.  Why  is  the  law  student  required  to 
attend  the  courts,  and  the  medical  student  the  hospitals,  while  attending  to  the 
theory  of  the  profession?  It  is  because,  even  in  these  learned  professions, 
where  much  more  depends  upon  books,  or  theory,  than  in  the  profession  of  arms, 
all  experienced  men  unite  in  the  opinion  that  great  benefit  to  the  student  results 
from  combining  practice  with  theory.  The  watchmaker,  shoemaker,  carpenter, 
and  blacksmith,  always  put  their  students  or  apprentices  to  work  at  the  earliest 
possible  period  of  their  instruction;  often,  indeed,  before  they  are  able  to  wield 
many  of  the  tools  of  their  trade.  With  these  facts  before  our  eyes,  added  to 
the  custom  which  has  obtained  in  many  of  the  enlightened  States  of  Europe, 
and  which  we  are  apparently  disposed  to  rivet  upon  our  own  land  of  freedom 
and  invention,  it  would  seem  impossible  to  resist  the  conviction  that  the  science 
of  war  is  indeed  in  its  infancy.  Of  all  the  sciences  and  arts,  there  are  none 
where  the  union  of  theory  and  practice,  in  all  the  duties  of  preparation  for  the 
great  dernier  results,  are  so  much  altogether  necessary  and  proper,  as  in  the  sci- 
ence of  war  and  the  duties  of  an  army ;  and  yet,  wonderful  to  tell,  there  is  no 
trade  or  profession,  reduced  to  separate  and  distinct  rules  of  science  and  art,  in 
which  theory  is  so  much  relied  on,  or  practice  so  much  neglected,  as  in  the  art 
of  war,  as  it  regards  military  operations  on  land,  or  in  the  attack  and  defence  of 
seaports. 

ART.  II.  So  much  for  floating  batteries,  and  their  uses  in  peace  and  in  war. 
Let  us  now  proceed  to  consider  the  all-important  kindred  measure  of  railroads 
for  co-operating  with  the  proposed  floating  batteries,  and  perfecting  the  promised 
system  of  national  defence. 

10.  We  propose  the  immediate  location  and  construction  of  seven  railroads, 
to  extend  from  the  two  central  States  of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  to  the  seven 
grand  divisions  of  the  national  frontier,  as  suggested  by  a  plan  embraced  in  the 
accompanying  diagram,  viz : 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  243 

{ 

First.  One  principal  railroad  from  Lexington,  Kentucky,  to  Buffalo  or  Platts- 
burg,  New  York,  with  branches  to  Detroit,  Albany,  and  Boston. 

Second.  One  principal  railroad  from  Knoxville,  Tennessee,  to  Norfolk,  Virginia, 
or  Baltimore,  Maryland,  with  branches  to  Richmond,  Virginia,  and  Newbern, 
North  Carolina. 

Third.  One  principal  railroad  from  Memphis,  Tennessee,  to  Charleston,  South 
Carolina,  or  Savannah, '  Georgia,  with  branches  to  Milledgeville,  Georgia,  and 
East  Florida. 

Fourth.  One  principal  railroad  from  Louisville,  Kentucky,  to  Mobile,  Alabama, 
with  a  branch  to  Pensaeola,  Florida. 

Fifth.  One  principal  railroad  from  Lexington,  Kentucky,  via  Nashville,  to 
New  Orleans. 

Sixth.  One  principal  railroad  from  Memphis,  Tennessee,  to  the  Sabine  ridge, 
with  branches  to  Fort  Towson  and  Fort  Gibson,  Arkansas. 

Seventh.  One  principal  railroad  from  Louisville,  Kentucky,  or  Albany,  In- 
diana, to  St.  Louis,  Missouri,  and  thence  to  the  Missouri  river,  north  of  the  mouth 
of  the  Big  Platte;  with  branches  from  Albany,  Indiana,  to  Chicago,  and  from 
the  northwest  angle  of  the  State  of  Missouri  to  the  upper  crossing  of  the  river 
Des  Moines. 

11.  These  seven  great  arteries  or  principal  railroads  here  enumerated  will  each 
be  from  500  to  700  miles  in  length,  (averaging  600  miles,)  making  altogether  a 
distance  of  4,200  miles;    and  the  average  cost  of  locating  and  constructing 
them  is  estimated  at  $15,000  per  mile;  amounting,  altogether,  to  the  sum  of 
$64,000,000,  provided  they  are  located  and  constructed  by  the  army  of  the 
United  States — the  railroads  to  be  of  the  most  substantial  kind,  each  having  a 
double  track.     The  whole  work  to  be  completed  by  the  authority  and  at  the 
expense  of  the  United  States;   provided  that,  on  its  final  completion,  it  shall 
revert  to  the  States,  in  their  sovereign  and  individual  capacity;  each  State  to 
retain  forever  the  right  of  property  in  and  to  all  of  such  section  or  sections  of  the 
said  railroads,  with  all  their  appurtenances,  lying  or  being  within  the  territorial 
limits  of  such  States,  respectively,  upon  the  simple  condition  that  all  troops, 
whether  regulars  or  volunteers,  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  with  their 
munitions  of  war,  together  with  the  mail,  shall  be  transported  forever  upon  these 
railroads  free  of  expense  to  the  United  States. 

12.  Without  attempting  to  enumerate  all  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  the 
proposed  railroads  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war — benefits  which  are  for  the  most 
part  too  generally  known  to  require  any  particular  notice  here,  (and  others,  cer- 
tainly of  very  great  value,  can  only  be  conjectured,  inasmuch  as  they  are  to 
some  extent  invisible,  and  to  be  developed,  principally,  it  is  believed,  by  the 
excavations  necessary  to  complete  the  graduation  of  the  basis   of  the  work 
through  the  vast  regions  of  mineral  wealth  over  which  its  various  lines  will 
extend,  where  accident  has  hitherto  led  to  the  discovery  of  a  sprinkling  of  gold, 
with  millions  of  acres  of  the  richest  iron  and  lead  ore  and  coal,  together  with 
copper  and  other  valuable  minerals,)  your  memorialist  will  here  concisely  advert 
to  the  principal  benefits  which  the  military  aspect  of  the  proposed  work  promises, 
and  conclude  with  a  notice  of  such  advantages  as  must  immediately  result  to  the 
army,  to  the  several  States,  and  the  UNION,  from  the  organization  and  employ- 
ment of  the  national  regulars  and  volunteers  as  operatives  upon  the  work. 

13.  The  prin^ml  advantages  to  be  derived  from  the  proposed  railroads  in 
a  military  point  of  view. 

In  a  state  of  war  they  will  enable  us  to  transport  the  military  men  and  mu- 
nitions of  war  of  the  two  central  States  of  the  Union,  and  of  all  the  interior 
districts  of  the  twenty-four  border  States,  to  the  seven  grand  divisions  of  the 
national  frontier,  without  animal  power,  in  one-tenth  part  of  the  time,  and  at 
one-tenth  part  of  the  expense  that  the  movement  would  cost  in  the  present  state 


244  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

of  our  bad  roads.  The  proposed  railroads  would  thus  enable  us  to  obtain  more 
useful  service  in  war  from  ten  thousand  men,  by  the  increased  rapidity  and 
safety  of  their  movement  to  the  point  of  attack  chosen  by  the  invading  foe, 
than  without  railroads  we  could  obtain  from  an  army  of  one  hundred  thousand 
men  marched  upon  our  common  roads ;  as,  in  addition  to  the  saving  of  time, 
which  in  war  is  power,  and  health,  and  life,  and  money,  we  shall  save  our  citizen 
soldiers  from  what  they  usually  deem  the  most  irksome  and  insupportable  afflic- 
tions and  privations  attending  their  tours  of  military  service;  AVC  shall  save  them 
from  long  and  tedious  marches,  and  from  the  still  more  trying  scenes  of  a  long- 
continued  delay  in  camp,  and  the  consequent  painful  separation  from  wife, 
children,  friends,  and  business.  On  the  contrary,  after  being  assembled  and 
prepared  for  action,  we  shall  fly  to  meet  the  invading  foe  at  the  rate  of  250  or 
300  miles  in  24  hours — taking  with  us  every  desirable  necessary  of  life  for  the 
preservation  of  health,  activity,  and  personal  prowess,  so  that  when  we  meet 
the  enemy  we  shall  enjoy  every  desirable  advantage  in  every  conflict,  in  most  of 
which  we  cannot  but  be  successful;  and  in  place  of  the  usual  campaign  of  three, 
six,  or  twelve  months  of  distressing  service,  we  may  reasonably  calculate  on 
being  conveyed,  with  every  desirable  supply  from  the  central  States  to  the  fron- 
tier, in  the  short  space  of  fifty  or  sb  ty  hours'  time,  and  of  meeting  and  beating 
the  invading  foe,  and  returning  to  our  homes  in  a  few  days,  or  at  most  a  few 
weeks  more.  Hence  the  great  utility  of  the  proposed  railroads  in  a  state  of 
war ;  and  then,  on  the  return  of  peace,  when  our  sixty  millions  of  dollars  worth 
of  fortifications,  and  armories,  and  arsenals,  and  ships-of-war,  are  worse  than 
useless  for  any  of  the  purposes  of  peace,  and  a  great  and  constant  expense  to 
repair  and  replenish  them  in  order  to  hold  them  ready  for  another  war ;  then 
our  railroads,  taking,  as  they  must  take,  precisely  the  direction  that  the  com- 
merce of  our  country  takes,  from  the  seaboard  to  the  central  western  States, 
will,  when  turned  to  commercial  purposes,  produce  a  revenue  to  the  States  that 
own  them  that  will  be  more  than  sufficient  to  replace,  in  seven  years'  time, 
every  dollar  expended  in  their  construction,  and  forever  thereafter  produce  a 
revenue  sufficient  for  the  support  of  all  the  State  governments,  and  to  pay  for 
the  education  of  every  orphan  child  in  America.  The  proposed  railroads  will 
do  more — they  will  form  ligaments  of  union  more  powerful  than  bulwarks  of 
adamant,  or  chains  of  iron  or  gold,  to  bind  the  States  together  in  perpetual 
union.  In  designating  the  military  men  of  the  central  States  of  Tennessee  and 
Kentucky  as  the  disposable  force  of  the  nation,  we  have  reference  to  the  fact 
that  this  force  is  rendered  disposable  by  the  central  position  of  these  two  States 
— they  having  no  frontier  to  defend ;  while  the  forces  of  all  the  other  twenty- 
four  States  are  rendered  local  forces,  and  not  disposable,  by  reason  of  their 
being  all  border  States — the  boundary  of  each  extending  to  the  frontier ;  and, 
therefore,  having  no  frontier  of  their  own  to  defend,  they  are  thus  rendered  local, 
not  disposable. 

14.  Organization  of  the  regular  forces  and  operatives  to  be  intrusted  with 
the  location  and  construction  of  the  ivork. 

One  major  general;  one  adjutant  general,  with  seven  assistants;  two  brigadier 
generals;  seven  surgeons,  with  twenty-eight  assistant  surgeons;  and  twenty- 
eight  chief  artificers  or  scientific  mechanics;  seven  regiments,  each  regiment  to 
consist  of  one  colonel,  two  lieutenant  colonels,  four  majors,  one  adjutant,  and 
one  quartermaster,  two  sergeant  majors,  and  two  quartermaster  sergeants,  with 
ten  companies ;  each  company  to  consist  of  one  captain,  two  first  lieutenants, 
two  second  lieutenants,  and  two  cadets,  with  one  quartermaster  sergeant,  one 
orderly  sergeant,  four  sergeants,  four  corporals,  two  musicians,  ten  artificers,  and 
eighty  private  soldiers.  The  general,  field,  and  staff  officers,  with  the  captains 
and  first  lieutenants,  to  be  taken  from  the  officers  of  the  engineers,  topographical 
engineers,  artillery,  and  infantry  now  in  service;  officers  of  established  reputa- 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  245 

i 

tion  for  professional  talents,  experience,  industry,  economy,  and  exemplary 
habits,  and  to  have  the  pay  and  emoluments  of  mounted  dragoons,  with  50  per 
cent,  additional  pay,  while  actually  employed  as  engineers,  superintendents,  or 
operatives,  upon  the  location  or  construction  of  the  work. 

15.  Location  of  the  proposed  railroads. 

The  location  must  embace  the  nearest  and  best  routes,  commencing  within  the 
two  central  States  of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  and  extending  to  the  seven 
grand  divisions  of  the  seaboard  and  northern  frontier,  as  above  suggested ;  to 
be  ascertained,  particularly  through  the  mountainous  regions,  by  a  series  of  to- 
pographical surveys,  and  finally  decided  on  and  established  by  a  b'oard  to  con- 
sist of  a  general  and  four  to  six  field  officers,  upon  whose  decision  the  major 
general  commanding  upon  this  service  should  have  power  to  act :  to  approve  or 
disapprove  the  decision  of  the  board,  upon  the  same  principles  that  the  President 
is  authorized  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  to  approve  or  disapprove 
an  act  of  Congress. 

These  surveys  will  produce  an  immense  mass  of  mineral,  geological,  and  topo- 
graphical information,  of  great  value  to  the  States  and  the  Union,  and  of  indis- 
pensable utility  to  every  member  of  the  army  and  militia  of  the  nation  who 
aspires  to  that  employment  in  the  national  defence  which  leads  to  the  true  fame 
of  a  citizen  soldier — information  tending  to  develop  the  military  and  physical 
resources  of  every  State  and  district  preparatory  to  a  state  of  war,  and  of  essen- 
tial benefit  to  the  people  of  every  class  during  a  state  of  peace. 

16.  Operations  in  the  final  construction  of  the  work. 

Each  one  of  the  proposed  routes  to  be  placed  in  charge  of  a  colonel,  who 
will  superintend  the  construction  of  the  work ;  and  for  the  prompt  and  con- 
venient accomplishment  of  every  part  of  the  work,  each  route  will  be  subdivided 
into  ten  sections,  and  each  section  placed  under  the  immediate  superintendence 
of  a  captain,  to  be  assisted  by  the  whole  of  the  subaltern  officers,  non-commis- 
sioned officers,  artificers,  and  privates  of  the  company,  with  as  many  volunteer 
artificers  and  other  operatives  as  will  be  sufficient  to  insure  the  completion  of 
each  section  in  from  four  to  five  years  after  the  location  of  the  work,  which  may 
be  accomplished  in  one  year;  so  that  when  one  section  of  sixty  miles  in  extent 
is  completed,  the  whole  work  will  be  quite  or  nearly  finished,  with  the  exception 
of  that  Avhich  is  unavoidably  located  over  a  mountainous  country.  The  com- 
pletion of  the  mountainous  sections  may  be  hastened  by  such  increased  means 
as  the  exigencies  of  the  service  shall  demand.  The  simple  process  of  carrying 
on  such  a  work  necessarily  increases  the  means  and  facilities  of  its  progress 
and  speedy  accomplishment.  Thousands  of  our  young  men,  ignorant  of  every 
operation  upon  tke  work,  will  soon  become  able  operatives.  To  the  regular 
army  we  should  have  the  power  to  add  every  scientific  mechanic,  artificer,  and 
able-bodied  willing  laborer,  to  be  employed  as  volunteers,  principally  within  the 
limits  of  the  States  where  the  sections  of  the  railroads*  on  which  they  are  to  be 
employed,  respectively,  are  located  and  constructed,  so  that  the  services  of  all 
may  be  near  their  places  of  residence.  We  shall  thus  call  into  action  and  use- 
fulness that  class  of  American  genius  which  would  otherwise,  to  a  great  extern, 
languish  and  fall  into  the  whirlpools  of  vice  or  imbecility  for  want  of  employ- 
ment and  judicious  direction — that  genius  which  is  found  in  the  learned  profes- 
sions, in  all  the  walks  of  fashionable  life,  in  the  pursuits  of  agriculture,  commerce, 
and  the  mechanic  arts,  as  well  as  in  the  haunts  of  dissipation  and  idleness  ; 
whose  votaries  may  indeed  often  too  truly  say,  "  We  are  idle  because  no  man 
hath  given  us  employment."  By  these  idlers,  whose  amployment  would  save 
them  from  misery  and  ruin,  and  render  them  valuable  citizens,  and  enable  them 
to  render  their  country  invulnerable  in  war  and  enrich  it  in  peace — aided  by  the 
enterprising  young  men  which  every  section  of  the  republic  is  capable  of  afford- 
ing for  the  proposed  great  work,  and  arming  with  the  irresistible  weapons  of 


246  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

industry  and  enterprise  necessary  to  enable  them,  in  obedience  to  the  sublime 
mandate  of  Holy  Writ,  "  to  replenish  the  earth  and  subdue  it,"  and  render  it 
fruitful,  that  it  may  multiply  the  benefits  and  blessings  which  it  is  capable  of 
yielding  to  man — the  proposed  work  will  be  speedily  accomplished. 

17.  The  hidden  wealth  which  the  progress  of  the  work  will  disclose,  added 
to  the  vast  supplies  of  materials  for  construction,  for  transportation,  and  for  food 
and  raiment  for  the  operatives  upon  the  work,  and  for  commerce — supplies,  a 
considerable  part  of  which  every  year  waste  away  among  the  interior  sections 
of  the  western  and  middle  States  for  want  of  a  cheap  conveyance  to  good  mar- 
kets, such  as  the  proposed  railroad  will  afford — will  contribute  much  towards  the 
completion  and  final  profitable  employment  of  the  work ;  supplies  that  would 
every  year  be  augmented  by  new  improvements  and  by  encouraged  industry, 
until  they  would  far  surpass  the  immediate  wants  of  the  great  and  increasing 
influx  of  population  and  operatives  upon  the  public  works  and  frontier ;  and,  on 
the  completion  of  the  work,  these  constantly  increasing  supplies  would  be  poured 
into  the  improved  channels  of  cheap  transportation  and  profitable  commerce, 
gradually  swelling  the  profits  of  both,  as  the  millions  of  tributary  rills  and  rivu- 
lets expand  the  mighty  river  into  whose  bosom  they  pour  their  liquid  treasures. 
It  is  believed,  moreover,  that  the  construction  of  the  proposed  railroad  through 
the  southern,  western,  and  Atlantic  States  would  not  fail  to  create  the  means  for 
the  speedy  completion  of  all  the  lateral  branches  required  for  every  State  and 
seaport,  by  multiplying  among  us  experienced  engineers  and  scientific  mechanics, 
with  habits  of  industry  and  enterprise;  giving  to  all  classes  of  the  community 
profitable  employment,  calculated  to  render  them  independent  in  their  domestic 
affairs,  respectable  and  happy  in  peace,  and  formidable  in  war,  while  the  money 
expended  would  be  kept  in  a  healtful  state  of  circulation  among  the  farmers, 
merchants,  and  mechanics  of  our  interior  settlements,  in  place  of  its  being  car- 
ried off  to  enrich  foreign  merchants,  or  to  form  every  year  at  home  a  new  bone 
of  contention  between  the  votaries  of  the  spirit  of  party,  such  as  go  all  lengths 
for  party  men,  regardless  of  the  true  interests  and  honor  of  the  republic.     And 
when,  during  a  state  of  war  with  nations  surpassing  us  in  naval  strength,  we 
find  ourselves  compelled  to  abandon  the  ocean,  and  be  deprived  of  our  foreign 
commerce — the  inevitable  consequence  of  a  war  with  any  of  the  strong  powers 
of  Europe,  without  first  supplying  ourselves  with  a  fleet  of  steamships  of  war, 
as  well  as  floating  batteries  and  the  proposed  railroads — these  roads,  even  while 
occasionally  employed  in  the  transportation  of  troops  from  the  central  Stages  to 
the  south,  will  take  return  cargoes  of  southern  products,  such  as  sugar,  cotton, 
oranges,  and  lemons,  from  the  southern  to  the  middle  and  northern  States,  from 
whence  they  will  bring  return  cargoes  of  the  numerous  products  and  manufac- 
tured articles  of  the  northern  and  central  States  needed  in  the  south — an  in- 
terior commercial  intercourse  by  which  the  privations  of  our  foreign  commerce 
would  be  remedied,  and  many  of  the  evils  of  war  removed,  and  all  others  greatly 
mitigated.     Indeed,  the  completion  of  the  proposed  railroads  and  floating  bat- 
terries  your  memorialist  believes  would  soon  effectually  prevent  the  recurrence 
of  war,  so  long  as  the  United  States  shall  see  fit  to  confine  their  views  and 
national  policy  to  the  magnanimous  principle  of  defensive  war ;  as  the  proposed 
means  of  national  defence  would  give  a  degree  of  available  strength,  both  physi- 
cal .and  moral,  that  would  render  the  peril  of  an  attack  a  perpetual  source  of 
terror  to  our  evil-disposed  neighbors,  and  consequently  mdral  strength  and  secu- 
rity to  our  beloved  country. 

18.  It  is  proper  in  a  state  of  peace  to  prepare  for  war.     The  wisest  statesmen 
in  all  civilized  nations  have  acted  upon  the  principle  here  suggested.     It  is  time 
for  us  to  inquire  what  would  be  the  consequence  of  our  receiving  the  unexpected 
visit  of  a  large  fleet  of  steamships,  armed  as  the  French  fleet  lately  in  the  har- 
bor of  Vera  Cruz  were,  bringing  in  the  mouths  of  their  cannon  an  unexpected 
declaration  of  war.      Much  as  we  may  rely  on  the  unsurpassed    chivalry  of 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  247 

our  volunteer  corps,  such  a  visit  could  not  but  be  attended  with  incalculable 
mischief,  without  the  means  of  defence  here  proposed — means  of  defence  which 
will  enable  us  to  march  by  land  from  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  to  Buffalo,  New 
York,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  Norfolk,  Charleston,  Savannah,  St.  Augustine, 
Pensacola,  Mobile,  New  Orleans,  or  Texas,  from  200,000  to  500,000  men  in  the 
short  period  of  three  days'  time !  This  rapid  movement  would  have  been  very 
desirable,  as  it  would  have  saved  millions  of  money  and  thousands  of  valuable 
lives  in  our  former  wars,  and  would  have  been  very  essential  to  our  security 
against  a  land  and  naval  attack  when  we  had  no  reason  to  apprehend  an  invasion 
by  fleets  propelled  by  steam  power.  But  now  that  we  know  many  of  the  most 
warlike  nations  of  Europe  are  busily  occupied  in  the  work  of  preparing  steam- 
ships of  war,  we  have  no  longer  a  choice  in  the  issue  whether  we  must  or  must 
not  prepare  the  means  here  proposed  for  defence  against  the  improved  elements 
of  destruction  which  we  know  our  neighbors  hold  in  readiness  to  employ  against 
us.  We  must  lay  aside  our  old  obsolete  military  books  of  the  last  century, 
such  as  we  have  borrowed  from  England  and  France,  and  we  must  profit  by 
the  lights  by  which  the  present  age,  the  present  year  is  illuminated,  and  prepare 
to  defend  ourselves  by  the  agency  of  this  mighty  power,  by  which  the  invading 
foe  will  inevitably  attack  us*. 

19.  Ancient  and  modern  history  is  replete  with  evidences  of  the  wisest  of 
governments  having  promptly  availed  themselves  of  the  use  of  every  description 
of  weapon  deemed  to  be  most  formidable  in  war,  as  well  as  of  every  kind  of 
power  applicable  to  the  purposes  of  rapidly  wielding  armies  and  munitions  of 
war,  as  soon  as  practicable  after  their  discovery.  We  need  only  advert  here  to 
some  few  discoveries  which,  trifling  as  th$  first  and  third  may  seem,  were 
deemed  sufficient  at  the  time  of  their  discovery  to  merit  the  attention  of  men 
and  monarchs  of  profound  wisdom  and  genius. 

1st.  When  the  commanders  of  the  armies  of  King  David  reported  to  that 
veteran  monarch  that  they  had  sustained  heavy  losses  in  their  operations  against 
the  Philistines,  in  consequence  of  their  having  employed  in  battle  the  bow  and 
arrow,  David  promptly  gave  orders  to  his  commanders  to  avail  themselves  of 
the  discovery  of  this  then  formidable  weapon,  and  make  themselves  and  their 
men  acquainted  with  the  use  of  it,  "so  as  to  place  them  on  an  equal  footing 
with  their  enemy." — (See  the  "  History  of  the  Bible.") 

2d.  When  in  the  fourteenth  century  an  obscure  monk  of  Germany  discov- 
ered gunpowder,  with  some  of  its  uses  in  war,  all  the  other  nations  of  Europe 
that  were  blessed  with  wise  rulers  hastened  to  avail  themselves  of  the  discovery 
— a  discovery  w^hich  ere  long  induced  all  the  civilized  world  to  change  their  un- 
wieldly  weapons  of  war  for  fire-arms ;  gradually  laying  aside  their  war  chariots 
armed  with  scythes,  their  battering-rams,  with  their  coat  of  mail,  and  most  of 
their  personal  armor. 

3d.  The  use  of  wheel  carriages  on  improved  roads  added  more  than  twenty- 
five  per  cent,  to  the  efficiency  of  an  army,  by  enabling  it  to  march  one-fourth 
further  in  a  given  time,  and  by  carrying  with  it  a  more  ample  supply  of  artil- 
lery, ammunition,  and  subsistence,  prolonging  the  period  of  active  operations, 
and  occasionally  taking  the  enemy  by  surprise,  as,  by  the  increased  celerity  of 
his  movements,  Napoleon  took  the  enemies  of  France  by  surprise  in  his  first 
campaign  into  Italy. 

4th.  All  civilized  nations  speedily  availed  themselves  of  the  discovery  of  the 
magnetic  needle,  with  the  inventions  and  improvements  in  ship-building,  tlie 
use  of  sails,  &c.  Many  of  the  discoveries  here  alluded  to,  however,  though 
they  contributed  to  facilitate  the  movement  of  troops  and  munitions  of  war, 
excited  little  or  no  interest  at  the  time  of  their  discovery  compared  with  that  of 
the  application  of  steam  power  to  ships  and  other  vessels,  and  to  vehicles  of 
land  transportation  on  railroads.  In  these  last  discoveries  we  may  well  be  allowed 
to  speak  in  the  language  of  poetry,  and  say  that — 

"  Steam  power  was  almighty  in  its  birth  ;" 


248  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

while  gunpowder,  fire-arms,  wheel  carriages,  and  all  former  improvements  in 
marine  structures,  though  partially  known  and  in  use  for  centuries  past,  have 
exhibited  little  or  nothing  beyond  their  now  apparent  state  of  infancy  until 
within  the  last  and  present  century.  Even  now  no  civilized  nation  can  boast  of 
any  discovery  or  improvement  in  fire-arms,  gun-carriages,  or  in  naval  architec- 
ture in  anywise  calculated  to  be  of  any  peculiar  advantage  to  any  one  nation 
over  another  nation;  while  these  developments  of  steam,  with  floating  batteries 
and  railroads,  are  calculated  to  render  a  nation,  in  the  position  which  we  occupy, 
at  least  ten  times  more  formidable  in  a  war  of  self-defence  than  in  an  offensive 
war  against  nations  of  equal  numerical  strength,  and  provided  with  the  means 
here  proposed.  All  the  discoveries  above  referred  to  in  the  science  of  war  have, 
however,  contributed  much  to  ameliorate  the  condition  of  nations  and  of  armies 
in  their  conflicts  and  controversies,  and  greatly  to  lessen  the  evils  of  war.  The 
greater  the  improvement  in  this  awful  and  sublime  science,  the  less  calamitous 
and  the  more  humane  have  been  the  results  of  military  operations,  wherever  the 
contending  parties  were  equally  acquainted  with  the  progressive  improvements, 
and1  had  equal  or  nearly  equal  means  of  profiting  by  them.  If  these  proposi- 
tions are  correct,  (and  history  proves  them  to  be  strictly  true,)  where,  it  may  be 
asked,  where  must  our  improvements  in  the  science  of  war,  dependent  on  steam 
power,  terminate  ?  The  wise  and  the  good  who  have  long  cherished  the  pros- 
pect of  a  blessed  millenium  will  readily  answer  the  question. 

20.  Your  memorialist  had  long  cherished  the  hope  that  some  patriotic  states- 
man of  military  mind  would  be  found  at  the  head  of  the  War  Department,  able 
and  willing  to  bring  the  subject  of  his  system  of  national  defence  before  the 
President  of  the  United  States  and  the  national  legislature ;  and  in  this  hope 
he  has  freely  and  frankly  submitted  to  several  of  the  heads  of  that  department 
his  views  upon  the  subject  at  different  periods  during  nearly  seventeen  years 
past,  until  he  received  from  Mr.  Secretary  Cass  the  most  irrefragable  evidence 
that  the  official  communications  and  reports  of  your  memorialist  were  either 
misunderstood,  disregarded,  or  disapproved.  Nevertheless,  assured  as  he  has 
constantly  been  of  the  practicability,  propriety,  and  necessity  of  such  a  system 
of  national  defence,  and  deeming  it  to  be  a  matter  of  discovery,  invention,  and 
improvement  in  the  art  of  war,  which  should  be  discussed  with  the  same  freedom 
as  any  other  discovery  in  the  useful  arts,  your  memorialist,  as  the  author  and 
inventor  of  the  proposed  system,  has  addressed  himself  freely  to  private  as  well 
as  public  men  of  several  different  nations  and  of  all  parties,  and  has  received  in 
return,  from  men  of  the  highest  attainments  and  unimpeached  and  unimpeach- 
able patriotism,  full  and  cordial  concurrence  in  his  every  view  hitherto  presented 
in  favor  of  his  system  of  national  defence  here  set  forth  and  explained.  Far 
from  being  discouraged  at  the  opposition  of  three  honorable  Secretaries  for  ten 
years  in  succession,  he  has  learned  from  that  opposition  that  the  War  Depart- 
ment of  the  United  States  republic  is  rather  a  theatre  of  executive  actions  upon 
political  matters  already  settled,  enacted,  or  ordered,  than  upon  new  discoveries, 
inventions,  or  improvements  in  any  branch  of  the  art  of  war.  He  could  not  but 
persevere,  therefore,  in  his  humble  efforts  to  render  his  country  some  good  ser- 
vice in  peace,  as  he  had  done  in  war;  convinced  as  he  is  that  his  system  soars 
above  the  pestilential  atmosphere  of  the  evil  spirit  of  party,  as  it  is  a  system  of 
national  defence  designed  to  impart  benefits  and  diffuse  blessings  alike  through- 
out every  State  and  Territory  of  the  republic  and  upon  all  parties. 

'The  oath  of  office  taken  by  your  memorialist,  requiring  him  to  serve  the 
"United  States,  (not  a  party,)  requires  him  to  act  and  speak  in  accordance  with 
the  rules  and  articles  of  war.  He  has  always  held  himself  ready  to  risk  his 
life,  his  bread,  and  his  fortune,  for  his  country ;  and  he  has  the  happiness  of 
knowing  that  he  has  risked  his  life  for  her  often — hundreds  of  times.  His  oath 
of  office  does  not  restrain  him  from  speaking  frankly  and  truly  in  the  vindication 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  249 

of  his  motives,  his  conduct,  his  honor,  and  his  system  of  national  defence.  To 
withhold  his  views  upon  an  occasion  of  this  kind,  indeed,  would  be  virtually  a 
violation  of  his  oath  of  office,  which  requires  him,  as  a  primary  duty  to  serve 
the  United  States  honestly  and  faithfully  against  their  enemies  or  opposers 
whomsoever ;  and  he  could  not  conscientiously  comply  with  this  oath,  without 
submitting  to  the  national  legislature  every  section  and  every  paragraph  con- 
tained in  this  memorial.  He  feels  conscious  that  he  is  right.  His  enemies  will 
not  hesitate  to  admit  that  he  is  either  right  or  wrong.  If  any  member  of  the 
national  legislature  believes  him  to  be  wrong,  he  entreats  that  member  to  insti- 
tute any,  the  most  rigid,  scrutiny  into  the  whole  of  the  views  here  presented  by 
your  memorialist.  He  thus  respectfully  solicits  his  friends,  and  fearlessly  chal- 
lenges his  enemies,  to  put  him  in  the  wrong,  by  proving  his  system  of  national 
defence  to  be  either  unnecessary  or  impracticable.  But  if  he  is  deemed  to  be 
right  in  the  foregoing  views,  showing  that  his  system  is  indispensably  necessary, 
and  that  its  accomplishment  is  practicable,  at  the  expense  and  within  the  period 
of  time  here  suggested,  surely  no  time  should  be  lost  in  carrying  into  execution 
this  system  of  national  defence.  As  it  regards  the  treatment  he  has  received 
from  the  last  three  heads  of  the  department  of  war,  personally,  he  has  nothing 
to  say ;  having,  ever  since  he  entered  the  public  service,  acted  upon  the  princi- 
ple that 

"The  real  patriot  bears  his  private  wrongs 
Bather  than  right  them  at  the  public  cost." 

Your  memorialist  desires  no  greater  triumph  over  his  weak  or  wicked  calum- 
niators, nor  any  other  atonement  for  past  injuries,  than  the  triumph  of  truth 
that  must  result  from  a  full  and  perfect  examination  of  his  past  life  and  services ; 
and  more  especially  a  critical  comparative  review  of  his  services  in  Canada 
(approved  by  a  M.adison) — and  his  services  in  Florida  (condemned  by  a  Jack- 
son)— and  more  especially  of  his  system  of  national  defence,  approved  by  a 
Seward,  a  Cannon,  a  White,  and  a  Lumpkin,  compared  with  the  services  and 
system  of  the  party  men  opposed  to  your  memorialist. 

21.  The  discovery,  by  Oliver  Evans,  of  that  development  of  steam  power  by 
which  the  locomotive  and  other  vehicles  of  land  transportation  are  propelled 
upon  the  railroad,  and  by  which  the  movement  of  large  armies,  which  may  be 
hastened  from  twenty-six  miles,  (the  day's  march  of  Napoleon,)  to  three  hundred 
miles  in  one  day ;  and  the  discovery,  by  Robert  Fulton,  of  that  kindred  develop- 
ment of  steam  power,  by  which  our  rivers  and  lakes  have  been  covered  with 
floating  palaces  and  warehouses,  surpassing  in  the  velocity  of  their  movement 
anything  before  seen  upon  our  waters — making  an  easy  conquest  of  the  pre- 
viously unsubdued  current  of  the  mighty  Mississippi,  and  now  proudly  encoun- 
tering in  triumph  the  mountain  wave  of  ocean ;  as  these  discoveries  were  the 
result  of  previously  known  developments  of  steam  power,  in  its  application  to 
mill  and  other  labor-saving  machinery,  suggesting  to  Evans  and  Fulton  the  great 
principle  upon  which  their  success  was  known  to  depend';  so  it  must  be  obvious 
to  every  man  of  military  mind,  and  to  every  scientific  mechanic,  that  the  dis- 
coveries of  these  two  great  public  benefactors  must  necessarily  form  the  basis  of 
the  system  of  national  defence  which  your  memorialist  here  offers  to  Congress. 
Oliver  Evans  and  Robert  Fulton  were,  until  a  few  years  before  their  death,  de- 
nounced by  thousands  of  learned  theorists  as  eccentric  visionary  men.  T^he 
same  class  of  censors  have  honored  your  memorialist  with  similar  epithets.  He 
has  had  the  satisfaction,  however,  to  learn  from  some  of  those  who  thus  de- 
nounced him  that  they  have  since  seen  their  error,  and  are  now  among  the  true 
believers  in  the  feasibility,  value,  and  importance  of  his  system.  He  adverts  to 
this  fact,  here,  only  to  justify  or  excuse  what  he  deems  it  to  be  his  duty  to  say 
ip.  his  own  vindication,  and  in  reference  to  his  own  past  public  services  ;  because 


250  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

he  can  refer  to  no  historical  work  or  biographical  memoir  containing;  any  account 
of  his  public  services  in  the  war  of  1814,  excepting  such  as  have  been  distorted 
by  malignity  or  by  ignorance.  He  is  therefore  constrained  to  say,  as  an  act  of 
justice  to  himself,  that  he  is  the  only  general  officer  now  living,  who,  as  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  a  division,  or  separate  army,  or  detached  corps,  ever  achieved 
a  victory  over  any  British  army,  upon  any  part  of  the  Niagara  frontier,  in  the 
war  of  1814 ;  that  he  had  the  good  fortune  to  command  the  division  from  which 
his  beloved  Major  General  (Brown)  had  been  taken,  by  reason  of  a  severe 
wound,  on  that  frontier,  in  August,  1814,  during  twenty -three  days  of  which 
time  your  memorialist  was  actively  engaged  in  battle,  and  in  a  brisk  cannonade 
and  bombardment,  and  other  severe  conflicts  with  the  British  army  under  Lieu- 
tenant General  Drumrnond.  In  the  principal  battle,  the  lieutenant  general  ac- 
knowledged a  loss  of  nine  hundred  and  five  officers  and  men  killed,  wounded, 
and  missing,  with  a  similar  loss  of  nearly  six  hundred  in  the  several  other  con- 
flicts. During  twenty-two  days  of  the  time,  there  were  but  few  hours,  from  day- 
light in  the  morning  until  dark  in  the  evening,  in  which  the  British  cannon  shot 
and  shells  did  not  present  to  your  memorialist  the  most  instructive  exhibition  of 
every  variety  of  effect  of  which  a  well-directed  cannonade  and  bombardment 
upon  a  very  slightly  and  partially  fortified  camp,  of  which  an  unfinished  bastion 
and  block-house  formed  the  only  tolerably  fortified  angle,  could  possibly  present. 
In  that  long  conflict — in  which  .the  British  forces  were  reported  to  amount  to 
4,200,  principally  regulars,  and  the  United  States  forces  to  2,500,  near  one- 
fourth  of  which  were  New  York  and  Pennsylvania  volunteers  under  General 
Peter  B.  Porter — your  memorialist  is  convinced  he  had  a  better  opportunity 
than  any  other  general  officer  of  the  United  States  army  ever  had  during  the 
war  of  being  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  effect  of  the  enemy's  shells  and 
cannon  shot  upon  our  stone-masonry,  earthen  traverses,  embankments,  or  breast- 
works. He  had  previously  witnessed  at  Fort  Meigs,  and  on  the  river  St.  Law- 
rence, as  well  as  upon  Lake  Erie,  in  the  British  and  United  States  ships-of-war, 
three  days  after  Perry's  glorious  triumph,  the  effect  of  the  enemy's  and  our  own 
cannon  shot  upon  block-houses,  ships-of-war,  and  other  vessels,  as  well  as  on 
other  means  of  defence.  The  investigation  of  these  results  of  some  of  the  most 
important  conflicts  between  the  United  States  and  British  troops,  in  the  war  of 
1813  and  1814,  added  to  a  careful  attention  to  the  theory  and  practice  of  gun- 
nery for  several  years  prior  to  the  war,  with  much  attention  to  the  subject  since, 
warrants  your  memorialist  in  speaking  somewhat  confidently,  as  he  has,  upon 
the  various  bearings  and  tendencies  of  cannon  shot  and  shells  on  floating  bat- 
teries, steamships  of  war,  forts,  and  other  means  of  attack  and  defence  of  sea- 
ports ;  and  of  railroads  for  the  prompt  movement  of  re-enforcements,  as  embraced 
in  his  system  of  national  defence  here  set  forth  and  explained.  For  further 
particulars  in  reference  to  the  various  conflicts  referred  to  in  this  article,  your 
memorialist  respectfully  refers  to  the  officers  whom  he  had  the  honor  to  command 
in  those  conflicts  :  among  the  most  meritorious  of  whom  are  Paymaster  General 
Towson  and  Adjutant  General  Jones,  now  on  duty  at  Washington  city.  The 
names  of  all  others  will  be  found  by  referring  to  the  Adjutant  General's  office. 
And  to  show  in  what  estimation  his  conduct  was  held  by  the  Executive  and 
national  legislature,  your  memorialist  takes  leave  to  refer  to  the  joint  resolution 
of  December,  1814,  by  which  he  and  the  officers  and  men  of  his  command  were 
honored  with  a  vote  of  thanks,  and  the  President  authorized  to  present  to  him 
a  gold  medal.  He  received  also  from  the  legislatures  of  the  great  and  patriotic 
States  of  New  York,  Virginia,  and  Tennessee,  similar  resolutions  of  thanks,  and 
from  each  a  gold-hilted  sword  of  honor.  With  these  magnificent  tokens  of  high 
approbation  of  his  conduct,  your  memorialist  could  not  but  feel  himself  in  honor 
and  in  duty  bound  to  exert  his  best  faculties  to  serve  his  country  faithfally  in 
war  and  in  peace.  With  these  impressions,  he  respectfully  offers  to  Congress 
his  present  system  of  national  defence. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  251 

22.  Your  memorialist  is  convinced  that  the  proposed  means  of  protection  con- 
stitute the  first  and  only  discovery  known  to  man,  whereby  a  nation  situated  as 
we  arc,  and  acting  upon  the  magnanimous  principle  of  self-defence,  can,  without 
any  doubt,  at  a  moderate  expense,  and  by  means  that  will  in  a  few  years  of 
peace  repay  all  the  expense  of  the  work,  hold  in  their  own  hands,  forever,  the 
incontestable  issue  of  any  possible  war  upon  her  seaboard  or  domain,  waged  by 
any  nation,  or  by  any  such  combination  of  empires  or  kingdoms  as  have  once 
dared  to  assume  the  appellation  of  "holy  alliance;"  and  that  any  nation  of  our 
numerical  strength  and  military   resources  availing   herself  of  the  discovery, 
may,  if  she  be  just  and  true  to  herself,  safely  assume  the  attitude  of  honest  de- 
fiance towards  the  armies  of  Europe,  if  not  of  every  quarter  of  the  globe ;  while 
the  most  warlike  nations,  neglecting  the  use  of  steam  power,  with  railroads  and 
floating  batteries,  will  be  found  wholly  unable  to  maintain  their  independence. 
In  this  view  of  the  subject,  it  presses  itself  upon  our  attention  not  as  a  matter 
of  choice,  but  as  a  work  of  absolute  necessity — as  a  measure  of  self-preservation. 

23.  The  constitutionality  of  the  proposed  system  of  national  defence  would 
be  left  untouched  by  your  memorialist,  but  for  the  veneration  he  entertains  for 
that  sublime   and  sacred  instrument  bequeathed  to  us  by  our 'fathers  of  the 
revolution,  added  to  the  oath  he  has  taken  to  support  that  inestimable  charter 
of  our  free  institutions.     He  would  not  willingly  be  deemed  capable  of  urging 
or  soliciting  the  adoption  of  any  measure  not  in  accordance  with  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States ;  and  having,  in  common  with  each  one  of  his  fellow-citi- 
zens, an  indubitable  right  to  judge  for  himself  upon  all  questions  arising  upon 
the  different  provisions  of  that  most  perfect  charter  of  human  freedom  and  self- 
government,  without  confiding  too  much  in  the  opinions  of  statesmen  laboring 
under  the  despotic  influence  of  party  discipline — a  despotism  ever  operating 
upon  the  hopes  and  fears  of  all  who  tamely  submit  to  the  tyranny  of  such  a 
discipline — the  views  which  follow  are  respectfully  submitted.     The  8th  section 
of  the  1st  article  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  authorizes  Congress 
to  "  declare  war"  and  "to  raise  and  support  armies,"  and  "to  provide  for  call- 
ing forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laAvs  of  the  Union,  to  suppress  insurrections, 
and  repel  invasions;"  and  also  "to  provide  for  organizing,  arming,  and  dis- 
ciplining the  militia,  and  for  governing  such  part  of  them  as  may  be  employed 
in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  reserving  to  the  States,  respectively,  the 
appointment  of  the  officers,  and  the  authority  of  training  the  militia  according 
to  the  discipline  prescribed  by  Congress." 

Inasmuch  as  these  important  provisions  of  the  Constitution  cannot  be  carried 
into  effect  without  roads,  and  the  effective  defence  of  the  republic  is  a  work 
upon  which  our  national  existence  depends,  the  transcendent  importance  of  this 
work  calls  aloud  for  the  very  best  roads ;  and  railroads  being  immeasurably  the 
best  for  all  military  purposes,  they  are  deemed  to  be  as  fully  authorized  by  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  as  the  best  of  rifles,  or  the  best  of  cannon,  or 
gunpowder,  or  flints,  or  forts,  are  authorized,  as  will  be  seen  by  the  last  para- 
graph of  the  above-mentioned  8th  section  of  the  Constitution,  which,  after  par- 
ticularizing the  specific  powers  granted  to  Congress,  as  enumerated  in  that  sec- 
tion, concludes  with  the  words  which  follow:  "To  make  all  laws  which  shall 
be  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  into  execution  the  foregoing  powers, 
vested  by  this  Constitution  in  the  government  of  the  United  States,  or  in  any 
department  or  officer  thereof." 

A  wise  people,  with  the  experience  which  the  framers  of  the  federal  Consti- 
tution had  acquired  in  the  triumphant  revolutionary  conflicts  through  which 
they  had  then  recently  passed,  could  never  have  authorized  a  declaration  of 
war  "to  repel  invasion,"  without  making  provision  for  the  best  of  means  for 
insuring  a  successful  and  glorious  termination  of  the  war :  that  provision  was 
accordingly  made  in  the  above-recited  authority  given  to  Congress,  to  make  all 
laws  which  shall  be  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  into  execution  "  the  fore- 


252  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

going  powers,  vested  by  this  Constitution  in  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
or  in  any  department  or  officer  thereof."  By  this  comprehensive  grant  of  power 
the  national  legislature  has  passed  laws  for  supplying  the  land  and  naval 
forces  with  many  things  not  expressly  named  in  the  Constitution.  Hundreds 
of  military  roads  have  been  made  by  the  troops  and  otherwise  at  the  expense  of 
the  United  States ;  first,  for  the  purpose  of  facilitating  the  march  of  the  troops 
to  and  from  the  places  of  their  destination,  at  the  rate  of  twenty  to  twenty-six 
miles  a  day,  when,  without  such  roads,  they  could  not  have  marched  a  quarter 
of  the  distance  without  leaving  behind  them  their  cannon  and  baggage-train  ; 
and,  secondly,  for  the  use  of  the  constantly -moving  families  and  other  travellers 
to  the  continually-expanding  border  of  the  republic,  by  which  simple  process 
thirteen  new  States  and  near  thirteen  millions  of  inhabitants  have  been  added 
to  the  old  thirteen  States  of  the  revolution  in  the  last  sixty  years.  Who  ever 
pronounced  these  miserable  roads  to  be  unconstitutional  1  These  roads  seldom 
cost  more  than  at  the  rate  of  from  fifty  to  one  hundred  dollars  per  mile ;  and 
yet  these  poor  roads  contributed  more  to  the  immediate  benefit  of  the  commu- 
nity at  large,  during  a  period  of  peace,  than  any  of  our  fortifications,  which  cost 
from  one  to  two  millions  of  dollars  each.  Your  memorialist  is  unable  to  perceive 
upon  what  ground  a  military  road,  upon  which  our  troops  can  be  marched  three 
hundred  miles  in  one  day,  can  be  unconstitutional,  when  roads  upon  which  they 
could  march  but  twenty-six  miles  in  a  day  were  constitutional  and  proper, 
(more  especially  when  all  are  made  by  the  troops  themselves,)  notwithstanding 
the  great  difference  in  the  cost  of  the  two  kinds  of  military  roads  here  alluded 
to.  As  it  is  obvious  that  the  military  railroads  will  enable  our  young  warriors 
of  the  central  and  western  States  to  fly  at  the  rate  of  three  hundred  miles  in  a 
day  to  meet  the  invading  foe,  the  constitutionality  of  such  roads,  as  "  necessary 
and  proper  means  for  repelling  invasion,"  cannot  but  be  admitted  by  all  parties, 
convinced,  as  they  must  be,  that  we  are  destined  in  another  war  with  any 
European  nation  to  be  attacked  by  fleets  propelled  by  steam  power.  But  if,  as 
your  memorialist  respectfully  asserts,  our  seaports  cannot  be  defended  against 
an  attack  by  foreign  armies,  with  the  co-operation  of  fleets  propelled  by  steam 
power,  who  can  doubt  the  absolute  necessity  of  the  proposed  railroads  and 
floating  batteries  ?  If,  indeed,  then,  they  are  indispensable,  and  our  country 
cannot  be  defended  without  them,  they  are  strictly  constitutional,  as  the  most 
rigid  constructionist  will  admit.  To  make  use  of  our  common  bad  roads  for 
marching  our  volunteers  and  other  troops  from  the  central  and  western  States 
to  our  seaports  in  a  state  of  war,  or  to  continue  the  use  of  sails,  without  steam 
power,  to  meet  an  invading  foe  with  large  fleets  of  steamships  of  war,  would  be 
as  unavailing  and  as  unwise  as  it  would  be  to  attempt  to  extinguish  by  water 
carried  in  a  nutshell  the  flames  by  which  thousands  of  our  houses  are  doomed 
to  be  enveloped  in  the  course  of  a  war  when  destitute  of  the  proposed  means 
of  defence,  while  possessing  the  power  to  obtain  the  best  of  fire-engines. 

24.  The  apprehended  expense  of  the  proposed  work  constitutes  the  principal 
objection  advanced  by  any  statesman,  or  by  any  man  of  military  mind,  whose 
opinions  have  come  to  the  knowledge  of  your  memorialist.  To  this  objection  it 
may  be  answered : 

First.  That  the  apprehended  appropriations  to  meet  the  expense  will  be  no 
more  than  eleven  millions  of  dollars  a  year  for  a  period  of  six  years,  provided 
the  work  is  done  by  the  army  of  the  United  States,  as  heretofore  suggested. 

Second.  The  employment  of  the  army  upon  the  work  will  be  to  the  officers 
and  men,  and  to  the  youth' of  every  State  and  district  through  which  the  work  will 
extend,  the  best  of  all  possible  schools  to  prepare  them  for  the  defence  of  their 
country ;  as  the  officers  and  men  so  employed  will  have  the  proud  satisfaction 
of  knowing  that  eveiy  day's  labor  in  this  essential  work  of  preparation  will 
contribute  to  increase  their  moral  and  physical  capacities  for  usefulness  and 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  253 

domestic  happiness  in  peace,  and  for  a  glorious  triumph  over  the  invading  foe  in 
war. 

Third.  In  exhibiting  the  cost  of  this  system  of  defence,  it  is  gratifying  to 
find  that  of  the  $66,000,000,  which  is  the  estimated  amount  required  for  the 
seven  railroads  from  the  central  States  to  the  seaboard  and  northern  frontier, 
with  five  floating  batteries  for  th^  Mississippi  river  at  the  passes,  and  below 
New  Orleans,  and  five  others  for  the  defence  of  the  harbor  of  New  York,  more 
than  sixty-three  millions  of  that  sum  will  be  expended  for  materials  and  work 
which  the  interior  of  the  United  States  will  afford. 

Fourth.  The  most  costly  material  required  for  the  work  will  be  bar-iron  for 
the  railways,  and  sheeting  for  the  sides  and  tops  of  the  floating  batteries ;  of 
this  article,  not  less  than  500,000,000  pounds  will  be  needed.  This  quantity,  at 
four  cents,  will  amount  to  twenty  millions  of  dollars. 

Fifth.  For  supplying  the  whole  of  the  iron,  it  is  proposed  to  erect  at  conve- 
nient places  near  the  site  of  each  one  of  the  seven  great  railroads  a  foundery 
and  a  rolling  mill,  for  the  manufacture  of  the  iron  required,  upon  the  same 
principle  that  armories  are  established  by  the  United  States  for  supplying  the 
army  and  navy  and  the  militia  with  cannon  and  small  arms.  By  these  works 
ample  supplies  of  the  best  of  iron  may  be  obtained  in  season  to  complete  the 
railroads  and  floating  batteries  in  the  time  here  suggested. 

We  shall,  in  this  way,  lay  open  to  the  individual  enterprise  of  the  people  of 
the  United  States  rich  mines  of  wealth  hitherto  but  little  known ;  and  we  shall 
moreover  relieve  ourselves  of  the  reproach  to  which  we  have  for  many  years 
been  subjected — the  reproach  of  sending  to  Europe  and  expending  there  many 
millions  of  dollars  for  iron,  whilst  most  of  our  States  abound  with  inexhaustible 
supplies  of  this  valuable  metal  equal  to  any  in  Europe. 

25.  The  great  revolution  which  steam  power  has  produced  in  its  application 
to  everything  that  is  wafted  upon  the  sea  and  that  rolls  upon  the  land,  applica- 
ble to  the  attack  and  defence  of  seaports,  leaves  our  country  absolutely  desti- 
tute of 'the  means  of  defence  indispensably  necessary  to  the  protection  of  our  sea- 
ports against  any  nation  or  community  of  men,  or  pirates  capable  of  attacking 
us  with  a  respectable  fleet  of  steamships  of  war,  armed  with  the  improved  bat- 
tering  cannon   of  the  largest  calibre,   without   floating  batteries  of   sufficient 
strength  and  number  to  enable  us  to  lock  up  our  seaports  and  railroads  extend- 
ing from  the  central  arid  western  States  to  the  principal  seaports,  for  marching 
our  disposable  force  and  munitions  of  war  of  the  central  and  western  States,  at 
one-tenth  part  the  expense  and  one-tenth  part  of  the  time  that  their  movement 
on  our  present  bad  roads  would  cost. 

26.  The  floating  batteries  here  recommended  constitute  the  most  sure  and 
economical  means  for  the  immediate  defence  of  our  seaports  in  war;  and  when 
aided  by  the  proposed  railroads,  in  the  rapid  transportation  of  troops  and  muni- 
tions of  war  from  the  central  and  western  States  to  the  principal  seaports  of 
the  Atlantic,  southern,  and  northern  States,  aided  at  sea  by  steamships  of  war, 
we  shall  thus  render  our  means  of  defence  complete  and  impregnable  in  war. 
And  on  the  return  of  peace,  when  all  other  expensive  means  of  defence,  such  as 
fortifications,  armories,  and  fleets  propelled  by  wind  and  sails  are  useless,  then 
our  floating  batteries  and  railroads,  turned  to  commercial  purposes,  will  con- 
tribute to  deepen  our  ship  channels  and  to  the  improvement  of  our  seaports,  and 
afford  facilities  to  our  interior  commercial  intercourse,  which  it  is  believed  will 
replace  every  dollar  expended  in  carrying  into  effect  this  system  of  national  de- 
fence in  from  seven  to  ten  years. 

27.  The  floating  batteries  and  railroads,  embracing  the  system  of  national 
defence  here  recommended,  which  will  cost  not  more  than  eleven  millions  of  dol- 
lars a  year  for  six  years,  will,  it  is  confidently  believed,  by  the  simple  process 
of  its  construction,  contribute  more  to  qualify  the  army,  and  the  young  men  of  the 
United  States  employed  upon  the  proposed  floating  batteries  and  railroads,  for 


254  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

active  military  service  in  the  national  defence,  than  they  could  possibly  be 
qualified  by  the  expenditure  of  double  the  estimated  amount  of  the  work  paid 
for  giving  each  one  of  them  a  complete  military  education,  according  to  the 
system  pursued  at  the  Military  Academy  at  West  Point ;  as  in  that  system  the 
theory  of  the  art  of  war  alone  is  acquired,  and  much  of  that  mere  theory  is 
rendered  useless  by  the  revolution  which  steam  power  has  produced  in  all  that 
relates  to  the  movement  of  armies  and  fleets,  and  the  attack  and  defence  of  sea- 
ports; whilst  in  the  system  here  recommended,  the  young  student  upon  the 
floating  battery,  as  well  as  upon  the  railroad,  is  enabled,  from  the  first  moment 
he  takes  in  hand  his  book  to  study  the  theory,  at  once  to  combine  with  it 
the  practical  science  and  manual  labor  of  his  profession;  and  when,  at  the  end 
of  four  or  five  years,  he  graduates  and  obtains  his  discharge,  his  mind,  limbs, 
and  body  would  be  alike  improved  and  invigorated  by  his  having  learned  how 
to  make  and  how  to  wield,  and  having  actually  assisted  in  making  and  wield- 
ing floa.ing  batteries  and  vehicles  of  land  transportation  on  railroads,  with 
every  other  preparatory  means  for  rendering  them  formidable  in  war  and  profita- 
ble in  peace.  This  will  afford  him  the  happiness  of  knowing  that  he  has  ren- 
dered his  country  much  useful  public  service  for  the  public  instruction  which 
will  enable  him  ever  after  to  be  in  the  highest  degree  useful  to  his  country  and 
his  family,  in  war  and  in  peace. 

28.  With  the  floating  batteries  and  railroads  here  recommended,  we  can  fear- 
lessly and  truly  say  to  all  Europe,  and  to  all  the  world,  "  We  ask  of  you  nothing 
but  what  is  right,  and  we  will  submit  to  nothing  that  is  wrong;"  whilst,  with- 
out the  proposed  or  some  such  system  of  national  defence,  such  a  declaration 
might  be  considered  as  pure  gasconade ;  as,  without  floating  batteries  and  rail- 
roads to  lock  up  and  promptly  re-enforce  our  seaports  when  menaced  by  an  en- 
emy, it  would  be  in  the  power  of  any  one  or  two  of  the  great  nations  of  Europe 
(with  two  of  whom  we  have  boundary  questions  to  settle)  to  enter  any  one  or 
more  of  our  principal  seaports,  and  destroy  the  richest  of  our  cities  in  the  course 
of  any  day  or  night  in  the  year;  and  in   doing  so,  to  damage  our  commercial 
establishments  to  the  amount  of  more  money  and  property  than  would  thrice 
defray  all  the"  cost  of  the  proposed  system  of  defence. 

29.  The  opinion  has  been  expressed  that  these  railroads  will,  during  a  state 
of  peace,  produce  a  revenue  that  will  replace  the  money  to  be  expended  in 
their   construction  in  the  course  of  seven  years  after  their  completion.      But 
should  it  be  twenty,  or  even  forty  years,  betore  their  annual  revenue  is  found 
adequate  to  reimburse  the  money  expended  in  the  construction  of  the  work, 
this  delay  will  tend  to  do  no  wrong  or  injustice  to  our  immediate  or  remote  pos- 
terity.    They  cannot  fail  to  enjoy,  as  much  -we  can  enjoy,  the  benefit  of  our 
labor  for  our  and  their  protection  and  prosperity.     But  the  great  question  upon 
which  we  are  now  to  act  is,  not  whether  we  have.,  or  have  not  a  right  to  tax  our 
posterity  with  a  heavy  debt  for  a  work  that  will  certainly  be  of  great  value  to 
us,  and  which  is  destined  to  be,  in  all  human  probability,  still  more  valuable 
to  them;  but  the  true  question  is,  whether  it  is  not  our  imperative  duty  to  do 
whatever  is  obviously  necessary  and  proper  to  secure  to  ourselves,  and  also  to 
our  posterity,  the  means  of  preserving  to  each  and  all  so  deeply  interested 
the  blessings  of  that  liberty  and  independence  secured  to  us  by  our  fathers  of 
the  revolution,  in  the  achivement  of  which  a  great  national  debt  was  contracted 
for  us  to  pay — a  debt  which  we  have  most  gladly  and  gratefully  paid.     And 
have  we  not  good  reason  to  believe  that  our  immediate  posterity  will  as  grate- 
fully pay  any  such  debt  which  we  may  deem  prudent  to  contract,  to  provide 
for  their  use  and  protection,  as  well  as  our  own,  a  system  of  national  defence, 
without  which  our  and  their  liberty  and  independence  would  be  left  at  the  mercy 
of  whatever  nations  of  Europe  may  see  fit  to  hold  in  their  own  hands  "  the  do- 
minion of  the  sea?"     This  will  be  attempted,  without  doubt,  by  the  great  mar- 
itime nation  who  first  provides  for  herself  a  fleet  of  some  fifty  or  a  hundred 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  255 

steamsliips-of-war,  with  floating  batteries  and  railroads  for  securing  her  own  sea- 
ports and  her  interior.  This  is  a  measure,  however,  more  likely  to  be  under- 
taken by  some  future  combination  of  empires,  arrogating  to  themselves,  as  the 
enemies  of  France  did  in  the  years  1814-'15,  the  title  of  "  Holy  Alliance," 
than  by  any  one  nation. 

30.  Our  unnatural  mother,  England,  who  has  had  the  address  to  subsidize 
most  of  her  neighbors,  and  to  force  others  to  ^anction  her  pretension  to  the 
dominion  of  the  sea;  and  for  half  a  century  past  to  hold  in  her  own  hands,  amid 
professions  of  peace  and  good  will  towards  us,  near  a  third  part  of  our  greatest 
eastern  border  State,  and  to  hold  several  of  their  and  our  border  savage  nations 
ready  to  take  the  scalps  of  our  frontier  citizens ;  that  enlightened  nation,  who 
has  shed  more  blood  than  any  other,  if  not  more  than  all  other  nations,  to  secure 
to  herself  the  dominion  of  the  sea,  has,  it  is  believed,  at  this  moment,  among  us 
organized  bands  of  spies  and  pioneers,  assuming  to  themselves  the  plausible 
character  and  vocation  of  "advocates  of  human  freedom,"  more  familiarly  called 
"abolitionists."  That  this  same  England  will,  in  due  season,  avail  herself  of 
her  newborn  abolitionism  to  secure  to  herself  some  favorite  scheme  of  a  foothold 
near  us,  to  the  northeast  or  south  of  us,  or  to  pay  us  for  our  having  twice 
beaten  her,  and  more  especially  having,  with  our  little  giant  navy,  taken  from 
her  the  glory  of  her  long  contested  dominion  of  the  sea,  we  can  have  no  doubt. 
Without  railroads  and  floating  batteries,  such  as  are  here  reccommended,  with 
steamships-of-war,  England's  banner  of  abolitionism  may  ere  long  be  planted 
in  Louisiana,  and  in  every  other  border  State  upon  our  seaboard,  from  Sabine 
bay  to  Eastport,  Maine.  Thus  may  we  soon  behold  England  openly  attempting 
by  force  to  accomplish  what  her  spies  and  pioneers  have  long  been  secretly  em- 
ployed in  preparing  and  hastening,  a  tragedy  of  blood  and  desolation,  the 
elements  of  which  were  principally  provided  and  brought  hither  from  Africa, 
within  the  last  two  centuries,  by  the  outrages  and  avarice  of  this  same 
England,  in  her  efforts  to  monopolize  the  freedom  of  the  seas.  The  incendiary 
fires  have  already  been  lighted  up  at  Charleston,  South  Carolina,  and  Mobile, 
Alabama,  and  perhaps  some  other  cities  of  our  southern  and  eastern  border  can 
testify.  The  system  of  national  defence  here  recommended  will  enable  us 
effectually  to  guard  against  the  apprehended  catastrophe,  It  will  do  more.  It 
will,  when  the  proper  time  arrives,  enable  us  effectually  to  fulfil  the  apparent 
destiny  by  which  an  overruling  Providence  has  decreed  that  the  African 
savages  should,  by  the  simple  though  often  abused  process  of  the  slave  trade, 
with  a  long  continued  pilgrimage  of  slavery  which  they  are  undergoing,  (a  sla- 
very marked  as  it  has  been  here,  ever  since  the  reign  of  England  ceased  among 
us,  with  a  high  degree  of  humanity  and  benevolence,)  when  the  proper  time 
arrives,  namely,  whenever,  in  the  next  century,  our  own  caste  and  color  shall 
have  increased  so  as  to  amount  to  two  hundred  millions  of  free  white  inhabitants, 
then  it  is  beleived  that  our  statesmen  will  see  clearly  the  propriety  of  preserving 
every  acre  of  the  national  domain  for  the  support  of  our  own  caste  and  color; 
then  shall  we  plainly  see,  and  cheerfully  do  what  we  can  to  fulfil,  that  apparent 
destiny — a  destiny  by  which  the  supposed  evils  of  the  slave  trade,  and  of  the 
slavery  of  the  Africans  in  America,  shall  eventually  contribute  to  cover  that  be- 
nighted quarter  of  the  globe  with  all  the  blessings  of  civilization  and  freedom. 
A  consummation  not  more  devoutly  to  be  wished,  than  it  is  certainly  to  be  ac- 
complished within  the  coming  century ;  unless,  indeed,  the  great  work  is  delayed 
by  the  lawless  interference  of  the  blind  votaries  of  abolitionism,  or  by  the  appre- 
hended incapacity  of  the  African  blacks  for  self-government.  Be  this  as  it  may, 
our  own  United  States  republic  of  the  coming  century  will,  in  all  human  proba- 
bility before  the  middle  of  that  century — say  80  or  90  years  hence — have  it  in 
their  power  to  make,  for  the  first  time  since  our  political  existence,  a  fair  experi- 
ment towards  the  solution  of  the  long  contested  problem,  involving  the  question  of 
the  utility  of  Africans  when  left  alone  as  members  of  a  free  civilized  community — 


256  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

the  question  upon  which  their  possible  capacity  for  self-government  necessarily 
depends ;  for  we  shall  then  be  able  to  spare  from  our  two  hundred  millions  of 
free  white  population  a  fleet  of  steam  ship  s-of- war,  with  an  army  of  missionaries 
and  United  States  volunteers,  for  the  instruction  and  protection  of  the  numerous 
savages  of  Africa :  the  terms  protection  and  instruction  are  here  employed  in 
connexion  with  each  other,  because  these  two  great  engines  of  civilization  have 
always  gone  side  by  side,  wherever  the  work  of  civilization  has  succeeded  best. 
That  complete  instruction  necessary  to  all  the  purposes  of  civilization  and  self- 
government,  as  we  understand  it,  never  was,  nor  ever  can  be  perfected  without 
military  protection. 

This  navy  and  army  of  protection  and  instruction  may  be  accompanied  and 
followed  by  such  detailed  corps  of  the  instructed  blacks  of  our  country  as  may 
be  qualified  to  assist  in  the  great  work :  these  detailed  corps  to  continue,  with  the 
consent  of  their  owners,  until  every  black  in  America  shall  find  a  comfortable 
and  a  safe  home  in  the  land  of  his  fathers.  Any  other  system  of  abolition  would 
inevitably  delay  though  it  might  not  defeat  the  accomplishment  of  the  great 
work  of  giving  civilization  and  self-government  to  Africa,  and  of  giving  to  the 
United  States  republic  the  glory  of  the  achievement — of  giving  civilization  and 
self-government  to  two  quarters  of  the  globe;  first  to  America,  and  next  to  Africa. 
To  secure  to  ourselves  the  happiness,  the  imperishable  glory,  of  giving  to  America 
and  Africa  all  the  blessings  of  civilization  and  self-government,  we  have  only  to 
do  that  which  we  are  now  admonished  by  every  dictate  of  the  first  law  of  nature 
to  do  quickly  for  our  own  preservation — that  which  we  possess  more  ample 
means  of  accomplishing  before  the  year  1864,  than  the  patriotic  people  of  New 
York  posessed  to  enable  them  to  complete  their  magnificent  canal  before  the 
year  1826 — namely,  to  locate  and  construct  the  proposed  railroads  and  floating 
batteries ;  as  by  the  simple  operation  of  the  execution  of  this  work,  we  shall 
insure  the  instruction  of  all  the  young  men  of  our  country  that  may  be  necessary 
or  desirable  as  engineers  or  scientific  mechanics  to  teach  millions  of  the  youth  of 
South  America  and  Africa  the  art  of  covering  their  country,  as  we  shall  have 
covered  our  country,  with  these  essential  means  of  national  defence  and  national 
wealth.  The  missionary,  whose  sacred  duty  it  is  to  extend  to  every  people  the 
blessings  of  the  Christian  religion,  may  with  perfect  propriety  himself  learn  to 
be  a  scientific  mechanic  and  a  practical  engineer.  He  may  thus  add  the  attracive 
power  of  practice  to  theory  ;  and  to  the  sublime  precepts  of  Holy  Writ,  and  in 
teaching  men  how  to  live  and  how  to  die,  teach  them  also  how  to  preserve  unio 
their  country  the  things  that  belong  to  their  country ;  and  how  to  defend  and 
2Jrotcct  the  helpless  women  and  little  ones  conjided  to  their  care,  in  obedience 
to  the  solemn  mandate  which  should  apply  alike  to  each  social  and  political 
union  most  dear  to  us,  namely  :  "  Those  ^v7tom  God  hath  joined  together,  let  no 
man  put  asunder"  Such  will  be — and  must  be — a  portion  of  the  glorious 
results  of  our  carrying  into  effect  the  proposed  system  of  national  defence.  But 
if  we  negelct  it  until  the  crowned  heads  of  Europe  shall  have  leisure  to  prepare 
another  holy  alliance,  with  fifty  to  one  hundred  first-rate  ships-of- war 'adapted 
to  the  action  of  steam  power,  we  may,  possibly  in  the  next  ten  years,  see  our 
foreign  commerce  under  the  control  of  that  holy  alliance ;  and  if  we  resist — and 
who  will  have  the  hardihood  to  say  we  will  not  resist  ? — we  may  be  told  by  the 
vain  diplomatists  of  that  imperial  combinatoin  of  pirates — "  Yankees !  the  holy 
alliance  is  graciously  pleased  to  permit  you,  with  your  wives  and  children,  to 
seek  an  asylum  beyond  the  Rocky  mountains."  Otherwise  we  must  submit  to 
the  degredation  of  seeing  all  our  seaports  in  the  possession  of  the  invading  foe; 
or,  of  seeing  our  commercial  cities  battered  down,  without  the  possibility  of  our 
bringing  to  their  succor  sufficient  force  in  time  for  their  protection. 

31.  To  obviate  any  such  calamity  as  the  foregoing  views  suggest  as  possible, 
your  memorialist  prays  Congress  to  provide  for  the  construction  of  the  proposed 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  257 

works.  Or,  should  some  previous  experiment  be  desirable,  lie  prays  that  he 
may  be  authorized  by  law  to  select  and  employ,  under  the  authority  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  such  engineers  and  other  officers,  scientific  mechanics, 
artificers,  ship-carpenters,  and  laborers,  as  may  be  necessary  to  enable  him  forth- 
with to  locate  and  construct,  upon  the  principles  and  in  the  manner  here  stated, 
one  of  the  proposed  principal  railroads — say  that  from  Lexington,  Kentucky, 
to  Nashville,  and  thence  to  New  Orleans  ;  or  the  one  from  Louisville,  Kentucky, 
via  Nashville,  to  Mobile ;  or  that  from  Memphis,  Tennessee,  to  meet  the  one 
already  completed  from  Charleston,  South  Carolina,  and  Augusta,  Georgia,  to 
Tennessee  river.  And  also  to  construct  three  of  the  proposed  floating  batteries, 
viz  :  two  for  the  harbor  of  New  Orleans,  and  one  for  the  harbor  of  Mobile ;  to  be 
constructed  under  his  direction,  in  accordance  with  the  project  here  recommended, 
and  under  the  immediate  superintendence  of  such  officers  as  he  may  select.  And 
when  the  floating  batteries  and  railroads  here  recommended  are  completed,  armed, 
equipped,  and  manned,  the  said  floating  batteries  and  railroads  to  be  subjected  to 
a  scrupulous  inspection  by  such  committee  of  Congress,  and  by  such  other  public 
functionaries  as  may  be  authorized  by  Congress,  or  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States :  provided  that  no  military  or  naval  officer  be  selected  for  any 
such  inspection,  but  suck  as  shall  have  been  in  battle  and  witnessed  the  effect  of 
the  enemy's  cannon  shot  upon  our  works  of  defence ;  to  the  end  that  by  such 
inspection  the  precise  character,  value,  and  utility  of  these  works  of  internal 
improvement  as  means  of  national  defence  and  national  wealth,  taken  in  connex- 
ion with  each  other,  may  be  f ally  ascertained  and  certified.  Under  such  author- 
ity, with  two  regiments  such  as  the  foregoing  organization  contemplates,  sustained 
by  an  appropriation  of  three  millions  of  dollars  a  year,  for  three  years,  your  me- 
morialist pledges  himself  to  complete  in  this  period  of  time  the  proposed  railroad 
and  three  floating  batteries  ;  which  will  serve  as  an  experiment  upon  which  the 
residue  of  the  works  here  recommended  may  be  safely  undertaken. 

32.  Your  memorialist  having,  at  different  times  during  the  last  seventeen 
years,  submitted  to  the  proper  authorities  of  the  War  Department  most  of  his 
views  contained  in  the  foregoing  30  sections,  as  will  more  fully  appear  from  his 
official  reports,  (which  he  prays  may  be  called  for  and  taken  as  a  part  of  this 
memorial,)  he  has  thus  repeatedly  appealed  to  the  War  Department,  but  he 
deeply  regrets  to  say  that  his  appeals  have  been  wholly  unavailing.  He  now 
respectfully  calls  on  every  member  of  the  national  legislature  who  loves  his 
country  and  her  institutions  to  sustain  his  efforts  in  preparing  for  her  a  system 
of  defence  worthy  of  their  fathers  of  the  revolution,  worthy  of  the  Union,  and 
of  the  Constitution  which  we  all  stand  pledged  to  support.  Your  memorialist 
did  not  enter  the  service  of  his  country  for  the  mere  selfish  enjoyment  of  the 
pomp  and  ephemeral  honors  of  the  field,  of  battle,  (though  he  would  not  shrink 
from  a  comparison  of  his  services  in  battle  with  those  of  any  other  United 
States  commander  now  living;)  his  anticipated  glory  and  great  object  have  been 
to  employ  her  means  of  defence,  ample  as  they  must  ever  be,  so  effectually  as 
to  convince  her  neighbors  that  honesty  is  the  best  policy,  and  that  defeat  must 
attend  their  every  act  of  invasion;  and  thus  to  direct  the  dements  of  war  to  the 
attainment  of  "peace  on  earth  and  good  will  towards  men."  With  these  im- 
pressions he  deems  it  to  be  an  act  of  common  justice  to  himself,  his  wife,  chil- 
dren, and  friends,  that  he  should  solicit  the  only  relief  to  which  a  United  States 
general  officer,  honored  as  he  has  long  been  with  one  of  the  highest  commands 
in  the  army,  and  whose  best  efforts  are  ever  due  to  his  country's  service,  can 
with  propriety  claim.  He  claims  to  be  the  author  and  inventor  of  the  system 
of  national  defence  herein  set  forth  and  explained;  he  therefore  prays  Congress 
to  confirm  his  claim  by  such  act  or  joint  resolution  as  in  their  wisdom  shall 
seem  just  and  right.  And  your  memorialist,  as  in  duty  bound,  will  ever  pray. 

EDMUND  P.  GAINES. 

NASHVILLE,  December  31,  1839. 
H.  Rep.  Com.  86 17 


258  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


BUREAU  OF  TOPOGRAPHICAL  ENGINEERS, 

Washington,  April  24,  1840. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  letter  of  the  17th 
instant,  referring  to  this  bureau  a  memorial  of  Major  General  Gaines,  proposing 
a  system  of  national  defence,  of  which  he  enumerates,  as  an  essential  part,  an 
extensive  series  of  railroads.  Upon  these  last,  your  directions  are  that  I  should 
submit  an  estimate  of  the  probable  cost. 

The  various  routes  enumerated  by  the  general  will  be  found  in  the  10th 
page  of  his  memorial.     According  to  his  computation,  they  would  embrace 
about  4,200  miles;  are  to  be  laid  in  double  track;  and  would  cost,  on  an 
average,  $15,000  the  mile. 
The  routes  are — 

1st.  One  principal  railroad  from  Lexington,  Kentucky,  to  Buffalo  or  Platts- 
burg,  New  York,  with  branches  to  Detroit,  Albany,  and  Boston. 

2d.  One  principal  railroad  from  Knoxville,  Tennessee,  to  Norfolk,  Virginia, 
or  Baltimore  Maryland,  with  branches  to  Richmond,  Virginia,  and  Newbern, 
North  Carolina. 

3d.  One  principal  railroad  from  Memphis,  Tennessee,  to  Charleston,  South 
Carolina,  or  Savannah,  Georgia,  with  branches  to  Milledgeville,  Georgia,  and 
East  Florida. 

4th.  One  principal  railroad  from  Louisville,  Kentucky,  to  Mobile,  Alabama, 
with  a  branch  to  Pensacola,  Florida. 

5th.  One  principal  railroad  from  Lexington,  Kentucky,  via  Nashville,  to 
New  Orleans. 

6th.  One  principal  railroad  from  Memphis,  Tennessee,  to  the  Sabine  ridge, 
with  branches  to  Fort  Towson  and  Fort  Gibson,  Arkansas. 

7th.  One  principal  railroad  from  Louisville,  Kentucky,  or  Albany,  Indiana, 
to  St.  Louis,  Missouri ;  and  thence  to  the  Missouri  river,  north  of  the  mouth  of 
the  Big  Platte,  with  branches  from  Albany,  Indiana,  to  Chicago,  and  from  the 
northwest  angle  of  the  State  of  Missouri  to  the  upper  crossing  of  the  river 
Des  Moines. 

As  the  general  has  given  no  precise  indication  of  the  courses  which  these 
routes  would  pursue,  or  of  that  of  their  branches,  I  find  it  difficult  to  determine 
the  method  by  which  he  has  ascertained  the  whole  distance.  But,  taking  Tan- 
ner's map  of  the  United  States  as  a  basis,  drawing  straight  lines  from  po^nt  to 
point,  without  reference  to  the  physical  peculiarities  of  the  country,  and  involv- 
ing but  once  in  the  consideration  those  parts  which  may  be  common  to  more 
than  one  principal  route  or  branch,  I  make  the  distance  of  the  whole  system 
equal  to  5,260  miles. 

This  is  a  distance  of  air  lines,  and  of  course  is  much  less  than  what  would 
be  the  actual  distance  of  the  roads.  Their  windings  and  sinuosities  would 
much  increase  that  length,  to  an  extent  which  I  think  may,  with  propriety,  be 
assumed  as  equal  to  20  per  cent,  and  which  would  make  the  entire  length  of 
roads  and  branches  equal  to  6,310  miles. 

Until  surveys  are  made  and  the  roads  located,  it  is  impossible  to  make  an 
accurate  estimate  of  the  cost.  But,  in  the  absence  of  these,  by  reasoning  from 
probabilities  and  from  experience  in  cases  somewhat  similar,  one  may  arrive  at 
a  result  which  may  be  considered  as  a  probable  minimum.  The  general  reasons 
upon  the  supposition  of  a  double  track  throughout ;  but  I  doubt  if  this  be 
necessary.  A  single  track,  with  suitable  turnouts,  and  double  lines  of  some 
extent  in  particular  localities,  will  probably  be  found  adequate  to  all  the  objects 
of  the  roads.  As  the  roads  are  intended  for  great  speed  as  well  as  great 
weights,  and  are  to  be  national  roads,  they  must  be  made  of  great  strength  as 
well  as  of  durable  materials ;  and  as  they  will  cross  the  country  in  so  many 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  259 

directions,  they  will  no  doubt  encounter  all  the  causes  of  great  expenses  in  such 
structures — rock  excavation,  deep-cuts,  tunnels,  heavy  embankments,  extensive 
bridges,  &c. 

Under  these  considerations,  and  after  having,  in  addition  to  my  own  inves- 
tigations and  observations,  consulted  some  of  the  most  experienced  and  most 
eminent  railroad  engineers  of  our  country,  I  find  myself  obliged  to  differ 
with  the  general  in  reference  to  probable  cost.  He  states  the  average,  on  the 
supposition  of  a  double  track,  at  $15,000  per  mile.  I  cannot,  consistently  with 
my  own  views,  state  it  at  less  than  $20,000  the  mile,  for  a  single  track  and  its 
requisite  accessories ;  and  this  amount  I  desire  also  to  be  understood  as  my 
opinion  of  a  probable  minimum. 

Six  thousand  three  hundred  and  ten  miles,  at  $20,000  the  mile,  will  amount 
to  $126,200,000. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  many  advantages  may  be  taken  of  the  railroads 
already  made  and  being  made  by  States  and  incorporated  companies,  in  adopting 
them  as  parts  of  the  major  general's  system,  but  one  cannot  say  to  what  extent, 
until  the  same  shall  be  shown  by  the  surveys.  If  we  suppose  it,  however,  to 
be  equal  to  1,000  miles,  it  will  reduce  the  cost  before  stated  to  $106,200,000. 

The  objects  of  these  various  roads  being  to  transport  masses  of  troops  and 
munitions  of  war  with  great  speed  and  to  great  distances,  means  of  transporting 
will  have  to  be  provided,  and  will  also  have  to  be  under  the  exclusive  control  of 
the  government,  which  last  condition  makes  it  necessary  that  these  means  should 
be  owned  by  the  government ;  they  become,  then,  an  essential  part  of  govern- 
ment expense  belonging  to  the  system. 

These  means  are  locomotives  and  cars.  A  car  that  would  properly  accom- 
modate 50  men,  with  their  arms  and  necessary  baggage,  would  probably  not  cost 
less  then  $500.  To  transport  10,000  men,  then,  would  require  200  cars.  We 
will  now  suppose  that  to  move  these  cars  with  the  anticipated  speed  will  require 
one  locomotive  to  each  train  of  ten  cars ;  there  must,  then,  be  twenty  locomo- 
tives, which,  with  the  requisite  tender  to  each,  will  not  cost  less  than  $8,000 
apiece.  It  will,  therefore,  be  necessary  for  the  transportation  of  10,000  men  to 
have  20  locomotives  and  tenders  and  200  cars.  This  may  be  considered  as  an 
equipment  for  one  of  the  principal  lines  ;  but  as  there  are  seven  principal  line? , 
and  as  each  should  be  supplied  with  an  equipment  adequate  to  the  transporta- 
tion of  10,000  men,  there  will  have  to  be,  for  the  whole  system  of  roads,  not  less 
than  140  locomotives  and  tenders  and  1,400  cars.  Applying  to  these  the  prices 
which  we  have  stated,  it  will  make  the  cost  of  the  means  of  transportation  equal 

to $1,820,000 

To  which  add  the  cost  of  the  roads..  106,200,000 


And  the  whole  will  be 108,  020,  000 


I  have,  in  the  foregoing,  supposed  the  plan  to  be  practicable — that  is,  that 
railroads  may  be  made  in  the  several  directions  as  required  by  the  system ;  but 
it  is  proper  to  add  that  this  is  a  point  which  cannot  be  determined  except  by 
accurate  surveys. 

Very  respectfully,  sir,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  J.  ABERT, 

Colonel    Topographical  Engineers. 
Hon.  J.  R.  POINSETT, 

Secretary  of   War. 


260  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


NAVY  COMMISSIONERS'  OFFICE,  April  25,  1840. 

SIR  :  The  board  of  navy  commissioners  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the 
receipt  of  the  letter  from  the  honorable  Secretary  of  War  to  you,  of  the  16th 
instant,  requesting  your  reference  to  them  of  the  memorial  of  General  E.  P. 
Gaines  to  Congress,  submitting  a  system  of  national  defence,  "for  a  report  as  to 
the  practicability,  expediency,  and  expense  of  the  plan,  so  far  as  relates  to  float- 
ing batteries  and  other  naval  defences;"  and,  in  compliance  with  your  indorse- 
ment, respectfully  state : 

That  in  relation  to  the  "expense,"  the  board  called  upon  the  chief  naval  con- 
structor for  the  probable  cost  of  one  of  the  floating  batteries  and  a  tow-boat,  as  de- 
scribed in  the  memorial,  a  copy  of  whose  report  is  herewith  enclosed.  These 
estimates  form  the  best  data  which  the  commissioners  can  furnish  for  ascertain- 
ing the  aggregate  expense  which  might  be  necessary  to  carry  into  effect  the 
recommendations  of  General  Gaines.  No  definite  number  is  specified  in  the 
memorial,  nor  any  other  information  given  by  which  that  number  can  be  ascer- 
tained with  any  probable  certainty ;  and  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  supply 
the  want  of  this  information  by  conjecture. 

There  appears  to  be  no  cause  for  doubting  that  the  approaches  of  an  enemy 
by  water  to  any  of  our  cities  and  seaports  might  be  prevented  by  the  employ- 
ment of  a  sufficient  number  of  floating  batteries  and  tow-boats,  prepared,  armed, 
and  manned,  as  are  proposed  by  General  Gaines ;  and,  consequently,  that  the 
plan  is  "practicable,"  provided  the  expense  can  be  met, and  a  sufficient  number 
of  men  be  obtained. 

In  considering  the  "expediency"  of  adopting  the  floating  batteries  which  are 
proposed  in  the  memorial,  it  is  necessary  to  estimate  their  comparative  efficiency 
with  other  means  which  may  be  provided,  manned,  and  supported  with  an  equal 
expenditure  of  money  and  an  equal  number  of  troops  or  other  persons. 

The  board  of  navy  commissioners,  when  presenting  their  views  upon  the 
general  defences  of  the  country  upon  former  occasions,  have  expressed  the 
opinion  that,  upon  a  subject  so  important  and  evidently  requiring  the  best  com- 
binations of  military  and  naval  force,  it  was  very  desirable,  if  not  indispensable, 
that  it  should  be  considered  and  reported  upon  by  a  board  which  should  com- 
prise officers  of  both  branches  of  the  service.  This  belief  has  not  been  changed 
by  any  subsequent  information  or  reflection  upon  the  subject,  and  consequently 
they  can  only  offer  opinions  upon  the  relative  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
the  floating  batteries  and  fixed  fortifications,  which  are  based  upon  facts  that 
appear  to  be  too  well  established,  or  so  obvious  as  not  to  be  questioned. 

The  system  presented  in  the  memorial  is  intended  "to  provide  for  the  defence 
of  our  seaports,"  and  "to  enable  us  to  repel,  by  the  agency  of  steam  power, 
every  invasion  suddenly  forced  upon  us  by  fleets  propelled  by  steam  power." 
To  effect  this  object,  the  memorialist  proposes  floating  batteries  and  attendant 
tow-boats,  which  he  has  described  in  very  general  terms,  and  considers  them 
preferable  to  fortifications  with  cannon  placed  on  the  banks  of  rivers  or  inlets ; 
because  with  such  fortifications  only  it  would  be  utterly  impracticable  to  lock 
up  a  navigable  river  or  inlet,  or  to  arrest  the  movement  of  a  fleet  thereon.  He 
also  prefers  the  floating  batteries  to  steamships-of-war,  unless  such  ships  should 
be  prohibited  from  leaving  the  vicinity  of  the  ports  or  harbors  to  which  they 
may  be  assigned,  From  these  general  views  it  appears  to  be  the  intention  of 
the  memorialist  that  each  and  every  port  or  harbor  shall  have  at  all  times  all 
the  means  for  defence  against  a  naval  force  which  may  be  necessary  to  resist 
attacks  until  re-enforcements  can  be  obtained  from  the  interior;  and  that  no  re- 
liance, is  to  be  placed  upon  the  concentration  of  these  separate  floating  defences 
fiom  contiguous  ports  for  temporary  purposes. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  such  a  perfect  system  of  defence  would  be  very 
desirable,  if  it  could  be  obtained  with  a  proper  regard  to  its  cost  and  its  de- 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  261 

mands  upon  the  population  of  the  country.  But  if  the  probable  expense  of  the 
construction  and  maintenance  of  the  floating  batteries  and  tow-boats  which 
would  be  required,  and  the  number  of  persons  necessary  for  their  advantageous 
use,  are  considered  and  compared  with  the  resources  of  the  country,  reasonable 
doubts  n%ay  be  entertained  whether  an  attempt  to  obtain  complete  security  in 
this  manner  would  be  expedient. 

That  floating  batteries  of  some  kind  will  be  necessary  as  component  parts  of 
the  defences  for  several  of  our  harbors  is  generally  admitted,  and  it  is  believed 
formed  a  part  of  the  plan  of  defence  as  proposed  by  the  board  which  had  that 
subject  under  examination  shortly  after  the  close  of  the  last  war  for  those  pas- 
sages to  important  points  which  could  not  be  well  and  thoroughly  commanded 
by  the  fortifications  on  the  land. 

One  of  the  strongest  objections  which  is  usually  made  to  fixed  fortifications 
is,  that  there  must  of  necessity  await  an  attack,  and  leave  the  choice  of  time  and 
circumstances  to  an  enemy.  The  greatest  advantage  of  a  floating  force  over 
fixed  fortifications  consists  in  the  greater  power  which  they  possess  of  choice  of 
position,  with  facility  and  promptitude  to  meet  in  the  best  manner  any  form  of 
attack  with  which  any  point  may  be  threatened.  All  varieties  of  floating  force 
are  liable  to  greater  danger  from  shells  and  hot  shot,  and  require  much  larger 
amounts,  in  proportion  to  their  original  cost,  to  keep  them  in  repair  than  fixed 
fortifications. 

In  considering  the  defence  of  a  coast  so  extensive  as  that  of  the  United  States, 
and  upon  which  there  are  so  many  positions  which  are  important  either  for  their 
commercial,  military,  or  political  relations,  the  board  of  navy  commissioners, 
when  they  refer  to  the  probable  nature  and  force  of  the  attacks  which  may  be 
expected  from  a  naval  enemy,  and  the  physical,  fiscal,  and  personal  resources 
of  the  country  to  meet  them,  are  led  to  the  conclusion  that  many  points  must 
be  left  more  or  less  exposed  for  many  years  ;  and  that,  while  permanent  arrange- 
ments are  made  for  giving  security  to  others  in  proportion  to  their  importance, 
the  best  policy  for  the  whole  country  will  be  to  extend  those  movable  defences 
which  can  advantageously  meet  an  enemy  at  the  greatest  distance  from  his 
meditated  points  of  attack,  or  be  soonest  concentrated  to  retard  his  progress,  or 
to  repel  him  from  our  shores. 

This  force,  if  composed  of  steam  and  ordinary  ships-of-war,  employed  sepa- 
rately, or  in  combination,  as  circumstances  may  require,  might,  it  is  believed,  be 
used  (except  at  some  few  points)  with  at  least  equal  advantage  as  the  floating 
batteries  which  are  proposed  in  the  memorial,  and  would  possess  the  further 
advantage  of  being  able  to  meet  and  annoy  an  enemy  in  his  progress,  to  con- 
centrate where  it  should  be  most  required,  to  retire,  if  necessary,  before  a  supe- 
rior force,  and  be  held  ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  accidents  to  the  enemy, 
or  of  any  mistakes  which  he  might  commit.  Its  pOAvers  would  be  active — 
aggressive  if  necessary,  whilst  that  of  the  batteries  proposed  must  necessarily 
be  almost  wholly  passive  and  strictly  defensive. 

Without  entering  more  particularly  into  the  general  subject  of  national  de- 
fence, after  a  careful  consideration  of  the  employment  of  such  floating  batteries  x 
as  are  proposed  in  the  memorial,  the  board  are  of  opinion  that,  although  a  few 
such  or  similar  batteries  might  perhaps  be  useful  in  particular  places,  it  would 
not  be  expedient  to  adopt  them  generally  as  substitutes  for  fixed  fortifications, 
or  for  a  floating  force  which  should  be  adapted  to  more  extensive  use  and  capa- 
ble of  quicker  and  more  rapid  combinations. 

The  papers  are  herewith  respectfully  returned. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  with  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

0.  MORELS, 
For  the  Board  of  Navy  Commissioners 

Hon.  JAMES  K.  PAULDING, 

Secretary  of  the  Navy. 


262  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 


WASHINGTON,  April  22,  1840. 

SIR  :  I  have  read  the  memorial  presented  by  Major  General  Gaines  to  Con- 
gress on  the  defence  of  the  coast.  A  part  of  the  system  proposed  by  the 
general  is  the  construction  of  heavy  floating  batteries,  the  probable  cosfrof  which 
with  their  tow-boats,  you  require  me  to  state.  It  is  difficult  to  form  an  opinion 
on  the  cost  of  vessels  of  such  unusual  dimensions  as  those  proposed  by  General 
Gaines ;  and,  in  addition  to  this  difficulty,  there  are  no  data  given  on  which  to 
ground  an  estimate,  excepting  length  and  breadth,  but  it  is  believed  that  the 
largest,  battery  with  her  tow-boats,  will  cost  about  $1,400,000,  and  the  smallest 
about  $700,000.  This  estimate  includes  copper-fastening  and  coppering,  cables, 
anchors,  boats,  and  water-casks,  but  does  not  embrace  masts,  spars,  sails,  arma- 
ment, nor  stores  of  any  description. 
I  am,  sir,  respectfully,  &c., 

SAMUEL  HUMPHREYS. 

Com.  CHARLES  MORRIS, 

President  of  the  Navy  Board. 


No.  5. 

[SENATE,  Ex.  Doc.   No.   85,  28iH  CONGRESS,  2o  SESSION.] 

MESSAGE  FROM  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  COMMUNICATING 
(IN  COMPLIANCE  WITH  A  RESOLUTION  OF  THE  SENATE)  A  COPY  OF  THE 
REPORT  ON  NATIONAL  DEFENCE,  MADE  TO  THE  ENGINEER  DEPARTMENT, 
BY  LIEUTENANT  HALLECK,  OF  THE  CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS. 

To  the  Senate  of  the  United  States: 

I  transmit  herewith  the  report  requested  by  the  resolution  of  the  Senate  of 
the  2d  of  January  last. 

JOHN  TYLER. 
WASHINGTON,  February  7,  1845. 


WAR  DEPARTMENT,  February  6,  1845. 

SIR:  In  answer  to  a  resolution  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  of  the  2d 
ultimo,  requesting  the  President  to  communicate  to  the  Senate  "a  cop'y  of  the 
report  made  to  the  engineer  department  on  military  defences  of  the  country,  by 
Lieutenant  Halleck,  of  the  corps  of  engineers,"  I  respectfully  lay  before  you  a 
letter  of  the  chief  engineer,  with  a  copy  of  the  report  referred  to  in  the  resolution. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

WILLIAM  WILKINS, 

Secretary  of  War. 
The  PRESIDENT  of  the  United  States. 


FOETIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  263 


ENGINEER  DEPARTMENT, 

Washington,  February  6,  1845. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor,  in  compliance  with  the  call  of  the  Senate  of  the  2d 
ultimo,  to  transmit  herewith  a  copy  of  the  report  on  national  defence,  made  to 
this  department  by  Lieutenant  H.  Wager  Halleck,  of  the  corps  of  engineers. 
Very  respectfully,  your  most  obedient, 

JOSEPH  G.  TOTTEN, 

Colonel  and  Chief  Engineer. 
Hon.  WILLIAM  WILKINS, 

Secretary  of  War. 


NEW  YORK  HARBOR,  October  20,  1843. 

SIR:  Agreeably  to  your  request,  I  transmit  herewith  a  copy  of  remarks, 
submitted  by  me  some  months  since,  to  an  officer  of  high  rank  in  another  de- 
partment of  the  army,  on  "the  means  of  national  defence."  These  remarks  are 
based  upon  the  following  congressional  documents : 

I.  Letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  (Mr.  Poinsett,)  transmitting  a  report  on 
national  defence,  &c.,  May  12,  1840. — (House  Document  206,  26th  Congress, 
2d  session.) 

II.  Report  on  the  survey  of  the  coast,  from  Apalachicola  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Mississippi,  December  17,  1841. — (House  Document  220,  27th  Congress,  2d 
session.) 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

H.  WAGER  HALLECK, 

Lieutenant  of  Engineers. 
Colonel  J.  G.  TOTTEN, 

Chief  Engineer  j  Washington,  D.  C. 


REPORT  ON  THE   MEANS  OF   NATIONAL  DEFENCE. 

General  Washington,  in  his  annual  address  at  the  opening  of  Congress  in 
1796,  dwelt  on  the  vast  importance  of  maintaining  the  country  in  an  attitude  of 
defence,  as  the  most  effectual  means  of  averting  the  calamities  of  war,  adding 
"  that  if  we  desire  to  secure  peace — one  of  the  most  powerful  instruments  of  our 
rising  prosperity — it  must  be  known  that  we  are  AT  ALL  TIMES  ready  for  war." 
This  precept  is  too  valuable  to  be  forgotten;  and  the  fact  that  since  it  was 
uttered  we  have  once  been  plunged,  without  preparation,  into  a  costly  and 
desolating  war,  and  thrice  .upon  the  very  brink  of  hostilities  with  two  of  the 
most  powerful  nations  of  Europe,  ought  to  awaken  us  to  a  sense  of  its  importance. 
Washington  has  pointed  out  the  best  way  to  avoid  the  calamity,  and  the 
experience  of  other  nations  has  most  abundantly  proved  the  correctness  of  his 
instruction. 

Let  us,  then,  "in  peace  prepare  for  war;"  and  even  should  this  state  of 
preparation  fail  to  preserve  peace,  it  will,  nevertheless,  be  vastly  influential  in 
bringing  the  war  to  an  early  and  successful  conclusion.  There  is  a  great  moral 
effect  produced  by  the  initiation,  and  by  a  few  brilliant  achievements  at  the 
outset  of  a  campaign.  Had  the  battles  of  Chippewa  and  Bridgewater,  and  the 
gallant  defence  and  sortie  of  Eort  Erie,  occurred  in  1812,  this  disastrous  and 
almost  disgraceful  war  would  never  have  lingered  till  1815. 


264  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

To  postpone  the  making  of  military  defences  till  such  time  as  they  are  actually 
required  in  defence,  is  to  waste  the  public  money  and  endanger  the  public  safety. 
The  closing  of  an  avenue  of  approach,  the  security  of  a  single  road  or  river,  or 
even  the  strategic  movement  of  a  small  body  of  troops,  often  effects  in  the 
beginning  what  afterwards  cannot  be  accomplished  by  large  fortifications  and 
the  most  formidable  armies.  Had  a  small  army  in  1812,  with  a  well  fortified 
depot  on  Lake  Champlain,  penetrated  into  Canada  and  cut  off  all  re-enforcements 
and  supplies  by  way  of  Quebec,  that  country  would  have  fallen  into  our  posses- 
sion. 

In  the  winter  of  1807  Napoleon  crossed  the  Vistula,  and  advanced  even  to 
the  walls  of  Konigsberg,  with  the  Austrians  in  his  rear  and  the  whole  power  of 
Russia  before  him.  If  Austria  had  pushed  forward  100,000  men  from  Bohemia, 
on  the  Oder,  she  would,  in  all  probability,  says  the  best  of  military  judges, 
(Jomini,)  have  struck  a  fatal  blow  to  the  operations  of  Napoleon,  and  his  army 
must  have  been  exceedingly  fortunate  even  to  regain  the  Rhine.  But  Austria 
preferred  remaining  neutral  till  she  could  increase  her  army  to  400,000  men. 
She  then  took  the  offensive,  and  was  beaten;  whereas,  with  100,000  men, 
brought  into  action  at  the  favorable  moment,  she  might,  most  probably,  have 
decided  the  fate  of  Europe. 

"Defensive  war,"  says  Napoleon,  "does  not  preclude  attack,  any  more  than 
offensive  war  is  necessarily  exclusive  of  defence ;  "  for  frequently  the  best  way 
to  counteract  the  enemy's  operations  and  prevent  his  conquests  is  first  to  invade 
and  cripple  him.  But  this  can  never  be  attempted  with  raw  troops,  ill  supplied 
with  the  munitions  of  war  and  unsupported  by  fortifications.  Such  invasions 
must  necessarily  fail.  Experience  in  the  errors  of  the  French  revolution  dem- 
onstrated this.  Even  our  own  short  history  is  not  without  its  proof.  In  1812 
the  conquest  of  Canada  was  determined  on  long  before  the  declaration  of  war ; 
an  undisciplined  army,  without  preparation  or  apparent  plan,  was  actually  put 
in  motion  eighteen  days  previous  to  this  declaration,  for  Detroit  and  the  Cana- 
dian peninsula ;  the  disastrous  and  disgraceful  result  is  but  too  well  known. 

Military  power  may  be  regarded  as  absolute  or  relative — the  absolute  force 
of  a  nation  depending  on  the  number  of  its  inhabitants  and  extent  of  its  rev- 
enues ;  the  relative  force  on  its  geographical  and  political  position,  the  character 
of  its  people,  the  nature  of  its  government,  its  military  organization,  &c.  Its 
military  preparations  must  evidently  be  in  proportion  to  its  resources.  Wealth 
constitutes  both  the  apprehension  and  the  incentive  to  invasion.  Where  two  or 
more  states  have  equal  means  of  war,  with  incentives  very  unequal,  an  equi- 
librium cannot  exist ;  for  danger  and  temptation  are  no  longer  opposed  to  each 
other.  The  preparation  of  states  may  therefore  be  equal  without  being  equiv- 
alent, and  the  smaller  of  two  may  be  most  liable  to  be  drawn  into  a  war  without 
the  means  of  sustaining  it. 

The  geographical  position  of  a  country  greatly  influences  the  degree  and 
character  of  its  military  preparation.  It  may  be  bordered  on  one  or  more  sides 
by  mountains  and  other  obstacles  calculated  to  diminish  the  probability  of  inva- 
sion, or  tne  whole  frontier  may  be  wide  open  to  attack  ;  the  interior  may  be  of 
such  a  nature  as  to  furnish  security  to  its  own  army,  and  yet  be  fatal  to  the 
enemy,  should  he  occupy  it ;  or  it  may  furnish  him  advantages  far  superior  to 
his  own  country.  It  may  be  an  island  in  the  sea,  and  consequently  exposed 
only  to  maritime  descents — events  of  rare  occurrence  in  modern  times. 

Again  :  a  nation  may  be  placed  between  others  who  are  interested  in  its  secu- 
rity, their  mutual  jealousy  preventing  the  molestation  of  the  weaker  neighbor. 
On  the  other  hand,  its  political  institutions  may  be  such  as  to  compel  the  others 
to  unite  in  its  destruction  in  order  to  secure  themselves.  The  republics  of 
Switzerland  could  remain  unmolested  in  the  midst  of  powerful  monarchies ;  but 
revolutionary  France  brought  upon  herself  the  armies  of  all  Europe. 

Climate  also  has,  undoubtedly,  some  influence  upon  military  character,  but  it 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  265 

is  far  less  than  that  of  education  and  discipline.  Northern  nations  are  said  to 
be  naturally  more  phlegmatic  and  sluggish  than  those  of  warmer  climates  ;  and 
yet  the  armies  of  Gustavus  Adolphus,  Charles  XII,  and  Suwarrow  have  shown 
themselves  sufficiently  active  and  impetuous,  while  the  Greeks,  Romans,  and 
Spaniards,  in  the  times  of  their  glory,  were  patient,  disciplined,  and  indefatigable, 
notwithstanding  the  reputed  fickleness  of  ardent  temperaments. 

While,  therefore,  the  -permanent  military  defences  of  a  nation  must  be  sub- 
ordinate to  its  resources,  position,  and  character,  they  can  in  no  case  be  dispensed 
with.  No  matter  how  extensive  or  important  the  temporary  means  that  may  be 
developed  as  necessity  requires,  there  must  be  some  force  kept  in  a  constant 
state  of  efficiency,  in  order  to  impart  life  and  stability  to  the  system.  The  one 
can  never  properly  replace  the  other  ;  for  while  the  former  constitutes  the  basis, 
the  latter  must  form  the  main  body  of  the  military  edifice  which,  by  its  strength 
and  durability,  will  offer  shelter  and  protection  to  the  nation,  or,  if  the  archi- 
tecture and  materials  be  defective,  crush  and  destroy  in  its  fall. 

The  temporary  means  of  defence  may  be  classed  as  follows  : 

1st.  An  increase  of  the  regular  army  and  regular  marine. 

2d.  The  employment  of  irregular  or  militia  forces,  and  the  authorization  of 
privateering,  or  a  resort  to  "marque  and  reprisal." 

3d.  An  increase  of  military  munitions  ana  "  logistique,"  and  the  use  of  tem- 
porary fortifications. 

I.  Much  energy  and  enterprise  will  always  be  imparted  to  an  army  by  the 
addition  of  new  troops.  The  strength  thus  acquired  is  sometimes  in  a  far 
greater  ratio  than  the  increase  of  numbers.  But  these  new  elements  are  of 
3iemselves  far  inferior  to  the  old  ones  in  discipline  and  steady  courage  and  per- 
severance. No  general  can  rely  on  the  accuracy  of  their  movements  in  the  ope- 
rations of  a  campaign,  and  they  are  exceedingly  apt  to  fail  him  at  the  most 
critical  moment  on  the  field  of  battle.  The  same  holds  true  with  respect  to 
sailors  inexperienced  in  the  discipline  and  duties  of  a  man-of-war.  There  is 
this  difference,  however :  an  army  obtains  its  recruits  from  men  totally  unac- 
quainted with  military  life,  while  a  navy,  in  case  of  sudden  increase,  is  mainly 
supplied  from  the  merchant  marine  with  professional  sailors,  who,  though  unac- 
quainted with  the  use  of  artillery,  &c.,  on  shipboard,  are  familiar  with  all  the 
other  duties  of  sea  life,  and  not  unused  to  discipline.  Moreover,  raw  seamen 
and  mariners,  from  being  under  the  immediate  eye  of  their  officers  in  time  of 
action,  and  without  the  possibility  of  escape,  fight  much  better  than  troops  of 
the  same  character  on  land.  If  years  are  requisite  to  make  a  good  sailor,  surely 
an  equal  length  of  time  is  necessary  to  perfect  the  soldier ;  and  no  less  skill, 
practice,  and  professional  study,  are  required  for  the  proper  direction  of  armies 
than  for  the  management  of  fleets.  The  relative  hardships  and  dangers  encoun- 
tered by  these  two  arms  of  defence  are  thus  described  by  Napoleon,  in  his  own 
memoirs  :  "  War  by  land  destroys  a  greater  number  of  men  than  maritime  war, 
being  more  perilous.  The  sailor,  in  a  squadron,  fights  only  once  in  a  campaign ; 
the  soldier  fights  daily.  The  sailor,  whatever  may  be  the  fatigues  and  dan- 
gers attached  to  his  element,  suffers  much  less  than  the  soldier ;  he  never  en- 
dures hunger  and  thirst ;  he  has  always  with  him  his  lodging,  his  kitchen,  his 
hospital,  and  his  medical  stores.  The  naval  forces  in  the  service  of  France  and 
England,  where  cleanliness  is  preserved  by  discipline,  and  where  experience  has 
taught  all  the  measures  to  be  adopted  for  the  preservation  of  health,  are  less 
subject  to  sickness  than  land  forces.  Besides  the  dangers  of  battles,  the  sailor 
has  to  encounter  those  of  storms ;  but  art  has  so  materially  diminished  the  lat- 
ter that  they  cannot  be  compared  to  those  which  occur  upon  land,  and  the  pop- 
ular insurrections,  assassinations,  and  surprises  by  the  enemy's  light  troops,  to 
which  the  soldier  is  always  exposed." 

Again,  in  the  council  of  state,  in  1802,  to  a  remark  of  M.  Thurguet,  that 
"  much  longer  time  is  required  to  form  a  sailor  than  a  soldier;  the  latter  may  be 


266  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

trained  to  all  his  duties  in  six  months" — Napoleon  replied:  "There  never  was 
a  greater  mistake ;  nothing  can  be  more  dangerous  than  to  propagate  such  opin- 
ions ;  if  acted  upon,  they  would  speedily  lead  to  the  dissolution  of  our  army. 
At  Jemappe  there  were  50,000  French  against  9,000  Austrians ;  during  the  first 
four  years  of  the  war,  all  the  hostile  operations  were  conducted  in  the  most 
ridiculous  manner.  It  was  neither  the  volunteers  nor  the  recruits  who  saved 
the  republic;  it  was  the  180,000  old  troops  of  the  monarchy,  and  the  discharged 
veterans  whom  the  revolution  impelled  to  the  frontiers.  Part  of  the  recruits 
deserted,  part  died ;  a  small  portion  only  remained,  who,  in  process  of  time, 
formed  good  soldiers.  Why  have  the  Romans  done  such  great  things  1  Because 
six  years'  instruction  were,  with  them,  required  to  make  a  soldier.  A  legion, 
composed  of  3,000  such  men,  was  worth  30,000  ordinary  troops.  With  15,000 
men,  such  as  the  guards,  I  would  anywhere  beat  40,000." 

II.  While  all  confess  the  value  and  importance  of  a  militia  force  as  an  aux- 
iliary and  temporary  means  of  defence,  there  are  some  who  think  it  capable  of 
competing  with  regulars  in  the  open  field,  and  others  who,  for  the  purpose  of 
making  political  capital,  loudly  proclaim  all  other  means  of  security  to  be  super- 
fluous, nay,  dangerous  and  unconstitutional ! 

There  are  instances  where  disorganized  and  frantic  mobs,  animated  by  patriotic 
enthusiasm,  have  gained  the  most  brilliant  victories.  Here,  however,  extraor- 
dinary circumstances  supplied  the  place  of  order,  and  produced  an  equilibrium 
between  forces  that  otherwise  would  have  been  very  unequal;  but,  in  almost 
every  instance  of  this  kind,  the  loss  of  the  undisciplined  army  has  been  unneces- 
sarily great,  human  life  being  substituted  for  skill  and  order.  But  victory,  even 
with  such  a  drawback,  cannot  often  attend  the  banners  of  newly-raised  and  dis- 
orderly forces.  If  the  captain  and  crew  of  a'  steamship  knew  nothing  of  navi- 
gation, and  had  never  been  at  sea,  and  the  engineer  were  totally  unacquainted 
with  his  profession,  could  we  expect  the  ship  to  cross  the  Atlantic  in  safety,  and 
reach  accurately  her  destined  port?  Would  we  trust  our  lives  and  the  honor  of 
our  country  to  their  care  ?  Would  we  not  say  to  them :  first  make  yourself  ac- 
quainted with  the  principles  of  your  profession ;  the  use  of  the  compass,  and  the 
means  of  determining  whether  you  direct  your  course  upon  a  ledge  of  rocks  or 
into  a  safe  harbor?  War  is  not,  as  some  seem  to  suppose,  a  mere  game  of  chance. 
Its  principles  constitute  one  of  the  subliinest  of  modern  sciences ;  and  the  gen- 
eral who  understands  the  art  of  rightly  applying  its  rules,  and  possesses  the 
means  of  carrying  out  its  precepts,  may  be  morally  certain  of  success. 

History  furnishes  abundant  proofs  of  the  impolicy  of  relying  upon  undisci- 
plined forces  in  the  open  field.  Almost  every  page  of  Napier's  classic  History 
of  the  Peninsular  War  contains  striking  examples  of  the  useless  waste  of  life 
and  property  by  the  Spanish  militia,  while  with  one-quarter  as  many  regulars, 
at  a  small  fractional  part  of  the  actual  expense,  the  French  might  have  been 
repelled  at  the  outset,  or  have  been  driven,  at  any  time  afterwards,  from  the 
peninsula.  At  the  beginning  of  the  French  revolution  the  regular  army  was 
abolished,  and  the  citizen  soldiery,  who  were  established  throughout  the  kingdom 
on  the  14th  of  July,  1789,  relied  upon,  exclusively,  for  the  national  defence. 
"But  these  3,000,000  of  national  guards,"  says  Jomini,  the  great  historian  of 
the  revolution,  "though  good  supporters  of  the  decrees  of  the  assembly,  were, 
nevertheless,  useless  for  re-enforcing  the  army  beyond  the  frontiers,  and  utterly 
incapable  of  defending  their  own  firesides."  Yet  no  one  can  ever  question  their 
individual  bravery  and  patriotism ;  for,  when  reorganized,  disciplined,  and  prop- 
erly directed,  they  put  to  flight  the  best  troops  in  Europe.  At  the  first  outbreak 
of  this  revolution,  the  privileged  classes  of  other  countries,  upholding  crumbling 
institutions  and  rotten  dynasties,  rushed  forth  against  the  maddened  hordes  of 
French  democracy.  The  popular  power,  springing  upward  by  its  own  elasticity 
when  the  weight  of  political  oppression  was  removed,  soon  became  too  wild  and 
reckless  to  establish  itself  on  any  sure  basis,  or  even  to  provide  for  its  own  pro- 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  267 

tection.  If  the  attacks  of  the  enervated  enemies  of  France  were  weak,  so  also 
feeble  were  her  own  efforts  to  resist  these  attacks.  The  republican  armies  re- 
pelled the  ill-planned  and  ill-conducted  invasion  by  the  Duke  of  Brunswick — 
but  it  was  by  the  substitution  of  human  life  for  preparation,  system,  and  skill ; 
enthusiasm  supplied  the  place  of  discipline ;  robbery  produced  military  stores ; 
and  the  dead  bodies  of  her  citizens  formed  epaulements  against  the  enemy.  Yet 
this  was  but  the  strength  of  weakness,  the  aimless  struggle  of  a  broken  and 
disjointed  government;  and  the  new  revolutionary  power  was  fast  sinking  away 
before  the  combined  opposition  of  Europe,  when  the  great  genius  of  Napoleon, 
with  a  strong  arm  and  iron  rule,  seizing  upon  the  scattered  fragments,  and  bind- 
ing them  together  in  one  consolidated  mass,  made  France  victorious,  and  seated 
himself  on  the  throne  of  empire. 

No  people  in  the  world  ever  exhibited  a  more  general  and  enthusiastic  patriot- 
ism than  the  Americans  during  the  war  of  our  own  revolution;  and  yet  our 
army  received,  even  at  that  time,  little  or  no  support  from  the  militia.  The 
letters  and  reports  of  Washington,  and  his  highest  officers,  are  filled  with  proofs 
of  this.  The  following  brief  extracts  are  from  Washington's  letters  to  the 
President  of  Congress,  December,  1776: 

"The  saving  in  the  article  of  stores,  provisions,  and  in  a  thousand  other 
things,  by  having  nothing  to  do  with  the  militia,  unless  in  cases  of  extraordinary 
exigency,  and  such  as  could  not  be  expected  in  the  common  course  of  events, 
would  amply  support  a  large  army,  which,  well  officered,  would  be  daily  im- 
proving, instead  of  continuing  a  destructive,  expensive,  and  disorderly  mob." 
"  In  my  opinion,  if  any  dependence  is  placed  on  the  militia  another  year,  Con- 
gress will  be  deceived.  When  danger  is  a  little  removed  from  them,  they  will 
not  turn  out  at  all.  When  it  comes  home  to  them,  the  well-affected,  instead  of 
flying  to  arms  to  defend  themselves,  are  busily  employed  in  removing  their  fami- 
lies and  effects ;  whilst  the  disaffected  are  concerting  measures  to  make  their 
submission,  and  spread  terror  and  dismay  all  around,  to  induce  others  to  follow 
their  example.  Daily  experience  and  abundant  proofs  warrant  this  information." 

"Short  enlistments,  and  a  mistaken  dependence  upon  the  militia,  have  been 
the  origin  of  all  our  misfortunes  and  the  great  accumulation  of  our  debt." 
"  The  militia  come  in,  you  cannot  tell  how ;  go,  you  cannot  tell  when ;  and  act, 
you  cannot  tell  where ;  consume  your  provisions,  exhaust  your  stores,  and  leave 
you  at  last  at  a  critical  moment." 

These  remarks  of  Washington  will  not  be  found  too  severe,  if  we  remember 
the  conduct  of  our  militia  in  many  an  open  field  of  the  revolutionary  war  and 
of  that  of  1812. 

But  there  is  another  side  to  this  picture.  We  can  point  to  the  defence  of 
Charleston,  Mobile,  New  Orleans,  Fort  McHenry,  Stonington,  Niagara,  and 
Plattsburg,  in  proof  of  what  may  be  accomplished  by  militia,  in  connexion  with 
fortifications.  These  examples  most  fully  demonstrate  the  great  value  of  a 
militia,  when  properly  employed,  as  a  defence  against  invasion.  With  fortifica- 
tions, they  constitute  a  grand  military  reserve,  upon  which  we  must  always  fall 
back  in  cases  of  pressing  emergency.  But  we  must  not  forget  that,  to  call  this 
force  into  the  open  field — to  take  the  mechanic  from  his  shop,  the  merchant  from  his 
counter,  and  the  farmer  from  his  plough,  will  necessarily  be  attended  with  an  im- 
mense sacrifice  of  human  life.  The  lives  lost  on  the  battle-field  are  not  the  only 
ones ;  militia,  being  unaccustomed  to  exposure,  and  unable  to  supply  their  own 
wants  with  certainty  and  regularity,  contract  diseases,  which  occasion,  in  every 
campaign,  a  most  frightful  mortality. 

There  is  a  vast  difference  in  the  cost  of  supporting  regulars  and  a  militia,  as 
ours  is  now  organized.  The  late  Secretary  of  War,  in  a  report  to  Congress, 
says  that  the  expenses  of  the  latter  "invariably  exceed  those  of  the  regular 
forces  at  least  three  hundred  per  cent.;"  and  that  55,000  militia  were  called 
into  service  during  the  Black  Hawk  and  Florida  wars,  and  that  "  30,000,000  of 


268  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

dollars  have  been  expended  in  these  conjlicfsf"  Facts -like  these  should  awaken 
us  to  the  necessity  of  reorganizing  and  disciplining  this  arm  of  defence. 

Privateers  bear  to  the  regular  navy  somewhat  the  same  relation  that  the 
militia  do  to  the  regular  army.  In  the  war  of  1812  they  were  of  considerable 
advantage  in  capturing  enemy  vessels  and  destroying  their  commerce. 

III.  In  reference  to  the  influence  of  field  fortifications,  railroads,  canals,  &c., 
on  the  operations  of  a  campaign,  we  will  only  remark  that  the  vast  changes 
which  have  been  made  since  our  last  war,  in  the  facilities  of  locomotion,  render 
doubly  imperative  the  duty  of  military  preparation.  Surrounded  as  our  country 
is  by  disciplined  forces,  capable  of  striking  at  any  moment  a  deadly  blow  at  the 
prosperity  of  our  large  cities,  our  government  cannot,  but  with  the  deepest 
guilt,  neglect  the  means  of  averting  such  a  calamity. 

We  may  regard  as  permanent  means  of  defence — 

1st.  The  army. 

2d.  The  navy. 

3d.  Fortifications. 

The  first  two  of  these  could  hardly  be  called  permanent,  if  we  were  to  regard 
merely  their  personnel  or  materiel;  but,  looking  upon  them  as  institutions  or 
organizations,  they  present  all  the  characteristics  of  durability.  They  are 
sometimes  subjected  to  very  great  and  radical  changes.  By  the  hot-house 
nursing  of  designing  ambition  or  rash  legislation,  they  may  become  overgrown 
and  dangerous ;  or  the  storms  of  popular  delusion  may  overthrow  and  apparently 
sweep  them  away  ;  but  they  will  immediately  spring  up  again  in  some  form  or 
other,  so  deeply  are  they  rooted  in  the  organization  of  political  institutions. 

I.  The  importance  of  maintaining  a  permanent  military  force  has  'already 
been  alluded  to  in  speaking  of  the  equilibrium  of  national  power.  An  army 
should  always  be  kept  within  the  limits  of  the  nation's  wants  ;  but  pity  for  a 
country  which  reduces  it  in  numbers  or  support,  so  as  to  degrade  its  character 
or  endanger  its  organization.  "A  government,"  says  one  of  the  best  historians 
of  the  age,  "which  neglects  its  army,  under  whatsoever  pretext,  is  a  govern- 
ment culpable  in  the  eyes  of  posterity ;  for  it  is  preparing  humiliations  for  its 
flag  and  its  country,  instead  of  laying  the  foundation  for  its  glory." 

On  this  point,  Mr.  B.  F.  Butler,  formerly  Acting  Secretary  of  War,  remarks : 
"  Our  experience,  as  an  independent  state,  has  clearly  shown  that  a  permanent 
force,  large  enough  to  keep  in  check  our  savage  neighbors,  to  fulfil  towards 
them  our  treaty  stipulations,  and  to  garrison  our  more  important  fortifications, 
and  capable  of  furnishing  a  considerable  body  of  instructed  officers  qualified  to 
organize,  in  case  of  need,  an  efficient  army,  is  indispensable  to  the  preservation 
of  peace  on  our  borders  and  with  other  nations.  The  history  of  our  relations 
with  the  Indian  tribes,  from  its  beginning  to  the  present  hour,  is  one  continued 
proof  of  this  remark  ;  and  for  a  long  series  of  years  the  treatment  we  received 
from  European  powers  was  a  most  humiliating  illustration  of  its  truth.  Twice 
we  were  compelled  to  maintain,  by  open  war,  our  quarrel  with  the  principal 
aggressors ;  and  the  last  of  these  conflicts,  from  the  causes  which  provo*ked  it, 
as  well  as  from  its  severity  and  length,  well  deserves  the  appellation  sometimes 
given  to  it  of  a  second  war  of  independence.  After  many  years  of  forbearance 
and  negotiation,  our  claims  in  other  cases  were  at  length  amicably  settled ;  but, 
in  one  of  the  most  noted  of  these  cases,  it  was  not  without  much  delay  and  im- 
minent hazard  of  war  that  the  execution  of  the  treaty  was  finally  enforced. 
No  one  acquainted  with  these  portions  of  our  history  can  hesitate  to  ascribe 
much  of  the  wantonness  and  duration  of  the  wrongs  we  endured  to  a  knowl- 
edge on  the  part  of  our  assailants  of  the  scantiness  and  inefficiency  of  our  mili- 
tary and  naval  force." 

In  a  report  on  this  subject,  Mr.  Calhoun  says :  "  The  organization  of  the 
army  ought  to  be  such  as  to  enable  the  government,  at  the  commencement  of 
hostilities,  to  obtain  a  regular  force,  adequate  to  the  emergencies  of  the  country, 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  269 

f. 

properly  organized  and  prepared  for  actual  service.  It  is  thus  only  that  we 
can  be  in  the  condition  to  meet  the  first  shocks  of  hostilities  with  unyielding 
firmness,  and  to  press  on  an  enemy  while  our  resources  are  yet  unexhausted. 
But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  disregarding  the  sound  dictates  of  reason  and  experi- 
ence, we  should  in  peace  neglect  our  military  establishment ,  we  must,  with  a 
powerful  and  skilful  enemy,  be  exposed  to  the  most  distressing  calamities" 

In  another  able  report  to  Congress,  in  1818,  Mr.  Calhoun  demonstrated  that 
great  danger  would  result  from  reducing  the  then  existing  military  establishment, 
which  was  in  all  near  13,000  men.  Nevertheless,  this  reduction  took  place  in 
1821,  and  we  were  soon  made  to  suffer  the  consequences.  It  is  stated,  on  high 
authority,  "that  if  there  had  been  two  regiments  in  position  at  Jefferson  Bar- 
racks, near  St.  Louis,  in  1832,  the  war  with  Black  Hawk,  which  cost  the  country 
$3,000,000,  would  have  been  easily  avoided;  and  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the 
scenes  of  devastation  and  savage  warfare,  which  overspread  the  Floridas  for 
nearly  seven  years,  would  have  been  avoided,  and  millions  saved,  if  two  regi- 
ments had  been  available." 

Congress,  though  late,  became  convinced  of  the  impolicy  of  departing  from 
the  organization  recommended  by  Mr.  Calhoun,  and  in  the  successive  acts  of 
1833,  1836,  and  1838,  restored  the  number  to  about  12,000.  But  the  Congress  of 
1842-'43  have  again  reduced  the  aggregate  number  to  between  7,000  and  8,000. 

A  singular  feature  of  this  reduction  was,  that  while  it  discharged,  without 
the  power  of  re-enlisting  them,  the  veteran  non-commissioned  officers  and  pri- 
vates of  the  last  war,  the  raw  recruits  had  to  be  retained — thus  depriving  the 
army  of  its  very  best  material. 

II.  Our  remarks  on  the  duty  of  government  to  support  an  army  are  equally 
applicable  to  the  support  of  the  navy.     It,  too,  has  important  duties  both  in 
peace  and  in  war,  and  its  healthful  organization  should   be  attended  to  with 
zealous  care.     But  it  also  has  had  its  vicissitudes  within  the  last  few  years. 

The  personnel  of  the  navy,  however,  has  escaped  much  more  fortunately 
than  that  of  the  army.  Its  organization  has  been  somewhat  improved,  and  its 
numbers  and  support  left  untouched. 

The  pay  proper  of  the  navy  (including  marines)  for  the  fiscal  year  of  1843 
is  $2,917,280  15;  that  of  the  army,  for  the  same  period,  is  $1,313,370.  The 
appropriations  made  for  the  support  of  the  navy  (including  marines)  for  the 
fiscal  year  of  1843,  including  pay,  provisions,  arms,  fuel,  clothing,  commutation, 
hospital  stores,  transportation,  increase,  repairs,  &c.,  of  ships,  repairs  and  im- 
provement of  docks,  navy  yards,  and  arsenals,  instruments,  clerks,  printing,  and 
other  contingencies,  amount  in  all  to  $5,586,757.  The  whole  appropriation  for 
the  army,  for  the  same  period,  including  pay,  provisions,  arms,  clothing,  fuel, 
quarters,  commutation,  transportation  of  troops  and  supplies,  forage,  horses, 
building  and  repairs  of  quarters,  parade  grounds,  camps,  armories,  arsenals,  the 
manufacture  of  cannon  for  the  army  and  fortifications,  and  arms  for  the  militia, 
the  collection  of  materials  for  powder,  &c.,  clerks,  instruments,  printing,  postage, 
and  other  contingencies,  amount  in  all  to  $3,965,768  60. 

III.  Permanent  fortifications  differ  in  many  of  their  features  from  either  of 
the  two  preceding  elements  of  defence.     They  are  passive  in  their  nature,  yet 
possess  all  the  conservative  properties  of  an  army  or  navy,  and,  through  these 
two,  contribute  largely  to  the  active  operations  of  a  campaign.     When  once  con- 
structed they  require  but  little  expenditure  for  their  support.     In  time  of  peace 
they  withdraw  no  valuable  citizens   from  the  useful   occupations   of  life.     Of 
themselves  they  can  never  exert  an  influence  dangerous  to  public  liberty ;  but 
as  the  means  of  preserving  peace,  and  as  obstacles  to  an  invader,  their  influence 
and  power  are  immense.     While  contributing  to  the  economical  support  of  a 
peace  establishment  by  furnishing  drill  grounds,  parades,  quarters,  &c.,  and  to 
its  efficiency  still  more  by  affording  facilities  both  to  the  regulars  and  militia  for 
that  species  of  artillery  practice  so  necessary  in  the  defence  of  water  frontiers, 


270  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

they  also  serve  as  safe  depots  of  arms,  and  the  immense  quantity  of  material 
and  military  munitions  so  indispensable  in  modern  warfare.  These  munitions 
usually  require  much  time,  skill,  and  expense  in  their  construction,  and  it  is  of 
vast  importance  that  they  be  preserved  with  the  utmost  care. 

Maritime  arsenals  and  depots  of  naval  and  military  stores  on  the  sea-coast 
are  more  particularly  exposed  to  capture  and  destruction.  Here  an  enemy  can 
approach  by  stealth,  striking  some  sudden  and  fatal  blow  before  any  effectual 
resistance  can  be  organized.  But,  in  addition  to  the  security  afforded  by  harbor 
fortifications  to  public  property  of  the  highest  military  value,  they  also  serve  to 
protect  the  merchant  shipping  and  the  vast  amount  of  private  wealth  which  a 
commercial  people  always  collect  at  these  points.  They  furnish  safe  retreats 
and  means  of  repair  for  public  vessels  injured  in  battle  or  by  storms,  and  to 
merchantmen  a  refuge  from  the  dangers  of  the  sea  or  the  threats  of  hostile 
fleets.  Moreover,  they  greatly  facilitate  our  naval  attacks  upon  the  enemy's 
shipping;  and  if  he  attempt  a  descent,  their  well-directed  fire  will  repel  his 
squadrons  from  our  harbors,  and  force  his  troops  to  land  at  some  distant  and 
unfavorable  position. 

The  three  means  of  permanent  defence  which  we  have  mentioned  are  of 
course  intended  to  accomplish  the  same  general  object;  but  each  has  its  distinct 
and  proper  sphere  of  action,  and  neither  can  be  regarded  as  antagonistical  to  the 
others.  Any  undue  increase  of  one,  at  the  expense  of  the  other  two,  must 
necessarily  be  followed  by  a  corresponding  diminution  of  national  strength.  It 
does  not  follow,  however,  that  all  must  be  maintained  upon  the  same  footing. 
The  position  of  the  country  and  the  character  of  the  people  must  determine 
this.  England,  from  her  insular  position,  and  the  extent  of  her  commerce, 
must  maintain  a  large  navy ;  a  large  army  is  also  necessary  for  the  defence  of 
her  own  sea-coasts  and  the  protection  of  her  colonial  possessions.  Her  men-of- 
war  secure  a  safe  passage  for  her  merchant  vessels,  and  they  transport  her 
troops  in  safety  through  all  seas,  and  thus  contribute  much  to  the  acquisition 
and  security  of  colonial  territory.  France  has  less  commerce,  and  but  few 
colonial  possessions.  She  has  a  great  extent  of  sea-coast,  but  her  fortifications 
secure  it  from  maritime  descents ;  her  only  accessible  points  are  on  the  land 
frontiers.  Her  army  and  fortifications,  therefore,  constitute  her  principal  means 
of  defence.  The  United  States  possess  no  colonies;  but  they  have  a  sea-coast 
of  3,000  miles,  with  numerous  bays,  estuaries,  and  navigable  rivers,  which  ex- 
pose our  most  populous  cities  to  maritime  attacks.  The  northern  land  frontier 
is  2,000  miles  in  extent ;  and  in  the  west  our  territory  borders  on  foreign  posses- 
sions for  some  two  or  three  thousand  miles  more. 

The  principal  attacks  we  have  had  to  sustain,  either  as  colonies  or  States,  from 
civilized  foes,  have  come  from  Canada.  As  colonies,  we  were  continually  en- 
countering difficulties  and  dangers  from  the  French  possessions.  In  the  war  of 
the  revolution,  it  being  one  of  national  emancipation,  the  military  operations 
were  more  general  throughout  the  several  States;  but,  in  the  war  of  1812,  the 
attacks  were  confined  to  the  northern  frontier,  and  a  few  exposed  points  along 
the  coast.  In  these  two  contests  with  Great  Britain,  Boston,  New  York,  Phila- 
delphia, Baltimore,  Washington,  Charleston,  Savannah,  Mobile,  and  New  Or- 
leans, being  within  reach  of  British  naval  power,  and  offering  the  dazzling  at- 
traction of  rich  booty,  have  each  been  subjected  to  powerful  assaults. 

Similar  attacks  will  undoubtedly  be  made  in  any  future  war  with  England. 
An  attempt  at  permanent  lodgement  would  be  based  either  on  Canada  or  a 
servile  insurrection  in  the  southern  States.  The  former  project,  in  a  military 
point  of  view,  offers  the  greatest  advantages,  and  probably  the  latter  would  be 
resorted  to  merely  for  effecting  a  diversion.  But,  for  inflicting  upon  us  a  sudden 
and  severe  injury  by  the  destruction  of  large  amounts  of  public  and  private 
roperty,  our  seaport  towns  offer  inducements  not  likely  to  be  disregarded. 
"  is  mode  of  warfare,  barbarous  though  it  is,  will  certainly  attend  a  conflict 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  271 

with  any  maritime  power.     How  can  we  best  prepare,  in  time  of  peace,  to  repel 
these  attacks] 

To  furnish  an  answer  to  this  question,  a  joint  commission,  of  our  most  dis- 
tinguished military  and  naval  officers,  was  formed  soon  after  the  war  of  1812. 
To  the  labors  of  this  board,  whose  investigations  were  continued  for  several 
years,  we  owe  our  present  system  of  sea-coast  defence.  The  details  of  this 
system  received  some  additions  and  alterations  by  a  board  of  officers  appointed 
by  President  Van  Buren  in  1839.  Their  report  constitutes  one  of  the  docu- 
ments which  form  the  basis  of  these  remarks. 

This  system  has  received  the  approbation  of  the  several  Presidents,  and, 
(with  one  apparent  exception,*)  of  all  the  Secretaries  of  War,  and  the  highest 
military  authorities  of  the  land.  The  fluctuating  state  of  the  public  finances, 
however,  has  much  delayed  the  completion  of  the  project.  When  the  treasury 
was  full  to  overflowing,  Mr.  Benton  strongly  advocated  the  appropriation  of  a 
sum  sufficient  for  the  gradual  construction  of  these  works  of  permanent  defence. 
But  Congress  preferred  turning  this  stream  into  the  already  swollen  channels  of 
trade  and  speculation.  We  know  the  consequences.  For  a  part  of  two  years 
the  public  works  were  mostly  suspended.  Mechanics  and  laborers  on  our  forti- 
fications were  discharged.  The  works  themselves,  suspended  in  the  middle  of 
their  construction,  were  much  injured  by  exposure,  and  the  total  cost  of  their 
construction  nearly  doubled. 

Some  persons,  from  a  partial  or  superficial  view  of  the  subject,  from  self-inter- 
est, or  from  entire  ignorance  of  the  principles  of  the  military  art,  have  pro- 
claimed opinions,  in  public  speeches  and  through  the  newspapers  of  the  day, 
decrying  all  works  of  defence  as  inexpedient  and  useless.  Their  objections  to 
the  use  of  permanent  works  of  national  defence  may  be  summed  up  as  follows : 

1.  That  fortifications  are  useless  as  a  defence  of  the  sea-coast,  inasmuch  as 
our  maritime  cities  and  arsenals  can  be  better  and  more  economically  secured 
by  a  home  squadron;  land  batteries  being  unable  to  cope,  gun  for  gun,  with  a 
naval  force. 

2.  That,  on  a  land  frontier,  they  are  not  only  useless,  but  actually  injurious, 
inasmuch  as  their  garrisons  must  weaken  the  active  army,  and  fetter  its  move- 
ments.    That  the  fundamental  principle  of  modern  military  science,  as  developed 
by  Napoleon,  celerity  of  movement,  is  wholly  .incompatible  with  the  use  of  forti- 
fications. 

Let  us  examine  each  of  these  objections  separately. 

1.  To  prove  the  absurdity  of  relying  exclusively  upon  naval  means  for  sea- 
coast  defence,  it  might  be  sufficient  to  refer  to  the  written  opinions  of  our  high- 
est naval  officers  themselves ;  but,  as  their  reports  are  not  within  reach  of  easy 
reference,  we  shall  proceed  to  discuss  the  general  principles  upon  which  these 
opinions  were  founded. 

We  have  already  alluded  to  the  impossibility  of  substituting  one  means  of 
defence  for  another.  The  efficiency  of  the  bayonet  can  in  no  way  enable  us  to 
dispense  with  artillery,  nor  the  value  of  engineer  troops  in  the  passage  of  rivers 
and  the  attack  and  defence  of  forts  render  cavalry  the  less  necessary  in  other 
operations  of  a  campaign.  To  the  navy  alone  must  we  look  for  the  defence  of 
our  shipping  upon  the  high  seas ;  but  it  cannot  replace  fortifications  in  the  pro- 
tection of  our  harbors,  bays,  rivers,  arsenals,  and  commercial  towns. 

Let  us  take  a  case  in  point.  For  the  defence  of  New  York  city  it  is  deemed 
highly  important  that  the  East  river  should  be  closed  to  the  approach  of  a  hos- 
tile fleet  at  least  fifteen  or  twenty  miles  from  the  city,  jo  that  an  army  landed 
there  would  have  to  cross  the  Westchester  creek,  the  Bronx,  Harlem  river,  and 

°The  apparent  exception  to  which  we  allude  is  the  report  of  1836,  in  which  the  system 
is  approved,  bat  objections  made  to  the  extent  of  its  application. 


272  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

the  defiles  of  Harlem  heights — obstacles  of  great  importance  in  a  judicious  de- 
fence. Throg's  Neck  is  the  position  selected  for  this  purpose ;  cannon  placed 
there  not  only  command  the  channel,  but,  from  the  windings  of  the  river,  sweep 
it  for  a  great  distance  above  and  below.  No  other  position,  even  in  the  channel 
itself,  possesses  equal  advantages.  Hence,  if  we  had  only  naval  means  of  de- 
fence, it  would  be  best,  were  such  a  thing  possible,  to  place  the  floating  defences 
themselves  on  this  point.  Leaving  entirely  out  of  consideration  the  question  of 
relative  power,  position  alone  would  give  the  superior  efficiency  to  the  fort. 
But  there  are  other  considerations  no  less  important  than  that  of  position.  Fort 
Schuyler  can  be  garrisoned  and  defended  in  part  by  the  same  militia  force  which 
will  be  employed  to  prevent  the  march  of  the  enemy's  army  on  the  city.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  crews  of  the  floating  defences  must  be  seamen ;  they  will 
consequently  be  of  less  value  in  the  subsequent  land  operations.  Moreover, 
forts,  situated  as  this  is,  can  be  so  planned  as  to  bring  to  bear  upon  any  part  of 
the  channel  a  greater  number  of  guns  than  can  be  presented  by  any  hostile 
squadron  against  the  corresponding  portion  of  the  fort.  This  result  can  be  ob- 
tained with  little  difficulty  in  narrow  channels,  and  an  approximation  to  it  is  not 
incompatible  with  the  defence  of  the  broader  estuaries. 

We  will  suppose  that  there  are  no  such  points  of  land  in  the  inlets  to  our 
harbor,  and  that  we  rely  for  defence  upon  a  naval  force  exclusively.  Let  us 
leave  out  of  consideration  the  security  of  all  our  other  harbors  and  our  com- 
merce on  the  high  seas,  and  also  the  importance  of  having  at  command  the 
means  of  attacking  the  enemy's  coast  in  the  absence  of  his  fleet.  We  take  the 
single  case  of  the  attack  being  made  here  where  our  fleet  is  assembled.  Now, 
if  this  fleet  be  equal  in  number  to  the  enemy,  the  chances  of  success  may  be 
regarded  as  equal;  if  inferior,  the  chances  are  against  us — for  an  attacking  force 
would  probably  be  of  picked  men,  and  of  the  best  material.  But  here  the  con- 
sequences of  victory  are  very  unequal ;  the  enemy  can  lose  his  squadron  only, 
while  we  put  in  peril  both  our  squadron  and  the  objects  it  is  intended  to  defend. 
If  we  suppose  our  own  naval  force  superior  to  that  of  the  enemy,  the  defence  of 
this  harbor  would,  in  all  respects,  be  complete,  provided  this  force  never  left  the 
harbor.  "But,  then,  all  the  commerce  of  the  country,  upon  the  ocean,  must  be 
left  to  its  fate ;  and  no  attempt  can  be  made  to  react  offensively  upon  the  foe, 
unless  we  can  control  the  chances  of  finding  the  enemy's  fleet  within  his  ports, 
and  the  still  more  uncertain  chance  of  keeping  him  there;  the  escape  of  a  single 
vessel  being  sufficient  to  cause  the  loss  of  our  harbor." 

These  remarks  are  based  upon  the  supposition  that  we  have  but  a  single  harbor, 
whereas  we  have  many  of  them,  and  all  must  be  equally  defended,  for  we  know 
not  to  which  the  enemy  will  direct  his  assaults.  If  he  come  to  one  in  our  ab- 
sence, his  object  is  attained  without  resistance;  or,  if  his  whole  force  be  concen- 
trated upon  one  but  feebly  defended,  we  involve  both  fleet  and  harbor  in  inevi- 
table defeat  and  ruin.  Could  our  fleet  be  so  arranged  as  to  meet  these  enter- 
prises ?  "  As  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  enemy  can  select  the  point  of  attack 
out  of  the  whole  extent  of  coast,  where  is  the  prescience  that  can  indicate  the 
spot  ?  And  if  it  cannot  be  foretold,  how  is  that  ubiquity  to  be  imparted  that 
shall  always  place  our  fleet  in  the  path  of  the  advancing  foe  1  Suppose  we  at- 
tempt to  cover  the  coast  by  cruising  in  front  of  it,  shall  we  sweep  its  whole 
length — a  distance  scarcely  less  than  that  which  the  enemy  must  traverse  in 
passing  from  his  coast  to  ours?  Must  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  be  swept  as  well  as 
the  Atlantic,  or  shall  we  give  up  the  Gulf  to  the  enemy  1  Shall  we  cover  the 
southern  cities,  or  give  them  up  also  1  We  must  unquestionably  do  one  of  two 
things — either  relinquish  a  great  extent  of  coast,  confining  our  cruisers  to  a  small 
portion  only,  or  include  so  much  that  the  chances  of  intercepting  an  enemy 
would  seem  to  be  out  of  the  question." 

"  On  the  practicability  of  covering  even  a  small  extent  of  coast  by  cruising 
in  front  of  it — or,  in  other  words,  the  possibility  of  anticipating  an  enemy's 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  273 

operations,  discovering  the  object  of  movements  of  which  we  get  no  glimpse 
and  hear  no  tidings,  and  seeing  the  impress  of  his  footsteps  on  the  surface  of 
the  ocean — it  may  be  well  to  consult  experience." 

The  naval  power  of  Spain  under  Philip  II  was  almost  unlimited.  With  the 
treasures  of  India  and  America  at  his  command,  the  fitting  out  of  a  fleet  of  150 
or  200  sail  to  invade  another  country  was  no  very  gigantic  operation.  Never- 
theless, this  naval  force  was  of  but  little  avail  as  a  coast  defence.  Its  efficiency 
for  this  purpose  was  well  tested  in  1596.  England  and  Holland  attacked  Cadiz 
with  a  combined  fleet  of  170  ships,  which  entered  the  bay  of  Cadiz  without,  on 
its  approach  to  their  coast,  being  once  seen  by  the  Spanish  navy.  This  same 
squadron,  on  its  return  to  England,  passed  along  a  great  portion  of  the  Spanish 
coast  without  ever  meeting  the  slightest  opposition  from  the  innumerable  Spanish 
floating  defences. 

In  1744,  a  French  fleet  of  twenty  ships,  and  a  land  force  of  22,000  men, 
sailed  from  Brest  to  the  English  coast,  without  meeting  with  any  opposition 
from  the  superior  British  fleet  which  had  been  sent  out,  under  Sir  John  Norris, 
on  purpose  to  intercept  them.  The  landing  of  the  troops  was  prevented  by  a 
storm,  which  drove  the  fleet  back  upon  the  coast  of  France  to  seek  shelter. 

In  1755,  a  French  fleet  of  twenty-five  sail  of  the  line,  and  many  smaller 
vessels,  sailed  from  Brest  for  America.  Nine  of  these  soon  afterwards  returned 
to  France,  and  the  others  proceeded  to  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence.  An  English 
fleet  of  seventeen  sail  of  the  line  and  some  frigates  had  been  sent  out  to  intercept 
them ;  but  the  two  fleets  passed  each  other  in  a  thick  fog,  and  all  the  French 
vessels  except  two  reached  Quebec  in  safety. 

In  1759,  a  French  fleet,  blockaded  in  the  port  of  Dunkirk  by  a  British  force 
under  Commodore  Bags,  seizing  upon  a  favorable  opportunity,  escaped  from  the 
enemy,  attacked  the  coast  of  Scotland,  made  a  descent  upon  Carrickfergus,  and 
cruised  about  till  February,  1760,  without  meeting  a  single  British  vessel, 
although  sixty-one  ships-of  the-line  were  then  stationed  upon  the  coasts  of 
England  and  France,  and  several  of  these  were  actually  in  pursuit. 

In  1796,  when  the  French  attempted  to  throw  the  army  of  Hoche  into  Ireland, 
the  most  strenuous  efforts  were  made  by  the  British  navy  to  intercept  the  French 
fleet  in  its  passage.  The  channel  fleet,  of  near  thirty  sail  of  the  line,  under 
Lord  Bridgeport,  was  stationed  at  Spithead;  Sir  Roger  Curtis,  with  a  smaller 
force,  was  cruising  to  the  westward;  Vice- Admiral  Colpoys  was  stationed  off 
Brest,  with  thirteen  sail  of  the  line;  and  Sir  Edward  Pellew  (afterwards  Lord 
Exmouth)  watched  the  harbor,  with  a  small  squadron  of  frigates.  Notwith- 
standing this  triple  floating  bulwark,  as  it  was  called — one  fleet  on  the  enemy's 
coast,  a  second  in  the  Downs,  and  a  third  close  on  their  own  shores — the  French 
fleet  of  forty-four  vessels,  carrying  a  land  force  of  25,000  men,  reached  Bantry 
bay  in  safety!  This  fleet  was  eight  days  on  the  passage,  and  three  more  in 
landing  the  troops ;  and  most  of  the  vessels  might  have  returned  to  Brest  in 
safety,  had  it  not  been  for  the  disasters  by  storms ;  for  only  one  of  their  whole 
number  was  intercepted  by  the  vast  naval  force  which  England  had  assembled 
for  that  express  object.  "The  result  of  this  expedition,"  says  Alison,  in  his 
history  of  Europe,  "was  pregnant  with  important  instructions  to  the  rulers  of 
both  countries.  To  the  French,  as  demonstrating  the  extraordinary  risks  which 
attend  a  maritime  expedition,  in  comparison  with  a  land  campaign ;  the  small 
number  of  forces  which  can  be  embarked  on  board  even  a  great  fleet;  and  the 
unforeseen  disasters  which  frequently,  on  that  element,  defeat  the  best  concerted 
enterprises.  To  the  English,  as  showing  that  the  empire  of  the  seas  does  not 
always  afford  security  against  invasion;  that,  in  the  face  of  superior  maritime 
forces,  her  possessions  were  for  sixteen  days  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy;  and 
that  neither  the  skill  of  her  sailors,  nor  the  valor  of  her  armies,  but  the  fury  of 
the  elements,  saved  them  from  danger  in  the  most  vulnerable  part  of  their 
dominions. 

H.  Rep.  Com.  86 18 


274  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

"While  these  considerations  are  fitted  to  abate  the  confidence  in  invasion, 
they  are  calculated,  at  the  same  time,  to  weaken  an  overweening  confidence  in 
naval  superiority,  and  to  demonstrate  that  the  only  base  on  which  certain  reli- 
ance can  be  placed,  even  by  an  insular  power,  is  a  well-disciplined  army  and 
the  patriotism  of  its  own  subjects." 

Subsequent  events  still  further  demonstrated  the  truth  of  these  remarks.  In 
the  following  year,  a  French  squadron  of  two  frigates  and  two  sloops  passed 
the  British  fleets  with  perfect  impunity,  destroyed  the  shipping  in  the  port  of 
Ilpacombe,  and  safely  landed  their  troops  on  the  coast  of  Wales.  Again :  in 
1798,  the  immense  British  naval  force  failed  to  prevent  the  landing  of  General 
Humbert's  army  in  the  bay  of  Killala;  and,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  same  year, 
a  French  squadron  of  nine  vessels  and  3,000  men  escaped  Sir  J.  B.  Warren's 
squadron,  and  safely  reached  the  coast  of  Ireland.  As  a  further  illustration, 
we  quote  from  the  report  of  the  board  on  national  defence,  in  1839. 

The  Toulon  fleet,  in  1798,  consisting  of  about  twenty  sail  of  the  line  and 
twenty  smaller  vessels-of-war,  and  numerous  transports,  making,  in  all,  300  sail 
and  40,000  troops,  slipped  out  of  port  and  sailed  to  Malta.  "  It  was  followed 
by  Nelson,  who,  thinking  correctly  that  they  were  bound  for  Egypt,  shaped  his 
course  direct  for  Alexandria.  The  French,  steering  towards  Caudia,  took  the 
more  circuitous  passage ;  so  that  Nelson  arrived  at  Alexandria  before  them,  and, 
not  finding  them  there,  returned  by  way  of  Caramania  and  Candia,  to  Sicily, 
missing  his  adversary  in  both  passages.  Sailing  again  for  Alexandria,  he  found 
the  French  fleet  at  anchor  in  Aboukir  bay,  and,  attacking  them  there,  achieved 
the  memorable  victory  of  the  Nile.  When  we  consider  the  narrowness  of  this 
sea ;  the  numerous  vessels  in  the  French  fleet ;  the  actual  crossing  of  the  two 
fleets  on  a  certain  night;  and  that  Nelson,  notwithstanding,  could  see  nothing 
of  the  enemy  himself,  and  hear  nothing  of  them  from  merchant  vessels,  we  may 
judge  of  the  probability  of  waylaying  our  adversary  on  the  broad  Atlantic. 

"The  escape  of  another  Toulon  fleet  in  1805;  the  long  search  for  them  in 
the  Mediterranean  by  the  same  able  officer;  the  pursuit  in  the  West  Indies; 
their  evasion  of  him  amongst  the  islands ;  the  return  to  Europe ;  his  vain  efforts 
subsequently,  along  the  coast  of  Portugal,  in  the  bay  of  Biscay,  and  off  the 
English  channel;  and  the  meeting  at  last  at  Trafalgar,  brought  about  only 
because  the  combined  fleets,  trusting  to  the  superiority  that  the  accession  of 
several  re-enforcements  had  given,  were  willing  to  try  the  issue  of  a  battle — 
these  are  instances,  of  many  that  might  be  cited,  to  show  how  small  is  the 
probability  of  encountering  upon  the  ocean  an  enemy  who  desires  to  avoid  a 
meeting,  and  how  little  the  most  untiring  zeal,  the  most  restless  activity,  the 
most  exalted  professional  skill  and  judgment,  can  do  to  lessen  the  adverse 
chances.  For  more  than  a  year,  Nelson  most  closely  watched  his  enemy,  who 
seems  to  have  got  out  of  port  as  soon  as  he  was  prepared  to  do  so,  and  without 
attracting  the  notice  of  any  of  the  blockading  squadron.  When  out,  Nelson, 
perfectly  in  the  dark  as  to  the  course  Villeneuve  had  taken,  sought  for  him  in 
vain  on  the  coast  of  Egypt.  Scattered  by  tempests,  the  French  fleet  again  took 
refuge  in  Toulon;  whence  it  again  put  to  sea,  when  refitted  and  ready,  joining 
the  Spanish  fleet  at  Cadiz. 

"  On  the  courage,  skill,  vigilance,  and  judgment,  acceded  on  all  hands  to  belong 
in  a  pre-eminent  degree  to  the  naval  profession  in  this  country,  this  system  of 
defence  relies  to  accomplish,  against  a  string  of  chances,  objects  of  importance 
so  great  that  not  a  doubt  of  misgiving  as  to  the  result  is  admissible.  It  de- 
mands of  the  navy  to  do  perfectly,  and  without  fail,  that  which,  to  do  at  all, 
seems  impossible.  The  navy  is  required  to  know  the  secret  purposes  of  the 
enemy,  in  spite  of  distance,  and  the  broken  intercourse  of  a  state  of  war,  even 
before  these  purposes  are  known  to  the  leader  who  is  to  execute  them ;  nay, 
more,  before  the  purpose  itself  is  formed.  On  an  element  where  man  is  but  the 
sport  of  storms,  the  navy  is  required  to  lie  in  wait  for  the  foe  at  the  exact  spot 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  275 

and  moment,  in  spite  of  weather  and  seasons ;  to  see  him  in  spite  of  fogs  and 
darkness. 

"Finally,  after  all  the  devices  and  reliances  of  the  system  are  satisfactorily 
accomplished,  and  all  difficulties  subdued,  it  submits  to  the  issue  of  a  single 
battle,  on  equal  terms,  the  fate  of  the  war,  having  no  hope  or  resource  beyond. 

"  The  proper  duty  of  our  navy  is,  not  coast  or  river  defence ;  it  has  a  more 
glorious  sphere — that  of  the  offensive.  In  our  last  war,  instead  of  lying  in  har- 
bor and  contenting  themselves  with  keeping  a  few  more  of  the  enemy's  vessels 
in  watch  over  them  than  their  own  number — instead  of  leaving  the  enemy's 
commerce  in  undisturbed  enjoyment  of  the  sea,  and  our  commerce  without  coun- 
tenance or  aid — they  scattered  themselves  over  the  wide  surface  of  the  ocean, 
penetrated  to  the  most  remote  seas,  everywhere  acting  with  the  most  brilliant 
success  against  the  enemy's  navigation.  And  we  believe,  moreover,  that  in  the 
amount  of  enemy's  property  thus  destroyed,  of  American  property  protected  or 
recovered,  and  in  the  number  of  hostile  ships  kept  in  pursuit  of  our  scattered 
vessels,  ships  evaded  if  superior,  and  beaten  if  equal — they  rendered  benefits 
a  thousand-fold  greater,  to  say  nothing  of  the  glory  they  acquired  for  the  na- 
tion, and  the  character  they  imparted  to  it,  than  any  that  would  have  resulted 
from  a  state  of  passiveness  within  the  harbors. 

"  Confident  that  this  is  the  true  policy  as  regards  the  employment  of  the 
navy  proper,  we  doubt  not  that  it  will  in  the  future  be  acted  on,  as  it  has  been 
in  the  past ;  and  that  the  results,  as  regards  both  honor  and  advantage,  will  be 
expanded  commeusurately  with  its  own  enlargement. 

"  In  order,  however,  that  the  navy  may  always  assume  and  maintain  that 
active  and  energetic  deportment,  in  offensive  operations,  which  is  at  the  same 
time  so  consistent  with  its  functions,  and  so  consonant  with  its  spirit,  we  have 
shown  that  it  must  not  be  occupied  with  mere  coast  defence." 

As  there  is  but  little  probability  that  our  naval  power,  no  matter  how  great 
that  power  may  be,  will  meet  the  enemy  at  sea  in  sufficient  force  to  destroy  any 
large  and  well-concerted  expedition,  we  must  prepare  to  meet  him  on  the  shore, 
and  repel  his  attacks.  To  determine  the  best  means  of  accomplishing  this,  let 
us  consult  past  experience.  We  shall  quote  exclusively  from  English  history, 
during  the  wars  of  the  French  revolution,  inasmuch  as  the  British  navy  was  then 
the  most  powerful  in  the  world,  and  their  maritime  descents  are  almost  the  only 
ones  which  have  ever  been  attended  with  the  least  shadow  of  success. 

In  1795,  a  maritime  expedition  was  fitted  out  against  Quiberon,  at  an  expense 
of  $8,000,000.  This  part  of  the  coast  had  then  a  naval  defence  of  near  thirty 
sail,  carrying  about  1,600  guns.  Lord  Bridgeport  attacked  it  with  fourteen  saili 
of  the  line,  five  frigates,  and  some  smaller  vessels,  about  1,500  guns  in  all,  cap- 
tured a  portion  of  the  fleet,  and  forced  the  remainder  to  seek  shelter  under  the 
guns  of  F Orient.  The  naval  defence  being  destroyed,  the  British  entered  Qui- 
beron without  opposition.  This  bay  is  said  by  Brenton,  in  his  British  Naval 
History,  to  be  "  the  finest  on  the  coast  of  France,  or  perhaps  in  the  world,  for 
landing  an  army." 

Besides  the  natural  advantages  of  naval  supplies,  the  inhabitants  of  the  sur- 
rounding country  were  in  open  insurrection,  ready  to  receive  the  invaders  with 
open  arms.  The  Chouans  and  Vendeans  offered  their  co-operation,  and  a  large 
body  of  royalists  in  the  south  of  France  were  favorable  to  the  enterprise.  A 
body  of  10,000  troops  were  landed,  and  arms  and  clothing  furnished  to  as  many 
more  Chouan  troops ;  but  they  failed  in  their  attack  upon  St.  Barbe ;  and  Gen- 
eral Hoche,  from  his  intrenchments,  with  7,000  men,  held  in  check  a  body  of 
18,000,  penned  up  without  defences  in  the  narrow  peninsula.  Re-enforced  by  a 
new  debarkation,  the  allies  again  attempted  to  advance,  but  were  soon  defeated 
and  nearly  destroyed. 

In  1799,  the  English  and  Russians  made  a  descent  upon  Holland,  with  a  fleet 


276  FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

of  fourteen  ships  of  the  line  and  ten  frigates,  carrying  about  1,100  guns,  and  a 
great  number  of  transports,  with  an  army  of  36,000  men.  The  first  division 
was  detained  some  two  weeks  off  the  coast  by  tempestuous  weather,  and  the 
whole  force  landed  in  detachments  at  some  days'  interval.  A  considerable 
party  of  Orangemen  favored  the  landing,  and  the  Prince  of  Orange  himself  made 
a  demonstration  on  the  frontiers  of  Frise.  The  Dutch  naval  defences  consisted 
of  eight  ships-of-the-line,  three  fifty-four  gun  ships,  eight  forty-eight,  and  eight 
smaller  frigates,  carrying  in  all  about  1,200  guns  ;  but  this  force  contributed  little 
or  nothing  to  the  defence,  and  soon  hoisted  the  hostile  flag.  The  defensive  army 
was  at  first  only  12,000  men,  but  the  Republicans  afterwards  increased  it  to  22,000, 
and  finally  to  28,000  men.  Several  undecisive  battles  were  fought,  but  the  allies 
failed  to  get  possession  of  a  single  -strong  place,  and,  after  a  loss  of  6,000  men, 
were  compelled  to  capitulate.  "  Such,"  says  Alison,  "  was  the  disastrous  issue 
of  the  greatest  expedition  which  had  yet  sailed  from  the  British  harbors  during 
the  war."- 

In  1801,  Nelson,  with  three  ships-of-the-line,  two  frigates,  and  thirty-five 
smaller  vessels  and  bombs,  made  a  desperate  attack  upon  the  harbor  of  Bou- 
longe,  but  was  repulsed  with  severe  loss. 

Passing  over  some  unimportant  attacks,  we  come  to  the  descent  upon  the 
Scheldt,  or,  as  it  is  commonly  called,  the  Walcheren  expedition,  in  1809.  This 
expedition,  though  a  failure,  has  often  been  referred  to  as  proving  the  expedi- 
ency of  maritime  descents,  and  the  ease  with  which  naval  forces  can  sail  past 
fortifications,  or  reduce  them  to  silence.  The  following  is  a  brief  narrative  of 
the  expedition  : 

Napoleon  had  planned,  for  the  protection  of  a  maritime  force  in  the  Scheldt, 
the  construction  of  vast  fortifications,  dock  yards,  and  naval  arsenals  at  Flushing 
and  Antwerp — the  former  at  the  mouth  of  the  Scheldt,  and  the  latter  sixty  or 
seventy  miles  further  up  the  river.  The  plan  was  scarcely  commenced,  when 
the  English  attempted  to  seize  upon  the  defences  and  capture  or  destroy  the 
naval  force.  Flushing  was  but  ill  secured,  and  Antwerp  was  at  this  time  entirely 
defenceless.  The  rampart  was  unarmed  with  cannon,  dilapidated,  and  tottering, 
and  its  garrison  consisted  of  only  about  200  invalids  and  recruits.  Napoleon's 
regular  army  was  employed  on  the  Danube  and  in  the  Peninsula.  The  attacking 
force  consisted  of  37  ships-of-the-line,  23  frigates,  33  sloops  of  war,  28  gun, 
mortar,  and  bomb  vessels,  36  smaller  vessels,  and  87  gunboats,  and  innumerable 
transports,  with  over  40,000  troops,  and  an  immense  artillery  train ;  making  in 
all,  says  Alison,  "  an  hundred  thousand  combatants."  The  land  force  alone  was 
dearly  equal  to  the  army  of  Wellington  at  Waterloo.  A  landing  was  made  upon 
the  island  of  Walcheren,  and  siege  laid  to  Flushing,  which  surrendered  eighteen 
days  after  the  landing,  and  two  days  after  the  opening  of  the  siege  batteries. 
These  batteries  were  armed  with  fifty-two  heavy  guns ;  the  attack  upon  the 
water  front  was  made  by  seven  or  eight  ships-of-the-line  and  a  large  flotilla  of 
bomb  vessels.  The  channel  at  the  mouth  of  the  river  was  too  broad  to  be  de- 
fended by  Flushing,  and  the  main  portion  of  the  fleet  passed  out  of  reach  of  the 
guns,  and  ascended  the  Scheldt.  Twenty-eight  days  after  the  first  disembarka- 
tion the  headquarters  had  advanced  about  half  way  to  Antwerp  ;  but  this  place 
was  now  repaired  ;  the  French  and  Dutch  fleets  (which,  on  the  arrival  of  the 
English,  were  off  the  mouth  of  the  river  as  a  home  squadron)  had  been  removed 
above  the  city  for  safety,  and  a  land  army  assembled  in  large  numbers.  The 
English  gradually  retired,  and  finally  evacuated  their  entire  conquest.  The  cost 
of  the  expedition  was  immense,  both  in  treasure  and  in  life.  It  was  certainly 
very  poorly  managed ;  but  we  cannot  help  here  noticing  the  superior  value  of 
fortifications  as  a  defence  against  such  descents.  They  did  much  to  retard  the 
operations  of  the  enemy  till  a  defensive  army  could  be  raised ;  the  works  of 
Flushing  were  never  intended  to  close  up  the  channel  of  the  Scheldt,  and  of 
course  could  not  intercept  the  passage  of  shipping.  But  they  were  not  reduced 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  277 

by  a  naval  force  as  has  sometimes  been  alleged.  Colonel  Mitchel  says,  that  the 
fleet  "  kept  tip  so  tremendous  a  fire  upon  the  batteries  that  the  French  officers, 
who  had  been  present  at  Austerlitz  and  Jena,  declared,  que  la  cannonade  in 
these  battles  had  been  a  mere  jeu  d'enfans  in  comparison.  Yet,  what  was  the 
effect  produced  on  the  defences  of  the  place  by  this  fire,  so  formidable,  to  judge 
by  the  sound  alone  ?  The  writer  can  answer  the  question  with  some  accuracy, 
for  he  went  along  the  entire  sea  line  the  very  day  after  the  capitulation  and 
found  no  part  of  the  parapet  injured  so  as  to  be  of  the  slightest  consequence,  and 
only  one  solitary  gun  dismounted,  evidently  by  the  bursting  of  a  shell,  and  which 
could  not,  of  course,  have  been  thrown  from  the  line-of-battle-ships,  but  must 
have  been  thrown  from  the  land  batteries." 

We  have  now  shown  that  a  naval  force  cannot  be  relied  on  as  the  sole  means 
of  securing  a  coast  from  naval  attacks  ;  that  maritime  descents  must  in  general 
be  limited  to  striking  some  sudden  blow  upon  an  unprotected  point*;  and  that 
fortifications  and  land  forces  are  the  best  means  of  warding  off  these  descents. 

Before  examining  the  questionof  relative  cost  of  forts  and  ships,  we  will  pass 
to  the  consideration  of  the  question  of  their  relative  power,  gun  for  gun,  when 
actually  brought  into  contact. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  this  question  does  not  at  all  involve  the  expe- 
diency of  supporting  navies  and  batteries.  Both  must  be  supported ;  for  neither 
can  perform  the  duties  of  the  other,  no  matter  how  strong  it  may  be. 

Let  us  suppose  a  fair  trial  of  this  relative  strength.  The  fort  is  to  be  properly 
constructed  and  in  good  repair ;  its  guns  in  a  position  to  be  used  with  effect ;  its 
garrison  skilful  and  efficient ;  its  commander  capable  and  brave.  The  ship  is  of 
the  very  best  character;  and  in  perfect  order ;  the  crew  disciplined  and  cour- 
ageous ;  its  commander  skilful  and  adroit ;  the  wind,  tide,  and  sea,  all  as  could 
be  desired.*  The  numbers  of  the  garrison  and  crew  are  to  be  no  more  than 
requisite,  with  no  unnecessary  exposure  of  human  life  to  swell  the  list  of  the 
slain.  The  issue  of  this  contest,  unlesss  attended  with  extraordinary  and  easily 
distinguishable  circumstances,  would  be  a  fair  test  of  their  relative  strength. 

What  result  should  we  anticipate,  from  the  nature  of  the  contending  forces  ? 
The  ship,  under  the  circumstances  we  have  supposed,  can  choose  her  point  of 
attack,  selecting  the  one  she  may  deem  the  most  vulnerable ;  but  she  herself  is 
everywhere  vulnerable ;  her  men  and  guns  are  much  concentrated,  and  conse- 
quently much  exposed. 

But  in  the  fort,  "  it  is  only  the  gun,  a  small  part  of  the  carriage,  and  now  or 
then  a  head  or  an  arm  raised  above  the  parapet,  that  can  be  hurt ;  the  ratio  of 
the  exposed  surfaces  being  not  less  than  Jiftcen  or  twenty  to  one.  Next,  there 
is  always  more  or  less  motion  in  the  water,  so  that  the  ship's  gun,  although  it 
may  have  been  pointed  accurately  at  one  moment,  at  the  next  will  be  thrown 
entirely  away  from  its  object,  even  when  the  .motion  of  the  ship  is  too  small  to 
be  otherwise  noticed ;  whereas  in  the  battery  the  gun  will  be  fired  just  as  it  is 
pointed,  and  the  motion  of  the  ship  will  merely  vary  to  the  extent  of  a  few  inches, 
or  at  most  two  or  three  feet,  from  the  spot  in  which  the  shot  is  to  be  received. 
In  the  ship,  there  are,  besides,  many  points  exposed  that  may  be  called  vital 
points.  By  losing  her  rudder,  or  portions  of  her  rigging,  or  of  her  spars,  she 
may  become  unmanageable  and  unable  to  use  her  strength ;  she  may  receive 
shots  under  water  and  be  liable  to  sink  ;  she  may  receive  hot  shot  and  be  set  on 
fire.  These  damages  are  in  addition  to  those  of  having  her  guns  dismounted 
and  her  people  killed  by  the  shots  that  pierce  her  sides,  and  scatter  splinters 
from  her  timbers — while  the  risks  of  the  battery  are  confined  to  those  mentioned 
above,  namely,  the  risk  that  the  gun,  the  carriage,  or  the  men  may  be  struck." 

The  opinions  of  military  writers  and  the  facts  of  history  fully  accord  with 

°  These  conditions  for  the  battery  are  easily  satisfied  ;  but  for  the  ship,  are  partly  depend- 
ent on  the  elements,  and  seldom  to  be  wholly  obtained. 


278  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

these  deductions  of  theory.  Some  few  individuals,  mistaking  or  misstating  the 
facts  of  a  few  recent  trials,  assert  that  modern  improvements  in  the  naval  service 
have  so  far  outstripped  the  progress  in  the  art  of  land  defence  that  a  floating 
force  is  now  abundantly  able  to  cope,  upon  equal  terms,  with  a  land  battery. 
Ignorant  and  superficial  persons,  hearing  merely  that  certain  forts  had  recently 
yielded  to  a  naval  force,  and  taking  no  trouble  to  learn  the  real  facts  of  the  case, 
have  paraded  them  before  the  public  as  proofs  positive  of  a  new  era  in  military 
science.  This  conclusion,  however  groundless  and  absurd,  has  received  credit 
with  us  merely  from  its  novelty.  The  Americans  are  often  attracted  by  what 
is  new  and  plausible ;  old  theories  and  established  principles  are  frequently 
regarded  so  much  the  less  for  their  antiquity,  notwithstanding  the  proofs  and 
arguments  which  time  has  thrown  around  them. 

In  the  Apalachicola  document  are  embodied  many  crudities  long  since  repu- 
diated in  *the  theories  and  banished  from  the  practice  of  the  old  world. 

The  report  consists  of  three  or  four  pages  of  a  survey  of  the  bays  of  Apa- 
lachicola, St.  Joseph's,  St.  Andrew's,  Ship  island,  and  Tampa,  and  30  pages 
of  an  attempt  to  prove  the  worthlessness  of  fortifications  and  the  superior  effi- 
ciency of  naval  defences.  We  shall  comment  only  upon  the  propositions  con- 
tained in  this  portion  of  the  document,  viz  :  "  That  whatever  policy  we  adopt 
must  and  ought  to  be  nearly  exclusive  in  its  application ;  "  "  that  our  defensive 
policy  should  be  by  naval  means ;  "  "  that  the  system  of  fortifications  recom- 
mended by  Mr.  Poinsett  in  1839,  and  by  Mr.  Bell  and  Mr.  Spencer  in  1841,  is 
intended  to  lay  the  foundation  of  a  great  military  power,  to  cover  the  country 
with  castles,  '  dangerous  to  freedom, '  but  utterly  worthless  in  defence ;  "  "  that 
fortifications  are  useless,  nay,  dangerous  without  an  army  educated  to  defend 
them,  and  of  competent  numbers ;  "  "  that  for  the  true  interests  of  the  country, 
it  had  been  better  that  we  had  never  known  this  system,  and  that  the  further 
prosecution  of  it  should  be  abandoned  ;  "  "  that  we  had  better  blow  into  air 
and  leave  in  ruins,  citadels  which  command  our  cities  with  their  guns  and  con- 
trol our  harbors,  that  might  and  probably  would  be  seized  upon  by  an  excited 
populace  for  lawless  purposes  ;  "  "  that  fortifications  do  not  and  cannot  success- 
fully resist  the  attacks  of  ships ;  "  and  that  "  they  must  henceforth  be  con- 
structed beyond  the  reach  of  fleets  to  be  even  secure." 

This  report  further  says  there  is  scarcely  a  port  in  the  old  or  new  world 
which  has  not  been  forcibly  entered  by  hostile  fleets  and  fallen  before  their 
broadsides  !  In  support  of  these  broad  assertions  the  following  successful  naval 
attacks  are  adduced,  viz  : 

Jamaica  in  Cromwell's  time,  Rio  Janeiro,  Carthagena  in  1565,  [1585 1  ] 
1697,  1706,  and  1741;  Porto  Bello  in  1740,  Guadaloupe  in  1759  and  1794, 
Martinique,  Havana,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  Malta,  Curacoa,  Chagres  in  1841, 
Senegal  and  Mocha,  Java,  Sumatra,  and  "  the  rich  city  or  Manilla,"  Madras, 
Calcutta,  Pondicherry  and  Ceylon,  Gibraltar,  Copenhagen,  Constantinople,  Al- 
giers, San  Juan  d'Ulloa,  St.  Jean  d'Acre,  Louisburg,  Quebec,  Bed  Hook, 
Washington  and  Baltimore,  Charleston  and  Mobile. 

Let  us  now  examine  these  cases,  and  see  if  they  authorize  the  inferences 
drawn  from  them  by  the  report. 

"  Jamaica,  by  a  British  fleet,  in  Cromwell's  time" — In  the  reduction  of  Ja- 
maica in  1655,  no  trial  of  strength  was  made  between  the  ships  and  forts ;  it 
was  effected  almost  wholly  by  the  army  of  General  Venobles,  which  amounted 
to  about  5,000  men.  The  defensive  army  was  forced  to  capitulate  and  the 
principal  place  surrendered  by  treaty.  So  little  assistance  was  rendered  to  the 
army  by  the  fleet  that  one  of  the  commissioners  openly  declared,  "  he  suspected 
they  were  betrayed."  And  this  same  naval  force  of  30  ships,  under  Admire! 
Penn,  also  made  an  attack  on  Hispaniola,  but  after  a  contest  of  some  two  weeks, 
was  repulsed  with  great  loss. 

"  Rio  Janeiro,  taken  by  Duguy  Truin,  with  a  small  fleet"  fyc. — Truin  did 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  279 

really  sail  into  the  harbor  of  Rio  Janeiro  in  1711,  in  spite  of  the  little  defences 
at  the  entrance,  but  that  passage  cost  him  the  loss  of  300  men  out  of  his  small 
fleet.  He  did  not  stop  to  test  the  question  of  strength,  but  sailed  past  with  all 
possible  speed.  His  troops  were  landed  and  batteries  erected  on  shore, 
but  neither  soldiers  nor  inhabitants  remained  to  fight,  they  had  fled  to  the 
mountains. 

CarthageTia. — The  taking  of  this  place  in  1585  was  effected  entirely  by  land 
troops.  The  fleet  merely  acted  as  transports  and  took  no  part  in  the  contest. 
The  conquest  of  this  place  by  the  French  in  1697  was  also  effected  by  land 
forces,  the  ships  again  acting  merely  as  transports.  The  heavy  train  of  land 
artilery  made  a  breach  in  the  walls  of  the  town,  through  which  the  assault  was 
made.  The  Carthagena  taken  in  1706  was  the  place  of  that  name  in  old  Spain, 
but  this  was  an  operation  purely  political,  no  defence  whatever  being  made.  In 
the  words  of  Dr.  Campbell,  "  information  being  received  that  the  inhabitants  of 
Carthagena  wished  only  for  the  presence  of  the  [English]  fleet  and  an  opportu- 
nity of  declaring  for  King  Charles  III,  it  was  determined  to  steer  thither." 
"  The  fleet  arrived  on  the  1st  of  June,  and  the  conditions  of  surrender  were 
finally  settled  on  the  following  day." 

The  attack  in  1741  was  a  total  failure,  though  made  with  30  ships-of-the- 
line  and  numerous  smaller  vessels — 124  sail  in  all,  carrying  2,682  guns,  16,000 
seamen  and  12,000  troops.  The  defences  of  Carthagena  consisted  of  10  forts 
and  batteries,  9  of  which  (the  armament  of  the  10th  not  known)  carried  222 
guns  of  all  calibres ;  but  a  part  of  this  number  of  guns  were  too  small  to  reach 
the  ships  at  any  considerable  distance.  Of  these  9  forts,  one  (of  85  guns)  was 
unfinished,  two  (together  71  guns)  were  blown  up  before  attacked,  and  only  a 
part  of  the  guns  were  mounted  in  one  of  fascine  batteries  (of  15  guns.)  Car- 
thagena itself  was  armed  with  160  guns,  but  the  only  attack  made  upon  it  was 
an  experimental  one  by  a  floating  battery.  The  several  garrisons  of  these  forts 
amounted  to  only  4,000  men.  The  siege  continued  forty  days,  when  the  British 
re-embarked  their  troops  and  retired  with  a  severe  loss.  In  the  single  attempt 
to  take  fort  St.  Lazar  the  loss  amounted  to  over  600  men. 

Carthagena  had  been  bombarded  in  1740,  for  three  days,  by  a  fleet  of  nine 
sail-of-the-line,  carrying  between  five  and  six  hundred  guns,  and  near  4,000 
men,  but  the  forts  were  unharmed,  and  the  bombardment  "  had  no  other  effect 
than  that  of  terrifying  the  inhabitants  and  injuring  some  churches  and  con- 
vents." The  ships,  however,  were  so  much  injured  as  to  render  it  necessary 
for  them  to  return  to  Porto  Bello  for  repairs. 

"  Porto  Bello  taken  by  Admiral  Vernon  in  1740." — Vernon's  fleet  here  con- 
sisted of  six  sail  of  the  line,  carrying  380  guns  and  2,495  men,  and  a  small  land 
force.  The  attack  was  first  made  upon  Fort  Iron,  which  carried  78  guns  and 
a  lower  battery  of  22  guns  ;  the  garrison  amounted  to  less  than  300  men  in  all. 
It  was  begun  by  the  Hampton  Court,  of  70  guns  and  495  men,  firing  400  balls 
in  the  first  25  minutes.  The  other  ships  st>on  followed,  but  their  united  efforts 
being  unable  to  effect  a  breach  in  the  walls  of  the  fort,  a  body  of  sailors  and, 
soldiers  were  directed  to  attack  it  on  the  land  side.  These  soldiers  climbed' 
into  the  embrasures  on  each  other's  shoulders,  and  reduced  the  garrison  by  a  fire 
of  musketry;  those  who  capitulated  being  only  40  in  number*  including  botl*; 
officers  and  privates;  the  remainder  had  fled.  Gloria  Castle  and  the  other  bat- 
tery in  the  further  part  of  the  harbor  were  neither  of  them  attacked  ;  together 
they  carried  120  guns  in  all  and  a  garrison  of  400  men.  Dr.  Campbell,  in  his. 
British  Naval  History,  says  :  "  It  must  be  confessed  that  the  easy  conquest  oi 
Admiral  Vernon  and  his  command  is  to  be  in  part  attributed  to  the  cowardice 
of  the  Spaniards  in  surrendering  the  first  fort  before  a  breach  was  made,  and 
the  other  two  before  they  were  attacked.  Gloria  Castle  might  have  sustained  a. 
long  siege,  and  the  batteries  in  that  and  St,  Jeronimo,  if  properly  served,  would 
have  rendered  the  entrance  into  the  harbor  exceedingly  dangerous,  if  not  im» 


280  FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

practicable."  Another  English  writer  of  equal  authority  says  :  "  The  Span- 
iards deserted  their  forts,  and  such  was  their  pusillanimity  that  they  suffered 
them  to  be  taken  without  bloodshed.  Vernon  found  more  difficulty  in  demol- 
ishing the  fortifications  of  the  place  than  in  taking  them." 

An  attempt  had  previously  been  made  by  Admiral  Hosier,  with  a  large 
English  squadron,  to  reduce  this  place;  but,  says  Dr.  Campbell,  "after  a  siege 
of  six  months  or  more,  he  weighed  anchor,  and  sailed  for  Jamaica,  after  such  a 
loss  of  men,  and  in  so  wretched  a  condition,  that-  1  cannot  prevail  on  myself  to 
enter  into  the  particulars  of  a  disaster  which  I  heartily  wish  could  be  blotted 
out  of  the  annals  and  of  the  remembrance  of  this  nation."  So  much  for  the 
naval  attacks  on  Porto  Bello. 

"  Among  the  rest,  the  island  of  Guadeloupe  is  remarkably  in  point"  8fc.  — 
The  attacks  quoted  in  the  report  are  those  of  1759  and  1794.  The  first  was 
made  by  Commodore  Moore,  with  10  ships-of-the-line,  some  frigates  and  gun 
vessels,  carrying  about  1,000  guns,  and  60  transports,  with  800  marines,  and  a 
land  force  of  six  regiments  of  the  line,  a  detachment  of  engineers  and  artiller- 
ists, and  a  large  number  of  volunteers  from  the  English  islands  —  in  all,  about 
6,000  men.  The  defences  consisted  of  a  citadel  and  several  open  water  batter- 
ies, carrying  in  all,  about  100  guns.  The  several  garrisons  were  composed  of 
"five  companies  of  regular  troops,  scarce  making  100  men  in  the  whole  island." 
The  ships  and  batteries  were  here  actually  brought  into  contact,  and  the  follow- 
ing is  the  order  of  the  engagement,  so  far  as  given  by  the  English  writers 
themselves  : 

British  ships.  No.  guns.  Batteries.     No.  guns. 

The  Leon  .................  60      engaged  with  ........  1st  battery         9 


Berwick  ..............  74      engaged  with  ........  4th  battery         7 

Rippon  ...............  60      engaged  with  ........  5th  battery         6 

St.  George  ............  90  } 

Cambridge  ............  SO  >  engaged  with  ........  Citadel  47 

Norfolk....  ...........  74) 

How  the  other  ships  and  batteries  were  engaged,  or  whether  engaged  at  all, 
is  not  stated.  Some  of  the  English  writers  state  the  armament  of  the  citadel 
at  43  guns,  and  that  of  the  Berwick  ship  at  66  —  an  unimportant  difference;  all 
agree  upon  the  other  points. 

Here  was  a  naval  force  of  7  to  1,  (we  count  both  broadsides  of  the  engaged 
ships,  and  also  all  the  guns  of  the  engaged  forts,  both  those  for  the  land  and 
water  defences,)  and  what  was  the  result  ?  Some  of  the  batteries  were  injured; 
but  the  citadel,  though  attacked  by  a  force  of  more  than  5  to  1,  had,  according 
to  Beatson,  neither  its  walls  injured  nor  its  guns  dismounted.  The  garrison 
was  driven  out  by  the  bravery  of  the  British  forces  on  land;  the  town  was 
taken,  and  the  whole  island  finally  subdued,  after  a  contest  of  a  little  over  three 
months.  All  this  is  well  known  ;  and  it  is  also  well  known,  to  those  who  have 
taken  the  trouble  to  examine  the  facts  of  the  case,  that  there  is  nothing  in  it  to 
justify  a  single  inference  in  favor  of  the  superiority  of  guns  afloat  over  those  on 
shore. 

The  reduction  of  Guadaloupe,  in  1794,  was  almost  wholly  effected  upon  land. 
The  force  sent  out  upon  this  expedition  consisted  of  18  vessels-of-war,  carrying 
between  700  and  800  guns,  and  nearly  7,000  troops.  A  part  of  these  troops 
were  landed  near  some  small  batteries,  under  the  fire  of  the  Winchelsea;  but 
the  principal  defences  of  the  place  being  almost  entirely  without  garrisons,  were 
carried  by  the  enemy's  land  forces.  The  English  left  a  large  squadron  for  the 
defence  of  the  island;  but,  notwithstanding  this,  the  French  found  the  means  of 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  281 

evading  them,  and  reorganizing  their  forts,  which,  being  now  properly  defended, 
repelled  the  combined  attacks  of  Admiral  Jervis  and  General  Grey. 

Martinique. — The  same  combined  sea  and  land  forces,  under  Commodore 
Moore,  which  attacked  Guadaloupe  in  1759,  also  made  an  attack  upon  Mar- 
tinique in  the  same  year.  Notwithstanding  the  great  superiority  of  the  attack- 
ing force  over  the  land  forces  of  Port  Royal,  the  several  attempts  of  the  British  to 
silence  the  batteries,  and  effect  a  lodgement  by  land,  were  altogether  ineffectual, 
and  the  enemy  was  at  last  compelled  to  re-embark  his  troops,  and  retire  from  the 
contest,  with  several  of  his  vessels  seriously  injured,  and  many  of  his  men  killed 
and  wounded.  The  fleet  afterwards  sailed  to  St.  Pierre,  for  the  purpose  of  at- 
tempting that  part  of  the  island;  but,  after  a  reconnoissance  of  the  place,  the 
commodore  decided  against  it,  because,  said  he,  "the  ships  may  be  so  much  in- 
jured in  the  attack  as  to  prevent  them  from  availing  themselves  of  their  success, 
and  from  undertaking  any  other  expedition  during  the  season." 

While  the  French  population  of  Martinique,  in  1793,  were  distracted  by  the 
same  political  differences  which  were  then  deluging  the  mother  country  in  blood, 
England  attempted  to  capture  the  island,  through  the  assistance  of  the  royalist 
party.  The  British  attacking  force  consisted  of  five  ships-of-the-line  and  three 
smaller  vessels,  496  guns  in  all,  and  a  land  force  of  3,000  men,  of  which  1,100 
were  regulars;  (some  writers  estimate  this  land  force  at  only  2,000  men.)  Gen- 
eral Rochambeau,  it  is  said,  had  "only  a  few  hundred  troops"  for  the  defence  of 
the  batteries ;  nevertheless,  he  most  signally  repulsed  the  enemy,  and  compelled 
him  to  abandon  the  island. 

But  the  English  returned  again  in  1794,  with  a  superior  force;  their  fleet  now 
consisted  of  eighteen  vessels-of-war,  carrying  between  700  and  800  guns,  and 
a  number  of  transports  with  near  7,000  troops.  General  Rochambeau's  army 
amounted  to  only  600  men,  of  whom  400  were  militia.  The  British  naval  force, 
notwithstanding  its  immense  superiority,  did  not  attempt  to  force  its  way  into 
the  harbor,  and  attack  the  forts.  On  the  contrary,  the  troops  were  first  landed 
upon  other  parts  of  the  island,  and  took  possession  of  Point  Solomon,  Pigeon 
island,  Casnavire,  and  several  other  batteries;  thus  "opening,"  says  an  English 
writer,  "a  way  for  the  British  fleet  to  advance."  The  other  forts  were  regularly 
besieged  on  the  land  side ;  siege  batteries  were  erected  within  200  yards  of  Fort 
Louis,  and  others  within  500  yards  of  Fort  Bourbon.  When  Fort  Louis  had 
been  fired  upon  for  48  hours  by  these  siege  batteries,  and  bombarded  by  the  gun 
boats,  the  Asia,  of  64  guns,  and  the  Zebra,  of  16  guns,  advanced  to  take  a  part 
in  the  attack.  The  former  was  twice  driven  back  by  the  fire  of  the  fort ;  the 
latter  ran  aground  near  by ;  her  crew  landed  and  assisted  in  the  capture  of  the 
fort,  Captain  de  Rouvignee  coming  up  at  the  same  time  on  the  opposite  side 
with  a  body  of  infantry  and  some  field  pieces.  The  other  forts  were  taken  in 
the  regular  operations  of  a  land  siege,  being  reduced  mainly  by  the  "heavy 
British  batteries  in  the  second  parallel."  This  siege  lasted  seven  weeks,  and 
the  entire  loss  of  the  British  in  killed  and  wounded  was  318 — equal  to  one-half 
of  the  defensive  army. 

The  Apalachicola  report,  apparently  forgetting  the  previous  unsuccessful 
naval  attacks  upon  Martinique,  adduces  this  attack  of  1794  as  an  example  of 
the  superiority  of  guns  afloat.  "The  joint  attack  upon  St.  Louis,"  he  says, 
"  was  anticipated  by  Captain  Faulkner,  of  the  Zebra,  who  laid  his  ship  along- 
side the  fort,  and  carried  it  at  the  head  of  his  crew." 

This  is  an  error.  Captain  Faulkner  was  assisted  by  a  land  force,  and  was 
himself  anticipated,  even  in  the  attack,  by  the  crews  of  the  boats.  It  was  at 
first  supposed  that  he  preceded  these,  and  it  was  so  stated  in  Sir  John  Jervis's 
despatches  ;  but  the  error  was  afterwards  corrected.  James,  in  his  Naval  His- 
tory, gives  the  corrected  version  of  the  affair,  and  says  :  "  The  boats  commanded 
by  Captains  Nugent  and  Riou,  containing  as  many  as  1,200  men,  pushed  across 
the  Carenage  before  the  Zebra  could  get  in,  and  stormed  and  took  possession  of 


282  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

Fort  Royal."  The  correction,  however,  is  of  little  importance  to  this  discussion. 
The  contest  was  in  no  way  one  between  ships  and  batteries.  The  defences  of 
the  island  were  taken  by  an  overwhelming  land  force.  Rochambeau,  although 
his  army  was  much  inferior  in  numbers,  made  a  defence  which  was  far  from 
being  satisfactory  to  the  republican  government.  Being  regarded  as  a  traitor  to 
his  country,  he  never  ventured  to  return  to  France. 

Political  animosities  run  so  high  that  the  French  generals  would  not  act  in 
concert ;  and,  on  the  retreat,  the  forces  of  General  Bellegarde  were  refused  ad- 
mittance into  the  fort.  Dr.  Campbell  expressly  states,  that  the  conquest  was 
attempted  "  in  consequence  of  the  disputes  which  existed  between  the  royalists 
and  republicans." 

"  Havana,  attacked  and  taken  in  1763  by  Admiral  Pocock  ;  "  the  "  castle  on 
the  beach  was  Jirst  silenced  by  Captain  Harvey,  in  the  Dragon,"  fyc.  The 
taking  of  Havana,  mentioned  above,  was  effected  almost  entirely  by  land  forces, 
under  Lord  Albemarle,  the  ships  acting  as  transports.  The  following  details  of 
this  attack  are  taken  from  the  British  reports  and  histories  of  the  affair :  The 
attacking  force  consisted  of  22  or  23  ships-of-the-line,  carrying  near  1,600  guns; 
20  frigates,  carrying  about  600  guns ;  a  large  number  of  sloops-of-war,  bomb 
vessels,  artillery  ships,  and  transports — 203  sail  in  all — with  a  land  force  of 
12,000  efficient  men,  and  a  considerable  body  of  negroes.  The  Havana  was 
defended  by  4,610  regulars,  and  some  militia,  mulattoes,  and  negroes — number 
not  known.  The  naval  defences  consisted  of  12  ships-of-the-line,  carrying  784 
guns,  and  5  smaller  vessels,  making  in  all  908  guns.  But  little  or  no  use  was 
made  of  this  home  squadron  in  the  defence,  and  it  was  surrendered  to  the  enemy 
on  the  capitulation.  "  So  little  confidence,"  says  the  British  account,  "  had 
they  (the  Spaniards)  in  their  shipping,  for  resisting  the  efforts  of  the  English 
armament,  that  the  only  use  they  made  of  it  was  to  sink  three  of  their  largest 
vessels  behind  a  boom,  which  they  had  thrown  across  the  mouth  of  the  harbor." 
The  defences  against  a  water  attack  consisted  of  the  Governor's  battery  of  22 
guns,  the  Apostles  and  Shepherds'  batteries  of  14  guns,  the  Moro  of  40  guns, 
and  the  Punta,  a  small  work  opposite.  The  works  of  Havana  against  a  land 
attack  were  large,  but  not  strong.  The  principal  defence  both  by  land  and 
water  was  the  Moro,  which  was  a  small  work,  armed  with  only  40  guns  of  all 
descriptions,  and  garrisoned  by  280  regulars,  300  marines,  and  94  negroes. 

The  British  troops  were  landed  several  miles  from  the  Moro,  to  which  they 
laid  formal  siege,  and,  forty-four  days  after  the  opening  of  the  trenches,  forced 
it  to  capitulate.  The  town  of  Havana  also  capitulated  after  a  siege  of  "two 
months  and  eight  days."  The  "  castle  on  the  beach,"  said  to  have  been 
"  silenced  by  Captain  Harvey,  in  the  Dragon,"  was  a  small  unimportant  work, 
some  six  miles  from  the  Havana,  and  used  merely  to  harass  the  English  while 
crossing  the  Coximar.  Little  or  no  defence  was  made,  and  the  English  them- 
selves have  never  thought  of  claiming  the  slightest  credit  for  its  capture.  No 
loss  is  mentioned  as  having  been  sustained  on  either  side ;  but  "  Captain  Har- 
vey, in  the  Dragon,"  and  two  other  shpis-of-the-line,  carrying  in  all  3-22  guns, 
did,  during  the  land  siege  of  the  Moro,  make  an  attack  upon  its  water  front. 
"  They  began,"  says  the  official  report  of  Admiral  Pocock,  "  to  cannonade  about 
8  o'clock ;  and  after  keeping  up  a  constant  fire  till  2  p.  m.,  the  Cambridge  was 
so  much  damaged  in  her  hull,  masts,  yards,  sails,  and  rigging,  with  the  loss  of 
so  many  men  killed  and  wounded,  that  it  was  thought  proper  to  order  her  off; 
and  soon  after,  the  Dragon,  which  had  likewise  suffered  a  loss  of  men,  and 
damage  in  her  hull ;  and,  it  being  found  that  the  Marlborough  could  be  of  no 
longer  service,  she  was  ordered  off  likewise.  The  numbers  in  killed  and 
wounded  are  as  follows:  Dragon — 16  killed,  37  wounded;  Cambridge — 24 
killed,  95  wounded ;  Marlborough — 2  killed,  8  wounded."  The  castle,  on  the 
contrary,  received  no  injury  worth  mentioning  from  this  water  attack,  which 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  283 

was  the  last  and  only  important  trial  of  strength  between  the  ships  and  forts 
made  during  the  siege. 

"  The  Cape  of  Good  Hope — taken  by  the  British  fleet,  and  the  commerce  of 
tlic  States  ruined  in  those  seas." — The  conquest  here  alluded  to  was  probably 
that  of  1795 ;  but  this  was  effected  wholly  by  troops  landed  at  a  distance  from 
any  defensive  works ;  and  the  ships,  after  effecting  this  landing,  were  anchored 
in  Simon's  bay,  six  miles  from  the  encampment  of  Muysenburg,  and  at  a  con- 
siderable distance  from  Cape  Town.  The  British  fleet  carried  about  600  guns, 
and  the  only  forts  that  could  have  been  engaged  with  it  were  two  small  bat- 
teries— one  armed  with  two  guns,  and  the  other  with  one  gun  and  a  mortar. 

That  the  naval  forces  assisted  indirectly  in  this  conquest  cannot  be  denied, 
for  they  trsnsported  the  troops  which  effected  it,  and  also  met  at  sea  and  de- 
feated a  Dutch  squadron  of  eight  men-of-war,  342  guns,  which  had  been  sent 
out  to  join  in  the  defence ;  but  it  is  well  known  that  these  forces  were  never 
immediately  engaged  in  the  attack.  This  has  been  so  decided  by  judicial 
authority ;  for,  when  the  admiralty  put  in  a  claim  for  a  share  in  the  profits  of 
the  capture,  it  was  rejected  by  Sir  William  Scott,  because  no  ships  of  a  military 
character  had  assisted  the  army  in  this  valuable  capture. 

The  expedition  of  1806  consisted  of  nine  ships-of-war,  carrying  above  270 
guns,  and  5,000  troops.  But  here,  again,  the  conquest  was  effected  entirely  by 
land  forces.  A  detachment  of  sailors  and  marines  served  with  the  troops  on 
shore,  under  the  designation  of  marine  battalion;  but  the  fleet  itself  acted 
merely  in  the  capacity  of  protecting  transports,  and  no  trial  of  strength  was 
made  between  them  and  land  batteries. 

"Malta  was  taken  by  the  French  fleet,  which  sailed  into  the  harbor,  and  car- 
ried the  city  during  the  panic.'" — This  statement  of  the  conquest  of  Malta  in 
1798  certainly  furnishes  no  argument  for  the  position  in  support  of  which  it  has 
been  adduced ;  for,  if  the  island  was  lost  through  panic,  it  could  not  have  been 
taken  merely  by  the  superiority  of  guns  afloat  over  those  on  shore.  But,  in 
reality,  panic  was  not  the  cause  of  no  defence  being  made  by  the  Maltese.  It 
has  been  generally  understood  that,  preferring  the  French  to  the  English,  the 
grand  master  and  knight  had  previously  agreed  with  Napoleon  for  its  surrender. 
This  is  positively  asserted  by  the  English  historians,  and  not  contradicted  by  the 
other  parties.  The  grand  master  retired  from  the  island  on  its  capture,  for  the 
sum  of  1,000,000  livres,  and  the  promise  of  an  annual  pension  for  life,  of  3,000 
more  from  the  French  treasury.  Napoleon  himself  confesses  that,  although  he 
then  commanded  forty  vessels-of-war,  and4  0,000  troops,  he  would  have  found 
it  very  difficult  to  reduce  the  fortifications  of  Malta,  if  the  moral  strength  had 
been  any  ways  equal  to  the  capability  of  physical  resistance. 

Malta  was  attacked  by  the  Turks  in  1565  with  200  sail  and  above  40,000  troops, 
mostly  Janissaries  and  Sophis,  who  were  the  bravest  troops  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  The  island  was  defended  by  700  knights  and  8,500  soldiers.  The 
siege  was  continued  for  four  months,  and  scarcely  a  day  elapsed  without  some 
attempt  to  batter  down  or  storm  the  fortifications ;  but  the  Turks  were  at  last 
compelled  to  raise  the  siege  and  retire  with  the  loss  of  a  considerable  portion  of 
their  shipping  and  more  than  a  quarter  of  their  men — or,  in  other  words,  the 
number  of  their  losses  was  more  than  equal  to  the  garrison  of  the  island  ! 

"Curacoa  was  stormed  and  taken  by  Sir  Charles  Brisbane  with  four  small 
ships,  boarding  the  castle  at  the  entrance  from  his  boats.1' — The  following  is  the 
account  of  this  capture,  as  given  by  the  English  historians  :  Captain  Brisbane 
was  directed  "  to  watch  the  island  of  Curacoa,  and  interrupt  the  trade  of  the 
enemy.  While  employed  on  this  service,  he  learnt  that  the  Dutch  had  a  cus- 
tom of  drinking  out  the  old  year  and  drinking  in  the  new  one ;  he  therefore  con- 
ceived the  possibility  of  taking  it  by  a  coup- de-main.'1  Accordingly,  about  the 
dawn  of  day  on  the  1st  of  January,  1807,  with  a  squadron  of  four  frigates,  car- 
rying 176  guns  and  1,200  men,  he  entered  the  harbor  of  Amsterdam,  and 


284  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

anchored;  the  governor  and  his  garrison  were  at  this  time  in  bed,  made  by  the 
revels  of  the  night  utterly  unconscious  of  all  danger.  The  harbor  was  well 
secured  by  fortifications ;  but  the  only  resistance  made  by  these  was  the  firing 
of  five  shot  from  Fort  Republique.  All  of  these  shot  took  effect,  killing  and 
wounding  fifteen  men,  which  was  the  only  loss  the  British  sustained.  Captain 
Brenton,  in  his  Naval  History,  says  that  this  fort  alone  might  have  sunk  every 
one  of  the  enemy's  frigates  in  half  an  hour,  without  any  comparative  injury. 
But,  instead  of  defending  his  fortifications,  the  drunken  governor,  under  pre- 
tence of  fearing  a  negro  insurrection,  but  in  reality  not  yet  being  awoke  from 
his  revels,  forbid  any  resistance  to  be  made  to  the  English,  because,  he  said, 
they  had  come  merely  as  friends  !  The  forts  were  therefore  given  up,  and  the 
squadron  of  Dutch  ships  then  lying  in  the  harbor,  with  a  number  of  guns  al- 
most equal  to  the  British  fleet,  also  surrendered  without  opposition,  the  prinei* 
pal  portion  of  the  crews  being  yet  asleep.  The  English  themselves  say  that 
scarcely  the  slightest  resistance  was  made  by  the  drunken  crews  and  garrisons. 
The  argument  attempted  to  be  drawn  by  the  Apalachicola  report  from  this 
attack  would  be  equally  conclusive  of  the  general  superiority  of  guns  afloat  over 
each  other ;  for  the  Dutch  forts  and  ship  were  overcome  in  the  same  way — a 
conquest  due  to  Bacchus  rather  than  Mars.  No  case  could  possibly  be  ad- 
duced more  inconclusive  and  inapplicable  to  the  argument. 

"Chagres  taken  in  [1740?]  1741,  by  Admiral  Vernon" — The  British  fleet, 
at  the  taking  of  Chagres,  consisted  of  three  sixty-gun  ships,  three  fifty-gun  ships, 
three  bomb-ketches,  two  fire  ships,  and  two  tenders,  carrying  in  all,  374  guns 
and  2,500  men ;  while  the  works  of  defence  were  armed  with  only  eleven  brass 
cannon  and  eleven  pateroes,  or  small  stone  mortars — an  inequality  of  fifteen  or 
twenty  to  one.  Of  the  eleven  guns  in  the  fort,  only  six  or  eight  could  be  brought 
to  bear  on  the  shipping ;  but,  notwithstanding  the  small  armament  of  the  castle 
of  St.  Lorenzo,  "  it  sustained  a  furious  bombardment  (from  the  bomb-ketches)  and 
a  continued  cannonade  from  three  of  the  largest  ships  in  the  fleet"  for  thirty-six 
hours.  Is  there  anything  in  this  capture  to  authorize  an  inference  of  naval  su- 
periority, gun  for  gun  1 

"  Senegal  taken  from  the  English  by  a  small  French  squadron.'11 — This  cap- 
ture was  made  in  1799.  The  French  fleet  consisted  of  two  ships-of-the-line, 
two  frigates,  and  three  smaller  vessels,  with  a  considerable  body  of  troops,  un- 
der the  Duke  de  Lauzun.  The  English  garrison  was  too  small  to  sustain  an 
attack.  They  therefore  determined  to  make  no  defence,  and  the  fort  was  sur- 
rendered without  resistance.  In  the  same  year,  the  English  attempted  to  retake 
it  with  a  fleet  of  six  ships-of-the-line  and  one  smaller  vessel,  carrying  in  all  over 
400  guns.;  but  their  efforts  were  of  no  avail.  In  the  first  attack,  there  was  no 
trial  of  strength  between  the  ships  and  fort ;  in  the  second,  there  was  such  a 
trial,  and  the  forts  were  victorious. 

"Mocha,  in  Arabia,  bombarded  and  taken  by  Captain  Lumly  with  one 
frigate." — We  give  the  English  the  benefit  of  their  own  account  of  this  affair. 
The  defence  consisted  of  a  small  work,  armed  with  only  twelve  guns,  and  garri- 
soned by  about  300  Arabs.  The  character  of  the  work  may  be  drawn  from  the 
following  remark  of  the  British  officer  :  "  With  a  few  spades  and  pick-axes  we 
would  have  levelled  the  walls  and  effected  a  breach."  But  they  had  no  min- 
ing tools,  and  were  obliged  to-attempt  a  breach  with  their  guns.  The  attacking 
force  consisted  of  a  fifty-gun  frigate,  a  brig,  two  cruisers,  and  a  mortar  boat, 
with  a  land  force  of  one  company  of  artillery.  In  the  evening,  "  the  ships 
anchored  as  close  as  possible  to  the  fort,"  and  about  10  o'clock  the  next  day, 
after  a  long  and  "  brisk  cannonade,"  the  English  landed  and  attempted  to  carry 
the  little  work  by  assault :  but,  "  to  their  surprise  and  mortification,  found  there 
was  no  breach ;  the  wall  had  been  a  little  injured  by  their  shot,  but  remained  as 
firm  and  inaccessible  as  ever;"  they  were  consequently  repelled  with  a  loss  of 
thirty  men.  On  the  second  morning  they  renewed  the  assault,  but  found  no 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  285 

one  in  the  fort — the  Arabs  had  deserted.  The  ships  were  not  once  fired  upon 
by  the  fort,  and  we  suppose  there  was  no  means  of  doing  it,  for  the  cold  shot 
thrown  over  the  walls  at  the  storming  party  were  the  same  the  ships  had  fired 
into  the  work.  The  fort,  when  taken,  was  but  slightly  injured,  and  the  garri- 
son unharmed  as  long  as  they  remained  inside. 

"Sumatra,  Java,  and  the  rich  city  of  Manilla" — A  battle  was  fought  by  the 
English  and  Dutch  fleets,  in  the  harbor  of  Java,  in  1807,  but  the  land  batteries 
took  little  or  no  part  in  the  contest.  The  English  had  eight  ships-of-war,  car- 
rying four  hundred  guns ;  and  the  Dutch  only  nine  small  vessels,  carrying  one 
hundred  and  forty  guns.  The  Dutch  shipping,  including  twenty  merchant  ves- 
sels, were  destroyed.  This  place  was  again  attacked  in  1811,  by  an  army  fitted  out 
at  Madras,  numbering  a  little  more  than  twelve  thousand  men,  one-half  of  whom 
were  Europeans.  The  naval  force  consisted  of  four  ships-of-the-line,  fourteen 
frigates,  and  seven  sloops,  carrying  nine  hundred  and  twenty-two  guns ;  besides 
eight  cruisers,  fifty-seven  transports,  and  some  gunboats — making  in  all  a  fleet 
of  one  hundred  sail.  The  defence  consisted  of  the  combined  French  and  Dutch 
forces  of  Generals  Jansens  and  Daendels,  numbering  in  all  between  eight  and 
ten  thousand  men ;  but  the  latter  were  too  disaffected  with  the  French  to  be  of 
any  service  in  the  defence,  and  indeed  a  portion  of  them  soon  deserted  to  the 
new  invaders.  The  British  troops  and  a  party  of  seamen  and  marines  landed 
upon  an  undefended  part  of  the  island,  twelve  miles  from  Batavia,  attacked 
General  Jansens,  and,  after  an  obstinate  contest  of  two  months,  forced  him  to 
surrender.  The  contest  was  wholly  upon  land ;  the  ships  were  not  once  brought 
into  action  against  the  forts,  and  in  no  way  whatever  could  it  be  regarded  as  a 
naval  attack.  The  capture  of  Manilla,  alluded  to  in  the  report,  was  that,  we 
suppose,  of  1762 ;  but  this  capture  was  effected  entirely  by  land  forces,  ships 
not  entering  into  the  contest  at  all.  All  that  was  required  of  the  navy,  says 
Dr.  Campbell,  was  a  light  frigate  to  transport  Colonel  Draper  and  his  command. 
This  force  amounted  to  two  thousand  three  hundred  effective  land  troops,  and 
a  body  of  seamen  and  marines,  arranged  into  companies  like  soldiers.  The  de- 
fences of  Manilla  were  small,  incomplete,  and  garrisoned  by  only  eight  hundred 
Spaniards,  and  defended  by  some  thirty  pieces  of  brass  cannon ;  they  had  also 
two  pieces  of  field  artillery  !  The  Indians,  being  undiciplined  and  entirely  un- 
acquainted with  the  use  of  Jire-arms,  could  be  of  little  value  in  the  defence. 
The  English  writers  say  that  the  garrison  were  wholly  unprepared  for  an  at- 
tack, not  even  knowing  of  the  declaration  of  war.  The  place  was  besieged  in 
form ;  its  guns  being  silenced  by  the  land  batteries,  it  was  carried  by  a  storm- 
ing party  of  three  thousand  men,  issuing  from  the  second  parallel. 

"Madras,  Calcutta,  Pondicherry,  Ceylon,  were  all  taken  by  the  British 
fleets" — The  bare  fact  of  some  town  having  been  reduced  by  some  certain 
fleet  would  hardly  seem  decisive  of  the  general  question  of  comparative  strength ; 
yet  such  is  the  purpose  for  which  the  above  is  adduced.  There  is  not  one  single 
feature  in  the  East  India  conquests  that  can  be  regarded  as  confirming,  in  any 
degree,  the  positions  of  the  Apalachicola  report.  These  conquests  were  made 
from  the  rude  natives  of  the  country,  or  from  Europeans  while  distracted  by 
political  broils.  Ceylon,  for  instance,  was  summoned  to  surrender  to  the  crown 
of  England,  to  be  held  in  trust  for  the  stadtholder.  Columbo,  the  seat  of  gov- 
ernment, obeyed  without  the  least  resistance,  and  ordered  the  other  towns  to  do 
the  same.  The  governor  of  Trincomalle  "  merely  required  the  formation  of  a 
camp  and  the  firing  of  a  few  shot  as  a  justification  of  his  conduct  in  surren- 
dering the  fort  intrusted  to  his  command.  The  fort  of  Osnaburg,  standing  on 
a  hill,  and  commanding  the  entrance  to  the  harbor,  surrendered  without  firing  a 
shot."  When  Pondicherry  was  reduced  by  Colonel  Floyd,  in  1793,  the  fleet 
merely  acted  as  a  blockading  force,  cutting  off  all  supplies  and  reinforcements 
from  France.  The  only  breaches  in  the  fort  were  made  by  the  land  batteries  ; 
these  had  considerably  injured  it ;  "  still,  however,"  says  the  English  historian, 


286  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

"its  strength,  both  by  nature  and  art  was  such  that  the  conquest  might  have 
required  a  considerable  length  of  time,  and  been  attended  with  no  small  diffi- 
culty and  loss,  had  not  disputes  between  the  royalist  and  republican  parties 
taken  place  in  the  garrison,  in  consequence  of  which  it  was  compelled  to  sur- 
render." This  place  had  been  previoualy  attacked  (in  1748)  by  5,000  Eu- 
ropeans and  2,000  native  troops,  and  a  fleet  of  five  ships,  carrying  six  hundred 
and  sixty-six  guns,  under  Admiral  Boscawen.  The  water  defences  of  Pondi- 
cherry  could  carry  only  one  hundred  guns  in  all ;  and  yet,  although  the  block- 
ade was  continued  for  several  months,  the  attempt  at  conquest  was  entirely 
unsuccessful.  Again,  in  1760-'61,  when  garrisoned  by  only  1,487  men,  includ- 
ing volunteers,  it  was  besieged  by  an  army  of  near  4,000  men,  under  Colonel 
Coote,  and  blockaded  by  a  fleet  of  nineteen  sail,  carrying  one  thousand  and 
fifty-two  guns,  under  Commodore  Stevens.  There  was  no  engagement  what- 
ever between  the  ships  and  forts ;  but  all  supplies  being  cut  off  by  the  siege 
and  blockade,  the  provisions  became  exhausted,  and,  after  a  siege  of  seven  or 
eight  months,  the  inhabitants  were  forced  to  surrender,  to  avoid  starvation. 
The  garrison,  however,  refused  to  capitulate,  although  the  town  had  been 
given  up  by  the  starving  inhabitants.  The  fortifications  of  Calcutta,  when  at- 
tacked by  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Watson,  were  not  worth  mentioning,  and  the 
town  surrendered  as  soon  as  the  British  had  prepared  to  open  their  batteries. 
Madras  was  attacked  on  the  14th  of  September,  1746,  by  a  British  fleet  of 
nine  ships,  and  an  army  of  1,500  Europeans,  and  800  "  well-armed,  well-trained 
and  discipline^"  sepoys  and  negroes.  This  place,  says  the  British  chronicler 
of  the  siege,  was  defended  by  only  "  one  weak  battalion  of  four  hundred  men, 
Its  fortifications  were  likeAvise  of  the  most  contemptible  order,  consisting,  for 
the  most  part,  of  a  common  wall,  which  might  at  any  moment  be  escaladed 
should  the  process  of  breaching  be  deemed  too  expensive ;  indeed,  out  of  the 
three  divisions  into  which  it  was  parted,  only  one  (called  Fort  St  George,  in 
which  the  chief  functionaries  resided)  could  boast  either  of  bastion  or  rampart, 
far  less  of  cannon  or  mortars.  Against  this  open  and  ill-provided  place,  a  heavy 
fire  was  opened  by  both  sea  and  land,  and  the  confusion  within  the  walls  soon 
became  fearful.  *  *  *  This  siege,  if  such  it  deserves  to  be  called,  lasted 
five  days,  and  ended  in  the  surrender  of  the  place." 

These  several  conquests  were  made  by  the  land  troops,  and  there  was  no  trial, 
except  in  the  unequal  contest  just  mentioned,  of  strength  between  the  ships  and 
forts.  The  navy  was  of  vast  service  in  transporting  troops  and  supplies,  block- 
ading the  enemy's  bastions,  and  cutting  him  off  from  all  resources  ;  but  nothing 
occurred  to  justify  the  inferences  drawn  in  the  report  above  alluded  to. 

"  Gibraltar"  says  the  ApalachicoJa  reporter,  "  was  only  once  in  its  history 
attacked  by  a  fleet,  when  it  was  taken  by  a  squadron  under  Admiral  Rooke" — 
To  any  one  who  has  ever  read  of  Gibralter,  this  assertion  will  be  received  with 
unmingled  surprise.  The  following  are  the  principal  facts  of  the  conquest  by 
Admiral  Rooke,  in  1704  : 

The  attacking  squadron  consisted  of  forty-one  ships-of-the-line  and  many 
smaller  vessels,  carrying  2,935  guns,  and  near  20,000  men.  The  fort  was  gar- 
risoned by  only  150  men,  and  armed  with  one  hundred  guns,  all  included.* 

The  attack  was  made  simultaneously  by  land  and  water;  1,800  men  being 
landed  for  this  purpose.  The  outworks  were  soon  reduced,  and  the  town  forced 
to  capitulate,  but  not  till  after  the  English  had  sustained  a  loss  of  267  men. 
We  know  of  but  one  inference  that  can  be  drawn  from  this  conquest.  It  is : 
that  a  fort  may  be  taken'  by  a  combined  land  and  naval  force  more  than  a  hun- 
dred times  greater  than  itself!  Surely,. no  one  could  object  to  such  an  inference. 

Aware  of  the  importance  of  Gibraltar,  the  Spaniards  immediately  attempted 

*  The  French  accounts  state  the  strength  of  .the  garrison  even  less  than  this,  but  we 
give  the  English  version  of  the  affair. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  287 

its  recovery,  sending  out  for  this  purpose  a  fleet  of  92  sail,  carrying  over  4,000 
guns  and  25,000  men.  A  battle  was  fought  with  the  British  off  Malaga,  but 
without  any  decided  result,  the  victory  being  claimed  by  both  sides.  In  the 
latter  part  of  this  year  and  the  beginning  of  1705,  the  French  and  Spaniards 
besieged  Gibraltar  both  by  sea  and  land.  8,000  bombs  and  70,000  cannon  balls 
were  fired  at  the  work  without  materially  injuring  it,  and  the  besiegers  were  at 
last  forced  to  retire  with  a  loss  of  near  10,000  men,  while  the  loss  of  the  garri- 
son amounted  to  only  400. 

This  place  was  again  besieged  by  the  Spaniards  in  1720  with  a  considerable 
fleet;  the  garrison  at  that  time  "consisted  of  only  three  weak  battalions;"  never- 
theless, the  naval  attack  proved  abortive.  Another  attack  in  1726  was  mostly 
by  land  forces;  the  loss  of  the  besiegers  3,000,  of  the  garrison  300. 

Although  the  Spaniards  had  been  thrice  defeated  in  their  attempts  to  recover 
Gibraltar,  the  siege  was  renewed  at  the  commencement  of  the  war  in  1779. 
The  garrison  now  numbered  5,382  men.  The  blockade  was  begun  about  the 
middle  of  the  summer  with  a  considerable  fleet,  but  it  was  soon  afterwards  sus- 
pended till  the  winter  of  1780.  This  blockade  was  raised  in  1781  by  the 
arrival  of  a  large  British  naval  force,  but  the  shipping  on  both  sides  was  much 
annoyed  by  the  land  batteries  which  the  two  parties  had  erected.  So  vigor- 
ously was  the  land  attack  continued,  that,  on  the  4th  of  May,  1782,  not  a  single 
day  had  elapsed  without  firing  from  these  batteries  "for  a  space  of  nearly  13 
months!" 

The  following  is  Dr.  Campbell's  account  of  the  general  attack  in  September 
of  the  same  year :  According  to  his  authority  the  combined  forces  consisted  of 
"40,000  land  troops,  47  sail  of  the  line  besides  floating  batteries,  frigates,  and 
other  vessels-of-war."  A  simultaneous  attack  by  land  and  sea  was  first 
planned,  in  which  a  loss  of  20  ships-of-war  and  a  proportional  number  of  troops 
was  expected  by  the  besiegers ;  and  "  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  Spanish 
monarch,  in  his  extreme  eagerness  to  obtain  possession  of  Gibraltar,  would  not 
have  hesitated  to  make  this  enormous  sacrifice,  provided  there  was  a  reasonable 
chance  of  success;  but,  to  all  who  knew  the  strength  of  the  fortress,  *  *  * 
the  scheme  was  regarded  as  wild  and  impracticable.  Another  was  therefore 
proposed."  This  was,  to  besiege  the  works  at  the  same  time  by  land  and  sea — 
the  sea  attack  to  be  made  by  ships  and  a  large  number  of  floating  batteries, 
constructed  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  bomb  proof,  and  to  contain  within  them- 
selves the  means  of  extinguishing  the  fires  caused  by  red  hot  shot.  This  was 
supposed  to  be  effected  by  means  of  water  pipes  and  tamping  with  wet  sand. 
The  hanging  roofs  were  contrived  in  such  a  manner  that  they  could  be  raised 
and  let  down  with  the  greatest  facility,  at  the  pleasure  of  those  on  bpard  the 
vessels. 

These  battering  ships  were  armed  with  154  pieces  of  heavy  ordnance  on  the 
attacking  side,  with  58  in  reserve,  to  be  used  in  case  of  accident.  "  The  whole 
number  of  men  on  board  could  not  be  less  than  6,000  or  7,000."  As  the  effect 
of  these  vessels  would  "  depend  in  a  great  measure  on  the  rapidity  and  con- 
stancy with  which  they  were  fired,  a  kind  of  match  was  contrived  by  which 
they  were  all  to  go  off  together,  as  it  had  Keen  by  a  single  shot."  The  roofs 
and  sides  of  the  ships  were  so  thick  that,  for  a  long  time,  says  Drinkwater,  the 
balls  could  not  be  made  to  penetrate  them.  Another  English  writer  says,  "their 
powers  of  resistance  to  projectiles  of  artillery  were  certainly  greater  than  that 
afforded  by  the  [British]  squadron  at  Algiers." 

The  attack  was  commenced  on  the  8th  of  September  by  the  troops  and  the 
ships  then  present.  For  the  land  siege  they  employed  J,200  pieces  of  heavy 
ordnance,  and  more  than  83,000  barrels  of  powder !  For  several  days  the 
besiegers  "fired  at  the  rate  of  6,500  cannon  shot  and  1,080  shells  in  every  24 
hours."  On  the  9th  the  combined  fleets  of  France  and  Spain  in  the  bay 
amounted  to  48  sail  of  the  line,  10  battering  ships,  a  large  number  of  frigates, 


288  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

gun  and  mortar  boats,  bomb  ketches,  &c.  The  new  battering  ships  joined  in 
the  attack  about  8  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  anchoring  about  900  yards 
from  the  works.  They  seemed  for  a  long  time,  says  Campbell,  "  completely 
invulnerable  to  all  attempts  made  by  the  garrison  to  destroy  them;  while  they 
continued  through  the  greatest  part  of  the  day  to  maintain  a  heavy  and  destruc- 
tive cannonade,  they  resisted  the  combined  powers  of  fire  and  artillery  to  such  a 
degree  that  the  incessant  showers  of  shells  and  the  red  hot  shot  with  which  they 
were  assailed  made  no  visible  impression  upon  them.  About  2  o'clock,  however, 
there  were  evident  symptoms  of  their  approaching  destruction;"  and  during  the 
night  a  large  portion  of  them  were  either  burnt  or  torn  in  pieces.  "It  is  impos- 
sible to  ascertain  the  loss  of  the  Spaniards  on  this  memorable  day;  that  it  was 
enormous  is  certain,  both  from  the  nature  and  effect  of  the  fire  from  the  garri- 
son, and  from  the  very  circumstance  that  they  published  only  a  vague  and  con- 
tradictory account  respecting  it.  Such  admirable  measures  had  been  taken  for 
the  security  of  the  garrison,  that  their  loss  was  comparatively  light.  In  the 
course  of  about  nine  weeks  the  whole  number  of  slain  amounted  only  to  65,  and 
the  wounded  to  388.  How  little  chance  the  Spaniards  had  of  succeeding  in 
their  attack,  even  if  their  battering  ships  had  not  taken  fire,  may  be*  judged 
from  this  circumstance — that  the  works  of  the  fortress  were  scarcely  damaged." 
"  As  the  enemy  now  had  most  melancholy  proof  that  Gibraltar  could  not  be 
taken  by  any  means  that  human  power  could  bring  against  it,  the  only  chance 
that  remained  to  them  was  by  famine."  .A  blockade  and  the  land  siege  were 
therefore  kept  up  for  some  time,  but  were  unsuccessful. 

Drinkwater  gives  nearly  the  same  account  as  above.  The  number  of  men  in 
the  garrison,  when  attacked,  was  7,000.  Neither  the  whole  number  of  guns  in  the 
fort  nor  in  the  ships  could  be  brought  into  action;  but,  according  to  Drinkwater, 
the  number  of  guns  afloat,  which  were  actually  brought  to  bear  on  the  fortifica- 
tions, was  300,  while  this  fire  was  returned  by  only  80  cannon,  7  mortars,  and 
7  howitzers.  The  loss  of  the  garrison  during  this  engagement  was  16  killed 
and  67  wounded,  while  the  enemy's  loss  during  the  same  time  was  estimated  at 
2,000. 

We  add  a  third  account  from  the  British  Naval  Chronicle,  coinciding  with 
those  already  given:  "47  sail  of  the  line,  10  invincible  battering  ships,  carrying 
212  guns,  numerous  frigates,  xebecs,  bomb  ketches,  cutters,  and  gun  and  mortar 
boats,  with  small  craft,  for  the  purpose  of  disembarkation,  were  assembled  in  the 
bay.  On  the  land  side  were  stupendous  batteries  and  works,  mounting  200 
pieces  of  ordnance,  and  protected  by  an  army  of  40,000  men,  commanded  by  a 
victorious  and  active  general,  and  animated  by  the  presence  of  two  princes  of 
the  blood,  a  number  of  officers  of  the  first  distinction,  and  the  general  expecta- 
tion of  the  world.  To  this  prodigious  force  was  opposed  a  garrison  of  7,000 
effective  men,  including  the  marine  brigade,  with  only  80  cannon,  7  mortars,  and 
9  howitzers."  "  The  loss  of  the  enemy  in  killed  and  prisoners  was  calculated 
at  2,000,  while  the  garrison,  in  so  furious  an  attack,  had  only  1  officer,  2  sub- 
alterns, and  13  privates  killed,  and  5  officers  and  63  privates  wounded.  The 
damage  sustained  by  the  fortress  itself  was  so  small  that  the  whole  sea  line  was 
put  in  order  before  night." 

Copenhagen. — The  passage  of  the  Cattegat  by  the  British  fleet  in  1801,  and 
their  attack  on  Copenhagen,  have  often  been  alluded  to  in  discussions  on  the 
power  of  ships  and  batteries ;  and  although  the  facts  and  circumstances  are  all 
well  authenticated,  they  have  sometimes  been  most  singularly  perverted,  and 
the  most  unwarrantable  inferences  drawn  from  them.  The  following  are  the 
main  features  and  facts  of  the  case,  as  drawn  from  the  official  returns  and 
authentic  records :  The  British  fleet  of  fifty -two  sail,  eighteen  of  them  line-of- 
battle-ships,  four  frigates,  &c.,  sailed  from  Yarmouth  roads  on  the  12th  of  March, 
passed  the  sound  on  the  30th,  and  attacked  and  defeated  the  Danish  line  on  the 
2d  of  April. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  289 

The  sound  between  Cronenberg  and  the  Swedish  coast  is  about' two  and  one- 
half  miles  wide.  The  batteries  of  Cronenberg  and  Elsinore  were  lined  with  100 
pieces  of  cannon  and  mortars ;  but  the  Swedish  battery  had  been  much  neglected, 
and  then  mounted  only  six  guns.  Nevertheless,  the  British  admiral,  to  avoid 
the  damage  his  squadron  would  have  to  sustain  in  the  passage  of  this  wide 
channel,  defended  by  a  force  scarcely  superior  to  a  single  one  of  his  ships,  pre- 
ferred to  attempt  the  difficult  passage  of  the  Belt ;  but  after  a  few  of  his  light 
vessels,  acting  as  scouts,  had  run  on  the  rocks,  he  returned  to  the  sound. 

He  then  tried  to  negotiate  a  peaceful  passage,  threatening  a  declaration  of  war 
if  his  vessels  should  be  fired  upon.  It  must  be  remembered  that  England  was 
at  peace  with  both  Denmark  and  Sweden,  and  that  no  just  cause  of  war  existed. 
Hence,  the  admiral  inferred  that  the  commanders  of  these  batteries  would  be 
loth  to  involve  their  countries  in  a  war  with  so  formidable  a  power  as  England, 
by  commencing  hostilities,  when  only  a  free  passage  was  asked.  The  Danish 
commander  replied,  that  he  should  not  permit  a  fleet  to  pass  his  post,  whose 
object  and  destination  were  unknown  to  him.  He  fired  upon  them,  as  bound  to 
do  by  long-existing  commercial  regulations,  and  not  as  an  act  of  hostility  against 
the  English.  The  Swedes,  on  the  contrary,  remained  neutral,  and  allowed  the 
British  vessels  to  lie  near  by  for  several  days  without  firing  upon  them.  Seeing 
this  friendly  disposition  of  the  Swedes,  the  fleet  neared  their  coast,  and  passed 
out  of  the  reach  of  the  Danish  batteries,  which  opened  a  fire  of  balls  and  shells ; 
but  all  of  "them  fell  more  than  two  hundred  yards  short  of  the  fleet,  which 
escaped  without  the  loss  of  a  single  man. 

The  Swedes  excused  their  treachery  by  the  plea  that  it  would  have  been 
impossible  to  construct  batteries  at  that  season,  and,  even  had  it  been  possible, 
Denmark  would  not  have  consented  to  their  doing  so,  for  fear  that  Sweden 
would  renew  her  old  claim  to  one-half  of  the  rich  duties  levied  by  Denmark  on 
all  ships  passing  the  strait.  There  may  have  been  some  grounds  for  the  last 
excuse;  but  the  true  reason  for  their  conduct  was  the  fear  of  getting  involved 
in  a  war  with  England.  Napoleon  says  that,  even  at  that  season,  a  few  days 
only  would  have  been  sufficient  for  placing  one  hundred  guns  in  battery;  and 
that  Sweden  had  much  more  time  than  was  requisite.  And  with  one  hundred 
guns  on  each  side  of  the  channel,  served  with  skill  and  energy,  the  fleet  must 
necessarily  have  sustained  so  much  damage  as  to  render  it  unfit  to  attack 
Copenhagen. 

On  this  passage,  we  remark:  1st.  The  whole  number  of  guns  and  mortars  in 
the  forts  of  the  sound  amounted  to  only  106,  while  the  fleet  carried  over  1,700 
guns;  and  yet,  with  this  immense  superiority  of  more  than  sixteen  to  one,  the 
British  admiral  preferred  the  dangerous  passage  of  the  Belt  to  encountering  the 
fire  of  these  land  batteries.  2d.  By  negotiations  and  threatening  the  vengeance 
of  England,  he  persuaded  the  small  Swedish  battery  to  remain  silent,  and  allow 
the  fleet  to  pass  near  that  shore,  out  of  reach  of  the  guns  of  Cronenberg  and 
Elsinore.  3d.  It  is  the  opinion  of  Napoleon  and  the  best  English  writers,  that 
if  the  Swedish  battery  had  been  put  in  order,  and  acted  in  concert  with  the 
Danish  works,  they  might  have  so  damaged  the  fleet  as  to  render  it  incapable 
of  any  serious  attempt  on  ^Copenhagen. 

This  passage  of  the  Cattegat  is  quoted  by  the  Apalachicola  report  as  a  case 
settling  the  naked  question  of  relative  strength  of  guns  afloat  and  guns  ashore, 
and  as  decisive  of  the  perfect  inability  of  our  fortifications  to  stop  the  transit  of 
a  fleet! 

We  now  proceed  to  consider  the  circumstances  attending  the  attack  and  de- 
fence of  Copenhagen  itself.  The  only  side  of  the  town  exposed  to  the  attack 
of  heavy  shipping  is  the  northern,  where  there  lies  a  shoal  extending  out  a  con- 
siderable distance,  leaving  only  a  very  narrow  approach  to  the  heart  of  the  city. 
On  the  most  advanced  part^of  this  shoal  are  the  crown  batteries,  carrying  in  all 

H.  Rep.  Com.  86 19 


290  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

eighty-eight  guns.*  The  entrance  into  the  Baltic,  between  Copenhagen  and 
Salthorn,  is  divided  into  two  channels  by  a  bank,  called  the  Middle  Ground, 
which  is  situated  directly  opposite  Copenhagen.  To  defend  the  entrance  on  the 
left  of  the  crown  batteries,  they  placed  near  the  mouth  of  the  channel  four  ships- 
of-the-line,  one  frigate,  and  two  sloops,  carrying,  in  all,  358  guns.  To  secure 
the  port  and  city  from  bombardment  from  the  King's  channel,  (that  between  the 
Middle  Ground  and  town,)  a  line  of  floating  defences  were  moored  near  the 
edge  of  the  shoal,  and  manned  principally  by  volunteers.  This  line  consisted 
of  old  hulls  of  vessels,  block  ships,  praams,  sloops,  rafts,  &c.,  carrying,  in  all, 
628  guns — a  force  strong  enough  to  prevent  the  approach  of  bomb  vessels  and 
gunboats,  (the  purpose  for  which  it  was  intended,)  but  utterly  incapable  of  con- 
tending with  first-rate  ships-of-war;  but  these  the  Danes  thought  would  be 
deterred  from  approaching  by  the  difficulties  of  navigation.  These  difficulties 
were  certainly  very  great;  and  Nelson  said,  beforehand,  that  "the  wind  which 
might  carry  him  in  would  most  probably  not  bring  out  a  crippled  ship."  Had 
the  Danes  supposed  it  possible  for  Nelson  to  approach  with  his  large  vessels, 
the  line  of  floating  defences  would  have  been  formed  nearer  Copenhagen,  the 
right  supported  by  batteries  raised  on  the  isle  of  Amack.  "In  that  case,"  says 
Napoleon,  "it  is  probable  that  Nelson  would  have  failed  in  his  attack;  for  it 
would  have  been  impossible  .for  him  to  pass  between  the  line  and  shore  thus 
lined  with  cannon."  As  it  was,  the  line  was  too  extended  for  strength,  and  its 
right  too  far  advanced  to  receive  assistance  from  the  battery  of  Amack.  A  part 
of  the  fleet  remained  as  a  reserve,  under  Admiral  Parker,  while  the  others,  under 
Nelson,  advanced  to  the  King's  channel.  This  attacking  force  consisted  of  eight 
ships-of-the-line  and  thirty-six  smaller  vessels,  carrying,  in  all,  1,100  guns, 
without  including  those  in  the  six  gun-brigs,  whose  armament  is  not  given.  One 
of  the  seventy-fours  could  not  be  brought  into  action,  and  two  others  grounded ; 
but  Lord  Nelson  says,  "although  not  in  the  situation  assigned  them,  yet  they 
were  so  placed  as  to  be  of  great  service."  This  force  was  concentrated  upon  a 
part  of  the  Danish  line  of  floating  defences,  the  whole  of  which  was  not  only 
inferior  to  it  by  382  guns,  but  so  situated  as  to  be  beyond  the  reach  of  succor, 
and  without  a  chance  of  escape.  The  result  was  what  might  have  been  ex- 
pected. Every  vessel  of  the  right  and  centre  of  this  outer  Danish  line  was 
taken  or  destroyed,  except  one  or  two  small  ones,  which  cut  and  run  under  pro- 
tection of  the  fortifications.  The  left  of  the  line,  being  supported  by  the  crown 
batiery,  remained  unbroken.  A  division  of  frigates,  in  hopes  of  proving  an 
adequate  substitute  for  the  ships  intended  to  attack  the  batteries,  ventured  to 
engage  them,  but  "it  suffered  considerable  loss,  and,  in  spite  of  all  its  efforts, 
was  obliged  to  relinquish  this  enterprise  and  sheer  off." 

The  Danish  vessels  lying  in  the  entrance  of  the  channel  to  the  city  were  not 
attacked,  and  took  no  material  part  in  the  contest.  They  are  to  be  reckoned  in 
the  defence  on  the  same  grounds  that  the  British  ships  of  the  reserve  should  be 
included  in  the  attacking  force.  Nor  was  any  use  made  of  the  guns  on  shore, 
for  the  enemy  did  not  advance  far  enough  to  be  within  their  range. 

The  crown  battery  was  behind  the  Danish  line,  and  mainly  masked  by  it. 
A  part  only  of  its  guns  could  be  used  in  support  of  the  left  of  this  line,  and  in 
repelling  the  direct  attack  of  the  frigates,  which  it  did  most  effectually.  But 
we  now  come  to  a  new  feature  in  this  battle.  As  the  Danish  line  of  floating  de- 
fences fell  into  the  hands  of  the  English,  the  range  of  the  crown  battery  en- 
larged and  its  power  was  felt.  Nelson  saw  the  danger  to  which  his  fleet  was 
exposed,  and,  being  at  last  convinced  of  the  prudence  of  the  admiral's  signal  for 
retreat,  "  made  up  his  mind  to  weigh  anchor  and  retire  from  the  engagement." 

*Some  writers  say  only  sixty-eight  or  seventy;  but  the  English  writers  generally  say 
eighty-eight.  A  few,  apparently  to  increase  the  brilliancy  of  the  victory,  make  this  num- 
ber .-till  greater. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  291 

To  retreat,  however,  from  his  present  position  was  exceedingly  difficult  and 
dangerous.  He  therefore  determined  to  endeavor  to  effect  an  armistice,  and 
despatched  the  following  letter  to  the  Prince  Regent : 

"  Lord  Nelson  has  directions  to  spare  Denmark,  when  no  longer  resisting  ; 
but  if  the  firing  is  continued  on  the  part  of  Denmark,  Lord  Nelson  must  be 
obliged  to  set  on  fire  all  the  floating  batteries  he  has  taken,  without  the  power 
to  save  the  brave  Danes  who  have  defended  them." 

This  produced  an  armistice,  and  hostilities  had  hardly  ceased  when  three  of 
the  English  ships,  including  that  in  which  Nelson  himself  was,  struck  upon  the 
bank.  "  They  were  in  the  jaws  of  destruction,  and  could  never  have  escaped 
if  the  batteries  had  continued  their  fire.  They  therefore  owed  their  safety  to 
this  armistice."  A  convention  was  soon  signed,  by  which  everything  was  left 
in  statu  quo,  and  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Parker  allowed  to  proceed  into  the  Baltic. 
The  Rev.  Edward  Baines,  the  able  English  historian  of  the  wars  of  the 
French  revolution,  in  speaking  of  Nelson's  request  for  an  armistice,  says  : 
"  This  letter,  which  exhibited  a  happy  union  of  policy  and  courage,  was  written 
at  a  moment  when  Lord  Nelson  perceived  that  in  consequence  of  the  unfavor- 
able state  of  the  wind,  the  admiral  was  not  likely  to  get  up  to  aid  the  enter- 
prise ;  that  the  principal  batteries  of  the  enemy,  and  the  ships  at  the  mouth  of 
the  harbor,  were  yet  untouched;  that  two  of  his  own  division  had  grounded, 
and  others  were  likely  to  share  the  same  fate."  Campbell  says  these  batteries 
and  ships  "  were  still  unconyuered.  Two  of  his  own  (Nelson's)  vessels  were 
grounded  and  exposed  to  a  heavy  fire  ;  others,  if  the  battle  continued,  might  be 
exposed  to  a  similar  fate,  while  he  found  it  would  be  scarcely  practicable  to 
bring  off  the  prizes  under  the  fire  of  the  batteries." 

With  respect  to  the  fortifications  of  the  toAvn,  a  chronicler  of  the  times  says 
they  were  of  no  service  while  the  action  lasted.  "  They  began  to  fire  when  the 
enemy  took  possession  of  the  abandoned  ships,  but  it  was  at  the  same  time  the 
parley  appeared."  The  Danish  commander,  speaking  of  the  general  contest 
between  the  two  lines  says  :  "  The  crown  battery  did  not  come  at  all  into 
action."  An  English  writer  says  distinctly  :  "  The  works  (fortifications)  of  Co- 
penhagen were  absolutely  untouched  at  the  close  of  the  action."  Colonel 
Mitchell,  the  English  historian,  says  :  "  Lord  Nelson  never  fired  a  shot  at  the 
town  or  fortifications  of  Copenhagen.  He  destroyed  a  line  of  block  ships, 
praams,  and  floating  batteries  that  defended  the  sea  approach  to  the  town ;  and 
the  Crown  Prince,  seeing  his  capital  exposed,  was  Avilling  to  finish  by  armistice 
a  war  the  object  of  which  was  neither  very  popular  nor  well  understood. 
What  the  result  of  the  action  between  the  defences  of  Copenhagen  and  the 
British  fleet  might  ultimately  have  been  is  therefore  uncertain.  The  BOMBARD- 
MENT OF  COPENHAGEN  BY  NELSON,  as  it  is  generally  styled,  is,  therefore, 
like  most  other  oracular  phrases  of  the  day,  a  mere  combination  of  words  with- 
out the  slightest  meaning." 

The  British  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  943  men,  and  the  loss  of  the  Danes, 
according  to  their  own  account,  which  is  confirmed  by  the  French,  was  but  very 
little  higher.  The  English,  however,  say  it  amounted  to  1,600  or  1,800  ;  but 
let  the  loss  be  what  it  may,  it  was  almost  exclusively  confined  to  the  floating 
defences,  and  can  in  no  way  determine  the  relative  accuracy  of  aim  of  the  guns 
ashore  and  guns  afloat. 

The  facts  and  testimony  we  have  adduced  prove  incontestably : 
1st.  That  of  the  fleet  of  52  sail  and  1,700  guns  sent  by  the  English  to  the 
attack  upon  Copenhagen,  two  ships  of  148  guns  were  grounded  or  wrecked; 
seven  ships- of- the-line  and  36  smaller  vessels,  carrying  over  1,000  guns,  wQre 
actually  brought  into  the  action ;  while  the  remainder  were  held  as  a  reserve, 
to  act  upon  the  first  favorable  opportunity. 

2d.  That  the  Danish  line  of  floating  defences,  consisting  mostly  of  old  hulls, 
sloops,  rafts,  &c.,  carried  only  628  guns  of  all  descriptions ;  that  the  fixed  bat- 


292  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

teries  supporting  this  line  did  not  carry  over  SO  or  90  guns  at  most ;  and  that 
both  these  land  and  fljating  batteries  were  mostly  manned  and  the  guns  served 
by  volunteers. 

3d.  That  the  fixed  batteries  in  the  system  of  defence  were  either  so  com- 
pletely masked  or  so  far  distant,  as  to  be  useless  during  the  contest  between  the 
fleet  and  floating  force. 

4th.  That  the  few  guns  of  these  batteries  which  were  rendered  available  by 
the  position  of  the  floating  defences  repelled  with  little  or  no  loss  to  themselves, 
and  some  injury  to  the  enemy,  a  vastly  superior  force  of  frigates  which  had  at- 
tacked them. 

5th.  That  the  line  of  floating  defences  was  conquered  and  mostly  destroyed, 
while  the  fixed  batteries  were  uninjured. 

6th.  That  the  fortifications  of  the  city  and  of  Amack  island  were  not  attacked, 
and  had  no  part  in  the  contest. 

7th.  That  as  soon  as  the  batteries  were  unmasked,  and  began  to  act,  Nelson 
prepared  to  retreat;  but,  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  doing  so,  he  opened  a 
parley,  threatening,  with  a  cruelty  unworthy  the  most  barbarous  ages,  that  un- 
less the  batteries  ceased  their  Jire  upon  his  ships,  he  would  burn  all  the  Danish 
prisoners  in  his  possession ;  and  that  this  armistice  was  concluded  just  in  time 
to  save  his  own  ships  from  destruction. 

8th.  That,  consequently,  the  battle  of  Copenhagen  cannot  properly  be  re- 
garded as  a  contest  between  ships  and  forts,  or  a  triumph  of  ships  over  forts ; 
that  so  far  as  the  guns  on  shore  were  engaged  they  showed  a  vast  superiority 
over  those  afloat — a  superiority  known  and  confessed  by  the  English. 

And  yet,  hi  the  face  of  all  these  facts,  and  in  opposition  to  the  accumulated 
testimony  of  English,  French,  and  Danish  historians,  the  Apalachicola  reporter 
persists  in  regarding  this  as  a  contest  between  ships  and  batteries,  in  which  the 
latter  gained  the  victory ;  nay,  he  goes  so  far  as  to  rank  all  the  old  rotten  hulks 
and  rafts  of  the  Danish  line  as  fortifications,  for  he  says;  "The  British  fleet 
fought  only  468  guns  afloat  against  those  986  guns  on  Amack  and  crown  batte- 
ries; yet  in  four  hours  they  were  silenced,  and  the  object  gained."  A  strange 
inaccuracy  of  vision,  while  looking  at  well-known  and  undisputed  historical 
events ! 

Constantinople. — "  Sir  John  Duckforth  forced  the  passage  of  the  Dardanelles 
with  six  ships-of-the-line,  and  was  rebuked  because  he  had  not  continued  on  to 
Constantinople,  and  with,  his  small  force  assaulted  the  city." — The  channel  of 
the  Dardanelles  is  about  12  leagues  long,  3  miles  wide  at  its  entrance,  and  about 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  at  its  narrowest  point.  Its  principal  defences  are  the 
outer  and  inner  castles  of  Europe  and  Asia,  and  the  castles  of  Sestos  and 
Abydos.  Constantinople  stands  about  100  miles  from  its  entrance  into  the  sea  of 
Marmora,  and  at  nearly  the  opposite  extremity  of  this  sea.  The  defences  of  the 
channel  had  been  allowed  to  go  to  decay ;  but  few  guns  were  mounted,  and  the 
forts  were  but  partially  garrisoned.  In  Constantinople,  not  a  gun  was  mounted, 
and  no  preparations  for  defence  were  made ;  indeed,  previous  to  tfre  approach 
of  the  fleet,  the  Turks  had  not  determined  whether  to  side  with  the  English  or 
French,  and  even  then  the  French  ambassador  had  the  greatest  difficulty  in 
persuading  them  to  resist  the  demands  of  Duckforth. 

The  British  fleet  consisted  of  six  sail  of  the  line,  two  .frigates,  two  sloops,  and 
several  bomb  vessels,  carrying  818  guns,  beside  those  in  the  bomb  ships.  Admiral 
Duckforth  sailed  through  the  Dardanelles  on  the  19th  February,  1807,  with 
little  or  no  opposition.  This  being  a  Turkish  festival  day,  the  soldiers  of  the 
scanty  garrison  were  enjoying  the  festivities  of  the  occasion,  and  none  were 
left  to  serve  the  few  guns  of  the  forts  which  had  been  prepared  for  defence. 
But  while  the  admiral  was  waiting  in  the  sea  of  Marmora  for  the  result  of  nego- 
tiations, or  for  a  favorable  wind  to  make  the  attack  upon  Constantinople,  the 
fortifications  of  this  city  were  put  in  order,  and  the  Turks  actively  employed, 
under  French  engineers  and  artillery  officers,  in  repairing  the  defences  of  the 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  293 

straits.  Campbell,  in  his  Naval  History,  says:  "Admiral  Duckforth  now  fully 
perceived  the  critical  situation  in  which  he  was  placed.  He  might,  indeed,  suc- 
ceed, should  the  weather  become  favorable,  in  bombarding  Constantinople;  but, 
unless  the  bombardment  should  prove  completely  successful  in  forcing  the  Turks 
to  pacific  terms,  the  injury  he  might  do  to  the  city  would  not  compensate  for  the 
damage  which  his  fleet  must  necessarily  sustain.  With  this  damaged  and 
crippled  fleet,  he  must  repass  the  Dardanelles,  now  rendered  infinitely  stronger 
than  they  were  when  he  came  through  them." 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  admiral  determined  to  retreat ;  and  on  the  3d 
of  April  escaped  through  the  Dardanelles,  steering  midway  of  the  channel,  with 
a  favorable  and  strong  current.  "This  escape,  however,"  says  Baines,  "was 
only  from  destruction,  but  by  no  means  from  serious  loss  and  injury.  *  *  * 
In  what  instance,  in  the  whole  course  of  our  naval  warfare,  have  ships  received 
equal  damage  in  so  short  a  time  as  in  this  extraordinary  enterprise  ?"  In  de- 
tailing the  extent  of  this  damage,  we  will  take  the  ships  in  the  order  they  de- 
scended. 

The  first  had  her  wheel  carrried  away,  and  her  hull  much  damaged,  but  es- 
caped with  the  loss  of  only  three  men.  A  stone  shot  penetrated  the  second  between 
the  poop  and  quarter  deck,  badly  injured  the  mizzen  mast,  carried  away  the 
wheel,  and  did  other  serious  damage;  killing  and  wounding  20.  Two  shot 
struck  the  third,  carrying  away  her  shrouds  and  injuring  her  masts ;  loss  in 
killed  and  wounded,  30.  The  fourth  had  her  mainmast  destroyed,  with  a  loss 
of  16.  The  fifth  had  a  large  shot,  six  feet  eight  inches  in  circumferaitce  enter 
her  lower  deck ;  loss  55.  The  sixth  not  injured.  The  seventh  a  good  deal 
damaged,  with  a  loss  of  17.  The  eighth  had  no  loss.  The  ninth  was  so  much 
injured  that  "had  there  been  a  necessity  for  hauling  the  wind  on  the  opposite 
tack  she  must  have  gone  down;"  her  loss  was  8.  The  tenth  lost  12.  The 
eleventh  was  much  injured,  with  a  loss  of  8 — making  a  total  loss  in  repassing 
the  Dardanelles  of  167,  and  in  the  whole  expedition  281,  exclusive  of  250  men 
who  perished  in  the  burning  of  the  Ajax. 

Such  was  the  effect  produced  on  the  British  fleet,  sailing  with  a  favorable 
wind  and  strong  current  past  the  half-manned  and  half-armed  forts  of  the  Dar- 
danelles. Duckforth  himself  says  that,  had  he  remained  before  Constantinople 
much  longer,  till  the  forts  had  been  completely  put  in  order,  no  return  would 
have  been  open  to  him,  and  "  the  unavoidable  sacrifice  of  the  squadron  must 
have  been  the  consequence."  Scarcely  had  the  fleet  cleared  the  straits  before 
it  (the  fleet)  was  re-enforced  with  eight  sail  of  the  line ;  but,  even  with  this  vast  in- 
crease of  strength,  they  did  not  venture  to  renew  the  contest.  They  had  ef- 
fected a  most  fortunate  escape.  General  Jomini  says,  that  if  the  defence  had 
been  conducted  by  a  more  enterprising  and  experienced  people  the  expedition 
would  have  cost  the  English  their  whole  squadron. 

Great  as  was  the  damage  done  to  the  fleet,  the  forts  themselves  were  uninjured. 
The  English  say  their  own  fire  did  no  execution,  the  shot  in  all  probability  not 
even  striking  their  objects — "the  rapid  change  of  position,  occasioned  by  a  fair 
wind  and  current,  preventing  the  certainty  of  aim."  The  state  of  the  batteries 
when  the  fleet  first  passed  in  is  thus  described  in  James's  Naval  History: 
"  Some  of  them  were  dilapidated,  and  others  but  partially  mounted  and  poorly 
manned."  And  Alison  says:  "  They  had  been  allowed  to  fall  into  disrepair. 
The  castles  of  Europe  and  Asia,  indeed,  stood  in  frowning  majesty,  to  assert 
the  dominion  of  the  Crescent  at  the  narrowest  part  of  the  passage,  but  their 
ramparts  were  antiquated,  their  guns  in  part  dismounted,  and  such  as  remained,, 
though  of  enormous  calibre,  little  calculated  to  answer  the  rapidity  and  precision 
of  an  English  broadside." 

With  respect  to  the  "rebuke"  mentioned  in  the  Apalachicola  report,  we  have 
been  unable  to  ascertain  by  whom  it  was  given.  We  can  find  no  account  of  it 
in  the  several  histories  of  the  British  navy.  The  House  of  Commons  rejected 


294  FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

a  motion  to  call  for  the  papers  ;  the  hoard  of  admiralty  made  no  charges  or  com- 
plaints; and,  in  the  public  estimation,  says  James,  "Sir  John  rather  gained  than 
lost  credit  for  the  discomfiture  he  had  experienced."  Much  has  been  said 
because  the  fortifications  of  the  Dardanelles  did  not  hermetically  seal  that  chan- 
nel, (an  object  they  were  never  expected  to  accomplish,  even  had  they  been 
well  armed  and  well  served;)  but  it  is  forgotten,  or  entirely  overlooked,  that 
twelve  Turkish  line-qf-battle -ships,  two  of  them  three-deckers,  with  nine  frigates ', 
were,  with  their  sails  bent  and  in  apparent  readiness,  filed  with  troops,"  and 
lying  within  the  line  of  fortifications  ;  and  yet  this  naval  force  effected  little  or 
nothing  against  the  invaders.  It  is  scarcely  ever  mentioned,  being  regarded  of 
little  consequence  as  a  means  of  defence;  and  yet  the  number  of  their  guns, 
and  the  expense  of  their  construction  and  support,  could  hardly  have  fallen 
short  of  the  incomplete  and  half-garrisoned  forts,  some  of  which  were  as  ancient 
as  the  reign  of  Amurath. 

Algiers. — The  attack  upon  Algiers,  in  1816,  has  been  frequently  alluded  to 
as  a  great  instance  of  naval  success,  and  is  discussed  at  considerable  length  by 
the  board  of  officers  appointed  by  Mr.  Poinsett,  on  the  subject  of  national  defence. 
But  this  board  confessed  themselves  uninformed  on  several  important  facts; 
and  their  report,  on  this  account,  is  less  satisfactory  than  it  otherwise  would 
have  been.  The  Apalachicola  reporter  has  paraded  this  attack  as  entirely 
decisive  of  the  superiority  of  guns  afloat ;  but  we  cannot  find  that  his  account  is 
sustained  by  any  authority  whatever. 

The  following  narrative  is  drawn  from  the  reports  of  the  English  and  Dutch 
admirals,  and  other  official  and  authentic  English  papers : 

The  attack  was  made  by  the  combined  fleets,  consisting  of  five  sail  of  the 
line,  eighteen  or  twenty  frigates  and  smaller  vessels,  besides  five  bomb  vessels 
and  smaller  rocket  boats,  mounting  in  all  about  1,000  guns.  The  armament  of 
some  of  the  smaller  vessels  is  not  given,  but  the  guns  of  those  whose  armaments 
are  known  amount  to  over  900.  The  harbor  and  defences  of  Algiers  had  been 
previously  surveyed  by  Captain  Warde,  royal  navy,  under  Lord  Exrnouth's 
direction;  and  the  number  of  the  combined  fleet  was  arranged  according  to  the 
information  given  in  this  survey — just  so  many  ships,  and  no  more,  being  taken, 
as  could  be  employed  to  advantage  against  the  city,  without  being  needlessly 
exposed.  Moreover,  the  men  and  officers  had  been  selected  and  exercised  with 
reference  to  this  particular  attack. 

From  the  survey  of  Captain  Warde,  and  the  accompanying  map,  it  appears 
that  the  armament  of  all  the  fortifications  of  Algiers  and  the  vicinity,  counting 
the  water  fronts  and  parts  that  could  flank  the  shore,  was  only  284  guns  of 
various  sizes  and  descriptions,  including  mortars.  But  not  near  all  of  these 
could  act  upon  the  fleet  as  it  lay.  Other  English  accounts  state  the  number  of 
guns  actually  opposed  to  the  fleet  at  from  220  to  230.  Some  of  these  were  in 
small  and  distant  batteries,  whereas  nearly  all  the  fleet  was  concentrated  on  the 
mole-head  works.  Supposing  only  one  broadside  of  the  ships  to  have  been 
engaged,  the  ratio  of  forces,  as  expressed  by  the  number  of  guns,  imist  have 
been  about  five  to  two.  This  is  a  favorable  supposition  for  the  ships;  for  we 
know  that  several  of  them,  from  their  position  and  a  change  of  anchorage, 
brought  both  broadsides  to  bear.  The  Algerine  shipping  in  the  harbor  was 
considerable,  including  several  vessels-of-war,  but  no  use  of  them  was  made  in 
the  defence,  and  nearly  all  were  burnt.  The  attacking  ships  commanded  some 
of  the  batteries,  and  almost  immediately  dismounted  their  guns.  The  walls  of 
the  casemated  works  were  so  thin  as  to  be  very  soon  battered  down.  Most  of 
the  Algeriue  guns  were  badly  mounted,  and  many  of  them  were  useless  after 
the  first  fire.  They  had  no  furnaces  for  heating  shot,  and,  as  "  they  loaded 
their  guns  with  loose  powder,  put  in  with  a  ladle,"  they  could  not  possibly  have 
used  hot  shot,  even  had  they  constructed  furnaces.  The  ships  approached  the 
forts,  and  many  of  them  anchored  in  their  intended  positions,  without  a  shot 


FOKTIFICATTONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  295 

being  fired  from  the  batteries.  The  action  commenced  at  a  quarter  before  three, 
and  did  not  entirely  cease  till  half-past  eleven.  The  ships  now  took  advantage 
of  the  land  breeze,  and,  by  warping  and  towing  off,  were  able  to  get  under  sail 
and  come  to  anchor  beyond  reach  of  the  land  batteries.  Negotiations  were 
again  opened,  and  the  Dey  surrendered  the  Christian  slaves,  and  yielded  to  the 
terms  of  the  treaty. 

During  the  contest,  the  fleet  "fired  nearly  118  tons  of  powder  and  50,000 
shot,  (weighing  more  than  500  tons  of  iron,)  besides  960  thirteen  and  ten  inch 
shells,  (thrown  by  the  bomb  vessels,)  and  the  shells  and  rockets  from  the 
flotilla."  The  vessels  were  considerably  crippled,  and  their  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  amounted  to  883.  The  land  batteries  were  much  injured,  and  a  large 
part  of  their  guns  dismounted.  Their  loss  is  not  known ;  the  English  confess 
.they  could  obtain  no  account  of  it,  but  suppose  it  to  have  been  very  great. 
This  seems  more  than  probable ;  for,  besides  those  actually  employed  in  the 
defence,  large  numbers  of  people  crowded  into  the  forts  to  witness  the  contest. 
So  great  was  this  curiosity,  that,  when  the  action  commenced,  the  parapets 
were  covered  with  the  multitude,  gazing  at  the  manoeuvres  of  the  ships.  To 
avoid  so  unnecessary  and  indiscrimite  a  slaughter,  Lord  Exmouth  (showing 
humanity  that  does  him  great  credit)  motioned  with  his  hand  to  the  ignorant 
wretches  to  retire  to  some  place  of  safety.  This  loss  of  life  in  the  batteries,  the 
burning  of  the  buildings  within  the  town  and  about  the  mole,  the  entire  de- 
struction of  their  fleet  and  merchant  vessels  anchored  within  the  mole  and  in 
the  harbor,  had  a  depressing  effect  upon  the  inhabitants,  and  probably  did  more 
than  the  injuries  received  by  the  batteries  in  securing  an  honorable  conclusion 
to  the  treaty.  We  know  very  well  that  these  batteries,  though  much  injured, 
were  not  silenced  when  Lord  Exmouth  took  advantage  of  the  land  breeze,  and 
sailed  beyond  their  reach.  The  ships  retired :  first,  because  they  had  become 
much  injured,  and  their  ammunition  nearly  exhausted;  second,  in  order  to  escape 
from  a  position  so  hazardous,  in  case  of  a  storm;  and  third,  to  get  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  Algerine  batteries.  Lord  Exmouth  himself  gives  these  as  his 
reasons  for  the  retreat,  and  says:  "The  land  wind  saved  me  many  a  gallant 
fellow."  And  Vice- Admiral  Von  de  Capellan,  in  his  report  of  the  battle,  gives 
the  same  opinion:  " In  this  retreat"  says  he,  "which,  from  want  of  wind  and 
the  damage  suffered  in  the  rigging,  was  very  slow,  the  ships  had  still  to  suffer 
much  from  the  new  opened  and  redoubled  Jire  of  the  enemy's  batteries;  at  last, 
the  land  breeze  springing  up,"  &c. 

An  English  officer,  who  took  part  in  this  affair,  says :  "  It  was  well  for  us 
that  the  land  wind  came  off,  or  we  should  never  have  got  out;  and  God  knows 
what  would  have  been  our  fate,  had  we  remained  all  night." 

The  motives  of  the  retreat  cannot,  therefore,  be  doubted.  Had  the  Arabs  set 
themselves  zealously  at  work  during  the  night  to  prepare  for  a  new  contest,  by 
remounting  their  gnns,  and  placing  others  behind  the  ruins  of  those  batteries 
which  had  fallen — in  other  words,  had  the  works  now  been  placed  in  hands  as 
skilful  and  experienced  as  the  English,  the  contest  would  have  been  far  from 
ended.  "But,  in  the  words  of  the  board  of  defence,  "  Loud  Exmouth  relied  on 
the  effects  produced  on  the  people  by  his  dreadful  cannonade,  and  the  result 
proves  that  he  was  right.  His  anxiety  to  clear  the  vessels  from  the  contest 
shows  that  there  was  a  power  still  unconquered,  which  he  thought  it  better  to 
leave  to  be  restrained  by  the  suffering  population  of  the  city  than  to  keep  in  a 
state  of  exasperation  and  activity  by  his  presence.  What  was  this  power  but 
an  unsubdued  energy  in  the  batteries  1 

"  The  true  solution  of  the  question  is,  then,  not  so  much  the  amount  of  injury 
done  on  the  one  side  or  the  other,  particularly  as  there  was  on  the  one  side  a 
city  to  suffer  as  well  as  the  batteries,  as  the  relative  efficiency  of  the  parties 
when  the  battle  closed.  All  political  agitation  and  popular  clamor  aside,  what 
would  have  been  the  result  had  the  fight  been  continued,  or  even  had  Lord  Ex- 


296  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

mouth  renewed  it  next  morning  ]  These  are  questions  that  can  be  answered 
only  on  conjecture;  but  the  manner  the  battle  ended  certainly  leaves  room  for 
many  doubts  whether,  had  the  subsequent  demands  of  Lord  Exmouth  been  re- 
jected, he  had  it  in  his  power  to  enforce  them  by  his  ships ;  whether,  indeed, 
if  he  had  renewed  the  fight,  he  would  not  have  been  signally  defeated. 

"  On  the  whole,  we  do  not  think  that  this  battle,  although  it  stands  pre- 
eminent as  an  example  of  naval  success  over  batteries,  presents  an  argument  to 
shake  the  confidence  which  fortifications,  well  situated,  well  planned,  and  well 
fought,  deserve,  as  the  defences  of  a  seabord." 

We  cannot  help  regarding  these  conclusions  just  when  we  reflect  upon  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  case.  The  high  character,  skill,  and  bravery  of  the  attack- 
ing force ;  their  immense  siiperiority  in  number  of  guns,  with  no  surplus  human 
life  to  be  exposed ;  the  antiquated  and  ill-managed  works  of  defence  ;  the  entire  . 
want  of  skill  of  the  Algerine  artillerists  and  the  neglect  of  the  ordinary  means 
of  preparation ;  the  severe  execution  which  these  ill-served  guns  did  upon  the 
enemy's  ships,  an  execution  far  more  dreadful  than  that  effected  by  the  French 
or  Dutch  fleets  in  their  best  contested  naval  battles  with  the  ships  of  the  game 
foe — from  these  facts  we  must  think  that  those  who  are  so  ready  to  draw  from 
this  case  conclusions  unfavorable  to  the  use  of  land  batteries  as  a  means  of 
defence  against  shipping  know  but  little  of  the  nature  of  the  contest. 

An  English  historian  of  some  note,  in  speaking  of  this  attack,  says  :  "  It  is 
but  little  to  the  purpose,  unless  to  prove  what  may  be  accomplished  by  fleets 
against  towns  exactly  so  circumstanced,  placed,  and  governed.  Algiers  is  situ- 
ated on  an  amphitheatre  of  hills  sloping  down  towards  the  sea,  and  presenting, 
therefore,  the  fairest  mark  to  the  fire  of  hostile  ships.  But  where  is  the  capital 
exactly  so  situated  that  we  are  ever  likely  to  attack  ?  And  as  to  the  destruction 
of  a  few  second-rate  towns,  even  when  practicable,  it  is  a  mean,  unworthy 
species  of  warfare,  by  which  nothing  was  ever  gained.  The  severe  loss  sustained 
before  Algiers  must  also  be  taken  into  account,  because  it  was  inflicted  by  mere 
Algerine  artillery,  and  was  much  inferior  to  what  may  be  expected  from  a  con- 
test maintained  against  batteries  manned  with  soldiers  instructed  by  officers  of 
skill  and  science,  not  only  in  working  the  guns,  but  in  the  endless  duties  of  de- 
tail necessary  for  keeping  the  whole  of  an  artillery  material  in  a  proper  state  of 
formidable  efficiency." 

San  Juan  d'  Ulloa,  "falling  before  a  small  French  squadron  after  a  few 
hours'  cannonading'' — Ti-e  following  facts  relative  to  this  attack  are  drawn 
principally  from  the  report  of  the  French  engineer  officer,  who  was  one  of  the 
expedition.  The  French  fleet  consisted  of  four  ships  carrying  188  guns,  two 
armed  steamboats,  and  two  bomb  ketches,  with  four  large  mortars.  The  whole 
number  of  guns  found  in  the  fort  was  187  ;  a  considerable  portion  of  these,  how- 
ever, were  for  land  defence.  When  the  French  vessels  were  towed  into  the 
position  selected  for  the  attack  "  it  was  lucky  for  us,"  says  their  reporter,  "  that 
the  Mexicans  did  not  disturb  this  operation,  which  lasted  nearly  two  hours,  and 
that  they  permitted  us  to  commence  the  fire."  "  We  were  exposed  to  'the  fire 
of  one  24-pounder,  fiv$  16-pounders,  seven  12-pounders,  one  8-pounder,  and  five 
18-pounder  carronades — in  all  nineteen  pieces  only."  If  these  be  converted  into 
equivalent  24-pounders,  in  proportion  to  the  weight  of  balls,  the  whole  19  guns 
will  be  less  than  12  2^-pounders  !  This  estimate  is  much  too  great,  for  it  allows 
three  8-pounders  to  be  equal  to  one  24-pounder,  and  each  of  the  18-pounder 
carronades  to  be  three-quarters  the  power  of  a  long  24-pounder;  whereas,  at  the 
distance  at  which  the  parties  were  engaged,  these  small  pieces  were  nearly  harm- 
less. Two  of  the  powder  magazines,  not  being  bomb-proof,  were  blown  up 
during  the  engagement,  by  which  three  of  the  19  guns  on  the  water  front  of  the 
castle  were  dismounted,  thus  reducing  the  land  force  to  an  equivalent  of  ten 
24-pounders.  The  other  17  guns  were  still  effective  when  abandoned  by  the 
Mexicans. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  297 

It  appears  from  the  above-mentioned  report  that  the  number  of  guns  actually 
brought  into  action  by  the  floating  force  amounted  to  94,  besides  four  heavy  sea 
mortars ;  that  the  whole  number  so  employed  in  the  fort  was  only  19 ;  that 
these  were  generally  so  small  and  inefficient  that  their  balls  would  not  enter  the 
sides  of  the  ordinary  attacking  frigates  ;  that  the  principal  injury  sustained  by 
the  castle  was  produced  by  the  explosion  of  powder  magazines,  which  were  in- 
judiciously placed  and  improperly  secured ;  that  the  castle,  though  built  of  poor 
materials,  was  but  slightly  injured  by  the  French  fire;  that  the  Mexicans  proved 
themselves  ignorant  of  the  ordinary  means  of  defence,  and  abandoned  their  works 
when  only  a  few  of  their  guns  had  been  dismounted  ;  that,  notwithstanding  all 
the  circumstances  in  favor  of  the  French,  their  killed  and  wounded,  in  proportion 
to  the  guns  acting  against  them,  was  upwards  of  jour  times  as  great  as  the  loss 
of  the  English  at  the  battle  of  Trafalgar ! 

"  St.  Jean  d*  Acre  reduced  in  a  Jew  hours  by  a  British  fleet,  and  taken  pos- 
session of  by  the  seamen  and  marines" — Fortunately,  the  principal  facts  con- 
nected with  this  attack  are  now  fully  authenticated.  For  the  armament  of  the 
fleet  we  quote  from  the  British  official  papers,  and  for  that  of  the  fort  from  the 
pamphlet  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Matuszewiez. 

The  fortifications  were  built  of  poor  materials,  antiquated  in  their  plans,  and 
much  decayed.  Their  entire  armament  amounted  to  only  200  guns,  some  of 
which  were  merely  field-pieces.  The  water  fronts  were  armed  with  100  cannon 
and  16  mortars,  those  of  the  smaller  calibre  included.  When  approached  by  the 
British  fleet  the  works  were  undergoing  repairs,  and,  says  Commodore  Napier, 
"  were  fast  getting  into  a  state  of  preparation  against  attack." 

The  British  fleet  consisted  of  eight  ships-of-the-line,  carrying  646  guns  ;  six 
frigates,  carrying  236  guns;  four  steamers,  carrying  eighteen  guns ;  and  two  or 
three  other  vessels  whose  force  is  not  given.  "  Only  a  few  guns,"  says  Napier, 
"defended  the  approach  from  the  northward,"  and  most  of  the  ships  came  in 
from  that  direction.  The  western  front  was  armed  with  about  forty  cannon ; 
but  opposed  to  this  were  six  ships  and  two  steamers,  carrying  about  500  guns. 
Their  fire  was  tremendous  during  the  engagement,  but  no  breach  was  made  in 
the  walls.  The  south  front  was  armed  in  part  by  heavy  artillery,  and  in  part  by 
field  pieces.  This  front  was  attacked  by  six  ships  and  two  steamers,  carrying 
over  200  guns.  The  eastern  front  was  armed  only  with  light  artillery ;  against 
this  was  concentrated  the  remainder  of  the  fleet,  carrying  240  guns.  The  guns 
of  the  works  were  so  poorly  mounted  that  but  few  could  be  used  at  all ;  and 
these,  on  account  of  the  construction  of  the  fort,  could  not  reach  the  ships,  though 
anchored  close  by  the  walls.  "Only  five  of  their  guns,"  says  Napier,  "  placed 
in  a  flanking  battery,  were  well  served  and  never  missed  ;  but  they  were  pointed 
too  high,  and  damaged  our  spars  and  rigging  only."  The  stone  *was  of  so  poor 
a  quality,  says  the  narrative  of  Colonel  Matuszewiez,  that  the  walls  fired  upon 
presented  on  the  exterior  a  shattered  appearance,  but  they  were  nowhere  seriously 
injured.  In  the  words  of  Napier,  "  they  were  not  breached,  and  a  determined 
enemy  might  have  remained  secure  under  the  breastworks,  or  in  the  numerous 
casemates  without  suffering  much  loss"  The  explosion  of  a  magazine  within 
the  fort,  containing  6,000  casks  of  powder,  laid  in  ruins  a  space  of  60,000  square 
yards,  opened  a  large  breach  in  the  walls  of  the  fortification,  partially  destroyed 
the  prisons,  and  killed  and  wounded  1,000  men  of  the  garrison.  This  frightful 
disaster,  says  the  French  account,  hastened  the  triumph  of  the  fleet.  The  pris- 
oners and  malefactors,  thus  released  from  confinement,  rushed  upon  the  garrison 
at  the  same  time  with  the  mountaineers,  who  had  besieged  the  place  on  the  land 
side.  The  uselessness  of  the  artillery,  the  breaches  in  the  fort,  the  attacks  of 
the  English — all  combined  to  force  the  retreat  of  the  garrison,  "  in  the  midst  of 
scenes  of  blood  and  atrocious  murders."  We  will  close  this  account  with  the 
following  extract  from  a  speech  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  February  4, 1841 :  "  He  had  had,"  he  said, "  a  little  experience  in  services 


298  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

of  this  nature,  and  he  thought  it  his  duty  to  warn  their  lordships  on  this  occa- 
sion that  they  must  not  always  expect  that  ships,  however  well  commanded,  or 
however  gallant  their  seamen  might  be,  were  capable  of  commonly  engaging 
successfully  with  stone  walls.  He  had  no  recollection  in  all  his  experience, 
except  the  recent  instance  on  the  coast  of  Syria,  of  any  fort  being  taken  by  ships, 
excepting  two  or  three  years  ago,  when  the  Fort  of  San  Juan  d'Ulloa  was  cap- 
tured by  the  French  fleet.  This  was,  he  thought,  the  single  instance  that  he 
recollected,  though  he  believed  that  something  of  the  sort  had  occurred  at  the 
siege  of  Havana  in  1763.  The  present  achievement  he  considered  one  of  the 
greatest  of  modern  times.  This  was  his  opinion,  and  he  gave  the  highest  credit 
to  those  who  had  performed  such  a  service.  It  was,  altogether,  a  most  skilful 
proceeding.  He  was  greatly  surprised  at  the  small  number  of  men  that  was  lost 
on  board  the  fleet ;  and,  on  inquiring  how  it  happened,  he  discovered  that  it  was 
because  the  vessels  were  moored  within  one-third  of  the  ordinary  distance.  The 
guns  of  the  fortress  were  intended  to  strike  objects  at  a  greater  distance ;  and 
the  consequence  was,  that  the  shot  went  over  the  ships  that  were  anchored  at 
one-third  the  usual  distance.  By  that  means  they  sustained  not  more  than  one- 
tenth  of  the  loss  which  they  would  otherwise  have  experienced.  Not  less  than 
500  pieces  of  ordnance  were  directed  against  the  walls,  and  the  precision  with 
which  the  fire  was  kept  up,  the  position  of  the  vessels,  and,  lastly,  the  blowing 
up  of  the  large  magazine — all  aided  in  achieving  this  great  victory  in  so  short  a 
time.  He  had  thought  it  right  to  say  thus  much,  because  he  wished  to  warn 
the  public  against  supposing  that  such  deeds  as  this  could  be  effected  every  day. 
He  would  repeat  that  this  was  a  singular  instance,  in  the  achievement  of  which 
great  skill  was  undoubtedly  manifested,  but  which  was  also  connected  with 
peculiar  circumstances,  which  they  could  not  hope  always  to  occur.  It  must 
not,  therefore,  be  expected  as  a  matter  of  course  that  all  such  attempts  must 
necessarily  succeed." 

We  have  now  discussed  the  several  instances,  in  other  countries,  of  British 
naval  prowess,  so  highly  lauded  by  the  Apalachicola  report,  except  the  taking 
of  "Constantinople  by  the  Venetian  fleet  "  and  the  English  conquest  of  "Canton, 
but  just  now"  With  respect  to  the  former  conquest,  it  will  be  sufficient  to  re- 
mark, that  it  was  made  before  the  invention  of  gunpowder.  The  utter  inefficiency 
of  the  Chinese  to  carry  on  war  with  modern  Europeans,  with  anything  like 
equality  of  forces,  is  too  well  known  to  require  comment.  Their  land  batteries 
were  constructed  in  violation  of  all  rules  of  the  art ;  and  they  attempted  to 
frighten  away  the  English  by  the  sound  of  their  gongs,  and  the  turning  of  som- 
ersets by  their  troops  !  Ten  Englishmen  were  anywhere  more  than  equal  to 
one  hundred  natives ! 

We  now  turn  to  the  examples  of  British  naval  superiority,  said  by  the  report 
to  have  been  exhibited  in  their  several  attacks  upon  the  fortifications  of  our  own 
country.  The  only  refutation  we  shall  offer  is  the  following  brief  account  of  the 
facts.  They  are  collected  from  the  best  English  and  American  authorities. 

"Louisbwg  was  attached  and  taken  by  a  naval  force" — So  says  tne  Ap- 
alachicola report;  but  we  confidently  affirm  that,  although  several  times  attacked, 
it  never  was  taken  by  a  naval  force  alone,  no  matter  how  superior  that  force 
might  be.  This  place  was  first  reduced  in  1745.  For  this  attack  the  colonies 
raised  about  4,000  men  and  100  small  vessels  and  transports,  carrying  between 
160  and  200  guns.  They  were  afterwards  joined  by  ten  other  ships,  carrying 
near  500  guns.  This  attacking  force  now,  according  to  some  of  the  English 
writers,  consisted  of  6,000 "provincials,  800  seamen,  and  a  naval  force  of  near 
700  guns.  The  troops  landed  and  laid  siege  to  the  town.  The  garrisons  of 
of  these  works  consisted  of  600  regulars  and  1,000  Breton  militia,  or,  according 
to  some  writers,  of  only  1,200  men  in  all.  The  armament  of  Louisburg  was 
101  cannon,  76  swivels,  and  six  mortars.  Auxiliary  to  the  main  works,  was  an 
island  battery  of  thirty  22-pounders,  and  a  battery  on  the  main  land  armed  with 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  299 

thirty  large  cannon.  Frequent  attempts  were  made  to  storm  the  place,  but  the 
most  persevering  efforts  were  of  no  avail — many  of  the  New  Englanders  being 
killed  and  wounded,  and  their  boats  destroyed,  while  the  garrison  remained 
unharmed.  At  length,  after  a  siege  of  49  days,  want  of  provisions,  and  the 
general  dissatisfaction  of  the  inhabitants,  caused  the  garrison  to  surrender. 
When  the  New  Englanders  saw  the  strength  of  the  works,  and  the  little  im- 
pression which  their  efforts  had  produced,  they  were  not  only  greatly  elated  but 
astonished  at  their  success.  It  should  be  noticed  that,  in  the  above  attack,  the 
number  of  guns  in  the  fleet  was  almost  three  times  as  great  as  that  of  all  the 
forts  combined ;  and  yet  the  naval  part  of  the  attack  was  unsuccessful.  The 
besieging  army  was  four  times  as  great  as  all  the  garrisons  combined;  and  yet 
the  place  held  out  forty-nine  days,  and  at  last  was  surrendered  through  the 
want  of  provisions  and  the  disaffection  of  the  citizens. 

A  formidable  effort  was  now  made  by  the  French  to  recover  this  place.  For 
this  purpose,  a  large  fleet  was  sent  from  France,  consisting  of  near  forty  ships- 
of-war,  two  artillery  ships,  and  fifty-six  transports,  carrying  about  3,500  men 
and  40,000  stand  of  small  arms  for  the  use  of  the  Canadians ;  but  this  formida- 
ble armament  was  scattered  by  storms,  and  the  project  abandoned.  The  place 
was  afterwards  surrendered  by  treaty. 

In  1757  a  British  fleet  of  fifteen  ships-of-the-line,  eighteen  frigates,  and  many 
smaller  vessels,  and  a  land  force  of  12,000  effective  men,  were  sent  to  attempt 
the  reduction^  of  this  fortress ;  but,  being  now  defended  by  seventeen  ships-of- 
the-line  and  a  garrison  of  6,000  regulars,  its  reduction  was  declared  by  the  British 
to  be  impossible.  The  forces  sent  against  this  place  in  1758,  consisted  of  twenty 
ships-of-the-line  and  eighteen  frigates,  with  an  army  of  14,000  men.  The  harbor 
was  defended  by  only  five  ships-of-the-line,  one  fifty  gun  ship,  and  five  frigates, 
three  of  which  were  sunk  across  the  mouth  of  the  basin.  The  fortifications  of 
the  town  had  been  much  neglected,  and  in  general  had  fallen  into  ruins.  The 
garrison  consisted  of  only  2,500  regulars  and  600  militia.  Notwithstanding  the 
number  of  guns  of  the  British  fleet  exceeded  both  the  armaments  of  the  French 
ships  and  all  the  forts,  it  did  not  risk  an  attack,  but  merely  acted  as  transports 
and  as  a  blockading  squadron.  Even  the  French  ships  and  the  outer  works 
commanding  the  harbor  were  reduced  by  the  land  batteries  erected  by  Wolfe ; 
and  the  main  work,  although  besieged  by  an  inequality  of  forces  of  nearly  five 
to  one,  held  out  for  two  months,  and  even  then  surrendered  through  the  peti- 
tions and  fears  of  the  non-combatant  inhabitants,  and  not  because  it  had  received 
any  material  injury  from  the  besiegers.  The  defence,  however,  had  been  con- 
tinued long  enough  to  prevent,  for  that  campaign,  any  further  operations  against 
Canada. 

"Quebec  was  taken  from  the  French  by  Admiral  Saunders,  ivho,  with  twenty- 
one  sail  of  the  line,  entered  the  St.  Lawrence  in  1759." — This  is  certainly  a 
remarkable  discovery,  for  we  are  sure  that  no  one  ever  before  heard  of  Quebec 
being  taken  by  Admiral  Saunders.  This  discovery  opens  a  new  era  in  military 
history;  for,  hereafter,  the  fleet  which  transports  an  army,  though  it  may  not 
have  a  gun  of  its  own  on  board,  is  entitled  to  the  credit  of  all  the  conquests 
which  that  army  may  achieve.  The  battle  of  the  Pyramids  was  not  fought  by 
Napoleon,  but  by  Admiral  Brueix,  who  conveyed  the  army  to  Egypt !  The 
defence  of  Portugal  was  not  made  by  Wellington,  but  by  the  ships  which  landed 
him  on  the  peninsula! 

The  several  naval  attacks  on  Quebec  are  matters  of  interest,  and  we  shall 
notice  them  briefly,  not,  however,  for  the  purpose  of  refuting  the  inferences  of 
the  above-mentioned  report.  In  1690,  Massachusetts  fitted  out  a  fleet  of  thirty- 
four  ships,  the  largest  carrying  forty-four  guns  and  about  200  men.  The  whole 
command  consisted  of  about  2,000  men.  This  force,  under  the  command  of  Sir 
William  Phipps,  ascended  the  St.  Lawrence  and  laid  siege  to  Quebec,  whose 
defences  were  then  of  the  slightest  character,  and  armed  with  only  twenty-three 


300  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

guns.  The  attack  was  kept  up  for  some  time ;  but,  at  length,  the  fleet,  receiv- 
ing more  injuries  from  the  batteries  than  it  inflicted  on  them,  withdrew  from  the 
contest,  and  hastened  home  with  precipitation.  In  1693,  a  considerable  fleet 
was  sent  out  from  England,  to  attempt  the  reduction  of  Quebec ;  but  a  portion 
of  the  crews  being  destroyed  by  the  yellow  fever,  the  project  was  abandoned. 
In  1709,  a  combined  attack  by  sea  and  land  was  planned  against  Quebec  and 
Montreal ;  the  army  advanced  as  far  as  Wood  creek,  but  the  fleet  never  ascended 
as  far  as  Quebec,  and  the  expedition  was  abandoned.  In  1711,  an  English 
fleet  of  fifteen  ships-of-war,  carrying  over  800  guns,  forty  transports,  and  six 
storeships,  with  over  5,000  seamen  and  a  large  land  force,  attempted  the  con- 
quest of  this  place;  they  failed,  however,  to  reach  their  destination,  and,  after 
losing  in  the  St.  Lawrence  a  part  of  the  ships  and  more  than  1,000  men,  aban- 
doned the  project.  In  the  latter  part  of  1745,  the  English  colonial  fleet  of  some 
600  guns,  at  Louisburg,  was  directed  to  attack  Quebec ;  but,  not  receiving  the 
promised  reinforcements  from  the  Duke  of  Newcastle,  they  did  not  venture  to 
ascend  the  St.  Lawrence.  The  fleets  of  Admiral  Saunders  and  Holmes  con- 
sisted of  "twenty-two  ships-of-the-line,  and  an  equal  number  of  frigates  and 
small  armed  vessels."  The  ships-of-the-line  alone  carried  1,500  guns.  Wolfe's 
army  amounted  to  about  8,000  men.  The  works  of  Quebec  were  armed  with 
ninety-four  guns  and  five  mortars,  and  only  a  part  of  these  could  be  brought  to 
bear  upon  the  shipping.  The  fleet  ascended  the  St.  Lawrence  without  difficulty, 
and  arrived  at  the  Isle  of  Orleans  in  the  latter  part  of  June,  birt  did  not  ap- 
proach the  city  until  after  Wolfe  had  "  secured  the  posts,  without  the  command 
of  which,  the  fleet  could  not  have  lain  in  safety  in  the  harbor."  Admiral 
Holmes's  division  first  ascended  the  St.  Lawrence  above  Quebec,  but  was  soon 
withdrawn,  to  cover  the  landing  of  the  troops  at  the  falls  of  Montmorenci,  where 
an  unsuccessful  attack  was  made  upon  the  intrenchments  of  Montcalm.  Several 
attempts  with  the  combined  sea  and  land  forces  were  made  to  carry  the  works, 
but  they  proved  equally  unsuccessful.  Although  the  ships  carried  fifteen  or 
twenty  times  as  many  guns  as  the  forts,  their  inability  to  reduce  these  works 
was  acknowledged.  The  siege  had  continued  for  two  months,  and  still  the  forti- 
fications were  uninjured.  General  Wolfe  himself  distinctly  stated,  that  in  any 
further  attempt  to  carry  the  place,  the  "guns  of  the  shipping  could  not  be  of 
much  use;"  and  the  chief  engineer  of  the  expedition  gave  it  as  his  opinion,  that 
"  the  ships  would  receive  great  damage  from  the  shot  and  bombs  of  the  upper 
batteries,  without  making  the  least  impression  upon  them."  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances, it  was  finally  determined  to  endeavor  to  decoy  Montcalm  from  his 
works,  and  make  him  risk  a  battle  in  the  open  field.  In  an  evil  hour,  the 
French  consented  to  forego  the  advantages  of  their  fortifications,  and  the  contest 
was  finally  decided  upon  the  plains  of  Abraham,  with  forces  nearly  equal  in 
number,  but  greatly  dissimilar  in  character — the  English  being  disciplined  and 
chosen  troops,  while  nearly  one-half  of  their  opponents  were  militia  and  Indians, 
who  gave  but  a  weak  support  to  the  regulars.  Both  Wolfe  and  Montcalm  fell 
in  this  battle,  but  the  former  onxthe  field  of  victory ;  and  five  days  afterwards 
the  inhabitants,  weakened  and  dispirited  by  their  losses,  surrendered  the  town, 
although  its  fortifications  were  still  unharmed. 

"The frigate  Roebuck  silenced  the  efficient  batteries  at  Red  Hook,"  fyc. — The 
little  batteries  of  Red  Hook  and  Governor's  Island,  however  much  ridiculed  by 
the  Apalachicola  report,  were  really  of  great  importance  to  the  security  of 
Washington's  army,  which  was  then  intrenched  in  the  lines  of  Brooklyn,  with 
its  right  resting  upon  the  small  field  works  of  a  few  guns  at  Red  Hook.  This 
little  work,  and  the  corresponding  one  on  Governor's  Island,  prevented  the 
British  shipping  from  passing  into  the  East  river,  where  they  could  have  as- 
sailed the  Americans  in  rear,  and  cut  off  their  retreat.  The  former  of  these  bat- 
teris  was  never  very  seriously  engaged ;  and  we  cannot  find,  either  in  American 
or  English  histories,  any  notice  of  its  being  silenced  by  the  Roebuck.  We 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    ^EA-COAST   DEFENCES.  301 

know  that  it  was  not  abandoned  till  Washingion  had  effected  his  retreat  across 
the  East  river.  Beatson  says,  the  Roebuck  exchanged  only  a  few  random  shots 
with  it. 

The  entire  English  attacking  force  consisted  of  103  ships,  carrying  over  2,600 
guns,  and  a  veteran  army  of  30,000  men.  The  fleet  lay  some  days  at  the  Nar- 
rows before  landing  the  troops,  and  seven  days  more  elapsed  previous  to  Wash- 
ington's retreat. 

Baltimore  and  Washington. — The  attacks  upon  these  two  places  by  the 
British,  in  the  war  1812,  are  referred  to  in  the  Apalachicola  report;  the  first 
as  proof  of  the  inefficiency  of  a  "fortress,  well  situated,  having  a  good  garri- 
son— nay,  where  all  the  requisite  conditions  are  fulfilled  "  to  withstand  the  fire 
of  shipping ;  for  it  "  was  evacuated  by  the  fire  of  the  two  hostile  frigates ;"  and 
the  second  as  being  defended  without  the  use  of  fortifications,  inasmuch  as  the 
"  attacking  fleet  could  not  approach  the  works  erected  for  the  defence  of  the 
city,  and  therefore  neither  received  nor  inflicted  much  injury." 

We  cbny  the  correctness  of  these  assertions.  The  fort  on  the  Potomac  was 
not  a  fortress,  was  not  well  situated,  was  not  well  garrisioned,  nor  were  the  re- 
quisite conditions  of  defence  fulfilled.  It  was  a  small  inefficient  work,  incor- 
rectly planned  by  an  incompetent  French  engineer,  and  has  not  yet  been  com- 
pleted. The  portion  constructed  was  never,  until  very  recently,  properly  pre- 
pared for  receiving  its  armament,  and  at  the  time  of  attack  could  not  possibly 
have  held  out  a  very  long  time.  But  no  defence  whatever  was  made.  Captain 
Gordon,  with  a  squadron  of  eight  sail,  carrying  173  guns,  under  orders  to 
"  ascend  the  river  as  high  as  Fort  Washington,  and  try  upon  it  the  experiment 
of  a  bombardment,"  approached  that  fort,  and,  upon  firing  a  single  shell,  which 
did  no  injury  to  either  the  fort  or  the  garrison,  the  latter  deserted  the  works, 
and  rapidly  retreated.  The  commanding  officer  was  immediately  dismissed  for 
his  cowardice.  The  fleet  ascended  the  river  to  Alexandria ;  but  learning,  soon 
afterwards,  that  batteries  were  preparing  at  the  White  House  and  Indian  Head, 
to  cut  off  his  retreat,  it  retired  in  much  haste,  but  not  without  injury. 

The  whole  fleet  sent  to  the  attack  of  Baltimore  consisted  of  forty  sail,  the 
largest  of  which  were  ships-of-the-line,  carrying  an  army  of  over  six  thousand 
combatants.  The  troops  were  landed  at  North  Point,  while  sixteen  of  the  bomb 
vessels  and  frigates  approached  within  reach  of  Fort  McHenry,  and  commenced 
a  bombardment  which  lasted  twenty-five  hours.  During  this  attack,  the  enemy 
"  threw  1,500  shells,  four  hundred  of  which  exploded  within  the  walls  of  the 
fort,  but  without  making  any  unfavorable  impression  on  either  the  strength  of 
the  work  or  the  spirit  of  the  garrison."  The  forts  labored  under  the  disadvan- 
tage of  being  armed  with  guns  of  too  small  a  calibre  to  reach  the  shipping ;  but 
a  fleet  of  barges  sent  to  storm  one  of  the  batteries  was  repulsed  with  loss,  and 
both  fleet  and  army  soon  withdrew  from  the  contest.  We  thought  it  was  a  fact 
too  well  known  to  need  re-assertion  at  the  present  day,  that  the  gallant  resist- 
ance of  Colonel  Armistead  in  Fort  McHenry,  and  of  General  Smith  upon  the 
enemy's  line  of  approach  per  North  Point,  saved  that  beautiful  city  from  being 
destroyed  by  the  ruthless  foe. 

"  Charleston  was  taken,  notwithstanding  the  attack  on  Fort  Moultrie 
failed." — When  this  second  attack  was  made  on  Charleston,  Marshall  says  that 
Fort  Moultrie  was  out  of  repair,  and  Fort  Johnson  in  ruins.  There  was,  how- 
ever, some  time  before  this  attack,  a  full  trial  of  strength,  before  Charleston,  be- 
tween the  American  batteries  and  British  ships.  The  fort  mounted  only  26 
guns,  while  the  fleet  carried  270  guns.  In  this  contest  the  British  were  entirely 
defeated,  and  lost,  in  killed  and  wounded,  more  than  seventy  men  to  every  ten 
guns  brought  against  them,  while  their  whole  270  guns  killed  and  wounded  only 
thirty-two  men  in  the  fort.  Of  this  trial  of  strength,  which  was  certainly  a  fair 
one,  Cooper,  in  his  Naval  History,  says  :  "  It  goes  fully  to 'prove  the  important 
military  position,  that  ships  cannot  withstand  forts,  when  the  latter  are  properly 


302  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

armed,  constructed,  and  garrisoned.  General  Moultrie  says,  only  thirty  rounds 
from  the  battery  were  fired,  and  was  of  opinion  that  the  want  of  powder  alone 
prevented  the  Americans  from  destroying  the  men-of-war." 

"  Mobile  fort  fell  without  resistance,  yielding  up  near  Jive  hundred  regular 
troops,  officers  and  men,  and  a  full  supply  of  the  necessaries  for  a  vigorous  de- 
fence"— In  1814,  a  British  fleet  of  four  vessels,  carrying  92  guns,  attacked  Fort 
Boyer,  a  small  redoubt,  located  on  a  point  of  land  commanding  the  passage  from 
the  Gulf  into  the  bay  of  Mobile.  This  redoubt  was  garrisoned  by  only  one 
hundred  and  twenty  combatants,  officers  included,  and  its  armament  was  but 
twenty  small  pieces  of  cannon,  some  of  which  were  almost  entirely  useless,  and  most 
of  them  poorly  mounted,  "  in  batteries  hastily  thrown  up,  and  leaving  the  gunners 
uncovered  from  the  knee  upwards  j"  while  the  enemy's  land  force,  acting  in  con- 
cert with  the  ships,  consisted  of  twenty  artillerists,  with  a  battery  of  one  twelve- 
pounder  and  a  howitzer,  one  hundred  and  thirty  marines,  and  six  hundred  In- 
dians and  negroes.  His  ships  carried  five  hundred  and  ninety  men  in  all.  This 
immense  disparity  of  numbers  and  strength  did  not  allow  to  the  British- military 
and  naval  commanders  the  slightest  apprehension  that  four  British  ships,  carry- 
ing 92  guns,  and  a  land  force  somewhat  exceeding  seven  hundred  combatants, 
could  hardly  fail  in  reducing  a  small  work,  mounting  only  twenty  short  carro- 
nades,  and  defended  by  a  little  more  than  one  hundred  men,  unprovided  alike 
with  furnaces  for  heating  shot  or  casemates  to  cover  themselves  from  rockets  and 
shells."  Nevertheless,  the  enemy  was  completely  repulsed ;  one  of  his  largest 
ships  was  entirely  destroyed ;  his  entire  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  could  have 
fallen  but  a  little  short  of  one  hundred,  while  ours  was  only  eight  or  nin£.  Here 
was  a  fair  trial  of  strength,  with  a  result  most  flattering  to  the  American  pride ; 
but  the  Apalachicola  report  passes  it  by  in  silence,  and  quotes,  as  proof  of  the 
superiority  of  British  ships  over  American  batteries,  the  land  attack  of  General 
Lambert,  in  February,  1815,  in  which  not  a  single  ship  was  in  the  remotest  de- 
gree concerned. 

We  have  now  disposed  of  the  several  examples  adduced  in  the  Apalachicola 
report  to  prove  the  superiority  of  British  naval  armaments,  gun  for  gun,  over 
both  American  and  European  batteries.  There  are  a  few  other  trials  of  strength 
between  ships  and  forts,  which  are  not  mentioned  in  that  report — trials  too  well 
known  to  admit  of  any  doubt  or  difference  of  opinion  respecting  their  results. 
Why  does  the  report  pass  over  in  silence  the  attacks  upon  Stonington,  Cagliari, 
Martello,  Santa  Cruz,  Marcou,  &c.,  and  offer  such  examples  as  "  Constanti- 
nople by  a  Venetian  fleet,"  "Mocha,  in  Arabia,"  "Senegal,"  "Canton?"  &c. 
We  will  in  part  supply  this  omission,  limiting  ourselves,  however,  to  the  period 
of  the  French  revolution. 

On  the  21st  of  January,  1792,  a  considerable  French  squadron  attacked 
Cagliari,  in  Sardinia,  but  after  a  bombardment  of  three  days,  (during  which 
they  attempted  to  land,)  they  were  most  signally  defeated  and  obliged  to  retire. 
In  1794,  in  the  bay  of  Martello,  Corsica,  a  small  tower  armed  with  one  gun 
in  barbette,  was  attacked  by  two  English  ships,  "  the  Fortitude  of  seventy-four 
and  the  Juno  frigate  of  thirty-two  guns.  After  having  engaged  it  for  two  hours 
and  a  half,  they  were  obliged  to  haul  off  with  considerable  damage.  The  For- 
titude lost  seven  men,  and  was  three  or  four  times  set  on  fire  by  heated  shot  ; 
once  in  the  cock  pit  and  state  room.  There  were  about  thirty  men  in  the  tower, 
though  three  were  sufficient  to  work  the  gun."  The  garrison  does  not  appear 
to  have  sustained  any  loss.  Colonel  Pasley,  an  English  officer  of  high  stand- 
ing, says  that  this  attack  "  proved  the  superiority  which  guns  on  shore  must 
always,  in  certain  positions,  possess  over  shipping,  no  matter  whether  the  former 
are  mounted  on  a  tower  or  not." 

In  July,  1797,  Nelson,  with  a  squadron  of  eight  ships  of  his  own  choosing, 
carrying  near  four  hundred  guns,  entered  the  bay  of  Santa  Croix,  Teneriffe, 
and  attacked  the  town.  The  ships  fired  upon  the  small  land  batteries  without 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  303 

producing  any  effect,  and  a  force  of  one  thousand  men  was  several  times  landed 
in  boats,  but  as  often  driven  back  with  great  loss ;  a  single  ball  striking  the 
side  of  the  Fox  cutter  instantly  sunk  her,  with  near  one  hundred  seamen  and 
marines.  After  many  desperate  attempts  by  the  dauntless  Nelson  to  cany  the 
works,  the  British  were  compelled  to  retire  with  a  loss  of  two  hundred  and  fifty 
killed  and  wounded,  while  the  garrison  received  little  or  no  damage. 

In  the  early  wars  of  the  French  revolution  the  English  took  possession  of 
the  islands  of  Marcou  and  fortified  them,  in  order  to  command  the  coast  trade 
between  Cherbourg  and  Havre.  In  1798  the  French  attempted  to  retake  these 
little  islands,  and  attacked  the  English  redoubt  with  fifty-two  brigs  and  gun- 
boats, carrying  80  long  36's  and  18-pounders  and  six  or  seven  thousand  men. 
The  redoubt  was  armed  with  two  32-pounders,  two  6-pounders,  four  4-pound ers, 
and  two  carronades  ;  its  garrison  consisted  of  only  250  seamen  and  marines. 
Notwithstanding  this  great  disparity  of  numbers,  the  little  redoubt  sunk  seven 
of  the  enemy's  brigs  and  boats,  captured  another,  and  forced  the  remainder  to 
retreat  with  great  loss.  The  loss  of  the  garrison  was  only  one  man  killed  and 
three  wounded. 

In  July,  1801,  Porto  Ferrairo  was  garrisoned  by  300  British,  800  Tuscans, 
and  400  Corsicans.  The  French  army  which  besieged  this  motley  garrison  first 
consisted  of  1,500  men,  but  was  afterwards  increased  to  6,000  land  forces  and 
three  frigates.  The  siege  was  continued  for  five  months,  during  which  time 
the  place  was,  several  times  bombarded  and  assaulted  without  success,  and  was 
at  last  surrendered  by  the  treaty  of  Amiens. 

In  July,  1801,  Admiral  Saumarez  attacked  the  defences  of  Algesiras  with  a 
fleet  of  one  80-gun  ship,  five  74's,  one  frigate,  and  a  lugger,  carrying  in  all  502 
guns.  The  land  defences  consisted  of  Green  island  battery  of  seven  18  and 
24-pounders,  and  St.  Jaques  battery  of  five  18-pounders.  The  floating  defences 
consisted  of  two  80-gun  ships,  one  of  74,  one  of  44,  and  some  gun-boats ;  in 
all  306  guns.  The  English  here  chose  their  time  and  mode  of  attack,  had  the 
wind  in  their  favor,  and  a  naval  superiority  of  196  guns ;  and  yet  they  were 
most  signally  defeated,  and  compelled  to  retire  with  the  entire  loss  of  one  ship 
and  with  the  others  much  injured.  Can  this  be  attributed  to  the  superior  skill 
and  bravery  of  the  French  and  Spanish  ships  and  crews  ?  Such  a  supposition 
would  be  in  contradiction  to  the  whole  history  of  the  war,  and  we  must  there- 
fore attribute  it  to  the  fire  of  the  land  batteries.  An  examination  of  the  details 
of  this  battle  will  prove  clearly  that  these  12  guns  ashore  more  than  compen- 
sated for  the  196  extra  guns  of  the  English.  The  Hannibal,  74  guns,  ran 
aground  near  the  land  battery,  and  thus  became  exposed  to  its  fire.  Her  posi- 
tion was  such,  however,  that  she  continued  to  return  the  fire  even  after  the 
other  ships  had  retired.  An  attempt  was  made  by  the  Audacious,  74  guns,  and 
the  Caesar,  80  guns,  to  cut  out  the  Hannibal,  but  the  fire  of  the  little  battery 
was  so  severe  that  the  admiral  says  in  his  despatches,  he  was  obliged  to  make 
sail  and  leave  her  to  her  fate.  The  whole  loss  of  the  English  in  killed  and 
wounded  was  375.  All  the  ships  were  much  injured.  The  Caesar  and  Pompe'e 
were  so  much  shattered  as  to  preclude  the  hope  of  their  being  ready  in  any 
seasonable  time  to  proceed  to  sea,  but  by  working  night  and  day,  the  former 
was  got  ready  for  the  first  battle  of  Trafalgar,  but  the  latter  was  reduced  almost 
to  a  wreck. 

Shortly  after  this  battle,  the  French  and  Spaniards,  encouraged  by  their  suc- 
cess at  Algesiras,  proceeded  to  attack  the  English  at  sea.  The  combined  fleet 
now  carried  1,012  guns,  and  the  English  only  422 ;  the  former,  nevertheless, 
were  most  completely  beaten — shoAving,  as  did  every  naval  contest  during  the 
war,  that  on  the  water  the  English  were  far  superior  to  their  opponents. 

In  1803  the  English,  under  Commander  Hood,  constructed  a  small  battery 


304  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

of  some  15*  guns  upon  Diamond  rock,  about  six  miles  from  Port  Royal  bay. 
It  was  garrisoned  with  about  100  men.  This  little  work  was  found  so  much 
to  annoy  the  French  shipping  going  to  and  from  Martinique  that  in  1805  they 
determined  to  destroy  it.  The  force  sent  to  accomplish  this  consisted  of  two 
74-gun  ships,  one  frigate,  and  a  brig,  with  a  detachment  of  200  troops.  Sev- 
eral ineffectual  attempts  were  made  to  silence  its  fire  or  carry  it  by  storm,  and 
on  the  fourth  day  of  the  siege  the  little  garrison,  though  still  unharmed  in  their 
works,  capitulated,  for  want  of  both  ammunition  and  provisions.  There  was 
not  a  single  man  killed  or  wounded  in  the  redoubt,  while  the  French  lost  50  men. 

In  1808  a  French  army  of  5,000  men  laid  siege  to  Fort  Trinidad,  then  gar- 
risoned by  less  than  100  Spaniards  and  British  marines.  An  English  seventy- 
four  and  a  bomb  vessel  attempted  to  annoy  the  besiegers,  but  were  soon  driven 
off  by  a  French  land  battery  of  three  guns.  During  the  progress  of  the  siege 
an  additional  force  of  50  seamen  and  30  marines  were  thrown  into  the  fort, 
making  in  all  about  180  men ;  and  this  little  force  not  only  successfully  sus- 
tained the  siege  but  most  bravely  repulsed  a  storming  party  of  1,000  picked 
men,  capturing  the  storming  equipage  and  killing  the  commanding  officer  and 
all  who  attempted  to  mount  the  breach. 

In  1806  the  British  ship  Pompee,  80  guns,  the  Hydra,  38  guns,  and 
another  frigate,  force  not  given,  "  anchored  about  800  yards  from  a  battery 
of  two  guns  situated  on  the  extremity  of  Cape  Licosa,  and  protected  from  as- 
sault by  a  tower,  in  which  were  five  and  twenty  French  soldiers  commanded 
by  a  lieutenant.  The  line-of-battle-ship  and  the  frigates  fired  successive 
broadsides  till  their  ammunition  was  nearly  expended,  the  battery  continually 
replying  with  a  slow  but  destructive  effect.  The  Pompee,  at  which  ship  alone 
it  directed  its  fire,  had  40  shot  in  her  hull,  her  mizzen  topmast  carried  away,  a 
lieutenant,  midshipman,  and  5  men  killed,  and  30  men  wounded.  At  length, 
force  proving  ineffectual,  negotiation  was  resorted  to,  and,  after  some  hours' 
parley,  the  officer  capitulated.  It  then  appeared  that  the  carriage  of  one  of  the 
two  guns  had  failed  on  the  second  shot,  and  the  gun  had  subsequently  been 
fired  lying  on  the  sill  of  the  embrasure;  so  that  in  fact  the  attack  of  an  80-gun 
ship  and  two  frigates  had  been  resisted  by  a  single*  piece  of  ordnance."  In  the 
latter  wars  of  the  French  revolution  the  British  partially  fortified  the  island  of 
Anhault  as  a  depot  and  point  of  communication  between  England  and  the 
continent.  This  place  was  attacked  by  the  Danes  in  1811  with  twelve  gunboats 
carrying  72  guns  and  howitzers  and  800  men  and  several  transports,  with  a  land 
force  whose  number  has  been  variously  stated  from  1,000  to  3,000.  The  whole 
Danish  attacking  force  is  estimated  by  several  English  writers  at  4,000.  The 
only  fortification  of  importance  on  the  island  was  a  small  redoubt,  called  Light- 
house fort,  and  the  garrison  consisted  of  only  381  men.  The  Danes,  under 
cover  of  darkness  and  a  thick  fog,  succeeded  in  effecting  a  landing ;  but  on 
their  approach  to  the  batteries  a  well  directed  and  destructive  fire  of  grape  and 
musketry  was  opened  upon  them.  They  were  most  signally  defeated,  writh  a 
loss  of  forty  killed  and  five  or  six  hundred  wounded  and  prisoners.  The  remainder 
re-embarked  in  their  boats,  but  were  pursued  by  two  small  English  vessels  that 
had  opportunely  arrived  and  the  greater  part  of  them  taken  or  destroyed. 

Leghorn,  during  the  absence  of  the  army  in  1813,  was  attacked  by  an  English 
squadron  of  six  ships,  carrying  over  300  guns  and  1,000  troops.  "This  attack 
failed  owing  to  the  strength  of  the  fortifications,"  and  the  troops  and  seamen 
were  re-embarked  during  a  temporary  suspension  of  hostilities. 

When  Lord  Lynedock  advanced  against  Antwerp  in  1814,  says  Colonel 
Mitchell,  "  Fort  Frederick,  a  small  work  of  only  two  guns,  one  at  right  angles 
and  the  other  looking  diagonally  up  the  stream,  was  established  in  a  bend  of  the 

<*The  armament  is  said  to  be  "that  of  a  sloop-of-war."  Sloops-of-war  then  carried  from 
10  to  15  guns. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  305" 

Polder  Dyke  at  some  distance  below  Lillo;  the  armament  was  a  long  18-pounder 
and  a  5j-inch  howitzer.  From  this  post  the  French  determined  to  dislodge  us, 
[the  English,]  and,  on  a  very  fine  and  calm  morning,  an  80-gnn  ship  dropped 
down  with  the  tide  and  anchored  near  the  Flanders  shore  about  600  yards  from 
the  British  battery;  by  her  position  she  was  secured  from  the  fire  of  the  18- 
pounder  and  exposed  to  that  of  the  howitzer  only.  As  soon  as  everything  was 
made  tight  her  broadside  was  opened;  and  if  noise  and  smoke  were  alone 
sufficient  to  insure  success  in  war,  as  so  many  of  the  moderns  seem  to  think, 
the  result  of  this  strange  contest  would  not  have  been  long  doubtful,  for  the 
thunder  of  the  French  artillery  actually  made  the  earth  to  shake  again ;  but 
though  the  earth  shook,  the  single  British  howitzer  was  neither  dismounted  nor 
silenced;  and  though  the  artillerymen  could  not,  perfectly  exposed  as  they  were, 
stand  to  their  gun  whilst  the  iron  hail  was  striking  thick  and  fast  around,  yet  no 
sooner  did  the  enemy's  fire  slacken  for  a  moment  than  they  sprang  to  tTieir  post 
ready  to  return  at  least  one  shot  for  eighty.  This  extraordinary  combat  lasted 
from  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning  till  near  twelve  at  noon,  when  the  French 
ship,  having  had  forty-one  men  killed  and  wounded,  her  commander  being  in 
the  list  of  the  latter,  and  having  besides  sustained  serious  damage  in  her  hull 
and  rigging,  returned  to  Antwerp  without  effecting  anything  whatever.  The 
howitzer  was  not  dismounted,  the  fort  was  not  injured — there  being,  in  fact, 
nothing  to  injure — and  the  British  had  only  one  man  killed  and  two  wounded." 
But  we  will  not  specify  examples ;  the  whole  history  of  the  wars  of  the  French 
revolution  is  one  continued  proof  of  the  superiority  of  fortifications  as  a  maritime 
frontier  defence.  The  sea-coast  of  France  is  almost  within  a  stone's  throw*  of 
the  principal  British  naval  depots.  Here  were  large  towns  and  harbors,  filled 
with  the  rich  commerce  of  the  world,  offering  the  most  dazzling  attractions  to 
the  brave  and  enterprising  enemy.  The  French  navy  was  at  this  time  utterly 
incompetent  to  their  defence,  while  England  supported  a  maritime  force  at  an 
annual  expense  of  near  ninety  millions  of  dollars.  Her  largest  fleets  were 
continually  cruising  within  sight  of  these  seaports,  and  not  unfrequently  attempting 
to  cut  out  their  shipping.  At  this  period,  says  one  of  her  naval  historians,  "  the 
naval  force  of  Britain,  so  multiplied  and  so  expert  from  long  practice,  had 
acquired  an  intimate  knowledge  of  their  [the  French]  harbors,  their  bays,  and 
creeks ;  her  officers  knew  the  depth  of  water  and  the  resistance  likely  to  be  met 
with  in  every  situation."  On  the  other  hand,  these  harbors  and  towns  were 
frequently  stripped  of  their  garrisons  by  the  necessities  of  distant  wars,  being 
left  with  no  other  defence  than  their  fortifications  and  militia.  And  yet,  not- 
withstanding all  this,  they  escaped  unharmed  during  the  entire  contest.  They 
were  frequently  attacked,  and,  in  some  instances,  the  most  desperate  efforts  were 
made  to  effect  a  permanent  lodgement;  but  in  no  case  was  the  success  at  all 
commensurate  with  the  expense  of  life  and  treasure  sacrificed,  and  no  permanent 
hold  was  made  on  either  the  maritime  frontiers  of  France  or  her  allies.  ,  This 
certainly  was  owing  to  no  inferiority  of  skill  and  bravery  on  the  part  of  the 
British  navy,  as  the  battles  of  Aboukir  and  Trafalgar,  and  the  almost  annihila- 
tion of  the  French  marine,  have  but  too  plainly  proven.  Why,  then,  did  these 
places  escape  1  We  know  of  no  other  reason  than  that  they  were  fortified,  and 
that  the  French  knew  how  to  defend  their  fortifications.  The  British  maritime 
expeditions  to  Quebec,  the  Scheldt,  Constantinople,  Buenos  Ayres,  &c.,  sufficiently 
prove  the  ill  success  and  the  waste  of  life  and  treasure  with  which  they  must 
always  be  attended.  But  when  her  naval  power  Avas  applied  to  the  destruction 
of  the  enemy's  marine,  and  in  transporting  her  land  forces  to  solid  bases  of 
operations  on  the  soil  of  her  allies  in  Portugal  and  Belgium,  the  fall  of  Napoleon 
crowned  the  glory  of  their  achievements. 

*  Only  18£  miles  across  the  British  channel  at  the  narrowest  place. 
H.  Rep.  Com.  86 20 


306  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

We  shall  close  our  remarks  upon  this  part  of  the  subject  of  maritime  defence 
by  quotations  from  the  reports  of  Mr.  Poinsett,  Mr.  Bell,  and  Mr.  Spencer*  and 
from  the  military  work  of  Colonel  Mitchell,  of  the  British  army.  The  latter,  in 
his  remarks  on  military  organization,  &c.,  says :  "  The  numerous  and  splendid 
victories  achieved  by  British  fleets  over  forts  and  batteries  have  not  only  tended 
to  make  naval  attacks  popular,  but  have  also  led  to  the  very  general  belief  that 
ships  can  contend  successfully  against  batteries  on  shore,  wherever  the  latter  are 
fairly  accessible,  and  as  often  as  there  is  anything  like  a  fair  proportion  as  to  the 
numerical  force  of  guns  between  the  contending  parties.  None  of  the  many 
theories  that  have  resulted  from  the  modern  chance  games  of  war  can  possibly 
be  more  erroneous  or  more  dangerous,  because  the  public  voice  may,  at  some 
moment  of  general  excitement,  induce  the  government  to  fit  out  naval  armaments 
for  the  attainment  of  objects  totally  beyond  the  reach  of  naval  power.  Under 
the  mischievous  belief  that  wooden  walls  can  stand  battering  as  long  as  stone 
walls,  the  lives  of  British  seamen,  the  fame  of  the  navy,  and  the  honor  of  the 
country  may  be  risked  in  enterprises  in  which  skill  and  courage  can  effect  nothing, 
and  in  which  success  can  be  anticipated  only  from  the  folly  or  cowardice  of  the 
enemy — always  precarious  foundations  on  which  to  trust  for  victory. 

"To  strike  even  a  pretty  large  object  with  a  ball  fired  from  a  piece  of  artillery, 
at  a  moderate  range,  is  no  very  easy  matter;  and  the  difficulty  is,  of  course, 
much  increased  when  the  gun  is  placed,  as  on  board  a  ship,  on  a  moving  or  at 
least  a  very  unsteady  platform,  and  where  those  whose  business  it  is  to  take 
aim  are,  after  the  first  fire,  completely  enveloped  in  smoke.  And  though  towns 
and  fortresses  are  not  exactly  small,  or  even  moderately  small  objects,  they 
nevertheless,  when  situated  on  a  level,  present  but  a  very  narrow  horizontal  line 
to  the  shipping ;  and  of  this  line  a  still  narrower  part  is  vulnerable.  To  unroof 
the  houses  of  a  few  harmless  citizens,  or  te  throw  shells  into  a  second-rate  town, 
is  a  mode  of  warfare  as  unworthy  as  inefiicient,  and  will  never  induce  a  com- 
mander of  ordinary  firmness  to  relinquish  his  post  or  give  up  the  contest.  To 
breach  a  rampart  where  there  are  no  troops  for  debarkation,  and  when,  as  in 
such  maritime  expeditious  generally,  there  is  no  intention  to  storm  the  works, 
is  of  course  useless ;  so  that  the  only  remaining  alternative  is  to  dismount  or  to 
silence  the  artillery.  This  can  be  effected  only  by  striking  the  guns  themselves, 
or  by  so  completely  demolishing  the  parapet  as  to  prevent  the  men  from  work- 
ing them.  The  first  is  difficult,  for  a  gun  presents  but  a  very  small  mark ;  and 
the  second  is  not  easy,  because  it  requires  time,  and  a  great  many  well-directed 
shots." 

"To  batter  down  even  an  ordinary  rampart  with  the  floating  artillery  of  a 
fleet  seems  to  us  next  to  an  impossibility,  when  we  recollect  the  long  and  well- 
directed  fire,  constantly  striking  from  a  short  range  on  the  same  spot,  that  was 
required  to  breach  even  the  rickety  walls  of  some  of  the  Spanish  fortresses. 
A  ship-of-war  brings,  as  we  have  said,  a  much  greater  body  of  fire  to  bear  upon 
a  single  point  than  a  land  battery  can  return  from  an  equal  front;  yet  is  the 
loss  which  a  ship  is  liable  to  experience  from  the  fire  of  the  small  number  of 
battery  guns  far  greater  than  any  that  can  be  inflicted  by  its  own  superior  ar- 
tillery. Every  shot  that  strikes  a  ship  occasions  some  mischief,  whereas  one 
hundred  guns  may  strike  a  battery  without  producing  any  effect  whatever."  "A 
ship  of  any  force  is  a  large  object,  easily  struck  by  the  fixed  artillery  of  forts. 
The  vulnerable  part  of  a  battery  is,  on  the  contrary,  a  small  object,  which  it  is 
difficult  to  strike  with  the  floating  artillery  of  ships." 

"How,  then,  it  may  be  asked,  are  the  many  victories  gained  by  our  fleets  over 
land  defences  to  be  accounted  for  ?  By  circumstances,  and  by  the  conduct  of 
our  seamen,  whose  bravery  naturally  commanded  success  whenever  it  was  within 
their  reach,  and  not  uufrequeritly  wrung  it,  by  mere  excess  of  daring,  from  the 
fears  of  their  astonished  and  intimidated  adversaries.  Naval  and  military  oper- 
ations present  but  too  many  occasions  where  both  sailors  and  soldiers  are  forced 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  307 

to  set  the  ordinary  calmness  of  probability  at  defiance,  and  trust  to  daring  and 
to  fortune  for  success ;  but  for  government  to  fit  out  expeditions  on  such  a  prin- 
ciple would  be  the  height  of  reprehensible  folly — criminal  as  an  avowed  game 
of  hazard  played  with  '  dice  of  human  bones.'  It  would  be  doubly  criminal  in 
the  government  of  this  country,  [England,]  so  amply  provided  with  the  power 
of  placing  the  fair  means  of  success  at  the  disposal  of  efficient  armaments.  But 
naval  armaments  alone  cannot  contend  successfully  against  well-constructed  and 
well-defended  land  batteries;  nor  is  there  anything  in  naval  history  to  justify 
the  dangerous  and  erroneous  opinion  now  entertained  on  the  subject." 

Mr.  Poinsett  says:  "After  a  careful  and  anxious  investigation  of  a  subject 
involving  in  so  high  a  degree  the  safety  and  honor  of  the  country,  I  fully  con- 
cur in  the  opinions  expressed  by  the  board  [of  officers  on  national  defence]  of 
the  superiority  of  permanent  works  of  defence  over  all  other  expedients  that 
have  yet  been  devised,  and  of  their  absolute  necessity,  if  we  would  avoid  the 
danger  of  defeat  and  disgrace;  a  necessity  rather  increased  than  diminished  by 
the  introduction  of  steam  batteries  and  the  use  of  hollow  shot.  It  would,  in 
my  opinion,  prove  a  most  fatal  error  to  dispense  with  them,  and  to  rely  upon 
our  navy  alone,  aided  by  the  number,  strength,  and  valor  of  the  people,  to  pro- 
tect the  country  against  the  attacks  of  an  enemy  possessing  great  naval  means. 
To  defend  a  line  of  coast  of  three  thousand  miles  in  extent,  and  effectually  to 
guard  all  the  avenues  to  our  great  commercial  cities  and  important  naval  depots, 
the  navy  of  the  United  States  must  be  very  superior  to  the  means  of  attack  of 
the  most  powerful  naval  power  in  the  world,  which  will  occasion  an  annual 
expense  this  country  is  not  now  able  to  bear;  and  this  large  naval  armament, 
instead  of  performing  its  proper  function  as  the  sword  of  the  State,  in  time  of 
war,  and  sweeping  the  enemy's  commerce  from  the  seas,  must  be  chained  to  the 
coast  or  kept  within  the  harbors. 

"  It  has  been  clearly  demonstrated  that  the  expense  of  employing  a  sufficient 
body  of  troops,  either  regulars  or  militia,  for  a  period  of  even  six  months,  for 
the  purpose  of  defending  the  coast  against  attacks  and  feints  that  might  be 
made  by  an  enemy's  fleet,  would  exceed  the  cost  of  erecting  all  the  permanent 
works  deemed  necessary  for  the  coast.  One  hundred  thousand  men,  divided 
into  four  columns,  would  not  be  more  than  sufficient  to  guard  the  vulnerable 
points  of  our  maritime  frontier,  if  not  covered  by  fortifications.  This  amount 
of  force,  which  would  be  necessary  against  an  expedition  of  twenty  thousand 
men,  if  composed  of  regulars,  would  cost  the  nation  $30,000,000  per  annum; 
and  if  militia,  about  $40,000,000 ;  and  supposing  only  one-half  the  force  to  be 
required  to  defend  -the  coast,  with  the  aid  of  forts  properly  situated  and  judi- 
ciously constructed,  the  difference  of  expense  for  six  months  would  enable  the 
government  to  erect  all  the  necessary  works.  This  calculation  is  independent 
of  the  loss  the  nation  would  suffer  by  so  large  an  amount  of  labor  being  ab- 
stracted from  the  productive  industry  of  the  country,  and  the  fearful  waste  of 
life  likely  to  result  from  such  a  costly,  hazardous,  and  harassing  system  of 
defence. 

"It  must  be  recollected,  too,  that  we  are  not  called  to  try  a  new  system,  but 
to  persevere  in  the  execution  of  one  that  has  been  adopted  after  mature  delibe- 
ration, and  that  is  still  practiced  in  Europe  on  a  much  more  extensive  scale  than 
is  deemed  necessary  here ;  so  much  so,  that  there  exist  three  single  fortresses, 
each  of  which  comprises  more  extensive  and  stronger  works  than  is  here  pro- 
posed for  the  whole  line  of  our  maritime  frontier.  We  must  bear  in  mind,  also, 
that  the  destruction  of  some  of  the  important  points  on  our  frontier  would  alone 
cost  more  to  the  nation  than  the  expense  of  fortifying  the  whole  line  would 
amount  to;  while  the  temporary  occupation  of  the  others  would  drive  us  into 
expenses  to  recover  them,  far  surpassing  those  of  the  projected  works  of  defence. 

"  The  organization  of  the  permanent  defences  proposed  for  our  frontiers  is  not 
based  upon  military  and  naval  considerations  alone,  but  is  calculated  to  protect 


308  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

the  internal  navigation  of  the  country.  The  fortifications  proposed,  at  the  same 
time  that  they  protect  our  coast  from  the  danger  of  invasion,  and  defend  the 
principal  avenues  and  naval  establishments,  cover  the  whole  line  of  internal 
navigation,  which,  in  time  of  war,  will  contribute,  in  an  essential  manner,  to  the 
defence  of  the  country  by  furnishing  prompt  and  economical  means  of  transpor- 
tation; so  that,  while  the  main  arteries  which  conduct  our  produce  to  the  ocean 
are  defended  at  their  outlets,  the  interior  navigation  parallel  to  the  coast  will  be 
protected,  and  a  free  communication  kept  up  between  every  part  of  the  Union." 
"  Although  it  would  appear  on  a  superficial  view  to  be  a  gigantic  and  almost 
impracticable  project  to  fortify  such  an  immense  extent  of  coast  as  the  United 
States,  and  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  provide  a  sufficient  force  to  garrison  and 
defend  the  works  necessary  for  the  purpose,  yet  the  statements  contained  in  the 
reports  of  the  board  remove  these  objections  entirely.  The  coast  of  the  United 
States,  throughout  its  vast  extent,  has  but  few  points  which  require  to  be  de- 
fended against  a  regular  arid  powerful  attack.  A  considerable  portion  of  it  is 
inaccessible  to  large  vessels,  and  only  exposed  to  the  depredations  of  parties  in 
boats  and  small  vessels-of-war ;  against  which  inferior  works,  and  the  combina- 
tion of  the  same  means,  and  a  well-organized  local  militia,  will  afford  sufficient 
protection.  The  only  portions  which  require  to  be  defended  by  permanent 
works  of  some  strength  are  the  avenues  to  the  great  commercial  cities  and  naval 
and  military  establishments,  the  destruction  of  which,  would  prove  a  serious  loss 
to  the  country,  and  be  regarded  by  an  enemy  as  an  equivalent  for  the  expense 
of  a  great  armament.  It  is  shown,  also,  that  the  number  of  men  required  on  the 
largest  scale,  for  the  defence  of  these  forts,  when  compared  with  the  movable 
force  that  would  be  necessary  without  them,  is  inconsiderable.  The  local  militia, 
aided  by  a  few  regulars,  and  directed  by  engineers  and  artillery  officers,  may, 
with  previous  training,  be  safely  intrusted  with  their  defence  in  time  of  war. 

"  It  canno.t  be  too  earnestly  urged,  that  a  much  smaller  number  of  troops  will 
be  required  to  defend  a  fortified  frontier  than  to  cover  one  that  is  entirely  unpro- 
tected ;  and  that  such  a  system  will  enable  us,  according  to  the  spirit  of  our 
institutions,  to  employ  the  militia  effectually  for  the  defence  of  the  country.  It 
is  no  reproach  to  this  description  of  force,  and  no  imputation  on  their  courage, 
to  state,  what  the  experience  of  two  wars  has  demonstrated,  that  they  cannot 
stand  the  steady  charge  of  regular  forces,  and  are  disordered  by  their  manoeuvres 
in  the  open  field;  whereas  their  fire  is  more  deadly  from  behind  ramparts." 

Mr.  Bell  says :  "  Since  the  recent  and  successful  experiments  in  the  navigation 
of  the  Atlantic  by  steam,  and  the  consequent  changes  anticipated  in  maritime 
warfare,  it  is  not  an  uncommon  impression  that  fortifications,  and  all  other  land 
defences,  may  be  dispensed  with  altogether;  and  that  the  navy,  improved  and 
strengthened  by  war  steamers  and  floating  batteries,  may  be  safely  and  exclusively 
relied  upon  for  the  defence  of  our  extensive  sea-coast.  Another  error,  not  less 
to  be  regretted,  has  obtained  some  hold  upon  the  public  mind  since  the  extension 
of  steam  navigation  already  adverted  to,  and  the  improvements  suggested  in  the 
means  of  defending  the  seaboard.  It  is,  that  the  defence  of  our  numerous  inlets, 
harbors,  and  naval  depots,  will,  by  their  improvements,  be  rendered  not  only 
more  certain,  but  less  expensive  than  heretofore,  and  therefore  of  diminished 
importance  in  every  point  of  view.  The  very  reverse  of  these  conclusions,  it 
may  be  justly  apprehended,  will  be  realized  in  the  experience  of  the  future.  The 
increased  facilities  which  tfte  late  extension  of  steam  navigation  will  give  to  any 
great  maritime  power,  holding  possession  of  one  or  more  naval  depots  on  this 
side  of  the  Atlantic,  in  -concentrating  a  large  naval  or  military  force  upon  any 
one  of  .the  numerous  assailable  points  upon  our  extensive  sea-coast;  the  celerity 
of  movement,  and  tHe  greater  certainty  and  precision  which  will  thereby  be 
secured  in  the  .execution  of  all  the  details  of  an  attack — enabling  an  enemy  to 
make  it,  in  every  instance,  a  surprise — will  probably  create  a  necessity  for  in- 
creasing .our  defences  in  some  form,  at  an  expense  far  exceeding  anything  here- 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  309 

tofore  deemed  important  or  necessary  to  reasonable  security.  But  the  prospect 
of  successful  defence  by  the  navy  alone  vanishes  altogether  when  we  reflect  that 
it  is  only  in  infancy,  and  that  for  a  long  time  it  must  be  inferior  to  the  naval 
armaments  of  several  of  the  powers  of  Europe.  Whether  the  United  States  will 
be  able,  at  any  time,  to  contend  with  them  upon  the  ocean,  it  is  obvious,  will 
depend  upon  the  successful  development  of  our  naval  resources  after  the  com- 
mencement of  a  war;  but  how  could  this  development  take  'place  in  the  face  of  a 
much  more  powerful  enemy,  if  our  depots  and  navy  yards  are  suffered  to  remain 
without  protection  by  fortifications,  and  there  are  no  harbors  in  which  our  ships- 
of-iuar  may  take  refuge  and  remain  in  safety  when  pursued  by  superior  squad- 
rons ?  It  would  be  fatal  to  the  national  honor  to  neglect  to  fortify  sufficiently 
and  amply  those  passes,  by  land  and  water,  by  which  an  enemy  could  approach 
the  depositories  of  our  naval  supplies,  and  also  the  principal  harbors  of  easy 
access  to  our  oion  vessels" 

"  The  necessary  quality  of  buoyancy  in  war  steamers  and  ffoating  batteries 
requires  that  they  should  be  constituted  mainly  of  wood ;  and  whether  of  wood 
or  iron,  their  destructibility,  by  the  usual  missiles  employed  in  war,  will  be 
neither  greater  nor  less  than  that  of  the  war  steamers  and  floating  batteries  with 
which  an  enemy  may  attack  them.  It  is  clear,  then,  that  nothing  will  be  gained 
by  their  exclusive  employment  in  this  point  of  view.  It  is  equally  clear  that  an 
enemy  is  able  to  concentrate  a  much  superior  force  upon  any  one  of  our  great 
harbors  and  naval  depots  than  is  provided  for  its  defence ;  he  must,  without 
some  extraordinary  casuality,  be  successful.  To  .guard,  therefore,  against  the 
capture  or  destruction  of  all  our  opulent  cities  and  great  naval  depots  upon  the 
seaboard,  the  government  must  provide  a  greater  number  of  war  steamers  and 
floating  batteries,  for  the  defence  of  each  of  them,  than  any  foreign  nation  will 
probably  be  able  to  assemble  upon  our  own  coast,  and  thus  have  it  in  his  power, 
by  uniting  his  whole  force  in  an  attack  upon  one  point  at  a  time,  to  lay  under 
contribution  or  destroy  the  whole. 

"But  suppose  each  of  our  great  harbors  or  depots  should  be  thus  defended, 
and  that  all  the  channels  or  passes  by  water  could  be  so  guarded  and  blocked 
up  by  floating  batteries,  or  with  the  advantages  of  position,  to  set  at  defiance 
any  naval  force  which  could  be  brought  to  the  attack,  without  fortifications  to 
guard  the  passes  or  avenues  over  which  an  enemy  could  reach  his  object  by 
land,  what  would  prevent  him  from  disembarking  a  sufficient  land  force  at  some 
other,  but  not  distant  point  upon  the  coast,  and  effecting  all  his  purposes  of 
spoliation  and  destruction  ?  It  is  manifest  that  something  more  will  be  wanting 
than  war  steamers  and  floating  batteries  to  give  even  a  tolerable  security  to  our 
cities  and  naval  depots.  If  fortifications  are  to  be  dispensed  with,  it  is  clear, 
that  to  afford  them  adequate  protection  and  security  against  the  sudden  assaults 
of  an  enemy  approaching  by  sea,  will  require  not  only  such  a  preparation  of 
war  steamers  and  floating  batteries  as  already  described,  but  a  stationary  land 
force  sufficient  in  numbers  and  discipline  to  resist  any  number  of  veteran  troops 
the  enemy  might  have  it  in  his  power  to  employ  as  an  auxiliary  force  in  his 
enterprises  upon  our  shares. 

"  Supposing  the  defences  of  a  harbor,  by  fortifications,  to  be  complete,  and 
the  attacking  ships  or  war  steamers  of  an  enemy  shall  have  succeeded  in  pass- 
ing the  outer  channels  leading  to  it,  without  material  damage  from  the  forts 
designed  to  guard  them ;  or  if  they  shall  have  taken  advantage  of  the  darkness 
of  the  night,  and  passed  them  unobserved,  they  will  have  gained  but  little  by 
that  success.  They  will  be  exposed  at  every  point  within  to  the  fire  of  one  or 
more  land  batteries.  They  will  be  able  to  find  no  anchorage  or  resting  place 
where  they  will  not  be  liable  to  be  disabled,  burnt,  or  blown  up  by  the  shells 
and  hot  shot  discharged  under  protection  of  walls  impenetrable  to  the  shot  of  an 
enemy,  except  at  the  gun  ports.  Not  so,  however,  when  floating  defences  are 
exclusively  relied  upon.  They  will  have  no  advantage  in  the  fight  over  the 


310  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES 

attacking  force — they  will  be  equally  exposed  and  combustible;  and  when 
overcome,  all  resistance  ceases,  and  the  success  of  the  enemy  will  be  complete." 

Mr.  Spencer  says  :  "  While  fortifications  are  more  effectual  for  defence,  in 
certain  positions,  than  floating  forces,  they  are  less  expensive  in  construction, 
more  durable,  and  requiring  an  outlay  in  repairs  utterly  insignificant  when  com- 
pared with  the  expense  of  maintaining  ships  and  renewing  them.  They  are 
indispensable  for  the  purposes  of  covering  the  military  and  naval  depots,  and 
all  other  public  or  private  establishments  which  would  incite  the  enterprise  or 
the  cupidity  of  a  foe,  and  excluding  him  from  strong  positions,  where  his  naval 
superiority  might  enable  him  to  maintain  himself,  and  from  which  he  might 
make  incursions  into  the  interior,  or  assail  an  extensive  line  of  coast." 

We  have  already  alluded  to  the  remarks  of  the  Apalachicola  report  on  the 
relative  cost  of  ships  and  forts,  and  the  economy  of  their  support.  We  do  not 
regard  this  question  of  relative  cost  a  matter  of  any  great  importance/for  it  can 
seldom  be  decisive  in  the  choice  of  these  two  means  of  defence.  No  matter 
what  their  relative  cost  may  be,  the  one  cannot  often  be  substituted  for  the  other. 
There  are  some  few  cases,  however,  where  this  might  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion, and  would  be  decisive.  Let  us  endeavor  to  illustrate  our  meaning.  For 
the  defence  of  New  York  city,  the  Narrows  and  East  river  must  be  secured  by 
forts  ;  ships  cannot,  in  this  case,  be  substituted.  But  «let  us  suppose  that  the 
outer  harbor  of  New  York  furnishes  no  favorable  place  for  the  debarkation  of 
troops,  or  that  the  place  of  debarkation  is  so  far  distant  that  the  troops  cannot 
reach  the  city  before  the  defensive  forces  can  be  prepared  to  repel  them.  This 
harbor  would  be  of  great  importance  to  the  enemy  as  a  shelter  from  storms,  and 
as  a  place  of  debarkation  or  of  rendezvous  preparatory  to  a  forcible  passage  of 
the  Narrows ;  while  to  us  its  possession  would  not  be  absolutely  essential, 
though  very  important.  A  strong  fortification  on  Sandy  Hook  might  probably 
be  so  constructed  as  to  furnish  a  pretty  sure  barrier  to  the  entrance  of  this  outer 
harbor ;  on  the  other  hand,  a  naval  force  stationed  within  the  inner  harbor,  and 
acting  under  the  protection  of  forts  at  the  Narrows,  might  also  furnish  a  good 
though  perhaps  less  certain  protection  for  this  outer  roadstead.  Here,  then, 
we  might  well  consider  the  question  of  relative  cost  and  economy  of  support  of 
the  proposed  fortification  on  Sandy  Hook,  and  of  a  home  squadron  large  enough 
to  effect  the  same  object  and  to  be  kept  continually  at  home  for  that  special 
purpose.  If  we  were  to  allow  it  to  go  to  sea  for  the  protection  of  our  commerce 
its  character  and  efficiency  as  a  harbor  defence  would  be  lost.  We  can  therefore 
regard  it  only  as  a  local  force — fixed  within  the  limits  of  the  defence  of  this 
particular  place — and  our  estimates  must  be  made  accordingly. 

The  average  durability  of  ships-of-war  in  the  British  navy  has  been  variously 
stated  at  7  and  8  years  in  time  of  war,  and  from  10  to  12  and  14  years  in  time 
of  peace.  Mr.  Perring,  in  his  "  Brief  Inquiry,"  published  in  1812,  estimates 
this  average  durability  at  about  8  years.  His  calculations  seem  based  upon 
authentic  information.  A  distinguished  English  writer  has  more  recently  ar- 
rived at  the  same  result  from  estimates  based  upon  the  returns  o'f  the  Board  of 
Admiralty  during  the  period  of  the  wars  of  the  French  revolution.  The  data 
in  our  own  possession  are  less  complete,  the  appropriations  for  building  and 
repairing  having  heen  so  expended  as  to  render  it  impossible  to 'draw  an  accu- 
rate line  of  distinction.  But  in  the  returns  now  before  us  there  are  generally 
separate  and  distinct  accounts  of  the  timbers  used  fx>r  these  two  purposes;,  and 
consequently,  so  far  as  this  (the  main  item  of  expense)  is  concerned,  we  may 
form  pretty  accurate  comparisons. 

According  to  Edge,  (pp.  20,  21,)  the  average  cost  of  timber  for  hulls,  masts, 
and  yards  in  building  an  English  74-gun  ship  is  d£61,382.  Let  us  now  com- 
pare this  cost  of  timber  for  building  with  that  of  the  same  item  in  repairs  for 
the  following  15  ships,  between  1800  and  1820.  The  list  would  have  been  still 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


311 


further  enlarged,  but  the  returns  for  other  ships   during  some  portion  of  the 
above  period  are  imperfect : 


Name  of  ship. 

No.  of  guns. 

When  built. 

Repaired  from  — 

Cost. 

Vengeance 

74 

1800  to  1807 

£84,720 

Ildefouso           .       ........ 

74 

1807  to  1808 

85,  195 

Scipio                .              .... 

74 

1807  to  1809 

60,785 

Tremendous 

74 

1807  to  1810 

135,397 

Elephant              ..         

74 

1808  to-1811 

67,007 

Spencer                 «... 

74 

1800 

1809  to  1813 

124,186 

Romulus     .     ..._.._..__ 

74 

1810  to  1812 

73,141 

Albion               

74 

1802 

1810  to  1813 

102,295 

Donegal 

74 

1812  to  1815 

101,367 

Implacable                        .   . 

74 

1813  to  1815 

59,865 

Illustrious 

74 

1803 

1814  to  1816 

74,  184 

Northumberland 

74 

1814  to  1815 

59,795 

Kent 

74 

1814  to  1818 

88,357 

Sultan 

74 

1807 

1816  to  1818 

61,518 

Sterling  Castle  

74 

1816  to  1818 

65,280 

This  table,  although  incomplete,  gives  for  the  above  15  ships,  during  a  period 
of  less  than  20  years,  the  cost  of  timber  alone,  used  in  tlisir  repair,  an  average 
of  about  $400,000  each.  More  timber  than  this  was  used,  in  all  probability, 
upon  the  same  vessels,  and  paid  for  out  of  the  funds  appropriated  "  for  such 
ships  as  may  be  ordered  in  the  course  of  the  year  to  be  repaired."  But  the 
amount  specifically  appropriated  for  timber  for  these  15  ships  would,  in  every  12 
or  15  years,  equal  the  entire  first  cost  of  the  same  items.  If  we  were  to  add  to 
this  amount  the  cost  of  labor  required  in  the  application  of  the  timber  to  the 
operations  of  repair,  and  take  into  consideration  the  expense  of  other  materials 
and  labor,  and  the  decayed  condition  of  many  of  the  ships  at  the  end  of  this  period, 
we  should  not  be  surprised  to  find  the  whole  sum  expended  under  these  heads 
to  equal  the  first  cost,  even  within  the  minimum  estimate  of  seven  years.  The 
whole  cost  of  timber  used  for  hulls,  masts,  and  yards,  in  building,  between  1800  and 
1820,  was  eei8,727,551 ;  in  repairs  and  "ordinary  wear  and  tear,"  6617,449,780; 
making  an  annual  average  of  $45,601,589  for  building  timber,  and  $42,733,714 
for  that  used  in  repairs.  A  large  portion  of  the  vessels  built  were  intended  to 
replace  others  which  had  been  lost,  or  were  so  decayed  as  to  be  broken  up. 

But  it  may  be  well  to  add  here  the  actual  supplies  voted  for  the  sea  service, 
and  for  the  wear  and  tear,  and  the  extraordinary  expenses  in  building  and 
repairing  of  ships  from  1800  to  1815: 


Year— 

For  the  wear  and 
tear  of  ships. 

Extraordinary   ex- 
penses in  building, 
repairing,  &c. 

For  entire  sea  ser- 
vice. 

1800  

£4  350  000 

£772  140 

^13  619  079 

1801  

5  850  000 

933  900 

16  577  037 

1802  

3  684  000 

773  500 

11   833  571 

1803  

3   120  000 

901  140 

10  211  378 

1804  

3  900  000 

948  520 

12  350,606 

1805  

4  680,000 

1  553  690 

15  035,  630 

1806  

4,  680  000 

1  980  830 

18,864,341 

1807  

5,070  000 

2   134  903 

17,400.  337 

1808 

5  070  000 

2  351   188 

18  087  544 

1809 

3  295  500 

2  296  030 

19  578  467 

1810 

3  295  500 

1   841    107 

18  975   120 

1811 

3  675  750 

2  046  200 

19  822  000 

1812  ..     ^     . 

3  675  750 

1   696  621 

19  305  759 

1813  . 

3  549  000 

2  822  031 

20  096  709 

1814 

3  268  000 

2  086  274 

19  312  070 

1815  

2,386,500 

2,116,710 

19,032,700 

312 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES 


It  appears  from  this  table  that  the  appropriations  for  the  sea  service  during 
the  first  15  years  of  the  present  century  amounted  to  a  little  less  than  ninety 
millions  of  dollars  per  annum,  and  for  the  wear  and  tear  of  ships  and  "  the 
extraordinary  expenses  in  building  and  repairing  of  ships,  &c.,"  the  annual  appro- 
priations amounted  to  thirty  millions  of  dollars. 

Our  own  naval  returns  are  also  so  imperfect  that  it  is  impossible  to  form  any 
very  accurate  estimate  of  the  relative  cost  of  construction  and  repairs  of  our 
men-of-war.  The  following  table,  compiled  from  a  report  of  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  in  1841,  (Senate  Document  No.  223,  26th  Congress,)  will  afford  data 
for  an  approximate  calculation : 


Name  of  ship. 

Number  of  guns. 

Total  cost  of  build- 
ing, exclusive  of 
armament,  stores, 
&c. 

I 

"P* 
1 

E 

|^ 

a° 

£  o    . 

*{* 

*l£ 

fli  § 

8  *  a 

Repaired  between  — 

Delaware  -  -  •    ...... 

74 

$543,368  00 

1820 

$354,  132  56 

1827  and  1838 

North  Carolina 

74 

431,852  00 

1825 

317,628  92 

1824  and  1P36 

Constitution      .   ......  . 

44 

302,718  84 

1797 

266,878  34 

1833  and  1839 

United  States  ..  

44 

299,336  56 

1797 

571,972  77 

1821  and  1841 

Brandy  wine  

44 

°299,218  12 

1825 

-377,665  95 

1826  and  1838 

Potomac  _ 

44 

°231,  Ol3  02 

1822 

°82,597  03 

1829  and  1835 

Concord 

20 

115  325  80 

1828 

72  796  22 

1832  and  1840 

Falmouth  

2Q 

94,093  27 

1827 

130,015  43 

1828  and  1837 

John  Adams  

?0 

110,670  69 

1829 

119,641  93 

1834  and  1837 

Boston 

20 

91  973  19 

1825 

189  264  37 

1826  and  1840 

St    Louis 

20 

102  461  95 

1828 

135,458  75 

1834  and  1839 

"Viucennes 

20 

111,512  79 

•  1826 

178,094  81 

1830  and  1838 

"Vandalia 

20 

90,977  88 

1828 

59,  181  34 

1832  and  1834 

Lexington            „     .. 

20? 

114,622  35 

1826 

83,386  52 

1827  and  1837 

Warren 

20  ? 

99,410  01 

1826 

152,596  03 

1830  and  1838 

Fairfield      .   

20 

100,490  35 

1826 

65,918  26 

1831  and  1837 

Natchez  f    

20? 

106,232   19 

1827 

129,969  80 

1829  and  1836 

Boxer  .     _    ............ 

10 

30,697  88 

1831 

28,780  48 

1834  and  1840 

Enterprise  ......... 

10 

27,938  63 

1831 

20,716  59 

1834  and  1840 

Grampus...    ...    .   - 

10 

23,627  42 

1821 

96,086  36 

1825  and  1840 

Dolphin  

10 

38,522  62 

1836 

15,013  35 

1839  and  1840 

Shark  

10 

23,627  42 

1821 

93,395  84 

1824  and  1839 

It  appears  from  the  above  table  that  the  cost  of  constructing  ships-of-the-line 
is  about  $6,600  per  gun;  of  frigates,  $6,500  per  gun;  of  smaller  vessels-of-war, 
a  little  less  than  $5,000  per  gun.  The  cost  of  our  war  steamers  (the  Fulton,  4 
guns,  built  in  1838-'39,  cost  $333,770  77;  the  Mississippi  and  Missouri,  10 
guns  each,  built  in  1841,  cost  about  $600,000  apiecef)  is  over  $60,000  per  gun ! 

It  is  obvious,  from  the  nature  of  the  materials  of  which  forts  are  constructed, 
that  the  cost  of  the  support  must  be  inconsiderable.  It  is  true  that  for  some 
years  past  a  large  item  in  annual  expenditures  for  fortifications  has  been  under 
the.  head  of  "repairs."  Much  of  this  sum  is  for  alterations  and  enlargements 
of  temporary  and  inefficient  works,  erected  interior  to  and  during  the  war  of 

°  Returns  incomplete. 

f  Broken  up  in  1840. 

JBy  the  returns  in  the  Navy  Department  up  to  December  31,  1841,  $553,850  32  had 
been  expended  on  the  Mississippi,  and  $519,032  57  on  the  Missouri  ;  but  all  the  returns 
bad  not  then  come  in.  rlhe  entire  cost  of  construction  and  modification  of  these  steamers, 
to  fit  them  for  service,  differs  but  little  from  their  estimated  cost  of  $600,000  apiece. 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  313 

1812.  Some  of  it,  however,  lias  been  for  actual  repairs  of  decayed  or  injured 
portions  of  the  forts;  these  injuries  resulting  from  the  nature  of  the  climate,  the 
foundations,  the  use  of  poor  materials  and  poor  workmanship,  and  from  neglect 
and  abandonment.  But  if  we  include  the  risk  of  abandonment  at  times,  it  is 
estimated,  ivjxm  data  drawn  from  past  experience,  that  one-third  of  one  per 
cent,  per  annum  of  the  first  cost  will  keep  in  perfect  repair  any  of  our  forts  that 
have  been  constructed  since  the  last  war ;  whereas  the  cost  of  repairs  for  our 
men-of-war  is  Hfcore  than  seven  per  cent,  per  annum  on  the  first  cost  of  the  ships. 
The  cost  of  steamships  will  be  still  more ;  but  we  have  not  yet  had  sufficient 
experience  to  determine  the  exact  amount.  But  the  cost  of  running  them  is  so 
great  that  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  in  his  last  annual  report,  says :  "  Their 
engines  consume  so  much  fuel  as  to  add  enormously  to  their  expenses ;  and  the 
necessity  that  they  should  return  to  port  after  short  intervals  of  time  for  fresh 
•  supplies  renders  it  impossible  to  send  them  on  any  distant  service.  They  cannot 
be  relied  on  as  cruisers,  and  are  altogether  too  expensive  for  service  in  time  of 
peace.  I  have  therefore  determined  to  take  them  put  of  commission  and  sub- 
stitute for  them  other  and  less  expensive  vessels." 

On  this  question  of  relative  cost,  we  add  the  following  extract  from  the  re- 
port of  Mr.  Bell  in  1841 : 

"  The  relative  expense  of  guns  in  forts  and  on  board  ships-of-war  or  floating 
batteries  is  strikingly  disproportionate.  The  most  favorable  estimate  will  show 
that  guns  afloat  will  cost,  upon  an  average,  a  third  more  than  the  cost  of  guns 
in  forts.  Well-constructed  forts,  bearing  any  number  of  guns,  may  be  erected 
at  less  than  half  the  amount  required  to  build  good  steam  batteries  bearing  the 
same  number  of  guns.  The  steamships  now  on  the  stocks  at  New  York  and 
Philadelphia,  1,700  tons  burden,  and  designed  to  carry  only  eight  guns  each,  it 
is  estimated  will  cost  $600,000  each.  A  floating  battery  of  the  largest  class 
contemplated  by  a  distinguished  advocate  for  that  mode  of  harbor  defence,  car- 
rying two  hundred  guns,  with  its  tow-boats,  it  is  estimated  cannot  cost  less  than 
$1,400,000;  and  the  smallest,  carrying  one  hundred  and  twenty  guns,  not  less 
than  $700,000.  A  ship-of-the-line  carrying  eighty  guns  it  is  estimated  will  cost, 
without  her  armament,  $500,000.  Fort  Adams  is  constructed  for  four  hundred 
and  fifty-eight  guns ;  when  finished  will  have  cost  $1,400,000.  Forts  are  built 
of  solid  and  of  the  most  part  of  imperishable  materials.  By  proper  care  and  a 
small  annual  expenditure  for  repairs  they  will  last  and  be  available  for  cen- 
turies ;  while  the  cost  of  the  repairs  that  ships-of-war  and  floating  batteries  will 
require  in  every  twelve  or  fifteen  years  will  equal  the  cost  of  the  original  con- 
struction. In  other  words,  in  respect  to  the  expense,  vessels-of-war  and  floating 
batteries  will  require  to  be  reconstructed  every  twelve  or  fifteen  years.  The  in- 
jury done  to  fortifications  in  the  most  serious  engagements  can  usually  be  re- 
paired in  a  few  days,  or  at  most  in  a  few  weeks,  while  the  damages  to  ships-of- 
war  and  floating  batteries  in  a  similar  engagement  would  require  extensive 
repairs  in*  every  instance,  and  often  render  them  unworthy  of  repair. 

"  Upon  this  data  a  satisfactory  estimate  may  be  made  of  the  relative  expense 
of  the  two  modes  of  defending  our  principal  harbors  and  naval  depots.  In  pre- 
senting these  views,  I  would  not  be  understood  by  any  means  as  disparaging 
the  value  and  efficiency  of  war  steamers  and  floating  batteries  when  employed 
as  an  auxiliary  force  in  any  system  of  coast  or  harbor  defence  that  may  be 
adopted :  nor  is  any  idea  entertained  that  they  ought  or  can  be  altogether  dis- 
pensed with." 

It  should  be  noticed  that  in  the  above  report  Mr.  Bell  not  only  attributes  to 
our  navy  the  entire  defence  of  our  shipping  at  sea,  but  also  attaches  importance 
to  war  steamers  and  floating  batteries  as  an  auxiliary  force  in  any  system  of 
coast  or  harbor  defence  that  may  be  adopted.  We  regret  that  the  friendly  feel- 
ings shown  towards  the  naval  service  in  the  reports  of  Messrs.  Poinsett,  Bell, 
and  Spencer,  and  of  the  board  of  officers  on  national  defence,  have  not  been  re- 


314  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

ciprocated  by  the  author  of  the  Apalachicola  report.  That  report  is  filled  with 
sneers  at  the  intelligence  of  the  distinguished  military  officers  of  the  board,  and 
at  the  defensive  system  of  the  honorable  Secretaries  of  War.  It  not  only  as- 
serts that  our  defensive  policy  should  be  nearly  exclusively  by  naval  tncans,  but 
it  charges  upon  one  branch  of  our  military  service  the  secret  design  of  foisting 
upon  the  country  a  large  standing  army  and  laying  the  foundation  upon  which  a 
great  military  policy  will  be  erected;  it  endeavors  to  prejudice  this  service  in 
the  public  estimation  by  calling  upon  the  country  to  be  on  its  guard  against 
these  covert  designs.  It  moreover  charges  that  fortifications,  in  furnishing  gar- 
risons to  the  army,  have,  by  their  "corrupting  influences,"  so  enervated  that 
army  and  enfeebled  its  physical  strength  that  it  has  perished  "  and  melted  away 
before  the  hardships  of  the  first  campaign  within  the  boundaries  of  our  own 
country." 

This  is  not  the  place  to  enter  upon  the  defence  of  the  Florida  army,  if  such 
defence  be  now  necessary;  but  we  affirm  that  no  body  of  men  ever  exhibited 
more  universal  bravery,  courage,  and  constancy  than  was  shown  by  our  soldiers 
during  the  tedious  and  harassing  operations  of  that  war.  Wherever  the  foe 
could  be  found  he  was  met  and  conquered,  no  matter  what  his  superiority  in 
position  or  numbers.  They  showed  no  signs  of  being  "enervated  in  spirit  or 
enfeebled  in  physical  strength,"  but  they  fought,  and  bled,  and  conquered,  offi- 
cers and  men,  side  by  side. 

II.  The  Apalachicola  report,  after  denouncing  fortifications  as  utterly  worth- 
less as  water  defences,  remarks  that  the  sphere  in  which  they  can  be  of  any  use 
is  in  retarding  the  enemy's  operations  upon  an  inland  frontier.  "  But  even  here" 
it  says,  "they  have  been  assailed  by  the  contempt  of  experienced  soldiers  ; "  "this 
system  of  fortifications  is  not  the  true  defence  of  the  country,  and  the  further 
prosecution  of  it  should  be  abandoned;"  "  our  country  should  be  relieved  from  the 
intolerable  burden  of  defences  by  fortifications,"  &c.  It  moreover  indorses  the 
opinion  that  we  should  "  confine  our  preparations  (for  defence)  to  the  maritime 
frontier,  as  the  inland  border  needs  none,  and  the  lake  shores  under  all  circum- 
stances would  be  under  the  dominion  of  the  strongest  fleet." 

From  the  middle  ages  down  to  the  period  of  the  French  revolution  Avars  were 
carried  on  mainly  by  the  system  of  positions — one  party  confining  their  opera- 
tions to  the  security  of  certain  important  places  while  the  other  directed  their 
attention  to  their  siege  and  capture.  But  Carnot  and  Napoleon  changed  this 
system,  at  the  same  time  with  the  system  of  tactics,,  or  rather  returned  to  the 
old  and  true  principle  of  strategic  operations.  Some  men,  looking  merely  at  the 
fact  that  a  change  was  made,  but  without  examining  the  character  of  that  change, 
have  rushed  headlong  to  the  conclusion  that  fortified  places  are  now  utterly  use- 
less in  warfare,  military  success  depending  entirely  upon  a  good  system  of 
marches.  On  this  subject  Jomini  remarks  that  "we  should  depend  entirely 
upon  neither  organized  masses  nor  upon  material  obstacles,  whether  natural  or 
artificial.  To  follow  exclusively  either  of  these  systems  would  be  equally 
absurd.  The  true  science  of  war  consists  in  choosing  a  just  medium  between 
the  two  extremes.  The  wars  of  Napoleon  demonstrated  the  great  truth  that 
distance  can  protect  no  country  from  invasion ;  but  that  a  state  to  be  secure 
must  have  a  good  system  of  fortresses  and  a  good  system  of  military  reserves 
and  military  institutions."  "Fortifications  fulfil  two  objects  of  capital  importance : 
first,  the  protection  of  frontiers;  and,  second,  assisting  the  operations  of  the 
army  in  the  field;"  "every  part  of  the  frontiers  of  a  state  should  be  secured  by 
one  or  two  great  places  of-  refuge,  secondary  places,  and  even  small  posts  for 
facilitating  the  active  operations  of  the  armies.  Cities  girt  with  walls  and  slight 
ditches  may  often  be  of  great  utility  in  the  interior  of  a  country  as  places  of 
deposit  where  stores,  magazines,  hospitals,  &c.,  may  be  sheltered  from  the  in- 
cursions of  the  enemy's  light  troops.  These  works  are  more  especially  valuable 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  315 

where  such  stores,  in  order  not  to  weaken  the  regular  army  by  detachments,  are 
intrusted  to  the  care  of  raw  and  militia  forces." 

"Fortifications,"  says  Napoleon,  "are  useful  both  in  offensive  and  defensive 
wars ;  for  although  they  cannot  alone  arrest  the  progress  of  an  army,  yet  they 
are  an  excellent  means  of  retarding,  fettering,  enfeebling,  and  disquieting  a 
conquering  foe." — (Maxim  40.)  In  all  military  operations  time  is  of  vast  im- 
portance. If  the  advance  of  a  single  division  of  the  army  be  retarded  for  a 
few  hours  only,  it  not  unfrequently  decides  the  fate  of  a  campaign.  Had  the 
approach  of  Blucher  been  delayed  for  a  few  hours,  Napoleon  must  have  been 
victorious  at  the  battle  of  Waterloo.  An  equilibrium  can  seldom  be  sustained 
for  more  than  six  or  seven  hours  between  forces  on  the  field  of  battle;  Ifut  in 
this  instance  the  state  of  the  ground  rendered  the  movements  so  slow  as  to 
prolong  the  battle  for  more  than  thirteen  hours — thus  enabling  the  allies  to 
effect  a  concentration  in  time  to  save  Wellington.  Many  of  Napoleon's  brilliant 
victories  resulted  from  merely  bringing  troops  to  bear  suddenly  upon  some 
decisive  point.  This  concentration  of  forces,  even  with  a  regular  army,  cannot 
be  calculated  on  by  the  general  with  any  degree  of  certainty  unless  his  commu- 
nications are  perfectly  secure.  But  this  difficulty  is  much  increased  where  the 
troops  are  new  and  undisciplined.  When  a  country  like  ours  is  invaded,  a  large 
number  of  such  troops  must  suddenly  be  called  into  the  field.  Not  knowing 
the  designs  of  the  invaders,  much  time  will  be  lost  in  marches  and  counter- 
marches ;  and  if  there  be  no  safe  places  of  resort,  the  operations  must  be  indeci- 
sive and  insecure.  To  a  defensive  army,  fortifications  are  valuable  as  points  of 
repose  upon  which  troops,  if  beaten,  may  fall  back  and  shelter  their  sick  and 
wounded,  collect  their  scattered  forces,  repair  their  materiel,  and  draw  together 
a  new  supply  of  stores  and  provisions ;  and  as  rallying  points  where  new  troops 
may  be  assembled  with  safety,  and  the  army  in  a  few  days  be  prepared  to  again 
meet  the  enemy  in  the  open  field.  Without  these1  defences,  undisciplined  and 
inexperienced  armies,  when  once  routed,  can  seldom  be  rallied  again  without 
great  losses.  But  when  supported  by  forts  they  can  select  their  opportunity  for 
fighting,  and  offer  or  refuse  battle  according  to  the  probability  of  success ;  and, 
having  a  safe  place  of  retreat,  they  are  far  less  influenced  by  fear  in  the  actual 
conflict.  It  is  not  supposed  that  any  system  of  fortifications  can  hermetically 
close  a  frontier.  "But,"  says  Jomini,  "although  they  of  themselves  can  rarely 
present  an  absolute  obstacle  to  the  advance  of  the  hostile  army,  yet  it  is  indis- 
putable that  they  straiten  its  movements,  change  the  direction  of  its  marches, 
and  force  it  into  detachments ;  while,  on  the  contrary,  they  afford  all  the  oppo- 
site advantages  to,  the  defensive  army;  they  protect  its  marches,  favor  its  de- 
bouches, cover  its  magazines,  its  flanks,  and  its  movements;  and,  finally,  furnish 
it  with  a  place  of  refuge  in  time  of  need."  "If  the  enemy  should  venture  to  pass 
the  line  of  these  places  without  attacking  them,  he  could  not  dispense  with  be- 
sieging, or,  at  least,  observing  them;  and  if  they  be  numerous,  an  entire  corps 
with  its  chief  must  be  detached  to  invest  or  observe  them,  as  circumstances 
might  require."  His  army  would  thus  be  separated  from  its  magazines,  its 
strength  and  efficiency  diminished  by  detachments,  and  his  whole  force  exposed 
to  the  horrors  of  partisan  warfare.  It  has  therefore  been  estimated,  by  the  best 
French  military  writers,  that  an  army  supported  by  a  judicious  system  of  forti- 
fications can  repel  a  land  force  six  times  as  large  as  itself. 

On  the  use  of  fortifications  as  inland  defences,  we  quote  from  the  writings  of 
the  Archduke  Charles,  who  as  a  general  knew  no  rival  but  Napoleon,  and  whose 
military  writings  are  equalled  by  none,  save  the  works  of  General  Jomini. 
"The  possession  of  strategic  points,"  says  the  archduke,  "is  decisive  in  military 
operations.  The  most  efficacious  means  should  therefore  be  employed  to  defend 
points  whose  preservation  is  the  country's  safeguard.  This  object  is  accom- 
plished by  fortifications ;  for  fortified  places  resist  for  a  given  time,  with  a  small 
number  of  troops,  every  effort  of  a  much  larger  force;  fortifications  should 


316  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

therefore  be  regarded  as  the  bases  of  a  good  system  of  defence."  "  I  advise  the 
construction  of  permanent  works  as  the  most  efficacious  method  of  securing 
strategic  points."  "  It  should  be  a  maxim  of  state  policy,  in  every  country  to  for- 
tify in  time  of  peace  all  such  points,  and  to  arrange  them  with  great  care,  so  that 
they  can  be  defended  by  a  small  number  of  troops ;  for  the  enemy,  knowing  the 
difficulty  of  getting  possession  of  these  works,  will  look  twice  before  he  involves 
himself  in  war."  "  Establishments  which  can  secure  strategic  advantages  are  not 
the  works  of  a  moment;  they  require  time  and  labor.  He  who  has  the  direc- 
tion of  the  military  forces  of  a  state  should  in  time  of  peace  prepare  for  war; 
whatever  he  does  should  have  reference  to  the  rules  of  strategic;  the  military 
organization  of  the  state,  the  construction  of  fortifications,  -the  direction  of 
roads  and  canals,  the  positions  of  depots  and  magazines,  all  should  be  attended 
to.  The  proper  application  or  neglect  of  these  principles  will  decide  the  safety 
or  the  ruin  of  the  state.  Fortifications  arrest  the  enemy  in  the  pursuit  of  his 
object,  and  direct  his  movements  upon  less  important  points;  he  must  either 
force  these  fortified  lines,  or  else  hazard  enterprises  upon  lines  which  offer  only 
disadvantages.  In  fine,  a  country  secured  by  a  system  of  defence  truly  strategic 
has  no  cause  to  fear  either  the  invasion  or  the  yoke  of  the  enemy,  for  he  can 
advance  to  the  interior  of  the  country  only  through  great  trouble  and  by  ruinous 
efforts.  Of  course,  lines  of  fortifications  thus  arranged  cannot  shelter  a  state 
against  all  reverses ;  but  these  reverses  will  not,  in  this  case,  be  attended  by 
total  ruin,  for  they  cannot  take  from  the  state  the  means  nor  the  time  of  collect- 
ing new  forces,  nor  can  they  ever  reduce  it  to  the  cruel  alternative  of  submission 
or  destruction." 

We  know  of  no  better  illustration  of  these  remarks  of  the  archduke  and 
General  Jomini,  (both  of  whom  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  are  warm  admirers 
of  Napoleon's  system  of  strategic  warfare,  and  both  of  whom  have  written 
since  the  period  at  which  modern  military  quacks  date  the  downfall  of  fortifica- 
tions as  defences,)  than  the  military  histories  of  Germany  and  France. 

For  a  long  period  previous  to  the  thirty  years'  war,  its  strong  castles  and 
fortified  cities  secured  the  German  empire  from  attacks  from  abroad,  except  on 
its  extensive  frontier,  which  was  frequently  attacked ;  but  no  enemy  could  pene- 
trate to  the  interior  till  a  want  of  union  among  its  own  princes  opened  its 
strongholds  to  the  Swedish  conqueror;  nor  then  did  the  cautious  Gustavus 
Adolphus  venture  far  into  its  territories  till  he  had  obtained  possession  of  all 
the  military  works  that  might  endanger  his  retreat.  Again :  in  the  seven  years' 
war,  when  the  French  neglected  to  secure  their  foothold  in  Germany,  by  placing 
in  a  state  of  defence  the  fortifications  that  fell  into  their  power,  the  first  defeat 
rendered  their  ground  untenable,  and  threw  them  from  the  Elbe  back  upon  the 
Rhine  and  Mayne.  They  afterwards  took  the  precaution  to  fortify  their  posi- 
tions and  to  secure  their  magazines  under  shelter  of  strong  places,  and  conse- 
quently were  enabled  to  maintain  themselves  in  the  hostile  country  till  the  end 
of  the  war,  notwithstanding  the  inefficiency  of  their  generals,  the  great  reverses 
they  sustained  in  the  field,  the  skill  and  perseverance  of  the  enemy  tliey  were 
contending  with,  and  the  weak  and  vacillating  character  of  the  cabinet  that 
directed  them. 

But  this  system  of  defence  was  not  so  carefully  maintained  in  the  latter  part 
of  the  eighteenth  century ;  for  -at  the  beginning  of  the  wars  of  the  French  revo- 
lution, says  Jomini,  "  Germany  had  too  few  fortifications ;  they  were  generally 
of  a  poor  character  and  improperly  located."  France,  on  the  contrary,  was  well 
fortified;  "and  although  without  armies,  and  torn  to  pieces  by  factions,"  (we 
here  .  use  the  language  of  the  archduke,)  "  she  sustained  herself  against  all 
Europe;  and  this  was  because  her  government,  since  the  reign  of  Louis  XIII, 
hod  continually  labored  to  put  her  frontiers  into  a  defensive  condition,  agreeably 
to  the  principles  of  strategic.  Starting  from  such  a  system  for  a  basis,  she  sub- 
dued every  country  on  the  continent  that  was  not  thus  fortified ;  and  this  reason 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  317 

alone  will  explain  how  her  generals  sometimes  succeeded  in  destroying  an  army, 
and  even  an  entire  state,  merely  .by  a  strategic  success." 

But  we  will  endeavor  to  illustrate  this  by  particular  campaigns.  In  1792, 
when  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  invaded  France,  she  had  no  armies  competent  to 
her  defence.  Their  numbers  upon  paper  were  somewhat  formidable,  it  is  true, 
but  the  license  of  the  revolution  had  so  loosened  the  bands  of  discipline  as  to 
effect  an  almost  complete  disorganization.  "  It  seemed  at  this  period,"  says  the 
historian,  "as  if  the  operations  of  the  French  generals  were  dependent  upon  the 
absence  of  their  enemies  ;  the  moment  they  appeared  they  were  precipitately 
abandoned."  But  France  had  on  her  eastern  frontier  a  triple  line  of  good 
fortresses,  although  her  miserable  soldiery  were  incapable  of  defending  them. 
The  several  works  of  the  first  and  second  line  fell  one  after  another  before  the 
slow  operations  of  a  Prussian  siege,  and  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  was  already 
advancing  upon  the  third  when  Dumourier,  with  only  25,000  men,  threw  him- 
self into  it,  and,  by  a  well-conducted  war  of  positions,  placing  his  raw  and 
unsteady  forces  behind  inassailable  intrenchments,  succeeded  in  repelling  a  disci- 
plined army  nearly  four  times  as  numerous  as  his  own.  Had  no  other  obstacle 
than  the  French  troops  been  interposed  between  Paris  and  the  Prussians  all 
agree  that  France  must  have  fallen. 

In  the  campaign  of  1793  the  French  army  of  Flanders  were  beaten  in  almost 
every  engagement,  and  their  forces  reduced  to  less  than  one-half  the  number  of 
the  allies.  The  French  general  turned  traitoi*  to  his  country,  and  the  national 
guards  deserted  their  colors  and  returned  to  France.  The  only  hope  of  the  re- 
publicans at  this  crisis  was  Vauban's  line  of  Flemish  fortresses.  These  alone 
saved  France.  The  strongholds  of  Lille,  Conde,  Valenciennes,  Quesnoy,  Lan- 
drecies,  &c.,  held  the  Austrians  in  check  till  the  French  could  raise  new  forces 
and  reorganize  their  army.  "  The  important  breathing  time  which  the  sieges  of 
these  fortresses,"  says  the  English  historian,  "  afforded  to  the  French,  and  the 
immense  advantage  which  they  derived  from  the  new  levies  which  they  received, 
and  fresh  organization  which  they  acquired  during  that  important  period,  is  a 
signal  proof  of  the  vital  importance  of  fortresses  in  contributing  to  national 
defence.  Napoleon  had  not  hesitated  to  ascribe  to  the  three  months  thus  gained 
the  salvation  of  France.  It  is  to  be  constantly  recollected  that  the  republican 
armies  were  then  totally  unable  to  keep  the  field ;  that  behind  the  frontier 
fortresses  there  was  neither  a  defensive  position  nor  a  corps  to  re-enforce  them ;  . 
and'  that,  if  driven  from  their  vicinity,  the  .capital  was  taken  and  the  war  con- 
cluded. The  fortifications  on  the  Rhine  played  a  similar  part  in  the  campaign 
on  that  frontier,  and  there  also  her  fortresses  checked  the  advance  of  the  enemy 
till  France  could  raise  and  discipline  armies  capable  of  meeting  him  in  the  open 
field. 

In  the  following  year,  (1794,)  when  the  republic  had  completed  her  vast 
armaments,  and,  in  her  turn,  had  become  the  invading  power,  the  enemy  had  no 
fortified  towns  to  check  the  progress  of  the  French  armies.  Based  on  strong 
works  of  defence,  these  in  a  few  weeks  overran  Flanders,  and  drove  the  allies 
beyond  the  Rhine. 

Napoleon's  remarks  on  the  influence  of  the  fortifications  on  the  Flemish  fron- 
tier are  ny>st  striking  and  conclusive  :  "  Vauban's  system  of  frontier  fortresses," 
said  he,  "  is  intended  to  protect  an  inferior  against  a  superior  army ;  to  afford  to 
the  former  a  more  favorable  field  of  operations  for  maintaining  itself,  and.  for 
preventing  the  hostile  army  from  advancing,  and  advantageous  opportunities  of 
attacking  it ;  in  short,  means  of  gaining  time  to  allow  its  succors  to  come  up. 
At  the  time  of  the  reverses  of  Louis  XIV  this  system  of  fortresses  saved  the 
capital.  Prince  Eugene,  of  Savoy,  lost  a  campaign  in  taking  Lille ;  the  siege  of 
Landrecies  gave  Villars  an  opportunity  of  changing  the  fortune  of  the  war.  A 
hundred  years  afterwards,  at  the  time  of  Dun^urier's  treachery,  the  fortresses 
of  Flanders  once  more  saved  Paris ;  the  combined  forces  lost  a  campaign  in 


318  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

taking  Condc,  Valenciennes,  Quesnoy,  and  Landrecies.  This  line  of  fortresses 
was  equally  useful  in  1814.  The  allies,  having^  violated  the  territory  of  Switzer- 
land, engaged  themselves  in  the  denies  of  Jura,  to  avoid  the  fortresses ;  and, 
even  while  turning  them  in  this  manner,  they  were  obliged  to  weaken  their  force 
by  detaching  a  considerable  number  of  men,  superior  to  the  total  of  the  gar- 
risons. When  Napoleon  passed  the  Marne,  and  manoeuvred  in  the  rear  of  the 
enemy's  army,  if  treason  had  not  opened  the  gates  of  Paris  the  fortresses  of  the 
frontier  would  have  played  an  important  part ;  Swaitzenberg's  army  would  have 
been  obliged  to  throw  itself  amongst  them,  which  would  have  produced  great 
events.  In  1815  they  would  likewise  have  been  of  grea't  value.  The  Anglo- 
Prussian  army  would  not  have  dared  to  .pass  the  Somme  before  the  arrival  of 
the  Austro-Russian  armies  on  the  Marne  had  it  not  been  for  the  political  events 
of  that  capital ;  and  it  is  certain  that  those  fortresses  which  remained  faithful 
influenced  the  allies  and  the  conduct  of  the  allied  kings  in  1814  and  1815." 

The  German  campaign  of  1796  is  another  admirable  illustration  of  the  value 
of  fortifications  in  military  operations,  and  as  such  is  particularly  noticed  by  both 
Jomini  and  the  archduke.  Previous  to  this  campaign  Austria  had  shamefully 
neglected  the  defences  of  the  Rhine,  leaving,  says  the  archduke,  the  principal 
communications  open  to  the  very  heart  of  the  country.  "  The  French,"  says  an 
English  historian,  "  were  in  possession  of  the  fortresses  of  Luxemburg,  Thion- 
nelle,  Mentz,  and  Saare-Louis,  which  rendered  the  centre  of  their  position 
almost  unassailable ;  their  right  was  covered  by  Hunningen,  New  Brisack,  and 
the  fortresses  «f  Alsace,  and  their  left  by  Maestricht,  Juliers,  and  the  iron 
barrier  of  the  Netherlands,  while  the  Austrians  had  no  fortified  point  whatever 
to  support  either  of  their  wings.  This  want  in  a  war '  of  invasion  is  of  incal- 
culable importance,  and  the  fortresses  of  the  Rhine  are  as  valuable  as  a  base  for 
offensive  as  a  barrier  to  support  defensive  operations."  Moreau,  taking  the 
powerful  fortress  of  Strasburg  for  his  point  of  departure,  and  surprising  the 
negligently  guarded  fortress  of  Kehl  on  the  opposite  bank,  effected  a  safe  pas- 
sage of  the  Rhine,  and  thus  forced  the  Austrians  to  fall  back  upon  the  distant 
and  ill-secured  line  of  the  Danube.  The  French,  passing  the  line  of  their  own 
frontier,  "  were  enabled  to  leave  their  fortresses  defenceless,  and  swell  by  their 
garrisons  the  invading  force,  which  soon  proved  so  perilous  to  the  Austrian 
monarchy."  Afterwards,  when  the  archduke,  by  his  admirable  strategic  opera- 
tions, forced  the  French  to  retreat,  he  derived  considerable  advantage  from  the 
Austrian  garrisons  of  Phillipsburg,  Manheim,  and  Mayence.  But  the  Fre'nch 
line  of  defence  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Rhine  arrested  his  pursuit,  and  obliged 
him  to  resort  to  the  tedious  operations  of  sieges  and  the  reduction  of  their  ad- 
vanced posts  alone.  Kehl  and  Hunningen,  poorly  as  they  were  defended,  em- 
ployed all  the  resources  of  his  army  and  the  skill  of  his  engineers  from  early  in 
October  till  late  in  February.  Kehl  was  at  first  assaulted  by  a  force  four  times 
as  large  as  the  garrison;  if  they  had  succeeded  they  would  have  cutoff  Moreau's 
retreat  and  destroyed  his  army.  Fortunately,  the  place  was  strong  enough  to 
resist  all  assaults. 

In  the  Italian  campaign  of  the  same  year  the  general  was  directed  "  to  seize 
the  forts  of  Savona ;  compel  the  senate  to  furnish  him  with  pecuniary  supplies ; 
and  surrender  the  keys  of  Gavi,  a  fortress  perched  on  a  rocky  height  (jommand- 
ing  the  pass  of  the  Bouhetta."  While  Napoleon  was  advancing  to  execute  this 
plan,  the  Austrians  endeavored  to  cut  off  his  army  at  Montenotte,  and  would 
have  succeeded  had  not  the  brave  Rampon,  with  only  1,200  men,  in  the  redoubt 
of  Monte  Legino,  repeatedly  repulsed  the  furious  assaults  of  10,000  Austrians. 
If  this  fort  had  been  carried,  says  the  historian,  "the  fate  of  the  campaign  and 
of  the  world  might  have  changed."  After  this  unsuccessful  attack,  the  Austrians 
found  it  necessary  to  support  themselves  by  a  defensive  line  of  fortifications, 
and  insisted  upon  the  fortresses  of  Tortona,  Alexandria,  &c.,  being  put  into 
their  possession  by  the  Sardinian  government.  But  jealousy  of  Austria  would 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  319 

not  permit  this;  and  Sardinia  preferred  surrendering  them  to  the  French,  who 
were  at  this  time  in  very  critical  circumstances,  having  neither  heavy  cannon 
nor  a  siege  equipage  to  reduce  Turin,  Alexandria,  or  the  other  numerous  for- 
tresses of  Piedmont,  without  the  possession  of  which  it  would  have  been  ex- 
tremely hazardous  to  have  penetrated  further  into  the  country.  "The  King  of 
Sardinia,"  says  Napoleon*  "had  still  a  great  number  of  fortresses  left,  and,  in 
spite  of  the  victories  which  had  been  gained,  the  slightest  check,  one  caprice  of 
fortune,  would  have  undone  everything."  So  fully  persuaded  was  he  of  the 
importance  of  the  works  which  Sardinia  had  yielded  to  him  in  order  to  save 
them  from  the  Austrians,  that  he  said  he  would  not  relinquish  them,  even  if 
directed  so  to  do  by  his  own  government.  "Coni,  Oena,  and  Alexandria,"  he 
wrote  to  the  directory,  "are  now  in  the  hands  of  our  army;  and  even  if  you  do 
not  ratify  the  convention,  1  will  still  keep  these  fortresses"  "The  King  of 
Sardinia  is  placed  at  the  mercy  of  the  republic,  having  no  other  fortified  points 
than  Turin  and  Fort  Bard."  To  the  remark  that  these  defences  were  unneces- 
sary to  the  French,  he  replied:  "That  the  first  duty  of  the  army  was  to  secure 
a  firm  base  for  future  operations ;  that  it  was  impossible  to  advance  without 
being  secured  in  the  rear,  and  that  the  Sardinian  fortresses  at  once  put  the 
rejmblicans  in  possession  of  the  keys  of  the  peninsula"  "From  the  solid  basis 
of  the  Piedmontese  fortresses  he  was  enabled  to  turn  his  undivided  attention  to 
the  destruction  of  the  Austrians,  and  thus  commence,  with  some  security,  that 
great  career  of  conquest  which  he  already  meditated  in  the  imperial  dominions." 
Indeed,  these  conquests  were  but  the  legitimate  results  of  his  present  strategic 
position. 

Afterwards,  when  the  Austrians  had  nearly  wrested  Italy  from  the  weak 
hold  of  Napoleon's  successors,  the  French  saved  their  army  in  the  fortress  of 
Genoa,  and  behind  the  line  of  the  Var,  which  had  been  fortified  with  care  in 
1794  and  1795.  Numerous  attempts  were  made  to  force  the  line,  the  advanced 
posts  of  Fort  Montauban  being  several  times  assaulted  by  numerous  forces. 
But  the  Austrian  columns  recoiled  from  its  murderous  fire  of  grape  and  musketry, 
which  swept  off  great  numbers  at  every  discharge.  Again  the  assault  was 
renewed  with  avast  superiority  of  numbers,  and  again  "the  brave  men  who 
headed  the  columns  almost  all  perished  at  the  foot  of  the  intrenchments ;  and, 
after  sustaining  a  heavy  loss,  they  were  compelled  to  abandon  their  enterprise." 

While  the  forces  on  the  Var  thus  stayed  the  waves  of  Austrian  success,  Mas- 
sena,  in  the  fortifications  of  Genoa,  sustained  a  blockade  of  60  and  a  siege  of  40 
days  against  an  army  five  times  as  large  as  his  own ;  and,  when  forced  to  yield 
to  the  stern  demands  of  famine,  he  almost  dictated  to  the  enemy  the  terms  of  a 
treaty.  These  two  defences  held  in  check  the  elite  of  the  Austrian  army,  while 
the  French  reserve  crossed  the  Alps,  and  seized  upon  the  important  points  of 
tke  country. 

But  while  the  French  were  deriving  so  much  assistance  from  their  own  works, 
they  were  also  made  to  feel  the  importance  of  fortifications  in  the  enemy's 
hands.  In  the  passage  of  the  Alps,  the  little  fortress  of  Bard,  with  its  two- 
and-twenty  cannon,  arrested  for  some  time  the  entire  army  of  Napoleon,  and 
had  well  nigh  proved  fatal  to  the  campaign.  The  most  desperate  efforts  were 
made  to  carry  the  place,  but  all  were  of  no  avail.  "  In  this  extremity,  the 
genius  of  the  French  engineers  surmounted  the  difficulty.  The  infantry  and 
cavalry  of  Lannes's  division  traversed,  one  by  one,  the  path  on  the  Monte 
Albaredo,  and  re-formed  lower  down  the  valley,  while  the  artillerymen  suc- 
ceeded in  drawing  their  cannon,  in  the  dark,  through  the  town,  close  under  the 
guns  of  the  fort,  by  spreading  straw  and  dung  upon  the  streets,  and  wrapping 
the  wheels  up,  so  as  to- prevent  the  slightest  sound  being  heard.  In  this  manner 
forty-eight  pieces  and  a  hundred  caissons  were  drawn  through  during  the  night, 
while  the  Austrians,  in  unconscious  security,  slumbered  above,  beside  their 
loaded  camion,  direcetd  straight  into  the  street  where  the  passage  was  going 


320  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

forward.  During  the  succeeding  night  the  same  hazardous  operation  was 
repeated  with  equal  successes;  and  while  the  Austrian  commander  was  writing 
to  Melas  that  he  had  seen  thirty-five  thousand  men  and  four  thousand  horse 
cross  the  path  of  the  Albaredo,  but  that  not  one  piece  of  artillery  or  caisson 
should  pass  beneath  the  guns  of  his  fortress,  the  whole  cannon  and  ammunition 
of  the  army  Avere  safely  proceeding  on  the  road  to  Ivrea."  The  fort  of  Bard 
itself  held  out  till  the  5th  of  June;  and  we  have  the  authority  of  Napoleon  for 
the  assertion  that  if  the  passage  of  the  artillery  had  been  delayed  to  its  fall,  (in 
other  words,  if  the  guards  of  the  fort  had  not  neglected  their  duty,)  all  hope  of 
success  in  the  campaign  was  at  an  end.  Napoleon  says,  moreover,  that  "this 
fort  was  a  more  considerable  obstacle  to  his  army  than  the  Great  St.  Bernard 
itself,"  and  that  the  enemy's  being  left  in  possession  of  it  in  his  rear  fettered 
his  operations  and  modified  his  plans;  and  \veknowthatliisdispositionsfor 
the  battle  of  Marengo  were  not  made  till  he  heard  that  its  reduction  had  opened 
to  him  a  secure  line  of  retreat  in  case  of  disaster.  When  this  battle  had  shat- 
tered the  main  force  of  the  Austrian?,  these,  again  yielding  to  sectional  pre- 
judices, instead  of  taking  advantage  of  the  works  in  their  rear  to  impede  the 
advance  of  the  French,  declared  it  was  better  to  save  the  lives  of  their  men  by 
armistice  "than  to  preserve  towns  for  the  King  of  Sardinia."  Accordingly,  the 
fortresses  of  Piedmont  again  fell  into  the  hands  of  Napoleon  without  opposition, 
and  he  was  not  slow  to  understand  their  utility.  He  directed  his  chief  engineer, 
Chasseloup  de  Laubat,  whose  admirable  arrangement  of  defensive  works  had 
already  been  of  vast  assistance  to  the  army  of  Italy,  (and  for  which  he  was 
promoted  from  colonel  of  engineers  to  brigadier  general,  then  general  of  division, 
and  afterwards  count  of  the  French  empire,  with  an  ample  hereditary  endow- 
ment,) to  revise  this  system  of  fortifications,  with  particular  reference  to  Austrian 
aggression.  By  demolishing  a  part  of  the  old  works,  and  repairing  those  of 
Genoa,  Roco  d'Aiifo,  Vienna,  Legnago,  Mantua,  Alexandria,  and  the  defences 
of  the  Adda,  Chasseloup  formed  two  good  lines  of  fortifications,  which  were  of 
great  service  to  the  French  in  1805,  enabling  Massena,  with  only  50,000  men, 
to  hold  in  check  the  Archduke  Charles  with  more  than  90,000  men,  while 
Napoleon's  grand  army  traversed  Germany,  and  approached  the  capital  of 
Austria. 

In  the  German  campaign  of  1800,  Moreau  derived  the  same  advantages  from 
his  fortified  base  on  the  Rhine  as  in  the  preceding  years,  while  the  Austrians 
were  soon  driven  back  with  great  loss  upon  the  Danube,  where,  without  de- 
fences, their  whole  army  would  have  been  exposed  to.  destruction.  But  retiring 
into  the  fortifications  of  Ulm,  "  the  Austrian  general  not  only  preserved  entire 
his  OAvn  communications  and  line  of  retreat  by  Donawert  and  Ratisbon,  but 
threatened  those  of  his  adversary,  who,  if  he  attempted  to  pass  either  on  the 
north  or  south,  exposed  himself  to  the  attack  of  a  powerful  army  in  flank. 
Securely  posted  in  this  central  point,  the  imperialists  daily  received  accessions 
of  strength  from  Bohemia  and  the  hereditary  states ;  while  the  French,  weak- 
ened by  detachments  necessary  to  preserve  their  communications  and-  observe 
the  Prince  of  Reuss  in  the  Tyrol,  soon  began  to  lose  that  superiority  which,  by 
the  skilful  concentration  of  their  force,  they  had  hitherto  enjoyed  in  the  cam- 
paign. The  Austrians  soon  reaped  the  benefits  of  this  admirably  chosen  strong- 
hold ;  the  soldiers,  lodged  in  excellent  quarters,  rapidly  recovered  their  strength ; 
while  the  morale  of  the  army,  which  had  been  extremely  weakened  by  the 
rapid  disasters  of  the  campaign,  as-  quickly  rose  when  they  perceived  that  a 
stop  was  at  length  put  to  the  progress  of  the  enemy."  Moreau,  on  the  contrary, 
"  found  himself  extremely  embarrassed,  and  six  weeks  were  employed  in  the 
vain  attempt  to  dislodge  a  defeated  army  from  their  stronghold;  a  striking  proof 
of  the  prophetic  wisdom  of  the  Archduke  Charles  in  its  formation,  and  the 
importance  of  central  fortifications  in  arresting  the  progress  of  an  invading 
enemy." 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  321 

When  the  great  victories  of  Napoleon,  in  the  campaign  of  1806,  had  over- 
thrown the  Prussian  armies  in  the  open  field,  there  was  still  a  dormant  power 
in  the  fortresses  sufficient  to  hold  in  check  the  French  till  the  new  organized 
forces,  acting  in  concert  with  the  Russian  army,  could  have  re-established  the 
Prussian  monarchy  in  its  ancient  greatness.  The  works  on  the  three  great 
lines  of  the  Oder,  the  Elbe,  and  the  Weser,  were  fully  capable  of  doing  this, 
had  they  been  properly  repaired,  garrisoned,  and  defended.  But  it  seemed,  say 
the  historians  of  that  period,  that  fate  or  treason  had  utterly  blinded  the  intel- 
lect and  paralyzed  the  energy  of  the  entire  Prussian  army.  Stettin,  Custrin, 
Glogau,  Magdebourg,  Spandau,  Hameln,  Nienbourg,  &c.,  were,  to  the  joy  and 
astonishment  of  Napoleon  and  his  generals,  surrendered  without  waiting,  in  most 
cases,  even  the  form  of  a  siege.  "Spandau,"  said  he,  in  the  19th  bulletin,  "is 
an  inestimable  acquisition.  In  our  hands,  it  could  sustain  two  months  of  opera- 
tions. But  such  was  the  general  confusion,  that  the  Prussians  had  not  armed 
the  batteries."  The  possession  of  these  fortifications  was  of  immense  value  to 
the  French  in  their  ensuing  operations  against  the  Russians.  All  the  historians 
of  the  war  notice  their  influence  on  the  campaigns  of  Friedland  and  Tilsit.  We 
quote  the  words  of  Alison  as  peculiarly  appropriate:  "The  Polish  winter  cam- 
paign demonstrates,  in  the  most  striking  manner,  the  ruinous  effects  to  the 
common  cause,  and  in  a  special  manner  the  interests  of  their  own  monarchy, 
which  resulted  from  the  disgraceful  capitulation  of  the  Prussian  fortresses  in 
the  preceding  autumn.  When  the  balance  quivered  at  Eylau,  the  arrival  of 
Lestoq  would  have  given  the  Russians  a  decisive  victory,  had  it  not  been  for 
the  great  successes  of  Davoust  on  the  left,  and  the  tardy  appearance  of  Ney  on 
the  right ;  yet,  if  the  governors  of  the  Prussian  fortresses  on  the  Elbe  and  Oder 
had  done  their  duty,  these  corps  would  have  been  engaged  far  in  the  rear — Ney 
around  the  walls  of  Magdebourg,  Davoust  before  Stettin,  Custrin,  and  Glogau. 
Saragossa,  with  no  defence  but  an  old  wall  and  the  heroism  of  its  inhabitants, 
held  out  fifty  days  of  open  trenches.  Tarragona  fell  after  as  many.  If  the 
French  marshals  had,  in  like  manner,  been  detained  two  months,  or  even  six 
weeks,  before  each  of  the  great  fortresses  of  Prussia,  time  would  have  been 
gained  to  organize  the  resources  of  the  eastern  provinces  of  the  monarchy,  and 
Russia  would  have  gained  a  decisive  victory  at  Eylau,  or  driven  Napoleon  to  a 
disastrous  retreat  from  the  Vistula." 

At  the  treaty  of  Tilsit,  Napoleon,  notwithstanding  the  protests  and  entreaties 
of  the  king  and  queen,  insisted  upon  retaining  possession  of  the  Prussian  for- 
tresses, as  a  pledge  of  peace.  "The  campaign  of  1809,"  said  he,  afterwards, 
"proved  the  prudence  of  my  policy."  They  then  effectually  prevented  Prussia 
from  joining  Austria  in  kindling  again  the  flames  of  war.  But  these  were  not 
the  only  fortresses  from  which  Napoleon  derived  assistance  in  this  war.  His 
garrisons  on  the  now  vastly  extended  frontiers  of  the  empire  served  as  so  many 
safe  rallying  points  around  which  the  several  contingents  were  collected,  before 
converging  to  the  general  rendezvous  at  the  fortresses  of  Ingolstadt  or  of  Dona- 
werth.  Davoust  was  to  concentrate  his  immense  corps  at  Bamberg  and  Wurtz- 
burg;  Massena  at  Strasburg  and  Ulm;  Oudinot  at  Ausburg;  Bernadotte  at 
Dresden;  the  Poles  upon  Gallicia;  and  the  troops  of  the  Rhenish  confederacy 
were  to  concentrate  upon  the  strongholds  of  the  Danube.  "Thus  from  all 
quarters  of  Europe,  from  the  mountains  of  Austria  to  the  plains  of  Poland, 
armed  men  were  converging  in  all  directions  to  the  valley  of  the  Danube,  where 
a  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  soldiers  would  ere  long  be  collected ;  while  the 
provident  care  of  the  Emperor  was  not  less  actively  exerted  in  collecting  maga- 
zines upon  the  projected  line  of  operations  for  the  stupendous  multitude,  and 
providing,  in  the  arming  and  replenishing  of  the  fortresses,  both  as  a  base  for 
offensive  operations,  and  a  refuge  in  the  probable  events  of  disaster"  This 
concentration  of  his  vast  army,  secured  by  his  fortifications,  soon  produced  the 
retreat  of  the  Austrian  army,  and  Napoleon's  advance  to  Vienna. 
H.  Rep.  Com.  86 21 


322  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

Again,  in  1813,  the  French  garrisons  of  Stettin,  Custrin,  Glogau,  Hamburg, 
Wettenberg,  and  Magdebourg,  would  have  had  a  fatal  influence  upon  the  Prus- 
sians, had  not  the  political  perfidy  of  Austria,  and  the  treason  of  his  own  gen- 
erals, prevented  Napoleon  from  profiting  by  the  advantages  of  his  own  position. 
If,  after  the  disasters  of  this  campaign,  the  fortresses  of  France  failed  to  save 
the  nation,  the  cause  must  be  sought  for  in  the  peculiar  features  of  the  invasion 
itself,  rather  than  in  any  lack  of  military  influence  in  the  French  defences.  A 
million  of  disciplined  men,  under  consummate  leaders,  were  here  assailing  a  single 
State,  impoverished  by  the  fatal  war  in  Russia,  torn  in  pieces  by  political  fac- 
tions, deserted  by  its  sworn  allies,  its  fortresses  basely  betrayed  into  the  enemy's 
hands,  and  its  military  power  paralyzed  by  the  treason  of  generals,  with  their 
entire  armies.  Its  only  hope  was  in  the  fortresses  which  had  remained  faithful ; 
and  Napoleon  said  at  St.  Helena,  that  if  he  had  collected  together  the  garrisons 
of  these  fortresses,  and  retired  to  the  Rhine,  he  could  have  crushed  the  allies, 
even  after  their  entrance  into  Paris.  But  political  considerations  prevented  the 
operation. 

Again,  in  1815,  Napoleon,  even  after  his  defeat  at  Waterloo,  possessed  lines 
of  defence  sufficiently  strong  to  resist  all  attempts  at  invasion.  But,  again,  the 
want  of  co-operation  on  the  part  of  the  government  at  Paris,  and  treason  of  his 
own  generals,  forced  his  second  abdication.  If  he  had  retained  the  command  of 
the  army,  and  the  nation  had  seconded  his  efforts,  the  allies  could  never  have 
reached  Paris.  But  the  new  government  presented  the  disgraceful  spectacle  of 
opening  the  way  for  the  enemies  of  their  country.  "France,"  said  Napoleon, 
at  St.  Helena,  "will  eternally  reproach  the  ministry  with  having  forced  her 
whole  people  to  pass  under  the  caudine-forks,  by  ordering  the  disbanding  of  an 
army  tliat  had  for  twenty-five  years  been  its  country's  glory,  and  by  giving  up 
to  our  astonished  enemy s  our  still  invincible  fortresses." 

History  fully  supports  Napoleon's  opinion  of  the  great  danger  of  penetrating 
far  into  a  hostile  country  to  attack  the  capital,  even  though  that  capital  may  be 
unfortified.  The  fatal  effects  of  such  an  advance,  without  properly  securing 
the  means  of  retreat,  is  exemplified  by  his  own  campaign  in  Russia  in  1812.  If, 
after  the  fall  of  Smolensky,  he  had  fortified  that  place  and  Vitepsh,  which  by 
their  position  closed  the  narrow  passage  comprised  between  the  Dnieper  and  the 
Dwina,  he  might,  in  all  probability,  on  the  following  spring,  have  been  able  to 
seize  upon  Moscow  and  St.  Petersburg.  But  leaving  the  hostile  army  of  Tsch- 
kakoff  cantoned  in  his  rear,  he  pushed  on  to  Moscow;  and  when  the  conflagra- 
tion of  that  city  cut  off  his  hopes  of  winter  quarters  there,  and  the  premature 
rigor  of  the  season  destroyed  the  horses  of  his  artillery  and  provision  trains, 
retreat  became  impossible,  and  the  awful  fate  of  his  immense  army  was  closed 
by  scenes  of  horror  to  which  scarcely  a  parallel  can  be  found  in  history.  We 
might  further  illustrate  this  point  by  the  Russian  campaign  of  Charles  XII,  in 
1708-'9,  the  advance  of  the  French  army  on  Lisbon  in  the  Peninsular  war, 
and  others  of  the  same  nature. 

Even  single  works  sometimes  effect  the  object  of  lines  of  fortifications,  and 
frustrate  the  operations  of  an  entire  army.  Thus  Lille  suspended  for  a  whole 
year  the  operations  of  Prince  Eugene  and  Marlborough,  Metz  arrested  the  entire 
power  of  Charles  V,  and  Strasbourg  was  often  the  bulwark  of  the  French. 
Napoleon  said  to-0'Meara,  that,  if  Vienna  had  been  fortified  in  1805,  the  battle 
of  Ulm  would  not  have  decided  the  event  of  the  war.  General  Kutusoff 's  army 
could  there  have  awaited  the  return  of  the  other  Russian  corps  and  of  the  army 
of  Prince  Charles,  then  approaching  from  Italy.  Again,  in  1809,  Prince  Charles, 
defeated  at  Eckmulh,  and  forced  to  retreat  by  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube,  would 
have  had  time  to  reach  Vienna,  and  form  a  junction  with  the  forces  of  General 
Heller  and  Archduke  John.  If  Berlin  had  been  fortified  in  1806,  the  army  routed 
at  Jena  would  have  rallied  there,  and  been  joined  by  the  Russians.  If  Madrid  had 
been  strongly  fortified  in  1805,  the  French  army,  after  the  victories  of  Espinosa. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  323 

Tudella,  Burgos,  and  Sammosiera,  would  not  have  marched  towards  that  capital, 
leaving  in  the  rear  of  Salamauea  and  Valladolid  both  the  English  army  of  Gen- 
eral Moore  and  the  Spanish  army  of  Romana.  These  two  would,  under  the 
fortifications  of  Madrid,  have  united  with  the  armies  of  Arragon  and  Valencia. 
If  Moscow  had  been  fortified  in  1812,  its  conflagration  would  have  been  avoided; 
for,  with  strong  works,  and  the  army  of  KutusofF  encamped  on  its  ramparts,  its 
investment  would  have  been  impossible.  Had  not  Constantinople  been  well 
fortified,  the  empire  of  Constantine  must  have  terminated  in  700,  whereas  the 
standard  of  the  Prophet  was  not  planted  there  until  1440.  This  capital  was 
therefore  indebted  to  its  walls  for  800  years  of  existence.  During  this  period  it 
was  besieged  53  times,  but  only  one  of  these  sieges  was  successful.  The 
French  and  Venetians  took  it,  but  not  without  a  very  severe  contest.  Paris 
often  owed  its  safety  to  its  walls.  In  885,  the  Normans  besieged  it  two  years 
without  effect.  In  1358,  the  Dauphin  besieged  it  in  vain.  In  1359,  Edward, 
King  of  England,  encamped  at  Montrouge,  devastated  the  country  to  its 
walls,  but  recoiled  from  before  its  works,  and  retired  to  Chatres.  In  1429, 
it  repulsed  the  attack  of  Charles  VII.  In  1464,  the  Count  of  Charolois 
surrounded  the  city,  but  was  unsuccessful  in  his  attacks.  In  1472,  it 
repulsed  the  army  of  the  Duke  of  Bourgone,  who  had  already  ravaged  its  pre- 
cincts. In  1536,  when  attacked  by  Charles  V,  it  again  owed  its  safety  to  its 
walls.  In  1589,  it  repulsed  the  armies  of  Henry  III  and  Henry  IV.  In 
1636,  the  inhabitants  of  Paris  for  several  years  owed  their  safety  to  its  walls. 
If  this  capital  had  been  strongly  fortified  in  1814  or  1815,  the  allied  armies 
would  not  have  dared  to  attempt  its  investment. 

We  had  intended  to  enter  into  an  analysis  of  the  Peninsular  war,  and  point 
out  the  influence  of  fortifications  upon  military  operations  in  Spain  and  Portu- 
gal; but  further  illustrations  would  seem  unnecessary;  for  the  usefulness  of  for- 
tifications in  the  defence  of  inland  frontiers  is  too  evident  in  itself,  and,  as  we 
have  already  shown,  is  too  well  supported  by  historical  facts,  and  the  recorded 
opinions  of  the  best  military  men  of  modern  ages,  to  be  overthrown  by  a  mere 
assertion  of  their  worthlessness,  no  matter  by  whom  such  assertion  is  made. 

While  there  exists  this  great  unanimity  among  military  men  upon  the  vast 
importance  of  fortifications  as  land  defences,  there  is  an  equal  diversity  of  opin- 
ion respecting  the  best  manner  of  arranging  them.  We  shall  mention  three  gen- 
eral systems  of  arranging  forts  for  the  defence  of  an  open  country,  each  of 
which  has  been  advocated  at  different  times,  and  afterwards  received  various 
modifications  and  additions.  These  three  systems  are  the  most  important,  and, 
in  fact,  comprise  the  main  features  of  all  others  worthy  of  much  consideration. 
They  are : 

1st.  Montalembert's  system  of  continuous  lines. 

2d.  A  system  of  *three  lines  of  detached  works,  strongly  recommended  by 
D'Arcon. 

3d.  A  system  proposed  by  Vauban,  and  advocated  by  Rogniat,  consisting  of 
lines  of  very  strong  works  placed  at  considerable  distances  from  each  other,  and 
covering  large  intrenched  camps. 

The  first  was  proposed  in  1790,  and  for  a  time  attracted  considerable  notice 
in  France,  but  has  long  since  been  exploded,  as  utterly  incompatible  with  the 
principles  of  military  art.  A  writer,  however,  of  some  pretension  in  this  country, 
recommends  its  adoption  for  the  defence  of  Baltimore  and  the  Chesapeake.  The 
same  author  would  dispense  entirely  with  our  present  system  of  fortifications  on 
the  sea-coast,  and  substitute  in  their  place  wooden  martello  towers  ! 

In  the  second  system  the  works  of  the  first  line  are  to  be  about  one  day's 
march  apart,  those  of  the  second  line  opposite  the  intervals  of  the  first  and  at 
the  same  distance,  and  those  of  the  third  line  having  the  same  relation  to  the 
second.  Works  of  different  sizes  are  recommended  by  some  writers  for  each  of 
these  three  lines. 


324  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

In  the  system  first  recommended  by  Vauban,  and  more  recently  by  Rogniatr 
the  works  of  the  advanced  line  are  to  be  thirty  leagues  apart,  and  the  other  lines 
at  the  same  distance  from  each  other,  with  their  works  opposite  the  intervals  in 
front.  Under  the  guns  of  each  is  established  a  large  intrenched  camp. 

These  systems  were  designed  for  an  open  country,  and  either  of  them  would 
be  greatly  modified  in  its  application ;  for,  in  practice,  the  frontier  to  be  defended 
will  always  be  of  a  broken  character.  The  proper  application  of  forts  in  the 
defence  of  such  frontiers  is  a  question  of  no  easy  solution.  The  principle  laid 
down  by  Jomini,  "  that  fortifications  should  always  be  constructed  on  important 
strategic  points,"  is  undoubtedly  the  correct  one ;  but  how  to  determine  these 
points  involves  questions  which  often  perplex  the  patience  and  try  the  skill  of 
the  engineer ;  yet  determine  them  he  must,  or  his  fortifications  will  be  worse 
than  useless.  A  fort  improperly  placed,  like  a  cannon  with  its  fire  reversed 
upon  its  own  artillerists,  will  be  sure  to  effect  the  destruction  of  the  very  forces 
it  was  designed  to  protect. 

The  system  of  fortifications  adopted  by  the  board  of  1840  for  the  defence  of 
our  northern  frontier — a  system  whose  extravagance  is  so  much  spoken  of  in 
the  Apalachicola  report — consists  of  a  single  line  of  forts  placed  at  different 
points  along  the  extreme  frontier,  and  one  large  military  station  and  depot  oppo- 
site about  the  middle  of  this  line,  and  some  two  hundred  miles  back  in  the  interior 
of  the  country.  This  great  central  station  it  is  proposed  to  locate  at  Albany  or 
in  that  vicinity ;  and  the  line  of  forts  to  be  as  follows  :  First,  a  fort  at  the  falls 
of  St.  Mary ;  second,  at  Michilimackinac ;  third,  at  the  foot  of  Lake  Huron ; 
fourth,  at  Detroit ;  fifth,  at  Buffalo  ;  sixth,  at  the  mouth  of  Niagara  river ;  seventh, 
at  Oswego ;  eighth,  at  Sackett's  harbor ;  ninth,  at  the  Narrows  of  the  St.  Law- 
rence, below  Ogdensburg;  tenth,  at  Rouses's  Point;  elventh,  arrangements  for 
depots  at  Plattsburg,  and  at  the  head  waters  of  the  Kennebeck  and  Penobscot ; 
and,  twelfth,  a  fort  at  Calais,  on  the  St.  Croix  river. 

This  system  has  been  considerably  commented  on  by  military  men,  and  va- 
rious opinions  have  been  advanced  recpecting  its  merits.  Some  are  of  opinion 
that  more  and  larger  works  should  have  been  planned  for  the  western  extremity 
of  the  line,  while  others  regard  the  eastern  portion  as  far  the  most  important. 
This  difference  results  from  a  diversity  of  opinion  respecting  the  most  feasible 
line  of  operations  against  Canada.  According  to  the  views  of  the  one  party 
we  should  concentrate  our  forces  at  the  single  point  of  Augusta,  and  advance 
from  thence  against  Quebec,  a  distance  of  some  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
along  the  isolated  carriage  road  through  the  valley  of  the  Chaudiere  ;  while  the 
other  party  would  draw  their  military  munitions  from  Pittsburg,  and  their  troops 
from  the  States  bordering  on  the  Ohio  river,  and  then  ascend  the  Detroit  and 
St.  Clair  rivers,  and  Lake  Huron ;  get  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy  by  way  of  the 
Georgian  bay  and  Lake  Simcoe,  or  still  further  north,  by  Lake  Nipissing  and 
the  Ottowa  river — thus  leaving  him  between  us  and  our  true  base.  This  subject 
is  worthy  of  examination. 

The  selection  of  positions  for  fortifications  on  this  frontier  must  have  reference 
to  three  distinct  classes  of  objects,  viz  :  The  security,  fast,  of  the  larger  frontier 
towns,  where  much  public  or  private  property  is  exposed  to  sudden  dashing 
expeditions  of  the  foe,  made  either  on  land  or  by  water ;  second,  of  lake  harbors, 
important  as  places  of  refuge  and  security  to  our  own  ships,  or  as  shelters  to  the 
enemy's  fleet  while  engaged  in  landing  troops  or  furnishing  supplies  to  an  invading 
army ;  third,  of  all  the  strategic  points  on  the  probable  lines  of  offensive  or  defensive 
operations.  These  objects  are  distinct  in  their  nature,  and  would  seem  to  require 
separate  and  distinct  means  for  their  accomplishment ;  nevertheless,  it  will  gen- 
erally be  found  that  positions  selected  with  reference  to  one  of  these  objects 
equally  fulfil  the  others,  so  intimately  are  they  all  connected.  To  determine 
the  strategic  points  of  a  probable  line  of  military  operations  is  therefore  the  main 
thing  to  be  attended  to  in  locating  the  fortifications.  That  such  points  of  max- 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  325 

imuin  importance  are  actually  marked  out  by  the  peaceful  or  hostile  intercourse 
of  nations  cannot  be  doubted. 

The  relative  importance  of  cities  and  towns  is  less  varied  by  the  fluctuations 
of  commerce  on  a  land  frontier  than  on  the  sea-coast.  The  ever  changing  system 
of  "  internal  improvements,"  by  furnishing  new  highways  and  thoroughfares  for 
the  transportation  of  products  of  manufactures  and  agriculture,  either  continually 
varies  the  relative  standing  as  the  seaports  already  opened,  or  else  opens  new 
ones  for  the  exportation  of  their  products  arid  importation  of  foreign  articles 
received  in  exchange.  But  these  "internal  improvements"  are  seldom  carried 
so  far  as  to  connect  together  two  separate  and  distinct  countries ;  and  conse- 
quently the  principal  places  on  the  dividing  line  usually  retain  their  relative 
importance,  no  matter  how  often  they  may  have  declined  during  times  of  hos- 
tility, or  again  flourished  with  the  increased  commercial  intercourse  which  results 
from  peace.  The  principal  European  places  of  traffic  near  the  frontiers  have 
remained  the  same  for  ages,  and  in  all  probability  ages  hence  the  great  frontier 
marts  will  be  nearly  the  same  as  at  present.  This  stability  of  rank  among  the 
border  towns  is  not  confined  to  commercial  influence ;  the  same  holds  true  with 
respect  to  that  established  by  iutercourse  of  a  hostile  character.  Military  his- 
tory teaches  us  that  lines  of  hostile  operations,  and  the  fields  upon  which  the 
principal  battles  between  any  two  countries  have  been  fought,  are  nearly  the 
same,  no  matter  how  remote  the  periods  of  comparison.  These  points  and  lines, 
so  important  in  commerce  as  well  as  in  war,  result  from  the  natural  features  of 
the  ground,  and  we  ought  therefore  to  expect  that  they  would  be  as  little  liable 
to  sudden  changes  as  the  character  of  the  earth  itself.  From  these  remarks  it 
will  readily  be  perceived  that  there  are  three  distinct  methods  of  determining  the 
strategic  points  between  this  country  and  Canada :  first,  by  an  examination  of 
the  topography  of  the  two  countries ;  second,  by  tracing  out  the  main  channels 
of  commercial  intercourse ;  third,  by  reviewing  the  lines  of  their  military  opera- 
rations.  The  last  method  is  the  least  liable  to  error,  and  perhaps  is  the  most 
easily  understood,  inasmuch  as  it  is  sometimes  difficult  to  point  the  precise 
degree  of  connexion  between  prospective  military  lines  and  the  channels  of  com- 
merce, or  to  show  why  these  two  have  a  fixed  relation  to  the  physical  features 
of  the  country.  In  the  present  instance,  moreover,  this  method  furnishes  us 
ample  data  for  the  formation  of  our  decision,  inasmuch  as  the  campaigns  between 
this  country  and  Canada  have  been  neither  few  in  number,  nor  unimportant  in 
their  character  and  results. 

By  tracing  out  the  history  of  the  earlier  of  these  campaigns,  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  English  were  vastly  superior  in  strength  and  numbers,  yet  the  result  of 
the  several  campaigns  was  decidedly  in  favor  of  the  French,  who  not  only  re- 
tained their  possessions  in  the  north,  but  extended  their  jurisdiction  to  the  mouth 
of  the  Mississippi,  and  laid  claim  to  the  whole  country  west  of  the  Allegany 
mountains.  This  success  must  be  attributed  not  to  any  superiority  of  the  Cana- 
dians in  bravery,  but  to  the  higher  military  character  of  their  governors,  and 
more  especially  to  their  fortifications,  which  were  constructed  in  situations  most 
judiciously  selected  to  influence  the  Indians  and  facilitate  incursions  into  the 
English  colonies.  The  disparity  of  numbers  was  always  very  great.  At  the 
middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  white  population  of  the  colonies  amounted 
to  upwards  of  one  million  of  souls,  while  that  of  both  Canada  and  Louisiana 
did  not  exceed  fifty-two  thousand.  But  the  French  possessions,  though  situated 
at  the  extremities  of  a  continent  and  separated  by  an  almost  boundless  wilder- 
ness, were  nevertheless  connected  by  a  line  of  military  posts  strong  enough  to 
resist  the  small  arms  that  could  there  be  brought  against  them.  This  fort- 
building  propensity  of  the  French  became  a  matter  of  serious  alarm  to  the 
colonies,  and,  in  1710,  the  legislature  of  New  York  especially  protested  against 
it  in  an  address  to  the  crown.  While  the  military  art  was  stationary  in  Eng- 
land, France  had  produced  her  four  great  engineers — Errard,  Pagan,  Vauban, 


326  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

and  Cormontaingne ;  and  nowhere  has  the  influence  of  their  system  of  military 
defence  been  more  strikingly  exhibited  than  in  the  security  it  afforded  to  the 
Canadian  colony  when  assailed  by  such  vastly  superior  forces.  Still  further 
accessions  were  now  made  to  these  forces  by  large  re-enforcements  from  the 
mother  country,  while  the  Canadians  received  little  or  no  assistance  from  France; 
nevertheless  they  prolonged  the  war  till  1760,  forcing  the  English  to  adopt  the 
slow  and  expensive  process  of  reducing  all  their  fortifications. 

The  history  of  the  northern  wars  of  the  revolution  and  of  1812  still  further 
proves  the  importance  of  fortifications  in  defence.  From  this  history  it  will  also 
be  seen  that  positions  for  defence  selected  by  the  board  are  really  important 
ones ;  and,  moreover,  that  while  the  proposed  eastern  and  western  routes  have 
been  used  as  auxiliary  to  the  main  attack,  the  line  of  Lake  Champlain  has  been 
the  field  of  strife  and  blood  for  fifteen  campaigns.  Nature  has  marked  this  out 
as  one  line  of  intercourse  with  Canada ;  for,  besides  being  the  shortest  and 
easiest  line  of  communication,  it  possesses  many  other  advantages.  Military 
stores,  &c.,  can  easily  be  transported  by  water,  while  the  roads  on  each  side  of 
this  line  offer  good  routes  to  the  troops.  These  roads  generally  converge  to  the 
northern  extremity  of  the  lake,  thus  enabling  us  to  concentrate  forces  at  that 
point  while  the  enemy's  invading  forces  would  be  obliged  to  pursue  diverging 
routes.  The  line  of  the  Kennebec,  on  the  contrary,  is  only  a  single  road,  but 
little  travelled,  and  penetrating  a  wide  and  almost  uninhabited  wilderness. 
General  Jomini  says,  emphatically,  that  a  line  of  operations  should  always  offer 
two  or  three  roads  for  the  movement  of  an  army  in  the  sphere  of  its  enterprises 
— an  insuperable  objection  to  the  Kennebec,  except  as  a  diversion  to  the  main 
attack.  But  there  are  still  stronger  objections  to  this  route  than  its  want  of 
feasibility  for  the  transportation  of  the  main  army  ;  for,  even  if  that  army  should 
succeed  in  reaching  Quebec  in  safety,  the  expedition  would  be  entirely  without 
military  results,  unless  that  fortress  could  be  immediately  reduced.  It  would 
be  precipitating  our  entire  force  upon  the  strongest  position  of  the  enemy,  and 
making  both  the  success  and  safety  of  our  army  entirely  dependent  upon  the 
reduction  of  that  fortress — a  contingency  which  would  be  extremely  doubtful, 
under  the  most  favorable  circumstances ;  and,  should  we  be  ever  so  fortunate  in 
our  operations,  its  siege  woulcl  occupy  a  considerable  length  of  time.  What 
principle  of  military  science  would  justify  such  a  disposition  of  our  force  1  We 
are  fully  aware  of  the  great  advantages  which  we  should  derive  from  the  reduc- 
tion of  Quebec  ;  but  we  are  also  aware  of  the  great  difficulties  to  be  encountered 
in  any  attempt  to  accomplish  that  object.  We  believe  it  can  and  will  bo  made 
to  surrender  to  our  arms ;  but  at  the  same  time  we  conceive  it  to  be  utter  folly 
to  base  our  military  operations  on  the  contingency  of  a  short  and  successful 
siege.  By  advancing  upon  Montreal  by  the  Champlain  route,  we  would  cut  off 
the  Canadian  forces  in  the  west  from  all  re-enforcements ;  and  then,  as  circum- 
stances might  direct,  could  besiege  Quebec  or  attack  the  enemy  in  the  field;  or, 
perhaps,  manoeuvring  as  the  French  did  at  the  siege  of  Mantua,  accomplish  both 
objects  at  the  same  time. 

If  the  Champlain  line  is,  as  we  believe,  the  most  important  line  in  the  north, 
its  security  by  fortifications  is  a  matter  of  great  interest.  The  works  recom- 
mended by  the  board  for  this  purpose  deserve  the  earliest  attention  of  Congress. 
But  are  these  works  alone  sufficient  to  accomplish  the  object  ?  They  consist  of 
a  single  fort,  costing  $600,000,  on  Lake  Champlain,  near  the  extreme  frontier, 
and  depots  at  Plattsburg  and  Albany.  But  what  is  to  retard  the  advance  of  a 
hostile  army  if  it  should  pass  this  extreme  frontier  barrier  ? — or  what  defensive 
works  are  to  protect  the  debouche  of  the  northern  canal,  or  even  to  save  the 
great  central  depot  1  We  know  of  no  foreign  engineer  who  has  recommended 
less  than  three  lines  of  fortifications  for  the  security  of  a  land  frontier ;  and 
Napoleon,  the  Archduke  Charles,  and  General  Jomini  agree  in  recommending 
at  least  this  number  of  lines.  There  may  be  circumstances  that  render  it  un- 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  327 

necessary  to  resort  to  a  threefold  defence  throughout  the  whole  extent  of  the 
northern  frontier ;  but  upon  our  main  line  of  communication  with  Canada,  a 
line  of  maximum  importance  both  to  us  and  the  enemy,  we  know  of  no  reason 
for  violating  the  positive  rules  of  the  art — rules  which  have  been  established 
for  ages,  and  sanctioned  by  the  best  engineers  and  greatest  generals  of  modern 
times. 

Ticonderoga  has  more  than  once  stayed  the  waves  of  northern  invasion; 
and  we  know  of  no  change  in  the  art  of  war,  or  the  condition  of  the  coun- 
try, that  renders  less  important  than  formely  the  advantages  of  an  intermediate 
point  of  support  between  Albany  and  the  Canadian  lines.  Indeed,  we  should  think 
that  the  connexion  of  the  Hudson  with  the  lake,  by  the  Northern  canal,  had 
even  increased  the  value  of  such  a  point.  Moreover,  we  should  think  that  the 
great  value  of  a  central  depot  near  Albany  would  warrant  a  resort  to  the  best 
means  of  security  which  can  be  afforded  by  defensive  works.  Here  we  already 
have  one  of  our  largest  arsenals  of  construction ;  here  are  to  be  located  maga- 
zines for  the  collection  and  deposit,  in  time  of  peace,  of  gunpowder ;  and  here, 
in  war,  is  to  be  formed  the  grand  military  depot  for  our  whole  northern  armies. 
Such  a  place  should  never  be  left  exposed  to  the  coup-de-main  of  an  enemy.  The 
chance  operations  of  a  defensive  army  are  never  sufficient  for  the  security  of 
so  important  a  position.  We  do  not  pretend  to  say  what  its  defences  should 
be.  Perhaps  strong  bridge-heads  on  the  Mohawk  and  Hudson  rivers,  and  de- 
tached forts  on  the  several  lines  of  communication,  may  accomplish  the  desired 
object ;  perhaps  more  central  and  compact  works  may  be  found  necessary.  We 
only  wish  to  insist  on  the  importance  of  securing  the  position  by  some  efficient 
means.  The  remarks  of  Napoleon  (quoted  before)  on  the  advantages  to  be  de- 
rived from  fortifying  such  a  central  place,  where  the  military  wealth  of  the 
state  can  be  secured,  are  strikingly  applicable  to  this  case.  The  views  of 
Alison  on  this  subject,  though  of  little  authority  when  compared  with  those  of 
Napoleon  already  given,  are  very  eloquently  and  forcibly  expressed.  We 
add  in  conclusion,  the  following  extract : 

"From  the  important  consequences  which  followed  the  occupation  of 
Vienna,"  says  he,  "and  the  seizure  of  its  immense  military  resources  by  the 
French,  may  be  derived  one  conclusion  of  lasting  value  to  every  independent 
state.  This  is  the  incalculable  importance  of  every  metropolis  either  being 
adequately  fortified,  or  possessing  in  its  immediate  vicinity  a  citadel  of  approved 
strength,  capable  of  containing  twenty  or  thirty  thousand  soldiers,  and  of  ser- 
ving as  a  place  of  secure  deposit  for  the  national  archives,  stores,  wealth,  and 
government,  till  the  national  strength  can  be  fairly  roused  for  their  rescue. 
Had  Austria  prepared  such  a  fortress,  in  or  near  adjoining  to  Vienna,  the  inva- 
sions o*f  1805  and  1809  would  have  terminated  in  the  invader's  ruin.  Had  the 
heights  of  Belleville  Montmartre  been  strongly  fortified,  the  invasions  of  1814 
and  1815  would  have  been  attended  with  nothing  but  disaster  to  the  allied 
armies.  Had  Berlin  been  of  as  great  strength  as  Dantzic,  the  French  armies, 
after  the  disaster  of  Jena,  would  have  been  detained  round  its  walls  till  the 
Russian  hosts  advanced,  and  six  years  of  bondage  saved  to  the  Prussian 
monarchy.  Had  the  Kremlin  been  a  citadel  capable  of  holding  out  six  weeks, 
the  terrible  sacrifice  of  Moscow  would  not  have  been  required.  Had  Vienna 
not  been  impregnable  to  the  Mussulman  arms,  the  monarchy  would  have  sunk 
in  the  dust  before  the  standard  of  Sobieski  gleamed  on  the  Bisemberg.  Had 
the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras  not  formed  an  impassable  barrier  to  Massena,  the 
germ  of  patriotic  resistance  in  the  Peninsula  would  have  been  extinguished  in 
the  bud.  Had  the  walls  of  Rome  not  deterred  the  Carthagenian  hero  from  a 
siege,  the  fortunes  of  the  republic  would  have  sunk  after  the  disaster  of  Cannae. 
It  is  by  no  means  necessary  for  these  important  ends  that  the  whole  metropolis 
should  be  confined  by  fortifications ;  it  is  enough  that  a  citadel  of  great  strength. 


328  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

is  at  hand,  to  contain  all  the  warlike  and  civil  resources  of  the  kingdom.  Let 
no  nation  imagine  that  the  magnitude  of  its  resources  relieves  it  from  this  neces- 
sity, or  that  the  effulgence  of  its  glory  will  secure  it  from  ultimate  danger.  It 
was  after  the  battle  of  Austerlitz  that  Naploleon  first  felt  the  necessity  of 
fortifying  Paris ;  and  it  was  in  five  short  years  afterwards  that  the  bitter  conse- 
quences of  national  vanity,  which  prevented  his  design  form  being  carried  into 
effect,  were  experienced  by  the  Parisians." 

H.  WAGER  HALLECK, 

Lieutenant  of  Engineers. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  329 

No.  6. 

[Ho.  REPS.,  Ex.  Doc.  No.  5,  32D  CONGRESS,  Isr  SESSION.] 

REPORT  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  OF  DECEMBER  8,  1851,  ON  THE  SUBJECT 
OF  FORTIFICATIONS,  IN  ANSWER  TO  A  RESOLUTION  OF  THE  HOUSE  OF  REP- 
RESENTATIVES OF  MARCH  3,  1851. 


List  of  Documents. 

A. — Statement  of  fortifications  on  the  Atlantic  coast  and  Gulf  of  Mexico,  the 
amount  expended  on  each,  and  the  estimated  cost  of  completion  and 
armament. 

B. — Statement  of  fortifications  on  the  northern  frontier. 

C. — Statement  of  cannon  and  carriages  at  the  forts  and  arsenals. 

D. — Report  of  General  J.  G.  Totten,  chief  engineer. 

E. — Letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  requesting  the  views  of  naval  officers 
on  certain  points  stated,  and  their  reports,  viz : 

1.  Report  of  Commodore  C.  Morris. 

2.  Report  of  Commodore  M.  C.  Perry. 

3.  Report  of  Commander  R.  B.  Cunningham. 

4.  Report  of  Commander  S.  F.  Dupont. 

5.  Report  of  Lieutenant  J.  Lanman. 

6.  Report  of  Lieutenant  M.  F.  Maury. 

7.  Report  of  Lieutenant  J.  A.  Dahlgren. 

F. — Order  to  the  chief  engineer,  requiring  the  views  of  engineer  officers  en  cer-" 
tain  points  stated,  and  their  reports,  viz : 

8.  Report  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  R.  E.  De  Russey. 

9.  Report  of  Major  W.  H.  Chase. 
10.  Report  of  Major  R.  Delafield. 


330 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 


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333 


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2.  Fort  Delaware,  Delawa 
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4.  Fort  Calhoun,  Hampton  Ro 
5.  Fort  Sumter,  Charleston  harb 
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Fla* 
9.  Redoubt  of  Fort  Barrancas, 
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334 


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GENERAL  REMARKS. 

In  estimating  for  peace  garrisons,  it  is  considered  disadvantageous  to  discipline  to  break  up  the  companies 
when  it  can  be  avoided.  Several  works  are  reckoned  as  requiring  peace  garrisons,  though  they  will  not,  at 
our  present  rate  of  progress,  be  prepared  for  troops  for  some  years.  Some  of  these  garrisons  nii<r!it,  on  an 
emergency,  be  reduced  for  a  time  ;  but  the  force  proposed  should  be  regarded  generally  as  the  minimum  proper 
to  secure  our  ports  from  insult  and  keep  watch  over  the  military  property.  The  garrisons,  as  stated,  amount 
to  forty-seven  and  a  half  companies  for  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  seaboard,  independent  of  Tampa  Bay  and  the 
city  of  New  Orleans. 

The  works  that  have  been  under  repair  of  class  A,  and  those  of  class  B,  may  all  be  regarded  as  completed  as 
respects  efficiency.  The  expenditures  still  required  have  relation,  most  generally,  to  matters  of  accommodation 
of  troops,  to  storehouses,  sea  walls,  wharves,  and  roads ;  to  repairs  of  perishable  portions;  to  the  substitution 
of  permanent  for  certain  decaying  materials  ;  to  preservation  of  sites  from  the  action  of  the  sea,  &c. 

The  amounts  given  in  the  column  under  the  head  of  expended  for  construction  or  repair,  include  all  the  appro- 
priations heretofore  made.  In  some  cases  balances  of  these  appropriations  remain,  and  are  in  course  of 
expenditure. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


339 


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Classes  and  description  of  works. 

Class  A.  —  Old  works  repaired  

Class  B.  —  New  works  completed  or  nearly  completed  
Class  C.  —  Works  now  under  construction  
Class  D.  —  Works  the  first  to  be  commenced  .... 
Class  E.  —  Works  to  be  commenced  after  those  in  class  D  .... 

Deduct  value  of  ordnance  and  ammunition  now  on  har 

Amount  still  required  for  armament  of  the  first  five  cla 
Class  F.  —  Works  to  be  commenced  last  of  all  „ 
Grand  total  „  

340 


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Designation  of  the  works  and  State  in 
which  located. 

.    "   .       .  -je                 •  *     # 

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1  .  Fort  Brady,  Michigan*  
2.  Fort  Mackinac,  Michigan*  
3.  Fort  Gratiot,  Michigan*  
4.  New  Fort  Barracks,  nr.  Detroit,  Mich 
5.  Works  at  Buffalo,  including  Fort  For 
ter,  New  York*  
fi.  Repair  of  old  Fort  Niagara,  New  Yorh 
7.  Repair  of  old  Fort  Ontario,  New  York 
8.  Fort  at  the  outlet  of  Lake  Chainplain 
New  York*  

FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


341 


CASEMATE  CARRIAGES. 

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Fort  Pickens,  Florida  

Fort  Washington,  Maryland  
Fort  Gibson,  Ellis  island,  N.  York 
Fort  Niagara,  New  York  

342  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


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Fort  Columbus,  New  York  
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Fort  McHenry  ,  Maryland  
Fort  Monroe,  Virginia  .. 
Fort  Moultrie,  South  Carolina  
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i  Trumbull,  Connecticut.., 

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FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


345 


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Fort  Marion,  Florida  

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I 


346  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

P. 

Report  of  General  J.  G.  Totten. 

WASHINGTON,  November  1,  1851. 

SIR  :  In  obedience  to  your  orders  of  April  17,  I  have  the  honor  to  present 
my  views  and  opinions  on  the  subject  embraced  in  the  first  of  the  resolutions 
adopted  by  the  House  of  Representatives  on  the  3d  March  last  in  relation  to 
the  permanent  fortifications  of  the  country. 

I  shall  successively  take  up  the  points  which  you  have  made  particular  subjects 
of  inquiry,  though  I  foresee  that  I  may  need  your  indulgence  for  some  time,  using 
a  rather  broad  license  in  connecting  them  with  collateral  topics.  I  hope,  also, 
to  have  your  indulgence  for  occasionally  quoting  from  a  report  on  national  de- 
fence, made  by  a  board  of  oincers  to  the  Secretary  of  War  on  the  10th  of  May, 
1840.  I  have  the  less  hesitation  in  thus  quoting,  since  that  report  was  written 
by  myself,  and  its  statements  and  opinions  have  been  confirmed  by  all  my  sub- 
sequent meditation  on  the  subject.  As  I  shall,  however,  repeat  herein  a  part 
only  of  what  is  therein  set  forth,  and  as  that  report  goes  into  a  pretty  full  dis- 
eussiofc  of  the  whole  subject,  and  was  concurred  in  by  several  experienced 
officers,  whose  countenance  and  support  gives  to  it,  indeed,  all  its  authority,  I 
would  respectfully  urge  the  whole  report  upon  your  attention.  It  is  to  be  found 
in  House  Document  No.  206,  1st  session  26th  Congress. 

The  remarks  made  by  Mr.  Secretary  Poinsett,  when  laying  the  report  before 
Congress,  as  given  in  the  same  document,  seem  to  me  worthy  of  full  considera- 
tion. 

I  do  not  consider  it  necessary  to  urge  the  point  that  wars  may  again  visit  us, 
and  wars  moreover  with  powerful  nations.  All  the  questions  of  the  Secretary 
assume  this  as  possibility  at  least,  as  do  the  resolutions  of  Congress  calling 
for  this  inquiry.  How  much  soever  a  nation  may  love  peace,  and  however  well 
disposed  to  preserve  it  by  moderation,  justice,  and  impartiality,  it  is  not  less  true 
now  than  it  ever  has  been  that  the  interests  and  honor  of  nations  cannot  always 
be  made  to  run  in  parallel  courses,  and  that  jostling  and  interference  are  the 
more  apt  to  occur  where  there  is  the  closer  proximity  by  position  or  by  the  re- 
lations of  trade  and  business. 

Within  the  last  fifteen  years  four  or  five  times  has  this  country,  owing  to 
some  question  suddenly  rising  into  importance,  been  surprised  to  find  itself  on 
the  very  verge  of  war  with  the  most  powerful  nations  of  the  earth.  And  the 
latent  spirit,  not  to  say  belligerent  aptitude,  on  either  side,  has  not  always  been 
quite  satisfied  that  the  concessions  made  for  peace  have  not  purchased  it  at  too 
high  a  price.  The  point  of  honor  will  always,  when  really  touched,  as  it  ever 
has  done,  keep  with  nations  as  with  men  the  point  of  interest  in  subjection. 
And  a  hackneyed  adage  shows  that  it  is  ever  deemed  not  less  important  with 
nations  than  with  men  that  there  should  at  all  times  be  obvious  preparation  and 
readiness  to  defend  both  honor  and  interest.  It  is,  therefore,  notwithstanding 
certain  theories  of  the  day  and  public  declarations  that  the  age  of  strife  and 
warfare  has  passed  away,  only  reasonable  and  prudent  to  assume  that  a  state 
of  war  may  exist,  and  to  inquire  in  what  way  a  powerful  enemy  may  wage  it 
against  us.  He  may  do  so — 

1.  By  attacking  our  commerce  and  navigation  upon  the  ocean.     As,  how- 
ever, no  military  preparation  on  the  shores  can  avert  this  danger,  and  the  means 
of  meeting  it  must  be  purely  naval,  these  means  do  not  now  fall  under  consid- 
eration; or, 

2.  By  assailing  some  one  or  more  important  point  or  points  of  the  coast  with 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  347 

a  large  military  and  naval  force,-with  a  view  to  immediate  damage  or  more  or  less 
protracted  occupation;  or, 

3.  By  suddenly  appearing  with  a  large  squadron  of  vessels  before  our  prin- 
cipal commerciarcities,  laying  them  under  contribution,  and  burning  or  carrying 
off  the  shipping,  and  by  making  powerful  attacks  upon  our  navy  yards  in  order 
to  destroy  those  establishments ;  or, 

4.  By  attacks  upon  smaller  towns  and  establishments  of  the  coast  with  small 
squadrons  or  single  vessels,  or  with  privateers,  capturing  the  shipping  therein, 
and  levying  contributions,  and  by  like  meant  intercepting  the  interior  commerce 
within  the  bays,  sounds,  and  estuaries  of  the  coast ;  these  lesser  enterprises  being 
often  conducted  under  the  countenance  and  support  of  considerable  fleets. 

The  danger  may  take  any  of  these  forms,  or  all  of  them.  And  against  any 
or  all  of  these  a  naval  force  of  equal  or  greater  strength,  if  it  could  with  any 
certainty  be  found  at  hand,  might  be  an  adequate  resort,  though  it  would  not  be 
the  most  economical.  But,  in  the  first  place,  we  are  yet  and  shall  be  for  years 
inferior  in  our  naval  preparation  to  nations  with  which  we  are  likely  to  be  in 
conflict ;  and  next,  if  we  were  even  far  superior,  it  would  be  impossible  to  have, 
at  each  of  the  points  to  be  guarded,  a  naval  force  sufficient  to  secure  it,  because 
a  hostile  squadron  of  twenty  or  thirty  sail  of  the  line  and  war  steamers  would 
fall  with  equal  ease  on  either  of  the  important  points,  and  could  with  no  more 
certainty  be  expected  at  one  than  at  another ;  so  that,  to  resist  successfully,  we 
must  be  ready  at  each  and  all,  with  a  force  not  less  than  that  of  the  enemy ;  if 
less,  an  unavailing  resistance  would  but  augment  the  calamitous  consequences. 

An  enemy's  squadron,  assembled  at  Halifax  or  Bermuda,  must  be  equally 
looked  for  at  every  important  point  from  the  Penobscot  to  New  Orleans,  inclu- 
sive, for  it  could  with  equal  ease  fall  upon  either.  The  same  would  be  true, 
moreover,  of  such  a  force  assembled  in  any  Atlantic  port  of  Europe. 

Having  seen  the  modes  in  which  we  may  be  assailed,  and  that  no  navy  we 
'are  likely  to  possess  can  supply  the  requisite  guarantees,  the  first  question  of 
the  Secretary  of  War  leads  us  to  inquire,  to  what  extent  we  may  be  aided  by 
our  numerous  and  multiplying  railroads.  This  question  is  in  the  following 
words : 

Hoicfar  the  invention  and  extension  of  railroads  have  sujterseded  or  dimin- 
ished the  necessity  of  fortifications  on  the  seaboard  ? 

If  there  are  cases  in  which  fortifications  will  be  aided  'by  these  roads — cases 
in  which  works  of  less  strength  and  efficiency  may  be  relied  on,  because  such 
aid  can  be  afforded  in  moments  of  need — there  are  many  others  in  which  any 
such  aid  as  they  could  supply  would  be  useless,  and  many  also  to  which  rail- 
roads can  have  no  application. 

In  very  rare  cases,  a  fort  lying  near  existing  or  probable  railroads  may  also 
occupy  a  position  exposing  it  to  a  besieging  army.  In  such  a  case,  undoubt- 
edly, a  railroad  would  have  a  direct  influence;  and  the  strength  and  cost  of  the 
fort  would  of  course  be  materially  lessened,  in  consequence  of  the  rapidity  with 
which  the  railroad  would  bring  succor. 

In  most  cases,  however,  forts  are  not  liable  to  a  siege,  nor  to  any  attack  that 
will  keep  an  enemy  more  than  a  few  hours  before  them;  they  are  required,  by 
sudden  action,  to  defend  the  passage  of  a  river  or  a  channel  leading  to  important 
objects,  or  to  prevent  an  enemy's  squadron  from  seizing,  or  cannonading,  or 
bombarding  ships,  navy  yards,  cities,  &c. — duties  to  be  accomplished  only  by 
heavy  artillery  in  its  various  forms.  The  question  whether  the  various  forms 
of  heavy  artillery  will  be  better  placed  for  this  purpose  within  forts  or  vessels 
wih1  be  examined  hereafter;  but  that  this  artillery,  however  arranged,  is  the 
only  effectual  instrument  of  defence,  admits  no  doubt.  This  artillery  being  in 
adequate  numbers,  properly  placed,  sufficiently  maimed,  out  of  the  reach  of 
seizure  by  the  enemy,  and  too  powerful  to  be  silenced  by  him — all  conditions 
indispensable,  whether  in  communication  with  railroads  or  not — is  prepared  with 


348  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

all  useful  accessories  and  ready  for  its  great  functions,  independent  of  any  aid 
to  be  supplied  from  without. 

It  happens,  moreover,  that  few  of  the  points  necessarily  occupied  for  this 
defence  are  so  situated  as  to  he  benefited  by  railroads,  unless  the  latter  be  con- 
structed with  the  exclusive  purpose  of  communicating  with  them ;  and  some  are 
wholly  unapproachable  by  such  means,  were  they  ever  so  necessary. 

As  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  these  communications,  even  as  they  now  exist, 
may  bring  with  much  rapidity  militia  and  volunteers  from  the  interior,  and  from 
lateral  sources,  to  many  points  of  tfte  coast,  it  may  be  worth  while  to  examine  a 
little  more  in  detail,  whether  such  use  could  be  made  of  these  superadded  num- 
bers as  to  justify  dependence  on  them  for  defence  against  a  powerful  enemy. 

Suppose  a  hostile  fleet  to  be  in  front  of  the  city  of  New  .York,  which  nothing 
would  prevent  if  the  channels  of  approach  were  not  fortified,  in  what  way  could 
the  100,000  or  200,000  new  men  poured  into  the  city  and  environs  by  railroads, 
although  armed  with  muskets  and  field-pieces,  aid  the  half  million  of  people 
already  there?  It  seems  to  me  very  clear  that  these  additional  forces  would, 
like  the  population  proper  of  the  city,  be  utterly  powerless  in  the  way  of  resist- 
ance, with  any  means  at  their  command ;  and  if  resistance  were  attempted  by 
the  city  would  but  serve  to  swell  the  list  of  casualties  unless  they  should  at 
once  retreat  beyond  the  range  of  fire.  If  the  enemy's  expedition  were  intended, 
according  to  the  second  supposed  mode  of  attack,  for  invasion  or  occupation  for 
some  time  of  a  portion  of  the  country,  then  in  many  places  this  resource  of  rail- 
roads would  be  of  value ;  because  then  the  duty  of  defence  would  fall  upon  the 
army  and  militia  of  the  country,  and  these  communications  would  swell  their 
numbers. 

But  of  all  the  circumstances  of  danger  to  the  coast  this  chance  of  an  attempt 
by  an  enemy  to  land  and  march  any  distance  into  a  populous  district  is  least  to 
be  regarded,  whether  there  be  or  be  not  such  speedy  mode  of  receiving  rein- 
forcements, and  our  system  of  fortifications  has  little  to  do  with  any  such  danger. 
In  preparing  against  maritime  assaults  the  security  of  the  points  to  be  covered 
is  considered  to  be  greatly  augmented  whenever  the  defence  can  be  so  arranged 
as  to  oblige  an  enemy  to  land  at  some  distance :  for  the  reason  that  opportunity 
is  thereby  allowed,  in  the  only  possible  way,  for  the  spirit  and  enterprise  of  the 
people  to  come  into  play. 

Instead  of  being  designed  to  prevent  a  landing  upon  any  part  of  the  coast,  as 
many  seem  to  suppose,  and  some  to  allege  in  proof  of  extravagant  views  on  the 
part  of  the  system  of  defence,  the  system  often  leaves  this  landing  as  an  open 
alternative  to  the  enemy,  and  aims  so  to  cover  the  really  important  and  dangerous 
points  as  to  necessitate  a  distant  landing  and  a  march  towards  the  object  through 
the  people.  It  is  because  the  expedition  would  otherwise  easily  accomplish  its 
object,  without  landing  and  without  allowing  the  population  to  partake  in  the 
defence,  that  the  fortifications  are  resorted  to.  For  instance,  without  Fort  Del- 
aware, or  some  other  fort  low  down  in  Delaware  bay,  an  enemy  could  place  his 
fleet  of  steamers  in  front  of  Philadelphia  by  the  time  his  appearance  •  on  the 
coast  had  been  well  announced  throughout  the  city.  And  in  spite  of  all  New 
Jersey,  Delaware,  and  lower  Pennsylvania  he  could  levy  his  contributions  and 
burn  the  navy  yard  shipping,  and  be  away  in  a  few  hours.  But  being  obliged, 
by  the  fort  above  mentioned,  to  land  full  forty  miles  below  the  city,  the  resist- 
ance to  his  march  may  be  safely  left  to  the  courage  and  patriotism  that  will  find 
ample  time  to  array  themselves  in  opposition. 

A  distant  landing  is  deemed  to  be  a  great  advantage  to  the  defence  in  all 
cases ;  and  in  populous  districts,  if  the  forts  be  sufficient  for  this  particular  duty, 
it  makes  the  security  complete. 

It  is  no  part  of  the  task  assumed  by  the  system  of  fortifications  to  guard 
against  the  invasion  and  protracted  occupation  of  a  well-peopled  district,  or  of 
a  point  around  which  the  forces  of  the  country  could  be  soon  rallied.  In  such 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  349 

attempts  railroads  would  accelerate  the  issues ;  but  even  the  common  modes  of 
conveyance  would  soon  bring  forces  enough  to  overwhelm  them. 

But  there  are  places  important  in  themselves,  or  necessary  to  the  general 
welfare,  that  have  not  the  advantage  of  a  large  population  at  hand  or  within 
call,  and  which  may  nevertheless  be  very  tempting  objects  to  an  enterprising 
enemy.  The  navy  yard  at  Pensacola  will,  for  instance,  in  time  of  war,  be  of 
infinite  value  in  reference  to  the  commerce  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Its  destruc- 
tion would  therefore  be  a  great  object  with  a  maritime  enemy,  and  it  has  accord- 
ingly been  so  fortified  as  to  be  safe  from  a  coup  de  main,  or,  at  any  r«ate,  will  be 
so  when  the  little  remaining  to  do  is  complete.  A  hostile  expedition  adequate 
to  the  reduction  of  these  defences  would,  however,  be  able  to  exclude  all  relief 
approaching  laterally  from  the  Mississippi,  and  there  is  no  help  to  be  supplied 
from  the  neighborhood,  and  none  but  very  tardy  succor  to  come  from  the  inte- 
rior ;  so  that  an  enemy  would  find  time  to  reduce  the  forts  established  on  the 
islands  at  the  mouth  of  the  bay. 

This  case  illustrates  one  aspect  of  the  influence  of  railroads  on  the  coast  de- 
fence of  the  United  States.  While  there  is  no  such  road  by  which  succor  can 
come  from  the  interior,  the  security  of  the  harbor  and  navy  yard  of  Pensacola 
must  depend  wholly  on  the  strength  and  state  of  readiness  of  the  defences,  naval 
and  military,  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  there  being  no  neighboring  population ; 
and  these  defences  will  be  liable  to  a  somewhat  prolonged  as  well  as  powerful 
attack,  giving  time  for  sieges  of  several  days  duration. 

With  a  railroad  extending  into  the  interior  of  Alabama,  an  attacking  force, 
though  large,  would  have  to  confine  itself  to  comparatively  brief  and  hurried 
operations,  even  though  a  short  siege  may  be  considered  out  of  the  question. 
But  although  such  a  railroad  were  made,  a  sudden  onslaught  would  suffice  for 
the  destruction  of  the  naval  establishments  (if  there  were  no  fortification)  when- 
ever the  attacking  naval  force  were  larger  than  that  which  might  be  present  for 
defence ;  that  is  to  say,  whenever  we  had  not  a  large  squadron  present.  As 
before  said,  the  railroad  can  supply  none  of  the  means  of  resisting  such  attacks. 

Without  fortifications  no  existing  or  projected  railroad  would  do  anything 
towards  the  protection  of  New  Orleans  against  a  squadron  of  a  med  steamers; 
and  not  more  could  such  communications  do  for  Mobile  or  for  the  hundreds  of 
large  vessels  that  lie  in  the  mouth  of  Mobile  bay  awaiting  cargoes.  There  are, 
moreover,  very  great  points  in  our  system  of  sea-coast  defence  that  derive  their 
importance  much  more  from  their  general  relation  to  and  bearing  on  general 
commerce  and  the  security  of  large  portions  of  the  coast  than  from  local  inter- 
ests. Narraganset  road,  Delaware  Breakwater  harbor,  Hampton  roads,  Cum- 
berland sound,  (Georgia,)  Key  West,  and  the  Tortugas,  are  points  of  this 
character;  and  neither  of  these  would  derive  material  aid  from  any  existing  or 
probable  railroad  communications.  It  is  proper  here  to  say  something  of  these 
relations. 

Narraganset  bay. — As  a  harbor  this  is  acknowledged  by  all  to  be  the  best 
on  the  whole  coast  of  the  United  States,  and  it  is  the  only  close  man-of-war 
harbor  that  is  accessible  with  a  northwest  wind,  the  prevailing  and  most  violent 
wind  of  the  inclement  season.  Numerous  boards  and  commissions — sometimes 
composed  of  naval  officers,  sometimes  of  army  officers,  sometimes  of  officers  of 
both  services — have  at  different  times  had  the  subject  of  this  roadstead  under 
consideration,  and  all  have  concurred  in  recommending  in  strong  terms  that  it 
be  made  a  place  of  naval  rendezvous  and  repair,  if  not  a  great  naval  depot — 
one  or  more  of  these  commissions  preferring  it  for  the  latter  purpose  to  all  other 
positions.  These  recommendations  have  not  been  acted  on,  but  it  is  next  to 
certain  that  a  war  would  force  their  adoption  upon  the  government.  With  the 
opening  of  this  anchorage  properly  defendedv  hardly  a  vessel-of-war  of  ours 
could  come,  either  singly  or  in  small  squadrons,  upon  the  coast  in  the  boisterous 
season  without  arming  at  this  port,  on  account  of  the  comparative  certainty  of 


350  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

an  immediate  entrance ;  and  this  would  be  particularly  the  case  with  vessels 
injured  by  heavy  weather,  or  in  conflict  with  the  enemy — with  vessels  bringing 
in  prizes,  or  pursued  by  a  superior  force. 

The  use  of  the  port  would  almost  necessarily  bring  with  it  the  demand  for 
the  means  of  repairing  and  refitting;  and  the  concentration  of  these  upon  some 
suitable  spot  would  be  the  beginning  of  a  permanent  dock  yard. 

For  the  same  reason  that  ships-of-war  would  collect  here,  it  would  be  a  favorite 
point  of  rendezvous  for  privateers  and  their  prizes,  and  a  common  place  of  refuge 
for  merchantmen. 

From  this,  as  a  naval  station,  the  navigation  of  Lpng  Island  sound  and  the 
communication  between  this  and  Martha's  Vineyard  sound  or  Buzzard's  bay 
might  be  well  protected;  New  London  harbor  would  be  covered;  this  navy 
yard  would  command  southwardly,  as  that  from  Hampton  roads  northwardly, 
the  great  inward  curve  of  the  coast  between  Cape  Cod  and  Cape  Hatteras,  the 
influence  of  which  command  over  the  blockading  operations  of  an  enemy  will 
be  apparent  when  it  is  considered  that  the  only  harbors  of  refuge  left  to  him 
will  be  the  Delaware,  Gardiner's  and  Buzzard's  bays,  and  Martha's  Vineyard 
sound. 

The  bays  just  mentioned  belong  to  the  class  which,  being  too  wide  for  com- 
plete defence  by  batteries,  must  call  in  such  auxiliary  defence  as  the  navy  may 
supply ;  and,  in  reference  to  their  defence  by  these  means,  nothing  can  be  more 
important  than  the  fortifications  of  Narraganset  roads,  because  all  but  Delaware 
bay,  including  an  anchorage  for  ships-of-war  under  Block  island,  would  be  com- 
manded by  a  single  squadron  of  those  floating  defences  lying  in  these  roads. 
To  a  squadron  of  steam  batteries,  for  instance,  lying  under  the  fortifications,  it 
would  be  a  matter  of  little  consequence  into  which  of  the  above  anchorages  an 
enemy  should  go,  all  being  within  reach  of  three  or  four  hours,  and. some  within 
sight.  We  will  here  observe,  by  the  way,  that  this  use  of  floating  defences  is 
in  accordance  with  the  principle  before  insisted  on  They  are  not  expected  to 
close  the  entrance  into  these  several  bays — that  would  require  a  squadron  for 
each  at  least  equal  to  the  enemy's ;  but  as  the  enemy  goes  in  merely  for  rest  or 
shelter,  and  there  is  no  object  that  he  can  injure,  he  may  toe  permitted  to  enter, 
and  our  squadrons  will  assail  him  only  when  the  circumstances  of  wind,  weather. 
&c.,  give  all  the  advantages  to  the  attack.  The  fortification  of  Narraganset 
roads  is,  therefore,  in  effect,  a  most  important  contribution  towards  the  defence 
of  all  the  neighboring  anchorages.  But  the  same  properties  that  make  Narra- 
ganset  roads  so  precious  to  us  would  recommend  them  to  the  enemy  also,  and 
their  natural  advantages  will  be  enhanced  in  his  eyes  by  the  value  of  all  the 
objects  these  advantages  may  have  accumulated  therein. 

If  this  roadstead  were  without  defence,  an  enemy  could  occupy  it  without 
opposition,  and  by  the  aid  of  naval  superiority  form  a  lodgement  on  the  island 
of  Rhode  Island  for  the  war.  Occupying  this  island  with  his  troops,  and  with 
his  fleets  the  channels  on  either  side,  he  might  defy  all  the  forces  of  the  eastern 
States ;  and  while  from  this  position  his  troops  would  keep  in  alarm  a»d  motion 
the  population  of  the  east,  feigned  expeditions  against  New  York  or  against  more 
southern  cities  would  equally  alarm  the  country  in  that  direction;  and  thus, 
though  he  might  do  no  more  than  menace,  it  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  embar- 
rassment and  expense  into  which  he  would  drive  the  government. 

It  has  been  alleged  that  similar  consequences  would  flow  from  the  occupation 
of  other  positions,  (such  for  instance  as  are  afforded  in  the  bays  just  mentioned,) 
and  that  therefore  the  defence,  in  a  strong  manner,  of  Narraganset  roads  is  use- 
less. Even  allowing  that  there  are  other  inaccessible  positions  whereon  an 
enemy  might  place  himself,  is  it  a  reason,  because  the  foe  can,  in  spite  of  us, 
possess  himself  of  comparatively  unsafe  and  open  harbors,  that  we  should  not 
apply  to  our  own  iises,  but  yield  up  to  him  the  very  best  harbor  on  the  coast ; 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  351 

that  we  should  submit  to  capture  and  destruction  the  valuable  objects  that  accu- 
.  mulate  in  consequence  of  the  properties  of  the  harbor  1 

But  it  is  believed  that  none  of  the  outer  and  wider  harbors  will  answer  for 
such  an  establishment  as  we  have  supposed,  nor  for  any  other  purpose  than  an 
occasional  anchorage  for  ships-of-war,  and  for  these  reasons,  among  others :  that 
although  ships-of-war  might  possibly  ride  in  these  broad  waters  at  all  seasons, 
it  would  seem  to  be  a  measure  of  great  temerity  for  transports  to  attempt  it, 
except  in  the  mildest  seasons  ;  and  there  can  be  but  little  doubt  that  a  hostile 
expedition  would  resort  to  no  harbor  as  a  place  of  rendezvous,  unless  it  afforded 
sure  protection  to  its  transports,  these  being  the  only  means  by  which  ulterior 
purposes  could  be  executed,  or  final  retreat  from  the  country  effected. 

If,  moreover,  Narraganset  roads  became  a  naval  station,  or  at  least  the  station 
of  a  floating  force  designed  to  act  against  these  outer  waters,  such  an  establish- 
ment by  an  enemy  on  other  positions  would  at  once  be  put  upon  the  defensive 
and  require  the  constant  presence  of  a  superior  fleet,  thus  measurably  losing  the 
object  of  the  establishment.  Independent  of  deficient  qualities  as  harbors,  how- 
ever, none  of  these  bays  would  answer  our  purposes  :  First,  because  they  can- 
not be  securely  defended ;  and  second,  because  they  are  difficult  of  access  from 
the  main,  the  communication  with  them  being  liable  to  interruption  by  bad 
weather,  and  liable  to  be  cut  off  by  the  enemy. 

It  seems  quite  evident  that  the  circumstances  involved  in  the  occupation  and 
defence  of  Narraganset  roads  will  not  be  materially  changed  by  the  facilities  of 
railroad  communications  ;  so  far  as  numbers  can  aid  in  defensive  arrangements, 
they  could  be  supplied  in  due  time  and  to  the  extent  needed  by  the  surrounding 
district  and  common  modes  of  conveyance. 

Delaware  Breakwater  harbor. — In  the  long  stretch  of  coast  between  New 
York  bay  and  the  Chesapeake,  a  distance  of  about  three  hundred  miles,  there  is 
no  other  entrance  from  the  ocean  (except  for  small  vessels)  than  that  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Delaware  bay.     This  circumstance  led  the  commercial  men  of  the 
country  to  call,  with  great  unanimity  and  earnestness,  for  the  creation  at  this 
place,  which  was  without  a  safe  anchorage  and  was  full  of  dangerous  shoals,  of 
an  artificial  harbor.     This  call  had  reference  mainly,  it  is  true,  to  protection  in 
stress  of  weather ;  but  for  the  same  reason,  namely,  the  great  distance  on  either 
hand  to  any  place  of  shelter,  it  must  become  a  place  of  refuge  from  an  enemy. 
Vessels  near  that  coast,  whether  bound  north  or  south,  will  be  liable  to  be  cut 
off  from  other  refuge  and  forced  into  this  only  entrance ;  and  vessels  bound  up 
the  Delaware  must  seek  it,  of  course ;  so  that  as  this  artificial  harbor  provided 
by  the  government  must  be  resorted  to  in  time  of  war  for  security  of  both 
kinds,  thereby  becoming  a  place  of  rendezvous,  it  will  be  an  attractive  point  for 
an  enemy.     It  would,  moreover,  since  it  now  yields  a  safe  anchorage,  most  cer- 
tainly become  the  habitual  resort  of  an  enemy's  vessel  cruising  on  this  coast,  in 
order  to  command  the  great  channel  of  commerce  that  sweeps  in  near  these  capes. 
These  considerations  show  the  necessity  of  defending  this  harbor,  and  its 
secure  defence  would  afford  the  further  great  advantage  of  providing  a  port 
whence  our  cruisers,  whether  steam  or  sail  vessels,  might  keep  watch  over  this 
same  channel  of  commerce  whenever  they  were  not  confined  within  the  defences 
by  the  actual  presence  of  a  superior  enemy. 

This  case  also  is  one  in  which  the  objects  in  view  do  not  depend  on  the  use 
of  railroads ;  they  can  all  be  achieved  without  such  aid.  And  it  is  also  a  case 
in  which  railroads  of  themselves  would  do  nothing,  and  in  which  nothing  could 
be  dispensed  with  because  of  their  existence.  If  the  enemy  landing  an  army 
were  to  lay  siege  to  a  fort  on  the  shore  side  of  the  harbor,  then  a  railroad  would 
certainly  be  useful  in  expediting  the  arrival  of  succor.  But  though  an  enemy 
would  certainly  use  this  harbor  for  the  purposes  above  stated,  if  it  were  not  de- 
fended, it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  for  the  conquest  of  these  advantages  he 
would  bring  a  great  land  expedition  that  would  find  much  richer  booty  else- 


352  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

where.  Forts  capable  of  resisting  a  coup  de  main  would  no  doubt,  therefore, 
fulfil  their  purpose  and  be  respected;  and  accordingly  no  siege  is  to  be  antici- 
pated, and  any  auxiliary  force  that  great  caution  might  demand  could  be  easily 
and  speedily  forwarded  by  the  numerous  and  fast  steamers  on  the  bay. 

Hampton  roads  and  Chesapeake  bay. — The  board  of  naval  officers  and 
engineers  intrusted  with  the  selection  of  sites  for  a  great  northern  and  a  great 
southern  naval  depot,  recommended,  in  their  joint  reports  of  1819  and  1820, 
Burwell's  bay,  on  James  river,  for  the  one,  and  Charlestown,  in  Boston  harbor, 
for  the  other.  They  also  recommended  Boston  harbor  and  Narraganset  bay  at 
the  north,  and  Hampton  roads  at  the  south,  as  chief  naval  rendezvous.  In  these 
reports  the  commissioners  entered  at  large  into  the  consideration  of  all  the  mat- 
ters relating  to  these  important  objects,  and  reference  is  now  made  to  those 
reports  for  many  interesting  details. 

Such  an  expansion  has,  however,  since  then  been  given  to  the  present  navy 
yard  at  Gosport,  (opposite  Norfolk,)  that  there  is  little  probability  of  any  other 
position  on  these  waters  being  occupied  for  such  purposes. 

The  great  importance  of  retaining  Hampton  roads  during  a  war,  and  of  cov- 
ering the  navy  yard,  is  conceded  on  all  hands.  But  the  bearing  of  this  harbor 
upon  the  general  defence  of  Chesapeake  bay  is  not  generally  understood. 

Being  the  great  naval  depot  station  and  rendezvous  of  the  southern  coast,  it 
may  be  safely  assumed  that  this  harbor,  during  war,  will  never  be  without  a 
number  of  ships-of-war,  some  ready  for  sea,  others  just  returned  from  sea,  and 
others  held  in  condition  to  be  suddenly  despatched.  This  being  so,  should  an 
enemy  with  a  small  or  moderate  force  venture  up  Chesapeake  bay,  with  designs 
upon  any  of  the  rivers,  harbors,  or  towns,  his  capture  would  be  inevitable  by  the 
squadrons  of  sailing  and  steaming  vessels  issuing  from  his  rear  from  Hampton 
roads.  This  certain  result  would  keep  back  any  enemy  from  any  such  preda- 
tory venture.  If,  then,  we  provide  adequate  defences  for  the  more  important 
places  upon  the  bay  and  its  tributaries,  there  will  remain  no  temptation  to  large 
expeditions,  and  the  peace  of  this  wide-spread  navigable  water  and  the  safety 
of  the  great  amount  of  business  and  commerce  traversing  it  in  all  directions 
will  be  secured.  Thus,  by  covering  the  anchorage  of  our  squadron,  the  defences 
of  Hampton  roads  become  to  a  most  important  extent  the  defences  of  all  the 
upper  waters. 

The  following  very  important  relation  existing  between  the  defences  of  Hamp- 
ton roads  and  the  security  of  both  Norfolk  and  the  navy  yard,  independent  of 
closing  the  channel  to  those*  places,  is  also  not  generally  understood,  and  has 
been  overlooked  by  cities. 

If  we  suppose  no  defences  at  the  mouth  of  the  roadstead,  or  only  such  as  can 
be  disregarded  or  easily  silenced,  an  enemy  might  debark  his  troops  in  Lynn- 
haven  bay  and  despatch  them  against  Norfolk,  while  his  fleet  would  pass  up  the 
harbor  to  the  vicinity  of  the  town,  not  only  covering  the  flank  of  his  troops, 
but  landing  parties  to  turn  any  position  that  might  be  taken  by  an  army  at- 
tempting to  defend  the  place ;  or,  instead  of  landing  in  the  bay,  he  might,  at  his 
option,  land  the  main  body  quite  near  to  Norfolk,  and  having  possession  of  James 
river,  he  would  prevent  the  arrival  of  any  succor  in  steamboats  or  otherwise  by 
that  channel. 

There  are  two  or  three  defiles  on  the  route  from  Lynnhaven  bay  to  Norfolk, 
caused  by  the  interlocking  of  streams,  that  with  the  aid  of  field-works  would 
possess  great  strength ;  and  being  occupied  in  succession,  would  undoubtedly 
delay,  if  not  repulse,  an- enemy  assailing  them  in  front.  Since  the  naval  depot 
seems  fixed  at  Gosport,  these  must  indeed  be  chiefly  relied  on  for  its  security 
from  land  attacks,  and  timely  attention  must  be  given  on  the  breaking  out  of  a 
war,  to  the  occupying  of  these  defiles  with  appropriate  defences.  These  posi- 
tions, however,  possess  no  value  whatever  if  they  can  be  turned ;  and  without 
adequate  fortifications  at  the  outlet  of  Hampton  roads,  there  would  seem  to  be 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  353 

no  security  for  Norfolk  or  the  navy  yard,  except  in  the  presence  of  a  large 
^military  force. 

On  the  completion  of  the  defences  at  the  mouth  of  Hampton  roads  the  cir- 
cumstances will  be  very  different.  Then  those  denies  must  be  attacked  in  front, 
because  no  part  of  the  enemy's  force  can  be  landed  above  the  mouth  of  the 
roads.  But  this  is  not  all.  The  moment  an  enemy  advances  towards  Norfolk 
from  this  point  of  debarkation,  his  communication  with  his  fleet  will  be  jeop- 
arded; because  as  the  defiles  do  not  require  a  large  body  to  defend  them 
against  an  attack  in  front,  the  greater  part  of  the  re-enforcements  arriving  from 
above  by  way  of  the  river  may  be  landed  upon  his  flanks  or  in  his  rear.  An 
offensive  land  movement  by  the  enemy,  under  such  circumstances,  could  be  jus- 
tified only  in  the  case  of  his  finding  an  entire  want  of  preparation  caused  by 
the  unexpected  commencement  of  hostilities.  In  connexion  with  this  disposition 
for  defence,  it  may  be  expedient,  on  the  breaking  out  of  a  war,  to  throw  up  a 
field-work  on  the  shore  opposite  the  position  of  Fort  Calhoun,  which  would, 
besides,  contribute  to  the  exclusion  from  the  roadstead  of  vessels  of  small  draught. 

The  above  remarks  show  that  the  fortifications  in  progress  are  not  less  neces- 
sary to  the  security  of  the  navy  yard  and  the  city  of  Norfolk  from  a  land  attack 
than  from  an  attack  by  water ;  and  that  both  these  important  functions  are  su- 
perseded to  the  task  of  defending  the  only  good  roadstead  of  the  southern  coast, 
and  of  contributing  in  a  very  important  degree  towards  the  defence  of  the 
Chesapeake  bay. 

As  in  the  case  of  Narraganset  roads,  it  has  been  objected  to  this  system  of 
defence,  that,  although  it  may  shut  up  this  anchorage,  it  leaves  others  in  this 
region  open.  May  we  suppose,  then,  that  if  there  were  no  other  than  this  har- 
bor, its  defence  -would  be  justifiable  ?  If  so,  it  would  seem  that  the  objection 
rests  on  the  principle  that,  in  proportion  as  nature  has  been  bountiful  to  us,  we 
must  be  niggardly  to  ourselves ;  that  having  little,  we  may  cherish  it ;  but  having 
much,  we  must  throw  all  away. 

The  same  criticism  complains  of  the  unreasonable  magnitude  of  one  of  these 
works,  (Fort  Monroe,)  and  it  is  conceded  that  there  is  justice  in  the  criticism. 
But  it  has  long  been  too  late  to  remedy  the  evil.  It  may  not,  however,  be  im- 
proper to  avail  of  this  opportunity  to  remove  from  the  country  the  professional 
reproach  attached  to  this  error.  When  the  system  of  coast  defence  was  about 
to  be  taken  up,  it  was  thought  best  by  the  government  and  Congress  to  call 
from  abroad  a  portion  of  that  skill  and  science  which  a  long  course  of  active 
warfare  was  supposed  to  have  supplied.  Fort  Monroe  is  one  of  the  results  of 
that  determination.  It  was  not  easy,  probably,  to  come  down  from  the  exag- 
gerated scale  of  warfare  to  which  Europe  was  then  accustomed;  nor  for  those 
who  had  been  brought  up  where  wars  were  often  produced  and  always  magni- 
fied by  juxtaposition  or  proximity,  to  realize  to  what  degree  remoteness  from 
belligerent  nations  might  diminish  military  means  and  qualify  military  objects. 
Certain  it  is,  that  this  experiment,  costly  as  it  was  in  the  case  ot  Fort  Monroe, 
would  have  been  much  more  so  but  for  the  opposition  of  some  whose  more 
moderate  opinions  had  been  moulded  by  the  circumstances  and  wants  of  our  own 
country. 

The  mistake  is  one  relating  to  magnitude,  however,  not  to  strength.  Magni- 
tude in  fortification  is  often  a  measure  of  strength,  but  not  always,  nor  in  this 
instance.  Fort  Monroe  might  have  been  as  strong  as  it  is  now  against  a  water 
attack,  or  an  assult,  or  a  siege,  with  one-third  its  present  capacity,  and  perhaps 
at  not  more  than  half  its  cost.  I  do  not  think  this  work  too  strong  for  its  posi- 
tion, nor  too  heavily  armed ;  and  as  the  force  of  the  garrison  will  depend  mainly 
on  the  extent  of  the  armament,  the  error  which  has  caused  an  excess  in  the  first 
outlay  will  not  involve  much  useless  expense  after  completion. 

The  railroad  coming  down  from  the  interior  of  the  country  to  Norfolk  navy 
yard  might  unquestionably  render  service  in  bringing  forward  troops  in  the 
H.  Rep.  Com.  86 23 


354  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

event  of  a  powerful  and  persevering  land  attack  on  the  defences  of  Norfolk  and 
the  navy  yard,  and  in  like  manner  useful  re-enforcements  might  arrive  rapidly  in 
the  steamers  of  James  river.  But  we  have  seen  that  without  the  defences  at 
the  mouth  of  the  roads  there  would  be  no  time  nor  opportunity  for  any  such 
force  to  arrive,  or  to  act  when  arrived.  The  enemy  would  proceed  from  sea 
directly  up  to  his  object,  and  need  not  necessarily  lose  a  tide  nor  land  a  man. 
If  a  sudden  attack  with  a  large  squadron  of  armed  steamers — for  this  great 
naval  depot  presents  an  object  worthy  of  a  great  expedition — is  to  be  repelled, 
it  will  not  be  by  crowds  of  volunteers  rushing  in  from  the  country  with  muskets 
and  rifles  on  their  soulders,  but  by  fortifications  of  some  sort,  or  by  naval 
means;  and  if  by  the  latter,  by  a  force  not  materially  less  than  the  enemy's. 

Cumberland  sound,  at  the  mouth  of  St.  Mary's  river. — It  is  an  important 
principle,  bearing  peculiarly  on  the  defence  of  the  whole  southern  coast,  that 
on  a  shore  possessing  few  harbors  it  is  at  the  same  time  more  necessary  to  pre- 
serve them  all  for  our  own  use  and  more  easy  to  deprive  an  enemy  of  that 
shelter  without  which  a  close  blockade  cannot  be  maintained.  This  principle 
is  enforced  in  the  instance  of  our  southern  coast  by  the  two  following  weighty 
considerations,  viz :  first,  its  remoteness  from  the  naval  rendezvous,  the  Chesa- 
peake, which  is,  on  a  mean,  six  hundred  miles  distant,  and  to  leeward  both  as 
to  wind  and  current;  and  second,  its  being  close  upon  the  larboard  hand  as  they 
enter  the  Atlantic  of  the  great  concourse  of  vessels  passing  at  all  seasons 
through  the  Florida  channel.  While,  therefore,  this  part  of  the  coast,  from  the 
concentration  of  vessels  here,  is  in  great  need  of  protection  of  some  sort,  naval 
aid  can  be  extended  to  it  only  with  difficulty,  and  at  the  risk  of  being  cut  off 
from  all  retreat  by  a  superior  enemy. 

All  the  harbors  accessible  to  vessels-of-war  on  this  part  of  the  coast  will 
sooner  or  later  need  defences,  because  otherwise  they  will  be  seized  by  an 
enemy,  in  order,  for  one  thing,  to  paralyze  the  valuable  commerce  that  circu- 
lates within  the  rivers,  sounds,  and  internal  lateral  communications.  The  pro- 
ducts of  a  considerable  portion  of  Georgia  find  outlet  only  by  these  channels. 
Perhaps  it  may  require  a  war  to  demonstrate  the  necessity  and  advantage  of 
such  protection ;  but  there  are  reasons  already  alluded  to,  and  of  much  weight, 
for  securing  the  mouth  of  Cumberland  sound  at  any  rate,  independent  of  those 
just  mentioned.  One  of  these  is  particularly  important,  namely,  the  situation  of 
this  point  with  respect  to  the  commerce  flowing  through  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 
Every  vessel  bound  northward  from  the  Gulf  must  pass  close  up  by  Cape  Canav- 
eral before  she  can  bear  away  clear  of  the  Matinilla  reef,  and  hence  two  or 
three  cruisers  may  take  such  positions  at  this  outlet  that  all  passing  vessels  will 
be  seen.  While  we  occupy  Cumberland  sound  our  own  steaming  or  sailing 
cruisers  can  hold  these  posts  permanently  and  fearlessly,  assured  of  a  place  of 
refuge  from  a  superior  enemy. 

When  the  best  and  deepest  of  these  Georgia  entrances  shall  be  fortified,  the 
operation  of  investing  the  coast  and  watching  the  great  outlet  of  commerce 
through  the  Florida  passage  will  be  a  difficult  and  hazardous  one  to  aii  enemy, 
to  whom  no  perseverance  or  skill  can  avail  to  maintain  a  continuous  blockade, 
while  on  the  part  of  our  small  vessels-of-war,  steam  frigates,  and  privateers,  the 
same  sort  of  supervision  will  be  at  all  times  easy  and  safe.  In  the  meantime 
the  fortifications  of  Cumberland  sound  alone  will  enable  us,  with  the  help  of  a 
floating  force,  to  protect  the  whole  of  this  part  of  the  coast  from  all  small  expe- 
ditions, and  to  harass  and  disturb  the  operations  of  larger  ones,  without  endan- 
gering the  safety  of  our  own  cruisers. 

This  sound  was  occupied  by  the  British  during  the  war  of  1812,  and  Cum- 
berland island  made  headquaters,  a  great  collateral  purpose  being,  as  it  would 
again  be,  to  excite  the  slaves  to  insurrection,  if  possible,  at  least  to  desertion. 

No  railroads  now  exist  to  influence  in  any  way  the  security  of  this  harbor, 
but  both  railroads  and  canals  have  been  talked  of,  which  would  greatly  enhance 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  355 

the  value  of  defences  on  the  Georgia  coast,  and  especially  those  of  Cumberland 
.sound. 

Key  West  and  the  Tortugas. — These  are  the  first  important  positions  that 
present  themselves  on  doubling  round  Cape  Florida  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

Strong  opinions  have  been  several  times  expressed  in  favor  of  these  fine  har- 
bors, and  I  beg  leave  particularly  to  refer  to  a  letter  from  Commodore  Rodgers 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  July  3,  1829,  (Senate  documents,  1st  session 
21st  Congress,  vol  I,  No.  1,  page  236,)  and  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  March  25,  1830,  (Senate  documents,  1st  session  21st  Congress,  vol.  II, 
No.  Ill,  page  1.) 

A  naval  force  designed  to  control  the  navigation  of  the  Gulf  could  desire  no 
better  position  than  Key  West  or  the  Tortugas.  Upon  the  very  wayside  of 
the  only  path  through  the  Gulf,  it  is  at  the  same  time  well  'situated  as  to  all  the 
great  points  therein.  It  overlooks  Havana,  Pensacola,  Mobile,  the  mouths  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  both  the  inlet  and  the  outlet  of  the  Gulf. 

The  Tortugas  harbor  and  that  of  Key  West  affords  perfect  shelter  for  vessels 
of  every  class,  with  the  greatest  facility  of  ingress  and  egress.  And  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  an  adversary  in  possession  of  large  naval  means  would  with 
great  advantage  make  them  his  habitual  resort  and  his  point  of  general  rendez- 
vous and  concentration  for  all  operations  on  this  sea.  With  an  enemy  thus 
posted,  the  navigation  of  the  Gulf  by  us  would  be  eminently  hazardous,  if  not 
impossible,  and  nothing  but  absolute  naval  superiority  would  avail  anything 
against  him.  Mere  military  means  could  approach  no  nearer  than  the  nearest 
shore  of  the  continent.  There  are  no  harbors  in  the  Gulf  at  all  comparable 
with  these  that  an  enemy  could  resort  to  with  his  large  vessels.  To  deprive 
him  of  these  would,  therefore,  be  interfering  materially  with  any  organized  sys- 
tem of  naval  operations  in  this  sea.  The  defence  of  these  harbors  would,  how- 
ever, do  much  more  than  this.  It  would  secure  to  our  own  squadron,  even 
should  it  be  inferior,  the  use  of  these  most  valuable  positions,  and  would  afford 
a  point  of  refuge  to  our  navy  and  our  commerce  at  the  very  spot  where  it  would 
be  most  necessary  and  useful. 

I  forbear  to  enlarge  on  this  point,  merely  adding  that  certain  and  complete 
defence  will  be  easily  secured,  and  that  we  shall  thereby  possess  ports  of  refuge 
in  the  middle  of  the  Gulf  whenever  we  have  to  fly,  and  points  of  rendezvous 
and  refreshment  in  the  very  midst  of  all  passing  vessels  whenever  we  hold  the 
mastery.  Every  vessel  that  crosses  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  passes  within  sight  of 
the  two  forts  commenced  under  the  sanction  of  Congress  and  now  in  progress, 
one  at  Tortugas,  and  one  at  Key  West. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  with  the  possession  of  these  advanced  posts,  and 
with  the  control  of  the  commerce  of  the  Gulf  thereby  insured,  no  railroads  upon 
the  main  can  have  any  relation.  The  forts  must  rely  solely  on  their  own  effi- 
ciency and  power  of  resistance.  Happily  the  local  circumstances  allow  these 
conditions  to  be  easily  secured. 

I  could  adduce  many  other  illustrations  of  the  truth  of  the  assertions  made  in 
the  commencement  of  these  remarks,  that  though  occasional  benefit  will  result 
to  the  system  of  fortification  on  the  seaboard  from  the  construction  of  railroads, 
they  in  general  will  have  little  or  no  bearing  on  the  immediate  means  of  defence. 
These,  whether  they  be  forts  or  ships,  must  be  put  in  a  state  of  preparation  and 
kept  so  by  the  use  of  means  that  railroads  do  not  supply,  or  at  least  that  can  be 
well  supplied  without  them. 

Numerous   and  facile  communications,  whether  by  railroad  or  steamers,   01 
common  roads,  are  important  undoubtedly  to  the  general  activity  and  vigor  of 
war,  whether  offensive  or  defensive ;  but  it  is  as  communications  that  they  are  use 
ful,  not  as  being  of  themselves  instruments  of  warfare,  or  as  supplying  any  that 
can  be  substituted  for  ships  or  forts. 


356  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

I  ought  here  to  advert  to  the  idea  often  announced,  though  always  vaguely 
and  in  general  terms,  namely,  that  by  the  help  of  these  railroads  large  bodies  of 
men  may  be  thrown  from  the  interior  of  the  country  upon  the  exposed  points  of 
the  coast,  and  there  erect,  and  arm,  and  serve  temporary  batteries  adequate  to 
repel  any  maritime  attack. 

If  we  have  waited  for  the  opening  of  a  war  to  do  this,  our  enemy,  who  knows 
the  fact  as  well  as  we,  will  surely  not  allow  time  for  the  completion  even  of  such 
works  as  these.  And  in  adopting  this  policy,  we  undertake  to  afford  a  protec- 
tion to  the  country  in  the  first  days  and  weeks  of  the  war,  that  nations  experi- 
enced in  warlike  affairs  have  considered  as  hardly  accomplished  after  years  and 
years  of  labor  during  peace. 

In  many  important  cases,  the  contemplated  batteries  could  not  be  erected 
hastily,  because  they  would  have  to  be  supported  by  piling  and  grillage ;  and  in 
others,  even  the  very  sites  would  have  to  be  raised  out  of  the  water.  The  in- 
feriority in  efficacy  and  equipment  of  such  batteries,  when  erected,  would  have 
to  be  compensated  by  an  increased  number  of  guns ;  but  in  many  instances,  a 
good  defence  could  only  be  made  in  positions  where  there  is  not  room  for  the 
requisite  number  of  guns,  except  by  placing  them  tier  above  tier,  an  arrange- 
ment wholly  inconsistent  with  sudden  preparation. 

But  even  if  the  sudden  arrival  of  a  number  of  men  brought  by  railroad  could 
supply  the  want  of  duly-prepared  batteries,  there  are  important  defensive  points 
to  which  railroads  do  not  approach,  and  are  not  likely  to  approach.  And  it  also 
happens  that  wherever  such  railroads  reach  the  coast,  it  is  already  peopled  be- 
yond all  probable  wants  for  laborers  upon  sea-coast  batteries.  If  such  batteries 
were  required  to  be  erected  as  speedily  as  possible  at  Boston,  New  York,  Phila- 
delphia, Baltimore,  Charleston,  Savannah,  &c.,  they  could  be  much  sooner  and 
better  executed  by  calling  in  the  laborers  and  mechanics  of  these  cities,  than  by 
relying  on  the  heterogeneous  aid  of  regiments  of  volunteers  and  drafted  militia. 

The  second  question  of  the  honorable  Secretary  is  in  these  words :  "  In  what 
manner  and  to  what  extent  the  navigation  of  the  ocean  by  steam,  and  particu- 
larly the  application  of  steam  to  vessels-of-war  and  recent  improvements  in  ar- 
tillery and  other  military  inventions  and  discoveries,  affect  the  question  ?" 

And  the  third  question,  which  it  will  be  convenient  to  consider  in  connexion 
with  the  second,  is  in  these  words,  namely :  "  How  far  vessels-of-war,  steam 
batteries,  and  ordinary  merchant  ships  and  steamers,  and  other  temporary  ex- 
pedients, can  be  relied  upon  as  a  substitute  for  permanent  fortifications  for  the 
defence  of  our  large  seaports V 

The  application  of  steam  to  vessels-of-war  acts  upon  the  question  of  sea-coast 
defence,  both  beneficially  and  injuriously.  It  acts  injuriously  in  several  ways; 
but  chiefly,  first,  by  the  suddenness  and  surprise  with  which  vessels  may  fall 
upon  their  object,  and  pass  from  one  object  to  another  in  spite  of  distance,  cli- 
mate, and  season;  and  secondly,  by  their  ability  to  navigate  shallow  waters. 

The  first  property,  by  which  squadrons  may  run  into  our  harbors,  outstrip- 
ping all  warnings  of  their  approach,  affords  no  chance  for  impromptu*  prepara- 
tions ;  accordingly,  whatever  our  preparations  are  to  be,  they  should  precede  the 
war.  It  seems  past  all  belief  that  a  nation  having  in  commission — as  France 
and  England  always  have — a  large  number  of  war  steamers  ready  for  distant 
service  in  twenty-four  hours,  receiving  their  orders  by  telegraph,  capable  of 
uniting  in  squadrons,  and  in  two  or  three  days  at  most  speeding  on  their  several 
paths  to  fall  upon  undefended  ports — it  is  not  to  be  expected,  I  say,  that  they 
should  delay  such  enterprises  until  temporary  resorts  could  be  got  ready  to  re- 
ceive them.  And  yet  there  are  those  who  insist  that  we  should  leave  defensive 
measures  to  a  state  of  war — that  we  should  let  the  day  supply  the  need. 

Inadequate  as  all  such  measures  must  prove,  there  would  not  be  time  to  ar- 
range even  these.  By  the  second  property,  due  to  their  light  draught  of  water, 
these  vessels  will  oblige  the  defence  to  be  extended  in  some  form  to  passages, 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  357 

or  channels,  or  shoals,  that  before  were  adequately  guarded  by  their  shallowness. 
The  bars  at  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  formerly  excluded  all  but  small  ves- 
sels-of-war,  and  the  strong  current  of  the  river  made  the  ascent  of  sailing  vessels 
exceedingly  uncertain  and  tedious.  Now  these  bars  and  currents  are  impedi- 
ments no  longer;  and  all  the  armed  steamers  of  Great  Britain  and  France  might 
be  formed  in  array  in  face  of  the  city  of  New  Orleans  before  a  rumor  of  their 
approach  had  been  heard. 

Had  the  English  expedition  of  1814,  attended  by  a  squadron  of  large  armed 
steamers,  arrived  at  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi,  a  few  transports  might  have 
been  taken  in  tow,  and  in  a  few  hours  the  whole  army  would  have  been  before 
the  city ;  or  twelve  or  fifteen  such  steamers  could  have  carried  the  whole  army 
up  in  half  a  day,  without  the  delay  of  transports.  Will  it  be  contended  that 
the  attack  in  that  form  would  have  been  repulsed  with  the  means  then  in  Gen- 
eral Jackson's  hands  ?  Would  the  landing,  or  even  the  presence  on  board  these 
steamships,  of  the  British  troops  have  been  necessary  to  burn  the  city  or  put  it 
under  contribution1?  Is  there  anything  now  but  the  existence  of  forts  on  the 
river  to  prevent  the  success  of  such  an  attack  by  fifteen  or  twenty  steamers-of- 
war,  allured  thither  by  the  vastly  increased  magnitude  of  the  spoil  1 

But  there  would  have  been,  even  then  and  with  those  means,  one  reason  with 
the  enemy  for  avoiding  the  channel  of  the  river,  namely,  the  existence,  seventy 
miles  below  New  Orleans,  of  old  Fort  St.  Philip.  I  will  not  venture  to  say 
that  in  the  then  condition  of  that  fort  it  could  have  repelled  such  an  expedition, 
though  it  did  very  manfully  resist  a  protracted  bombardment ;  but  I  do  not 
doubt  that  the  existence  of  even  that  feeble  work  would  have  had  weight  in 
settling  the  mode  and  channel  of  approach,  and  in  turning  off  the  attack  into 
circuitous  and  tedious  avenues,  and  thereby  gaining  some  time  for  preparation. 
I  am  confident,  however,  that  on  the  completion  of  the  repairs  to  that  work, 
now  well  advanced,  and  on  the  completion  of  the  exterior  battery  of  Fort  Jack- 
son, (a  new  fort  opposite,)  no  attack  of  that  nature,  even  of  twice  the  force, 
could  penetrate  by  that  avenue  to  the  city  of  New  Orleans. 

The  use  of  war  steamers  against  New  Orleans  may  take  another  phase.  If 
deterred  by  the  forts  above  mentioned  from  an  attack  by  the  river,  an  enemy 
might  again  take  the  anchorage  off  Ship  island,  and  transport  his  army,  either 
on  board  steamers  of  light  draught  or  in  boats  towed  by  such  steamers,  to  the 
foot  of  Lake  Borgne,  whence  his  march  to  the  city  (a  distance  of  twenty-eight 
miles  through  an  unpeopled  district)  would  be  over  one  of  the  best  roads  in 
Louisiana. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  shallowness  of  Lake  Borgne  to  prevent  this,  nor  are 
there  now  any  defences  on  the  way,  though  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  erection 
of  a  tower  and  battery  at  Proctor's  Landing,  which  has  been  strongly  urged  for 
some  years,  and  which  would  effectually  close  this  aperture,  will  at  once  be 
ordered  by  Congress. 

If,  as  during  the  war  of  1812,  it  were  now  necessary  to  pass  the  troops  from 
the  ships  to  the  shore  by  means  of  tow-boats,  we  might,  perhaps,  considering 
the  augmented  population  of  the  city  and  environs,  trust  for  sufficient  notice 
and  preparation  to  the  time  that  must  elapse  before  a  considerable  number  could 
be  landed;  but  with  ten  or  fifteen  light-draught  war  steamers,  fifteen  thousand 
men  could  be  landed  and  on  their  march  towards  the  city  within  twenty-four 
hours  of  dropping  anchor. 

All  other  avenues  to  New  Orleans  from  that  quarter  have,  since  the  war  of 
1812,  been  well  closed  by  permanent  forts  and  batteries. 

We  have  another  illustration  on  the  Gulf  of  this  action  of  hostile  steamers 
through  shallow  channels,  and  that  may  be  worth  adducing.  Fort  Morgan,  at 
Mobile  Point,  defends  very  well  the  main  channel  into  Mobile  bay,  and  there 
is  no  other  entrance  for  sailing  vessels-of-war.  But  the  smaller  class  of  war 
steamers  would  find  water  enough  near  the  end  of  Dauphin  island,  and,  keeping 


358  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

out  of  reach  of  the  guns  of  Fort  Morgan,  could  pass  up  into  the  bay.  They 
could  without  difficulty  ascend  as  high  as  the  city  of  Mobile,  and  reach  that 
place  moreover  in  three  hours.  A  dozen  such  vessels  could  in  that  short  time 
carry  up,  if  they  were  needed,  five  thousand  soldiers.  It  is  surely  not  too  much 
to  say,  therefore,  that  Mobile,  one  of  our  greatest  depots  of  cotton,  is  by  this 
new  inlet  for  an  enemy's  cruisers  much  exposed.  But  this  is  not  all  the  dan- 
ger. The  large  fleet  of  ships,  often  one  hundred  in  number,  and  of  the  largest 
class  of  merchantmen,  that  lie  for  months  awaiting  their  cargoes  in  the  lower 
part  of  the  bay,  are  within  an  hoar's  run  of  such  steamers  from  the  open  Gulf, 
and  might  be  destroyed  either  by  the  same  expedition  that  ascends  to  Mobile, 
or  by  one  sent  for  that  particular  purpose. 

For  this  and  other  serious  consequences  of  leaving  open  this  entrance  to  Mo- 
bile bay,  the  sure  and  the  cheap  remedy  is  the  placing  of  a  small  fort  at  the 
east  end  of  Dauphin  island,  a  work  already  wisely  ordered  by  Congress. 
When  it  is  said  in  general  that  the  light  draught  of  these  vessels  opens  avenues 
of  attack  before  defended  by  nature,  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  therefore  it 
is  part  of  the  system  of  defence  to  fortify  all  shallow  channels.  Whether  shal 
low  passages  will  require  defences  or  not,  will  depend  entirely  on  the  importance 
of  the  objects  to  which  they  give  access  and  the  power  of  the  attack  that  may 
be  directed  through  them,  and  not  all  on  the  circumstance  that  an  enemy's 
steamers  may  enter  them  without  difficulty. 

There  are  a  great  many  entrances  and  harbors  on  the  coast,  not  shoal  harbors 
merely,  but  many  affording  water  enough  for  the  largest  vessels,  that  will  re- 
quire, if  any,  no  other  defences  than  such  as  can  be  prepared  in  time  of  war, 
because  there  are  no  objects  upon  these  waters  of  a  nature  to  provoke  the 
cupidity  of  hostile  cruisers :  having  nothing  to  lose  in  this  way,  they  will  have 
nothing  to  fear.  The  shallow  and  difficult  avenues  to  great  and  valuable  objects 
are  those  for  which  we  have  to  provide  defences  in  addition  to  defences  that 
were  necessary  before  the  introduction  of  war  steamers.  The  danger  of  the 
Hell  Gate  passage  to  New  York  sufficed  to  keep  any  man-of-war  from  attempting 
to  sail  through,  but  it  proves  to  be  no  impediment  to  steamers.  The  "Broad 
Sound"  channel  and  also  the  "  Gut"  channel  into  Boston  harbor  are  easy  tracks 
for  large  steamers,  though  next  to  impracticable  to  line-of-battle  ships  and 
frigates ;  and  so  with  other  channels  and  other  places. 

In  considering  to  what  extent  the  introduction  of  steamers  into  war  service 
may  help  the  coast  defence  of  the  country,  should  we  assume  that  we  ought  to 
rely  upon  them  to  repel  the  enemy's  steamers,  so  dangerous  in  coming  without 
warning  and  penetrating  promptly  through  all  natural  obstacles  up  to  the  vital 
points  of  the  coast,  WG  should  commit  a  very  great  error,  though  it  is  perhaps  a 
natural  one  on  a  cursory  examination,  as  it  certainly  is  a  frequent  one.  It  would 
be  a  fatal  error  if  practiced  upon  by  a  nation  having  more  than  one  or  two  im- 
portant ports,  and  even  with  such  nation  it  would  be  the  most  expensive  of  all 
resorts. 

This  cannot  be  a  safe  reliance  with  war  steamers  any  more  than  with  sailing 
vessels-of-war,  and  a  few  words  may  make  this  clear. 

I  do  not  assert  that  armed  vessels  would  not  be  useful  in  coast  defence.  Such 
an  idea  would  be  absurd.  I  shall  even  have  occasion  to  show  a  necessity  for 
this  kind  of  force  in  certain  exceptional  cases.  It  is  the  general  proposition, 
viz :  that  armed  vessels  and  not  fortifications  are  the  proper  defences  for  our 
vulnerable  points — a  proposition  the  more  dangerous  because  seemingly  in  such 
accordance  with  the  well-tried  prowess  and  heroic  achievements  of  the  navy 
that  we  have  now  to  controvert. 

Boston,  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  Charleston,  and  New  Orleans 
are,  we  will  suppose,  to  be  guarded,  not  by  forts,  but  by  those  vessels,  on  the 
occurrence  of  a  war  with  a  nation  possessing  large  naval  means.  We  know 
that  it  is  no  effort  for  such  nations  to  despatch  a  fleet  of  twenty  line-of-battle 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  359 

ships  and  frigates,  or  an  equal  number  of  war  steamers,  or  even  the  combined 
mass,  both  fleets  in  one. 

The  United  Service  Journal  shows  that  in  the  month  of  August  last  Great 
Britain  had  actually  in  commission  in  their  navy,  in  a  time  of  profound  peace, 
thirty-eight  line-of-battle  ships  and  frigates,  thirteen  sloops-of-war,  and  upwards 
of  fifty  smaller  armed  sailing  vessels,  together  with  forty-eight  armed  war 
steamers  and  near  forty  unarmed  steamers. 

What,  then,  shall  we  do  at  the  above-named  ports  severally  ?  Each  is  justly 
felt  to  be  an  object  worthy  of  an  enemy's  efforts,  and  each  would  be  culpable 
in  sending  elsewhere  any  part  of  the  force  required  for  its  own  defence.  Each, 
therefore,  maintains  a  naval  force  equal  at  least  to  that  the  enemy  is  judged  to 
be  able  to  send  promptly  against  it.  Omitting  any  provision  for  other  places 
scarcely  less  important,  what  is  the  result  ?  It  is,  that  we  maintain  within  the 
harbors  of,  or  at  the  entrance  to,  these  places,  chained  down  to  this  passive  de- 
fence, a  force  at  least  six  times  as  large  as  that  of  the  enemy. 

He  does  not  hesitate  to  leave  his  port,  because  it  will  be  protected  in  his  ab- 
sence by  its  fortifications,  which  also  will  afford  him  a  sure  refuge  on  his  return. 
He  sails  about  the  ocean  depredating  upon  our  commerce  with  his  privateers 
and  small  cruisers,  putting  our  small  places  to  ransom,  and  in  other  ways  follow- 
ing up  appropriate  duties,  all  which  is  accomplished  without  risk,  because  our 
fleet,  although  of  enormous  magnitude,  must  cling  to  ports  which  have  no  other 
defence  than  that  afforded  by  their  presence.  They  cannot  combine  against 
him  nor  attack  him  singly,  for  they  cannot  know  where  he  is,  and  must  not, 
moreover,  abandon  the  objects  which  they  were  provided  expressly  to  guard. 

It  would  really  seem  that  there  could  not  be  a  more  impolitic,  inefficient,  and 
dangerous  system,  as  there  certainly  could  not  be  a  more  expensive  one. 

A  navy,  whether  of  war  steamers  or  sailing  vessels,  should  be  aggressive  in 
its  action.  It  should,  by  carrying  the  war  into  the  seas  and  upon  the  coast  of 
the  enemy,  direct  its  calamities  from  our  coast  and  commerce ;  but  the  system 
we  are  now  considering  involves  the  absurdity  of  relinquishing  all  the  incalcu- 
lable advantages  of  mastery  upon  the  ocean  to  an  enemy  who  nevertheless  may 
possess  but  a  sixth  of  our  naval  power. 

To  bring  other  means  even  in  partial  substitution  for  this  defence  by  ships 
and  steamers,  or  to  give  it  local  auxiliary  aid,  by  way  of  reducing  its  inordinate 
magnitude,  would  be  to  confess  its  inappropriateness  for  harbor  defence.  We 
know  that  other  comparatively  cheap  means  may  be  substituted,  but  this  is  just 
what  the  proposition  denied.  Naval  means  would  be  useful  undoubtedly.  The 
question  is,  whether  they  would  be  sufficient ;  and  we  see  some  of  the  conse- 
quences of  making  them  sufficient.  We  come  thus  to  examine  the  defensive 
arrangements  that  can  be  made  in  aid  of  or  substituted  for  armed  sea-going 
vessels. 

These  arrangements  may  be  of  two  classes,  namely :  first,  fixed  forts  and 
batteries  on  the  land,  and  in  some  cases  movable  batteries  of  heavy  guns :  and 
second,  upon  the  water-floating  batteries  of  all  kinds,  gunboats,  &c.,  fixed  or 
movable. 

There  are  doubtless  situations  where  it  may  be  necessary  for  us  to  present  a 
defensive  array,  at  the  same  time  that  to  do  so  by  fortifications  alone  would  be 
impracticable ;  and  it  is  not  therefore  prejudging  the  question  we  are  about  to 
examine.  It  is  neither  underrating  fortifications  nor  overrating  floating  defences 
to  say  that  these  last  are  some  or  all  of  them  indispensable  in  such  positions. 

Any  very  broad  water,  where  deep  soundings  may  be  earned  at  a  distance 
from  the  shores,  greater  than  effective  gun  range,  and  where  no  insular  spot, 
natural  or  artificial,  can  be  found  or  formed  nearer  the  track  of  ships,  will  pre- 
sent such  a  situation ;  and  we  may  take  some  of  our  great  bays  as  examples. 

Broad  sounds  and  wide  roadsteads  affording  secure  anchorage  beyond  good 


360  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

gun  range  from  the  shores  will  afford  examples  of  another  sort,  and  harbors  with 
very  wide  entrances  and  large  surface  exhibit  examples  of  still  another  kind. 

As  in  all  such  cases  fortifications  alone  will  be  ineffectual,  and  nevertheless 
recourse  to  defences  of  some  sort  may  be  unavoidable,  it  has  not  failed  to  be  a 
recommendation  in  the  several  reports  on  the  defence  of  the  coast  since  1818 
that  there  should  be  a  suitable  and  timely  provision  of  appropriate  floating  de- 
fences. And  until  the  invention  of  man  shall  have  caused  an  entire  revolution 
in  the  nature  of  maritime  attack  and  defence,  these  or  kindred  means  must  be 
resorted  to,  not,  however,  because  they  are  means  intrinsically  good  or  suitable 
under  like  circumstances,  but  because  they  are  the  only  means  applicable  to  such 
cases.  In  the  circumstances  just  referred  to  there  is  no  alternative,  and  there- 
fore no  point  to  be  discussed.  The  remaining  question  is,  whether  these  floating 
defences  are  to  be  relied  on  in  cases  that  admit  of  defence  by  fortifications. 

And,  first,  as  to  gunboats.  Although  of  undoubted  use  in  peculiar  circum- 
stances, it  will  hardly  be  contended  that  gunboats  afford  a  safe  reliance  in  har- 
bors that  can  be  entered  by  vessels  of  magnitude.  Ships  becalmed  or  aground 
might  be  sorely  harassed,  if  not  destroyed,  by  a  spirited  attack  from  this  force, 
and  there  are  other  situations  wherein  it  would  be  very  effective.  But  harbors 
defended  by  gunboats  will  not  be  attacked  in  calms  nor  in  adverse  winds,  and 
it  is  not  easy  to  believe  that  any  probable  array  of  these  crafts  would  impede  or 
hinder  for  a  moment  the  advance  of  a  hostile  fleet.  Nelson,  at  Trafalgar,  bore 
down  in  two  divisions  upon  the  combined  fleet,  each  division  being  exposed  to  a 
raking  fire  ;  and  although  suffering  considerably  from  that  fire,  he  was  able,  not- 
withstanding, to  break  the  hostile  line  and  defeat  his  superior  adversary.  What, 
comparatively,  with  the  raking  fire  of  the  combined  fleet,  would  be  the  fire  of  a 
fleet  of  gunboats  ?  Opposing  no  effectual  obstacle  to  approach  or  entrance,  these 
small  vessels,  scattered  and  driven  upon  the  shoals,  could  be  kept  by  the  broad- 
side of  a  few  active  vessels  at  too  great  a  distance  to  produce  any  serious  effect 
upon  the  main  attack  by  their  desultory  fire. 

Although  they  might  afford  useful  means  of  annoyance  during  a  protracted 
occupation  by  the  enemy  of  harbors  containing  extensive  shoal  grounds  and 
shallow  bays  and  inlets,  they  would  be  nearly  useless  in  resisting  the  first  assault 
and  in  preventing  the  brief  operation  of  levying  contributions,  or  burning  or 
spoiling  national  establishments. 

The  true  reason  of  this  defence  must  not,  however,  be  misunderstood.  It  is 
not  that  the  boats  do  not  carry  guns  enough  or  men  enough  for  the  object,  but 
it  is  because,  from  the  comparative  weakness  of  the  vessels,  the  guns  and  the 
men  cannot  be  kept  in  an  effective  position. 

There  are,  moreover,  many  harbors  requiring  defence,  in  which  there  are  no 
shoals  whereon  the  boats  could  take  refuge ;  and  in  such  their  capture  or  de- 
struction would  be  inevitable  should  there  be,  at  the  same  time,  no  river  up 
which  they  might  fly,  or  lateral  issue  through  which  they  could  escape  to  a  safe 
distance. 

Floating  batteries,  of  which,  a  good  use  might  be  sometimes  made  in  peculiar 
situations,  would,  I  suppose,  differ  from  gunboats,  in  being  larger,  containing 
many  guns  each,  and  in  being  stronger ;  that  is  to  say,  having  thicker  sides  or 
bulwarks ;  and  it  has  sometimes  even  been  proposed  to  construct  them  with 
ball-proof  parapets,  and  with  platforms  open  above — like,  in  these  respects, 
batteries  upon  the  shore.  But  in  whatever  way  formed,  it  is  necessarily  a  part 
of  the  idea  that  they  be  strong  and  massive ;  and,  consequently,  that  they  be 
unwieldy,  incapable  of  sudden  change  of  place,  and  incapacitated  either  to  ad- 
vance upon  a  defeated  foe  or  to  evade  a  victorious  one.  We  are  now,  of  course, 
speaking  of  batteries  moved  by  steam,  Being  denied  the  power  of  locomotion, 
at  least  for  any  purpose  of  manoeuvring  in  face  of  the  enemy,  we  are  to  consider 
these  batteries  as  moored  in  position,  and  awaiting  his  advance.  Should  the 
batterries  be  large,  requiring  deep  water  to  float  them,  or  should  they  be  placed 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  361 

across  or  near  the  channel,  for  the  sake  of  proximity  to  the  track  of  ships,  the 
enemy  would  engage  them  at  close  quarters.  All  advantages  of  mobility — of 
'  concentrating  his  whole  fleet  upon  one  or  two  points,  to  which,  under  these  cir- 
cumstances, no  relief  can  be  sent — of  greater  elevation  and  command,  would  be 
on  the  side  of  the  assailant,  with  no  counteracting  advantage  to  the  batteries, 
but  greater  thickness  of  bulwarks.  Whether  this  excess  of  thickness  should  be 
considered  a  material  advantage,  since  the  introduction  of  large  bomb-cannon 
into  the  armament  of  ships  is  a  very  doubtful  matter.  The  batteries  if  anchored 
across  the  channel  would  have  the  further  advantage  of  a  raking  fire ;  but  we 
have  seen  that  the  raking  fire  of  one  squadron  of  ships  upon  another  advancing 
is  by  no  means  decisive.  The  power  of  throwing  the  whole  assailing  force  upon 
one  or  two  points,  of  pouring  upon  the  decks  of  the  batteries  a  greatly  superior 
force  of  boarders,  would  of  themselves  seem  to  leave  little  room  to  doubt  as  to 
the  issue. 

If,  now,  we  suppose  these  floating  batteries  to  be  smaller,  so  that  having  a 
lighter  draught  they  might  be  placed  near  the  shores  or  upon  the  shoals,  they 
might  certainly  be  thereby  saved  from  the  kind  of  attack  which  would  prove  so 
fatal  if  anchored  more  boldhr  in  deep  water;  but  they  would  at  the  same  time 
lose  much  of  their  efficiency  from  their  remoteness;  and  positions  wherein  they 
would  be  secure  from  being  laid  alongside,  while  they  would  be  in  a  proper 
attitude  to  contribute  materially  to  the  defence  of  the  harbor,  are  afforded  but 
rarely.  It  is  doubtful  whether,  as  a  general  rule,  these  smaller  floating  batteries, 
notwithstanding  their  greater  capacity  of  endurance,  would  afford  a  better 
defence,  gun  for  gun,  than  gunboats ;  or,  in  other  words,  whether  this  capability 
of  endurance  in  the  one  would  be  more  than  a  compensation  for  the  power  of 
locomotion  in  the  other.  But  whether  near  the  shore  or  in  the  channel,  whether 
large  or  small,  this  description  of  defence,  owing  to  its  fixedness  connected  with 
the  destructibility  of  the  material  of  which  it  must  be  made,  will  be  exposed  to 
attacks  analogous  to  those  made  by  gunboats  on  ships  aground.  The  enemy 
knowing  of  what  the  defensive  arrangements  consist,  will  come  provided  with 
the  requisite  number  of  sailing  or  steam  vessels  armed  with  bomb- cannon, 
against  which  the  thicker  bulwarks  of  the  floating  batteries  would  avail  nothing. 
He  would,  besides,  hardly  fail  to  provide  himself  with  bomb-ketches  armed  with 
heavy  sea  mortars ;  and  as  there  could  be  no  guarding  against  the  effects  of  the 
long  ranges  of  these,  a  few  such  vessels  would,  with  great  certainty,  constrain 
the  floating  batteries  to  quit  their  position,  abandoning  every  disposition  ap- 
proaching to  a  concentrated  array.  Not  to  mention  other  modes  of  attack,  which 
would  seem  to  leave  the  chances  of  success  with  the  enemy,  it  will  be  noticed 
that  this  kind  of  defence,  whether  by  gunboats  or  floating  batteries,  has  the 
same  intrinsic  fault  that  an  inactive  defence  by  the  navy  proper  has ;  that  is  to 
say,  the  enemy  has  it  in  his  power  to  bring  to  the  attack  a  force  of  the  same 
nature  and  at  least  as  efficacious  as  that  relied  on  for  defence ;  hence  the  neces- 
sity not  of  mere  quality,  but  of  superiority  on  the  part  of  the  defence  at  every 
point  liable  to  be  attacked;  and  hence  also  the  necessity  of  having  an  aggregate 
force  as  many  times  larger  than  that  disposable  by  the  enemy,  as  we  have  im- 
portant places  to  guard.  Should  we,  for  example,  have  ten  -such  places,  and  the 
enemy  threaten  us  with  twenty  ships-of-the-line,  we  must  have,  in  all  these 
places,  an  aggregate  of  gunboats  and  floating  batteries  more  than  equivalent  to 
two  hundred  ships-of-the-line ;  for  it  will  hardly  be  contended  that  these  defences 
can  be  transported  from  one  place  to  another  as  they  may  be  respectively  in 
danger. 

But  what  will  be  the  relative  state  of  the  parties  if,  instead  of  gunboats  or 
floating  batteries,  we  resort  to  steam  batteries  ? 

Although  much  has  been  said  of  late  of  the  great  advantage  that  defence  is  to 
derive  from  this  description  of  force,  I  have  not  been  able  to  discover  the  advan- 
tages ;  nor  do  I  see  that  sea-coast  defence  has  been  benefited  in  any  particular 


362  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

by  the  recent  improvements  in  steam  vessels,  except  that  in  the  case  before  ad- 
verted to,  where  from  the  breadth  of  the  waters  defence  from  the  shore  would 
be  unavailing,  a  more  active  and  formidable  floating  defence  than  by  gunboats 
and  floating  batteries  is  provided. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  by  far  the  greatest  improvement  in  steam  vessels 
consists  in  having  adapted  them  to  ocean  navigation ;  and  one  inevitable  con- 
sequence of  this  improvement  will  be,  that  if  the  defence  of  harbors  by  steam 
batteries  be  regarded  as  securing  them  from  the  attacks  of  ships-of-the-line  and 
frigates,  or  at  least  of  placing  the  defence  quite  above  that  kind  of  attack,  they 
will  no  longer  be  attacked  by  sailing  vessels,  but  by  steam  vessels  similar  in  all 
warlike  properties  to  those  relied  on  for  defence. 

Not  only  are  there  no  impediments  to  transferring  these  vessels  across  the 
ocean,  but  the  rapidity  and  certainty  of  these  transfers  are  such  as  to  enjoin  a 
state  of  the  most  perfect  readiness  everywhere  and  at  all  times ;  and  also  a  com- 
plete independence  of  arrangement  at  each  particular  point,  both  the  state  of 
preparation  and  the  independence  of  arrangement  being  much  more  important 
than  when  the  enemy's  motions  were  governed  by  the  uncertain  favor  of  winds 
and  weather.  ^ 

It  is  not  easy  to  conceive  of  any  important  properties  belonging  to  steam 
batteries  acting  defensively,  that  the  attacking  steam  vessels  may  not  bring  with 
them,  or  at  least  may  not  have  imparted  to  them  on  their  arrival  upon  the  coast, 
unless  it  should  be  thought  proper  to  give  to  the  former  a  greater  thickness  of 
bulwark  than  would  be  admissible  in  sea-going  vessels. 

But  the  peculiar  advantage  conferred  by  steam  lies  in  the  faculty  of  moving 
with  promptitude  and  rapidity,  and  any  attempts  to  strengthen  the  harbor  vessels 
by  thickening  their  bulwarks  considerably  would  unavoidably  lessen  their  mo- 
bility, thereby  partially  neutralizing  the  advantage  sought.  At  the  same  time 
it  is  extremely  doubtful  whether  any  benefit  would  be  derived  from  the  thicker 
sides.  It  is  probable  that  the  best  kind  of  bulwarks  for  these  vessels  and  all 
others,  is  that  which  Avill  be  just  proof  against  grape  and  canister-shot  fired  from 
moderate  distances,  because  with  such  bulwarks  a  shell  fired  from  a  bomb-cannon, 
within  a  reasonable  distance  would  pierce  both  sides,  that  is  to  say,  would  go  in 
one  side  of  the  ship  and  out  at  the  opposite  side,  producing  no  greater  effect  than 
a  solid  shot  of  the  same  calibre,  while  with  thickened  sides  every  shell  would 
lodge  in  the  timbers  and  produce  terrible  ravages  by  bursting. 

In  the  practice  with  these  missiles  in  this  country  it  has  been  found  difficult 
to  lodge  a  shell  in  thin  targets,  even  when  the  load  of  the  gun  wTas  so  reduced 
as  to  increase  materially  the  uncertainty  of  aim.  As  it  is  probable,  therefore, 
that  the  protection  from  solid  shot  afforded  by  massive  bulwarks  would  be  more 
than  counterbalanced  by  the  greater  injury  horizontal  shells  would  inflict  by 
means  of  these  bulwarks,  we  may  conclude  that  the  harbor  steam  battery  will 
not  differ  in  this  respect  materially  from  the  attacking  steamships ;  and  if  they 
do  differ  in  having  more  solid  and  impervious  bulwarks,  that  no  advantage  over 
the  enemy  will  result  therefrom. 

We  come,  therefore,  to  the  same  result  as  when  considering  the  application  of 
the  other  kinds  of  floating  force  to  the  defence  of  harbors ;  and  this  result  is, 
that  there  is  no  way  of  placing  the  coast  in  a  condition  of  reasonable  security 
but  by  having  at  any  point  the  enemy  may  happen  to  select  a  force  in  perfect 
readiness,  which  shall  be  superior  to  that  brought  to  the  attack. 

There  not  only  prevails  the  idea  that  we  ought  to  rely  upon  these  floating 
defences,  but  also  the  idea  that  we  may  postpone  the  fitting  them  for  service 
till  the  commencement  of  war.  Turning  again  to  the  six  ports  before  mentioned, 
our  whole  peace  navy  that  may  happen  to  be  in  port  and  ready  for  use,  being 
appropriated  to  local  defence  in  its  several  stations,  immense  additions  would 
have  to  be  made  at  each  port;  and  whether  these  additions  were  to  be  supplied 
from  the  ship-yards  or  by  conversion  of  merchant  vessels  and  service  steamers 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND  SEA- COAST  DEFENCES,       363 

into  floating  batteries,  a  considerable  time  must  necessarily  elapse  before  there 
could  be  anything  like  readiness.  In  the  meantime  the  enemy,  sending  a  small 
squadron  of  war  steamers  against  each — nothing  being  ready,  large  squadrons 
would  not  be  needed — would  nip  all  preparations  in  the  bud.  We  have  to  keep 
in  mind  a  fundamental  principle  of  this  system,  which  is,  not  to  incur  the  ex- 
pense of  preparation  till  the  certainty  of  war  has  arrived,  or,  as  it  might  be 
phrased,  till  there  will  no  longer  be  time  to  prepare. 

I  should  not  have  gone  so  much  at  length  into  a  branch  of  one  subject  wherein 
the  general  conclusion  appears  to  be  so  obvious  and  incontrovertible  but  for  the 
prevalence  of  opinions  which  I  consider  not  erroneous  merely,  but  highly 
dangerous,  and  which,  I  think,  must  give  way  before  a  full  exhibition  of  the 
truth.  I  do  not  anticipate  any  formidable  objections  to  the  positions  assumed* 
nor  to  the  illustrations ;  but  even  should  all  these,  in  the  form  presented,  be  ob- 
jected to,  I  may  still  challenge  opposition  to  the  following  broad  propositions, 
namely : 

1st.  If  the  sea-coast  is  to  be  defended  by  naval  means  exclusively,  the  de- 
fensive force  at  each  point  deemed  worthy  of  protection  must  be  at  least  equal 
in  power  to  the  attacking  force. 

2d.  As,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  there  can  be  no  reason  for  expecting  an 
attack  on  one  of  these  points  rather  than  on  another,  and  no  time  for  transferring 
our  state  of  preparation  from  one  to  another  after  an  attack  has  been  declared, 
each  of  them  must  have  assigned  to  it  the  requisite  means  ;  and, 

3d.  Consequently,  this  system  demands  a  power  in  the  defence  as  many  times 
greater  than  that  in  the  attack  as  there  are  points  to  be  covered. 

Believing  that  a  well-digested  system  of  fortification  will  save  the  country 
from  the  danger  attending  every  form  of  defence  by  naval  means,  and  the  in- 
tolerable expense  of  a  full  provision  of  these  means,  I  will  now  endeavor  to  show 
that  such  a  system  is  worthy  of  all  reliance. 

There  has  been  but  one  practice  among  nations  as  to  the  defence  of  ports  and 
harbors,  and  that  has  been  a  resort  to  fortifications.  All  the  experience  that 
history  exhibits  is  on  one  side  only ;  it  is  the  opposition  of  forts  or  other  works 
comprehended  by  the  term  fortification  to  attacks  by  vessels ;  and  although 
history  affords  some  instances  wherein  this  defence  has  not  availed,  we  see  that 
the  resort  is  still  the  same.  No  nation  omits  covering  the  exposed  points  upon 
her  seaboard  with  fortifications,  nor  hesitates  in  confiding  in  them. 

But  it  has  been  asserted,  in  a  way  to  convey  incorrect  and  hurtful  impressions 
to  the  country,  that  fortifications  for  such  purposes  are  obsolete  resorts ;  that  the 
improvements  in  the  instruments  and  appliances  of  war  within  late  years  have 
caused  the  abandonment  of  such  reliances.  This,  however,  is  far  from  being- 
true  ;  and  it  is  quite  important  in  respect  to  the  quarters  whence  such  assertions 
have  sometimes  proceeded  not  only  to  sustain,  but  to  enforce  this  denial. 

If  considerable  additions  have  not  been  made  lately  to  the  defences  of  many 
well-known  European  harbors,  it  is  because  they  were  fully  fortified  long  ago. 
And  it  might  here  be  asked,  in  passing,  what  would  have  happened  to  the 
seaports  of  France  during  the  long  wars  between  her  and  Great  Britain,  and 
with  such  naval  supremacy  in  the  hands  of  the  latter,  if  the  French  ports  had  not 
been  well  fortified  %  Can  it  be  supposed  that  anything  but  these  fortifications 
kept  the  English  out  of  the  great  ports  and  naval  depots  of  France,  and  per- 
mitted large  fleets  to  grow,  great  expeditions  to  mature,  flotillas  to  manoeuvre, 
under  the  eyes  of  the  blockading  squadron,  and  almost  within  reach  of  its  guns  ? 

But  it  happens  that  even  in  well-fortified  France  any  improvement  or  change 
in  a  harbor  that  affords  opportunity  and  place  for  new  defences  is  sure  to  pro- 
duce them ;  the  Cherbourg  breakwater,  a  work  of  late  years,  is  supplied  with 
formidable  batteries,  perhaps  even  now  not  quite  finished. 

It  happens,  moreover,  that  in  Great  Britain,  which  of  all  the  nations  of  the 


364  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

earth  lias  most  reason  to  rely  for  defence  on  naval  power,  fortifications  are  the 
reliance  for  harbor  defence,  and  of  late  years  particularly. 

The  application  of  steam  to  ocean  navigation  has  done  much,  and  is  likely  to 
do  more,  to  lessen  the  naval  ascendency  of  that  power,  and  the  ports  which 
formerly  found  security  in  rather  indifferent  fortifications  under  the  overwhelm- 
ing numbers  of  her  men-of-war,  have,  in  the  present  liability  to  be  surprised  by 
fleets  of  war  steamers,  received  and  are  at  this  moment  receiving  large  additions 
of  strength  in  forts  and  batteries,  and  new  "  harbors  of  refuge  "  are  being  formed 
and  strongly  fortified,  in  order  the  better  to  protect  her  coast  and  her  commerce 
under  this  change  of  naval  relations. 

Great  Britain  sees  that  she  cannot  effectually  guard  her  coast  and  her  ports 
from  this  particular  danger  by  the  number  of  her  war  vessels,  great  as  this 
number  is,  and  greatly  as  it  may  be  augmented  from  her  vast  commercial 
marine.  She  does  not  run  into  the  folly  of  posting  at  every  dock  yard  a 
squadron  of  steamers  as  large  as  any  that  can  be  brought  against  it ;  but  she  im- 
proves and  adds  to  her  old  fortifications  to  make  them  adequate  of  themselves, 
and  she  creates  new  (artificial)  harbors  for  the  sake  of  having  fortified  shelter 
near  the  probable  field  of  activity  of  her  navy  in  its  various  forms. 

Instead,  therefore,  of  lessening  the  utility  of  fortifications,  we  see  that,  in  the 
•opinion  of  the  high  military  authorities  of  that  government,  the  late  changes  and 
improvements  have  made  the  increase  and  improvement  of  fortifications  indis- 
pensable. There  are  some  particulars  of  her  late  course  in  this  respect. 

Referring  to  parliamentary  estimates  for  1S47-'4S,  1848-' 49,  and  1849-'50, 
I  find  that  for  fortification  alone,  including  new  works  and  repairs  of  old  works 
upon  the  coast  of  Grjeat  Britain  and  Ireland,  (chiefly  along  the  English  channel,) 
and  excluding  estimates  for  barracks,  quarters,  storehouses,  fyc.,  there  was  de- 
manded for  those  years,  severally,  $578,766,  $282,892,  and  $439,036,  being 
$1,300,694  for  the  last  three  years. 

I  find  that  important  colonial  ports  have  received  accessions  of  strength  in  the 
same  way  lately,  and  that,  for  example,  on  the  water  front  of  the  redoubtable 
Gibraltar  the  same  batteries  that  repelled  and  destroyed  the  formidable  floating 
batteries  of  France  and  Spain  in  1782,  expenditures  exceeding  six  hundred 
thousand  dollars  have  been  made  within  four  or  five  years,  and  $367,887  more 
-are  estimated  to  be  necessary  to  put  them  in  equilibrium  with  new  means  of 
attack. 

At  Malta,  already  possessed  of  very  strong  fortifications,  about  $180,000 
have  already  been  voted,  and  $696,000  is  called  for  in  addition,  to  be  applied 
to  harbor  defences  particularly. 

The  same  nation  is  meanwhile  placing  in  her  new  coast  batteries  eight-inch 
and  fifty-six  pounders,  and  thirty-two  pound  guns ;  and,  at  a  great  expense,  is 
substituting  this  heaviest  kind  of  ordnance  for  twenty-four  pounders  and  eighteen 
pounders  in  the  old  batteries.  Between  the  years  1839  and  1849  she  has  sup- 
plied, or  has  issued  orders  to  supply,  to  sea-coast  fortifications  at  least  two 
thousand  new  pieces  of  the  largest  calibre.  The  increase  of  heavy  ordnance  in 
.the  batteries  of  Gibraltar  within  that  period  was  eighty-two  pieces,  and  at  Ports- 
mouth and  vicinity  it  was  two  hundred  and  eighty-seven  pieces. 

Sir  Thomas  Hastings,  of  the  Royal  Navy,  under  examination  before  a  com- 
mittee of  the  House  of  Commons,  said :  "  I  was  asked  just  now  whether  the 
guns  at  Portsmouth  or  other  places  had  been  fired  in  anger.  I  should  be  glad 
to  bring  under  the  consideration  of  the  committee  that  the  introduction  of  steam 
makes  it  much  more  possible  now  to  make  attacks  upon  any  certain  points. 
From  the  different  points  all  along  the  channel  a  concentration  may  be  made  of 
a  very  large  body  of  steamers,  and  under  such  circumstances  an  equipment" 
(he  is  speaking  of  sea-coast  batteries)  "  which  would  have  answered  very  well 
when  you  had  only  incidental  attacks  to  contemplate  from  sailing  vessels  might 
be  insufficient  when  you  could  bring  twenty-five  or  thirty  vessels  carrying  the 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  365 

heaviest  possible  guns  to  bear  upon  your  works.  I  will  take,  for  example,  if 
you  will  permit  me,  the  port  of  Falmouth.  In  the  event  of  any  war  occurring 
with  this  country  the  probability  is,  being  the  most  western  port,  it  would  be- 
come the  refuge  of  our  merchantmen  running  into  the  channel  to  avoid  privateers 
and  steamships.  If  that  port  were  left  in  its  present  state  it  is  clear  that  ten 
powerful  steamers  might  destroy  everything  in  it,  without  any  material  injury 
to  the  assailants." 

In  answer  to  the  question  whether,  in  his  opinion,  the  merchant  steamers 
would  be  as  available  for  the  defence  of  the  coasts  as  war  steamers,  he  said  t 
"  Certainly  not ;  I  think  this  country  (England)  would  derive  an  immense  power 
from  her  merchant  marine ;  but  I  look  upon  it  to  propose  to  contend  with  mer- 
chant steamers  against  the  powerful  vessels  which  are  in  existence  in  France 
would  be  a  very  unwise  thing." 

In  April,  1850,  the  Hon.  Colonel  Anson,  in  explaining  the  ordnance  estimate 
to  the  House  of  Commons,  said,  in  reference  to  the  estimates  for  "  works,  build- 
ings, and  repairs :  "  "  The  whole  of  this  vote  had  been  most  carefully  considered 
by  the  master  general  of  the  ordnance  and  her  Majesty's  government;  and 
though  large  in  amount,  the  House  would  see  how  small  a  sum  was  asked  for  new 
works,  such  as  fortifications,  &c.,  either  at  home  or  abroad.  That  reduction 
was,  however,  attributable  to  the  large  amount  that  had  been  spent  on  those 
works  in  previous  years.  It  was  needless  for  him  now  to  point  out  to  how  low 
a  state — he  might  say,  indeed,  to  what  a  state  of  degradation  our  works  of  de- 
fence had  fallen  till  within  the  last  few  years,  and  in  what  condition  the  means 
we  possessed  of  protecting  our  shores  from  aggression  and  insult  were  in  1835, 
It  was  enough  to  say  they  were  totally  inadequate  for  the  purpose.  They 
remained  nearly  in  the  same  state  till  1845,  and  were  in  the  very  lowest  possible 
condition  in  that  year.  But,  in  the  meantime,  the  state  of  things  had  not  escaped 
the  observation  of  those  who  turned  their  attention  to  our  relations  with  foreign 
powers,  and  many  honorable  gentlemen  found  fault  with  the  government  for 
not  providing  more  effectually  for  the  defence  of  the  country.  In  1845  the 
aspect  of  affairs  became  threatening;  the  few  fortifications  we  had  to  rely  upon 
dismantled,  dilapidated,  and  decayed.  If  a  squadron  of  steamers  had  chosen 
to  nlake  their  way  to  any  of  our  principal  naval  stations,  either  Portsmouth, 
Plymouth,  or  Pembroke,  or  up  the  Thames,  they  were  completely  open  to  attack, 
and  an  enemy  might  have  committed  any  act  of  aggression  he  pleased.  There 
was  nothing  to  prevent  his  vessel  coming  up  the  Thames  and  insulting  her 
Majesty  in  the  very  heart  of  her  dominions.  These  considerations  pressed 
themselves  so  seriously  at  the  time  that  the  attention  of  the  right  honorable 
member  for  Tamworth  and  the  existing  government  were  called  to  it,  and  they 
at  once  set  to  work  to  remedy  the  neglect.  They  proposed  that  a  sum  of  money 
should  be  set  apart  to  improve  our  defences,  and  their  example  had  been  fol- 
lowed by  the  present  government  to  a  very  considerable  extent.  The  result 
was,  that  very  much  had  been  accomplished  during  those  four  years,  and  he 
was  happy  to  say  the  country  might  be  proud  of  it.  At  Portsmouth  the  sea 
defences  had  been  completed  and  made  very  powerful ;  at  Plymouth  they  were 
equally  complete,  and  he  believed  great  improvements  had  taken  place  at 
Sheerness,  asid  in  the  defences  on  the  Thames.  They  had  commenced  similar 
works  at  Pembroke,  which  was  one  of  the  finest  dock  yards  and  harbors  in  the 
world,  and  he  was  sure  the  house  would  be  prepared  to  meet  any  reasonable 
demand  upon  them  for  its  defence.  It  was  impossible  to  say  what  might  come 
to  pass  in  a  few  years,  and  though  the  expense  might  appear  to  be  large  now, 
when  the  House  considered  the  ultimate  advantage  to  the  country  from  the  state 
and  the  feeling  of  security  against  aggression,  they  would,  he  was  certain,  agree 
with  him  that  it  far  outbalanced  any  temporary  inconvenience  from  the  grant 
of  so  much  money." 

An  English  officer  of  rank  and  distinction  discussing,  in  1849,  the  system  of 


366  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

defence  necessary  to  Great  Britain,  after  recommending  large  inland  fortifica- 
tions to  be  erected  against  the  possible  march  of  an  enemy's  army  upon  London, 
estimates  that  it  will  require  661,500,000  ($6,600,000)  to  complete  existing 
fortifications  upon  the  coast,  including  new  batteries  to  be  constructed  there,  and 
to  supply  them  with  artillery  and  stores;  that  is  to  say,  in  his  opinion,  the 
sum  of  $6,600,000,  in  addition  to  what  had  within  these  few  years  been  ex- 
pended, was  necessary  to  be  applied  to  the  coast  defences  of  that  country,  in 
consequence  of  the  changes  lately  introduced  into  the  means  of  carrying  on  war 
from  the  ocean. 

When  I  had  advanced  thus  far  in  this  report,  and  was  still  seeking  facts  in 
illustration  of  the  course  pursued  by  Great  Britain,  I  met  the  following  summary 
of  remarks  made  in  relation  to  fortifications  by  Mr.  Pitt,  sixty-five  years  ago, 
(1786.)  The  principles  for  which  he  then  contended  are  now  and  ever  must  be 
as  sound  and  as  applicable  as  when  he  pressed  them  on  the  consideration  of 
Parliament  with  so  much  earnestness.  The  only  change  is  one  of  degree.  And 
we  have  just  seen  that  the  statesmen  and  military  men  of  that  country,  at  the 
present  day,  take  the  same  view  and  press  the  same  policy.  During  the  wars 
of  the  French  revolution  the  vast  naval  superiority  of  England  enabled  her  to 
hold  the  closest  blockade  of  all  the  ports  of  her  adversary.  This  crippled 
French  naval  enterprise  in  a  twofold  manner — by  shutting  up  the  commerce 
which  alone  could  supply  seamen,  and  by  shutting  up  the  few  war  vessels  that 
they  were  able  to  man.  But  even  then,  with  such  little  apparent  cause  to  fear 
.anything  from  that  navy,  large  sums  were  expended  by  England  upon  new  sea- 
coast  ports,  towers,  and  batteries.  Now,  when  France  can  suddenly  send  out 
large  squadrons  of  steam  war  vessels  in  spite  of  the  strictest  blockade,  Great 
Britain  feels  the  need  of  still  greater  strength  at  home.  But  it  is,  we  see,  always 
on  fortifications  that  England  relies  for  the  safety  of  her  ports ;  in  no  case  do 
we  see  her  resorting  to  a  parade  of  war  vessels  within  or  at  the  entrance  to  her 
ports.  Where  her  largest  assemblages  of  men-of-war  of  all  sorts  take  place, 
and  where  there  must  at  all  times  be  a  considerable  number,  there  she  places, 
not  small  batteries  and  insignificant  forts  and  towers,  but  her  strongest  and 
heaviest  fortifications.  Her  history  demonstrates  that  she  knows  how  to  employ 
her  fleets  better  than  keeping  them  moored  within  her  harbors  and  roadsteads. 

In  urging  upon  the  House  of  Commons,  in  1786,  certain  propositions  in 
relation  to  fortifications,  Mr.  Pitt,  "  to  prove  the  utility  of  fortifications,  appealed 
to  the  unfortunate  and  calamitous  situation  in  which  we  were  placed  in  the  late 
war.  A  considerable  part  of  our  fleet  was  confined  to  our  ports  in  order  to  pro- 
tect our  dock  yards,  and  thus  we  were  obliged  to  do  what  Great  Britain  had 
never  done  before — to  carry  on  a  defensive  war,  a  war  in  which  we  were  under 
the  necessity  of  wasting  our  resources  and  impairing  our  strength,  without  any 
prospect  of  any  possible  benefit  by  which  to  mitigate  our  distress.  Mr.  Pitt 
felt  the  question  to  be  a  portion  of  that  momentous  system  which  challenged, 
from  its  nature,  the  vigilance  and  support  of  every  administration." 

"  W^as  the  House  ready  to  stand  responsible  to  posterity  for  a  repe- 
tition of  similar  misfortunes  and  disgrace  ?  Were  they  willing  to  take  upon 
themselves  the  hazard  of  transmitting  the  dangers  and  calamities  which  they 
themselves  so  bitterly  experienced  ? "  "  Mr.  Pitt  observed 

that  there  was  a  consideration  which  ought  to  have  more  weight  than  others, 
and  this  was,  that  fortifications,  being  calculated  to  afford  complete  security  to 
dock  yards,  would  enable  our  fleets  to  go  on  remote  services  and  carry  on  the 
operations  of  war  at  a-  distance,  without  exposing  the  materials  and  seed  of 
future  navies  to  destruction  by  the  invasion  of  an  enemy." 
•"  But  it  was  not  only  by  foreign  expeditions  that  we  might  lose  the  aid  of  our 
fleet ;  in  case  of  invasions  it  might  so  happen  that  the  ships,  though  in  the 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  367 

very  channel,  might  be  prevented  by  contrary  winds,  tides,  and  other  contin- 
gencies, from  arriving  to  the  assistance  and  relief  of  the  dock  yards." 

"Were  it  to  be  asked  why  the  sum  to  be  required  by  these  fortifications  had 
not  been  demanded  for  strengthening  the  navy,  he  would  fairly  answer  that  the 
money  which  would  prove  sufficient  to  accomplish  these  works  would  not  build 
so  many  ships  as  would  serve  for  the  defence  of  our  most  valuable  harbors. 
There  was,  besides,  a  certain  degree  beyond  which  we  could  neither  build  nor 
man  any  more.  The  true  limit  he  could  not,  nor  would  it  be  prudent  for  him  to 
assign,  yet  in  the  nature  of  things  such  a  limit  must  exist;  but  there  could 
never  be  any  line  drawn  to  restrain  the  security  which  we  ought  to  provide  for 
our  dock  yards." 

"Mr.  Pitt  called  upon  the  House  to  beware  how  they  suffered  themselves 
lightly  to  be  drawn  into  a  line  of  conduct  which  might  involve  their  posterity 
in  accumulated  evils ;  and  he  suggested  to  their  recollection  the  remorse  which 
they  must  feel  if  they  should  hereafter  find  that  they  had,  by  an  ill-timed  per- 
tinacity upon  the  present  occasion,  brought  upon  the  country  calamity  and 
ruin." 

I  regret  that  I  have  not  time  to  find  and  adduce  a  few  pertinent  facts  from  the 
practice  of  the  French  nation  in  this  respect,  and  especially  within  the  last  few 
years.  We  know  well,  however,  the  general  result,  namely,  that  France  has 
always  kept  herself  well  guarded  by  sea-coast  fortifications ;  and,  as  before  said, 
that  she  owes  her  exemption  from  many  heavy  calamities  to  a  steady  adherence 
to  that  policy. 

Believing  that  the  statements  just  presented  must  conclusively  show  that 
nations  having  experience  in  war  have  made  fortifications  their  main  reliance  for 
the  defence  of  their  ports,  reserving  their  navies  for  offensive  purposes,  and  that 
the  greater  energy  and  activity  imparted  to  the  latter  by  modern  improvements 
have  compelled  a  still  more  powerful  preparation  of  such  defences,  I  turn  again 
to  the  particular  point  of  our  present  inquiry,  namely,  the  use  and  influence  of 
steamers  in  coast  defences.  I  have  to  add,  that  steamers  as  substitutes  for 
fortifications  would  be  inferior  to  other  armed  vessels,  because  the  efficiency  of 
the  defence  must  depend,  other  things  equal,  on  the  number  of  guns ;  that  is,  as  a 
large  number  will  be  brought  to  the  attack,  a  large  number  must  be  employed  in 
defence,  and  steamers  carry  very  few  in  comparison.  The  power  of  rapid  loco- 
motion characteristic  of  steamers,  is  for  this  purpose  nothing  in  itself,  nor  the 
power  of  transporting  quickly  bodies  of  armed  men;  there  must  be  the  power 
of  heavy  and  numerous  guns,  whether  moving  or  anchored.  Though  very  use- 
ful in  reconnoitring  an  advancing  enemy,  in  carrying  orders,  in  conveying  relief 
to  batteries,  in  transporting  quickly  large  bodies  of  men,  and  in  such  like  duties, 
steamers  could  not  constitute  a  good  defensive  array  except  against  steamers 
only;  and,  accordingly,  against  such  an  array  the  enemy's  fleet  of  steamers 
would  bring  in  tow  a  few  line-of-battle  ships  or  frigates. 

Even,  therefore,  should  there  be  time  after  a  war  shall  have  been  opened  to  pre- 
pare in  each  of  the  great  harbors  a  hurried  display  of  this  kind  out  of  the  light 
river  and  bay  steamers,  it  would  be  no  match  for  sea-going  steamers  and  heavy 
armed  vessels  brought  into  the  attack ;  indeed,  it  would  not  be  easy  to  say  what 
excess  of  numbers,  in  favor  of  the  defence,  could  establish  an  equilibrium.  As 
just  said  above,  there  could  be  no  resistance  of  moment  made,  except  by 
many  heavy  guns ;  and  to  supply  these  a  great  multitude  of  steamers  or  of 
merchant  ships  would  have  to  be  converted  into  floating  batteries.  What  the 
result  of  such  a  resort  would  be  may  be  learned  from  the  battle  of  Copenhagen. 

This  was  in  no  sense  a  contest  between  ships  and  fortifications,  as  is  generally 
supposed;  it  was  the  attack  of  a  fleet  of  sailing  ships  upon  a  line  of  floating 
batteries  of  one  kind  or  another.  The  Danes  had  anchored  on  the  edge  of  a 
shoal  a  line  of  these  batteries,  parallel  nearly  with  the  wall  of  the  city,  and  at 
the  distance  of  at  least  three-fourths  of  a  mile.  This  line  could  be  attacked 


368  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

only  on  the  outside,  and,  when  attacked,  was  interposed  between  the  enemy  and1 
the  walls,  and  consequently  for  the  time  entirely  extinguished  the  fire  from  the 
fortifications. 

The  line  consisted  of  block-ships  and  praams — by  which  are  understood  to 
be  meant  vessels  converted  into  mere  floating  batteries  and  more  or  less  strength- 
ened for  the  purpose ;  and  rafts,  supposed  to  be  floats  of  timber  with  a  timber 
parapet  towards  the  enemy — in  all,  eighteen  batteries.  A  squadron  of  four  sails 
of  the  line,  one  frigate  and  two  sloops-of-war,  were  anchored  higher  up  the 
harbor — where  there  was  also  the  "  three-crown  "  battery.  Lord  Nelson  carried 
to  the  attack  twelve  line-of-battle  ships,  twelve  frigates,  and  a  number  of  smaller 
armed  vessels.  All  this  force  he  concentrated  upon  the  line  of  floating  batteries ; 
every  vessel  of  which  was  taken  or  destroyed,  except  one  or  two  smaller  vessels, 
which  cut  their  moorings  and  ran  in  under  shelter  of  the  fortification.  This 
concentration  excluded  the  Danish  squadron  above  mentioned,  and  also  the 
"three-crown"  battery,  from  any  material  participation  in  the  action.  Some 
English  frigates  within  reach  of  the  latter  were  greatly  injured  and  obliged 
to  retreat. 

This  faculty  of  concentration  (applied  with  success  on  several  memorable  oc- 
casions by  that  great  naval  commander)  is  an  inherent  one  in  an  attacking 
squadron,  and  is  not  to  be  evaded  by  a  line  at  anchor — especially  not  by  a 
line  of  floating  batteries. 

If,  however,  we  should  allow  batteries  of  this  sort,  whether  aided  by  steam 
or  not — to  be  equal,  gun  for  gun,  to  the  attacking  squadron,  and  that  they  can 
be  got  ready  in  time,  we  nevertheless  should  thereby  throw  an  enormous  expen- 
diture of  money  upon  the  country  at  a  moment  of  great  fiscal  difficulty.  Let 
us  make  a  rough  estimate  of  that  expenditure. 

Lord  Nelson's  fleet,  just  mentioned,  was  rated  at  1,158  guns,  and  it  is  only 
reasonable  to  assume  that  we  should  be  liable  to  a  visit  from  a  force  as  great. 
Assuming  that  the  merchant  vessels  taken  for  conversion  into  floating  batteries, 
would,  on  the  average,  carry  ten  guns  on  a  broadside,  which  will  be  assuming 
that  they  are  as  large  as  sloops-of-war,  we  should  need  fifty-eight  such  vessels ; 
and  estimating  these  at  fifty  thousand  dollars  each,  which,  including  purchase, 
armament,  alteration,  &c.,  is  a  moderate  allowance,  we  shall  have  a  total  first 
cost  of  two  million  nine  hundred  thousand  dollars  for  one  port,  and  for  the  six 
ports  before  mentioned,  a  grand  total  of  seventeen  million  four  hundred  thousand 
dollars — a  sum  much  greater  than  has  been  expended  in  preparing  for  more 
than  four  thousand  of  the  heaviest  guns  in  permanent  fortifications  upon  the 
great  points  of  the  coast. 

If  we  attempt  to  supply  the  requisite  force  in  guns  by  the  use  of  river  and 
bay  steamers,  instead  of  sailing  vessels,  we  cannot  allow  more  than  five  guns, 
in  the  average,  to  a  broadside ;  so  that  we  shall  require  one  hundred  and  sixteen- 
steamers,  which,  at  thirty  thousand  dollars  for  purchase,  armament  and  altera- 
tion, will  give  three  million  four  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  dollars  for  the 
first  cost  in  a  single  harbor,  and  for  the  six  ports,  twenty  million  eight-  hundred 
and  eighty  thousand  dollars. 

I  do  not  give  these  estimates  as  exact,  though  I  believe  them  to  be  below  the 
cost  that  would  have  to  be  incurred,  but  as  affording  hints  of  the  costliness  of 
provisions  of  that  nature.  An  expenditure  for  this  purpose,  equally  great* 
would  have  to  be  repeated,  moreover,  at  the  commencement  of  every  war,  or 
still  greater  outlays  would  be  incurred  in  keeping  up  this  perishable  armament 
during  peace. 

What  conclusions  follow  from  the  preceding  considerations  ?  Why,  that  in 
adopting  this  expedient,  we  should  involve  ourselves,  at  the  opening  of  every 
war,  in  a  vast  outlay  for  the  defence  of  these  ports ;  that  there  would  be  great 
probability  that  the  preparations,  although  involving  that  enormous  expense, 
could  not  be  made  in  time ;  that,  even  if  prepared  in  time,  everything  would  be 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  369 

put  at  the  hazard  of  a  single  battle,  with  most  important  advantages  on  the  side 
of  the  enemy,  and  consequently  few  probabilities  of  successful  resistance ;  or  if, 
by  more  extended  preparations,  we  should  endeavor  to  turn  these  probabilities 
the  other  way,  it  would  be  at  the  greater  risk  of  not  being  ready,  and  with  the 
certainty  of  greatly  enhanced  cost. 

It  has  been  deemed  necessary  above  all  things,  considering  impressions  that 
have  been  made  on  the  public  mind  as  to  the  influence  of  steam  vessels  upon 
sea-coast  defence,  to  show  at  large  that  while  the  introduction  of  the  vessels 
into  naval  equipment  has  greatly  facilitated  attacks,  either  by  steamers  alone  or 
in  conjunction  with  sailing  vessels,  it  has  done  more  to  avert  or  repel  them, 
leaving  fortifications,  which  these  vessels  can  in  no  case  replace  but  at  great  dis- 
advantage, more  indispensable  than  ever. 

In  my  desire  to  convey  my  own  strong  convictions,  I  am  conscious  that  I 
have  tediously  prolonged  this  part  of  the  report. 

Although  what  has  been  said  above  is  undoubtedly  true  in  reference  to  steam- 
ers or  other  floating  defences  as  substitutes  for  fortifications,  there  remain  import- 
ant functions  in  defence  which  must  be  committed  to  floating  defences  of  some 
kind,  as  has  before  been  fully  set  forth ;  and  in  some  of  these  cases  it  is  quite 
certain  that  steam  batteries  may,  of  all  floating  defences,  be  the  most  suitable. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten,  however,  that  the  very  qualities  which  recommend 
this  particular  kind  of  force  will  equally  characterize  the  steam  vessel  of  the 
enemy,  a,nd  that  whether  steam  vessels  or  sailing  vessels,  or  both,  are  relied  on, 
unless  there  are  well-secured  points  on  the  shore  under  which  they  can  take 
refuge,  they  will  themselves  constitute  an  inviting  object  to  a  superior  force  of 
the  enemy. 

If,  for  example,  we  were  to  deem  one  of  our  open  waters  of  such  importance 
as  to  assign  eight  or  ten  steam  batteries  for  its  protection,  we  should  thereby 
place  within  the  reach  of  the  enemy  an  object  worthy  of  the  efforts  of  a  squad- 
ron of  twelve  or  fifteen  vessels  of  the  same  description.  Even,  therefore,  in- 
stances where  these  naval  means  must  be  resorted  to  for  defence  upon  the  water, 
there  must  be  Works  at  hand  upon  the  shore,  to  the  shelter  of  which,  if  likely  to 
be  overpowered,  they  can  retire. 

A  branch  of  the  second  question,  namely,  that  portion  which  inquires,  "In 
what  manner  recent  improvements  in  artillery  and  other  military  inventions  and 
discoveries  affect  this  question,"  require  some  separate  remarks. 

The  only  invention  and  discovery,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  that  can  affect  this 
question,  one  way  or  the  other,  is  that  which  has  introduced  the  practice  of  firing 
shells  from  guns;  and  which  has  involved  the  use  of  guns  of  comparatively 
large  calibre,  so  that  guns  which  discharge  missiles  of  eight-inch  and  ten-inch 
diameter,  are  rather  extensively  used,  especially  eight-inch  guns.  Even  guns  of 
twelve-inch  bore  have  been  made  in  this  country,  and  I  believe  also  in  other 
countries. 

It  is,  of  course,  understood  that  even  larger  shells  than  these  were  long  ago 
thrown  in  the  attack  and  defence  of  fortified  places,  from  the  mortars  of  land 
batteries  and  bomb  ketches.  The  shells  now  spoken  about,  instead  of  being 
projected  under  a  high  angle,  as  from  mortars,  are  discharged  from  guns  at  low 
angles,  or  nearly  horizontally,  like  solid  shot;  these  guns  of  large  calibre  being 
often  called  Paixhan  guns,  after  the  French  officer  who  first  succeeded  in  secur- 
ing the  favor  of  the  military  authorities  for  the  idea — the  idea  having  been 
suggested  long  before,  and  even  successfully  tried. 

These  shell-guns  are  now  introduced  by  maritime  nations  in  all  vessels-of-war, 
whether  sailing  vessels  or  steamers.  Those  latter  vessels,  which  carry  but  few 
guns  in  number,  are  much  augmented  in  power  by  their  introduction,  but  not 
more  so  than  sailing  vessels,  to  which  these  guns  are  equally  appropriate;  and  I 
have  no  doubt  that  their  numbers  will  be  every  day  increased,  until  perhaps 
there  will  be  few  or  no  armed  sailing  or  steaming  ships  of  which  the  guns  will 
H.  Rep.  Com.  86 24 


370  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

not  be  modified  in  their  calibre  for  this  purpose,  and  provided  with  shells  as 
well  as  shot. 

As  to  the  injury  sustained  from  an  enemy's  shells,  that  will  undoubtedly  be 
more  serious  in  steamers  than  in  sailing  vessels,  because,  in  addition  to  all  the 
liabilities  to  injury  that  belong,  inherently,  to  vessels  of  all  kinds,  there  are 
several  superadded  by  the  machinery,  the  wheels,  the  boilers,  &c.,  of  steamers. 
In  contests  between  vessels,  whether  sailing  or  steam  vessels,  the  effects  of  shell- 
guns  will  no  doubt  be  very  destructive  on  both  sides;  but  between  forts  and 
ships,  the  peculiar  injury  inflicted  by  shells  will  be  suffered  by  the  vessel  exclu- 
sively. The  fort  will  suffer  less  from  hollow  shot  than  from  solid  shot.  This, 
though  true  beyond  all  question  or  cavilling,  may  need  a  few  words  of  explanation. 

How  are  the  batteries  to  be  affected  by  them  1  It  can  be  but  in  two  ways : 
first,  the  ship's  gun  having  been  pointed  so  as  to  strike  a  vital  point — that  is  to 
say,  a  gun  or  a  carriage — the  shell  may  explode  at  the  instant  of  contact.  This 
explosion  may  possibly  happen  thus  opportunely,  but  it  would  happen  against 
all  chances ;  and  if  happening,  would  probably  do  no  more  than  add  a  few  men 
to  the  list  of  killed  and  wounded.  For  reasons  that  will  soon  appear,  it  is  to  be 
doubted  whether  the  probability  of  dismounting  the  gun  would  be  so  great  as  if 
the  missile  were  a  solid  thirty-two  pound  shot.  Secondly,  if  it  be  not  by  dis- 
mounting the  guns  or  killing  the  garrison,  the  effect  anticipated  from  these  mis- 
siles must  result  from  the  injury  they  do  the  battery  itself.  Now  we  are  per- 
fectly informed  by  military  experience  as  to  the  effects  of  these  shells  upon  forts 
and  batteries ;  for  the  shells  are  not  new,  although  the  guns  may  be  so ;  the 
eight-inch  and  the  ten-inch  shells  having  always  been  supplied  in  abundance  to 
every  siege  train,  and  being  perfectly  understood,  both  as  to  their  effects  and  the 
mode  of  using  them.  Were  it  a  thing  easily  done,  the  blowing  away  of  the 
parapets  of  a  work  (a  very  desirable  result  to  the  attacking  party)  would  be  a 
common  incident  in  the  attacks  of  fortifications ;  but  the  history  of  attacks  by 
land  or  water  affords  no  such  instance.  The  only  practicable  way  yet  discov- 
ered of  demolishing  a  fortification  being  by  attaching  a  mine  to  the  foot  of  the 
wall ;  or  by  dint  of  solid  shot  and  heavy  charges  fired  intennittingly,  during  a 
long  succession  of  hours,  upon  the  same  part  of  the  wall,  in  order  not  only  to 
break  through  it,  but  to  break  through  it  in  such  a  manner  that  the  weight  and 
pressure  of  the  incumbent  mass  may  throw  large  portions  of  the  wall  prostrate. 
This,  the  shortest  and  best  way  of  breaking  a  wall,  requires,  in  the  first  place, 
perfect  accuracy  of  direction;  because  the  same  number  of  shots  that  being  dis- 
tributed over  the  expanse  of  a  wall  would  merely  peel  off  the  face,  would,  if 
concentrated  in  a  single  deep  cut,  cause  the  wall  to  fall ;  and  it  requires,  more- 
over, great  power  of  penetration  in  the  missile — the  charge  of  a  breeching  gun 
being,  for  that  reason,  one-third  greater  than  the  common  service  charge.  Now 
the  requisite  precision  of  firing  for  this  effect  is  wholly  unattainable  in  vessels, 
whether  shot  be  solid  or  hollow ;  and  if  it  were  attainable,  hollow  shot  would  be 
entirely  useless  for  the  purpose,  because  every  one  of  them  would  break  to  pieces 
against  the  wall,  even  when  fired  with  a  charge  much  less  than  th$  common 
service  charge.  This  is  no  newly  discovered  fact ;  it  is  neither  new  nor  doubtful. 
Every  hollow  shot  thrown  against  the  wall  of  a  fort  or  battery,  if  fired  with  a 
velocity  affording  any  penetration,  will  unquestionably  be  broken  into  fragments 
by  the  shock. 

After  so  much  had  been  erroneously  said  about  the  effect  of  these  shells  upon 
the  castle  of  San  Juan  d'Ulloa,  it  was  deemed  advisable,  although  the  result  of 
European  experiments  were  perfectly  well  known,  to  repeat,  in  our  own  service, 
some  trials  touching  this  point.  A  target  was  therefore  constructed,  having  one- 
third  part  of  the  length  formed  of  granite,  one-third  of  bricks,  and  the  remaining 
third  of  freestone.  This  was  fired  at  by  a  Paixhan  gun  and  by  a  thirty-two 
pounder,  from  the  distance  of  half  a  mile,  and  the  anticipated  results  were  ob- 
tained, namely : 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  371 

1st.  Whether  it  was  the  granite,  the  brick,  or  the  freestone  that  was  struck, 
the  solid  thirty-two  pound  shot  penetrated  much  deeper  into  the  wall,  and  did 
much  more  damage  than  the  eight-inch  hollow  shot;  and,  2d.  These  last  broke 
against  the  wall  in  every  instance  that  the  charge  of  the  gun  was  sufficient  to 
give  them  any  penetration. 

The  rupture  of  the  shell  may  often  cause  the  explosion  of  the  powder  it  con- 
tains, because  the  shell,  the  burning  fuse,  and  the  powder  are  all  crushed  up 
together ;  but  the  shell  having  no  penetration,  no  greater  injury  will  be  done  to 
the  wall  by  the  explosion  than  would  be  caused  by  the  bursting  of  a  shell  that 
had  been  placed  by  the  hand  against  it. 

From  all  this  it  appears  incontrovertible  that,  as  regards  the  effects  to  be  pro- 
duced upon  batteries  by  ships,  solid  shot  are  decidedly  preferable  to  hollow 
shot;  and  the  ship  that,  contemplating  the  destruction  of  batteries,  should 
change  any  of  her  long  twenty -four  or  thirty -two  pound  guns  for  Paixhan 
guns  would  certainly  weaken  her  armament.  Her  best  missiles,  at  ordinary 
distances,  are  solid  shot ;  and,  if  she  can  get  near,  grape  shot  to  fire  into  em- 
brasures and  over  the  walls.  The  best  shells  against  the  batteries  are  the  sea- 
mortar  shells,  fired  at  high  elevations;  which,  being  of  great  weight  and  falling 
from  a  great  height,  penetrate  deeply ;  and,  containing  a  considerable  quantity 
of  powder,  cause  material  ravage  by  their  explosion.  Such  shells,  however,  can 
only  be  fired  by  vessels  appropriately  fitted ;  namely,  by  bomb  ketches. 

The  use  of  these  same  hollowed  shot  or  shells,  by  batteries  against  vessels,  is, 
however,  an  affair  of  a  different  character.  The  shells  do  not  break  against 
timber;  but,  penetrating  the  bulwarks,  they,  in  the  first  place,  would  do  greater 
damage  than  solid  shot,  by  making  a  large  hole  and  dispersing  more  splinters ; 
and  having,  as  shot,  effected  all  this  injury,  they  would  then  augment  it  many 
fold  by  exploding. 

In  all  cases  of  close  action  between  ship  and  battery  the  shells  will  pass 
through  the  nearer  side;  and,  if  not  arrested  by  some  object  on  the  deck,  will 
probably  lodge  and  explode  in  the  further  side,  causing  by  the  explosions  a 
much  greater  loss  among  the  crew,  and  greater  injury  to  the  vessel,  than  by 
the  mere  transit  across  the  vessel ;  as  before  suggested,  the  vessel  would  suffer 
less  injury  were  her  sides  made  so  thin  as  not  to  retain  the  shell,  permitting  it 
to  pass  through  both  sides,  unless  fired  with  a  small  velocity.  It  is  not  impos- 
sible that  an  extensive  use  of  these  horizontal  shells  may  lead  to  a  reduction  in 
the  thickness  of  ship's  bulwarks.  It  is  unquestionably  true,  therefore,  that  the 
advantage  of  this  invention  or  improvement  stands,  as  between  forts  and  vessels, 
wholly  on  the  side  of  fortifications ;  as  between  sailing  vessels  and  steamers,  it 
i,s  believed  to  be,  as  they  are  now  prepared,  on  the  side  of  sailing  vessels;  but 
this  last  is  a  point  with  which  we  are  not  now  particularly  concerned. 

Another  invention  or  improvement  of  modern  days  was  for  a  time  thought  to 
offer  important  advantages  to  vessels  in  contest  with  forts;  not  as  making  the 
fort  more  valuable,  but  the  vessel  less  so.  It  was  the  substitution  of  iron  for 
wood  as  the  material  of  vessels'  hulls.  Experience  thus  far,  however,  is  un- 
favorable. To  make  the  sides  of  a  thickness  to  repel  shot  demands  great  cost 
and  involves  a  material  loss  of  buoyancy,  and  shot  passing  through  the  sides  of 
iron  'vessels  are  apt  not  merely  to  make  a  hole  of  about  their  diameter,  as  through 
wood,  but  to  tear  whole  plates  of  iron  from  their  rivets.  There  is  good  reason 
to  suppose  that  the  use  of  this  material  for  war  vessels  has  or  will  be  abandoned ; 
if  adhered  to,  to  say  the  least,  it  will  not  lessen  the  advantages  possessed  by 
fortification. 

The  course  of  the  preceding  remarks — in  discussing  the  effects  upon  sea-coast 
defence,  of  numerous  railroads,  and  of  the  use  of  steamers  as  war  vessels — led 
to  so  many  incidental  observations  on  the  relative  influence  of  fortifications,  that 
the  particular  point  of  this  influence  has  already,  perhaps,  been  sufficiently 
elucidated.  Though  the  relative  superiority  of  fortifications  over  any  other 


372  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

suggested  means  has  been  often  enough  asserted  in  these  observations,  some- 
thing more  must  be  said  as  to  their  sufficiency  for  the  security  of  the  great  in- 
terests on  our  coast.  If  willing  to  trust  for  their  sufficiency  to  the  example  of 
other  nations,  we  should  find  abundant  proof  in  the  practice  of  all  that  have 
taken  part  in  or  been  exposed  to  the  hazards  of  war.  All  have  resorted  to  forti- 
fications, and  many  have,  for  long  periods  of  time,  owed  to  them  alone  exemp- 
tion from  some  of  the  worst  of  its  calamities.  The  example  of  other  nations  at 
the  present  moment,  as  has  before  been  stated,  shows,  moreover,  that  they  find 
no  other  satisfactory  reliance  under  the  increased  energy  now  given  to  the  instru- 
ments of  warfare  than  an  increase  of  the  number  and  an  augmentation  of  the 
force  of  fortifications. 

In  opposition  to  this  mode  of  defence  much  stress  is  laid  on  certain  successful 
attacks  that  have  been  made  by  ships  on  works  deemed  strong.  I  have  no 
doubt  that  all  such  results  might  be  accounted  for  by  circumstances  independent 
of  the  naked  question  of  relative  strength,  but  at  any  rate,  when  carefully  con- 
sidered, how  little  do  these  results  prove  in  comparison  with  numerous  other 
instances  in  which  there  was  an  immense  disparity  of  force  in  favor  of  vessels 
that  have  been  signally  defeated.  These  latter  instances  are  those  that  should 
be  received  as  a  test  of  the  actual  relation  between  the  two  kinds  of  force;  not 
certainly  because  they  were  successful,  but  because  the  smaller  the  works,  its 
armament,  its  garrison,  the  less  the  probability  that  any  extraneous  influence 
has  been  in  operation.  A  single  gun  behind  a  parapet,  provided  its  position  be 
a  fair  one  and  the  parapet  be  proof,  need,  as  regards  its  contest  with  ships,  owe 
nothing  else  to  the  art  of  fortification;  and  its  effect  will  be  the  same  whether 
the  battery  were  fresh  from  the  hands  of  the  ablest  engineer  of  the  age  or  were 
erected  at  the  dawn  of  the  art.  The  gun  is  in  a  position  to  be  used  with  effect ; 
the  men  are  as  fully  protected  by  the  parapet  as  the  service  of  the  gun  will 
allow;  they  are  brave  and  skilful,  and  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  them  from 
doing  their  duty  to  the  utmost.  These  are  all  conditions  easily  fulfilled,  and 
therefore  likely  to  be  so.  The  state  of  things  is  not  less  just  and  fair  towards 
the  vessel ;  she  chooses  her  time  and  opportunity.  The  battery  goes  not  to  the 
ship,  but  the  ship  to  the  battery,  taking  the  wind,  the  tide;  the  sea — all  as  she 
would  have  them ;  her  condition  and  discipline  are  perfect,  and  her  crew  cour- 
ageous and  adroit.  Nothing,  under  such  circumstances,  can  prevent  the  just 
issue  of  battle  but  some  extraordinary  accident,  possible  indeed  to  either  party, 
but  easily  recognized  when  occurring. 

The  contest  between  larger  works  and  heavy  squadrons  may  be  much  more 
complicated  affairs ;  the  cause  of  disaster  to  the  former  being  often  traceable  to 
potent,  though  not  always  obvious  influences.  The  fortifications  may  have  been 
absurdly  planned  originally,  or  badly  executed,  for  there  has  at  all  times  been 
in  this  profession,  as  in  others,  much  scope  given  to  quackery ;  they  may  have 
been  erected  at  a  time  when  ships-of-war,  against  which  they  were  provided, 
were  very  different  things  from  the  lofty  line-of-battle  ships  of  modern  times — a 
long  peace  or  long  impunity  may  have  left  them  in  a  state  wholly  unprepared 
for  the  sudden  use  of  their  strength ;  the  command  may  have  been  intrusted  to 
persons  ignorant  alike  of  the  amount  of  power  in  their  hands,  and  of  the  mode 
of  exercising  it;  the  garrison  may  have  been  undisciplined  or  mutinous;  the 
populace  discontented  or  disloyal ;  the  clamor  of  frightened  citizens  may  have 
caused  a  premature  surrender ;  all  these,  or  any  of  them  may  have  produced  the 
issue,  leaving  the  question  of  relative  power  untouched. 

While  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  these  and  other  deteriorating  influences  may 
have  occasionally  operated  to  the  prejudice  of  fortifications,  and  that  these  were 
likely  to  be  more  numerous  and  more  controlling  as  the  works  were  more  exten- 
sive, it  is  certain  that  there  can  be  no  influence  acting  in  a  reverse  direction  upon 
them,  that  is  to  say,  none  making  them  stronger  and  more  efficient  than  they 
ought  to  be.  There  can  be  no  favorable  influence  of  such  a  nature,  for  example, 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  373 

as  to  make  the  simple  one-gun  battery,  before  mentioned,  equivalent  to  a  battery 
(say)  ten  times  as  large. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  from  wbat  is  said  in  relation  to  larger  fortifications 
that  their  magnitude  necessarily  involves  imperfection  or  weakness,  nor  because 
I  have  considered  small  and  simple  works  as  affording  the  best  solution  to  the 
question  of  relative  force  must  it  be  inferred  that  small  works  are  suited  to  all 
circumstances.  I  speak  here  in  reference  merely  to  the  judgment  we  are  en- 
titled to  form  of  the  relative  power  of  these  antagonist  forces  from  their  contests 
as  exhibited  in  history.  In  instances  of  the  latter  sort  there  cannot,  from  the 
nature  of  the  cases,  be  any  important  influence  operating  of  which  we  are  igno- 
rant, or  for  which  we  cannot  make  due  allowances,  while  in  examples  of  the 
former  kind  we  may  be  in  the  dark  as  to  many  vital  matters. 

These  observations  have  been  deemed  necessary  because,  in  judging  of  this 
matter,  it  might  not  be  so  obvious  that  certain  brilliant  and  striking  results 
should  not  be  adopted  as  affording  the  true  test  of  relative  power.  It  would  be 
more  natural  to  turn  to  Copenhagen  and  Algiers  as  indicating  where  the  power 
lies,  than  to  Charleston  or  Stonington,  and  yet  these  latter  as  indices  would  be 
true  and  the  former  false. 

We  will  now  turn  to  certain  examples. 

"  The  name  of  Martello  tower  was  adopted  in  consequence  of  the  good  de- 
fence made  by  a  small  round  tower  in  the  Bay  of  Martello,  in  Corsica,  in  the 
year  1794,  which  although  armed  with  one  heavy  gun  only,  beat  off  one  or  two 
British  ships-of-war  without  sustaining  any  material  injury  from  their  fire.  But 
this  circumstance  ought  merely  to  have  proved  the  superiority  which  guns  on 
shore  must  always  in  certain  situations  possess  over  those  of  shipping,  no  matter 
whether  the  former  are  mounted  in  a  tower  or  not.  That  this  is  a  just  decision 
will  perhaps  be  readily  allowed  by  all  who  are  acquainted  with  the  following 
equally  remarkable,  but  less  generally  known  fact,  which  occurred  about  twelve 
years  afterward  in  the  same  part  of  the  world. 

"  Sir  Sidney  Smith,  in  the  Pompee,  an  eighty-gun  ship,  the  Hydra,  of  thirty- 
eight  guns,  Captain  Manby,  and  another  frigate,  anchored  about  eight  hundred 
yards  from  a  battery  of  two  guns  situated  on  the  extremity  of  Cape  Lecosa,  and 
protected  from  assault  by  a  tower  in  which  were  five-and-twenty  French  soldiers, 
commanded  by  a  lieutenant. 

"  The  line-of-battle  ship  and  the  frigate  fired  successive  broadsides  till  their 
ammunition  was  nearly  expended,  the  battery  continually  replying  with  a  slow 
but  destructive  effect.  The  Pompee  (at  which  ship  alone  it  directed  its  fire)  had 
forty  shot  in  her  hull,  her  mizzen  topmast  carried  away,  a  lieutenant,  midship- 
man, and  fireman  killed,  and  thirty  men  wounded.  At  length,  force  proving  in- 
effectual, negotiations  were  resorted  to  ;  and,  after  some  hours  parley,  the  officer, 
a  Corsican  and  relative  of  Napoleon,  capitulated.  It  then  appeared  that  the 
carriage  of  one  of  the  two  guns  had  failed  on  the  second  shot  and  the  gun  had 
subsequently  been  fired  lying  on  the  sill  of  the  embrasure ;  so  that,  in  fact,  the 
attack  of  an  eighty-gun  ship  and  two  frigates  had  been  resisted  by  a  single 
piece  of  ordnance." — (Journal  of  Sieges,  by  Colonel  John  T.  Jones.) 

"  The  Corsican  tower  above  mentioned,  which  had  in  like  manner  completely 
baffled  a  naval  cannonade,  was  very  soon  found  to  surrender  when  attacked  by 
land ;  not,  however,  before  a  small  battery  had  been  made  (erected)  to  reduce 
it." — (Paisley 's  Course,  vol.  iii.) 

Here  are  two  examples  :  1st.  A  single  heavy  gun  mounted  on  a  tower  beat 
off  one  or  two  British  ships  ;  2d.  A  barbette  battery,  containing  two  guns,  beat 
off  a  British  eighty-gun  ship,  supported  by  two  frigates. 

It  would  seem  that  no  exception  can  possibly  be  taken  to  either  instance  as 
trials  of  relative  power.  There  is  no  complication  of  circumstances  on  one  side 
or  the  other ;  nothing  to  confuse  or  mislead ;  all  is  perfectly  simple  and  plain. 
A  small  body  of  artillery  judiciously  posted  on  the  shore  is  attacked  by  armed 


374  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

vessels  bearing  forty  or  fifty  times  as  many  guns,  and  the  ships,  unable  to  pro- 
duce any  effect  of  consequence,  are  beaten  off  with  loss. 

The  cases  present  no  peculiar  advantage  on  the  side  of  the  batteries,  either  as 
regards  position  or  quality,  for  both  works  were  immediately  reduced  by  a  land 
attack — that  which  the  eighty-gun  ship  and  two  frigates  were  unable  to  effect 
being  immediately  accomplished  by  landing  two  field-pieces  with  a  very  small 
portion  of  the  crew  of  one  of  the  vessels.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  no 
peculiar  disadvantage  on  the  part  of  the  ships,  as  the  time  and  mode  of  attack 
were  of  their  own  choice. 

In  order  that  there  might  be  no  unjust  disparagement  of  the  vessels  in  the 
manner  of  representing  the  affairs,  the  language  of  British  military  writers  (the 
ships  being  British)  has  been  exactly  quoted. — (See  Paisley's  Course  of  Ele- 
mentary Fortification,  vol.  ii,  and  Journal  of  Sieges,  by  Colonel  John  T.  Jones.) 
Had  the  representation  of  these  actions  been  taken  from  the  victorious  party, 
the  result,  probably,  would  have  appeared  still  more  to  the  disadvantage  of  the 
ships. 

The  circumstances  attending  the  attack  and  defence  of  Copenhagen,  in  April, 
1801,  have  already  been  briefly  stated.  A  more  minute  description  will  be 
found  in  House  document  No.  206,  1st  session,  26th  Congress. 

I  now  proceed  to  examine  a  great  instance  of  naval  success,  in  which  there  is 
no  room  to  doubt  the  extent  to  which  fortifications  were  engaged.  This  instance 
is  the  attack  on  Algiers,  in  1816.  The  attack  was  made  by  the  combined  Eng- 
lish and  Dutch  fleets,  mounting  about  one  thousand  guns,  under  the  command 
of  Lord  Exrnouth. 

In  the  fortifications  that  looked  towards  the  water  there  are  enumerated,  in  a 
plan  supposed  to  be  authentic,  three  hundred  and  twenty  guns ;  but  not  more 
than  two  hundred  of  these  could  act  upon  the  fleet  as  it  lay.  The  ratio  of  the 
forces  engaged,  therefore,  as  expressed  by  the  number  of  guns,  (saying  nothing 
of  the  calibres,  of  which  we  know  nothing,)  was  about  as  five  to  two.  The  ac- 
tion continued  from  a  quarter  before  three  until  nine,  without  intermission,  and 
did  not  cease  altogether  until  half  past  eleven. 

It  is  very  certain  that  the  effect  of  the  fire  upon  the  Algerine  shipping  and 
town  was  very  severe,  because  we  know  that  all  the  shipping  was  destroyed 
except  some  small  vessels ;  and  we  know,  also,  that  Lord  Exmouth  dictated  the 
the  terms  of  the  treaty  that  followed. 

Honorable  as  this  result  was  to  the  combined  fleets,  and  happy  as  it  was  for 
the  cause  of  humanity,  there  are,  nevertheless,  technical  circumstances  con- 
nected with  it  that  excite  doubts  as  to  how  much  of  the  final  result  was  due  to 
physical  chastisement,  to  moral  effect,  to  inherent  defects  in  the  defences,  and  to 
ignorance  in  the  use  of  these  defences,  such  as  they  were.  That  the  loss  in 
killed  and  wounded  in  the  city  and  works  was  great  is  probable,  because  we  are 
informed  that  a  very  great  addition  had  been  made  to  the  garrison,  in  prepara- 
tion for  the  attack,  under  some  impression,  no  doubt,  that  a  landing  would  be 
attempted.  For  the  service  of  the  guns  there  were  needed  but  three  or  four 
thousand  men  at  the  utmost.  An  accumulation  beyond  that  number  would  add 
nothing  to  the  vigor  of  defence,  while,  by  causing  an  increase  of  the  casualties, 
it  would  heighten  the  terrors  of  the  combat.  The  depressing  effect  of  this  loss 
of  life  in  the  batteries  and  of  the  burning  of  buildings  within  the  town  and 
about  the  mole  was,  of  course,  increased  by  the  entire  destruction  of  the  Algerine 
fleet  anchored  within  the  mole. 

We  have  no  means  of  judging  of  the  actual  condition  of  the  works;  nor  of 
their  fitness  for  the  task  of  contending  with  the  heavy  ships  of  modern  times. 
The  forts  and  batteries  on  the  shore  were  probably  too  elevated  to  be  com- 
manded even  by  the  largest  of  the  sailing  ships ;  and  provided  these  guns  were 
covered  with  a  proof  parapet,  they  may  be  regarded  as  being  well  situated. 
But  more  than  half  the  guns  engaged  were  in  the  Molehead  battery,  and  the 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND  SEA- COAST  DEFENCES.       375 

mode  of  attack  adopted,  especially  by  the  Queen  Charlotte,  of  one  hundred  and 
ten  guns,  was  calculated  to  test,  in  the  severest  manner,  the  principles  on  which 
this  work  had  been  planned.  She  so  placed  herself  within  "  fifty  yards"  of  the 
extremity  of  this  battery,  that  she  could  either  rake  or  take  in  reverse  every 
part  of  it.  If  she  at  the  same  time  commanded  the  battery — that  is  to  say,  if 
from  her  spar-deck  she  could  look  down  upon  its  platform — then  she  must  at 
once,  with  her  grape  and  canister,  have  driven  the  garrison  from  that  platform, 
leaving  only  the  lower  and  covered  tier  of  guns,  if  there  were  such  a  tier,  for 
service.  With  our  imperfect  knowledge  of  the  fortifications,  all  this  must, 
however,  be  left  to  conjecture. 

But  there  are  matters  connected  with  the  service  of  batteries  which  are  not 
conjecture.  Not  a  shot  was  fired  until  the  Queen  Charlotte  had  anchored. 

What  a  different  vessel,  when  she  anchored,  might  not  this  ship  have  been  if 
the  Molehead  battery  had  employed  its  fire  of  more  than  one  hundred  guns,  in 
raking  her  from  the  time  she  arrived  within  a  mile  and  a  half  until  she  had  an- 
chored within  fifty  yards !  How  different  might  have  been  the  condition  of  the 
fleet,  generally,  if  they  had  been  subjected  during  the  approach,  and  while  as- 
suming their  stations,  to  the  raking  fire  of  all  the  two  hundred  guns ! 

It  does  not  appear  that  a  single  red-hot  shot  was  fired  from  the  batteries. 

We  might  almost  rest  on  this  fact,  and  assert  that  a  defence  which  had  failed 
to  provide  itself  with  this  auxiliary  means  must  have  been  carried  on  in  disre- 
gard if  not  in  violation  of  all  rules,  all  knowledge,  and  all  experience ;  that  it 
was  probably  without  plan  or  combination,  and  not  less  probably  without  prepa- 
ration in  other  particulars  of  importance  scarcely  inferior. 

Before  leaving  this  example  it  may  be  well  to  inquire  what,  after  all,  was  the 
effect  of  these  batteries  upon  the  ships,  compared  with  the  effect  of  ships  upon 
ships. 

In  the  battle  of  the  Nile  the  French  fleet,  rated  at  one  thousand  one  hundred 
and  ninety  guns,  caused  a  loss  in  Nelson's  fleet  of  eight  hundred  and  ninety- 
five  killed  and  wounded,  which  is  in  the  proportion  of  ten  French  guns  to  less 
than  eight  Englishmen  killed  and  wounded.  In  the  battle  of  Trafalgar  the 
French  fleet  carried  not  less  than  three  thousand  guns,  and  they  caused  a  loss 
to  the  English  of  one  thousand  five  hundred  and  eighty-seven  killed  and 
wounded,  which  is  in  the  proportion  of  ten  guns  to  less  than  six  killed  and 
wounded.  In  this  affair  of  Algiers,  with  a  force  not  exceeding  two  hundred 
guns,  the  batteries  caused  a  loss  of  eight  hundred  and  eighty-three  killed  and 
wounded,  being  in  the  proportion  of  ten  guns  to  forty-four  men ;  and  if  we  take 
into  account  every  gun  that  was  pointed  over  the  bay,  (say  three  hundred  and 
fifty  guns,)  the  proportion  will  be  ten  guns  to  twenty-five  men;  being  an  effect 
more  than  three  times  as  great  as  that  produced  by  the  French  ships  at  the 
battle  of  the  Nile,  and  more  than  four  times  as  great  as  that  produced  by  the 
same  nation  at  Trafalgar. 

While  reflecting  on  the  circumstances  of  this  battle  the  mind  is  not  satisfied 
with  any  reasons  that  present  themselves  for  the  withdrawal  of  Lord  Exmouth,  the 
moment  the  land  wind  enabled  him  to  do  so,  on  the  supposition  of  entire  success 
on  his  part.  It  is  not  understood  why  he  should  feel  the  great  anxiety  he  states 
himself  to  have  been  under  that  this  wind  should  spring  up.  "  Providence  at 
this  interval,"  (between  ten  and  eleven  o'clock  at  night,)  "  gave  to  my  anxious 
wishes  the  usual  land  wind  common  in  this  bay,  and  my  expectations  were 
completed.  We  were  all  hands  employed  in  warping  and  towing  off,  and,  by 
the  help  of  the  light  air,  the  whole  were  under  sail  and  came  to  anchor  out  of 
the  reach  of  shells  about  two  in  the  morning,  after  twelve  hours  of  incessant 
labor." 

Now  if  anything  had  been  decided  by  the  action,  it  must  have  been  one  of 
two  things :  either  the  ships  were  victorious  or  the  batteries  were  so.  If  the 
ships  were  completely  victorious  it  would  seem  to  have  been  judicious  for  them 


376  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

to  remain  where  they  were,  in  order,  if  there  was  to  be  any  more  fighting,  to  be 
ready  to  press  their  advantage,  and  especially  in  order  to  maintain  the  ascend- 
ency, by  preventing  the  remounting  of  guns,  repairing  batteries,  and  re-supply- 
ing them  with  munitions,  &c. 

Had  the  people  possessed  the  inflexibility  report  ascribed  to  the  Dey,and  had 
they  set  zealously  about  the  work  of  preparation  for  a  new  contest,  it  might  not 
have  been  easy  for  Lord  Exmouth,  in  the  condition  to  which  his  ships  are  ac- 
knowledged by  authentic  accounts  to  have  been  reduced,  to  enforce  his  de- 
mands. It  is  not  understood,  therefore,  why,  if  he  had  been  so  successful  as  to 
be  certain  that  his  end  was  attained,  he  should  be  so  anxious  to  get  out  of  gun- 
shot, when  by  so  doing  he  involved  the  issue  in  more  or  less  doubt  and  hazard. 

He  relied  on  the  effect  produced  on  the  people  by  his  dreadful  cannonade, 
and  the  result  proves  that  he  was  right ;  but  his  anxiety  to  clear  the  vessels 
from  the  contest  shows  that  there  was  a  power  still  unconquered,  which  he 
thought  it  best  to  leave  to  be  restrained  by  the  suffering  population  of  the  city 
than  to  keep  in  a  state  of  exasperation  and  activity  by  his  presence.  What  was 
this  power  but  an  unsubdued  energy  in  the  batteries? 

The  true  solution  of  the  question  is,  then,  not  so  much  the  amount  of  injury 
done  on  the  one  side  or  the  other — particularly  as  there  was,  on  the  one  side,  a 
city  to  suffer  as  well  as  the  batteries — as  the  relative  efficiency  of  the  parties 
when  the  battle  closed  at  about  eleven  o'clock.  All  political  agitation  and 
popular  clamor  aside,  what  would  have  been  the  result  had  the  fight  been  con- 
tinued, or  even  had  Lord  Exmouth  renewed  it  next  morning? 

These  are  questions  that  can  be  answered  only  on  conjecture ;  but  the  manner 
the  battle  ended  certainly  leaves  room  for  many  doubts  whether,  had  the  sub- 
sequent demands  of  Lord  Exmouth  been  rejected,  he  had  it  in  his  power  to  en- 
force them  by  his  ships ;  whether,  indeed,  if  he  had  renewed  the  fight,  he  would 
not  have  been  signally  defeated. 

On  the  whole,  this  battle,  although  it  stands  pre-eminent  as  an  example  of 
naval  success  over  batteries,  presents  no  argument  to  shake  the  confidence 
which  fortifications,  well  situated,  well  planned  and  well  fought,  deserve  as  the 
defences  of  a  seaboard. 

Gibraltar. — The  attack  on  the  water  batteries  of  Gibraltar,  in  September, 
1782,  by  the  French  and  Spanish  floating  batteries,  is  a  well  known  instance  of 
the  power  of  guns  on  shore. 

These  floating  batteries  had  been  rendered,  as  was  supposed,  shot  proof  and 
shell  proof,  by  several  additional  thicknesses  of  timber  to  the  sides,  and  by 
covering  the  decks  with  a  roof  of  sloping  timbers. 

They  mounted  one  hundred  and  forty-two  guns  on  the  engaged  side,  with 
seventy  in  reserve  to  replace  any  that  might  be  dismounted.  They  were  an- 
chored at  the  distance  of  about  one  thousand  yards  from  the  walls,  and  were  op- 
posed by  about  eighty-five  guns. 

After  a  protracted  cannonade  nine  of  the  floating  batteries  were  burnt  by  hot 
shot  from  the  shore,  and  the  tenth,  having  been  taken  possession  of  by  the  vic- 
tors, was  set  on  fire  by  them. 

No  material  injury  was  done  to  the  works  of  the  town  by  their  fire,  and  only 
eighty -five  men  and  officers  were  killed  and  wounded  by  the  fire  from  these 
vessels,  together  with  a  very  violent  cannonade  and  bombardment  from  the  siege 
batteries. 

Battle  of  Algesiras. — On  the  6th  of  July,  1801,  the  French  admiral  Lenois 
was  lying  at  anchor  off  the  town  of  Algesiras  with  two  ships  of  eighty  guns, 
one  of  seventy -four  guns,  and  one  frigate.  To  the  south  of  him,  on  a  small 
island,  was  a  battery,  called  the  Green  island  battery,  mounting  seven  eighteen 
and  twenty-four  pounders ;  and  to  the  north  of  him,  on  the  main,  another  bat- 
tery, called  St.  Jacques's  battery,  mounting  five  eighteen-pounders.  There  were, 
besides,  fourteen  Spanish  gunboats  anchored  near,  making  a  total  of  three 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  377 

hundred  and  six  guns  afloat  and  twelve  guns  in  battery — altogether  three  hundred 
and  eighteen  guns. 

Sir  James  Saumarez  hearing  that  Lenois  was  in  this  position,  advanced 
against  him  from  Cadiz  with  two  ships  of  eighty  guns,  four  of  seventy-four 
guns,  one  frigate,  and  a  lugger — in  all  five  hundred  and  two  guns.  On  his  ap- 
proach, Lenois,  who  was  anchored  in  a  line  nearly  north  and  south  at  some  dis- 
tance from  the  shore,  cut  his  cables,  and  ran  into  shoal  water  to  prevent  being 
doubled  upon  by  the  British  line :  this  manoeuvre  at  the  same  time  entirely  un- 
masked the  fire  of  the  batteries. 

The  Hannibal,  one  of  the  British  seventy-fours,  in  attempting  to  close  with 
the  French  admiral,  touched  the  ground  and  could  not  be  floated  off.  She,  how- 
ever, continued  the  fight  with  great  obstinacy,  even  for  a  considerable  time  after 
she  was  deserted  by  her  consorts.  Not  being  able  to  double  upon  the  French 
line,  an  attempt  was  made  to  assault  the  Green  island  battery,  which,  being 
badly  served  by  the  Spaniards,  had  nearly  ceased  firing. 

But  this  attempt  was  anticipated  by  the  arrival  at  the  island  of  a  party  sent 
from  the  French  frigate  lying  near ;  and  the  assault  was  defeated  with  the  loss 
to  the  English  of  one  boat  sunk  and  another  taken — the  Frenchmen  renewing 
with  vigor  the  fire  of  the  battery.  At  the  north  end  of  the  line  the  French  admi- 
ral was  aided  by  seven  gunboats,  which  took  so  active  a  part  in  the  fight  that 
five  of  them  were  sunk  or  rendered  unserviceable.  The  St.  Jacques  battery  being, 
however,  served  sluggishly  by  the  Spaniards,  the  French  sent  a  party  from  the 
Dessaix  to  impart  greater  activity  and  effect. 

After  the  combat  had  continued  about  six  hours,  the  British  squadron  drew  off 
greatly  damaged,  leaving  the  Hannibal  seventy-four  alone  and  aground ;  and  she, 
after  suffering  great  loss,  was  obliged  to  strike.  The  French  insist  that  the 
Pompde,  an  English  ship  of  eighty  guns,  had  struck  her  colors ;  but  as  they 
could  not  take  possession,  she  drifted  off  and  was  towed  away  :  it  is  believed  she 
was  entirely  dismasted. 

We  do  not  know  the  loss  in  the  French  squadron,  but  the  killed,  wounded, 
and  missing  in  the  English  fleet  amounted  to  three  hundred  and  seventy -five 
men  ;  being  more  than  twelve  men  for  every  ten  guns  against  them,  and  being 
twice  as  great  in  proportion  as  the  English  loss  in  the  battle  of  Trafalgar. 

In  this  battle  of  Algesiras  there  were  five  hundred  and  two  English  guns 
afloat  acting  against  three  hundred  and  six  French  guns  afloat.  As  the  English 
chose  their  own  time  for  the  attack  and  had  the  wind,  it  is  only  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  three  hundred  and  six  of  the  English  guns  were  a  match  for  the 
three  hundred  and  six  guns  of  the  French  vessels.  This  will  leave  one  hundred 
and  ninety-six  English  guns  afloat,  opposed  to  the  twelve  guns  in  the  batteries  ; 
or,  reckoning  one  side  only  of  each  ship,  it  shows  ninety-eight  guns  in  the  Brit- 
ish fleet  to  have  been  overmatched  by  the  twelve  guns  in  the  batteries. 

There  never  was  a  more  signal  and  complete  discomfiture,  and  it  will  admit  of 
no  other  explanation  than  that  just  given ;  namely,  that  the  two  small  batteries, 
one  of  five  and  the  other  of  seven  guns,  partly  eighteen  and  partly  twenty-four 
pounders,  more  than  compensated  for  the  difference  in  favor  of  the  British  fleet 
of  one  hundred  and  ninety-six  guns. 

The  Hannibal  got  aground,  it  is  true  ;  but  she  continued  to  use  her  guns  with 
the  best  effect  until  she  surrendered ;  and  even  on  the  supposition  that  this  ship 
was  useless  after  she  grounded,  the  British  had  still  an  excess  of  one  hundred 
and  twenty-two  guns  over  the  French  fleet  and  batteries. 

These  batteries  were  well  placed,  and  probably  well  planned  and  constructed, 
but  there  was  nothing  extraordinary  about  them  ;  their  condition  before  the  fight 
was  complained  of  by  Admiral  Lenois,  and  they  were  badly  fought  in  the  early 
part  of  the  action ;  still  the  twelve  guns  on  shore  were  found  to  be  more  than 
equivalent  to  two  seventy-fours  and  one  frigate. 


378  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

Battle  of  Fuenterabia. — This  recent  affair  introduces  steam  batteries  to  our 
notice. 

On  the  llth  of  July,  1836,  six  armed  steamers,  together  with  two  British  and 
several  Spanish  gunboats,  attacked  the  little  town  of  Fuenterabia.  The  place 
is  surrounded  only  by  an  old  wall,  and  two  guns  of  small  calibre,  to  which,  on 
the  evening  of  the  attack,  a  third  gun  of  larger  calibre  was  added,  formed  the 
entire  of  its  artillery.  The  squadron  cannonaded  this  place  during  a  whole  day, 
and  effected  absolutely  nothing  beyond  unroofing  and  demolishing  a  few  poor 
and  paltry  houses,  not  worth,  perhaps,  the  ammunition  wasted  in  the  attack. 
What  may  have  been  the  number  of  guns  and  weight  of  metal  which  the  assail- 
ants brought  is  unknown;  though  the  superiority,  independent  of  the  superior 
weight  of  metal,  must  have  been  at  least  ten  to  one ;  but  not  the  slightest  military 
result  was  obtained. — (See  United  Service  Journal,  August,  1836,  p.  531.) 
We  will  now  turn  to  affairs  of  a  similar  character  on  our  own  coast. 
In  June,  1776,  Sir  Peter  Parker,  commanding  a  squadron  of  two  ships  of  fifty 
guns,  four  of  twenty-eight  guns,  two  of  twenty  guns,  and  a  bomb  ketch — in  all 
(according  to  their  rate)  two  hundred  and  fifty -two  guns — attacked  Fort  Moultrie, 
in  Charleston  harbor,  South  Carolina. 

It  is  stated  that  the  fort  mounted  "  about  thirty  pieces  of  heavy  artillery." 
Three  of  the  smaller  vessels  were  aground  for  a  time  during  the  action,  and  one 
of  them  could  not  be  floated  off,  and  was  in  consequence  burned  by  the  English. 
Deducting  this  vessel  as  not  contributing  to  the  attack,  and  supposing  the  other 
two  were  engaged  but  half  the  time,  the  English  force  may  be  estimated  at  two 
hundred  guns ;  or  reckoning  one  broadside  only,  at  one  hundred  guns  against 
thirty  guns. 

The  English  were  defeated  with  great  loss  of  life  and  injury  to  the  vessels ; 
while  the  fort  suffered  in  no  material  degree,  and  lost  but  thirty  men.  The  killed 
and  wounded  in  the  squadron  were  reported  by  the  commodore  to  be  two  hun- 
dred and  five ;  being  for  every  ten  guns  employed  against  them  more  than 
sixty-eight  men  killed  and  wounded — a  loss  more  than  eleven  times  as  great,  in 
proportion  to  the  opposing  force,  as  the  loss  at  the  battle  of  Trafalgar. 

In  September,  1814,  a  squadron  of  small  vessels,  consisting  of  two  ships  and 
two  brigs,  mounting  about  ninety  guns,  attacked  Fort  Boyer,  at  the  mouth 
of  Mobile  bay.  A  false  attack  was  at  the  same  time  made  by  a  party  of  marines, 
artillery,  and  Indians,  on  the  land  side.  The  fort  was  very  small,  and  could 
not  have  mounted  more  than  twenty  guns  on  all  sides,  nor  more  than  fifteen  guns 
on  the  water  fronts.  The  action  continued  between  two  and  three  houiv-i,  when 
one  of  the  ships,  being  so  injured  as  to  be  unmanageable,  drifted  ashore  under 
the  guns,  and  was  abandoned  and  burned  by  the  English;  the  other  vessels  re- 
treated, after  suffering  severely. 

There  were  ten  men  killed  and  wounded  in  the  fort ;  the  loss  on  the  other  part 
is  not  known. 

The  affair  of  Stonington,  during  the  last  war,  affords  another  instance  of  suc- 
cessful defence  by  a  battery.  In  this  case  there  were  only  two  guns*  (eigh teen- 
pounders)  in  a  battery  which  was  only  three  feet  high,  and  without  embrasures. 
The  battery,  being  manned  exclusively  by  citizen  volunteers  from  the  town, 
repelled  a  persevering  attack  from  a  sloop-of-war,  causing  serious  loss  and  damage, 
but  suffering  none. 

In  order  not  to  extend  this  branch  of  the  report  further,  I  beg  leave  to  refer 
for  a  detailed  account  of  the  attack  of  the  French,  in  1838,  on  the  castle  of  St. 
Juan  d'Ulloa,  to  the  document  above  referred  to. — (House  Doc.  206, 1st  session, 
26th  Congress,  p.  25.)  For  the  same  reason  I  abstain  from  introducing  several 
other  instances,  which,  though  interesting  and  instructive,  would  not  sensibly 
affect  the  argument. 

In  the  fact  quoted  above  there  is  no  illustration  of  the  effect  of  hot  shot, 
except  in  the  case  of  Gibraltar.  Iii  that  attack  the  floating  batteries  were 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  379 

made  proof  against  cold  shot,  and,  as  was  thought  by  the  constructor,  proof 
against  hot  shot  also  ;  and  so,  indeed,  for  a  time,  it  seemed.  It  was  conceived 
that  the  hot  shot,  when  buried  deep  in  the  closely  jointed  timbers,  would  scarcely 
communicate  flame,  and  that  it  would  not  be  difficult,  by  the  use  of  the  fire- 
engines  provided,  to  subdue  so  stifled  a  combustion. 

By  making  these  floating  batteries  impenetrable  to  shot,  it  was  supposed  they 
had  been  rendered  equal  in  perfectly  smooth  water  to  land  batteries,  gun  for  gun. 
And  so  they  might  then  have  been,  nearly,  had  the  incombustibility  of  the  lat- 
ter been  imparted  to  them.  But  now  resistance  to  fire  would  not  suffice ;  these 
floating  batteries  must  either  repel  these  horizontal  shells  from  their  bulwarks, 
or,  if  that  be  impossible,  permit  them  to  pass  through  both  sides.  Nothing  can 
be  better  calculated  to  exhibit  the  tremendous  effect  of  these  shells  than  a  ves- 
sel so  thicksided  as  to  stop  every  shell,  allowing  it  to  burst  when  surrounded 
by  several  feet  of  timber ;  and  there  can  be  no  greater  mistake  than  supposing 
that,  by  thickening  the  bulwarks  of  vessels-of-war,  or  fitting  up  steam-batteries 
with  shot-proof  sides,  the  effects  of  land  batteries  are  to  be  annulled  or  in  any 
material  degree  modified. 

This  branch  of  the  subject  will  be  summed  up  with  the  remark  that  the  facts 
of  history  and  the  practice  of  all  warlike  nations  are  in  perfect  accordance  with 
the  conclusions  of  theory.  The  results  that  reason  anticipated  have  occurred 
again  and  again.  And  so  long  as  on  the  one  side  batteries  are  formed  of  earth 
and  stone,  and  on  the  other,  ships  are  liable  to  be  swallowed  up  by  the  element 
on  which  they  float,  or  to  be  deprived  of  the  means  by  which  they  move — so 
long  as  they  can  be  penetrated  by  solid  shot,  set  on  fire  or  blown  up  by  hot  shot, 
or  torn  piecemeal  by  shells,  the  same  results  must  inevitably  be  repeated  at  each 
succeeding  trial. 

But  after  all,  it  may  be  urged  that  the  general  principle  herein  contended  for, 
namely,  the  superiority  of  batteries  in  a  contest  with  ships,  might  be  admitted, 
and  still  it  would  remain  to  show  that  batteries  constitute  the  kind  of  defence 
best  adapted  to  our  peculiar  wants.  This  is  true ;  and  I  will  now  proceed  to 
consider,  severally,  the  cases  to  which  defence  must  be  applied.  It  may  be  well, 
however,  first  to  recall  the  general  scope  of  the  preceding  argument.  It  has 
been  contended  that  floating  defences  should  not  be  relied  on — not  because 
they  are  actually  incompetent  to  the  duty,  but  because  they  cannot  fulfil  this 
duty  unless  provided  in  inordinate  numbers,  and  at  a  boundless  expense ;  and  I 
have  endeavored  to  show  that  this  remark  is  generally  true,  whether  the  defen- 
sive fleet  be  made  up  of  sea-going  vessels,  of  floating  batteries,  or  of  steam  bat- 
teries. I  have  next  urged  the  point  that  properly  planned  and  constructed  bat- 
teries are  an  overmatch  for  vessels-of-war,  even  when  greatly  inferior  to  them 
in  armament — sustaining  the  opinion  by  many  striking  examples,  and  explain- 
ing satisfactorily  instances  that  have  cast  any  doubt  on  such  contests. 

If  the  facts  and  reasoning  presented  do  not  convey  the  same  strong  convic- 
tions that  sway  my  own  mind,  it  must  be  because  I  have  obscured  rather  than 
illustrated  them ;  for  it  would  seem  to  be  impossible  that  facts  could  be  more 
•unexceptionable  or  reasons  more  beyond  the  reach  of  cavil.     However  that  may 
be,  I  now  leave  them  to  candid  and  dispassionate  revisal,  and  proceed  to  exam- 
ine the  mode  of  applying  these  defences  to  our  own  coasts. 
It  may  be  well  to  divide  these  into  several  distinct  classes. 
1.  There  will  be  all  the  smaller  towns  upon  the  coast,  constituting  a  very  nu- 
merous class. 

At  the  same  time  that  no  one  of  these,  of  itself,  would  provoke  an  enterprise 
of  magnitude,  it  is  still  necessary  to  guard  each  and  all  against  the  lesser 
attacks.  A  small  vessel  might  suffice  to  guard  against  single  vessels  that  would 
otherwise  be  tempted  by  the  facility  to  bum  the  shipping  and  exact  a  contribu- 
tion ;  but  something  more  than  this  is  necessary,  since  the  amount  of  temptation 
held  out  by  a  number  of  these  towns  would  be  apt  to  induce  operations  on  a 


380  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

larger  scale.  It  might  often  happen,  moreover,  that  our  own  vessels-of-war 
would  be  constrained  to  take  refuge  in  these  harbors,  and  they  should  find  cover 
from  the  pursuer. 

Although  the  harbors  of  which  we  now  speak  afford  every  variety  of  form 
and  dimension,  there  are  few,  or  none,  wherein  one  or  two  small  forts  and  bat- 
teries cannot  be  so  placed  as  to  command  all  the  water  that  a  ship-of-war  can  lie 
in,  as  well  as  the  channel  by  which  she  must  enter.  While  the  circumstances  of 
no  two  of  them  are  so  nearly  alike  as  not  to  modify  the  defences  to  be  applied 
to  them  severally,  all  should  fulfil  certain  common  conditions,  namely :  the  pas- 
sage into  the  harbors  should  be  strongly  commanded  ;  the  enemy  should  find  nc 
place  after  passing  wherein  he  would  be  safe  from  shot  and  shells ;  and  the 
works  should  be  inaccessible  to  sudden  escalade — that  is  to  say,  a  small  garri- 
son should  be  able  to  repel  such  an  assault.  With  works  answering  to  these 
conditions,  and  of  degrees  of  strength  in  accordance  with  the  value  of  their  re- 
spective trusts,  this  class  of  harbors  may  be  regarded  as  secure.  I  cannot, 
however,  here  avoid  asking  what  would  be  the  mode  of  defence,  if  purely  naval 
of  these  harbors  1  Suppose  the  circumstances  are  deemed  to  require  the  pres- 
ence of  a  frigate,  or  a  steam  frigate,  or  an  equivalent  in  gunboats ;  would  noi 
two  hostile  frigates  or  two  steam  frigates  infallibly  arrive  in  quest  ?  Could  then 
be  devised  a  system  more  certain  to  result  in  the  capture  of  our  vessels  and  th< 
submission  of  our  towns  1 

2.  Another  class  will  consist  of  great  establishments,  such  as  larger  cities 
naval  depots,  &c.,  situated  in  harbors  not  of  too  great  extent  to  admit  of  gooc 
defence  at  the  entrance,  and  also  at  every  successive  point,  so  that  an  enemj 
could  find  no  spot  within  which  he  could  safely  prepare  for  operations  ulterioi 
to  the  mere  forcing  an  entrance. 

In  this  class  are  to  be  found  objects  that  are  in  every  sense  of  the  highes 
value.  On  the  one  hand,  accumulations  of  military  and  naval  material,  anc 
structure  for  naval  accommodation  that  could  not  be  replaced  during  a  war 
which  are  of  indispensable  necessity  and  of  great  cost ;  and  on  the  other  hand 
the  untold  wealth  of  great  cities.  As  these  objects  must  be  great  in  the  eyes  o 
the  enemy — great  for  him  to  gain  and  for  us  to  lose — corresponding  efforts  01 
his  part  must  be  looked  for  and  guarded  against.  If  he  come  at  all,  it  will  b< 
in  power ;  and  the  preparations  on  our  part  must  be  commensurate. 

The  entrance  to  the  harbor  and  all  the  narrow  passes  within  it  must  be  occu 
pied  with  heavy  batteries  ;  and  if  nature  does  not  afford  all  the  positions  deemec 
requisite,  some  must,  if  practicable,  be  formed  artificially.  Batteries  shouh 
succeed  each  other  along  the  channel,  so  that  the  enemy  may  nowhere  fine 
shelter  from  effective  range  of  shot  and  shells  while  within  the  harbor,  evei 
should  he  succeed  in  passing  the  first  batteries.  Provided  the  shores  admit  thi 
disposition,  and  the  defence  be  supplied  with  an  armament  numerous,  heavy 
and  selected  with  reference  to  the  effect  on  shipping,  the  facts  quoted  fron 
history  show  that  the  defences  may  be  relied  on. 

If  the  mere  passing  under  sail  with  a  leading  wind  and  tide  one«or  even  tw< 
sets  of  batteries,  and  then  carrying  on  operations  out  of  the  reach  of  these  o 
any  other,  were  all,  the  enemy  might  perhaps  accomplish  it ;  but  the  presen 
supposition  is,  that  with  this  class  his  ulterior  proceedings,  and  finally  his  return 
are  to  be  subject  to  the  incessant  action  of  the  defences. 

.  3.  This  brings  us  to  consider  a  third  class,  consisting  of  establishments  o 
importance  situated  at  a  distance  up  some  river  or  bay,  there  being  intermediat 
space  too  wide  to  be  jcommanded  from  the  shores.  In  such  cases  the  defenc 
must  be  concentrated  upon  the  narrow  passes,  and  must,  of  course,  be  appoi 
tioned  in  armament  to  the  value  of  the  objects  covered.  When  the  value  is  no 
very  great,  a  stout  array  of  batteries  at  the  best  positions  would  deter  an  enenr 
from  an  attempt  to  force  the  passage,  since  his  advantage,  in  case  of  success 
would  not  be  commensurate  with  any  imminent  risk.  But  with  the  more  valu 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA- COAST   DEFENCES.  .381 

able  establishments  it  might  be  otherwise.  The  consequence  of  success  might 
justify  all  the  risk  to  be  encountered  in  rapidly  passing  in  face  of  batteries,  how- 
ever powerful.  This  condition  of  things  requires  peculiar  precautions  under  any 
system  of  defence.  If,  after  having  occupied  the  shores  in  the  narrow  places  in 
the  best  manner  with  batteries,  we  are  of  opinion  that  the  temptation  may  induce 
the  enemy,  notwithstanding,  to  run  the  gauntlet,  the  obstruction  of  the  passage 
must  be  resorted  to.  By  this  is  not  meant  the  permanent  obstruction  of  the 
passage;  such  a  resort,  besides  the  great  expense,  might  entail  the  ruin  of  the 
channel.  The  obstruction  is  meant  to  be  the  temporary  closing  by  heavy  float- 
ing masses. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  a  double  line  of  rafts,  each  raft  being  of  large  size  and 
anchored  with  strong  chains,  would  make  it  impossible  to  pass  without  first 
removing  some  of  the  obstructions ;  and  it  might  clearly  be  made  impossible  to 
effect  this  removal  under  the  fire  of  batteries.  Such  obstructions  need  not  be 
resorted  to  until  the  breaking  out  of  a  war,  as  they  could  then  be  speedily  formed 
should  the  preparation  of  the  enemy  be  of  a  threatening  nature. 

There  would  be  nothing  in  these  obstructions  inconsistent  with  our  use  of  part 
of  the  channel,  since  two  or  three  of  the  rafts  might  be  kept  out  of  line,  ready  to 
move  into  their  places  at  an  hour's  notice. 

The  greatest  danger  to  which  these  obstructions  would  be  exposed  would  be 
from  explosive  vessels,  and  from  these  they  might  be  protected  by  a  boom  or  a 
line  of  smaller  rafts  in  front. 

From  what  has  just  been  said,  it  will  be  perceived  that  when  the  inducements 
are  such  as  to  bring  the  enemy  forward  in  great  power,  and  efficient  batteries  can 
be  established  only  at  a  few  points,  we  are  not  then  to  rely  on  them  exclusively. 
In  such  a  case  the  enemy  should  be  stopped  by  some  physical  impediments,  and 
the  batteries  must  be  strong  enough  to  prevent  his  removing  these  impediments ; 
and  also  to  prevail  in  a  cannonade,  should  the  enemy  undertake  to  silence  the 
works.  Not  to  encumber  this  report  with  details  in  relation  to  these  channel 
obstructions,  I  beg  leave  to  refer  for  them  to  the  same  document  206,  page  34. 

It  may  be  repeated  here  that  such  expedients  need  not  be  resorted  to,  except 
to  cover  objects  of  the  highest  importance  and  value,  such  as  would  induce  an 
enemy  to  risk  a  large  expedition.  For  objects  of  less  importance  batteries  would 
afford  ample  protection.  It  will  be  remembered  that  this  last  power  is,  when  once 
established  in  any  position,  a  constant  quantity,  and  although  it  should  be  incom- 
petent to  effect  decisive  results  when  diffused  over  a  large  fleet,  may  be  an  over- 
match for  any  small  force  upon  which  it  should  be  concentrated.  At  the  same 
time,  therefore,  that  there  is  the  less  liability  to  heavy  attack,  there  will  be  in 
the  batteries  the  greater  capacity  of  resistance  to  others. 

It  must  not  be  urged,  as  a  reproach  to  fortifications,  that  in  the  case  we  are 
considering  they  are  obliged  to  call  in  aid  from  other  sources,  so  long  as  these 
aids  are  cheap,  efficient,  and  of  easy  resort.  By  the  mode  suggested  the  defence 
will  undoubtedly  be  complete,  every  chance  of  success  being  on  the  side  of  the 
defence  ;  that  is  to  say,  if  any  confidence  is  to  be  placed  in  the  lessons  of  experi- 
'  ence.  How,  on  the  other  hand,  will  the  same  security  be  attained  by  naval 
means  ?  Only,  as  before  shown,  by  keeping  within  the  harbor  a  fleet  or  squadron, 
or  whatever  it  may  be,  which  shall  be  at  all  times  superior  to  the  enemy  in 
number  of  guns. 

In  a  naval  defence  there  will  be  no  advantage  in  obstructions  of  any  sort,  for 
there  can  be  no  lessening  of  the  array  of  guns  in  consequence  of  such  obstruction, 
because  if  these  obstructions  are  under  the  fire  of  the  floating  defences,  the  enemy 
will  first  subdue  that  fire  and  then  remove  the  obstructions  at  his  leisure.  If 
this  fire  proves  too  powerful  for  the  enemy,  the  obstructions  will  have  been  un- 
necessary, and  will  serve  only  to  shut  up  our  own  fleet,  preventing  the  prompt 
pursuit  of  a  beaten  foe. 

4.  There  is  a  fourth  class,  consisting  of  harbors,  or  rather  bays  or  estuaries,  of 


382  ^  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

such  expanse  that  batteries  cannot  be  made  to  control  the  passage.  These  have 
been  before  spoken  of.  If  the  occupation  of  or  passage  through  these  rnu,st  be 
defended,  it  must  be  by  other  means  than  batteries  upon  the  shore.  The  reliance 
must,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  be  a  floating  defence  of  magnitude  at  least 
equal  to  the  force  the  enemy  may  bring.  The  complete  defence  of  each  of  these 
bays  would,  therefore,  involve  very  great  expense — certainly,  in  most  cases, 
greater  than  the  advantages  gained.  The  Chesapeake  bay  cannot,  for  instance, 
be  shut  against  a  fleet  by  fortifications ;  and  if  the  entrance  of  the  enemy  is  to  be 
interdicted,  it  must  be  by  the  presence  of  a  not  inferior  fleet  to  his  own.  Instead 
of  such  a  system,  it  will  be  better  to  give  up  the  bay  to  the  enemy,  confining  our 
defence  to  the  more  important  harbors  and  rivers  that  discharge  into  the  bay. 

By  this  system  not  only  will  these  harbors  be  secured,  but  the  defences  will 
react  upon  the  bay  itself,  and  at  any  rate  secure  it  from  predatory  incursions, 
because,  as  before  shown,  while  Hampton  roads  and  the  navy  yard  at  Norfolk 
are  well  protected,  no  enemy  would  proceed  up  the  bay  with  any  less  force  than 
that  which  could  be  sent  out  from  the  navy  yard.  In  certain  cases  of  broad 
waters,  wherein  an  enemy's  cruisers  might  desire  to  rendezvous  in  order  to  pro- 
secute a  blockade  or  as  a  shelter  in  tempestuous  weather,  there  may  be  positions 
from  which  sea-mortars  can  reach  the  whole  anchorage,  although  nothing  could 
be  done  with  guns.  A  battery  of  sea-mortars,  well  secured  from  escalade,  would 
in  such  a  case  afford  a  good  defence,  because  no  fleet  will  lie  at  anchor  within 
4he  range  of  shells. 

In  thus  distributing  the  various  exposed  points  of  the  sea-coast  into  general 
classes,  according  to  the  most  appropriate  modes  of  defence,  we  do  not  find  that 
anything  can  be  substituted  for  fortifications,  where  fortifications  are  applicable, 
and  we  find  them  applicable  in  all  the  classes  but  the  last,  and  in  the  last  we 
shall  find  them  indispensable  as  auxiliaries.  In  this  last  class  there  are,  no  doubt, 
some  cases  where  naval  means  must  constitute  the  active  and  operative  force ;  and 
it  is  probable  that  steam  batteries  may,  of  all  floating  defences,  be  most  suitable, 
as  before  stated. 

Before  proceeding  to  a  specification  of  the  positions  on  our  coast  requiring 
fortifications,  something  more  should  be  said  on  the  general  subject,  though  on 
another  branch,  namely :  the  proper  magnitude  and  strength  to  be  given  to 
these  fortifications. 

The  present  system  is  founded  on  this  principle,  to  wit :  That  the  fortifica- 
tions should  be  strong  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  the  objects  to  be  secured. 
The  principle  will  not,  I  suppose,  be  controverted,  although  the  mode  of  apply- 
ing it  may  be. 

There  will  hardly  be  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  mode  of  guarding  the 
less  important  points.  There  being  no  great  attraction  to  an  enemy,  works 
simple  in  their  features,  requiring  small  garrisons  only,  containing  a  moderate 
armament,  but  at  the  same  time  inaccessible  to  the  dashing  enterprises  that 
ships  can  so  easily  land,  and  which  can  be  persevered  in  for  a  few  hours  with 
much  vigor,  will  suffice.  Circumstances  must,  however,  materially  modify  the 
properties  of  these  works,  even  when  the  points  to  be  guarded  are  of  equal  value. 
In  one,  the  disadvantage  of  position  must  be  compensated  by  greater  power ;  in 
another,  natural  strength  may  need  little  aid  from  art ;  in  another,  greater  width 
in  the  guarded  channel  may  demand  a  larger  armament;  and  in  a  fourth, 
peculiar  exposure  to  a  land  attack  may  exact  more  than  usual  inaccessibility ;  but 
all  these  varieties  lie  within  limits  that  will  probably  be  conceded. 

As  to  the  larger  objects,  it  has  been  contended  that  there  has  been  exaggera- 
tion in  devising  works  to  cover  these,  the  works  having  been  calculated  for  more 
formidable  attacks  than  they  will  be  exposed  to. 

It  is  easy  to  utter  vague  criticisms  of  this  nature,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  rebut 
them  without  going  into  an  examination  as  minute  aa  if  the  criticisms  were  eve* 
so  precise  and  pertinent. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  383 

Bnt  let  us  look  a  little  at  the  material  facts.  What  is  the  object  of  an  enemy? 
What  are  his  means  1  What  should  be  the  nature  of  our  defences'? 

The  object  may  be  to  lay  a  great  city  under  contribution,  or  to  destroy  one 
of  our  naval  depots,  or  to  take  possession  of  one  of  our  great  harbors,  &c. 

It  was  estimated  that  in  the  great  fire  in  the  city  of  New  York  in  the 
year  1835,  the  property  destroyed  within  a  few  hours  was  worth  upward  of 
$17,000,000,  although  the  fire  Was  confined  to  a  very  small  part  of  the  city,  and 
did  not  touch  the  shipping.  Is  it  easy,  then,  to  estimate  the  loss  that  would 
accrue  from  the  fires  that  a  victorious  enemy  could  kindle  upon  the  circuit  of 
that  great  city,  when  no  friendly  hand  could  be  raised  to  extinguish  them  ?  or 
is  it  easy  to  overrate  the  tribute  such  a  city  would  pay  for  exemption  from  that 
calamity  ?  Can  we  value  too  highly  the  pecuniary  losses  that  the  destruction 
of  one  of  the  great  navy  yards  would  invoke  1  and  the  loss  beyond  all  pecuniary 
value  of  stores  and  accommodations  indispensable  in  a  state  of  war,  and  that  a 
state  of  war  could  hardly  replace  ? 

But  what  are  the  enemy's  means?  They  consist  of  his  whole  sea-going 
force,  which  he  concentrates  for  the  sake  of  inflicting  the  blow. 

"  From  the  nature  of  maritime  operations,  suck  a  fleet  could  bring  its  whole 
strength  to  bear  upon  any  particular  position,  and  by  threatening  or  assailing 
various  portions  of  the  coast,  either  anticipate  the  tardy  movements  of  troops 
upon  land  and  effect  the  object  before  their  concentration,  or  render  it  necessary 
to  keep  in  service  a  force  far  superior  to  that  of  the  enemy,  but  so  divided  as  to 
be  inferior  to  it  on  any  one  point"* 

We  have,  then,  objects  of  sufficient  magnitude,  and  the  means  of  the  enemy 
consist  in  the  concentration  of  his  whole  force  upon  one  of  these  objects. 

With  the  highest  notion  of  the  efficiency  of  fortifications  against  shipping, 
these  are  not  cases  where  any  stint  in  the  defensive  means  are  admissible. 
Having,  therefore,  under  a  full  sense  of  the  imminent  danger  to  which  the  great 
objects  upon  the  coast  are  exposed,  applied  to  the  approaches  by  water  an  array 
of  obstacles  worthy  of  confidence,  we  must  carefully  explore  all  the  avenues  by 
land,  in  order  to  guard  against  approaches  that  might  be  made  on  that  side  in 
order  to  evade  or  to  capture  the  works  guarding  the  channels. 

But  before  deciding  on  the  defences  necessary  to  resist  these  land  attacks,  it 
will  be  proper  to  estimate  more  particularly  the  means  that  an  enemy  may  be 
expected  to  bring  forward,  with  a  view  to  such  land  operations. 

History  furnishes  many  examples,  and  the  expedition  to  Flushing,  commonly 
called  the  Walcheren  expedition,  may  be  cited  as  peculiarly  instructive. 

From  an  early  day  Napoleon  had  applied  himself  to  the  creation  of  a  maritime 
force  in  the  Scheldt;  and  in  1809  he  had  provided  extensive  dockyards  and 
naval  arsenals  at  Flushing  and  at  Antwerp.  On  his  invasion  of  Austria  that 
year  he  had  drawn  off  the  masses  of  his  troops  that  had  before  kept  zealous 
watch  over  these  naval  preparations,  relying  now  on  forts  and  batteries,  and  on 
the  fortifications  of  Flushing  and  Antwerp  for  the  protection  of  the  naval 
establishments  and  of  a  fleet  containing  several  line-of-battle  ships  and  frigates 
•and  a  numerous  flotilla  of  smaller  vessels. 

The  great  naval  establishment  at  Flushing,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Scheldt, 
and  of  Antwerp,  some  sixty  or  seventy  miles  up  the  river,  with  the  vessels 
afloat  on  the  river  or  in  progress  in  the  yards,  presented  an  object  to  England 
worthy  of  one  of  her  great  efforts. 

The  troops  embarked  in  this  expedition  consisted  of  upwards  of  thirty-three 
thousand  infantry,  three  thousand  cavalry,  more  than  three  thousand  artillery, 
and  some  hundred  of  sappers  and  miners,  constituting  an  army  of  about  forty 
thousand  men. 


0  Mr.  Secretary  Cass. 


384  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

The  naval  portion  consisted  of  thirty-five  sail  of  the  line,  twenty-three  frigates, 
thirty-three  sloops-of-war,  twenty-eight  gun,  mortar,  and  bomb  vessels,  thirty- 
six  smaller  vessels,  and  eighty-two  gunboats,  making  a  total  of  one  hundred 
and  fifty-five  ships  and  other  armed  vessels,  and  eighty-two  gunboats.  The 
guns,  mortars,  &c.,  provided  for  such  bombardments  and  sieges  as  the  troops 
might  have  to  conduct,  amounted  to  one  hundred  and  fifty-eight  pieces,  with 
suitable  supplies  of  ammunition  and  stores  of  every  kind. 

>•,•; The  idea  of  sailing  right  up  to  their  object,  in  spite  of  the  forts  and  batteries, 
seems  not  to  have  found  favor,  notwithstanding  the  power  of  the  fleet.  The 
plan  of  operations,  therefore,  contemplated  the  landing  a  portion  of  the  army  on 
the  island  of  Walcheren,  to  carry  on  the  siege  of  Flushing,  while  another  portion 
proceeded  up  the  Scheldt,  as  high  as  Fort  Bartz,  which  was  to  be  taken;  after 
which  the  army  would  push  on  by  land  about  twenty  miles  further  and  lay 
siege  to  Antwerp,  all  of  which  it  was  thought  might  be  accomplished  in  eighteen 
or  twenty  days  from  the  first  landing. 

The  execution  did  not  accord  with  the  design.  Flushing,  it  is  true,  was  re- 
duced within  fifteen  days ;  and  in  less  than  a  week  from  the  debarkation  (which 
was  on  the  31st  of  July)  Fort  Bartz  was  in  possession  of  the  English,  having 
been  abandoned  by  the  garrison.  But  it  was  twenty-five  days  before  the  main 
body,  with  all  necessary  supplies  for  a  siege,  were  assembled  at  this  point  and 
ready  to  take  up  the  line  of  march  against  Antwerp.  Since  the  first  descent  of 
the  British  matters  had,  however,  greatly  changed. 

The  French  were  now  in  force;  they  had  put  their  remaining  defences  in 
good  condition ;  they  had  spread  inundations  over  the  face  of  the  country ;  and 
not  only  would  there  be  little  chance  of  further  success,  but  the  safety  of  the 
expedition,  formidable  as  it  was,  might  have  been  compromised  by  a  further 
advance;  it  was  therefore  decided  in  council  to  abandon  the  movement  against 
Antwerp ;  the  troops  accordingly  returned  to  the  island  of  Walcheren,  which 
they  did  not  finally  leave  till  the  end  of  December. 

The  failure  in  the  ultimate  object  of  the  expedition  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the 
omission  to  seize,  in  the  first  instance,  the  south  shore  of  the  river  and  capture 
the  batteries  there,  as  was  originally  designed,  and  which  was  prevented  by  the 
difficulty  of  landing  enough  troops  at  any  one  debarkation  in  the  bad  weather 
then  prevailing.  The  capture  of  these  batteries  would  have  enabled  the  expe- 
dition to  have  reached  Fort  Bartz  during  the  first  week ;  and,  in  the  then  unpre- 
pared state  of  the  French,  the  issue  of  a  dash  upon  Antwerp  can  hardly  be 
doubted. 

The  dreadful  mortality  that  assailed  the  British  army  is  wholly  unconnected 
with  the  plan,  conduct,  or  issue  of  the  enterprise  as  a  military  movement;  unless, 
indeed,  it  may  have  frustrated  a  scheme  for  occupying  the  island  of  Walcheren 
as  a  position  during  the  war. 

Possession  was  held  of  the  island  for  five  months ;  and  it  was  finally  aban- 
doned, from  no  pressure  upon  it  by  the  French;  although,  after  the  first  six 
weeks,  the  British  force  consisted,  in  the  aggregate,  of  less  than-  seventeen 
thousand  men,  of  which,  for  the  greater  part  of  the  time,  more  than  half  were 
sick — effectives  being  often  reduced  below  five  thousand  men. 

We  see,  therefore,  that  an  effective  force  of  less  than  ten  thousand  men  main- 
tained possession  of  the  island  in  the  face  of,  and  in  close  proximity  to,  the  most 
formidable  military  power  in  Europe,  for  more  than  three  months.  And  no 
reason  can  be  perceived  why  it  might  not  have  remained  an  indefinite  period 
while  possessed  of  naval  superiority. 

The  proximity  of  England  undoubtedly  lessened  the  expense  of  the  expedition ; 
but  it  influenced  the  result  in  no  other  way  material  to  the  argument. 

I  will  allude  to  no  other  instances  of  large  expeditious  sent  by  the  English  to 
distant  countries  than  the  two  expeditions,  each  of  about  ten  thousand  men, 
sent,  in  the  year  1814,  against  this  country — one  by  the  way  of  Canada,  the 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  385 

other  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  United,  in  a  single  force  of  twenty  thousand  men 
against  our  sea-coast,  the  expense  would  have  been  less  and  the  result  more 
certain. 

The  French,  notwithstanding  their  constant  naval  inferiority,  have  found 
opportunities  to  embark  in  great  undertakings  of  the  same  nature.  In  1802 
Leclerc  proceeded  to  St.  Domingo  with  thirty-four  line-of-battle-ships  and  large 
frigates,  more  than  twenty  small  frigates  and  sloops,  and  upwards  of  twenty 
thousand  men.  We-  learn  from  these  points  in  history  what  constitutes  an  object 
worthy  of  vast  preparations,  and  it  is  impossible  to  resist  the  fact  that  our  own 
coast  and  rivers  and  bays  possess  many  establishments  not  less  inviting  to  an 
enemy  than  Flushing  and  Antwerp. 

We  are  taught,  moreover,  what  constitutes  a  great  expedition ;  in  other  words, 
what  is  the  amount  of  force  we  must  prepare  to  meet.  And,  more  than  all,  we 
are  taught  that  such  an  expedition,  seizing  a  favorable  moment  when  the  military 
arrangements  of  a  country  are  incomplete,  when  the  armies  a*re  absent  or  imper- 
fect in  their  organization  or  discipline,  does  not  hesitate  to  land  in  the  face  of 
the  most  populous  districts ;  and  availing  of  the  local  peculiarities,  and  covered 
and  supplied  by  a  fleet,  to  undertake  operations  which  penetrate  into  the  country 
and  consume  considerable  time. 

It  seems,  therefore,  that  whenever  the  object  we  are  to  cover  possesses  a  value 
likely  to  provoke  the  cupidity  of  an  enemy,  or  to  stimulate  his  desire  to  inflict  a 
serious  blow,  it  is  not  enough  that  the  approaches  by  water  arc  guarded  against 
his  ships;  it  will  be  indispensable  to  place  safeguards  against  attacks  by  land 
also.  A  force  considerable  enough  for  very  vigorous  attacks  against  the  land 
tildes  of  the  fortifications  may  be  thrown  upon  the  shore;  and,  if  these  yield,  a 
way  is  opened  for  the  ships,  and  the  enemy  carries  his  object. 

In  certain  positions  the  local  circumstances  would  favor  the  land  operations 
of  an  enemy,  permitting  him,  while  operating  against  the  fortifications,  to  be 
aided  by  the  fleet  and  covered  from  the  reaction  of  the  general  force  of  the 
country.  In  other  positions  the  extreme  thinness  of  the  population  in  the 
neighborhood  would  require  the  forts  to  rely  for  a  considerable  time  solely  on 
their  own  strength.  In  all  such  cases  a  much  greater  power  of  resistance  would 
be  requisite  than  in  circumstances  of  an  opposite  nature.  In  all  such  circum- 
stances the  works  should  be  of  a  strength  adequate  to  resist  an  attack,  although 
persevered  in  vigorously  for  several  days.  But  when  these  land  operations  lead 
away  from  the  shipping,  or  when  the  surrounding  population  is  considerable,  or 
when  considerable  numbers  of  volunteers  or  regulars  can  be  speedily  drawn  in 
by  steamers  or  railroads,  or  the  enemy  is  unable  to  shelter  his  movements  by 
local  peculiarities,  then  it  will  suffice  if  the  work  can  withstand  vigorous  attacks 
for  a  lew  hours  only. 

The  magnitude  and  strength  of  the  work  will  depend,  therefore,  on  the  joint 
influence  of  the  value  of  the  objects  covered,  the  natural  strength  of  the  position, 
and  the  succor  to  be  drawn  from  the  country.  We  may  introduce,  as  instances, 
New  York  and  Pensacola.  The  former  is  as  attackable  as  the  latter;  that  is  to 
•  say,  it  equally  requires  artificial  defences;  and,  owing  to  its  capacious  harbor 
and  easy  entrance,  it  is  not  easy  to  place  it  in  a  satisfactory  condition  as  to  the 
approaches  by  water.  But,  while  an  enemy  in  approaching  any  of  the  principal 
works  by  land  could  not  well  cover  himself  from  the  attacks  of  the  concentrated 
population  of  the  vicinity,  the  rapid  means  of  communication  from  the  interior 
would  daily  bring  great  accession  to  the  defence.  A  land  attack  against  the 
city  must  consequently  be  restricted  to  a  day  or  two,  and  the  works  will  fulfil 
their  object  if  impregnable  to  a  coup  de  main. 

Pensacola,  an  object  in  many  respects  of  the  highest  importance,  and  growing 

in  consequence  every  day,  is  capable  of  being  defended  as  perfectly  as  the  city 

just  mentioned.     The  principal  defences  lie  on  a  long  sandy  island  which  closes 

in  the  harbor  from  the  sea.    An  enemy  landed  on  this  island  (Santa  liosa)  would 

H.  Rep.  Com.  86 25 


386  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

be  in  uninterrupted  communication  with  his  fleet,  could,  owing  to  the  spars* -nos.s 
of  its  population,  have  nothing  to  apprehend  for  some  lime  from  ;my  re-oiiforre- 
ments  arriving  at  the  place,  and  would  be  well  protected  by  position  from  the 
effects  of  this  succor  when  it  should  arrive 

While  in  possession  of  naval  superiority,  he  might,  therefore,  not  unreason- 
ably calculate  on  being  able  to  press  a  siege  of  many  days  of  the  work  which 
occupies  the  extremity  of  the  island  and  guards  the  entrance;  to  the  harbor.  And 
even  before  coming  into  possession  of  this  work,  his  gun  and.  mortar  batteries  on 
the  same  island  could  destroy  everything  not  bomb-proof  and  incombustible  at 
the  navy  yard. 

An  attack  not  less  persevering,  and  with  equal  chances  of  success,  might  be 
made  from  the  other  side  of  the  harbor  also. 

If,  therefore,  the  power  to  resist  a  coup  de  main  be  all  that  is  conferred  on 
the  works  at  Pensacola,  their  object  will  be  attained  only  through  the  forbear- 
ance of  the  enemy,  -it  being  obviously  indispensable  that  the  principal  of  these 
works  be  competent  to  resist  a  short  siege.  If  this  liability  resulted  from  the 
thinness  of  the  neighboring  population,  it  would  still  be  many  years  before  this 
state  of  things  would  be  materially  altered. 

But  it  does  not  depend  on  this  alone :  the  peculiar  topographical  features  will 
continue  this  liability  in  spite  of  increasing  numbers  and  ever  so  easy  and  rapid 
communication  with  the  interior,  it  having  been  proved  that  a  fleet  may  lie  broad 
off  this  shore  and  hold  daily  communication  therewith  during  the  most  tempes- 
tuous season.  The  English  fleet  of  men-of-war  and  transports  lay,  during  the 
last  war,  from  February  7  to  March  15,  1814,  anchored  abreast  of  Dauphin 
island  and  Mobile  Point,  where  the  exposure  is  the  same  as  that  off  Pensacola. 

Between  the  cases  cited,  which  may  be  regarded  as  the  class  of  extreme  cases, 
(a  class  comprising,  however,  many  important  positions,)  almost  every  conceivable 
modification  of  the  defence  will  be  called  for  to  suit  the  various  conditions  of  the 
several  points. 

The  fortifications  of  the  coast  must  therefore  be  competent  to  the  double  task 
of  interdicting  the  passage  of  ships  and  resisting  land  attacks — two  distinct  and 
independent  qualities.  The  first  demands  merely  an  array,  in  suitable  numbers 
and  in  proper  proportions,  of  heavy  guns  covered  by  parapets  proof  against  shot 
and  shells;  the  second  demands  inaccessibility.  As  there  is  nothing  in  the  first 
quality  necessarily  involving  the  last,  it  has  often  happened,  either  from  the 
little  value  of  the  position  or  from  the  supposed  improbability  of  a  land  attack, 
or  from  the  want  of  time  to  construct  proper  works,  that  this  property  of  inaccessi- 
bility has  been  neglected. 

Whenever  we  have  an  object  of  sufficient  value  to  be  covered  by  a  battery, 
we  should  bear  in  mind  that  the  enemy  will  know  the  value  of  the  object  as 
well  as  ourselves;  that  it  is  a  very  easy  thing  for  him  to  land  a  party  of  men 
for  an  expedition  of  an  hour  or  two ;  and  unless  we  take  the  necessary  preventive 
measures  his  party  will  be  sure  to  take  the  battery  first,  after  which  nothing 
will  prevent  his  vessels  consummating  the  design  it  was  the  puruqse  of  the 
battery  to  prevent.  In  general,  the  same  fortifications  that  guard  the  water 
approaches  will  protect  the  avenues  by  land  also ;  but  in  certain  cases  a  force 
may  be  so  landed  as  to  evade  the  channel  defences,  reaching  the  object  by  a 
route  entirely  inland.  Of  course  this  danger  must  be  guarded  against  by  suita- 
ble works  whenever  the  people  cannot  come  promptly  to  the  rescue. 

After  the  preceding  exposition  of  views  on  the  general  subject  of  the  defences 
of  the  coast,  it  may  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  indicate  the  mode  by  which  the 
system  of  fortifications  can  be  manned  and  served  without  an  augmentation,  for 
that  particular  purpose,  of  the  regular  army. 

The  force  that  should  be  employed  for  this  service  in  time  of  war  is  the  militia, 
(using  the,  term  in  a  comprehensive  sense,)  the  probability  being  that,  in  most 
of  the  defended  points  on  the  seaboard,  the  uniformed  and  volunteer  companies 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  387 

will  supply  the  garrisons  needed ;  and  it  may  be  slioAvn  that  it  is  a  service  to 
which  militia  are  better  adapted  than  to  any  other.  The  prominent  defect  of  a 
militia  force  results  from  the  impossibility  of  so  training  the  men  to  field  move- 
ments in  the  brief  period  of  their  service,  as  to  give  them  any  confidence  in 
themselves  as  manoeuvrers  in  the  face  of  regular  troops.  The  little  they  learn 
merely  suffices  to  show  them  that  it  is  -but  little ;  every  attempt  of  the  kind 
proving,  by  the  disorders  that  they  know  not  how  to  avoid,  how  much  greater 
would  be  the  disorder  if  in  the  face  of  an  enemy  and  under  fire. 

Without  the  knowledge  to  be  obtained  only  by  long  and  laborious  practice, 
the  militiaman  feels  that  he  is  no  match,  in  the  field,  for  the  regular  soldier,  and 
it  would  not  be  surprising  should  he  desire  to  avoid  an  encounter.  But  there  is 
no  such  difficulty  in  the  service  of  fixed  batteries ;  the  militiaman  lias  there  to 
be  taught  merely  the  service  of  a  single  gun,  than  which  nothing  can  be  more 
simple.  He  must  learn  to  use  the  rammer  and  the  sponge,  the  handspike  and 
the  linstock ;  to  load  and  to  run  to  battery,  to  trail  and  to  fire ;  these  are  all. 
Each  of  these  operations  is  of  the  utmost  simplicity,  depending  on  individual 
action  and  not  on  concert,  and  they  may  all  be  taught  in  a  very  short  time. 
There  is  no  manoeuvring,  no  marching,  no  wheeling.  The  squad  of  one  gun 
may  be  marched  to  another,  but  the  service  of  both  is  the  same.  Even  the  art 
of  pointing  cannon  is  to  an  American  militiaman  an  art  of  easy  attainment,  from 
the  skill  that  all  our  countrymen  acquire  in  the  use  of  fire-arms,  "drawing  sight" 
or  "aiming"  being  the  same  art,  modified  only  by  the  difference  in  the  gun. 

The  mode  of  applying  this  force  may  be  illustrated  by  the  case  of  any  of  our 
cities  on  the  seaboard.  The  forts  and  batteries  being  put  in  perfect  condition, 
should  be  garrisoned  by  a  small  body  of  regular  artillery,  such  as  a  moderate 
military  force  could  supply,  and  sufficient  for  the  preservation  of  the  public 
property,  and  to  afford  indispensable  daily  guards.  To  these  should  be  added 
two  or  three  men  of  the  ordnance  department,  especially  charged  with  the  con- 
dition of  the  armament  and  ammunition,  and  two  or  three  engineer  soldiers, 
whose  sole  duty  it  would  be  to  attend  to  the  condition  of  the  fortifications,  keep- 
ing every  part  in  a  state  of  perfect  repair.  In  certain  important  works,  however, 
that  would  be  liable  to  a  violent  assault,  or  exposed  to  siege,  or  to  analogous 
operations,  it  would  be  necessary,  especially  on  the  approach  of  a  war,  to  keep 
up  a  more  considerable  body  of  regular  troops.  The  volunteer  force  of  the  city 
should  then  be  divided  into  detachments,  if  possible,  without  disturbing  their 
company  organization,  and  should  be  assigned  to  the  several  works  according  to 
the  war  garrisons  required  at  each — from  four  to  six  men,  according  to  circum- 
stances, being  allowed  to  each  gun.  The  larger  works  might  require  ten,  fifteen, 
or  even  twenty  companies;  the  smaller  ones,  two,  three,  or  more  companies;  and 
in  some  cases  even  a  platoon  might  suffice.  Being  thus  occupied,  each  por- 
tion of  the  city  force  would  have  its  definite  alarm  post,  and  should  be  often 
taken  to  it  and  there  exercised  in  all  the  duties  of  its  garrison,  and  more 
especially  in  the  service  of  its  batteries,  and  in  its  defence  against  assault.  The 
multiplicity  of  steamboats  in  all  the  cities  would  enable  the  volunteers  to  reach 
even  the  most  distant  alarm  posts  in  a  short  time.  In  order  that  all  these  troops 
may  become  expert  in  their  duty,  one  of  the  works  most  convenient  to  the  city, 
beside  being  the  alarm  post  of  some  particular  portion  of  the  volunteers,  should, 
during  peace,  be  the  ordinary  school  of  drill  for  all ;  and  in  this  the  detachments 
should  in  turns  assemble  and  exercise. 

Beside  the  mere  manual  of  the  gun  and  battery,  there  should  be  frequent 
target  practice,  as  being  not  only  necessary  in  teaching  the  proper  use  of  the 
battery,  but  as  imparting  interest  and  excitement  to  the  service. 

It  might  be  necessary  for  a  time  to  submit  the  volunteers  to  the  drill  of  a 
competent  officer  or  non-commissioned  officer  of  the  regular  artillery ;  and  in 
particular,  to  conduct  the  practice  with  shot  and  shells  under  such  inspection. 


388  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

The  portion  of  the  military  force  of  the  city  not  stationed  in  the  fixed  Lat- 
teries would  constitute,  under  an  impending  attack,  a  reserve  posted  either  in 
one  or  several  bodies,  according*  to  circumstances,  ready  to  cover  exposed  points. 
to  co-operate  in  offensive  movements,  or  to  relieve  exhausted  garrisons  •  this 
portion  having  connected  with  it  the  mounted  force,  the  field  artillery,  and  the 
heavy  movable  guns. 

This  appropriation  of  the  volunteer  force  to  the  immediate  defence  of  the  city 
would  operate  in  the  most  favorable  way  upon  that  force,  superadding  to  the 
impulses  of  patriotism  every  feeling  connected  with  family  property  and  social 
and  civil  relations ;  and,  while  making  military  service  the  first  of  duties,  re- 
lieving it  of  hardship  and  privation. 

The  organization  of  volunteer  force  here  contemplated  may  comprehend  the 
whole  maritime  frontier,  and  be  applicable,  also,  at  the  more  populous  points 
upon  the  inland  borders. 

This  arrangement,  while  it  might  be  an  enduring  one,  would  be  the  least 
expensive  by  far  of  .any  that  would  be  efficient. 

The  days  of  exercise  drill  and  encampment  should  be  fixed  and  invariable, 
in  order  that  they  may  the  less  interfere  with  the  private  occupations  of  the 
volunteers.  During  an  impending  attack,  greater  or  less  portions  should  be 
constantly  at  their  posts ;  but  still  the  service  in  the  batteries  would  comprise 
but  a  very  small  portion  of  the  year. 

According  to  the  value  of  the  interests  to  be  defended,  and  the  extent  of  the 
works  to  be  occupied,  would  be  the  rank  of  the  chief  command,  which  should 
be  intrusted  to  an  officer  of  the  regular  army,  whose  control  might  often  be  ex- 
tended, advantageously,  over  a  certain  extent  of  seaboard  to  the  right  and  left, 
constituting  a  maritime  department. 

The  existing  fortifications  of  the  sea-coast — including  a  few  useless  remains 
of  the  revolutionary  works,  are  due  to  three  distinct  epochs,  namely  :  1.  Those 
that  grow  out  of  the  political  agitations  attending  the  French  revolution  of  1789, 
and  the  wars  consequent  thereon.  As  all  the  principal  harbors  had  to  be  pro- 
tected at  once,  the  contracted  fiscal  means  of  the  country  required  that  the 
works  should  be  small,  and  they  were  also  generally  of  a  temporary  character ; 
but  they  proved  sufficient.  France,  then  a  weak  naval  power,  was  moreover 
fully  occupied  at  home,  and  in  pressing  her  continental  campaign. 

2.  On  the  approach  of  the  war  of  1812,  the  obvious  inadequacy  of  existing 
forts  led  to  large  appropriations  for  fortifications,  so  that  when  the  war  broke 
out  there  was  not  a  town  of  any  magnitude  upon  the  coast  not  provided  with 
one  or  more  batteries.     Every  place  within  the  reach  of  an  enemy's  marauding 
expeditions  called  for  this  kind  of  protection ;   and  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
defences  supplied  saved  the  country  from  great  losses.     These  defences  of  the 
second  system  were  also  small  and  weak,  and,  being  built  for  the  sake  of  present 
economy,  of  cheap  materials  and  workmanship,  were  very  perishable.      The 
government,  aware  of  this  weakness,  called  out  to  their  support,  during  the  war, 
vast  bodies  of  militia  at  enormous  expense— covering  these  troops  with  exten- 
sive lines  of  field-works. 

3.  The  war  with  England  being  over,  the  government  promptly  entered  upon 
a  permanent  system  of  coast  defence,  and  to  that  end  constituted  a  board  of 
engineers,  with  instructions  to  make  examinations   and  plans,  subject  to  the 
revision  of  the  chief  engineer,  and  the  sanction  of  the  Secretary  of  War.     And 
it  is  this,  the  third  system,  that  has  been  ever  since   1816  in  the  course  of 
execution,  and  is  now,  as  we  shall  see,  well  advanced. 

Whenever  the  examinations  of  the  board  of  engineers  included  positions  for 
dock  yards,  naval  depots,  &c.,  naval  officers  of  rank  and  experience  were  asso- 
ciated with  them. 

The  board  devoted  several  years  uninterruptedly  to  the  duty — presenting 
successive  reports,  and  submitting,  first,  plans  of  the  fortifications  needed  at  the 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  389 

most  important  points.  Afterward,  they  Avere  sufficiently  in  advance  of  the 
execution  of  the  system  to  apply  most  of  their  time  to  the  duties  of  construction, 
giving  in  occasionally  additional  reports  and  plans.  In  rare  cases  it  has  happened 
that  plans  have  boon,  made  under  the  particular  direction  of  the  chief  engineer, 
owing  to  the  difficulty,  at  moments,  of  drawing  the  widely  dispersed  members 
of  the  board  from  their  individual  trusts. 

The  board  and  the  chief  engineer  arranged  the  defences  into  classes,  according 
to  their  view  of  the  relative  importance  of  the  proposed  works,  in  the  order  of 
time.  This  order  has  been  generally  well  observed  in  the  execution  of  the 
system,  with  the  exception  of  some  cases  in  which,  by  the  action  of  Congress, 
certain  forts  were  advanced  out  of  the  order  advised  by  the  board. 

For  many  years  grants  for  fortifications  were  made,  annually,  by  Congress  in 
a  gross  sum,  which  was  apportioned  according  to  the  discretion  of  the  President. 
But  since  March  3,  1821,  the  appropriations  have  been  specific,  the  grants  for 
each  work  being  particularly  stated.  For  many  years  every  new  fortification 
has,  before  being  made  the  object  of  appropriations,  been  sanctioned  by  a  special 
act  of  Congress  upon  recommendation  of  the  military  committee. 

The  classes  are  as  follows,  giving  now  merely  the  names  of  forts  and  places : 
the  cost,  armament,  &c.,  of  the  several  works  executed  or  projected  will  be 
given  at  the  end  in  proper  tables. 

Class  A  includes  certain  old  works  of  the  first  and  second  systems.  Some 
of  these  are  already  repaired,  some  undergoing  repairs,  and  some  subject  to 
repair,  should  a  war  impend  before  better  works  shall  have  been  substituted. 

Fort  Sullivan Eastport,  Maine. 

Edgecomb Wiscasset,  Maine. 

Preble Portland,  Maine. 

Scammel Portland,  Maine. 

McClary Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire. 

Constitution Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire. 

Gloucester,  Massachusetts. 

Pickering Salem,  Massachusetts. 

Lee Salem,  Massachusetts. 

Sewall Marblehead,  Massachusetts. 

Independence Boston  harbor,  Massachusetts. 

Winthrop Boston  harbor,  Massachusetts. 

West  Head  battery Governor's  Island,  Massachusetts. 

Southeast  battery Governor's  Island,  Massachusetts. 

New  Bedford,  Massachusetts. 

Wolcott Newport,  Rhode  Island. 

Greene Newport,  Rhode  Island. 

Trumbull New  London,  Connecticut. 

Hale New  Haven,  Connecticut. 

Columbus Governor's  Island,  New  York. 

Castle  Williams Governor's  Island,  New  York. 

South  battery Governor's  Island,  New  York. 

Gibson Ellis's  Island,  New  York. 

Wood Bedlow's  Island,  New  York. 

Richmond Staten  Island,  New  York. 

Tompkins Staten  Island,  New  York. 

Battery  Hudson Staten  Island,  New  York. 

Morton Staten  Island,  New  York. 

Fort  Lafayette Narrows,  New  York  harbor. 

Miffiin Delaware  river,  Pennsylvania. 

McHenry Baltimore  harbor,  Maryland. 

Madison Annapolis,  Maryland. 


390  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA- COAST    DEFENCES. 

Fort  Severn Annapolis,  Maryland. 

Washington Potomac  river,  Maryland. 

Johnson Cape  Fear  river,  North  Corolina. 

Castle  Pinckney Charleston  harbor,  South  Carolina. 

^Fort  Monltrie Charleston  harbor,  South  Carolina. 

Battery Beaufort,  South  Carolina. 

Fort  Jackson Savannah  river,  Georgia. 

Marion St.  Augustine,  Florida. 

Barrancas Pensacola,  Florida. 

St.  Philip Mississippi  river,  Louisiana. 

Class  B  includes  new  Avorks  (third  system)  completed,  or  so  nearly  com- 
pleted as  to  be  able  to  use  all  or  nearly  all  their  batteries,  viz : 

Fort  Warren Boston  harbor,  Massachusetts. 

Adams   Newport,  Rhode  Island. 

Sclmyler Throg's  Neck,  New  York  harbor. 

Hamilton New  York  harbor,  New  York. 

Monroe Old  Point  Comfort,  Virginia. 

Macon Beaufort,  North  Carolina. 

Caswell    Oak  Island,  North  Carolina. 

Pulaski .Cockspur  Island,  Georgia. 

Pickens Pensacola,  Florida. 

McRce Foster's  Bank,  Florida. 

Morgan Mobile  Point,  Alabama. 

Pike Rigolets,  Louisiana. 

Macomb  (formerly  Wood) Chef  Menteur,  Louisiana. 

Battery  Bienvenue,  Bayou  Bienveuue,  Louisiana. 

Tower  Dupre,  Bayou  Dupre,  Louisiana. 

Fort  Jackson Mississippi  river,  Louisiana. 

Livingston Barrataria  bay,  Louisiana. 

Class  C  includes  works  now  under  construction,  and  more  or  less  advanced, 
viz: 

Fort  Knox Bucksport,  Maine. 

Delaware Delaware  river,  Delaware. 

Carroll Seller's  Point,  Maryland. 

Calhoun Hampton  roads,  Virginia. 

Sumter Charleston  harbor,  South  Carolina. 

Clinch Cumberland  sound,  Georgia. 

Taylor Key  West,  Florida.      ' 

Jefferson Garden  Key,  Tortugas,  Florida. 

Redoubt  of  Fort  Barrancas Pensacola,  Florida. 

Fort  Games Dauphin  Island,  Alabama. 

C/ass  D  includi'S  works,  the  first  to  be  commenced,  arranged  in  geographical 
order,  viz 

Fort  at  mouth  of  Kemiebec  river,  and  Fort  Scammel,  (new,)  Portland  harbor 
Maine. 

Fort ,  (new,)  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire. 

Fort  Pickering,  (new,)  Salem;  Fort ,  (new,)  Jack's  Point,  Marblejiead; 

works  at  Provincetown,  and  New  Bedford,  Massachusetts. 

Fort  on  Rose  island,  Narraganset  roads,  Rhode  Island. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  391 

Fort  on  Sandy  Hook  Point,  New  York. 

Fort  on  Thomas's  Point,  Patuxent  river,  Maryland. 

Fort  at  Proctor's  Landing,  Louisiana. 

Works  at  G-alveston  bay,  and  Brazos  Santiago,  Texas. 

Class  E  includes  works  to  be  commenced  after  those  in  Class  D,  in  geo- 
graphical order,  viz  : 

New  Fort  Preble,  Portland  harbor,  Maine. 

Works  at  Gloucester ;  Closing  Broad  Sound  Pass,  Boston  harbor ;  works  at 
Gurnet  Point,  Plymouth,  Massachusetts. 

Works  at  Cedar  Point,  Potomac  river,  Maryland. 

Works  at  Georgetown,  and  in  Port  Royal  roads,  South  Carolina. 

Works  on  Tybee  island,  Savannah  river,  Georgia. 

Tower  at  Pass  an  Heron,  Alabama. 

Fort  at  Ship  island,  Mississippi. 

Works  at  Passa  Cavallo,  Matagorda  bay,  Texas. 

Class  F  includes  works  to  be  commenced  last  of  all,  also  in  geographical 
order,  viz : 

Works  at  Eastport  harbor,  Machias,  Mount  Desert  island,  Castine,  St. 
George's  bay,  Damariscotta  bay,  Broad  bay,  Sheepscot  bay,  Hog  Island  chan- 
nel, (Portland  harbor,)  mouth  of  Saco  river,  mouth  of  Kennebunk  river,  York, 
Maine. 

Works  at  Newburyport,  Beverly,  Naugus  Head,  (Salem,)  Fort  Sewall,  (Mar- 
blehead,)  Nantasket  Head,  (Boston  harbor,)  redoubt  on  Hog  island,  (Boston 
harbor,)  Nantucket,  Edgartown,  Falmouth,  Holmes's  Hole,  Tarpaulin  Cove,  Mas- 
sachusetts. 

Works  at  Conanicut  island,  and  works  closing  west  passage  of  Narraganset 
roads,  Rhode  Island. 

Fort  Griswold,  (New  London,)  works  at  mouth  of  Connecticut  river,  Fort 
Hale  and  Fort  Wooster,  (New  Haven,)  Connecticut. 

Works  for  harbors  and  towns  between  New  Haven  and  New  York  ;  works  in 
Gardiner's  bay,  Long  Island  sound;  works  in  Sag  Harbor;  fort  on  Wilkins's 
Point,  Long  Island  ;  redoubt  in  advance  of  Fort  Tompkins,  Staten  island,  New 
York. 

Fort  at  Delaware  breakwater,  Lewes ;  fort  opposite  Fort  Delaware,  Delaware 
river,  Delaware. 

Fort  on  Elk  river ;  works  on  Hawkins's  Point, below  Baltimore;  fort  on  Point 
Patience,  Patuxent  river;  works  at  St.  Mary's,  Potomac  river,  Maryland. 

Works  at  Bald  Head  and  Federal  Point,  Cape  Fear  river,  North  Carolina. 

Works  at  mouth  of  Sautee  river,  Bull's  bay  and  other  inlets,  Stono  sound, 
North  Edisto  sound,  South  Edisto  sound,  St.  Helena  sound,  South  Carolina. 

Works  at  Wassaw  sound,  Ossabam  sound,  St.  Catherine's  sound,  Sapelo 
sound,  Doley  inlet,  Altamaha  sound,  St.  Simon's-  sound,  St.  Andrew's  sound, 
Georgia. 

Works  at  Charlotte  harbor,  Tampa  bay,  Apalachicola  bay,  Apalachic  bay, 
St.  Joseph's  bay,  Santa  Rosa  bay,  Florida. 

Works  at  Perdido  bay,  Alabama. 

Being  arranged  in  the  preceding  classes,  on  the  principles  before  stated,  it 
will  be  seen  that  those  places  which  are  deemed  to  be  least  important  in  the 
system,  and  Avhich  may  be  postponed  till  all  others  are  executed,  constitute  by 
far  the  most  numerous  class.  Within  this  class  (F)  there  are,  no  doubt,  great 
differences  as  to  the  claim  for  defences,  and  in  the  .course  of  years  likely  to 
elapse  before  any  of  them  can  be  taken  in  hand,  several  may  rise  in  the  scale 
of  relative  importance. 

There  are  also  in  class  E  differences  of  the  same  sort,  and  it  is  not  unlikely 


392  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

that  before  they  can  be  commenced,  at  the  rate  the  system  has  heretofore  ad- 
vanced, there  may  be  interchanges  between  this  and  class  F. 

In  class  D,  however,  it  is  less  probable  that  there  will  be  a  material  change, 
as  all  the  positions  are  important  now,  being  designed  to  cover  large  towns  or 
cities,  or  national  establishments,  or  the  outlets  of  valuable  commerce  or  impor- 
tant roadsteads. 

I  proceed  now  to  examine  the  coast  in  detail,  proceeding  geographically, 
beginning  at  the  northeastern  extremely  and  referring  to  accompanying  tables. 
It  may  be  well  to  observe  here,  once  for  all,  that  much  confidence  is  not  asked 
for  the  mere  conjectures  presented  below  as  to  the  number  and  cost  of  the 
works  assigned  for  the  protection  of  the  harbors  which  have  not  yet  been  sur- 
veyed. In  some  cases  there  may  be  mistakes  as  to  the  number  of  forts  and 
batteries  needed ;  in  others  errors  will  exist  in  the  estimated  cost. 

Eastport  and  Macliias  may  be  mentioned  as  places  that  will  unquestionably 
be  thought  to  need  defensive  works  by  the  time,  in  the  order  of  relative  impor- 
tance, the  execution  of  them  can  be  undertaken  by  the  government.  There 
are  several  small  towns  eastward  of  mount  Desert  island  that  may,  at  that 
period,  deserve  equal  attention  ;  at  present,  however,  the  places  mentioned  will 
be  the  only  ones  estimated  for,  and  $100,000  will  be  assumed  as  the  cost  of 
each. 

Class  F — Mount  Desert  island,  situated  a  little  east  of  Penobscot  bay, 
having  a  capacious  and  close  harbor,  affording  anchorage  for  the  highest  class 
of  vessels,  and  easily  accessible  from  sea,  offers  a  station  for  the  navy  of  an 
enemy  superior  to  any  other  on  this  part  of  the  coast.  From  this  point  his 
cruisers  might  act  with  great  effect  against  the  navigation  of  the  eastern  coast, 
especially  that  of  Maine,  and  his  enterprises  could  be  conducted  with  great 
rapidity  against  any  points  he  might  select.  These  considerations,  added  to  the 
very  great  advantage,  in  certain  political  events,  of  our  occupying  a  naval 
station  thus  advanced,  whence  we  might  act  offensively,  together  with  the 
expedience  of  providing  places  of  succor  on  a  part  of  the-  coast  where  vessels 
are  so  frequently  perplexed  in  their  navigation  by  the  prevailing  fogs,  lead  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  fortification,  in  a  strong  manner,  of  this  roadstead  may, 
before  long,  be  necessary.  A  survey  of  this  island  was  begun  many  years  ago, 
but  the  party  being  called  off  to  other  duties  it  was  never  completed.  The 
project  of  defensive  works  has  not  been  made.  The  entire  cost  may  be,  as  as- 
sumed by  the  engineer  department  some  years  ago,  $500,000. 

Class  F — Castme. — It  would  seem  to  be  impossible  on  this  coast  to  deprive 
an  enemy  enjoying  naval  superiority  of  harbors,  or  prevent  him  using  them  as- 
stations  during  a  war,  insular  situations,  which  his  vessels  would  render  unap- 
proachable, being  so  numerous  ;  but  it  seems  proper  that  such  of  these  positions 
as  are  the  sites  of  towns  should  be  secured.  During  the  last  war,  the  English 
held  the  position  of  Castine  for  some  time,  and  left  it  at  their  pleasure.  It  is 
probable  a  work  costing  about  $50,000  would  deter  an  enemy  from  again  making 
choice  of  this  position. 

Class  F — Penobscot  bay. — Upon  this  bay,  and  upon  the  river  of  the  same 
name  flowing  into  it,  are  several  flourishing  towns  and  villages.  Of  the  many 
bays  which  intersect  the  coast,  the  Penobscot  is  the  one  which  presents  the 
greatest  number  of  safe  and  capacious  anchorages.  As  before  observed,  a  large 
portion  of  these  harbors  must,  for  the  present,  be  left  without  defences,  but  the 
valuable  commerce  of  the  bay  and  river  must  be  covered ;  and  to  afford  a  secure 
retreat  for  such  vessels  as  may  be  unable  to  place  themselves  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  works  to  the  east  or  west  of  the  bay,  the  passage  of  the  river  must, 
be  defended.  The  lowest  point  at  which  this  can  be  done  without  great  expense, 
is  opposite  Bucksport,  at  the  Narrows.  Fwrt  Knox,  at  this  position,  is  now  un- 
der construction,  estimated  at  $500,000. 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  393 

Class  C — *S^.  George's  bay,  Broad  Lay,  Damariscotta,  and  ShcepscoL — 
West  of  the  Penobscot  occur  the  above-mentioned  bays,  all  being  dee])  inden- 
tations leading  to  towns,  villages,  and  various  establishments  of  industry  and 
enterprise.  The  bays  have  not  been  surveyed,  and  of  course  no  plans  have  been 
formed  for  their  defence.  $400,000  are  assigned  to  the  defence  of  these  waters. . 
The  Sheepscot  is  an  excellent  harbor  of  refuse  for  vessels  of  every  size. — 
(Class  F.) 

Kcnncbcc  river. — This  river  (one  of  the  largest  in  the  eastern  States)  enters 
the  sea  nearly  midway  between  Cape  Cod  and  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Croix.  It 
rises  near  the  source  of  the  Chandiere,  which  is  a  tributary  of  the  St.  Lawrence, 
and  has  once  served  as  a  line  of  operations  against  Quebec.  The  situation  and 
extent  of  this  river,  the  value  of  its  products,  and  the  active  commerce  of  several 
very  flourishing  towns  upon  its  banks,  together  with  the  excellence  of  the  har- 
bor within  its  mouth,  will  not  permit  its  defence  to  be  neglected.  The  surveys 
begun  many  years  ago,  were  never  finished.  The  estimated  cost  of  defences,  as 
formerly  reported  by  the  engineer  department,  was  $300,000.  Positions  near 
the  mouth  will  permit  a  secure  defence. — (Class  D.) 

Portland  harbor. — The  protection  of  the  town,  of  the  merchantmen  belonging 
to  it,  and  of  the  ships-of-war  that  may  be  stationed  in  this  harbor  to  watch  over 
this  part  of  the  coast,  or  that  may  enter  for  shelter,  (all  of  them  important  ob- 
jects,) may  be  secured,  as  an  inspection  of  the  map  of  the  harbor  will  show,  by 
occupying  Fort  Preble  Point,  House  island,  Hog  Island  ledges,  and  Fish  Point. 
If  the  two  channels  to  the  west  and  east  of  Hog  island  can  be  obstructed  at 
small  expense,  (to  decide  which  some  surveys  are  yet  necessary,)  there  will  be 
no  necessity  for  a  battery  on  the  ledge,  and  Fish  I3oirit  need  be  occupied  only 
by  such  works  as  may  be  thrown  up  in  time  of  war.  The  expense,  as  now  esti- 
mated, of  the  works  planned  for  this  defence,  will  be  $155,000  for  Fort  Preble 
and  $48,000  for  House  island;  for  Hog  Island  channel,  say  $135,000. — (Classes 
A,  I),  E,F.) 

In  addition,  there  must  be  repairs  immediately  applied  to  the  old  works  at 
Fort  Preble,  including  the  rebuilding  of  a  sea-wall  lately  overthrown,  at  an  ex- 
pense of  $7,500. 

Saco,  Kenncbunk,  and  York. — Small  works,  comparatively,  will  cover  these 
places ;  $75,000  is  assumed  as  the  aggregate  cost. 

Class  F— Portsmouth  harbor  and  navy  yard. — The  only  good  roadstead  or 
harbor,  between  Cape  Elizabeth  and  Cape  Ann,  is  Portsmouth  harbor,  within 
the  mouth  of  the  Piscataqua  river.  Line-of-battle  ships  can  ascend  as  high  as 
Fox  Point,  seven  miles  above  the  town.  This  situation,  sufficiently  commodious 
for  a  naval  depot,  should  be  maintained  ;  but  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  bay 
to  the  south  of  Fox  Point  was  not  chosen  as  the  site  of  the  navy  yard,  instead 
of  Fernald's  island.  Being  where  it  is,  it  will  be  necessary,  in  time  of  Avar,  to 
make  some  particular  dispositions  for  the  protection  of  the  navy  yard  from  an 
attack  from  the  north  shore  of  the  river. 

The  position  of  Fort  Constitution  will  certainly,  and  that  of  Fort  McClary 
will  probably,  be  occupied  as  the  defence;  though  the  Avorks  themselves  should 
give  place  to  those  that  would  better  fulfil  the  object.  The  other  positions  for 
forts  or  batteries,  are  Gerrist's  Point,  Fishing  island,  and  Clarke's  island,  some, 
if  not  all,  of  Avhich  must  be  occupied.  Surveys  have  been  made  and  projects 
for  the  defence  are  IIOAV  under  the  consideration  of  the  board  of  engineers.  The 
estimates  have  not  been  furnished,  but  there  is  reason  for  believing  that  the  en- 
tire cost  for  fortifying  this  harbor  Avill  not  fall  short  of  $300,000. 

Class  D — Newburyport  harbor. — The  points  forming  the  mouth  of  the  harbor 
are  continually  changing,  and  it  seems  necessary,  therefore,  to  rely,  for  the  de- 
fence of  the  harbor,  on  works  to  be  thrown  up  during  a  Avar.  There  is  only  a 
shoal  draught  of  Avater.  It  is  thought  $100,000  will  defend  this  harbor  ade- 
quately. 


394  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

Class  F — Gloucester  harbor. — The  position  of  this  harbor,  near  the  extremity 
of  Cape  Ann,  places  it  in  close  relation  with  the  navigation  of  all  Massachusetts 
bay,  and  imparts  to  it  considerable  importance.  No  surveys  have  yet  been 
made,  but  it  is  believed  that  sufficient  defence  may  be  provided  for  $200,000. — 
(Class  E.)  Should  there  be  any  occasion  for  defensive  works  before  the  pro- 
posed new  works  can  be  commenced,  an  expenditure  of  $10,000  in  repairs  of 
the  old  fort  will  be  required. — (Class  A.) 

Beverly  harbor. — This  harbor  will  be  defended  chiefly  by  a  portion  of  the 
works  designed  for  Salem.  $50,000  in  addition  will  secure  it. — (Class  F.) 

Salem  harbor. — The  port  of  Salem  is  distant  from  Marblehead  two  miles,  and 
separated  therefrom  by  a  peninsula.  The  occupation  of  the  extremity  of  Winter 
island  (where  are  the  ruins  of  Fort  Pickering')  on  one  side,  and  Xaugus  Head  on 
the  other,  wrill  effectually  secure  this  harbor.  Projects  have  been  presented  for 
this  defence,  estimated  to  cost  $'225,000. — (Classes  D  and  F.)  On  a  sudden 
emergency  old  Fort  Lee  may  be  put  in  an  effective  state  for  82,000,  and  Fort 
Pickering  for  $5,000. — (Class  A.) 

Marblehead  harbor. — Besides  covering,  in  some  measure,  the  harbor  of  Bos- 
ton, Salem  and  Marblehead  possess  an  important  commerce  of  their  own,  and 
also  afford  shelter  for  vessels  prevented  by  certain  winds  from  entering  Boston 
or  pursuing  their  course  eastward.  The  proposed  mode  of  defending  Marble- 
Lead  harbor  consists  in  occupying,  on  the  north  side,  the  hillock  which  com- 
mands the  present  Fort  Sewall,  (which  will  be  superseded  by  the  new  work,) 
and  on  the  south,  the  position  of  Jack's  Point.  The  two  works  will  cost 
$318,000.— (Classes  D  and  F.) 

To  repair  old  Fort  Sewall,  which  maybe  necessary  if  the  new  works  are  not 
soon  begun,  will  require  ten  thousand  dollars. — (Class  A.) 

Boston  harbor. — We  come,  now,  to  the  most  important  harbor  in  the  eastern 
section  of  the  coast,  and  considering  the  relations  to  general  commerce  and  the 
interests  of  the  navy,  one  of  the  most  important  in  the  whole  Union. 

After  a  careful  examination  of  all  the  necessary  conditions  of  such  a  problem, 
the  board  of  naval  officers  and  engineers,  in  their  joint  report  of  1820,  gave  this 
harbor  a  preference  over  all  other  positions  to  the  east,  and  inclusive  of  New 
York  bay  and  the  Hudson,  as  the  seat  of  the  great  northern  naval  depot;  and 
the  government,  by  the  great  additions  and  improvements  that  have  from  year 
to  year  been  since  made  to  the  navy  yard  on  the  Charlestown  side,  have  virtu- 
ally sanctioned  the  recommendation  of  the  board.  But  independent  of  the  navy 
yard,  Boston  is  a  city  of  great  wealth,  and  possesses  an  extensive  and  active 
commerce. 

The  old  works  defended  merely  the  interior  basin  from  attacks  by  water,  but 
as  it  often  happens  that  vessels  enter  Nantasket  roads  with  a  wind  too  scant  to 
take  them  to  the  city,  or  are  detained  in  President  roads  by  light  winds  or  an 
adverse  tide,  as  the  former  especially  is  a  very  convenient  anchorage  whence  to 
proceed  to  sea,  and  above  all  as  Nantasket  roads  afford  the  best  possible  station 
for  a  blockading  squadron,  it  was  deemed  indispensable  to  place  permanent  de- 
fences at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  The  project  of  defence  regards  the  existing 
works,  with  the  necessary  repairs  and  modifications,  as  constituting  a  second 
barrier. 

Besides  a  permanent  work  now  almost  finished  on  George's  island,  it  contem- 
plates permanent  works  on  Nantasket  Head,  and  filling  up  the  Broad  Sound 
channel,  so  as  to  leave  no  passage  in  that  direction  for  sHips-of-war. 

Until  the  best  draught  for  steam  vessels-of-war  shall  be  well  ascertained,  it 
will  not  be  safe  to  say  to'  what  depth  the  Broad  Sound  channel  should  be  re- 
stricted, nor  indeed  can  it  be  positively  asserted  that  this  description  of  vessels 
can  be  conveniently  excluded  by  such  means.  Other  vessels  can,  however,  be 
thus  excluded,  and  steam  vessels  passing  this  channel  would  still  have  to  pass 
the  inner  barrier.  The  estimated  cost  of  the  works  for  this  harbor  is  §1,354,573. 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  395 

Besides  the  works  of  a  permanent  character,  it  will  be  necessary  in  the  be- 
ginning of  a  war  to  erect  several  temporary  works  on  certain  positions  in  the 
harbor  and  on  the  lateral  approaches  to  the  navy  yard. — (Classes  A,  B,  E,  and  F.) 

Plymouth  and  Provincetown  harbors. — These  harbors  have  a  commerce  of 
some  consequence  of  their  own,  but  they  are  particularly  interesting  in  reference 
to  the  port  of  Boston.  While  these  are  undefended,  an  enemy's  squadron 
blockading  Massachusetts  bay  will  have  ports  of  refuge  under  his  lee,  which 
would  enable  him  to  maintain  his  blockade  even  throughout  the  most  stormy 
seasons,  knowing  that  the  winds  which  would  force  him  to  seek  shelter  would 
be  adverse  to  outward  bound  and  fatal  to  such  inward-bound  vessels  as  should 
venture  near  the  cape.  Were  the  enemy  deprived  of  these  harbors  he  would  be 
unable  to  enforce  a  vigorous  investment,  as  he  must  be  constrained  to  take  an 
offing  on  every  approach  of  foul  weather.  Our  own  vessels  coming  in  from  sea, 
and  finding  an  enemy  interposed  between  them  and  Boston,  or  being  turned 
from  their  course  by  adverse  winds,  would,  in  case  of  the  defence  of  these  ports, 
find  to  the  south  of  Boston  shelter  equivalent  to  those  provided  in  the  east  at 
Marblehead,  Salem,  Gloucester,  and  Portsmouth.  Plymouth  harbor  has  not 
been  fully  surveyed.  Provincetown  harbor  has  been  surveyed,  but  the  projects 
of  defence  have  not  been  formed.  The  former,  it  is  thought,  may  be  suitably 
covered  by  a  work  of  no  great  cost  on  Gurnett  Point,  while  to  fortify  Province- 
town  harbor  in  such  a  way  as  to  cover  vessels  taking  shelter  therein,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  deprive  an  enemy  of  safe  anchorages,  will  involve  considerable  ex- 
pense. Probably  no  nearer  estimate  can  be  formed  at  present  than  that  offered 
by  the  engineer  department  some  years  ago,  which  gave  one  hundred  thousand 
dollars  to  Plymouth  and  six  hundred  thousand  dollars  for  Provincetown. — 
(Classes  D  and  E.) 

The  coast  between  Cape  Cod  and  Cape  Hatteras  differs  from  the  northeastern 
section  in  possessing  fewer  harbors,  in  having  but  little  rocky  and  a  great  por- 
tion of  sandy  shore,  in  its  milder  climate  and  clearer  atmosphere ;  and  it  differs 
from  all  the  other  portions,  in  the  depth  and  magnitude  of  its  interior  seas  and 
sounds,  and  in  the  distance  to  which  deep  tide  navigation  extends  up  its  numer- 
ous large  rivers.  The  circuit  of  the  coast,  not  including  the  shores  of  the  great 
bays,  measures  about  six  hundred  and  fifty  miles. 

Martha's  Vineyard  sound. — To  the  south  of  Cape  Cod  lie  the  islands  of 
Nantucket  and  Martha's  Vineyard,  which,  with  several  smaller  islands  on  the 
south,  and  the  projection  of  Cape  Malabar  on  the  east,  enclose  the  above-named 
sound.  The  channels  through  this  sound  being  sufficient  for  merchant  vessel.-. 
and  one  of  the  channels  permitting  the  passage  even  of  small  frigates,  are  not 
only  the  constant  track  of  coasting  vessels,  but  also  of  large  number  of  vessel- 
arriving  in  the  tempestuous  months  from  foreign  voyages.  There  are  within 
the  sound  the  harbors  of  Tarpaulin  Cove,  Holmes 's  Hole,  Rdgartown,  Falmoutli. 
Hyannis,  and  Nantuckct,  besides  small  anchorages. 

In  addition  to  the  many  thousand  vessels  passing  this  water  annually,  of 
which  there  are  sometimes  forty  or  fifty  (a  portion  containing  very  valuable 
cargoes)  to  be  seen  in  the  harbors  awaiting  a  change  of  wind,  there  is  supposed 
to  be  at  least  forty  thousand  tons  of  whaling  vessels  owned  in  the  towns  of  this 
sound. 

^  If  the  harbors  just  named  are  to  be  defended  at  all  it  must  be  by  fortifications. 
There  is  little  or  no  population  except  in  the  towns,  and  even  this  is  believed  to 
be  entirely  without  military  organization.  A  privateer  might  run  into  either  of 
these  harbors  and  capture,  destroy,  or  levy  contributions  at  pleasure.  The  use 
of  the  sound  itself  as  an  anchorage  for  vessels-of-war  cannot  be  prevented  by 
fortifications  alone.  Two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars  may  perhaps  suf- 
fice for  the  defence  of  all  the  harbors  against  the  kind  of  enterprise  to  which 
they  are  exposed. — (Class  F.) 

New  Bedford  and  Fairhaven  harbor. — Projects  and  estimates  have  been 


396  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

made  for  the  defence  of  this  harbor,  on  which  lie  two  of  the   most 

towns  in  the  eastern  States,  New  Bedford  being,  as  regards  registered  tonnage 

the  third  harbor  in  the  United  States.     Estimate  8,208,000. — (Class  D.) 

Buzzard's  bay. — Interposed  between  tlie  main  and  the  island  of  Martha'; 
Vineyard  or  the  Elizabeth  islands,  which  bound  Buzzard's  bay  on  the  south 
This  bay  covers  the  harbor  of  Xew  Bedford,  and  might  be  used  as  an  anchoragi 
by  an  enemy's  fleet,  but  it  is  too  wide  to  be  defended  by  fortifications. 

^arragansct  bay. — Some  of  the  properties  of  this  great  roadstead  have  beei 
stated  in  the  preceding  remarks. 

The  defence  adopted  for  Xarraganset  roads  must  be  formidable  on  the  im 
portant  points,  because  they  will  be  exposed  to  powerful  expeditions.  Althoud 
the  possession  of  this  harbor,  the  destruction  of  the  naval  establishment,  th 
capture  of  the  floating  defences,  and  the  possession  of  the  island  as  a  place  o 
debarkation  and  refreshment,  should  not  be  considered  as  constituting  of  them 
selves  objects  worthy  a  great  expedition,  they  might  very  w^ell  be  the  prelim 
inary  steps  of  such  expedition;  and  defences,  weak  in  their  character,  rnigli 
tempt  rather  than  deter  it;  for  although  unable  to  resist  his  enterprise,  the; 
might  be  fullv  competent,  after  being  captured  and  strengthened  by  such  mean 
as  he  would  have  at  hand,  to  protect  him  from  offensive  demonstrations  on  ou 
part. 

There  are  besides,  in  the  local  circumstances,  some  reasons  why  the  work 
should  be  strong.  The  channel  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  island  being  perms 
nently  closed  by  a  solid  bridge,  requires  no  defensive  works ;  but  this  bridg 
being  the  upper  end  of  the  island,  the  channel  is  open  to  an  enemy  all  along  th 
eastern  shore  of  the  island.  Works  erected  for  the  defence  of  the  channel  c 
the  west  side  of  the  island  cannot,  therefore,  prevent  nor  even  oppose  a  landin 
on  the  eastern  side.  The  enemy  may,  consequently,  take  possession,  and  ben 
his  whole  force  to  the  reduction  of  the  forts  on  the  island,  which  cannot  be  n 
lieved  until  a  force  has  been  organized,  brought  from  a  distance,  conveyed  b 
water  to  the  points  attacked,  and  landed  in  the  face  of  his  batteries;  all  thi 
obviously  requiring  several  days,  during  which  the  forts  should  be  capable  r 
holding  out.  To  do  this  against  an  expedition  of  ten  thousand  or  twenty  thoi 
sand  men  demands  something  more  than  strength  to  resist  a  single  assaul 
Unless  the  main  works  be  competent  to  withstand  a  siege  of  a  few  days,  the 
will  not,  therefore,  fulfil  their  trust,  and  will  be  worse  than  useless. 

It  must  here  be  noticed  that,  although  the  works  do  not  prevent  the  landin 
of  an  enemy  on  Rhode  Island,  they  will,  if  capable  of  resisting  his  efforts  for 
few  days,  make  his  residence  on  the  island  for  any  length  of  time  impossibh 
since  forces  in  any  number  may  be  brought  from  the  main,  and  landed  und< 
cover  of  the  fire  of  the  works. 

To  come  now  to  the  particular  defences  proposed  for  this  roadstead.  It  mus 
be  stated  that  there  are  three  entrances  into  Narraganset  roads : 

1st.  The  eastern  channel,  which  passes  upon  the  east  side  of  the  island  < 
Rhode  Island.  This,  as  before  stated,  being  shut  by  a  solid  bridge,  needs  n 
defence  by  fortificotions,  other  than  a  field-work  or  two,  which  may  be  throw 
up  at  the  opening  of  a  war. 

2d.  The  central  channel,  which  enters  from  sea  by  passing  between  Rhoc 
Island  and  Conanicut  island.  This  is  by  far  the  best  entrance,  and  leads  to  th 
.best  anchorage;  and  this  it  is  proposed  to  defend  by  a  fort  on  the  east  side  ( 
the  entrance,  designed  to  be  the  principal  work  in  the  system.  This  worl 
called  Fort  Adams,  is  nearly  completed.  On  the  Avest  side  of  the  entrance  it 
proposed  to  place  another  work,  and  on  an  island,  called  Rose  island,  facing  tli 
entrance,  a  third  work.  It  is  also  proposed  to  repair  the  old  fort  on  Goat  islan< 
just  within  the  mouth;  and  also  old  Fort  Green,  which  is  a  little  higher  up  o 
the  island  of  Rhode  Island. 

3d.  As  to  the  western  passage,  three  modes  present  themselves :  first,  by  n 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  397 

ducing  tlie  depth  of  water  by  an  artificial  ledge,  so  as,  while  the  passage  shall 
be.  as  free  as  it  is  now  for  the  coasting-  trade,  it  shall  be  shut  as  to  the  vessel— 
of-war,  including  steam  vessels  ;  second,  by  relying  on  fortifications  alone  to 
close  the  channel ;  or,  third,  by  resorting  in  part  to  one,  and  in  part  to  the  other 
mode  just  mentioned.  Either  is  practicable ;  but,  being  the  least  expensive  and 
most  certain,  the  estimates  are  founded  on  the  first.  The  total  cost  of  the  Nar- 
raganset  defences  is  estimated  at  $1,699,000.: — (Classes  A,  B,  D,  F.) 

Gardiner's  bay. — It  is  uncertain  whether  this  harbor,  which  would  be  a  very 
valuable  one  to  an  enemy  investing  this  part  of  the  coast,  is  defensible  by  forti- 
fications alone.  After  it  shall  have  been  surveyed,  it  may  appear  that,  from  one 
or  more  positions,  the  whole  anchorage  may  be  controlled  by  heavy  sea-mortars. 
In  such  a  case,  the  defensive  works  would  not  be  costly.  If  it  be  found  expe- 
dient to  fortify  some  particular  portion  of  the  bay  as  an  anchorage  for  steam 
batteries,  (which,  however,  is  not  anticipated,)  the  expense  would  probably  be 
as  great  as  was  anticipated  some  years  since  by  the  engineer  department,  viz  : 
$400,000.— (Class  F.) 

Sag  Harbor,  New  York,  and  Stonington,  Connecticut. — Neither  of  these 
harbors  has  been  surveyed  with  reference  to  defence.  The  first  is  possessed  of 
considerable  tonnage  ;  and  the  second,  beside  being  engaged  in  commerce,  is  the 
terminus  of  a  railroad  from  Boston.  $100,000  may  be  assigned  to  the  first,  and 
$200,000  to  the  other. — (Classes  E  and  F.) 

New  London  harbor  is  very  important  to  the  commerce  of  Long  Island  sound  ; 
and,  as  a  port  of  easy  access,  having  a  great  depth  of  water,  rarely  freezing, 
and  being  easily  defended,  it  is  an  excellent  station  for  the  navy.  It  is  also 
valuable  as  a  shelter  for  vessels  bound  out  or  home,  and  desirous  of  avoiding  a 
blockading  squadron  off  Sandy  Hook.  The  plan  of  defence  includes  the  re- 
building of  Forts  Trumbull  and  Griswold — the  former  having  been  already  done, 
very  nearly — remaining  expense  estimated  at  $198,000. — (Classes  A  and  F.) 

]\iouth  of  Connecticut  river. — This  river  has  been  shown  to  be  subject  to  the 
expeditious  of  an  enemy.  No  survey  has  been  made  with  a  view  to  its  defences. 
$100,000  is  introduced  here  as  the  conjectural  cost. — (Class  F.) 

New  Haven  harbor. — It  is  proposed  to  defend  this  harbor  by  improving  and 
enlarging  Fort  Hale,  and  substituting  a  new  work  for  the  slight  redoubt  erected 
during  the  last  war,  called  Fort  Wooster.  The  expense  of  both  may  be  set 
down  at  $90,000,  exclusive  of  $5,000  for  immediate  repairs  of  old  Fort  Hale.— 
(Classes  A  and  F.) 

There  are  several  towns  between  New  Haven  and  New  York  on  both  sides 
of  the  sound ;  none  of  them  are  very  large  as  yet ;  still  most,  if  not  all,  arc 
prosperous  and  increasing.  Although  in  their  present  condition  it  might  not  be 
deemed  necessary  to  apply  any  money  to  permanent  defences,  yet,  as  part  of 
the  present  object  is  to  ascertain,  as  near  as  may  be,  the  ultimate  cost  of  com- 
pletely fortifying  the  coast,  it  seems  proper  to  look  forward  to  the  time  when 
some  of  these  towns  may  become  objects  of  predatory  enterprises  of  some  mag- 
nitude. Bearing  in  mind  the  probable  increase  of  population  in  the  meantime, 
and  the  situation  of  the  places  generally,  it  is  thought  that  $200,000  will  be 
enough  to  provide  defences  for  all. — (Class  F.) 

New  York  harbor. — The  objects  of  the  projected  works  for  the  security  of 
New  York  are  to  cover  the  city  from  an  attack  by  land  or  sea ;  to  protect  its 
numerous  shipping ;  to  prevent,  as  far  as  possible,  the  blockade  of  this  great 
port,  and  to  cover  the  interior  communication  uniting  this  harbor  with  the  Dela- 
ware. 

There  are  two  avenues  to  the  city,  namely,  one  by  the  main  channel,  direct 
from  sea,  and  one  by  the  sound. 

The  projected  system  of  defence  closes  this  last  avenue  at  the  greatest  distance 
possible  from  the  city,  namely,  at  Throg's  Point.  The  occupation  of  this  point 


398  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCE*. 

will  force  the  enemy  to  land  more  than  twenty  miles  from  the  city  on  one  side, 
and  still  further  from  the  navy  yard  on  the  other. 

A  work  now  in  progress  and  nearly  finished  at  Throg's  Point  will  prevent 
any  attempt  to  force  this  passage.  It  will,  as  we  have  seen,  oblige  an  enemy  to 
land  at  a  considerable  distance  from  the  object;  and,  as  he  will  then  be  unable 
to  turn  the  strong  position  afforded  by  Harlem  river,  the  cover  on  the  New  York 
side  will  be  sufficient, 

But  should  he  land  on  the  Long  Island  side,  he  might,  by  leaving  parties  on 
suitable  positions,  with  a  view  to  prevent  our  crossing  the  river  and  falling  on 
his  rear,  make  a  dash  at  the  navy  yard,  having  no  obstacle  in  his  front.  To 
prevent  this  effectually,  and  also  to  accomplish  other  objects,  a  work  should  be 
erected  on  Wilkins's  Point,  opposite  Throg's  Point.  This  work,  besides  com- 
pleting the  defence  of  that  channel,  would  involve  a  inarch  against  the  navy 
yard  from  this  quarter  in  great  danger,  since  all  the  forces  that  could  be  col- 
lected on  the  New  York  shore  might,  under  cover  of  this  work,  be  crossed  over 
to  Long  Island,  and  fall  on  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  cutting  off  1iis  communication 
with  the  fleet.  The  two  works  on  Throg's  and  Wilkins's  Points  may  therefore 
be  regarded  as  perfectly  protecting  on  that  side  the  city  and  navy  yard. 

Against  an  attack  by  the  main  cheinnel  there  are  : 

1st.  The  works  in  the  vicinity  of  the  city,  which  would  act  upon  an  enemy's 
squadron  only  after  its  arrival  before  the  place.  They  consist  of  Fort  Colum- 
bus, Castle  Williams,  and  South  Battery,  on  Governor's  island,  Fort  Wood,  on 
Bedlow's  island,  and  Fort  Gibson,  on  Ellis's  island. 

It  is  necessary  that  these  works  be  maintained,  because,  in  the  event  of  the 
lower  barriers  being  forced,  these  would  still  afford  a  resource.  It  is  a  disad- 
vantage of  their  positions,  however,  that  the  destruction  of  the  city  might  be 
going  on  simultaneously  with  the  contest  between  the  forts  and  the  fleets.  They 
cannot,  however,  be  dispensed  with  until  the  outer  barriers  are  entirely  com- 
pleted, if  even  then. 

2d.  At  the  Narrows,  about  seven  miles  below  the  city,  the  passage  becomes 
so  contracted  as  to  permit  good  disposition  to  be  made  for  defence.  On  the 
Long  Island  side  of  the  Narrows  is  Fort  Lafayette,  which  is  a  strong  water 
battery,  standing  on  a  reef  at  some  distance  from  the  shore,  and  immediately 
behind  it,  on  the  top  of  the  bank,  is  a  small  but  strong  work,  called  Fort  Ham- 
ilton. Some  repairs  being  applied  to  these  works,  this  position  may  be  regarded 
as  well  occupied. 

On  the  west  or  Staten  Island  side  of  the  Narrows  are  the  following  works, 
all  of  which  were  erected  by  the  State  of  New  York,  viz :  Fort  Richmond, 
which  is  a  water  battery ;  Battery  Hudson,  which  is  at  some  height  above  the 
water ;  Battery  Morton,  which  is  a  small  battery  on  the  top  of  the  hill,  and 
Fort  Tompkins,  which  is  also  011  the  hill,  and  is  the  principal  work.  All  these 
works,  as  well  as  the  site  common  to  them  all,  are  now  the  property  of  the 
United  States  by  purchase  from  the  State  of  New  York. 

Batteries  Hudson  and  Morton  have  been  put  in  perfect  order,  and  afford  a 
formidable  array  of  guns.  Fort  Richmond,  which  occupied  the  best  position 
within  the  whole  harbor  for  channel  defence,  had  fallen  entirely  to  ruin ;  it  is 
now  being  reconstructed,  and  with  the  appropriation  asked  for  in  the  estimates 
of  last  year  might  have  been  now  ready  for  one  tier  of  guns. 

The  nature  and  extent  of  repairs  required  by  Fort  Tomj'kins  have  not  yet 
been  settled,  this  not  being  deemed  so  pressing  as  a  state  of  readiness  in  the 
batteries  just  mentioned.  Besides  these  works,  there  has  been  projected  for 
Staten  Island  an  advanced  redoubt,  which,  however,  falls  within  the  class  of 
works  (F)  last  to  be  erected. 

With  the  Narrows  thus  defended,  and  the  Avorks  near  the  city  in  perfect 
order,  New  York  might  be  regarded  as  pretty  well  protected  against  an  attack 
by  water  through  this  passage. 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  399 

But  there  lies  below  the  Narrows  a  capacious  bay,  affording*  good  anchorage 
for  any  number  of  vessels-of-war  and  transports.  An  enemy's  squadron  being- 
in  that  bay,  into  which  entrance  is  very  easy,  would  set  a  seal  upon  this  outlet 
of  the  harbor.  Not  a  vessel  could  enter  or  depart  at  any  season  of  the  year. 
And  it  would  also  intercept  the  water  communication,  by  way  of  the  Raritan, 
between  New  York  and  Philadelphia. 

The  same  squadron  could  land  a  force  on  the  beach  of  Gravesend  bay,  (the 
place  of  the  landing  of  the  British,  which  brought  on  the  battle  of  Long  Island 
in  the  revolutionary  war,)  within  seven  miles  of  the  city  of  Brooklyn,  of  its- 
commanding  height,  and  of  the  navy  yard,  with  no  intervening  obstacle  of  any 
sort. 

This  danger  is  imminent,  and  it  would  not  fail,  in  the  event  of  war,  to  be  as 
fully  realized  as  it  was  during  the  last  war,  when,  on  the  rumor  of  an  expedition 
being  in  preparation  in  England,  twenty-seven  thousand  militia  were  assembled 
to  cover  the  city  from  an  attack  of  this  sort.  It  is  apparent  that  the  defences 
near  the  city  and  those  at  the  Narrows,  indispensable  as  they  are  for  other 
purposes,  cannot  be  made  to  prevent  this  enterprise,  which  can  be  thoroughly 
guarded  against  only  by 

3d.  An  outer  barrier  at  the  very  mouth  of  the  harbor.  This  would  accom- 
plish two  objects  of  great  consequence,  namely,  rendering  a  close  blockade  of 
the  harbor  impossible,  and  obliging  an  enemy  who  should  design  to  move  troops 
against  the  navy  yard  to  land  at  a  distance  of  more  than  twenty  miles  from  his- 
object,  upon  a  dangerous  beach,  leaving,  during  the  absence  of  the  troops,  the 
transports  at  anchor  in  the  ocean,  and  entirely  without  shelter. 

The  hazard  of  such  a  land  expedition  would  moreover  be  greatly  enhanced 
by  the  fact  that  our  own  troops,  by  passing  over  Long  Island  under  cover  of 
the  fort  at  Wilkins's  Point,  could  cut  off  the  return  of  the  enemy  to  his  fleet, 
which  must  lie  at  or  somewhere  near  Rockaway.  Time,  distance,  and  the  direc- 
tion of  the  respective  marches  Avould  make,  very  naturally,  such  a  manoeuvre  a 
part  of  the  plan  of  defence.  Against  an  enemy  landing  in  Gravesend  bay  no 
such  manoeuvre  could  be  effectual,  on  account  of  the  shortness  of  his  line  of 
march,  as  well  as  of  its  direction. 

In  view  of  these  considerations,  the  board  of  engineers  projected  additional 
works,  one  for  the  east  bank,  and  another  for  the  middle  ground,  these  positions 
being  on  shoals  on  either  hand  of  the  bar  outside  of  Sandy  Hook.  Before  deter- 
mining on  the  works  last  mentioned  the  board  went  into  much  research,  in  order 
to  ascertain  whether  these  shoals  were  unchangeable,  and  it  was  thought  to  have 
been  fully  proved  that  there  had  been  no  material  alteration  in  more  than  sixty 
years.  This  apparent  stability  of  the  shoals  encourage  the  board  to  devise  the 
project  referred  to. 

More  recent  surveys  have,  however,  discovered  new,  or  rather  other  channels.. 
If  they,  indeed,  be  new  channels,  they  show  a  want  of  stability  in  the  shoals 
that  forbids  any  such  structures  as  the  batteries  formerly  contemplated.  And 
whether  new  or  not  they  would  deprive  these  batteries  of  a  material  portion  of 
their  efficacy.  Removing,  then,  these  defences  from  this  outer  bar,  they  must 
occupy  the  position  of  Sandy  Hook;  at  which  they  will  afford  a  very  good 
defence  of  the  main  channel,  and  prevent  the  entrance  to  or  occupation  of  the 
lower  bay  for  any  hostile  purpose  whatsoever,  and  cover  a  secure  anchorage- 
there  for  our  own  merchantmen  and  privateers,  and  for  our  steam  and  sailing: 
cruisers. 

To  recapitulate  as  to  New  York  harbor.  The  security  of  the  city  of  New 
York,  Brooklyn,  &c.,  and  the  navy  yard  requires,  first,  defences  on  the  passage- 
from  the  sound ;  namely,  the  completion  of  Fort  Schuylcr  on  Throg's  Point,, 
(Class  B,)  and  the  erection  of  a  fort  on  Wilkins's  Point  (Class  F) — cost  of  both 
$711,000;  second,  completion  of  repairs  on  works  of  Governor's  island,  Bed- 
low's  island,  and  Ellis's  island — estimated  cost  842,689,  (Class  A;)  third,  repairs 


400  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

of  the  works  at  the  Narrow*,  including  those  formerly  belonging  to  the  State  of 
New  York — cost  $326,834,  (Class  A  and  B;)  and  fourth,  the  erection  of  outer 
defences  on  Sandy  Hook — estimated  by  the  board  of  engineers  to  cost  $1,200,000, 
(Class  D;)  the  total  cost  will  therefore  be  $2,332,523.— (Classes  A,  B,  D,  F.) 

Delaware  bay,  Fort  Delaware,  Fort,  Mifflin,  Delaware  Breakwater. — Tin- 
coast  from  the  mouth  of  the  Hudson  to  the  Chesapeake,  as  well  as  that  on  the 
south  side  of  Long  Island,  is  low  and  sandy,  and  is  penetrated  by  several  inlet. •» ; 
but  not  one,  besides  the  Delaware,  is  navigable  by  sea-going  vessels.  The 
Delaware  bay  itself  being  wide  and  full  of  shoals,  having  an  intricate  channel, 
and  being  much  obstructed  by  ice  in  the  winter,  affords  no  very  good  natural 
harbor  within  a  reasonable  distance  of  the  sea. 

The  artificial  harbor  constructed  just  Avithin  the  mouth  of  Delaware  bay  sup- 
plies this  need,  and  must  be  securely  fortified.  No  plans  have,  however,  as  yet 
been  made  with  that  object;  and  as  to  the  probable  cost,  nothing  better  can  now 
be  done  than  to  assume  the  conjectural  estimate  made  some  years  since  in  the 
engineer  department,  namely,  $600,000. — (Class  F.) 

The  lowest  point  at  which  the  bay  is  defensible  is  at  Pea  Patch  island,  about 
forty-five  miles  below  the  city  of  Philadelphia.  A  fort  on  that  island,  to  replace 
the  one  destroyed  by  fire;  a  fort  opposite  the  Pea  Patch,  on  the  Delaware  shore, 
to  assist  in  commanding  the  Delaware  channel,  and  at  the  same  time  to  protect 
the  mouth  of  the  Delaware  and  Chesapeake  canal;  a  temporary  work  on  the 
Jersey  shore,  to  be  thrown  up  at  the  commencement  of  a  war,  to  assist  in  closing 
the  channel  on  that  side;  together  Avith  floating  obstructions,  to  be  put  down  in 
moments  of  peril,  Avill  effectually  cover  all  above  this  position — including  Phila- 
delphia and  its  navy  yard,  Wilmington,  New  Castle,  the  canal  before  mentioned, 
and  the  Philadelphia  and  Baltimore  railroad. 

The  rebuilding  of  Fort  Delaware  Avas  long  delayed  by  difficulties  attending 
the  settlement  of  claims  to  the  island  (Pea  Patch)  on  which  it  is  to  stand;  these 
having  been  adjusted,  the  fort  is  in  progress — the  tedious  and  difficult  process  of 
forming  a  foundation  with  piles  and  grillage  being  concluded.  In  the  meantime. 
Fort  Mifflin,  an  old  work,  standing  about  seven  miles  below  the  city  of  Phila- 
delphia had  been  put  in  good  order. 

The  expense  of  Fort  Delaware  is,  according  to  reA'ised  estimates,  $580,000. 
and  of  the  fort  opposite,  $521,000. — (Classes  C  and  F.) 

Chesapeake  boy,  Hampton  roads,  James  river,  Norfolk,  and  the  navy  yard. — 
The  Avorks  projected  for  these  are:  first,  a  fort  at  Old  Point  Comfort — this  is 
called  Fort  Monroe;  second,  a  casemated  battery  called  Fort  Calhoun,  in  the 
Kip  llap  shoals,  opposite  Old  Point  Comfort ;  and,  third,  a  line  of  floating  ob- 
structions, extending  across  the  channel  from  one  of  these  Avorks  to  the  other. 

Fort  Monroe  is  of  itself  complete,  but  an  adA~anced  redoubt  on  the  land  side  is 
unfinished,  and  considerable  Avork  is  yet  necessary  to  secure  proper  ventilation 
and  the  necessary  dryness  to  the  great  powder  magazines  within  the  fort,  de- 
signed as  a  principal  depot  of  that  material.  Attempts  to  secure  good  water 
by  an  artesian  Avell  are  still  persevered  in.  Required  to  complete,  $75,000. — 
(Class  B.) 

Fort  Calhoun  cannot  yet  be  carried  forward  for  want  of  stability  in  the  foun- 
dation. The  artificial  mass  on  which  it  is  to  stand  having  been  raised  out  of 
the  water,  the  Avails  of  the  battery  were  begun  some  years  since;  but  it  was 
soon  found  that  their  weight  caused  considerable  subsidence.  On  an  inspection 
by  engineer  officers  it  Avas  then  decided  to  keep  the  foundation  loaded  Avith  more 
than  the  Avhole  weight  of  the  finished  work  until  all  subsidence  had  ceased. 
The  load  had  hardly  been  put  on,  however,  before  it  Avas  injudiciously  deter- 
mined to  take  it  off,  and  begin  to  build,  although  the  settling  was  still  going  on. 
Happily,  a  better  policy  prevailed  before  the  construction  Avas  resumed,  but  not 
before  tlie  very  considerable  expense  of  remoA'ing  the  load  had  been  incurred, 
and  the  further  expense  of  replacing  it  rendered  necessary.  The  subsidence 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  401 

has  now  so  nearly  ceased  that  it  is  contemplated  to  resume  the  construction  at 
an  early  day. — (Class  C.)     Required  to  complete,  $729,332. 

It  may  be  expedient  in  time  of  war,  by  way  of  providing  interior  barriers,  to 
erect  batteries  on  Craney  island,  at  the  mouth  of  Elizabeth  river,  and  'to  put  in 
condition  and  arm  Old  Fort  Norfolk,  which  is  just  below  the  city. 

Harbor  of  St.  Mary's. — The  central  situation  (as  regards  the  Chesapeake)  of 
this  fine  basin,  its  relation  to  the  Potomac,  its  depth  of  water,  and  the  facility 
with  which  it  may  be  defended,  indicate  its  fitness  as  a  harbor  of  refuge  for  the 
commerce  of  the  Chesapeake  bay,  and  as  an  occasional,  if  not  constant,  station 
during  war  of  a  portion  of  the  naval  force.  A  survey  has  been  made,  but  no 
project  has  been  formed.  The  engineer  department  some  years  ago  conjectured 
that  the  cost  of  defences  in  this  harbor  might  amount  to  $300,000. — (Class  F.) 

Annapolis  harbor. — Fort  Severn  has  been  put  in  an  efficient  condition,  and 
repairs  have  been  advanced  on  Fort  Madison ;  these  will  be  continued  until 
that  work  also  shall  afford  an  efficient  battery. — (Class  A.)  Estimated  at 
$30,000. 

Harbor  of  Baltimore. — The  proximity  of  the  city  to  Chesapeake  bay  greatly 
endangers  the  city  of  Baltimore.  In  the  present  state  of  things  an  enemy,  in  a 
few  hours'  march,  after  an  easy  landing,  and  without  having  his  communication 
with  his  fleet  endangered,  can  make  himself  master  of  that  great  emporium  of 
commerce.  There  are  required  for  its  security  two  forts  on  the  Patapsco,  one 
at  Hawkins's  Point,  and  the  other  opposite  that  point ;  these  being  the  lowest 
positions  at  which  the  passage  of  the  Patapsco  can  be  defended.  Besides  the 
advantages  that  will  result  of  obliging  the  enemy  to  land  at  a  greater  distance, 
thereby  gaming  time  by  delaying  his  march,  for  the  arrival  of  succor,  and  pre- 
venting his  turning  the  defensive  positions  which  our  troops  might  occupy,  it 
will  be  impossible  for  him  to  endanger  the  city  by  a  direct  attack  by  water. 

The  operations  on  Fort  Carroll — the  work  occupying  the  extremity  of  Sollers's 
flats,  (opposite  Hawkins's  Point,) — are  proceeding  with  all  the  rapidity  allowed 
by  the  appropriations.  Estimate,  $865,000. — (Class  C.) 

The  work  on  Hawkins's  Point  belongs  to  class  F,  and  is  estimated  to  cost 
$376,000. 

The  present  Fort  McHenry,  Redoub't  Wood,  and  Covington  Battery  should 
be  retained  as  a  second  barrier.  The  first  mentioned  is  now  in  good  condition, 
and  the  repairs  required  for  the  others  may  be  applied  at  the  beginning  of  a  war. 

Mouth  of  Elk  river. — The  completion  of  the  line  of  water  communication 
from  the  l)elaware  to  the  waters  of  the  Chesapeake  makes  it  proper  to  place  a 
fort  somewhere  near  the  mouth  of  Elk  river,  in  order  to  prevent  an  enemy  from 
destroying,  by  a  sudden  enterprise,  the  works  forming  this  outlet  of  the  canal. 

There  have  been  no  surveys  made  with  a  view  to  establish  such  protection, 
which  is  estimated  at  $50,000. — (Class  F.) 

Cities  of  Washington,  Georgetown,  and  Alexandria. — Fort  Washington 
covers  these  cities  from  any  attack  by  water,  and  will  oblige  an  enemy  to  land 
at  some  eight  or  ten  miles  below  Alexandria,  should  that  city  be  his  object,  and 
'about  twice  as  far  below  Washington.  It  will  also  serve  the  very  important 
purpose  of  covering  troops  crossing  from  Virginia,  with  a  view  to  fall  on  the 
flanks  of  an  enemy  moving  against  the  Capitol  from  the  Patuxent  or  the  Chesa- 
peake. The  repairs  on  this  work  have  been  completed. — (Class  A.) 

Cedar  Point,  Potomac  river. — But  all  these  objects  would  have  been  better 
fulfilled  had  the  work  been  placed  at  Lower  Cedar  Point.  As  it  is,  however, 
the  contemplated  works  being  constructed  in  the  Patuxent,  and  the  militia  of  the 
surrounding  country  in  a  due  state  of  preparation,  an  enterprise  against  Wash- 
ington would  be  a  hazardous  one.  As  giving  complete  security  to  the  towns  in 
the  district,  covering  more  than  sixty  miles  in  length  of  the  Potomac ;  the  river 
terminus  of  the  great  railroad  from  the  south,  and  a  large  tract  of  country  lying 
between  the  Potomac  and  the  Patuxent ;  the  work  on  Cedar  Point  should  not 
H.  Rep.  Com.  86 26 


402  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

be  omitted.  There  have  been  no  surveys  made  of  the  ground,  nor  projects  of 
the  fort,  which,  in  a  conjectural  estimate  of  the  engineer  department,  was  set 
down  at  $300,000. — (Class  E.) 

PatuXent  river. — The  more  effectually  to*protect  the  city  of  "Washington 
from  a  sudden  attack  by  troops  landed  at  the  head  of  navigation  in  the  Patux- 
ent,  and  to  provide  additional  shelter  for  vessels  in  the  Chesapeake,  a  fort  has 
been  planned  to  occupy  Point  Patience  and  another  to  occupy  Thomas's  Point, 
both  a  short  distance  up  the  river.  The  work  on  Thomas's  Point  is  estimated 
at  $259,000,  and  the  work  on  Point  Patience  estimated  to  cost  $246,000. — 
(Classes  D  and  F.) 

It  will  be  perceived  that  the  system  of  defence  for  Washington  contemplates, 
first,  defending  the  Potomac  on  Cedar  Point,  and  maintaining  a  second  barrier 
at  Fort  Washington ;  second,  defending  the  mouth  of  the  Patuxent.  This  par- 
ticular arrangement  not  having  been  always  understood,  a  few  words  are  added 
in  explanation. 

During  the  last  war  there  was  no  fort  in  the  Patuxent,  and  the  consequence 
was  that  the  British  approached  by  that  avenue  and  occupied  the  whole  river  as 
high  as  Pig  Point,  nearly  fifty  miles  from  its  mouth,  and  less  than  twenty  miles 
from  the  Capitol ;  while,  in  consequence  of  there  being  no  forts  in  the  Potomac, 
they  occupied  that  river  as  high  as  Alexandria,  inclusive ;  by  this  latter  occu- 
pation perfectly  protecting  the  left  flank  of  the  movement  during  its  whole 
advance  and  retreat.  Both  flanks  being  safe,  the  British  had  nothing  to  fear 
except  from  a  force  in  front ;  and  that  this  risk  was  not  great,  in  the  short  march 
of  less  than  twenty  miles  from  the  boats,  was  proved  by  the  issue. 

On  the  ninth  day  from  that  on  which  the  fleet  entered  the  Chesapeake  the 
English  army  was  in  possession  of  the  Capitol,  having  penetrated  nearly  fifty 
miles  beyond  the  point  of  debarkation.  On  the  twelfth  day  from  the  time  of 
landing,  the  troops  were  again  on  shipboard,  near  the  mouth  of  the  river.  This 
attack,  exceedingly  well  conceived  and  very  gallantly  executed,  owed  its  success 
entirely  to  the  want  of  defences,  such  as  are  now  proposed. 

Let  us  suppose  both  rivers  fortified  as  recommended,  and  an  enemy  landed  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Patuxent.  If  now  he  attempt  this  enterprise,  his  march  would 
be  prolonged  by  at  least  four  days — that  is  to  say,  it  will  require  more  than 
sixteen  days,  during  which  time  he  will  be  out  of  communication  with  his  fleet 
as  regards  supplies  and  assistance. 

The  opposition  to  his  invasion  will  begin  at  the  landing,  because  our  troops 
having  now  nothing  to  fear  as  to  their  flanks,  either  from  the  Potomac  or  Patux- 
ent, will  dispute  every  foot  of  territory ;  and  although  he  should  continue  to 
advance  it  must  be  at  a  slower  rate.  While  he  is  thus  pursuing  his  route  toward 
Washington,  the  forces  of  Virginia,  brought  by  railroad  to  the  mouth  of  Aquia 
creek,  will  be  crossing  the  Potomac,  and  concentrating  at  Port  Tobacco,  or 
some  position  between  that  place  and  Fort  Washington,  preparatory  to  falling 
on  his  flank  and  rear.  This  would  seem  to  be  conclusive,  for  it  is  difficult  to 
conceive  of  troops  persevering  in  an  expedition  when  every  moment  will  not 
only  place  them  further  from  succor  but  greatly  increase  their  need  of  it.  Rail- 
roads reach  from  near  the  crossing  places  of  the  Potomac  to  the  very  heart  of 
the  country  south,  and  a  very  few  days  would  bring  forward  a  large  force,  all 
of  which  would  arrive  upon  the  rear  of  the  enemy. 

It  has  been  said  that  if  shut  out  of  the  Patuxent  the  enemy  might  land 
between  the  mouth  of  that  river  and  Annapolis,  and  thence  proceed  against 
Washington.  But  the  same  difficulties  belong  to  this  project,  and  a  new  difficulty 
is  added.  The  Virginia  forces  arrive  as  before,  and  assail  his  flank,  either  between 
the  Potomac  and  Patuxent  or  between  the  Patuxent  and  the  Chesapeake ;  and 
there  is,  besides,  the  Patuxent  for  the  enemy  to  cross,  both  in  going  and  return- 
ing— itself  a  formidable  military  obstacle. 

It  is  said,  also,  that  the  landing  may  be  made  in  the  Potomac ;  but  this  only 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  403 

proved  that  the  system  animadverted  on  had  not  been  studied,  it  being  a  funda- 
mental principle  of  the  system  that  such  landing  must  be  prevented  by  fortify- 
ing the  river  as  low  down  as  possible. 

The  southern  coast,  stretching  from  Cape  Hatteras  to  the  southern  point  of 
Florida,  is  invariably  low,  and  for  the  greater  part  sandy,  much  resembling  the 
coast  from  the  above-mentioned  cape  to  Montauk  Point,  on  the  east  end  of  Long 
Island.  A  ridge  of  sand,  here  and  there  interrupted  by  the  alluvion  of  the 
rivers,  extends  through  its  whole  length.  This  ridge,  in  certain  portions,  lies 
on  the  main  land,  while  in  others  it  is  divided  therefrom  by  basins  or  "  sounds" 
of  various  width  and  depth,  and  is  cut  up  into  islands  by  numerous  channels, 
which  connect  these  interior  waters  with  the  sea.  Wherever  this  sand  ridge  is 
interrupted  its  place  is  occupied  by  low  and  marshy  grounds,  bordering  the 
principal  and  the  many  lesser  outlets  of  the  rivers. 

Ocracoke  inlet,  N.  C. — The  shallowness  of  the  water  on  the  bars  at  this  inlet 
effectually  excludes  all  vessels-of-war,  at  least  all  moved  by  sails.  But  as  this 
is  an  outlet  of  an  extensive  commerce,  and  as,  through  this  opening,  attempts 
might  be  made  in  small  vessels,  barges,  or  the  smaller  class  of  steam  vessels  to 
destroy  this  commerce,  or  to  interrupt  the  line  of  interior  water  communication, 
timely  preparation  must  be  made  of  temporary  works,  equal  to  defence  against 
all  such  minor  enterprises. 

Beaufort  harbor,  N.  C. — A  work  called  Fort  Macon  has  been  erected  for  the 
defence  of  this  harbor.  It  is  in  a  very  efficient  condition,  though  some  slight 
additional  work  is  needed,  both  for  the  fort  itself  and  for  the  preservation  of  the 
site,  which  is  acted  upon  violently  by  the  sea.  Successful  impediments  to  this 
action  have  been  resorted  to,  which  require  a  little  extension,  however,  and  con- 
tinual care.  Estimate,  $3,000. — (Class  B.) 

Mouths  of  Gape  Fear  river,  N.  C. — The  defence  of  •  the  main  channel  of 
Cape  Fear  requires,  in  addition  to  Fort  Caswell,  (now  completed,)  on  Oak  island, 
another  fort  on  Bald  Head.  And  the  defence  of  the  smaller  channel  will  require 
a  redoubt  on  Federal  Point.  The  battery,  magazine,  block-house,  &c.,  at  Smith- 
ville  should  remain  as  accessories.  Fort  Caswell,  Oak  island,  $7,000. — (Class  B.) 
The  fort  on  Bald  Head  (class  F)  will  require  $180,000.  The  redoubt  on  Fed- 
eral Point  (class  F)  will  require  Si 8,000 ;  and  the  battery,  &c.,  called  Fort 
Johnston,  at  Smithville,  (class  A,)  $5,000. 

Georgetown  harbor,  S.  C. — The  first  inlet  of  any  consequence  south  of  Cape 
Fear  river  is  at  the  united  mouths  .of  the  Waccamaw,  Pedee,  and  Black  rivers, 
forming  Georgetown  harbor,  which  is  a  commodious  and  capacious  bay,  having 
sufficient  water  within,  and  also  upon  the  bar  near  the  mouth,  for  merchant  ves- 
sels and  small  vessels-of-war.  A  survey  of  this  harbor  was  begun  many  years 
ago,  but  never  completed,  and  no  projects  for  defence  have  been  made.  It  is 
probable  that  a  work  placed  near  Moscheto  creek,  or  on  Winyaw  Point,  would 
give  adequate  strength,  at  the  cost  of  about  $250,000. — (Class  E.) 

Santee  river  and  Bull's  bay. — About  ten  miles  south  from  Georgetown  are 
the  mouths  of  the  Santee,  the  largest  river  in  South  Carolina.  It  is  not  known 
whether  the  bars  at  the  mouth  of  this  river  have  sufficient  water  for  sea-going 
vessels.  The  same  uncertainty  exists  as  to  the  depth  into  Bull's  bay.  It  may 
be  sufficient  to  consider  these,  and  the  other  inlets  between  Georgetown  and 
Charleston,  as  calling  for  small  works  capable  of  resisting  boat  enterprises,  and 
to  assign  as  the  cost  $100,000.  Should  they  prove  to  be  navigable  for  priva- 
teers, they  will  require  a  larger  expenditure. — (Class  F.) — $100,000. 

Charleston,  S.  C. — This  city,  situated  at  the  junction  of  the  Ashley  and 
Cooper  rivers,  is  about  five  miles,  in  a  direct  line,  from  the  sea.  Between  it  and 
the  ocean  there  is  a  wide  and  safe  roadstead  for  vessels  of  any  draught.  Upon 
the  bar,  lying  three  or  four  miles  outside  of  the  harbor,  there  is,  however,  only 
water  enough  for  smaller  frigates  and  sloops-of-war.  On  the  southwest  side  of 
the  harbor  is  James's  island, 'in  which  are  several  serpentine  passages,  more  or 


404  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES 

less  navigable  for  boats,  barges,  and  small  steam  vessels ;  some  of  them  commu- 
nicate directly  with,  the  sea  and  Stono  river.  Whappoo  cut,  the  most  northerly 
passage  from  the  Stono  to  Charleston  harbor,  enters  Ashley  river  opposite  the 
middle  of  the  city. 

Interior  natural  water  communications  exist,  also,  to  the  southwest  of  Stono 
river,  connecting  this  with  North  Edisto  river;  the  latter  with  South  Edisto  and 
St.  Helena  sound ;  this,  again,  with  Broad  river ;  and,  finally,  this  last  with 
Savannah  river. 

On  the  north  side  of  the  harbor  of  Charleston  lies  Sullivan's  island,  separated 
from  the  main  by  a  channel  navigable  only  by  small  craft.  On  the  northwest 
side  of  this  island  is  an  interior  water  communication  which  extends  to  Bull's 
bay,  and  even  beyond,  to  the  harbor  of  Georgetown. 

From  this  sketch  it  is  apparent  that  it  will  not  do  to  restrict  the  defences  to 
the  principal  entrance  of  the  harbor. 

The  lateral  avenues  must  also  be  shut.  And  it  is  probable  that  accurate  sur- 
veys of  all  these  avenues  will  show  that  the  best  mode  of  defending  them  will 
be  by  works  at  or  near  the  mouths  of  the  inlets,  as  the  enemy  will  be  kept 
thereby  at  a  greater  distance  from  the  city ;  the  lesser  harbors  formed  by  these 
inlets  will  be  protected,  and  the  line  of  interior  water  communication  will  be 
inaccessible  from  the  sea. 

No  position  for  the  defence  of  the  principal  entrance  to  Charleston  harbor  can 
be  found  nearer  to  the  ocean  than  the  western  extremity  of  Sullivan's  island. 
This  is,  at  present,  occupied  by  Fort  Moultrie,  a  work  of  some  strength,  but 
by  no  means  adequate  to  its  object,  its  battery  being  weak,  and  the  scarp  so 
low  as  to  oppose  no  serious  obstacle  to  escalade.  How  far  this  work,  by  a 
modification  of  its  plan  and  relief,  may  be  made  to  contribute  to  a  full  defence 
of  the  harbor  has  not  yet  been  determined.  But  so  long  as  it  is  the  only  work 
at  this,  the  principal  point  of  defence,  it  must  be  kept  in  good  condition  for 
service,  and  no  alterations  that  will  disturb  this  efficiency  should  be  under- 
taken.— (Class  A.) 

On  a  shoal  nearly  opposite  Fort  Moultrie  a  new  fort  has  been  well  advanced, 

which  will  have  a  powerful  cross-fire  with  Fort  Moultrie.     This  is  called  Fort 

Sumter. — (Class  C.)    To  complete  this  fort  will  require,  it  is  estimated,  $150,000. 

In  the  upper  part  of  the  harbor  is  Castle  Pinckney,  on  Shuter's  Folly  island. 

This  requires  some  repairs,  estimated  at  $800. — (Class  A.) 

Stono,  North  Edisto,  and  South  Edisto.— rAll  these  must  be  fortified,  at  least 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  protect  these  inlets  from  enterprises  in  boats  or  small 
vessels.  To  that  end  $50,000  may  be  assigned  to  each. — (Class  F.) 

St.  Helena  sound. — The  proper  defences  cannot  be  pointed  out  till  the  sound 
shall  have  been  surveyed.  Although  there  is  supposed  to  be  no  great  depth  of 
water  on  the  bar,  it  is  known  to  be  navigable  for  the  smaller  class  of  merchant- 
men and  for  steamboats,  and  to  have  a  navigable  communication  with  the  head 
of  Broad  river,  or  Port  Royal,  intersecting  the  interior  navigation  between 
Charleston  and  Savannah.  The  estimate  is  $150,000. — (Class  F.)  • 

Broad  river,  or  Port  Royal  roads. — The  value  of  this  capacious  roadstead, 
as  a  harbor  of  refuge,  depends  upon  the  depth  that  can  be  carried  over  the  bar, 
on  the  distance  of  this  bar  beyond  the  line  of  coast,  and  on  the  means  that 
may  be  applicable  of  lessening  the  danger  of  crossing  it.  This  is  supposed  to 
be  the  deepest  bar  on  the  southern  coast.  Should  there  prove  to  be  water 
enough  for  frigates,  and  should  it  be  practicable  to  make  the  passage  over  the 
bar  safe  and  easy  by  the  erection  of  light-houses  on  the  shore,  and  lights  or  other 
distinct  guides  on  the  bar,  this  harbor,  situated  within  sixty  miles  of  the  city  of 
Charleston,  and  twenty  of  Savannah  river,  intersecting  the  interior  water  com- 
munication between  these  cities,  thereby  securing  the  arrival  of  supplies  of  every 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  405 

kind,  would  possess  a  high  degree  of  importance  not  only  as  a  harbor  of  refuge, 
but  also  as  a  naval  station. 

The  survey  of  the  exterior  shoals,  constituting  the  bar,  should  be  made  with 
the  greatest  care  and  all  possible  minuteness.  Only  when  this  shall  have  been 
done  can  the  true  relations  of  this  inlet  to  the  rest  of  the  coast  be  known,  and 
on  this  relation  the  position  and  magnitude  of  the  required  defences  will  depend. 
For  the  present  the  estimate  made  some  years  ago  by  the  engineer  department 
is  adopted,  namely,  $300,000. — (Class  E.) 

Savannah,  and  mouth  of  the  Savannah  river,  Georgia. — Mention  has  been 
made  of  the  natural  interior  water  communication  along  the  coast  of  South 
Carolina.  A  similar  communication  extends,  south  from  the  Savannah  river,  as 
far  as  the  St.  John's,  in  Florida.  Owing  to  these  passages,  the  city  of  Savan- 
nah, like  Charleston,  is  liable  to  be  approached  by  other  avenues  than  the 
harbor  or  river ;  and,  accordingly,  its  defence  must  have  relation  to  these  lesser, 
as  well  as  to  the  great  channels. 

The  distance  from  the  mouth  of  Wassaw,  or  even  the  Ossabaw  sounds  (both 
to  the  soutliAvard  of  Savannah  river)  to  the  city  is  not  much  greater  than  from 
the  mouth  of  the  river;  and  an  enterprise  may  proceed  the  whole  distance  by 
water,  or  part  of  the  way  by  water  and  part  by  land,  from  either  inlet  or  from 
both.  As  in  the  case  of  like  channels  in  the  neighborhood  of  Charleston,  it 
cannot  now  be  determined  where  they  can  be  defended  most  advantageously. 
It  is  hoped,  however,  that  the  localities  will  permit  the  defences  to  be  placed 
near  the  inlets,  because,  thus  placed,  they  will  serve  the  double  purpose  of 
guarding  the  city  of  Savannah  and  covering  these  harbors,  which,  in  time  of 
war,  cannot  but  be  very  useful. 

The  defence  of  Savannah  river  is  not  difficult.  A  fort  on  Cockspur  island, 
lying  just  within  the  mouth,  and,  perhaps  for  additional  security,  another  on 
Tybee  island,  which  forms  the  southern  cape  at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  would 
prevent  the  passage  of  vessels  up  the  channel,  and  cover  the  anchorage  between 
Tybee  and  Cockspur. 

Old  Fort  Jackson,  standing  about  four  miles  below  the  city,  must  be  main- 
tained as  a  second  barrier,  both  as  respects  the  main  channel  and  the  passages 
which  come  into  the  river  from  the  south,  which  last  would  not  be  at  all  con- 
trolled by  fortifications  on  Cockspur  or  Tybee.  Fort  Jackson  is  accordingly 
undergoing  the  repairs  and  modifications  necessary  to  give  the  proper  strength 
and  efficiency.  Estimated  to  cost  $45,000. — (Class  A.) 

Fort  Pulaski,  a  new  work  situated  on  Cockspur  island,  is,  in  all  the  most 
important  matters,  finished.  Some  further  work  has  to  be  done,  however,  on 
the  dikes  of  the  island,  on  barracks,  and  quarters,  and  storehouses,  and  in  the 
construction  of  an  advanced  battery.  Estimated  to  cost  $35,000. — (Class  B.) 

To  fortify  Tybee  island  may  require  $120,000. — (Class  E.) 

Wassaw  sound,  Ossabaw  sound,  St.  Catharine's  sound,  at  the  mouth  o 
Medway  river;  Sapclo  sound,  Doby  inlet,  Altamaha  sound,  at  the  mouth  of 
Altamaha  river;  St.  Simon's  sound,  at  the  mouth  of  Buffalo  creek  ;  St.  Andrew's 
sound,  at  the  united  mouths  of  the  Scilla  and  Santilla  river;  and  Cumberland 
sound,  at  the  mouth  of  St.  Mary's  river. — All  these  communications  with  the 
ocean  are  highly  important  as  regards  the  line  of  interior  navigation,  and  several 
of  them  as  affording  access  to  excellent  harbors.  The  last  and  one  or  two 
others  are  known  to  be  navigable  to  the  largest  sloops-of-war  and  merchantmen, 
and  some  of  the  others  are  but  little  inferior  as  regards  depth  of  entrance  or 
safety  of  anchorage. 

Fort  Clinch,  a  work  now  in  course  of  erection  at  the  mouth  of  Cumberland 
sound,  is  a  most  important  contribution  to  the  defence  of  this,  the  most  southern 
of  the  Georgia  entrances.  Estimated  to  cost  $180,000. — (Class  C.) 

All  the  above-named  openings,  except  that  into  Cumberland  sound,  have  to 


406  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

be  surveyed.  Some  of  them  are  probably  easily  defensible  by  forts  and  batte- 
ries, while  others  may  need  the  aid  of  floating  defences. 

Nothing  better  can  now  be  done  than  to  assume  $200,000  as  the  average 
cost  of  defending  each  of  the  eight  entrances,  giving  a  total  of  $1,600,000. — 
(Class  F.) 

St.  Augustine,  Florida. — This  most  southern  of  all  the  harbors  of  the  Atlan- 
tic, and  the  key  to  the  eastern  portion  of  Florida,  is  accessible  to  the  smaller 
classes  of  merchantmen,  or  privateers,  and  to  steam  vessels,  and  requires  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  protection  from  attack  by  water.  It  is  believed  that  adequate 
protection  has  been  given  by  repairs  bestowed  upon  the  water  battery  of  the  old 
Spanish  fort,  (Fort  Marion.) — (Class  A.) 

SEA-COAST  FROM  CAPE  FLORIDA  TO  THE  MOUTH  OF  THE  RIO  GRANDE. 

Fort  Taylor,  at  Key  West,  is  in  a  good  state  to  be  brought  speedily  into 
efficiency ;  the  walls  have  been  raised  up  out  of  the  water  almost  to  the  sills  of 
the  lower  embrasures ;  and  with  the  sum  asked  for  in  the  last  estimates  the 
lower  tier  of  embrasures  might  be  got  ready  for  the  armament  in  a  short  time. 
Estimated  to  cost  $805,000. — (Class  C.) 

Fort  Jefferson,  Garden  key,  Tortugas. — This  fort,  which  will  perfectly 
command  the  admirable  harbor  lying  in  the  heart  of  this  group  of  keys,  is 
advancing  without  the  slightest  impediment.  The  outer  or  counter-scarp  wall 
first  executed,  because  necessary  to  prevent  the  flooding  of  the  islan4  in  gales 
of  wind,  has  been  completed,  and  labors  are  now  bestowed  on  the  main  scarp. 
Estimated  at  $989,862.— (Class  C.) 

Turning  now  to  the  shore  of  the  Gulf,  we  find  a  portion,  namely,  from  Cape 
Florida  to  Pensacola,  that  has  never  been  surveyed  with  particular  reference  to 
the  defence  of  the  harbors.  Within  this  space  there  are  Charlotte  harbor, 
Tampa  bay,  ApalacMcola  bay,  Apalachie  bay,  St.  Joseph's  bay,  and  Santa 
Rosa  bay.  Nothing  better  can  now  be  done  than  to  assume  for  these  the  esti- 
mate formerly  presented  by  the  engineer  department,  viz:  $1,000,000  for  all. — 
(Class  F.) 

It  may  be  remarked,  as  applying  to  the  whole  Gulf  coast,  that,  from  the  rela- 
tive geographical  position  of  this  part  of  the  seaboard  and  the  country  inter- 
ested in  its  safety,  from  the  unhealthiness  of  the  climate,  nature  of  the  adjacent 
country,  and  mixed  character  of  the  inhabitants,  it  will  be  some  time  before  that 
portion  within  supporting  distance,  whose  welfare  may  be  endangered  by  an 
enemy,  will  be  competent  of  itself  to  sustain  a  serious  attack  from  without. 

Upon  the  Atlantic  seaboard  the  Alleghanies  crowd  the  people  down  upon  the 
shore,  every  important  point  on  the  coast  being  surrounded  by  a  population  dense 
now,  and  every  day  rapidly  increasing  in  numbers;  while  the  ocean  and  the 
interior  parallel  communications  transmit  rapid  aid  to  the  right  and  left.  The 
coast  of  the  Gulf,  however,  is  thinly  peopled  in  itself,  is  remote  from  succor  from 
behind,  and  is  almost  inaccessible  to  lateral  assistance.  Those  reasons,  there- 
fore, which  tend  to  establish  the  necessity  of  an  organized,  permanent,  and 
timely  system  of  defence  for  the  whole  seaboard  of  the  United  States,  apply  to 
this  part  of  it  with  peculiar  force. 

We  now  pass  on  to  the  remaining  points  of  defence  on  the  Gulf. 

Pensacola  bay.  — The  upper  arms  of  this  considerable  bay  receive  the  yellow 
water  or  Pea  river,  Middle  river,  and  Escambia  river.  The  tributaries  of  the 
last  interlocking  with  the  Alabama  and  Chattahoochie,  seem  to  mark  the  routes 
whereby,  at  some  future  day,  canals  will  convey  a  part  of  the  products  of  these 
rivers  to  Pensacola;  while  the  qualities  and  position  of  the  harbor,  and  the 
favorable  nature  of  the  country,  have  already  marked  out  lines  of  railroad  com- 
munication with  a  vast  interior  region. 

Santa  Rosa  sound  extends  eastward,  from  the  lower  part  of  the  bay,  into 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  407 

Santa  Rosa  bay.  On  the  west  the  lagoons  of  Pensacola,  Perdido,  and  Mobile 
bays,  respectively,  interlock  in  such  a  manner  as  to  require  but  a  few  miles  of 
cutting  to  complete  a  navigable  channel  from  the  first  to  the  last  named  bay, 
and  thence  through  an  existing  interior  water  communication  to  the  city  of  New 
Orleans. 

Pensacola  bay  has  rare  properties  as  a  harbor.  It  is  now  accessible  to 
frigates,  and  there  is  reason  to  hope  that  the  bar  may  be  permanently  deepened. 

The  bar  is  near  the  coast  and  the  channel  across  it  straight  and  easily  hit. 
The  harbor  is  perfectly  landlocked  and  the  roadstead  very  capacious.  There 
are  excellent  positions  within  for  repairing,  building,  and  launching  vessels,  and 
for  docks  and  dock  yards,  in  healthy  situations.  The  supply  of  good  water  is 
abundant.  The  harbor  is  perfectly  defensible.  These  properties,  in  connexion 
with  the  position  of  the  harbor,  as  regards  the  coast,  have  induced  the  govern- 
ment to  select  it  as  a  naval  station  and  place  of  rendezvous  and  repair. 

An  excellent  survey  has  been  made  of  the  bay  of  Pensacola,  sufficing  to  form 
the  scheme  of  defence  for  the  town  and  harbor.  Regarded,  however,  as  an  im- 
portant naval  station  and  place  of  rendezvous  and  repair,  which  it  now  is, 
further  surveys,  extending  a  greater  distance  back  from  the  shores,  delineating 
accurately  the  face  of  the  country,  and  showing  the  several  avenues  by  land 
and  water,  are  found  to  be  necessary. 

The  defences  of  the  water  passage  as  projected  are  nearly  completed. 

Fort  Pickens,  on  Santa  Rosa  island,  is  finished. 

Fort  *McRae,  on  Foster's  island,  is  also  finished ;  as  is  Fort  Barrancas,  on 
the  site  of  an  old  Spanish  fort.  An  old  Spanish  water  battery  has  been 
thoroughly  repaired,  and  placed  in  connexion  with  the  last-named  fort,  and  con- 
siderable progress  has  been  made  on  a  redoubt,  in  advance  of  the  same  fort. 
Permanent  barracks  in  the  same  vicinity  are  about  half  finished. 

The  site  of  Fort  McRae  was,  a  few  years  since,  seriously  threatened  by  the 
abrasion  of  a  new  outlet  from  the  lagoon  that  lies  just  behind  it ;  but  this  danger 
has  been  averted,  and  by  the  erection  of  a  low  rampart  exterior  to  the  fort  a 
permanent  security  against  any  recurrence  of  the  danger  will  be  provided,  and 
place  for  a  heavy  additional  battery  acting  on  the  channel  will  be  prepared.  At 
a  future  day  it  will  be  proper  to  extend  this  exterior  protection.  At  present  it 
is  designed  to  execute  only  that  part  lying  over  or  nearly  over  the  outlet  that 
was  lately  so  threatening  and  so  difficult  to  close.  Estimated  at  $204,&00. — 
(Classes  A,  B,  0.) 

Perdido  bay. — This  bay  is  intimately  related  to  Pensacola  and  Mobile  bays, 
both  as  regards  security  and  intercommunication,  and  should  be  carefully  sur- 
veyed with  a  view  to  those  objects.  It  must  be  fortified,  and  the  cost  may  be 
$200,000.— (Class  F.) 

Mobile  bay. — The  plan  of  defence  for  this  bay  requires  a  fort  on  Mobile 
Point,  and  another  on  Dauphin  island.  Fort  Morgan,  at  the  first-mentioned 
position,  is  a  finished  work,  in  an  efficient  condition,  but  requiring,  in  the  way 
of  barracks  and  quarters,  storehouses,  &c.,  for  the  accommodation  of  its  garri- 
son, some  further  expenditures.  These  improvements  are  in  progress — estimated 
at  $30,000.— (Class  B.) 

Fort  Gaines,  on  Dauphin  island,  has  been  authorized  by  Congress,  and  the 
expenditure  of  the  appropriation  awaits  only  the  settlement  of  title  to  the  site, 
as  to  which  there  are  supposed  to  be  no  remaining  difficulties.  Estimate, 
$180,000.— (Class  C.) 

New  Orleans  and  tlie  delta  of  the  Mississippi. — The  most  northern  water 
communication  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Gulf  is  by  the  passage  called 
the  Rigolets,  connecting  Lake  Borgne  and  Lake  Pontchartrain.  The  next  is 
the  pass  of  Chef  Menteur,  also  connecting  these  lakes.  Through  these  pas- 
sages an  enemy  entering  Lake  Pontchartrain  would,  at  the  same  time  that  he 
intercepted  all  water  communication  with  Mobile  and  Pensacola,  be  able  to  reach 


408  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

New  Orleans  from  the  southern  shore  of  the  lake;  or  he  might  continue  onward 
through  Lake  Maurepas,  Amite  river,  and  Iberville  river,  thereby  reaching  the 
Mississippi  at  the  very  head  of  the  Delta;  or,  landing  within  the  mouths  of  the 
Chef  Menteur,  he  might  move  against  the  city,  along  the  edge  of  the  Gentilly 
road. 

To  the  southwest  of  Chef  Menteur,  and  towards  the  head  of  Lake  Borgne, 
is  Bayou  Bienvenue,  a  navigable  channel,  (the  one  followed  by  the  English  army 
in  the  last  war,)  not  running  quite  to  the  Mississippi,  but  bounded  by  shores  of 
such  a  nature  as  to  enable  troops  to  march  from  the  point  of  debarkation  to  the 
city. 

These  avenues  are  defended  by  Fort  Pike,  at  the  Rigolets ;  by  Fort  Macomb, 
formerly  Fort  Wood,  at  Chef  Menteur;  by  a  small  fort  at  Bayou  Bienvenue,  and 
by  a  tower  at  Bayou  Dupre. 

The  defences  of  the  Mississippi  are  placed  at  the  Plaquemine  turn,  about 
seventy  miles  below  New  Orleans — the  lowest  position  that  can  be  occupied. 
Fort  Jackson  is  on  the  right  bank,  and  Fort  St.  Philip  a  little  higher  up  on  the 
left. 

Forts  Pike,  Macomb,  Battery  Bienvenue,  and  Tower  Dupre,  have  been  put  in 
the  most  efficient  state,  and  will  perfectly  accomplish  the  objects  for  which  they 
were  designed.  They  will  still  need  some  small  expenditures  in  reference  to 
security  of  site,  extension  of  accommodations,  &c.  Fort  Jackson  is  also  in  good 
condition  as  to  its  batteries,  but  will  be  much  improved  in  that  respect  on  the 
completion  of  an  outwork  now  in  hand.  It  needs  also  more  barrack  room. 
Fort  St.  Philip  is  a  very  old  fort,  and  much  dilapidated.  Its  position  is  so 
commanding  and  advantageous  as  to  require  the  fort  to  be  put  in  the  best  state, 
and  much  has  been  done  to  that  end  within  a  few  years ;  still  more  is  necessary 
for  the  fort  itself  and  its  dependencies ;  and  all  the  barracks,  quarters,  and  store- 
houses have  yet  to  be  built.  Estimated  at  $111,500. — (Classes  A  and  B.) 

The  most  western  avenue  by  which  New  Orleans  is  approachable  from  the 
sea  passes  on  the  west  side  of  the  island  of  Grande  Terre  into  Barrataria  bay, 
which  is  an  excellent  harbor  for  a  floating  force,  guarding  the  coasting  trade  on 
that  side  of  the  Mississippi.  From  this  bay  there  are  several  passages  leading 
to  New  Orleans. 

Fort  Livingston  has  been  erected  on  the  west  end  of  Grande  Terre  island. 
This  Tort  is  kept  from  entire  completion  to  await  the  cessation  of  a  slight  sub- 
sidence which  has  been  going  on  for  some  time.  It  could  be  finished  with  the 
means  now  applicable  at  any  moment  by  a  few  weeks'  work. — (Class  B.) 

Proctor's  Lake,  on  Lake  Borgne. — This  position,  which  was  overlooked  in 
the  original  project  for  the  defences  of  the  city  of  New  Orleans,  has  been  already 
adverted  to.  A  small  battery,  enclosing  a  tower,  standing  on  the  shore,  would 
effectually  close  this  avenue.  The  tower  could  not  be  carried  by  assault,  nor 
the  battery  while  protected  by  the  tower.  No  landing  could  be  made  under  its 
fire,  and  there  is  no  other  spot  for  a  landing,  owing  to  the  swampy  nature  of  the 
ground,  but  the  site  of  the  battery.  Estimated  at  $100,000. — (Class  D.) 

Several  times  in  this  report  we  have  alluded  to  circumstances  which  would 
demand  the  employment  of  floating  defences  in  addition  to  fixed  defences  upon 
the  shore.  We  have  here  an  instance  in  which  that  kind  of  defence  would  be 
very  useful.  Fortifications  will  enable  us  to  protect  New  Orleans  even  from 
the  most  serious  and  determined  efforts  of  an  enemy ;  but,  owing  to  the  great 
width  of  some  of  the  exterior  passages,  we  cannot  by  fortifications  alone  de- 
prive an  enemy  of  anchorages,  (especially  that  of  Chandeleur  island,)  nor  cover 
entirely  the  exterior  water  communication  between  the  Bigolets  and  Mobile. 
We  must,  therefore,  either  quietly  submit  to  the  annoyance  and  injury  that  an 
enemy  in  possession  of  these  passages  may  inflict,  or  avert  them  by  &  timely 
preparation  of  a  floating  force  adapted  to  their  peculiar  navigation,  and  capable, 
under  the  shelter  of  forts,  of  being  always  on  the  alert,  and  of  assuming  an 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  409 

offensive  or  defensive  attitude,  according  to  the  designs,  conduct,  or  situation  of 
the  enemy. 

A  floating  force  of  this  nature  would  be  very  useful  in  overlooking  the  coast 
eastward  of  New  Orleans,  especially  the  portion  just  mentioned,  extending  from 
the  Rigolets  (Fort  Pike)  to  Mobile  bay.  And  in  connexion  with  the  active  ser- 
vice of  such  a  force,  and  as  a  further  defence  of  the  approaches  to  New  Orleans 
from  that  quarter,  a  fort  on  Ship  island  would  be  important.  It  would  cover 
an  excellent  anchorage  for  the  defensive  flotilla  and  for  other  cruisers.  With 
this  refuge  at  one  end  of  the  base  of  operations,  and  at  the  other  the  anchorage 
between  Pelican  island  and  Dauphin  island,  guarded  by  works  at  the  eastern 
end  of  the  latter,  a  light  steam  squadron  might,  without  being  much  exposed, 
be  very  effective. 

Projects  have  not  yet  been  made  for  works  on  Ship  island,  but  it  may  be  esti- 
mated that  an  adequate  fort  would  cost  about  $200,000. — (Class  E.) 

In  this  age  of  great  improvements  in  the  means  of  locomotion,  it  would  be 
unwise  to  decide,  without  pressing  need,  on  the  details  of  the  floating  force 
required  at  certain  points  on  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  of  Mexico  coasts — perhaps 
even  on  the  nature  of  the  moving  power.  Although  the  probability  undoubtedly 
is  that  the  power  will  be  steam,  genius  may  in  the  interim  devise  something  still 
better  than  steam. 

And  I  may  here  remark,  in  relation  to  the  preparation  of  steam  vessels  for 
warlike  purposes  generally,  that  wisdom  would  seem  to  direct  a  very  cautious 
and  deliberate  progress.  Every  new  vessel  may  be  expected  to  surpass  in  im- 
portant particulars  all  that  had  preceded,  and  to  surpass  the  more,  as  each  suc- 
ceeding vessel  should  be  the  result  of  careful  study  and  trial  of  the  preceding. 

It  may  be  considered  unreasonable  to  expect  that  steam  itself  will  give  way 
to  some  agent  still  more  potent,  and  at  the  same  time  not  less  safe  and  manage- 
able. But  it  certainly  is  no  more  than  probable  that  steam  vessels  now  under 
construction  may  be  regarded  almost  as  incumbrances  within  ten  years. 

A  deliberate  advance  in  this  branch  of  naval  construction  is  recommended 
the  more,  by  our  ability  to  construct  these  vessels  in  large  numbers,  when  about 
to  be  needed,  the  timber  being  collected  in  the  meantime. 

COAST  OF  TEXAS. 

In  November,  1845,  a  special  board  of  engineer  officers  was  appointed  to 
examine  the  coast  of  Texas  in  relation  to  its  defence.  Their  report,  submitted 
in  February,  1846,  was  to  the  following  effect  : 

The  coast  from  the  Sabine  to  the  Rio  Grande  is  about  three  hundred  and 
seventy-five  miles  in  extent.  It  is  composed,  for  nearly  the  whole  distance,  of 
long  narrow  islands  and  peninsulas,  which  lie  parallel  to  the  main  land,  forming 
several  bays  and  lagoons,  the  inlets  to  which  exhibit  channels  generally  only 
suitable  to  the  smaller  classes  of  vessels. 

Galveston  bay  is  the  most  important  one  on  the  coast.  Besides  a  number  of 
•  bayous  and  small  tributaries,  it  receives  the  waters  of  the  river  Trinity.  This 
river  is  said  to  be  navigable  for  six  hundred  miles  for  steamers  of  a  light  class, 
and,  when  improved,  this  navigation  will  doubtless  be  extended.  The  harbor 
is  represented  as  being  undoubtedly  the  best  on  the  coast,  the  bar  at  the  entrance 
having  also  the  greatest  depth  of  water.  The  charts  submitted  by  that  board 
show  a  depth  of  nine  feet  at  low  water  and  twelve  feet  at  high  water. 

A  permanent  work  is  proposed  for  the  defence  of  this  harbor,  of  the  class  of 
that  constructed  on  Grande  Terre  island,  Barrataria  bay.  Its  estimated  cost  is 
three  hundred  thousand  dollars. — (Class  D.)  The  construction  of  some  Mar- 
tello  towers  along  the  shore  and  across  the  island  is  deemed  essential  to  the 
defence  of  the  "  Swash  "  channel  and  to  the  security  of  the  toAvn,  Brazos  San- 
tiago. The  board  deem  this  harbor  of  equal  importance  with  that  of  Galveston; 


410  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

it  has  not  much  capacity,  but  is  the  only  one  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Rio  Grande. 
The  bay  at  the  pass  has  eight  feet  water. 

The  trade  of  the  Rio  Grande  and  of  its  dependent  country  passes  overland 
thirty  miles  to  Point  Isabel,  and  from  thence  issues  from  the  Brazos  Santiago. 
The  depth  of  water  over  the  bar  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande  being  only 
four  feet,  admits  the  passage  of  very  small  vessels  not  suited  to  the  purposes 
of  commerce. 

With  reference,  then,  to  the  trade  of  the  Rio  Grande  and  to  a  point  from 
which  military  supplies  could  with  the  greatest  facility  be  sent  to  the  frontier, 
the  defence  of  the  Brazos  Santiago  is  deemed  by  the  board  of  equal  importance 
with  that  of  Galveston,  and  they  recommend  a  permanent  work,  of  the  size, 
character,  and  cost  of  the  one  proposed  for  the  latter  place,  estimated  at  three 
hundred  thousand  dollars. — (Class  D.) 

Matagorda  bay. — It  is  deemed  due  to  the  extensive  country  washed  by  the 
rivers  tributary  to  this  bay,  that  its  entrance  should  be  defended.  The  diffi- 
culties, however,  attending  that  entrance,  and  the  navigation  of  the  bay  up  to 
Matagorda  and  La  Vacca,  would  seem  to  lessen,  in  a  military  point  of  view,  the 
importance  of  its  defence  as  compared  with  that  of  Galveston  and  the  Brazos 
Santiago ;  but  as  a  very  good  harbor  for  vessels  drawing  no  more  than  eight 
feet  of  water  is  exhibited  within  the  bay  at  Porto  Oabello,  and  as  it  would  afford 
convenient  rendezvous  for  the  light  flotillas  of  an  enemy,  it  is  considered  that  a 
permanent  work  of  secondary  importance  to  those  proposed  for  Galveston  and 
the  Brazos  Santiago  should  be  constructed  for  its  defence.  A  small  work, 
mounting  some  twenty -five  guns,  and  estimated  to  cost  $175,000,  is  accordingly 
proposed. — (Class  E.)  The  remaining  inlets  on  the  coast,  either  from  the  shal- 
lowness  of  the  water,  the  comparatively  little  value  of  the  harbors  themselves, 
or  the  nature  of  the  country  immediately  depending  upon  them,  are  deemed  to 
require,  at  present,  no  other  defence  than  that  of  a  temporary  character.  They 
would  depend  upon  the  ultimate  opening  of  a  line  of  inland  navigation,  considered 
practicable  between  the  Sabiue  and  the  Rio  Grande;  and  the  necessary  work 
would  be  thrown  up  only  in  time  of  war. 

GENERAL  SUMMARY. 

It  may  be  of  convenience  to  have  here  a  summary  of  the  principles  con- 
tended for  in  the  preceding  remarks,  and  of  the  essential  points  contained 
therein. 

1.  Assuming  that  we  may  have  wars  with  nations  in  possession  of  extensive 
naval  means,  we  must  consider  ourselves  likely  to  be  attacked  wherever  there 
are  objects  tempting  to  an  enemy,  either  from  the  spoil  he  might  hope  to  gather, 
or  the  injury  that  through  them  he  might  hope  to  inflict.     We  must  also  con- 
sider that  the  power  of  the  attack  will  be  proportioned  to  the  value  of  the 
object,  and  that,  consequently,  the  means  of  defence  should  be  of  corresponding 
strength. 

2.  The  mode  of  defence  proper  to  our  circumstances,  as  sustained  by  the 
consideration  presented  in  the  preceding  remarks,  and  others  of  analogous  nature, 
and  as  exemplified  by  the  present,  as  well  as  by  the  former  practice  of  all  na- 
tions having  an  exposed  seaboard,  is  believed  to  be  a  system  of  permanent 
fortifications,  consisting  of  work  adapted  respectively  in  their  power  to  the  value 
of  the  object  covered,  and  applied,  in  times  of  peace,  severally,  in  an  order  of 
time  also  fixed  by  the  relative  importance  of  the  objects. 

3.  It  is  just  this  mode  of  defence  that  has  been,  to  a  great  extent,  built  up 
in  this  country  since  the  war  of  1812,  and  that  should  be  carried  to  completion 
as  rapidly  as  the  means  of  the  treasury  will  allow.     The  points  that  are  most 
valuable  are  already,  to  a  very  important  extent,  covered  by  these  defences. 
But  among  many  points  that  are  valuable,  all  are  not  equally  so ;  while,  for  exam- 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  411 

pie,  New  York  has  had  much  done  for  it,  Baltimore  has  had  little,  and  New 
Bedford — the  third  city  in  the  Union  for  registered  tonnage — almost  nothing. 
"  More  than  four  thousand  heavy  guns  may,  however,  as  has  before  been  said, 
now  be  mounted  for  the  defence  of  places  which  it  was  necessary  first  to  guard, 
in  permanent  fortifications  that  are  equal  to  any  in  the  world,  in  their  respective 
grades,  and  placed,  moreover,  in  the  most  effective  positions.  These  are  in 
what  are  called  in  this  report  classes  A  and  B,  namely,  old  works  repaired  and 
new  ones  completed,  or  nearly  so,  at  a  total  cost  of  $16,756,708. 

Then  follows  the  class  of  works  in  progress,  (class  C,)  of  which  the  remain- 
ing expenditures  are  estimated  at  $5,028,194. 

And  then  the  class  D,  next  to  be  commenced,  in  which  there  is  no  work  that 
can  be  dispensed  with,  as  must  be  evident  on  consulting  the  list,  page  92.  The 
cost  of  class  D  is  estimated  at  $4,083,000. 

Then  follows  the  class  E,  next  in  importance,  of  which  the  estimated  cost  is 
$2,235,000. 

As  to  those  in  hand,  all  have  received  the  approbation  of  the  government  and 
Congress,  and  not  one  of  those  comprised  in  any  other  class  can  be  begun  with- 
out the  particular  sanction  of  both. 

The  last  class,  marked  F,  the  most  numerous  of  all,  cannot  be  begun  for 
many  years,  at  any  rate,  and  then  orrly  as  the  several  positions  shall,  in  the  view 
of  Congress,  have  risen  to  an  adequate  degree  of  importance.  The  estimate  for 
that  class  is  $11,829,000. 

4.  Though  facility  of  communication  with  the  interior  of  the  country,  by 
railroads,  might  be  an  advantage  in  all  cases  where  an  enemy  might  land  and 
conduct  operations  for  two,  three,  or  more  days,  there  are  few  such  positions  that 
now  have,  or  are  likely  to  have,  the  advantage  of  such  communications.   Gener- 
ally, the  points  of  the  coast  attained  by  railroads  are  not  points  at  which  the 
people  are  deficient  in  numbers,  but  where  they  most  abound ;  and  besides,  the 
attacks  to  which  the  coast  will  be  liable,  will  be  almost  universally  sudden 
attacks — attacks  without  warning — attacks  that  must  be  settled,  one  way  or 
the  other,  before  relief  could  come,  even  by  railroad,  and  to  which  railroads  could 
net  supply  relief,  even  were  there  time — men  not  being  wanted  to  resist  these  at- 
tacks, but  heavy  guns,  whether  afloat  or  ashore. 

The  use  of  existing  railroads,  or  of  any  railroad  likely  to  be  constructed, 
cannot,  in  general,  therefore,  affect  materially  a  system  of  forts  and  batteries 
upon  the  sea-coast.  There  may  be  particular  instances  of  partial  benefit,  but 
none  is  likely  to  occur  wherein  their  use  could  justify  the  reduction  of  the 
power  of  fortifications  otherwise  necessary,  much  less  the  dispensing  with  such 
works  altogether. 

5.  The  application  of  steam  to  vessels-of-war  is  believed  to  act  detrimentally 
to  the  defence  of  the  sea-coast  by  opening  new  avenues  of  approach,  and  also 
by   the    suddenness    and   surprise   with    which    attacks   may   fall  upon   any 
point.     The  first  augments  the  number  of  the  defensive  works,  and  the  second 
requires  them  to  be  at  all  times — at  the  opening  of  the  war  as  well  as  during 
.its  continuance — in  a  state,  of  perfect  readiness   for  action.     With  the  large 
steam  navies  now  kept  in  commission  by  naval  powers,  there  would  be  no  state 
of  transition  between  peace  and  war — no  time  for  new  defences  to  be  prepared, 
nor  for  substituting  new  expedients  even  if  any  such  would  answer. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  use  of  steam  vessels  as  a  reliance  for  coast  defence 
is  attended  with  all  the  objections  inherent  in  other  modes  of  defence  with  ves- 
sels, and  with  some  of  the  objections  exaggerated.  The  objections  that  are 
inevitable  are,  inordinate  expense  and  the  perishable  nature  of  the  preparation ; 
and  to  these  are  to  be  added  uncertainty  as  to  their  proper  state  of  readiness, 
and  as  to  their  sufficiency  when  ready.  Steamers  should  in  no  case,  therefore, 
take  the  place  of  shore  batteries,  when  the  use  of  the  latter  is  not  forbidden  by 


412  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

local  peculiarities.     As  auxiliaries  of  fortifications  they  will  always  be  useful, 
however,  and  as  substitutes  in  the  cases  just  supposed  indispensable. 

6.  No  improvements  or  inventions  of  modern  times  tend  in  any  degree  to 
lessen  the  efficiency  of  fortifications  as  means  of  coast  defence,  while  the  prin- 
cipal one,  namely,  the  firing  of  shells  from  guns,  unquestionably  augments  their 
relative  power. 

NORTHERN  FRONTIER. 

The  Secretary  of  War  presents  another  interrogatory  (the  fourth)  in  the  fol- 
lowing words :  "  How  far  the  increase  of  population  on  the  northern  frontier, 
and  of  the  mercantile  marine  on  the  northern  lakes,  obviates  or  diminishes  the 
necessity  of  continuing  the  system  of  fortification  on  those  lakes  ?" 

The  system  of  defence  for  these  lakes  recommended  by  the  joint  board  in 
1840  (see  Doc.  206,  page  100)  comprised  the  following  works  : 

1.  Fort  Brady,  at  the  straits  between  Lake  Superior  and  Lake 

Huron.     Estimated  cost  of  repair $75,  000 

2.  Fort  Mackinac,  at  the  junction  of  Lake  Michigan  with  Lake 

Huron.     Estimated  cost  of  repair 50,  000 

3.  Fort  Gratiot,  at  the  outlet  of  Lake  Huron.    Estimated  cost  of 

repair 50,  000 

Note. — All  these  are  old  works,  long  occupied  by  United  States  troops,  and 
it  is  designed  to  give  them  further  strength  and  means  of  accommodation  for 
garrisons. 

4.  A  new  fort  and  barracks  near  Detroit.     Estimated  cost  of  con- 
struction (original) $250,  000 

Amount  expended 171,  755 

Amount  required  to  complete 66,  000 

5.  Defensive  works  and  barracks  at  Buffalo.     Estimated  cost  of 
construction $150,  000 

Amount  expended 116,  500 

Amount  required  to  complete 33,  500 

6.  Repair  of  old  Fort  Niagara.     Estimated  cost  of  repair $84,  027 

Amount  expended 59,  027 

Amount  required  to  complete 25,  000 

7.  Repairs  of  old  Fort  Ontario.     Estimated  cost  of  repair $83,  013 

Amount  expended 78,  013 

Amount  required  to  complete 5,  000 

Note. — These  two  are  old  works,  the  former  having  been  always  garrisoned,  I 
believe. 

8.  And  a  fort  at  the  outlet  of  Lake  Champlain.     Estimated  cost 

of  construction $41 1,  497 

Amount  expended.  * 187,  355 

Amount  required  to  complete 224,  142 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  413 

These,  it  was  thought,  should  be  executed  as  soon  as  the  means  of  the 
treasury  would  allow. 

And  it  was  recommended  in  the  above  report,  and  in  others  on  the  same  sub- 
ject, that  at  the  approach  of  war  with  England — 

9.  Works  should  be  placed  at  the  mouth  of  the  Genesee  river 

10.  A  fort  should  be  built  at  Sackett's  Harbor. 

11.  Another  at  a  narrow  part  of  the  St.  Lawrence  river. 

12.  That  a  large  barrack  establishment  should  be  prepared  at  Plattsburg. 

13.  Stone  house,  &c.,  at  the  head  of  the  Kennebec  and  Penobscot. 

14.  A  fort  at  Calais,  on  the  St.  Croix;  and, 

15.  A  large  barrack  establishment  near  Albany. 

These  last  mentioned  preparations  for  war  (Nos.  9,  10,  11,  12,  13,  14,  and 
15)  may  still  be  left  (as  was  designed)  to  be  reconsidered  at  any  time  that  such 
a  certainty  may  seem  to  impend. 

Nothing  has  yet  been  done  to  Forts  Brady,  Mackinac,  or  Gratiot,  and 
though  the  maintenance  of  these  forts  in  a  war  with  England  would  undoubtedly 
be  necessary,  they  may,  with  less  damage  than  the  others,  be  left  as  the  last,  to 
receive  all  the  additional  strength  their  situations  demand.  In  the  meantime 
the  indispensable  repairs  that  small  appropriations  will  accomplish  should  be 
provided  for ;  for  instance,  a  part  of  the  very  old  wall  of  Fort  Mackinac  having 
fallen  down,  a  small  grant  was  asked  last  year  for  its  repair,  a  request  that  is 
this  year  repeated. 

Fort  Wayne,  the  new  fort  near  Detroit,  has,  since  the  date  of  the  report 
above  referred  to,  been  built  and  is  now  in  perfect  condition,  and  there  remains 
therein  only  the  re-erection  of  officers'  quarters  destroyed  by  lire  just  after  being 
completed,  and  the  addition  of  some  other  quarters,  storehouses,  &c.,  the  bar- 
racks being  very  nearlv  finished;  the  remaining  expense  being  estimated  at 
$66,000. 

Fort  Ontario,  at  Oswcgo,  has  also  been  finished,  with  several  entirely  new 
quarters,  storehouses,  barracks,  &c.,  together  with  a  long  sea-wall,  found  to  be 
necessary  to  preserve  the  site.  Only  small  grants,  for  slight  repairs,  will  be 
needed  for  this  work  for  some  time;  but  of  which  one  for  nine  hundred  dollars 
is  now  asked.  This  fort  is  not  a  permanent  one,  and,  if  required  to  be  main- 
tained many  years  hence,  may  need  repairs  somewhat  extensive. 

Fort  Niagara  has  received  extensive  repairs,  and  is  in  a  defensible  condition ; 
but  the  expenditure  having  been  restricted  to  the  fortification  proper  and  to  the 
magazine,  the  accommodations  for  the  garrison,  which  are  remains  of  the  old 
French  work,  are  in  a  bad  condition,  and  need  repair  for  the  health  and  comfort 
of  the  troops.  A  new  hospital  was  hardly  finished,  a  year  or  two  ago,  when  it 
was  destroyed  by  fire,  originating  in  another  part  of  the  fort ;  which  accident, 
with  the  similar  one  at  Fort  Wayne  mentioned  above,  shows  that  economy  even 
exacts  that  buildings  be  made  fire-proof.  The  effect  of  this  fire  upon  some 
palisading,  as  well  as  upon  the  hospital,  and  the  decay  of  some  wooden  gun 
platforms,  make  a  small  appropriation  necessary.  The  old  stone  houses  will 
•  have  to  be  rebuilt,  though  they  may  be  kept  up  for  a  short  time,  and  some 
enlargement  must  be  given  to  quarters;  all  which  will,  perhaps,  involve  an 
expense  of  $25,000. 

At  Buffalo,  Fort  Porter  has  been  built,  and  is  finished.  It  is  a  tower 
enclosed  by  a  battery.  It  commands  the  entrance  into  Niagara  river,  and  also 
the  shore  and  anchorage  in  front  of  the  city  of  Buffalo,  nearly  up  to  the  mouth 
of  Buffalo  harbor.  There  is  connected  with  the  fort  a  good  house  for  officers' 
quarters  that  was  purchased  with  the  site.  There  will  be  needed,  further, 
another  battery  and  tower,  to  be  placed  at  or  near  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  at 
an  additional  cost,  beyond  the  means  in  hand,  of,  say,  $33,500. 

Such  barracks  as  may  be  wanted  at  a  future  day  may  there  be  hired  or  hastily 
erected. 


414  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

Fort  Montgomery,  outlet  of  Lake  Champlain. — This  fort  is  not  less  than  half 
fjnished;  indeed,  considering  the  difficulties  and  expense  that  attended  the 
making  a  foundation  of  piles  under  the  whole  fort,  it  may  be  said  to  be  two-thirds 
finished.  '  The  remaining  expense  may  be  estimated  at  $224,142. 

We  see,  therefore,  that  of  all  the  new  works  designed  to  be  executed  on  the 
northern  frpntier,  in  anticipation  of  a  war,  there  remains  to  be  expended — 

At  Fort  Wayne,  Detroit,  for  buildings $66,  500  00 

At  Buffalo,  for  tower  and  battery 33,  000  00 

At  Fort  Montgomery,  outlet  of  Lake  Champlain 224,  142  00 

323,642  00 
On  repairs  of  old  works  there  is  now,  or  soon  will  be,  needed — 

At  Fort  Niagara,  say $25,  000  00 

At  Fort  Ontario,  say 5,  000  00 

At  Fort  Mackinac,  say 20,  000  00 

50,  000  00 


Making  a  total  of 373,  642  00 

If  we  add  to  this  sum  the  estimates,  before  given,  for — 

Fort  Brady- $75,  000  00 

Fort  Gratiot 50,  000  00 

Fort  Mackiuac,  the  balance  after  the  above  provision       30,  000  00 

155,000  00 


There  will  be  a  grand  total  for  the  northern  frontier  of          528,  642  00 


I  thought  it  best  to  show  first  the  actual  condition  of  things  on  the  northern 
frontier,  before  proceeding  with  a  reply  to  the  specific  inquiries  of  the  honorable 
Secretary  of  War. 

The  great  length  to  which  this  report  has  extented,  notwithstanding  that  a 
sincere  desire  to  keep  it  within  more  reasonable  limits  has  induced  me  to  omit 
considerations  that  I  wished  to  adduce,  must  now  restrict  my  remarks,  referring 
to  some  previous  reports  wherein  the  subject  of  our  northern  defences  have  been 
specially  treated — I  mean,  particularly,  first,  a  report  of  a  special  board  of  engi- 
neer officers,  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  December  27,  1838;  second, 
a  letter  from  the  chief  engineer  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  of  February  20, 
1839;  and,  third,  a  report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  from  a  joint  board, 
consisting  of  Commodore  Morris  and  the  chief  engineer,  dated  November  18, 
1845. 

It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  augmented  population  and  extended  naviga- 
tion of  the  upper  lakes  will  afford  great  resources  in  that  quarter  to  the  nation, 
on  the  occurrence  of  a  war  with  England,  and  there  seems  to  be  a  feeling  with 
many  that  in  such  an  event  a  great  flood  of  armed  men  would  sweep  across  the 
whole  surface  of  Canada,  effacing  all  organized  resistance,  and  trampling  down 
all  opposition.  That  this  is  possible  may  not,  I  suppose,  be  questioned,  but  that 
it  will  not  be  done  is  certain,  if  there  remain  in  our  councils  firmness  to  resist  all 
such  fruitless  impulses,  and  wisdom  to  see  and  pursue  the  proper  course. 

All  Upper  Canada  might  be  thus  swept,  from  Lake  Superior  down  to  Mon- 
treal, without  a  real  conquest  of  the  country,  and,  indeed,  without  gaining  any 
advantage  of  vital  moment.  Kingston,  in  all  that  distance,  is  the  only  place  at 
which  anything  like  a  serious  impression  would  be  made  upon  the  military 
means  of  defence ;  and,  as  the  flood  should  pass  away,  all  that  part  of  the  prov- 
ince, if  loyal  before,  would  not  be  made  less  so  by  the  desolation  spread  around. 


*        FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  415 

No  solid  resistance  would  be  made  to  such  an  inroad,  and  there  being  no  forti- 
cations  worth  defending  in  a  way  to  compromise  the  safety  of  the  regular 
troops,  these  would  retreat  before  it,  accumulating,  as  they  receded,  into  the 
lower  province,  where  would  be  found,  supported  by  the  most  formidable  nat- 
ural obstacles,  not  the  force  of  Canada  merely,  but  also  the  army  and  navy  of 
England,  in  daily  communication  with  the  mother  country,  and  where  would 
have  to  be  fought  and  won  the  battles  which  alone  would  secure  a  conquest. 
Any  plan  of  operation  that  contemplates  overrunning  Upper  Canada,  or  making 
such  attacks  upon  it,  would  be  costly,  beyond  all  calculation,  in  life  and  treasure, 
and  unnecessary  and  fruitless  after  all.  '  A  country  is  conquered  by  concentrated 
efforts  of  well  appointed  armies  upon  vital  points,  often  a  single  point — a  levy 
en  masse  is  the  great  resource  of  defence;  a  well  prepared  and  well  appointed 
army  is  the  only  reliable,  as  it  is  also,  by  far,  the  cheapest  means  of  invasion. 

If  we  send  a  single  army  into  Canada  by  Lake  Champlain  and  the  peninsula 
lying  between  the  Richelieu  and  St.  Lawrence,  and  possess  ourselves  of  Mon- 
treal, or  of  both  shores  of  the  St.  Lawrence  at  any  place  below  that  city  where 
the  channel  can  be  commanded,  all  the  wide  extent  of  the  British  possessions 
above  that  point  will  be  paralyzed,  being  entirely  cut  off,  not  only  from  the 
mother  country,  but  also  from  all  relief  from  Lower  Canada,  including  Quebec, 
and  from  the  provinces  of  New  Brunswick  and  Nova  Scotia.  To  do  this  a 
great  battle  must  be  gained — probably  on  the  peninsula  just  mentioned,  and 
being  gained,  must  be  followed  up  by  other  victories,  ending  in  the  capture  of 
Quebec — the  last  barrier  that  can  be  manned  by  the  British.  The  policy  of  the 
defence  will  be,  while  keeping  an  eye  upon  any  preparations  for  the  attack  just 
mentioned,  by  every  resort,  device,  and  effort,  to  agitate  the  frontier  above,  and 
thereby  draw  the  attention,  and,  as  far  as  possible,  the  means  of  our  govern- 
ment to  the  defence  of  that  frontier.  They  will  generally  expose  there  but  few 
regular  troops,  but  will  collect  volunteers,  militia  and  Indians  in  as  large  num- 
bers as  possible.  They  will  detach  thither  bodies  of  ship-carpenters  and  sail- 
ors, and  make  great  efforts  to  obtain  and  keep  a  naval  ascendency,  if  not  every- 
where, at  least  wherever  possible. 

This  was  exactly  the  policy  followed  by  the  English  during  the  war  of  1812, 
and  with  full  success.  By  judgment,  perseverance,  and  activity,  they  kept  the 
strength  of  this  country  so  attenuated,  by  stretching  along  a  frontier  of  many 
hundred  miles,  that  no  great  effort  could  be  made  anywhere ;  and  upon  the  true 
point  of  attack  reduced  the  efforts  to  means  so  feeble  as  to  end  only  in  discom- 
fiture and  disgrace.  Our  government  had  its  attention  always,  more  or  less, 
turned  in  the  right  direction,  and  several  times  attempted  to  assemble  armies  on 
the  Champlain  frontier,  but  always  withdrew  these  troops,  giving  way  to  clamor 
raised  by  other  frontier  districts  that  were  assailed,  or  believed  themselves  en- 
dangered by  British  enterprises. 

The  British  took  Chicago,  Mackinac,  Detroit ;  besieged  Fort  Meigs ;  attacked 
Fort  Sandusky ;  captured  Black  Rock  and  Buffalo  two  or  three  times ;  they 
fought  the  battles  of  Chippawa  and  Lundy 's  Lane ;  besieged  and  assaulted  Fort 
Erie ;  they  captured  Fort  Niagara  and  Fort  Ontario ;  attacked  Sackett's  Har- 
bor; took  Ogdensburg,  French  Mills,  Malone,  &c.  All  these  certainly  for  no 
design  or  hope  of  conquest  and  extended  occupation,  but  for  the  purpose  of 
keeping  up  an  excited  state  of  feeling  and  an  energetic  warfare  that  would  fully 
occupy  this  government.  When  in  1814  the  assemblirg  of  six  or  seven  thou- 
sand men  at  Plattsburg,  under  •  General  Izard,  seemed  to  threaten  their  weak 
point,  the  English  forthwith  began  to  concentrate  their  best  troops  in  opposition, 
and  no  sooner  was  that  general  withdrawn  to  reinforce  the  Niagara  frontier 
than  this  English  force  dashed  forward  in  hopes,  by  profiting  of  our  weakness'] 
to  make  themselves  masters  of  the  lake,  and  thereby  cover  for  an  indefinite 
period  their  vital  point. 

If  there  has  been  a  great  increase  of  power  and  reasoning  in  the  United 


416  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

States  since  the  war  of  1812,  there  has,  on  the  other  hand,  been  a  great  change 
of  the  same  sort  in  the  population,  and  also  in  the  military  means  of  Canada. 

The  Rideau  canal  opens  a  communication  between  Montreal  and  Lake  Ontario, 
and  the  Welland  canal  between  Lakes  Erie  arid  Ontario ;  and  good  roads  and 
canals  from  Toronto,  on  Lake  Ontario  to  Lake  Huron,  all  deep  in  the  heart  of 
the  country,  and  not  to  be  intercepted  except  by  victorious  armies.  All  the 
light  draught  war  steamers  of  Great  Britain  can  be  sent  fully  armed,  provisioned, 
and  manned,  directly  from  sea  up  to  the  very  head  of  Lake  Ontario ;  and  we 
can  now  do  nothing  whatever,  and  shall  be  unable  to  do  anything  except  by  the 
erection  of  a  fort  at  some  commanding  'point  on  the  St.  Lawrence  to  stop  this 
transit.  War  steamers  or  other  armed  vessels,  though  of  smaller  size,  may 
branch  off  from  this  main  line  into  Lake  Champlain,  and  others  into  Lake  Erie. 
Besides,  the  number  of  British  merchant  steamers  on  Lake  Ontario  and  the  St. 
Lawrence,  above  Montreal,  is  greater  than  of  American  steamers ;  and  between 
Montreal  and  Quebec  there  are  several  of  the  largest  size,  so  that  as  many 
troops  as  they  might  desire  to  send  could  be  transported  in  twenty-four  hours 
from  Quebec  to  Montreal ;  in  two  or  three  days  to  Kingston ;  and  in  three  or 
four  days  to  the  head  of  Lake  Ontario  and  the  shores  of  Lake  Erie.  They 
have,  moreover,  a  strong  new  fortification  at  Kingston  which  will  require  a  siege 
to  reduce,  and  which,  with  other  defences,  covers  a  large  naval  depot,  and  also 
the  outlet  of  the  Rideau  canal.  Under  these  and  other  circumstances  favorable 
to  the  power  of  Canada,  the  relative  numbers  of  the  people  of  the  two  countries 
afford  no  measure  of  relative  strength  for  military  purposes,  especially  at  the 
beginning  of  a  war;  and  even  as  to  numbers  we  shall  find  the  difference  less 
when  we  call  to  mind  that  the  people  of  the  British  Islands  are  quite  as  near  in 
time  to  this  frontier  as  our  most  remote  States,  and  that  the  help  those  islands 
will  send  will  consist  of  war  steamers  and  regiments  of  disciplined  troops.  It 
will  not  be  with  Canada  alone  that  we  shall  have  to  contend,  but  with  Canada 
and  Great  Britain — the  latter  a  nation  always  ready  with  great  military  power, 
and  prepared  with  naval  means  to  throw  a  large  army  upon  the  lake  shore  as 
soon,  at  least,  as  we  should  be  ready  to  face  them  with  our  undisciplined  levies. 
Our  plan  of  operations  being  to  move  forward  from  the  foot  of  Lake  Cham- 
plain  as  a  base,  we  should  not  permit  any  demonstration  nor  any  real  attacks 
from  Canada  upon  the  frontier  above  to  direct  us,  although  great  efforts  will 
undoubtedly  be  made  to  that  end  all  along  the  line  from  Montreal  to  Lake  Su- 
perior. 

We  have  not  now,  and  without  great  and  costly  efforts  could  not  acquire  the 
naval  ascendency  on  Lake  Ontario  and  on  the  St.  Lawrence.  We  could  not 
attain  to  it  at  all  without  putting  our  building  establishments  under  cover  of 
fortifications. 

By  the  time  one-half  dozen  merchant  steamers  on  Lake  Champlain  could  be 
prepared  and  armed,  the  English  might  pour  into  the  lake  through  their  canals 
adequate  naval  means,  supplied  by  Montreal,  Quebec  and  the  St.  Lawrence,  to 
make  the  struggle  for  the  mastery  on  that  lake  a  doubtful  one  at  least.  If  they 
could  think  it  possible  that  we  should  fail  to  fortify  the  outlet  of  the  lake,  the 
contemplated  enlargement  of  the  canal  from  Chambly  to  St.  John's,  (about 
twelve  miles,)  whereby  Avar  steamers  could  pass  into  that  lake  as  they  now  may 
into  Lake  Ontario,  would  undoubtedly  be  executed. 

Upon  Lakes  Erie,  Huron,  and  Michigan  we  unquestionably  have  a  great  su- 
periority in  naval  preparation,  which  is  likely,  moreover,  to  increase  from  year 
to  year;  and  if  timely  care  betaken  to  arm  and  man  a  suitable  portion  of  these, 
the  mastery  may  be  retained. 

If  there  be  truth  and  force  in  the  foregoing  statements  and  opinions,  a  war 
with  England  will  begin  with  the  naval  supremacy  against  us,  along  the  whole 
range  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  head  of  Lake  Ontario ;  with  means  in  the 
enemy's  hands  of  contending  for,  at  least,  if  not  seizing,  a  like  supremacy  on 


FOKTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  417 

Lake  Champlain,  with  the  power  of  throwing  troops,  mechanics,  and  sailors  in 
a  few  days  upon  the  shore  of  the  upper  lakes,  and  with  the  strongest  induce- 
"ments  to  keep  up  then  an  active  warfare.  The  possession  of  a  naval  depot  at 
Penetanqueshin,  on  Lake  Huron,  which  it  is  understood  can  readily  be  made  a 
strong  place,  and  where  there  is  now  one  war  steamer,  and  the  easy  communi- 
cation with  it  from  Toronto  would  allow  enterprises  to  be  prepared  and  sent  at 
favorable  moments  against  the  establishments  and  commerce  of  the  upper  lakes. 
But  an  anchorage  under  the  defence  of  Fort  Mackinac  as  a  place  of  rendezvous 
and  watch  for  our  own  steam  squadron,  and  a  place  of  refuge  in  case  of  disaster, 
would  be  very  important  in  counteraction  of  any  such  project.  Fort  Gratiot> 
when  strengthened,  would  prevent  any  such  hostile  expedition  from  passing 
through  the  strait  in  Lake  St.  Glair  and  endangering  Detroit,  while  it  would 
cover  any  of  our  vessels  retreating  to  that  end  of  the  lake.  Fort  Wayne,  near 
Detroit,  will  prevent  the  passing  of  any  vessel  between  Lakes  Huron  and  Erie, 
while  it  would  become  the  rallying  point  of  the  militia  of  that  region  assembled 
to  meet  threatened  attacks  of  a  serious  nature,  or  to  organize  expeditions  into 
the  opposite  territory,  and  its  garrison  would  protect  the  neighborhood  from  all 
predatory  inroads. 

Even  on  Lake  Erie,  where  we  might  have  the  means  of  arming  and  manning 
any  number  of  steamers,  we  should  derive  important  if  not  indispensable  aid 
from  batteries,  duly  prepared  at  Buffalo.  The  English  now  own  several  good 
steamers  on  this  lake,  and  by  the  aid  of  the  Welland  canal  they  could  bring  in 
others,  and  they  could  also  soon  build  a  number  within  harbors  secure  and  near ; 
so  that  we  may  reasonably  look  for  vigorous  efforts  of  that  nature  if  we  leave 
our  great  places  uncovered.  The  proposed  battery  and  tower,  in  addition  to 
the  one  already  constructed  at  Buffalo,  will  place  that  city  out  of  danger  of 
conflagration,  bombardment,  or  contribution,  a  security  otherwise  to  be  attained 
only  by  keeping  it  constantly  covered  by  a  number  of  war  steamers  greater 
than  the  enemy  can  bring.  There  can  be  no  comparison  as  to  the  expense  of 
the  two  modes,  while  the  naval  defence  will  be  subject  to  all  the  chances  of 
absence,  at  the  moment  of  need,  on  other  duty ;  of  being  enticed  away  by  other 
real  or  fictitious  attacks  ;  of  being  dispersed  for  a  time  by  tempests,  &c.  Other 
important  places  on  the  lake  shore  will  be  distant  comparatively,  not  under 
constant  supervision  from  the  Canada  side,  less  valuable,  and  for  these  and  other 
reasons  may,  with  less  damage,  be  left  to  such  defences  as  temporary  and  hastily- 
prepared  works  may  supply.  The  two  batteries  at  Buffalo  would  cover  the 
whole  face  of  the  shore,  so  that  no  vessel  could  lie  within  reach  of  the  city 
without  coming  under  their  fire,  and  the  towers  would  guard  these  guns  from 
being  spiked  in  any  attempts  at  surprise. 

On  Lake  Ontario,  with  the  exception  of  some  slight  repairs,  all  has  been  done 
that  has  been  proposed  for  the  present.  But  we  have  seen  that  we  shall  here 
be  under  the  naval  command  of  the  English,  and  must,  therefore,  make  timely 
preparation  to  avert  the  more  serious  consequences. 

On  the  St.  Lawrence  we  should,  as  soon  as  possible  after  a  war  becomes 
probable,  erect  a  work  to  command  its  navigation ;  and  we  ought,  also,  then  to 
do  something  for  the  protection  of  Ogdensburg. 

The  obvious  advantages  afforded  by  our  occupation  of  the  outlet  of  Lake 
Champlain  would  seem  to  require  nothing  to  be  added  to  the  preceding  remarks. 
I  may  say,  however,  that  the  fort  now  under  construction,  and  more  than  half 
finished,  will  give  to  us  the  control  of  the  lake  beyond  all  doubt,  and  retain  it 
in  spite  of  the  energetic  efforts  that  its  great  importance  might  induce  an  enemy 
to  make  for  its  capture  or  reduction.  It  will  keep  all  the  shores  of  the  lake,  as 
well  as  its  surface,  free  from  any  hostile  irruption,  because  no  expedition  could 
penetrate,  on  either  side,  without  exposing  itself  to  be  cut  off  by  troops  landed 
in  its  rear,  and  it  will  secure  the  inappreciable  advantage  of  taking  the  armies 
destined  to  the  conquest  of  Canada,  together  with  all  their  supplies,  up  to  the 

H.  Rep.  Com.  86 27 


418  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

very  frontier  with  all  the  velocity  of  steam ;  it  will  bring  all  re-enforcements  with 
the  same  rapidity  and  certainty ;  and,  moreover,  in  case  of  reverses  it  will 
establish  a  limit  to  retreat — a  place  of  shelter,  refreshment,  and  a  base  for  re- 
newed operations. 

It  is  necessary  to  consider  that  this  point  is  so  near  to  the  point  of  concen- 
tration of  the  English,  in  the  case  we  have  supposed,  that  no  temporary  work 
could  be  prepared  in  time,  or,  if  prepared,  would  be  competent  to  resist,  unless 
very  strong,  extensive,  and  defended  by  a  large  body  of  troops. 

If  these  defences  be  not  earned  to  completion  we  may  look  with  certainty  to 
see  the  English  widen  and  deepen  the  Chambly  canal,  a  trivial  operation,  and 
at  the  very  beginning  of  a  war  throw  a  squadron  of  war  steamers  into  the  lake, 
from  which  they  could  not  be  driven  but  by  infinite  cost  and  much  sacrifice  of 
life  and  loss  of  time. 

I  forbear  to  enlarge  further  on  this  and  other  important  matters  connected 
with  this  frontier  system  of  defence,  again  taking  the  liberty,  if  the  subject  be 
deemed  worthy  of  further  pursuit,  to  refer  to  the  special  reports  before  men- 
tioned, and  also  to  that  in  document  206.  In  these  reports  will  be  seen  views 
in  relation  to  the  embodying  militia  forces  in  support  of  the  lake  frontier,  and 
also  in  support  of  the  frontier  eastward  of  Lake  Champlain,  as  well  as  other 
ideas  supposed  to  have  an  important  bearing  on  the  topic. 

No  speculations  are  ventured  as  to  a  possible  change  in  the  political  condition 
of  Canada.  Until  Great  Britain  shall  willingly  relinquish  Tier  dominion  we 
may  be  certain  that  all  her  energies  will,  if  necessary,  be  exerted  in  its  main- 
tenance ;  and  whether  this  be  for  ten  years  or  for  a  century,  the  defensive  system 
herein  advocated,  as  dictated  by  forecast  and  prudence,  should  be  steadily  ad- 
hered to ;  for,  up  to  the  moment  of  relinquishrnent,  if  such  moment  ever  arrive, 
the  defences  may  be  growing  more  and  more  necessary. 

The  considerations  detailed  in  the  preceding  remarks,  and  others  with  which 
it  does  not  seem  necessary  further  to  burden  this  long  report,  permit  me  to 
make  no  other  reply  to  the  fourth  inquiry  of  the  Hon.  Secretary  of  War  than 
that  no  change  has  occurred,  or  is  likely  to  occur,  that  will  justify  the  relin- 
quishment  of  the  system  of  defence  for  the  northern  frontier,  of  which  system 
the  portion  designed  to  be  first  prepared  and  to  be  permanent  is  now  nearly 
completed. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


419 


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Designation  of  the  works  and  State  in 
which  located. 

•    .     * 

Repair  of  old  Fort  Niagara.  New  York  * 

Repair  of  old  Fort  Ontario,  New  York  * 
Fort  at  the  outlet  of  Lake  Champlain, 
NewYork*  

Fort  Brady,  Michigan*  
Fort  Mackiuac.  Michigan*  
Fort  Gratiot,  Michigan*  
New  Fort  Barracks,  n'r  Detroit,  Mich 
Works  at  Buffalo,  including  Fort  For 
ter.  New  York  *.  .. 

^d«W 

10     «c 

i-  oo 

420  FOKTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

The  inquiries  embodied  in  the  resolutions  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  and 
those  specified  in  the  letter  of  the  Hon.  Secretary  of  War  calling  for  this  report, 
have  seemed  to  me  to  require  that  the  several  topics  should  be  gone  into  with 
some  minuteness.  Certain  of  these,  moreover,  having  been  often  of  late  placed 
before  the  public  mind  in  erroneous  lights,  according  to  my  judgment,  it  appeared 
to  be  a  duty  of  my  office  to  press  such  considerations  as  might  be  calculated  to 
satisfy  the  inquiries  of  the  unprejudiced  and  uncommitted  of  the  necessity  of  a 
permanent  system  of  defence,  and  of  the  adaptation  to  our  wants  and  circum- 
stances of  a  system  of  fortification. 

Were  it  not  for  the  length  and  diffusion  of  the  preceding  remarks,  of  which  I 
m  fully  conscious,  but  which  I  have  not  time  to  condense,  I  should  have  intro- 
duced other  considerations  of  like  tendency  and  of  much  weight. 

As  it  is,  in  the  full  knowledge  of  our  remaining  weakness  at  many  important 
points,  and  under  a  deep  conviction  of  the  grave  consequence  likely  to  flow  from 
tardiness  in  the  prosecution  of  the  system,  or  interruption  to  its  progress,  I  feel 
constrained  to  invoke  for  it,  with  all  admissible  earnestness,  the  prompt  and 
liberal  support  of  the  Executive  and  Congress. 

At  the  same  time,  I  only  fulfil  a  further  duty  in  warning  the  same  authorities 
against  relying  on  means  that,  though  inordinately  expensive,  will  be  but  tem- 
porarily of  use,  and  insufficient  while  they  last,  instead  of  those  adopted  by  all 
enlightened,  experienced  nations  as  relatively  cheap  as  permanent,  and  in  all 
respects  adequate. 

COAST   OF    THE   PACIFIC. 

Several  works  of  defence  will  be  required  for  this  coast.  The  special  board  of 
engineers  organized  for  its  examination,  whose  province  it  is  to  project  the  neces- 
sary works,  have  but  just  commenced  their  sessions,  and  have  had  the  time  to 
examine  and  determine  on  the  location  of  a  single  fort  only.  This  is  on  the 
southern  side  of  the  entrance  to  San  Francisco  bay,  where  a  work  will  undoubt- 
edly be  required. 

For  the  other  points  of  the  coast  no  positive  information  as  to  the  locality, 
size,  and  cost  of  works  can  now  be  offered.  The  joint  commission  of  naval  and 
engineer  officers  who  recently  made  a  reconnoissance  of  the  coast,  without  the 
means  of  minute  examination,  suggest  several  points  that  will  probably  require 
defence  in  the  course  of  time.  These  positions  they  designate  as  requiring  forti- 
fications to  be  commenced  immediately,  namely,  San  Francisco  bay,  San  Diego 
harbor,  and  the  mouth  of  Columbia  river;  and  the  department  is  disposed  to  rely 
confidently  upon  the  opinion  of  the  intelligent  officers  composing  the  commission. 

Several  other  points  they  also  suggest  as  ultimately  requiring  defence,  submit- 
ting estimates  of  cost.  The  number  of  these  works,  as  well  as  the  cost,  must  be 
taken  as  conjectural  until  a  thorough  examination  can  be  made. 

The  localities  specified,  with  approximate  cost  of  works,  are  as  follows : 

"  The  commission  of  navy  and  engineer  officers  constituted  by  the*  President 
for  the  purpose  of  making  an  examination  of  the  coast  of  the  United  States  lying 
on  the  Pacific  ocean,  with  reference  co  points  of  defence  and  occupation,  for  the 
security  and  accommodation  of  trade  and  commerce,  and  for  military  and  naval 
purposes,"  *  *  *  *  state: 

"  The  several  works  required  for  the  defence  of  harbors,  roadsteads,  rivers, 
sounds,  &c.,  upon  the  coast  of  the  United  States  on  the  Pacific  will  be  shown  in 
the  following  tables,  arranged  in  the  order  of  their  relative  importance,  in  three 
classes,  with  approximate  estimates  of  their  cost;  each  class  being  shown  in  a 
separate  table,  and  the  heading  being  applicable  to  all  the  tables." 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


421 


Sites  of  fortifications. 

Their  denominations. 

Approximate  estimate  of 
cost. 

On  the  At- 
lantic. 

On  the  Pa- 
cific. 

FIRST  CLASS.  —  TO  BE  BUILT  WITHOUT 
DELAY. 

South  shore  San  Francisco  bay,  chan- 

Battery  

$400,  000 

400,000 
150,000 

200,000 
300,  000 
400,  000 

$1,600,000 

1,600,000 
600,000 

800,  000 
1,200,000 
1,600,000 

North  shore  San  Francisco  bay,  chan- 

do  

Alcatrazas  island  San  Francisco  bay.. 

do  

Cape  Disappointment,  mouth  of  Co- 

Redoubt,  with  battery. 
Fort,  with  battery  
Battery,  with  coverface 

Point  Adams,  mouth  of  Columbia  river 
Punta  de  Guianos  San  Diego.... 

Total  

1,850,000 

7,400,000 

SECOND  CLASS.  —  TO  BE  BUILT  AT  A  LATER 
PERIOD. 

Santa  Catalina  island.  

Fort,  with  battery... 
Redoubt  and  battery.  . 
do  

$400,  000 
150,000 
150.000 
100,000 
100,000 
150,  000 
50,000 
50,000 
50,  000 
50,  000 

$1,600,000 
600,000 
600,  000 
400,000 
400,  000 
600,000 
200,000 
200,000 
200.  000 
200^000 

Entrance  to  Humboldt  harbor.  ...... 

Entrance  to  Klamet  harbor  

Neat  island,  (Scarborough  harbor).... 

do  

San  Pedro  roadstead,  (island)........ 

do..  

Monterey  roadstead  

do  

Santa  Barbara  roadstead  

Battery  and  tower  
do  

Estero  bay  

Entrance  of  Umpqua  or  of  Cahons.... 

do  

Bodega  roadstead,  (island).....  ...... 

Battery  

Total  

1,250,000 

5,000,000 

THIRD  CLASS.  —  TO  BE  BUILT  AT  A  REMOTE 
PERIOD. 

Port  Lawrence,  (Admiralty  inlet)  .... 
Port  Townsend,  Straits  of  Fuca  ...... 

Redoubt  and  battery., 
do 

$150,000 
150,  000 

$644,  000 
600,000 

C  West  cape  

do  

Port  Discovery,  do.  ?  East  cape.  

do  

{  Protection  island. 

do 

Narrows  of  Puget's  sound  

do 

150,000 
150,000 
50,000 
20,000 
20,000 
10,000 
10,000 

600,  000 
600,000 
200,000 
80,  000 
80,000 
40,000 
40,  000 

Entrance  of  Hood's  canal  

do 

Gray's  harbor,  mouth  of  Chiboby  river. 
Point  Josd,  San  Francisco  bay  ... 

Battery  and  tower.... 
Temporary  battery  
do 

Angel  island,  San  Francisco  bay  

San  Pedro  

do 

do 

Total  

710,000 

2,840,000 

3,810,000 

15,240,000 

422  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

In  conclusion,  I  have  to  refer  to  a  tabular  statement  of  all  the  fortifications 
erected,  under  construction,  or  intended  to  be  built  on  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf 
frontier  of  the  United  States,  said  fortifications  being  arranged  in  classes,  accord- 
ing to  the  order  of  importance,  and  within  each  class  according  to  the  geo- 
graphical order  of  the  States  hi  which  they  are  situated. 

The  statement  exhibits  the  amounts  expended,  or  to  be  expended  for  fortifica- 
tions and  for  the  armament,  as  also  a  specification  of  the  armament. 
Very  respectfully,  your  most  obedient  servant, 

JOSEPH  G.  TOTTEN, 
Brevet  Brig'r  General  and  Col.  of  Engineers. 
Hon.  0.  M.  CONRAD,  Secretary  of  War. 


E. 

Letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  Washington,  June  17,  1851. 

SIR  :  I  herewith  enclose  a  copy  of  certain  resolutions  adopted  by  the  House 
of  Representatives  at  the  last  session  of  Congress. 

With  a  view  to  procure  such  information  as  will  enable  me  to  prepare  the 
repqrt  called  for  by  the  House  of  Representatives,  I  have  propounded  to  several 
officers  of  the  engineer  corps  certain  questions,  to  which  they  are  desired  to  give 
their  separate  answers. 

I  desire  also  to  obtain  the  opinions  of  several  naval  officers,  combining  profes- 
sional science  with  experience  and  practical  skill  on  several  points  connected 
with  the  proposed  inquiry. 

You  will,  therefore,  oblige  me  by  enclosing  a  copy  of  the  within  resolution  to 
such  officers  as  you  may  select,  and  requesting  their  separate  opinions,  hi  writ- 
ing, on  the  following  points,  viz : 

1.  To  what  extent,  if  any,  ought  the  present  system  of  fortifications  for  the 
protection  of  our  seaboard  to  be  modified,  in  consequence  of  the  application  of 
steam  to  vessels-of-war,  the  invention  or  improvement  of  projectiles,  or  other 
changes  that  have  taken  place  since  it  was  adopted  in  the  year  1816? 

2.  What  reliance  could  be  placed  on  vessels-of-war  or  of  commerce,  floating 
batteries,  gunboats,  and  other  temporary  substitutes  for  permanent  fortifications  1 

3.  Is  it  necessary  or  expedient  to  continue  the  system  of  fortifications  on  the 
shores  of  the  northern  lakes  ? 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

C.  M.  CONRAD,  Secretary  of  War. 

Hon.  WILLIAM  A.  GRAHAM,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 


No.  1. 
Report  of  Commodore  Morris. 

WASHINGTON,  My  12,  1851. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  a  copy  of  your  letter  of 
June  17,  1851,  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  with  directions  from  him  to  report 
to  you  my  opinions  upon  certain  points  connected  with  the  present  system  of 


FOKTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  423 

fortifications  for  the  defence  of  the  coasts  and  shores  of  the  United  States,  as  it 
has  been  recommended  by  boards  of  engineers  and  others  appointed  in  1816  and 
.at  subsequent  dates. 

The  particular  points  to  which  my  attention  is  directed  by  your  letters  are : 

"1st.  To  what  extent,  if  any,  ought  the  present  system  of  fortifications  for  the 
protection  of  our  seaboard  to  be  modified,  in  consequence  of  the  application  of 
steam  to  vessels-of-war,  the  invention  or  improvements  of  projectiles,  or  other 
changes  that  have  taken  place  since  it  was  adopted  in  the  year  1816  ? 

"2d.  What  reliance  could  be  placed  on  vessels-of  war  or  of  commerce,  floating 
batteries,  gunboats,  and  other  temporary  substitutes  for  permanent  fortifications  ? 

"3d.  Is*  it  necessary  or  expedient  to  continue  the  system  of  fortifications  on 
the  shores  of  the  lakes?" 

1.  I  have  endeavored  to  ascertain,  by  an  examination  of  some  of  the  reports 
from  the  boards  of  engineers  and  other  officers  upon  this  subject,  what  system  of 
defence  they  recommended,  the  bases  of  that  system,  the  objects  they  proposed  to 
accomplish  by  it,  the  particular  measures  which  they  suggested  to  secure  those 
objects,  and  the  data  on  which  they  determined  the  character  and  force  of  the 
respective  fortifications  which  are  embraced  in  their  general  plan  of  defence. 

2.  TL«  bases  of  their  system  are  :  a  navy  composed  of  armed  vessels  capable 
of  navigating  the  ocean  with  safety  and  of  reaching  distant  points  speedily. 

Fortifications,  permanent  and  temporary,  with  the  auxiliaries  of  floating  bat- 
teries, gunboats,  and  steam  batteries,  and  both  fixed  and  floating  obstructions  to 
channels. 

Interior  communications  by  land  and  water,  and  a  regular  army  and  well, 
organized  militia,  all  to  be  so  combined  as  to  form  a  complete  system. 

3.  The  objects  of  the  system  were  to  leave  the  navy  free  to  protect  our  own 
commerce  or  to  act  against  an  enemy  on  the  ocean  or  upon  his  unprotected 
coasts ;  to  close  all  important  harbors  against  an  enemy,  and  secure  them  to  our 
military  and  commercial  marine ;  to  deprive  an  enemy  of  all  strong  positions, 
where,  protected  by  naval  superiority,  he  might  maintain  himself  and  keep  our 
frontier  in  continual  alarm;  to  prevent,  as  far  as  practicable,  the  great  avenues 
of  interior  navigation  from  being  blockaded  at  their  entrances  into  the  ocean ;  to 
cover  the  coastwise  and  interior  navigation,  by  closing  the  harbors  and  the  several 
inlets  from  the  sea  which  intersect  the  lines  of  communication,  and  thereby  fur- 
ther aid  the  navy  in  protecting  the  navigation  of  the  country ;  and  to  protect  our 
great  naval  establishments. 

4.  To  secure  these  important  objects  with  all  practicable  sound  economy,  and 
in  a  manner  which  in  time  of  war  should  require  the  least  necessary  interruption 
to  the  ordinary  pursuits  of  our  citizens,  appears  to  have  been  the  controlling 
motive  in  determining  the  position,  character,  and  extent  or  force  of  the  respec- 
tive works  which  the  boards  have  proposed. 

5.  Of  these  works  permanent  fortifications  are  mainly  relied  upon,  and  have 
preference  over  any  of  their  auxiliaries  wherever  due  security  can  be  given  with- 
out the  aid  of  the  latter. 

6.  The  dimensions,  form,  and  strength  of  each  fortification  appears  to  have 
been  determined  by  the  local  topography,  the  importance  of  the  interests  which 
it  was  intended  to  secure,  the  character  and  amount  of  force  by  which  it  might 
probably  be  assailed,  and  the  time  which  would  be  required  to  concentrate  upon 
it  a  sufficient  number  of  militia  to  secure  it  from  capture  by  such  assailing  force. 

7.  Your  first  question  requires  an  opinion  of  the  expediency  of  any  modifica- 
tion of  the  present  system  of  fortifications  in  consequence  of  two  specified  causes, 
and  of  "any  other  changes  that  have  taken  place  since  it  was  adopted."     It  be- 
comes necessary,  therefore,  to  ascertain  what  "other  changes"  have  thus  occurred, 
and  which  would  probably  have  led  the  boards  of  engineers  to  different  recommen- 
dations, if  the  present  states  of  things  had  existed  when  the  plans  were  proposed. 

8.  Among  these  causes  and  changes  the  most  important  appear  to  be  the  dis- 


424  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

covery  of  a  channel  leading  from  the  ocean  into  the  bay  of  New  York,  which 
could  not  be  commanded  by  any  of  the  fortifications  proposed  by  the  board;  the 
application  of  steam  power  to  armed  and  other  vessels  for  ocean  navigation;  the 
great  increase  in  the  number  and  the  size  of  the  mercantile  and  packet  steamers 
which  are  employed  on  our  interior  lakes,  bays,  and  rivers,  and  the  substitution 
of  shells  for  solid  shot  to  be  fired  from  cannon;  the  introduction  of  the  electric 
telegraph  for  communicating  intelligence,  and  of  railroads  for  the  transportation 
of  persons  and  materials ;  and  a  greatly  increased  and  more  dense  population  in 
the  vicinity  of  many  of  the  points  which  were  intended  to  be  protected  against 
an  enemy. 

9.  The  operations  of  vessels  which  depend  on  the  wind  alone  must  always  be 
uncertain,  and  the  best-devised  plans  will  be  greatly  exposed  to  failure  in  execu- 
tion by  them.     When  used  as  an  assailing  force  against  batteries  or  other  fixed 
objects,  the  winds  which  are  necessary  to  cany  them  to  their  desired  positions 
might  frequently  prevent  the  possibility  of  their  retreat,  if  it  should  be  desired. 
The  present  defences  were  calculated  to  resist  a  force  of  this  character,  or  which 
depended  on  such  vessels  for  its  transportation. 

Ships-of-the-line  and  armed  vessels  of  smaller  sizes  are  now  moved  by  steam, 
either  as  the  only  motive  power  or  as  auxiliary  to  sails. 

These  vessels,  under  ordinary  circumstances  and  for  special  purposes,  may 
have  their  movements  regulated  and  combined,  at  the  will  of  their  commander, 
with  almost  the  same  precision  and  certainty  as  can  be  accomplished  by  troops 
on  land. 

The  capacity  and  armament  of  many  of  these  vessels,  connected  with  their 
light  draught  of  water  enable  them  to  operate  with  comparative  ease  and  safety 
through  channels  and  upon  positions  which  would  be  almost  secure  against 
attacks  by  common  sailing  vessels. 

10.  When  the  present  system  was  proposed,  the  use  of  explosive  shells  was 
only  contemplated  from  mortars,  either  for  attack  or  defence. 

Arrangements  are  now  made  for  the  general  use  of  such  shells  from  large 
cannon,  thus  combining  the  superior  accuracy  of  shot  firing  with  the  destructive 
effects  of  explosive  shells — a  change  which  greatly  increases  the  dangers  of  a 
floating  force  when  opposed  to  permanent  fortifications  of  earth  and  masonry. 

11.  In  determining  upon  the  character  and  extent  of  many  of  the  fortifica- 
tions which  were  proposed  by  the  boards,  an  important  element  of  their  calcu- 
lations was  the  facility  or  difficulty  of  concentrating  troops  upon  the  work  in 
case  assistance  should  be  required  to  repel  an  attack  by  an  enemy.     This 
element  of  calculation  has  been  greatly  changed  since  by  the  increased  density 
and   amount   of  available   population,    and   at   many   points   by   the   greatly 
increased  facilities  for  communicating  intelligence  by  telegraphs  and  railroads, 
and  for  receiving  re-enforcements  of  men  and  supplies  by  railroads  and  steamers. 

The  purchase  of  Florida  since  the  fortifications  and  defences  for  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  were  proposed  has  given  to  us  new  and  important  positions  for  strength- 
ening our  defences  on  that  frontier,  and  for  giving  greater  security  to  the 
immense  interests  connected  with  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi.  *0ur  more 
recent  acquisitions,  which  have  given  us  an  extensive  ocean  frontier  on  the  Pacific 
ocean,  have  brought  with  them  new  interests,  which  require  fortifications  or 
other  adequate  means  for  their  protection  and  security. 

12.  The  increased  power  which  has  been  given  to  vessels  when  moved  by 
steam  to  regulate  and  secure  their  joint  or  separate  action  as  may  be  desired, 
and  to  reach  with  comparative  ease  and  safety  places  which  might  be  consid- 
ered as  nearly  secure  -against  ordinary  sailing  vessels ;   the  additional  power 
which  is  given  to  fortifications  when  acting  against  ships  or  other  floating  force 
by  the  substitution  of  explosive  shells  for  solid  shot ;  the  discovery  of  new 
channels  to  and  from  some  of  our  harbors;  the  facilities  for  more  rapid  concen- 
tration of  troops  and  supplies  than  was  formerly  practicable,  and  the  acquisition 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  425 

of  large  extents  of  new  territory,  are  changes  or  causes  which,  in  my  opinion, 
may  render  some  "modifications"  of  the  details  of  the  present  system  more 
•  advantageous.  At  least  these  changes  appear  to  be  of  sufficient  importance  to 
justify,  if  not  to  require,  preparatory  to  definitive  action,  a  re-examination  of  the 
present  system,  as  recommended  by  former  boards,  with  the  same  thorough  and 
careful  deliberation  which  was  bestowed  when  it  was  originally  proposed. 

13.  In  reply  to  your  second  question,  "What  reliance  could  be  placed  on 
vessels-of-war  or  of  commerce,  floating  batteries,  gunboats,  and  other  temporary 
substitutes   for  permanent   fortifications'?"    I   respectfully   state   that,   in   my 
opinion,  no  safe  reliance  could  be  placed  on  any  of  the  kinds  of  force  enume- 
rated in  your  question,  as  "substitutes"  for  permanent  fortifications,  unless 
they  should  be  multiplied  to  an  extent  that  would  require  an  expenditure  which 
would  be  unreasonably  great,  and  much  greater  than  would  give  equal  security 
by  a  judicious  combination  of  permanent  fortifications  and  a  floating  force  as 
auxiliary  to  them.     On  any  sudden  emergency,  private   steamers  and  other 
merchant  vessels  might  be  usefully  employed  in  aid  of  other  means  which  had 
been  previously  prepared,  either  by  having  them  armed  to  contend  with  an 
enemy,  or  to  bring  forward  re-enforcements  of  men,  materials,  or  other  supplies. 
Little  advantage  could  be  expected,  however,  from  the  vessels,  for  direct  assist- 
ance, unless  all  that  was  necessary  for  their  armament  and  equipment  had  been 
previously  prepared,  and  kept  ready  for  immediate  use. 

14.  The  voluntary  use   of  vessels-of-war,  which   are  able  to  navigate  the 
ocean  as  substitutes  for  fixed  fortifications,  or  even  as  direct  auxiliaries  to  them, 
except  in  extreme  cases,  would,  in  my  opinion,  be  highly  injudicious.     The 
proper  employment  of  such  vessels-of-war  or  of  our  navy  is   to  afford   all 
possible  protection  to  our  merchant  shipping,  to  destroy  or  harass  an  enemy's 
commerce,  and   either  by  itself  or  in  conjunction  with  troops  to  assail  an 
enemy's  possessions  at  points  where  they  would  otherwise  be  inaccessible  to  us. 

15.  The  protection  which  the  coasts  of  our  country  may  justly  expect  from 
the  navy  is  that  which  it  may  afford  by  intercepting  forces  which  may  threaten 
attacks  upon  it ;  or  when  unequal  to  that  task,  diminishing  the  means  of  an 
enemy  for  such  attempts,  by  rendering  it  necessary  for  him  to  protect  his  own 
commerce  or  his  own  shores  against  our  ships-of-war. 

16.  With  a  navy  sufficiently  powerful  to  compete  fairly  with  that  of  an 
enemy,  great  additional  security  would  be  given  to  our  coasts  by  it,  and  still 
greater  if  our  naval  force  was  decidedly  superior.     But  even  under  these  favor- 
able circumstances  the  chances  for  avoiding  the  most  vigilant  watchfulness  on 
the  ocean  are  so  great,  that  so  long  as  we  expect  wars  with  nations  having  a 
respectable  navy,  sound  policy  and  true  economy,  in  my  opinion,  requires 
permanent  fortifications  at  all  points  necessary  to  defend  our  important  national 
establishments,  our  populous  and  wealthy  cities,  against  sudden  attacks,  and  to 
keep  open,  as  far  as  practicable,  our  coastwise  navigation  and  other  communi- 
cations, which  might  otherwise  be  interrupted  by  any  enemy  who  could  elude 
the  vigilance  of  our  navy.      The  navy,  if  employed  as  here  suggested,  would 
not  render  it  as  substitute  for  fortifications,  but  would  give  an  increased  security 
to  our  seaboard,  and  in  proportion  to  its  strength  dimmish  the  necessity  of  inter- 
rupting the  ordinary  pursuits  of  our  population. 

17.  To  the  third  question,  "Is  it  necessary  or  expedient  to  continue  the 
system  of  fortification  on  the  shores  of  the  lakes'?"  I  state  as  my  opinion  that 
no  future  attacks  from  the  Canada  shores  of  the  lakes,  of  a  character  sufficiently 
powerful  to  affect  the  final  result  of  war,  are  to  be  apprehended;  still,  the 
advantages  which  are  offered  by  the  St.  Lawrence  and  Rideau  canals  for  the 
increase  of  a  naval  force  on  Lake  Ontario  might  give  to  Great  Britain  a  tempo- 
rary superiority  of  naval  force  on  that  lake.     This  superiority,  and  the  presence 
of  a  considerable  body  of  regular  troops  which  are  always  kept  in  Canada, 
might  induce  and  possibly  enable  an  enemy  in  Canada,  by  a  sudden  incursion, 


426  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

to  injure  our  great  lines  of  communication  by  railroads  and  canals,  on  the  lake 
frontier,  or  to  levy  contributions  on  cities  near  it,  all  of  which  would  be  greatly 
exposed  if  there  were  no  fortifications  to  furnish  military  supplies  for  the  sur- 
rounding militia,  and  so  aid  them  in  repelling  such  attacks. 

18.  Under  existing  circumstances  it  would,  in  my  opinion,  be  expedient  to 
continue  the  present  system  so  far  as  to  retain  all  the  fortifications  on  the  lake 
frontier  which  have  been  completed,  and  to  complete  such  as  have  been  com- 
menced. The  expense  would  be  comparatively  inconsiderable,  and  would  no 
doubt  be  amply  repaid  by  the  increased  security  and  other  advantages  which 
would  be  gained  at  the  commencement  of  any  war  in  which  Canada  would  have 
the  character  of  an  enemy  to  us. 

It  has  been  difficult  for  me  to  confine  my  remarks  very  strictly  to  the  precise 
questions  which  were  submitted,  but  it  was  believed  that  the  reference  to 
"  other  changes"  in  the  first  question  would  be  a  sufficient  excuse  for  the 
latitude  which  has  been  taken. 

With  much  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

C.  MORRIS, 
Captain  U.  S.  Navy. 

Hon.  C.  M.  CONRAD, 

Secretary  of  War. 


No.  2. 
Report  of  Commodore  C.  M.  Perry. 

NORTH  TARRYTOWN,  July  25,  1852. 

SIR  :  In  obedience  to  your  order  of  the  23d  ultimo,  covering  a  copy  of  a  com- 
munication with  the  Secretary  of  War,  together  with  a  copy  of  a  resolution  of 
Congress,  calling  for  information  upon  the  expediency  of  modifying  the  system 
of  national  fortifications  established  in  1816,  I  have  the  honor  to  report — 

In  reply  to  the  first  inquiry,  as  follows : 

"  To  what  extent,  if  to  any,  ought  the  present  system  of  fortifications  for  the 
protection  of  our  seaboard  to  be  modified,  in  consequence  of  the  application  of 
steam  to  vessels-of-war,  the  inventions  or  improvement  of  projectiles,  or  other 
changes  that  have  taken  place  since  it  was  adopted  in  1816?" 

I  may  remark  that,  in  my  opinion,  it  is  desirable  that  the  system  referred  to 
should  be  substantially  modified  by  an  entire  abandonment  of  the  plan  of  exterior 
coast  fortifications,  and  a  confinement  to  the  completion  of  the  works  already 
commenced  for  the  protection  of  our  principal  ports  of  trade  and  naval  depots ; 
and  that  no  greater  number  of  works  should  be  recognized  as  permanent  means 
of  defence  of  the  more  important  points  upon  the  seaboard  than  those  that  may 
be  suitably  garrisoned  and  kept  in  constant  preparation,  whether  in  peace  or 
war,  for  repelling  an  enemy. 

In  the  attempt  to  sustain  the  position  which  I  propose  to  assume,  being  at  my 
residence  in  the  country,  without  proper  documents  or  other  data  to  enable  me 
to  enter  fully  into  detail,  I  shall,  with  two  exceptions,  refrain  from  alluding 
to  the  published  statements  and  reports  of  others  upon  the  subject ;  and  while 
cheerfully  according  to  those  who  may  differ  from  me  all  credit  for  sincerity 
and  patriotism,  I  may  content  myself  with  a  general  expression  of  opinion  upon 
the  question  under  investigation,  calling  particular  attention  to  the  report  of  Mr. 
Cass,  when  Secretary  of  War.— (See  Doc.  293,  24th  Congress,  April  8,  1836.) 

Concurring,  as  I  most  fully  did  at  the  period  of  its  date,  (1836,)  and  as  I  do 
now,  in  the  opinion  set  forth  in  that  masterly  state  paper,  I  might  be  satisfied  in 
assuming  the  whole  range  of  argument  of  that  distinguished  man,  as  exhibiting 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  427 

my  own  views  upon  the  great  question  of  national  defence,  had  not  the  imagina- 
tion even  of  his  prophetic  foresight  been  outstripped  by  the  extraordinary  devel- 
'  opments  of  the  few  subsequent  years — developments  which,  though  they  have 
thrown  into  bolder  relief  the  more  prominent  features  of  his  prophecies,  have 
gone  far  beyond  the  anticipations  of  the  wildest  visionary,  bringing  to  light  im- 
provements in  practical  science  utterly  astounding  to  the  theorists  of  yesterday, 
deranging  all  previous  plans  of  war,  whether  by  sea  or  land,  and  foreshadowing 
even  further  changes,  perhaps  equally  remarkable ;  and  thus  showing  that  if  the 
system,  under  things  as  they  existed  in  1816,  was  wisely  devised,  (a  proposition 
1  have  never  assented  to,)  there  is  no  longer  the  remotest  useful  object  to  be 
gained  by  persistence  in  the  plan,  but  rather  on  the  contrary.  The  erection  of 
isolated  exterior  works  upon  our  seaboard  would,  instead  of  contributing  to  our 
protection,  hold  out  assailable  points,  inviting  attention  from  an  active  enemy, 
in  the  possibility  of  carrying  them  by  coup  de  main — an  achievement  not  so 
difficult*  since  the  use  of  steam  for  naval  purposes  ;  and  when,  moreover,  it  may 
be  fairly  presumed  that  these  works,  however  extensive  and  complete  in  them- 
selves, would  in  fact  be  weak  as  defences,  for  want  of  adequate  garrisons ;  that 
is,  if  we  are  to  judge  from  past  experience  and  the  present  desolate  condition  of 
some  of  those  already  constructed,  made  necessary,  it  is  true,  for  want  of  troops 
to  send  to  them. 

Let  us  suppose,  for  purpose  of  illustration,  that  the  two  works  recommended 
in  the  original  design  to  be  erected  on  Sandy  Hook  bar,*  (see  report  of  Wai- 
Department,  House  Doc.  206,  26th  Congress,  1st  session,)  are  completed,  and 
garrisoned  by  the  estimated  number  of  rank  and  file  assigned  to  them,  say  1,760 
each,  their  isolated  position  would  place  them  beyond  the  effective  range  of  guns 
planted  upon  Sandy  Hook,  the  nearest  land  ;  and  being  encircled  by  channels 
navigable  for  the  largest  war  steamers,  they  could  not  prevent  the  ingress  of  the 
enemy,  and  unaided  by  a  friendly  naval  force  might  be  surrounded  by  the  hos- 
tile ships,  who,  if  they  did  not  surprise  and  carry  them  by  escalade,  would  have 
the  power  to  cut  off  their  communication  with  the  laud,  and  consequently  their 
supplies. 

And  let  us  suppose,  further,  that  in  conjunctures  like  those  growing  out  of  the 
northeastern  boundary  and  Oregon  questions,  where  serious  difficulties  with 
Great  Britain  were  anticipated  by  many,  (and  everybody  knows  that  a  similar 
contingency  did  happen  under  the  administration  of  General  Jackson,  with 
France,  and  may  again  happen,)  that  these  forts  were  completed,  and  armed,  and 
garrisoned,  as  they  probably  would  be  in  time  of  peace,  with  a  single  company 
or  half  company  each,  and  it  might  be  the  policy  of  the  enemy  to  enter  suddenly 
into  war,  and  give  us  the  first  intimation  of  hostilities  by  the  appearance  off  the 
port  of  a  powerful  squadron  of  war  steamers,  not  only  would  the  forts  on  the 
bars,  inviting  attack  by  their  very  weakness,  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy,  but 
the  safety  of  the  city  itself  would  be  compromised.  For  though  by  a  delay  of  a 
day  or  two  the  inner  line  of  forts  could  be  garrisoned  by  militia  and  volunteers, 
and  temporary  steam  batteries  prepared  in  aid  of  the  outer  defences,  if  the  oppo- 
sing squadron  were  to  be  commanded  by  a  Nelson  or  a  Sujfren,  such  precaution 
would  be  too  late. 

From  any  of  the  inner  forts,  should  they  perchance  make  a  lodgement,  the 
enemy  could  soon  be  driven ;  but  once  in  possession  of  the  outer  line  of  works, 
with  the  sea  open  to  them,  the  port  would 'be  entirely  locked  up ;  hence,  in  the 
possibility  of  such  an  issue,  is  it  not  far  better  that  they  should  not  be  erected  ? 

But  many  other  solid  reasons  may  be  adduced  to  prove  the  impolicy  of  their 
erection.  The  impracticability  of  covering  the  whole  extent  of  coast  by  for- 


0 1  shall  apply  my  remarks  upon  the  seaboard  defences  more  particularly  to  the  port  of 
New  York,  though  they  are  intended  to  have  a  general  bearing  upon  the  whole  coast. 


428  FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

tresses,  commanding  every  port,  bay,  and  roadstead ;  the  improbability  of  any 
future  attempt  by  an  enemy  to  land  an  armed  force  upon  our  shores,  except  for 
some  marauding  purposes  ;  and  the  perfect  capability  of  the  inner  line  of  works, 
assisted  by  floating  batteries,  to  repel  whatever  force  might  venture  an  attack 
upon  any  of  our  principal  cities  or  towns,  except  by  coup  de  main,  in  which 
event,  as  I  have  before  remarked,  the  outer  line  of  works  would  prove  of  im- 
measurable injury,  if  captured,  as  some  of  them  might  possibly  be  by  a  dashing 
enemy.* 

And,  besides,  we  have  the  experience  of  history  to  show  that  extensive  military 
works  are  alike  destructive  of  the  prosperity  and  the  liberties  of  the  people, 
saying  nothing  of  the  enormous  cost  of  construction  and  the  keeping  them  in 
condition  for  service.  I  may  instance  the  fortresses  of  Spain,  of  Portugal,  and 
of  the  former  republics  of  Genoa  and  Venice,  as  gigantic  works,  now  of  little 
use,  and  looked  upon  by  the  voyager  only  as  monuments  of  the  extravagance 
and  peculating  spirit  which,  at  the  time  of  their  erection,  characterized  the  people 
of  those  governments. 

Experience,  moreover,  shows  that  while  the  fortifications  of  San  Juan  d'Ulloa 
at  Vera  Cruz,  the  Moro  of  Havana,  the  castle  protecting  the  harbor  of  Cartha- 
gena  upon  the  coast  of  Columbia,  the  Venetian  fortress  of  Napoli  de  Romania,  in 
Greece,  the  castle  of  St.  Elino,  in  Malta,t  and  many  others  of  similar  extent 
and  character,  are  considered  by  some  impregnable.  They  command  only  a 
circuit  embraced  within  the  range  of  their  guns,  and  cannot  irr  any  manner 
prevent  a  landing  of  the  enemy  upon  the  coast  beyond  the  extent  of  such  range ; 
in  a  word,  these  works  are  useful  only  to  command  the  entrances  of  the  ports 
which  they  were  intended  to  defend,  and  to  cover  with  their  guns  vessels  an- 
choring in  their  immediate  vicinity.  The  celebrated  fortress  of  Gibraltar  neither 
commands  the  passage  of  the  straits  nor  the  anchorage  on  the  Spanish  side  of 
the  bay  of  that  name.  They  are,  in  truth,  like  chained  monsters,  harmless  be- 
yond the  reach  of  their  manacles  ;  not  so  with  their  steam  batteries — they  have 
the  means  of  locomotion,  and  their  power  can  be  made  effective  at  any  point 
upon  the  coast  capable  of  being  reached  by  an  enemy's  vessel. 

Of  all  the  coasts  of  Europe  that  of  Great  Britain  is  the  least  provided  with 
fortifications,  and  yet  her  soil  has  not  been  trodden  by  a  successful  enemy  since 
the  conquest — solely  protecting  her  military  and  naval  arsenals  by  perfect  and 
well-garrisoned  works.  She  depends  mainly  for  defence  of  her  coast  upon  her 
navy  and  the  warlike  spirit  of  her  yeomanry ;  and  the  very  absence  of  fortified 
works  prevents  a  deceitful  reliance  upon  such  defences,  and  keeps  alive  the 
more  gallant  and  more  certain  dependence  upon  their  own  personal  prowess. 

And  thus  it  should  be  with  us,  man  to  man.  The  Americans  are,  at  least, 
equal  to  any  other  race,  and  they  are  fully  capable  of  driving  back  to  their  ships 
or  capturing  any  number  of  troops  that  might  have  the  temerity  to  land  upon 
our  soil. 

Let  us  suppose  that  New  York  is  menaced  with  an  attack  by  a  force  much 


°  In  speaking  of  militia  and  volunteers  above  I  may  add,  by  way  of  note,  that  the  city 
of  New  York  could  alone  parade,  in  six  hours,  one  thousand,  and  in  twelve  hours,  five  thou- 
sand uniformed  troops,  composed  of  men  in  the  prime  of  life,  who  would,  doubtless,  do 
good  service  before  the  enemy. 

This  body  of  troops  is  well  officered  and  under  excellent  organization,  and  embraces  fair 
proportions  of  cavalry,  artillery,  and  infantry,  with  all  the  requisite  material  and  munitions. 

The  cities  and  towns  in  the  immediate  neighborhood  could  furnish  an  equal  number  with 
the  same  expedition,  and  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  with  the  facilities  of  transportation 
by  railroad  and  other  modes,  a  force  sufficient  for  all  purposes  of  defence  could  be  concen- 
trated in  a  very  short  space  of  time  at  any  point  upon  our  coast  north  and  east  of  Texas. 

f  I  more  particularly  name  these,  among  many  others,  for  reason  of  being  better  ac- 
quainted with  them  by  personal  examination. 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND  SEA  COAST  DEFENCES.       429 

larger  than  the  English  have  ever  yet  been  able  to  concentrate  upon  our  coast. 
The  only  assailable  point  which  might  promise  any  chance  of  success  would  be 
"debarkation  upon  the  south  side  of  Long  island  and  to  advance  upon  the  rear 
of  Brooklyn. 

This  mode  of  attack  was  contemplated  during  the  war  of  1812-'! 3,  and  ex- 
tensive entrenchments  were  thrown  up  by  the  citizens  upon  'a  chain  of  hills  just 
beyond  the  town  designed  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check  until  re-enforcements 
could  arrive  from  a  distance;*  but  the  rapid  increase  of  the  place  has  now 
brought  these  military  sites  within  the  corporate  limits  of  the  city,  and  it  will 
be  necessary,  in  the  event  of  another  war,  to  select  more  advanced  positions  on 
which  to  construct  redoubts  to  command  the  approaches  referred  to,  and  it  would 
be  at  this  day  a  measure  of  wisdom  for  the  government  to  take  steps  for  select- 
ing and  securing  the  fee  of  suitable  points  for  military  purposes.  These  posi- 
tions, judiciously  chosen,  would,  at  the  moment  of  alarm,  be  occupied  by  myriads 
of  militia  and  volunteers,  who,  judging  from  what  was  accomplished  on  a 
former  occasion,  would,  in  an  incredible  short  time,  throw  up  and  man  the  neces- 
sary works  ;  with  these  precautionary  measures,  and  with  a  respectable  number 
of  steam  batteries  as  auxiliaries  to  the  permanent  works  already  constructed, 
New  York  would  be  safe  from  any  foreknown  attack  of  the  enemy. 

With  respect  to  the  second  inquiry — 

"  What  reliance  could  be  placed  on  vessels-of-war  or  of  commerce,  floating 
batteries,  gunboats,  or  other  temporary  substitutes  for  permanent  defences  1  " 

I  reply  that  much  reliance  could  be  placed  on  all  vessels-of-war,  particularly 
those  moved  by  steam,  whether  intended  for  ocean  or  harbor  service,  as  auxili- 
aries to  the  fortifications,  thereby  lessening  the  necessary  number  and  extent  of 
those  permanent  works ;  but  there  could  be  no  dependence  on  gunboats  or  ves- 
sels of  commerce,  except  for  the  temporary  conversion  of  the  latter  into  public 
armed  ships. 

But  the  most  reliable  force  for  harbor  defence  as  auxiliary  to  the  fortifications 
would  be  steamers  of  war,  in  addition  to  which  temporary  steam  batteries  might 
be  equipped  at  most  of  our  principal  ports. 

It  may  be  presumed  that  there  is  at  this  time  but  one  opinion  among  naval 
men  as  to  the  utility  of  steamers-of-war.  The  strongest  and  most  unreasonable 
prejudices  growing  out  of  professional  predilections  must  now  give  way  to  the 
unmistakable  evidences  of  their  usefulness,  and  the  absolute  necessity  of  their 
employment  at  the  present  day  in  all  naval  operations. 

These  vessels  should  all  be  capable  of  traversing  the  ocean,  and  while  efficient 
for  ocean  navigation,  not  the  less  effective  for  harbor  or  coast  defence. 

Steam  batteries,  so  called  in  contradistinction  to  steamers-of-war,  should  be 
of  a  temporary  character,  and  used  only  for  the  defence  of  ports,  or  bays,  or 
roadsteads,  and  of  these  there  would  be  no  necessity  of  having  many  in  com- 
mission, excepting  at  times  when  the  enemy  might  be  expected,  as  they  could 
be  prepared  in  a  very  short  time — the  cities  and  towns  which  they  may  be 
wanted  to  defend  all  furnishing  the  means  of  then:  equipment  and  the  requisite 
,  crews. 

In  a  communication  accompanied  by  drawings  submitted  to  the  Navy  De- 
partment some  years  ago,  I  demonstrated  the  practicability  of  equipping  and 
manning  at  the  port  of  New  York  powerful  and  efficient  floating  batteries  in  less 
than  three  days. 

Wherever  steam  vessels  can  be  found  to  furnish  the  moving  power  and  small 
coasters  to  be  used  for  floating  the  guns,  as  both  can  be  found  as  well  as  guns 
at  most  of  our  largest  ports,  temporary  batteries  capable  of  attacking  the  largest 
sail  ship  can  be  speedily  equipped,  care  being  taken  to  protect,  by  a  mode  pointed 
out,  the  machinery  and  the  entire  hull  of  the  steamer  which,  without  being 

*  These  works  covered  the  rear  of  the  navy  yard,  Brooklyn. 


430  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

herself  armed,  is  to  furnish  the  power  of  moving  the  batteries  from  one  point  to 
another. 

Modern  discoveries  in  the  use  of  warlike  projectiles  have  shown,  and  espe- 
cially in  the  use  of  explosive  shells,  that  wooden  bulwarks,  however  massive 
they  may  be,  so  far  from  giving  protection  to  those  behind  them,  cause  by  their 
splinters  greater  havoc ;  hence  the  inutility  of  such  defences  in  the  proposed 
floating  batteries,  which,  by  means  of  the  steam  power  attached  to  them,  may 
be  easily  kept  at  long  range  with  the  enemy  and  beyond  grape  or  canister 
distance. 

But  no  one  can  foretell  or  scarcely  imagine  the  changes  in  the  art  of  war  that 
steam  and  other  natural  elements  more  recently  brought  into  use  are  to  produce. 

On  a  late  occasion  I  had  the  honor  of  suggesting  to  the  Navy  Department  a 
new  mode  of  attack  by  steamers-of-war.  The  opinions  then  advanced  have 
been  more  and  more  confirmed  by  further  reflection  and  consultation  with  intel- 
ligent engineers  and  ship-builders,  and  I  am  now  well  satisfied  that,  besides  the 
use  of  an  ordinary  war  steamer,  as  a  striking  body,  in  the  manner  explained  in 
the  communication  referred  to,  a  steam  vessel,  to  be  moved  by  a  submerged  pro- 
peller and  capable  of  traversing  any  of  our  inland  waters,  may  be  constructed 
and  advantageously  used  solely  as  a  projectile  (using  the  term  in  this  sense.) 
This  vessel  should  be  long  and  narrow,  and  of  unusual  proportional  depth  to 
accommodate  the  engines  and  boilers,  and  the  crew,  (if  desirable,)  below  the 
water  line.  She  should  be  of  wedge-shape  forward,  with  the  most  approved 
lines  for  speed,  considering  her  depth  and  her  whole  construction,  whether  built 
of  wood  or  iron,  of  sufficient  strength  to  give  the  requisite  momentum,  and  the 
power  to  withstand  the  most  violent  shocks  produced  by  collision  with  other 
bodies. 

A  vessel  of  this  description,  say  of  two  thousand  tons  measurement,  would 
weigh,  with  her  machinery,  &c.,  nearly  four  thousand  tons,  and  might  be  pro- 
pelled with  engines  of  extra  proportional  power  at  the  rate  of  fourteen  statute 
miles  per  hour.  We  have  thus  a  projectile  (still  using  the  term)  of  this  weight 
moved  upon  the  surface  of  the  water  at  the  velocity  of  twenty  feet  per  second. 
Can  any  one  imagine  the  overwhelming  effect  of  a  contact  of  this  moving  body 
with  anything  capable  of  floating  upon  the  ocean  ?  This  is  no  visionary  pro- 
ject^ but  one  of  simple  demonstration  and  practicable  accomplishment. 

In  reply  to  the  third  inquiry,  as  follows  :  "  Is  it  necessary  or  expedient  to 
continue  the  system  of  fortifications  on  the  shores  of  the  northern  lakes  ?  "  I  an- 
swer in  the  negative,  and  for  the  very  obvious  reason  that  we  have  now  the 
command  of  the  lakes  so  far  as  regards  an  aggregate  superiority  of  tonnage  and 
seamen,  and  it  would  be  strange  indeed  if,  Mrith  the  well-organized  militia  of  the 
States  bordering  on  and  contiguous  to  these  waters,  and  the  facilities  for  trans- 
portation to  the  scene  of  war  of  any  number  of  regulars  and  volunteers  with 
the  requisite  munitions,  we  did  not,  at  the  least,  preserve  the  integrity  of  the 
soil,  and  the  navy  would  be  recreant  to  its  former  reputation  did  it  not  sweep 
from  these  inland  seas  every  vestige  of  an  opposing  force. 

In  reference,  therefore,  to  the  foregoing  remarks,  I  respectfully  submit — 

That  no  additional  fortification  be  commenced  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  leav- 
ing it  questionable  whether  those  already  commenced  should  be  completed  to 
the  extent  originally  designed. 

That  very  great  reliance  can  be  placed  upon  steamers-of-war  and  steam  bat- 
teries as  auxiliaries  to  the  military  work  now  completed  or  in  progress  of  com- 
pletion. 

And  lastly,  it  is  altogether  unnecessary  and  inexpedient  even  to  progress  any 
further  with  the  uncompleted  works  which  have  been  commenced  on  the  shores 
of  the  northern  lakes. 

For  myself,  I  cannot  entertain  the  idea  that  we  are  always  to  act  on  the  de- 
fensive ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  more  reasonable  to  suppose  that,  in  the  event  or 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  431 

another  war,  the  power  of  the  United  States  will  be  felt  beyond  their  own  im- 
mediate coasts;  most  certainly  it  ought  to  be,  for  we  have  the  means  of  placing 
'ourselves  upon  an  equality  of  naval  strength  with  any  of  the  European  nations. 

Looking  to  the  inexhaustible  resources  of  the  country,  the  warlike  and  adven- 
turous spirit  of  the  people,  its  extensive  and  rapidly  increasing  commerce,  and 
the  acknowledged  superiority  of  the  Americans  in  the  construction  and  manage- 
ment of  ships,  whether  navigated  by  sails  or  steam,  is  it  not  surprising  that  all 
our  military  plans  have  hitherto  been  confined  to  the  mere  defence  of  our  fire- 
sides against  an  enemy,  always  supposed  to  be  able,  in  order  to  reach  us,  to  cross 
with  a  superior  force  in  tact  a  wide  expanse  of  ocean,  and  knocking  at  our  doors, 
to  cause  the  whole  country  to  be  thrown  into  alarm  ? 

Why  should  we  barricade  ourselves  and  wait  within  onr  defences  the  coming 
of  the  enemy  1  Why  not  do  that  which  is  more  congenial  to  our  national  spirit — 
meet  them  beyond  the  threshold,  and  thus  preserve  our  waters  and  our  soil  in- 
violate? We  possess  the  power;  why  not  exercise  it1?  In  truth,  the  destinies 
of  the  nation  are  inevitably  leading  to  events  which  will  sooner  or  later  make 
us  superior  on  the  ocean,  and  instead  of  tamely  waiting  the  approach  of  the  foe, 
we  shall  be  more  apt  to  turn  the  tide  of  war  eastward. 

The  great  battles  for  national  mastery  are  to  be  fought  upon  the  ocean,  and 
the  sooner  we  prepare  for  the  struggle  the  better. 

Hence  it  is  evident  that  upon  the  navy  the  country  should  chiefly  depend 
for  its  protection  from  invasion,  not  under  its  present  organization,  but  upon  a 
navy  commensurate  in  extent  to  the  commercial  resources  and  wealth  of  the 
nation  ;  we  should  have  naval  strength  sufficient  to  protect  our  commerce  in 
every  sea,  and  in  time  of  war  to  assume  the  offensive. 

Still  it  would  be  unwise  to  neglect  a  reasonable  system  of  permanent  defences 
upon  the  coast,  but  not  by  any  means  to  the  extent  contemplated  by  the  system 
of  1816. 

In  the  opinions  which  I  have  ventured  to  advance  upon  the  fortifications  of 
the  country  I  have  intended  to  allude  only  to  the  Atlantic  seaboard  and  the 
shores  of  the  northern  lakes.  Believing  that  the  seaboard  on  the  Pacific  ocean 
is  infinitely  more  exposed  to  successful  attack  from  either  of  the  great  naval 
powers  of  Europe — England,  France,  and  Russia — and  may  require  additional 
defences;  but  not  being  well  acquainted  with  that  coast,  I  abstain  from  any 
remarks  upon  the  subject.  In  connexion  with  this  report,  however,  I  propose 
to  submit,  at  a  future  time,  some  remarks  upon  the  importance  of  securing  the 
naval  command  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  with  special  reference  to  the  better  pro- 
tection of  our  Pacific  possessions. 

With  great  respect,  I  have  the  honor  to  be  your  most  obedient  servant, 

M.  C.  PERRY. 


No.  3. 
Report  of  Commander  R.  B.  Cunningham. 

UNITED  STATES  NAVY  YARD, 
Gosport,    Virginia,  September  29,  1851. 

SIR  :  In  pursuance  of  an  order  from  the  honorable  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
dated  June  23,  1851,  enclosing  a  copy  of  a  letter  from  you  to  him,  with  a  copy 
of  certain  resolutions  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  last  session  of 
Congress,  pertaining  to  a  proposed  modification  of  our  system  of  defences  by 
means  of  fortifications  on  shore;  and  directing  that  I  should  give  to  the  subject 


432  FOKTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

my  best  reflections,  and  communicate  the  result  in  season  to  be  reviewed  by  you 
prior  to  your  report  in  obedience  to  resolutions  aforesaid  in  December  next. 

With  a  diffidence  I  have  never  before  experienced  in  drawing  up  an  official 
communication,  I  will  endeavor  to  give  you  my  views  on  this  important  question 
of  national  policy  with  as  much  brevity  as  its  magnitude  will  admit  of;  but  I 
beg  leave  to  state  that,  while  I  feel  myself  highly  honored  by  the  consideration 
so  undeservedly  bestowed  upon  me  by  the  honorable  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in 
selecting  me  for  a  duty  of  so  much  consequence,  and  which  calls  for  scientific 
attainments  in  its  execution  that  I  do  not  aspire  to,  I  must  claim  your  indul- 
gence when,  in  all  sincerity,  I  state  to  you  that  my  remarks  are  drawn  from  my 
very  limited  practical  observation  and  experience  only. 

To  the  first  inquiry,  viz :  "  To  what  extent,  if  to  any,  ought  the  present 
system  of  fortifications  for  the  protection  of  our  seaboard  to  be  modified  in  con- 
sequence of  the  application  of  steam  vessels-of-war,  the  invention  or  improve- 
ment of  projectiles,  or  other  changes  that  have  taken  place  since  it  was  adopted 
in  the  year  1816?" 

I  would  respectfuly  reply  that  the  important  improvements  in  the  application 
of  steam  to  ships-of-war  and  sea-going  ships,  and  the  certainty  that  railroads 
will  be  continuous  in  a  few  years  from  Maine  to  Texas,  and  that  by  these 
facilities  troops,  munitions  of  war,  and  stores  of  all  kinds  can  be  transported 
with  such  expedition  that  in  a  very  short  space  of  time  large  bodies  of  men, 
with  the  necessary  artillery,  can  be  concentrated  upon  any  intermediate  point 
between  permanent  fortifications  fully  prepared  to  meet  an  invading  foe  before  an 
invader  could  make  any  material  progress  in  the  erection  of  fortifications  for  his 
defence,  should,  in  my  opinion,  induce  the  government  to  direct  its  attention 
alone  to  those  points  in  our  seaboard  where  the  protection  of  our  cities  and  such 
roadsteads  as  are  calculated  for  naval  depots,  and  where  large  fleets  can  ren- 
dezvous, be  sheltered  and  ride  in  safety  at  their  anchors  at  all  seasons  of  the 
year. 

It  can  hardly  be  supposed  that  any  nation  would  be  so  reckless  as  to  attempt 
an  invasion  of  our  Atlantic  coast  at  the  present  day ;  but  a  large  and  powerful 
fleet  could  approach  within  gunshot  and  batter  down  our  cities  if  they  were  not 
prepared  with  fortifications  in  all  respects  adequate  for  their  protection  and 
defence. 

These  fortifications  should  be  so  located  as  to  command  the  channel  way ;  and 
at  the  inner  extremity  of  every  reach  there  should  be  a  battery  erected  if  prac- 
ticable, so  as  to  commence  a  raking  fire  upon  an  enemy  the  moment  he  approached 
within  the  range  of  its  guns. 

The  guns  for  the  batteries  should  be  of  the  largest  calibre  and  of  the  greatest 
range,  as  the  effect  of  the  shot  would  be  more  destructive  and  the  enemy  sooner 
reached. 

There  has  been  no  improvement  in  projectiles;  nor  can  the  application  of 
steam  to  ships-of-war  do  away  the  necessity  of  building  permanent  fortifications 
at  the  points  before  enumerated;  but,  as  a  modification,  I  would  respectfully 
suggest  that  steam  propellers  of  sufficient  power  to  attain  a  speed  of  ten  or  twelve 
miles  per  hour  be  constructed  as  auxiliaries  to  the  permanent  fortifications  and 
for  the  additional  protection  and  security  of  our  cities  and  harbors. 

These  steamers  should  be  of  peculiar  construction  and  equipment,  and  one  or 
more,  as  may  be  deemed  expedient,  should  be  stationed  at  each  of  the  permanent 
fortifications. 

Ships  are  at  all  times  liable  to  accidents  from  various  causes;  and  more 
especialy  so  are  steamers,  as  they  are  subject  to  the  same  injuries  that  other 
vessels  are  from  storms  and  other  disasters  of  the  sea,  with  the  additional  ones 
of  fire,  explosion,  &c.;  and  when  in  commission  their  expenses  are  fourfold 
greater  than  sailing  ships.  I  propose,  therefore,  that  machinery  for  as  many  of 
those  ships  as  may  be  deemed  expedient  be  constructed,  put  together,  tried,  and 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  433 

then  taken  apart,  and  when  carefully  packed,  stowed  in  suitable  storehouses  and 
kept  ready  for  use ;  and  that  the  materials  for  the  hulls  of  these  steamers  be 
procured,  and  the  timber  properly  stowed  in  well  ventilated  sheds. 

The  steamers  should  be  built  of  logs,  their  length  not  less  than  two  hundred 
and  fifty  feet,  with  sufficient  breadth  to  admit  of  batteries  across  at  each  end  of 
six  ten-inch  guns,  and  three  mortar  beds  between  the  batteries.  Their  bottoms 
should  not  be  perfectly  flat,  but  formed  with  a  slight  ellipse,  the  bilge  rounded, 
and  their  extremities  handsomely  tapered,  so  as  to  enable  them  to  pass  easily 
through  the  water. 

These  steamers  are  intended  to  be  shot-proof,  as  it  is  designed  to  have  iron 
plates  one  inch  and  a  half  thick  and  six  inches  wide  let  into  their  sides  from 
stem  to  stern,  and  about  two  and  a  half  inches  apart,  this  to  be  extended  from 
gunwale  to  two  feet  below  deep  load  line ;  and  when  it  is  remembered  that  they  are 
to  fight  end  on,  and  built  of  long  easy  lines  from  stem  to  stern,  the  conclusion 
is  irresistible  that  a  shot  touching  those  plates  will  most  assuredly  glance  off. 

In  all  works  intended  for  public  defence,  as  a  system,  two  strong  points  should 
always  be  borne  in  mind,  viz :  simplicity  and  economy ;  and  as  these  vessels  are 
to  be  of  the  simplest  mode  of  structure,  and  built  of  the  cheapest  material, 
while  at  the  same  time  it  is  as  durable  as  any  other,  (white  pine,)  and  the  con- 
struction of  them  so  simple,  that  carpenteres,  joiners,  and,  in  fact,  all  who  can 
use  the  broad-axe  and  adze,  can  be  profitably  employed  in  their  construction 
when  they  are  needed. 

Another  peculiarity  in  these  vessels  is  to  have  their  sterns  perpendicular,  of 
great  thickness,  and  an  iron  cut-water  firmly  attached  thereto,  and  in  a  width  of 
two  and  a  half  feet,  bearded  off  to  half  its  thickness  at  the  stern,  so  that  when 
in  action,  and  the  enemy  at  hand  with  his  broadside  presented,  the  steamer,  with 
her  greatest  momentum,  is  to  drive  directly  into  him ;  and  it  cannot  be  doubted 
that  this  operation  once  performed  would  require  no  repetition,  as  nothing  here- 
tofore built  in  the  shape  of  a  ship  could  withstand  the  concussion. 

The  mortar  beds  are  intended  to  be  used  in  the  event  of  an  enemy's  obtaining  a 
landing  at  a  point  where  he  could  be  sheltered  from  the  operation  of  battery  guns, 
but  accessible  to  shells  from  mortars ;  and  as  these  steamers  will  be  of  light 
draught  of  water,  they  will  be  enabled  to  approach  the  shore  much  nearer  than 
other  vessels  of  equal  size  if  differently  constructed. 

It  has  long  been  my  opinion  that  steamers  are  more  to  be  feared  from  the 
power  they  possess  of  running  into  an  enemy  than  from  any  other  cause,  either 
from  their  great  weight  of  metal  and  consequent  extended  range,  the  choice 
which  they  are  enabled  to  make  of  position,  or  any  other  superiority  claimed  for 
them,  for  in  all  these  respects  ships-of-war  can  be  built  to  equal  them ;  but  if 
constructed  as  here  described,  and  properly  managed,  they  are  not  to  be 
resisted. 

With  one  more  remark  I  will  close  my  response  to  the  first  branch  of  your 
inquiry. 

The  telegraph  in  the  event  of  war,  will  keep  them  constantly  informed  at 
headquarters  of  the  movements  of  our  enemy's  fleet  on  our  Atlantic  coast,  and 
the  old  ruse  of  making  a  demonstration  at  one  point  for  the  purpose  of  effecting 
a  landing  at  another,  can  no  longer  be  practiced  with  the  usual  success,  as  their 
movements  will  be  anticipated,  and  the  necessary  preparations  made  to  receive 
them.  This  great  invention  offers  an  additional  argument  for  the  discontinuance 
of  intermediate  fortifications. 

In  reference  to  our  possession  on  the  Pacific,  a  little  deviation  from  the 
course  recommended  to  be  observed  on  this  side  would  be  advisable.  There  it 
will  be  necessary  to  construct  the  permanent  fortifications,  so  as  to  enable  them 
to  stand  a  siege,  as  invasion  in  that  remote  quarter  is  probable,  in  the  event  of 
war  with  a  strong  maritime  power ;  but  in  ail  other  respects  the  course  to  be  pursued 

H.  Rep.  Com.  86 28. 


434  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

should  be  the  same  as  on  this  side,  as  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  the  telegraph 
will  soon  be  extended  there,  and  in  the  course  of  time  railroads  also. 

To  the  second,  viz:  "What  reliance  could  be  placed  on  vessels-of-war,  or  of 
commerce,  floating  batteries,  gunboats,  and  other  temporary  substitutes  for  per- 
manent fortifications  ?" 

The  indispensable,  and,  in  fact,  imperative  necessity  of  having, strong  permanent 
fortifications  at  the  points  before  referred  to,  is  a  settled  and  decided  conviction 
of  my  mind ;  they  will  admit  of  no  substitute. 

Steam  batteries,  such  as  have  been  recommended  in  my  reply  to  your  first 
inteiTOgatory  as  a  modification,  would  unquestionably  prove  an  important  and 
powerful  auxiliary,  and  in  all  probability  would,  in  the  day  of  battle,  if  properly 
managed,  be  the  more  destructive  of  the  two ;  but,  like  all  ships,  the  materials  of 
which  they  must  necessarily  be  constructed  are  perishable ;  and  possibly,  at  the 
moment  their  services  are  most  required,  a  broken  shaft,  or  some  other  of  the 
numerous  accidents  to  which  all  such  ships  are  liable,  would  render  them 
unavailable,  if  not  altogether  useless ;  and  hence  the  risk  a  nation  would  encounter 
in  adopting  any  substitute  for  permanent  fortifications  when  there  existed  a 
possibility  of  its  failure. 

Third.  "Is  it  necessary  or  expedient  to  continue  the  system  of  fortifications 
on  the  shores  of  the  northern  lakes." 

To  this,  your  last  inquiry,  I  would  state,  that  the  unprecedented  change 
which  the  entire  shores  of  our  northern  lakes  has  undergone  since  the  termina- 
tion of  the  late  war  with  Great  Britain  renders  it  very  improbable  that  invasion 
will  ever  take  place  from  the  opposite  shore.  Certain  destruction  would  await 
an  enemy  who  attempted  it.  Then  the  population  was  comparatively  sparse  ; 
now  cities  and  villages  are  to  be  seen  in  every  direction,  occupying  places  which 
were  then  an  uninterrupted  wilderness,  and  hosts  of  stout  hearts  ready  to  do 
battle,  if  needed ;  besides  the  numerous  and  increasing  facilities  for  building 
ships  and  for  transporting  munitions  of  war  forbid  the  idea  that  the  northern 
lakes  will  ever  again  constitute  an  arena  for  naval  combats. 

In  the  event  of  another  war  with  Great  Britain  we  would  be  able  to  build  and 
equip  five  ships  to  her  one ;  this  fact  alone  affords  a  conclusive  reason  why  the 
government  should  run  to  no  unnecessary  expense  in  its  preparations  for  war  in 
that  quater. 

Our  tonnage  will,  as  it  is  now,  always  be  greater  in  the  lakes  than  that  of 
Great  Britain,  which  must  secure  to  us  the  supremacy  in  the  event  of  war,  as 
many  of  those  vessels,  steamers  and  others,  could  be  converted  into  cruisers, 
which  would  not  only  protect  our  shores  from  invasion,  but  push  the  war  into 
the  enemy's  country. 

Ports  selected  for  naval  depots  should  have  heavy  guns  ready  for  their  protec- 
tion ;  and  parks  of  artillery,  composed  of  heavy  ordnance,  should  be  kept  in  readi- 
ness at  the  diffierent  military  posts  for  immediate  use  or  transportation.  Further 
than  this,  I  think  the  government  is  not  called  upon  to  provide  for  defence. 

In  conclusion,  I  beg  leave  to  state  that  if  there  should  be  another  war  with 
one  of  the  strong  maritime  nations  of  Europe,  the  trial  of  strength  must  be  upon 
the  ocean,  and  it  behooves  the  United  States  to  be  well  upon  their  guard.  As 
to  the  opinion  which  is  rife  among  us,  that  steam  alone  can  constitute  an  efficient 
navy,  and  that  the  nation  who  can  command  the  greatest  number  of  steamers  is 
to  hold  supremacy  on  the  ocean,  I  regard  as  one  of  those  visionary  speculations 
based  entirely  upon  the  opinions  of  mere  theorists.  Their  efficiency  for  towing 
ships  into  position,  and  for  transporting  munitions  of  war,  I  admit. 

If  we  had  ten  ships  of  two  hundred  and  forty  feet  in  length,  with  a  proportion- 
able breadth  of  beam,  and  built  to  carry  their  mettle  upon  two  decks,  instead  of 
four,  and  their  batteries  throughout  to  be  of  ten-inch  guns,  I  believe  it  would 
take  the  combined  steam  navy  of  Great  Britain  to  cope  with  them. 

Two  years'  war,  with  a  large  steam  navy  to  support  and  keep  in  constant 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES  435 

service,  would  bring  any  power  in  Europe  to  bankruptcy ;  and  I  trust  our 
government  will  not  be  drawn  into  so  unwise  and  expensive  a  system  of  national 
defence. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

R.  B.  CUNNINGHAM, 

Commander  U.  S.  Navy. 
Hon.  0.  M.  CONRAD, 

Secretary  of  War,  Washington. 


No.  4. 
Report  of  Commander  S.  F.  Dupont. 

Report  on  the  national  defence,  in  reply  to  the  following  questions,  submitted 
by  the  Department  of  War. 

First.  "  To  what  extent,  if  any,  ought  the  present  system  of  fortifications,  for 
the  protection  of  our  seaboard,  to  be  modified,  in  consequence  of  the  application 
of  steam  to  vessels-of-war,  the  invention  or  improvement  of  projectiles,  or  other 
changes  that  have  taken  place  since  it  was  adopted  in  the  year  1816  ]" 

Second.  "  What  reliance  could  be  placed  in  vessels-of-war,  or  of  commerce, 
floating  batteries,  gunboats,  and  other  temporary  substitutes  for  permanent  forti- 
fications 1 " 

Third.  "  Is  it  necessary  or  expedient  to  continue  the  system  of  fortifications 
on  the  shores  of  northern  lakes  ?" 

Whether  treated  distinctively  or  generally,  these  inquiries  may  be  supposed  to 
amount  to  this  :  Shall  we  expend  as  much  as  we  have  hitherto  done  for  defence 
upon  fortifications  ?  and  how  have  these  been  affected  by  the  introduction  of 
some  new  elements  in  war,  such  as  steam  power,  and  enormous  projectiles  of  an 
explosive  character  1 

This  subject  is  one  which  involves  the  honor  and  safety  of  the  country ;  it 
has  been  critically  examined  by  distinguished  military  men  and  eminent  states- 
men, and  I  do  not  venture  to  think  that  I  can  throw  much  new  light  upon  it. 
In  such  an  investigation  one's  profession  and  esprit  du  corps  would  naturally 
lead  in  any  scheme,  for  the  general  defence,  to  bring  the  navy  prominently  for- 
ward. But  this  question  is  too  broad  and  national  to  be  viewed  from  any  such 
narrow  limits,  and  in  examining  it  an  officer  should  discard  from  his  mind  to 
which  arm  of  the  public  service  he  belongs.  In  my  apprehension,  however,  the 
most  extended  system  of  fortifications  for  the  defence  of  our  seaboard  will  still 
leave  enough  for  the  navy  to  do ;  a  navy,  too,  carried  far  beyond  its  present 
number  and  strength.  Indeed,  this  arm  can  only  fill  its  special  mission  in  war, 
that  of  aggression,  by  being  enabled  to  leave  the  great  seaports  and  exposed 
points  of  our  maritime  frontier  to  a  more  certain  and  more  economical  system  of 
protection,  in  order  to  carry  the  "  sword  of  the  state  "  upon  the  broad  ocean, 
sweep  from  it  the  enemy's  commerce,  capture  or  scatter  the  vessels-of-war  pro- 
tecting it,  cover  and  convoy  our  own  to  its  destined  havens,  and  be  ready  to 
meet  hostile  fleets ;  in  other  words,  to  contend  for  the  mastery  of  the  seas  where 
alone  it  can  be  obtained,  on  the  sea  itself. 

Yet  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  theories  have  sprung  up,  assigning  much  less 
importance  than  formerly  to  fortifications,  in  a  system  of  national  defence,  under 
the  influence  of  opinions  "which  doubtless  have  some  truth  in  them,  but  which 
are  liable  to  be  carried  to  a  dangerous  extent.  Various  reasons  might  be  assigned 
for  this  change  of  opinion — speculation,  supposed  economy,  a  mistaken  desiri  to 


436  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

advance  the  interests  of  the  navy,  in  short,  the  characteristic  pursuit  of  theories 
into  the  field  of  extravagance. 

But  it  may  be  still  more  probable  that  these  views  mainly  spring  from  some 
misconception  as  to  the  extent  proposed  for  a  system  of  permanent  defences. 
Some  would  seem  to  believe  that  our  seaboard  and  lake  frontier  were  to  be 
bound  by  a  Chinese  wall,  and  that  all  the  salient  points  on  the  coasts  were  to 
be  crowned  by  castles,  the  cross-fires  of  which  would  cover  the  intervening 
space ;  in  other  words,  that  the  system  of  fortifications  proposed  to  protect  some 
four  thousand  miles  of  sea-coast  from  the  possibility  of  invasion  or  attack.  But 
is  there  any  cause  to  apprehend  such  extreme  views  1  And  if  they  should  exist, 
is  that  a  sufficient  reason  for  rejecting  a  wise  and  practical  system  of  permanent 
defences  vitally  essential  to  the  safety  of  important  points,  and  so  clearly  within 
the  means  of  the  country  to  provide  1 

In  treating  this  branch  of  the  subject,  can  we  do  better  than  examine  the  ob- 
jections presented  and  the  modification  proposed,  from  sources  entitled  to  the 
gravest  consideration  ? 

Holding  the  first  position  among  these  is  the  report  of  a  distinguished  states- 
man, then  occupying  the  Department  of  War,  and  still  holding  a  prominent  place 
in  the  public  councils — a  gentleman,  too,  familiar  with  arms  in  early  life,  and 
one  of  the  defenders  of  his  country  in  the  war  of  1812.  His  views,  set  forth 
with  great  ability,  received  the  indorsement  of  another  distinguished  personage, 
President  Jackson,  and  were  submitted  to  the  national  legislature  in  the  year 
1836.— (Doc.  No.  243,  24th  Congress,  Gen.  Cass's  report.) 

Now,  it  is  submitted  that  there  has  been  an  equal  misconception  as  to  the  scope 
and  tendency  of  this  able  report,  as  with  the  views  considered  extreme,  on  the 
other  side.  In  the  one,  modifications  recommended  in  reference  to  special 
features  have  been  considered  as  objections  to  the  whole  system ;  in  the  other, 
an  extended  scale  of  defence,  because  we  had  an  extended  frontier,  was  looked 
upon  as  a  desire  to  cover  the  whole  surface  of  the  land  with  forts  and  field 
works,  and  to  rely  upon  these  alone  for  defence.  Whereas  the  only  difference 
related  to  the  character  and  extent  of  the  works  to  be  constructed,  based  upon 
the  consideration  that  there  was  scarcely  a  possibility  of  these  works  being 
called  upon  to  repel  attacks  by  land,  as  well  as  by  water,  and  repeating  the 
hypothesis  that  an  enemy  will  ever  attempt  to  make  a  more  or  less  permanent 
establishment  in  the  country.  Such  an  establishment  as  would  induce  him  tc 
make  a  formal  investment  of  some  of  these  first  class  works,  requiring  a  large 
army  with  its  battering  trains  and  other  preparations  for  siege.  View?  on  these 
points  are  presented  in  full,  and  with  great  force,  yet  the  objections  are  strictly 
confined  to  what  is  conceived  to  be  the  unnecessary  magnitude  of  some  of  these 
works,  but  not  to  the  system  of  permanent  defences,  for  the  distinguished  authoi 
of  the  report  tells  us  with  equal  explicitness  : 

"  I  consider  the  duty  of  the  government  to  afford  adequate  protection  of  ttu 
sea-coast  a  subject  of  paramount  obligation,  and  I  believe  we  are  called  upon  b} 
every  consideration  of  policy  to  push  the  necessary  arrangements  as  rapidly  as 
the  circumstances  of  the  country  and  the  proper  execution  of  the  works  wil 
allow.  I  think  every  town  large  enough  to  tempt  the  cupidity  of  an  enemj 
should  be  defended  by  works,  fixed  or  floating,  suited  to  its  local  position,  ant 
sufficiently  extensive  to  resist  such  attemps  as  would  probably  be  made  agains 
it.  There  will,  of  course,  after  laying  down  such  a  general  rule,  be  much  lati 
tude  of.  discretion  as  to  its  application.  Upon  this  branch  of  the  subject  ] 
would  give  to  the  opinion  of  the  engineer  officers  almost  controlling  weight,  afte: 
proper  limitations -.are  established." 

"  All  the  defences  should  be  projected  upon  a  scale  proportionate  to  the  im 
portance  of  the.jjlace,  and  should  be  calculated  to  resis*t  any  naval  attack  am 
any  sudden  assault  that  a  body  of  land  troops  might  make  upon  it." 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  437 

"  It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  great  object  of  our  fortifications  is  to  exclude  a 
.naval  force  from  our  harbors ;  this  end  they  ought  fully  to  answer." 

In  truth,  it  cannot  be  questioned  that  our  principal  seaports,  naval  depots,  and 
all  important  points  on  our  seaboard,  should  receive  commensurate  protection ; 
neither  should  there  be,  in  our  judgment,  a  question  as  to  the  mode  in  which 
this  protection  should  be  given.  It  would  seem  unnecessary  to  set  forth  the  ad- 
vantages for  such  purposes  of  fixed  defences  or  fortifications.  These  advan- 
tages have  been  shown  over  and  over  again  by  our  distinguished  engineers,  and 
never  controverted.  To  run  over  some  of  these  once  more,  it  may  be  said  of 
forts  that  they  are  the  only  permanent  defences,  and  the  most  economical,  for, 
with  the  present  science  in  construction  and  choice  of  material,  the  outlay  is 
there  once  for  all,  for  the  repairs  are  next  to  nothing.  Forts  offer  means  by 
which  a  small  force  is  enabled  to  resist  a  large  one ;  a  small  number  of  men  a 
large  army.  In  the  event  of  an  attack  by  a  competent  power  upon  a  place 
liable  to  be  put  under  contribution,  the  injury  might  be  accomplished  before  suf- 
ficient means  of  resistance  could  be  assembled.  Forts  can  be  made  impregnable 
against  any  naval  force  that  could  be  brought  against  them,  and  are  needed  for 
the  protection  of  our  own  fleets  while  preparing  for  hostilities  on  the  ocean. 
They  are  secure  depots  for  munitions  of  war,  and  render  defence  certain  and 
easy,  and  above  all,  a  defence  which  rarely  involves  loss  of  life,  leaving  the  or- 
dinary state  of  society  undisturbed.  No  alarms  are  created ;  no  calling  of  men 
from  their  ordinary  business.  In  short,  by  rendering  success  impossible,  they 
derive  immunity  from  attack. 

It  is  impossible  to  view  with  favor  the  substitution  of  floating  or  steam  bat- 
teries for  permanent  defences,  the  preparation  of  which  will  be  ever  deferred,  on 
account  of  their  perishable  nature,  until  danger  is  pending ;  and  if  ready  in  time, 
their  value  ceases  with  the  occasion  which  called  them  forth,  for  their  decay  is 
certain  and  speedy.  Their  unsuitableness  and  want  of  adaptation  to  the  altera- 
tions constantly  made  in  the  means  and  implements  of  war  are  also  elements  of 
insecurity  in  these  wood  and  iron  defences  for  harbors.  There  can  never  be  any 
certainty  that  some  recent  discovery  has  not  lessened  our  effective  force,  without 
any  remissness  on  our  part ;  there  can  be  no  certainty  that  we  may  not  be  sud- 
denly called  on  to  renew  our  expenditures  before  our  last  appropriations  have 
been  spent.  For  example,  a  well-known,  and  scientific,  and  practical  gentle- 
man obtained  the  contract,  under  a  law  of  Congress,  to  construct  for  harbor  de- 
fence an  iron  floating  battery,  which  was  to  be  shot  and  shell  proof — in  fact, 
invulnerable  in  every  respect.  A  target,  constructed  after  the  manner  he  pro- 
posed for  the  sides  of  his  battery,  was  subjected  to  the  test  of  one  of  Commodore 
Stockton's  large  guns.  It  presented  little  or  no  resistance ;  the  ball  passed 
through  without  difficulty,  tearing  out  large  fragments  formed  of  seven  thick- 
nesses of  boiler-iron,  well  bolted  and  rivetted  together.  There  is  no  desire, 
however,  to  be  understood  as  excluding  altogether  these  costly  and  un wieldly 
machines ;  they  may  serve  as  important  auxiliaries  to  forts,  in  broad  sheets  of 
water,  or  special  localities  not  within  the  range  of  the  fixed  work ;  though,  in 
'  all  probability,  in  most  cases  the  hulls  of  stout  merchant  ships,  strengthened  and 
prepared  for  mounting  one  or  more  pieces  of  heavy  ordnance,  would  be  sooner 
got  ready  and  answer  an  equally  good  purpose.  But  to  leave  the  whole  defence 
of  our  harbors  to  such  tempoary  expedients,  built  of  materials  as  vulnerable  and 
perishable  as  ships,  would  be  expending  enormous  sums  in  order  to  invite  at- 
tack. 

Throughout  this  report  I  was  at  first  disposed  to  take  for  granted  that  no 
idea  could  prevail  in  this  country,  to  any  extent  at  least,  that  would  desire  to 
retain  the  navy  proper — by  which  is  meant  efficient  steam  and  sailing  ships-of- 
war — within  the  harbors,  for  harbor  defence ;  but  it  seems  to  be  included  in  the 
scope  of  one  of  the  inquiries,  and  cannot  be  overlooked. 

What,  then,  is  the  first  object  and  main  purpose  of  a  navy  but  the  defence 


438  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

and  protection  of  our  commerce  ?  It  is  the  only  form  in  which  that  protection 
can  be  given ;  but  this  is  essentially  taken  away  when  it  has  assigned  to  it  the 
defence  of  our  seaports.  It  may  be  said  that  the  navy  will  be  increased  to  such 
a  size  as  to  be  able  to  perform  this  double  duty.  There  is  nothing  in  our  past 
history  to  authorize  such  a  belief;  and  in  time  of  peace  the  people  of  the  United 
States  will  never  support  such  a  naval  force.  They  object  to  spending  much 
money  on  the  personnel  of  military  establishments.  Nor  does  it  belong  to  their 
temper,  or  their  position  among  nations,  to  indulge  in  apprehensions  of  war ; 
their  time  is  too  much  occupied  with  the  noble  arts  and  pursuits  of  peace  to 
feel  such  an  interest  in  this  subject  as  must  be  felt  to  bring  them  to  such  large 
expenditures  upon  perishable  materials. 

If  our  country  had  to  rely  upon  naval  defences,  it  may  well  be  questioned 
whether  any  portion  of  the  navy  would  be  suffered  to  leave  our  coasts  for  the 
protection  and  preservation  of  our  foreign  commerce,  while  we  were  under  the 
alarm  of  war.  However  great  the  naval  force  might  be,  it  would  not  be  thought 
sufficient.  The  dangers  nearest  home  would  command  our  interest  and  sympa- 
thy ;  the  preservation  of  our  great  emporiums  of  commerce  from  sudden  devas- 
tation would  cause  the  single  trading  ships  upon  the  ocean  to  be  forgotten. 
And  how  would  a  naval  force,  for  home  defence,  be  partitioned  out  to  the  differ- 
ent cities  and  stations,  without  endless  vexation,  dissatisfaction,  and  dispute? 

To  employ  our  active  navy,  in  whole  or  in  part,  to  the  entire  or  partial  aban- 
donment of  our  system  of  fortifications,  would  be  to  supplant  impregnable  bul- 
warks by  pregnable  ones — a  fixed  security  by  a  changeable  one — placing  perish- 
able materials  in  lieu  of  those  that  are  durable ;  it  would  be  exposing  ourselves 
to  the  chance  of  being  suddenly  left,  for  a  time,  without  defence,  through  new 
discoveries  in  the  art  of  war ;  it  would  be  opening  the  way  to  expenditures  of 
money  which  no  estimate  could  count  the  sums  ;  it  would  be  depriving  our 
commerce  of  its  legitimate  protection,  and  would  be  resigning  our  sense  of  secu- 
rity, peace  of  mind,  and  continuance  in  our  pursuits  without  interruption,  in  the 
event  of  war.  But  there  are  objections  to  such  a  plan  still  more  fatal :  it  in- 
volves the  sacrifice  of  the  lives  of  our  fellow-citizens,  and  proposes  to  make  their 
bodies,  since  they  are  brave  and  willing,  the  walls  of  defence  for  the  enemy  to 
fire  at,  instead  of  stone  or  mortar ;  it  is  compelling  the  conclusions  of  science  to 
give  way  to  mere  speculations,  and  rejecting  the  experience  of  the  world.  Nor 
is  this  all  that  is  involved  in  so  destructive  a  proposition :  it  would  divert  the 
navy  from  its  highest  duty ;  deprive  it  of  its  chief  honor  and  merit,  and  best  claim 
to  the  respect  and  support  of  the  people,  that  is,  the  vindication  of  the  national 
honor,  and  the  maintenance  of  the  national  freedom  and  independence  upon  the 
high  seas.  Again,  if  naval  defences  are  relied  on,  they  will  either  be  manned 
or  not.  If  manned,  what  shall  we  say  of  the  effects  of  such  a  life  upon  men' 
and  officers  ? — would  it  not  be  destructive  of  all  those  characteristics  of  skill, 
daring,  and  endurance  which  give  to  the  seamen  his  power  and  prestige  upon 
the  ocean "?  If  not  manned,  then,  compared  to  forts,  they  are  what  wooden  docks 
are  to  stone  docks.  In  either  case,  more  men  will  be  required  to  kee*p  them  in 
repair  than  forts. 

On  the  question  of  economy,  let  us  further  consider  the  cost  that  would  be 
entailed  upon  the  nation,  by  the  alarm  of  an  invasion  or  the  appearance  of  a 
hostile  fleet  on  the  coast. 

The  sudden  equipment  and  preparation  of  an  army,  and  its  maintenance  suf- 
ficiently long  to  remove  all  apprehension,  would  cost  more,  at  every  principal 
seaport,  on  one  single  occasion,  than  all  the  forts.  Then  what  would  be  the  first 
thing  that  an  army  would  do,  belched  forth  by  the  tens  of  thousands  from  every 
railroad  station  and  terminus,  but  to  set  to  work  and  throw  up  the  best  fortifica- 
tions they  could  in  the  emergency  ?  Would  not  every  musket  be  grounded  to 
take  up  picks  and  shovels  ?  Again :  shall  we  dwell  upon  the  state  of  the  public 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  439 

mind,  in  one  of  our  chief  cities,  if  its  approaches  were  left  without  forts  equipped 
and  manned? 

Is  there  any  exaggeration  in  the  picture  of  an  enemy's  fleet  of  some  thirty 
steamers  watching  an  opportunity,  and  through  the  ever  recurring  viscissitudes 
on  the  ocean,  familiar  to  professional  men,  eluding  a  naval  force  of  our  own, 
which  it  would  not  have  been  willing  to  encounter,  running  up  New  York  harbor, 
anchoring  from  the  North  to  the  East  river,  in  a  semicircle  round  the  battery, 
hurling  destruction  with  its  new  and  gigantic  projectiles,  setting  fire  to  the  forests 
of  shipping,  and  burning  the  navy  yard ;  and  retreating  the  moment  the  tempo- 
rary and  hurried  defences  began  to  tell  against  them,  destroying  more  property 
in  a  few  hours  than  would  cover  the  shores  of  Raritan  bay,  the  Narrows,  and 
the  islands  of  'the  Sound,  with  fortifications  1  Now,  this  is  the  kind  of  wafare 
we  must  look  to,  and  that  we  must  carry  on  ourselves. 

The  greater  the  injury  we  can  inflict,  the  more  rapidly  this  injury  is  repeated, 
and  the  sooner  we  will  obtain  redress  and  bring  an  unnatural  condition  of  affairs 
to  a  close.  The  position  of  Halifax,  Bermuda,  and  the  West  Indies,  must  ever 
be  borne  in  mind,  where  fleets  may  wait  for  a  fitting  opportunity  for  incursions ; 
to  suppose  that  there  are  to  be  no  such  thing  as  surprises,  because  railroads  have 
been  invented  and  hollow  shot  cast,  seems  to  be  taking  for  granted  that  human 
life  has  changed.  Indeed,  those  who  indulge  in  such  theoretical  securities  are 
preparing  for  themselves  surprises,  perilous  ones  too. 

Steam  will  be  the  great  agent  in  giving  to  the  new  elements  of  destruction 
powers  of  ubiquity.  Wherever  there  is  a  vulnerable  spot,  there  we  must  dash, 
and  there  an  active  enemy  will  dash  at  us.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that 
so  far  as  the  improvement  in  projectiles,  specially  referred  to  in  the  inquiries 
under  consideration,  are  concerned,  these  have,  relatively  to  ships,  strengthened 
forts.  Hollow  shot  crumble  into  fragments  and  fall  harmless  when  directed 
against  stone  walls.  At  the  siege  of  Antwerp,  under  Marshal  Girard,  they  were 
thrown  from  heavy  mortars  without  effect,  and  experiments  at  home  have  further 
established  the  fact.  It  takes  solid  shot  to  batter  walls  and  make  breaches — 
plenty  of  them,  and  rapidly  discharged,  and  concentrated  upon  or  near  one  spot. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  have  only  to  imagine  a  few  eight  or  ten-inch  shells 
passing  through  the  side  of  a  line-of-battle-ship  into  the  main  or  lower  gun-deck, 
and  there  exploding  amidst  the  dense  crowd  at  the  batteries,  every  fragment 
multiplying  itself  in  countless  splinters  of  wood  and  iron  as  destructive  as  itself, 
and  if  it  should  fail  to  burst,  still  doing  all  the  injury  a  solid  shot  could  do.  Or, 
let  one  enter  on  the  orlop  deck  among  the  passers  of  powder;  or,  lower  still, 
striking  at  the  water  line,  tearing  out  large  irregular  fragments,  and  leaving 
openings  defying  all  shot-plugs.  Change  the  scene  to  a  steamer,'  with  all  the 
circumstances  above  mentioned  of  pervious  sides  and  crowded  decks,  and  con- 
ceive a  few  exploding  in  the  engine-room ;  for  truly  has  it  been  said  that,  com- 
pared to  a  sailing  ship,  a  steamer  has  twenty  mortal  parts  to  one !  No !  when 
it  comes  to  using  hollow  shot  a  ship  will  prefer  engaging  something  similarly 
constructed.  No  ship  or  ships  can  lay  under  a  fort  at  this  day;  no  American 
fort,  at  least,  with  its  furnaces  for  hot  shot  in  addition  to  these  murderous  shells. 

In  this  connexion  it  may  be  well  to  make  a  passing  allusion  to  the  past  suc- 
cesses of  ships-of-war  against  forts. 

They  are  certainly  striking  examples  of  naval  prowess,  and  should  always 
cause  a  thrill  of  professional  pride  in  the  breast  of  every  seaman,  let  his  flag  be 
where  it  may ;  and  they  should  be  remembered  and  studied  by  officers  to  incite 
to  deeds  of  daring,  to  self-reliance,  and  to  faith  in  that  "  fortune  which  favors 
the  brave."  But  there  is  no  foundation  for  the  theory  attempted  to  be  raised 
upon  these  successes.  The  attack  on  Algiers  by  Lord  Exmouth,  commanding 
the  combined  English  and  Dutch  fleets,  take  it  all  in  all,  is  probably  the  greatest 
naval  achievement  in  this  line. 


440  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

About  two  hundred  guns  could  be  brought  to  bear  against  about  one  thousand 
in  the  fleet,  and  thereof  the  admiral's  ship,  the  Queen  Charlotte,  is  considered 
generally  by  the  profession  to  be  equal  to  any  on  record ;  but  she  was  permitted 
to  come  in  close  to  the  mole,  take  up  her  position,  swing  round  her  broadside, 
and  make  fast  to  an  adjoining  vessel,  before  a  shot  was  fired  upon  her.  This 
fact  alone  gives  an  idea  how  the  defence  was  conducted;  the  batteries  were  de- 
fective and  unskilfully  served,  yet  the  ships  hauled  off,  and  the  batteries  were 
not  silenced,  though  redress  was  obtained.  Indeed,  it  is  admitted  by  Lord 
Exmouth  that  he  could  not  have  continued  the  contest. 

Nearer  the  present  day  the  capture  of  Acre  is  equally  celebrated,  and  is  inter- 
esting, as  the  new  elements  of  war,  steam  power  and  hollow  projectiles,  were 
brought  to  bear. 

The  highest  military  authority  in  England  expressed  the  opinion  in  Parliament 
that  this  was  one  of  the  greatest  achievements  of  modern  times ;  but  the  same 
authority  added  it  was  also  connected  with  peculiar  circumstances  which  they 
could  not  always  hope  to  occur,  and  warned  their  lordships  that  they  must  not 
always  expect  that  ships,  however  well  commanded,  or  however  gallant  their 
seamen  might  be,  were  capable  of  commonly  engaging  successfully  with  stone 
walls. 

The  works  in  question  were  in  a  bad  condition  and  were  undergoing  repairs. 
Their  position  permitted  an  approach  through  a  channel  where  only  a  few  guns 
could  be  brought  to  bear  against  the  fleet,  most  of  which  took  this  passage. 
But  few  of  the  guns  of  the  fort  were  heavy  or  effective,  and  only  one  battery 
of  five  guns  were  well  served.  About  five  hundred  guns  brought  to  bear 
on  the  fort ;  the  walls  were  not  breached,  but  a  large  magazine  blew  up,  and, 
producing  a  panic,  the  fort  surrendered,  which,  it  must  be  remembered,  was  be- 
sieged by  land  also. 

We  have  merely  alluded  to  these  two  justly  celebrated  attacks  of  ships  against 
forts  to  invite  an  examination  into  their  details,  and  into  the  circumstances  of 
other  similar  achievements  nearly  as  striking,  with  the  conviction  that  few  per- 
sons could  be  found  who  would  use  these  instances  of  success  as  an  argument 
against  the  necessity  of  permanent  defences.  Surely  we  cannot  measure  what 
has  been  done  in  this  way,  when  the  preparations  for  defence  and  the  resistance 
were  conducted  by  those  whose  bravery,  as  in  the  cases  cited,  was  left  unaided 
by  skill  or  science.  Neither  let  it  be  supposed,  where  ships  have  attacked 
forts,  the  results  have  always  been  the  same ;  far  from  it ;  and  it  is  only  neces- 
sary to  allude  to  the  affairs  at  Fort  Moultrie,  and,  later,  to  Mobile  Point,  Ston- 
ington,  Fort  McHenry,  &c.,  from  our  own  national  experience. 

Are  we  entirely  to  reject,  in  this  question  the  experience  and  practice  of  the 
great  European  powers,  England  and  France?  The  former,  with  her  gigantic 
navy,  according  to  the  modern  hypothesis,  would  seem  to  require  no  permanent 
defences ;  nor  the  latter  with  her  increasing  marine,  already  brought  to  a  very 
formidable  condition  in  numbers,  material,  and  discipline. 

Yet  those  two  nations  while  building,  without  ceasing,  war  steamers  are  con- 
tinually adding  to  the  fixed  defences  of  their  seaboard,  and  this,  too,  w'ith  a  view 
of  making  their  navies  more  efficient  in  their  share  of  the  national  defence. 
France,  in  consideration  of  the  change  likely  to  occur  from  the  new  elements  in 
war  now  under  consideration,  has  had  recently  her  sea-coast  re-examined  by  a 
high  commission,  representing  all  arms  in  her  stupendous  military  organization ; 
and  the  result  was  to  order  still  further  protection  to  numerous  points  on  her 
seaboard,  rendered  accessible  by  light  draught  steamers  mounting  heavy  ord- 
nance, their  forts  to  be  'garrisoned  in  time  of  need  by  the  local  militia,  (garde 
nationale.)  In  England  the  call  is  for  greater  activity  in  material  and  permanent 
means  of  defence,  particularly  in  the  case  of  refuge  harbors  such  as  Portland 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  441 

and  Dover,  while  the  fortifications  of  her  great  arsenals  have  all  recently  been 
strengthened. 

After  mature  examination,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  in  a  system  of  national 
defence  forts  cannot  be  dispensed  with  without  entailing  enormous  expenditures 
for  uncertain  results.  The  invention  of 'cannon  and  their  constant  improvements 
have  changed  the  form  of  fortifications,  and  added  to  the  size,  durability,  and 
massiveness  of  their  construction.  Now  the  invention  of  cannon  was  a  greater 
change  in  the  art  of  war  than  any  that  has  occurred  in  this  century,  and  with 
regard  to  one  of  the  principal  improvements  of  the  day  in  destructive  agents — 
explosive  shot — the  advantage  has  been  given  decidedly  to  forts. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  we  cannot  dispense  with  forts,  can  they  not  be  modi- 
fied ?  Is  there  no  middle  course  ?  Fortifications  in  military  science  are  regarded 
as  a  temporary  means  of  resistance,  by  which  an  enemy  is  kept  in  check  until 
relief  is  afforded. 

In  this  view  of  their  functions  it  seems  probable  that  as,  on  the  one  hand, 
they  might  be  more  effectually  assailed  by  steamers -of- war  towing  in  heavy 
ships,  both  ships  and  steamers  mounting  the  heavy  ordnance  which  has  been 
introduced,  throwing  solid  as  well  as  hollow  shot,  so,  on  the  other  hand,  relief 
being  more  easily  procured,  their  style  of  construction  might  be  more  economical. 
But  this  is  a  question  belonging  to  the  engineers. 

It  is  one,  however,  which  may  be  interesting  just  now  with  reference  to  forti- 
fying our  new  coast  on  the  Pacific — a  work  which  surely  ought  not  to  be  delayed. 
Here  we  are,  as  it  were,  building  up  another  nation,  and  it  must  be  built  up 
with  arms  as  well  as  arts ;  for  without  arms  no  nation  was  ever  safe,  much  less 
great. 

The  position  of  Halifax,  Bermudas,  and  the  West  Indies  have  been  alluded 
to  above  in  reference  to  our  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts.  In  the  Pacific  we  have 
already  outposts  on  our  flanks,  in  the  hands  of  first  class  powers.  The  French 
have  a  protectorate  government  in  the  Society  Islands  ;  they  hold  the  Marquesas 
still  nearer,  with  its  superior  harbors,  and  have  been  looking  for  years  for  some 
excuse  for  seizing  the  Sandwich  group ;  for  this  is  the  only  way  to  account  for  the 
manner  in  which  they  have  ever  countenanced  the  unjust  and  ungenerous  demands 
of  their  agents  in  those  islands.  That  they  have  not  now  possession  of  them  is 
due,  probably,  to  what  has  been  stated  of  the  determination  of  the  government  of 
the  islands  to  hoist  the  American  flag,  and  call  upon  the  United  States  for  pro- 
tection or  incorporation.  It  is  impossible  to  estimate  too  highly  the  value  and 
importance  of  the  Sandwich  Islands,  whether  in  a  commercial  or  military  point 
of  view.  Should  circumstances  ever  place  them  in  our  hands  they  would  prove 
the  most  important  acquisition  we  could  make  in  the  whole  Pacific  ocean — an 
acquisition  intimately  connected  with  our  commercial  and  naval  supremacy  in 
those  seas.  Be  this  as  it  may,  these  islands  should  never  be  permitted  to  pass 
into  the  possession  of  any  European  power.  Then  we  have  British  Oregon,  with 
Vancouver's  island,  the  Halifax  of  the  Pacific  coast ;  and  last,  though  perhaps 
not  the  least,  the  Russian  possessions  of  the  Sitka,  &c.,  in  the  north ;  and  all 
these  in  an  ocean  above  all  others  adapted  to  the  use  of  steam. 

The  third  inquiry  submitted  by  the  department  is  whether  it  be  necessary  or 
expedient  to  continue  the  system  of  fortifications  on  the  shores  of  the  northern 
lakes. 

The  first  view  of  this  branch  of  the  subject  would  probably  lead  to  the  con- 
clusion that,  as  we  dispensed  with  forts  during  the  war  of  1812,  we  need  them 
still  less  now ;  that  the  contiguity  of  the  two  frontiers  will  enable  us  to  keep 
pace  with  any  evidence  of  preparation  on  the  other  side ;  that  our  progress  in 
population  and  resources,  rendered  so  immediately  available  by  the  increase  of 
water  communication  with  all  parts  of  the  border  States,  especially  with  such 
important  points  as  the  city  of  Albany,  which,  in  its  turn,  is  connected  with  all 
sections  of  the  country  by  its  great  river,  railroads,  and  canals,  was  far  greater 


442  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

than  any  progress  within  the  Canaclas.  Yet  the  advance  there  has  been  highly 
respectable,  and  very  extensive  public  works,  intimately  connected  with  a  sys- 
tem of  defence,  have  been  completed. 

But  this  very  progress  on  our  lake  frontier,  showing  itself  in  large  and  popu- 
lous towns  with  a  rapidly  increasing  commerce,  all  exposed  to  sudden  assault*, 
naturally  lead  one  to  pause  well  before  advancing  the  opinion  that  the  general 
government  is  absolved  from  giving  adequate  protection  to  all  exposed  and  im- 
portant points,  whether  on  our  lake  or  sea-coast. 

Why  should  not  Buffalo  and  Oswego  be  protected,  as  well  as  Savannah  and 
Mobile  ?  Not  by  extensive  and  costly  works,  capable  of  resisting  invasion  or 
siege,  but  sufficiently  strong  not  to  excite  the  cupidity  or  daring  spirit  of  an  enemy, 
who  in  a  rapid  incursion,  might,  as  elsewhere,  destroy  an  enormous  amount  of 
property  before  any  resistance  could  be  brought  against  him.  To  conduct  a 
surprise  may  be  difficult  on  the  lakes ;  but  we  have  had,  within  a  few  years,  full 
proof  that  it  is  possible. 

In  case  of  a  war  with  England  her  provinces  will,  in  all  probability  be  invaded, 
and  this  invasion,  according  to  the  declaration  of  a  distinguished  citizen,  will  be 
one  almost  en  masse.  He  predicts  that  an  army  of  a  hundred  thousand  men 
will  march  upon  the  heart  and  capital  of  the  country,  and  settle  all  at  one  blow; 
that  neither  forts  nor  ships  will  be  wanted ;  and  that  the  rivers  and  lakes,  instead 
of  obstacles,  would  become  bridges  to  the  invaders.  One  cannot  fail  to  be  stirred 
up  by  this  captivating  picture ;  but  in  the  only  trial  heretofore  made  upon  Que- 
bec the  river  was  not  found  to  be  a  bridge,  and  the  campaign  failed  for  want  of  one. 
Suffice  it,  however,  to  say,  if  we  carry  on  war  on  a  large  scale  without  being 
governed  by  the  art  of  war,  by  science,  and  past  experience,  we  may,  and  doubt- 
less will,  still  be  successful ;  but  this  result  will  be  obtained  by  an  increased 
expenditure  of  blood  and  treasure. 

While  an  army,  however  large,  was  marching  upon  a  vital  point,  millions  of 
property  might  be  destroyed  along  the  lake  shores,  making  a  heavy  discount  on 
the  fruits  of  the  victory,  which  might  be  prevented  by  moderate  expenditures.- 
Our  large  frontier  towns,  where  great  injury  could  be  suddenly  inflicted,  should 
be  protected  from  liability  to  a  coup  de  main  by  forts  of  moderate  dimensions, 
to  be  garrisoned,  in  time  of  need,  by  those  whose  hearths  they  shelter.  All 
lake  harbors,  whose  position,  depth  of  water,  and  accessibility  would  render 
them  important  as  refuge  harbors  to  our  own  ships  or  to  those  of  the  enemy, 
should  also  be  defended  by  adequate  works.  All  materials  not  perishable 
should  be  gradually  collected  for  the  construction  of  ships  and  steamers.  These 
preparations  become  invaluable  where  war  threatens  or  comes;  neither  are  they 
lost  if  it  should  not  overtake  us,  for  they  may  have  had  an  important  part  in 
averting  it. 

In  many  particulars,  and  according  to  the  opinion  of  men  of  the  most  expe- 
rience, Ontario  is  the  most  important  in  the  series  of  inland  seas  in  a  military 
point  of  view,  and  at  this  time  the  English  steam  tonnage  upon  it  is  greater  than 
our  own.  This  fact  alone  is  one  for  consideration. 

In  connexion  with  the  movements  of  large  armies,  nothing  has  been  said  of 
fortifying  strategic  points  on  the  line  of  offensive  operations,  because  this  ques- 
tions is  a  purely  military  one,  and  belongs  so  especially  to  another  branch  of  the 
service  that  it  would  be  mere  presumption  to  touch  upon  it  here. 

Though  not  specially  referred  to  in  the  questions  under  consideration,  it  may 
be  expected  that  some  notice  will  be  taken  of  the  facilities  to  be  derived,  in  a 
system  of  national  defence,  from  rapid  railroad  intercommunication  and  trans- 
portation. These  certainly  can  confer  a  great  and  real  benefit,  amounting, 
perhaps,  to  positive  exemption  from  the  possibility  of  invasion.  An  army,  with 
its  baggage,  can  accomplish  an  ordinary  march  of  twenty-five  days  in  one  day, 
and  reach  the  terminus  without  fatigue,  all  ready  for  fight.  The  experiment  of 
transporting  troops  in  this  way  has  already  been  tried  in  France,  and,  more 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  443 

recently,  the  emperor  of  Russia  lias  been  amusing  himself  by  sending  his  guards, 
with  their  artillery,  to  and  fro  between  his  capital  and  Moscow,  with  entire 
success.  But  it  is  a  misapprehension  of  means  and  ideas  to  suppose  that  the 
necessity  of  coast  defences  will  be  done  away  with  because  we  possess  the  power 
of  transporting  the  militia  from  the  interior  to  the  seaboard  in  the  briefest  space 
conceivable.  Are  our  farmers,  mechanics,  merchants,  doctors,  and  lawyers  to 
constitute  the  defence  of  our  maritime  frontier'?  Are  they,  in  time  of  war,  to 
sleep  with  their  knapsacks  on  their  backs  and  their  muskets  by  their  sides,  and 
be  ready  at  the  sound  of  bell  or  steam-whistle  to  leave  families  and  business  to 
man  floating  batteries  in  or  near  our  seaports,  or  sounds,  or  rivers  ?  Besides, 
mere  numbers,  though  they  may  prevent  an  enemy  from  landing  on  our  shores, 
cannot  prevent  his  ships  approaching  near  enough  to  hurl  destruction  among 
themselves,  destroy  cities,  and  burn  shipping. 

But  if  we  are  to  rely  upon  railroads  as  one  of  the  modes  of  repelling  sudden 
attacks,  having  for  their  object  the  destruction  of  property  or  the  levying  of 
contributions,  it  will  be  well  to  inquire  as  to  the  amount  of  dependence  that  can 
be  placed  upon  them.  The  utility  of  a  road  may  be  destroyed  in  a  few  minutes 
by  very  little  exertion ;  a  single  rail  removed  will  cause  delay  if  not  a  serious 
accident.  During  the  last  revolution  in  Paris  troops  were  thus  prevented  from 
reaching  the  city  from  the  departments.  In  time  of  war,  for  those  roads  at  least 
which  lie  along  the  coasts,  a  system  of  frequent  inspection  may  be  necessary, 
and  means  of  repairing  injuries  kept  at  hand. 

In  the  first  part  of  this  report  it  has  been  stated  that,  however  complete  our 
system  of  fortifications  may  be  made,  a  large  sphere  of  action  in  a  scheme  of 
national  defence  will  still  devolve  upon  the  navy.  The  general  effect  of  fortifi- 
cations is  to  exclude  war  from  our  borders,  and  contribute  to  the  inestimable 
advantage  of  leaving  society  in  an  undisturbed  state,  pursuing  its  usual  avoca- 
tions. A  navy  becomes  efficient  just  in  proportion  as  it  is  relieved  from  harbor 
defence;  and  in  a  war,  even  defensive  in  its  origin  and  object,  the  navy  in  almost 
every  case  must  assume  an  offensive  attitude.  We  lose  the  vantage-ground  if 
we  wait  the  assault  of  an  enemy.  One  would  suppose  there  could  scarcely  be 
a  dissenting  opinion  in  reference  to  this  point ;  that  the  special  function  of  the 
navy,  in  war,  is  to  be  aggressive.  Our  able  engineers,  and  especially  their 
present  distinguished  chief,  in  the  admirable  reports  they  have  been  making  for 
years  on  this  subject,  invariably  assign  this  high  and  all-important  position  to 
the  navy. 

General  Cass  tells  us,  "Our  great  battle  upon  the  ocean  is  yet  to  be  fought, 
and  we  shall  gain  nothing  by  shutting  our  eyes  to  the  nature  of  the  struggle." 
Similar  views  are  held  abroad  as  to  the  true  sphere  of  a  navy.  The  Duke  of 
Wellington,  while  urging  increased  activity  in  the  permanent  defences  of  Great 
Britain,  in  the  strengthening  of  forts,  the  construction  of  barracks,  and  place 
cTarmes  to  be  walled  in,  still  considers  the  navy  of  England,  through  its  powers 
of  aggression,  its  most  essential  defence. 

The  extraordinary  expansion  of  this  country  and  its  development  in  every 
department,  shown  especially  in  a  commerce  which,  long  since  whitening  every 
sea,  has  received  a  marvellous  stimulant  recently,  by  the  accession  of  a  thou- 
sand miles  of  coast  on  the  Pacific,  by  new  channels  of  trade,  and  by  the  modifi- 
cations in  the  navigation  laws  of  our  great  competitor,  should  lead  all  reflecting 
minds  to  consider  how  great  would  be  the  revulsion  in  our  prosperity  if,  through 
any  untoward  event,  we  should  loose  the  means  of  protecting  this  commerce. 
Standing  now  in  the  front  rank  with  our  great  commercial  rival,  shall  we  neglect 
an  old  aphorism  of  Sir  Walter  Raleigh,  most  cogent  still :  "Whosoever  com- 
mands the  sea  commands  the  trade,  and  whosoever  commands  the  trade  com- 
mands the  riches  of  the  world?" 

Now,  is  our  navy,  in  point  of  efficiency  and  numbers,  what  it  should  be? 
Our  statesmen  constantly  allude  to  it  as  the  right  arm  of  the  nation's  power; 


444  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

yet  has  this  arm  been  kept  in  any  degree  of  vigor  commensurate  with  the  work 
it  may  have  to  perform  or  in  keeping  with  our  position  among  the  nations  1  Is 
it  equal  to  the  ordinary  exigencies  occurring  almost  daily  1  The  law  passed 
some  years  since  limiting  the  number  of  seamen  still  exists.  Since  its  passage 
our  commerce  has  nearly  doubled,  and  our  squadrons  are  too  small  to  give  it 
adequate  protection  or  to  keep  up  a  healthful  spirit  and  experience  in  the  naval 
profession.  Recently  the  government  had  not  at  its  disposal  the  means  to  pre- 
vent an  unlawful  aggression  on  the  territory  of  a  friendly  power;  nor  was  the 
force  sufficiently  respectable  afterwards  to  infuse,  by  its  presence  alone,  a  little 
mercy  into  Spanish  justice.  But  are  we  yet  through  with  this  question  of  Cuba? 
Are  we  not  threatened  with  a  foreign  intervention  ?  At  any  rate,  does  it  not 
offer  another  striking  instance  to  be  added  to  the  long  list  of  dangers  which,  at 
different  periods,  have  suddenly  sprung  upon  us,  and  to  which  this  day  of  special 
international  amity  has  proved  no  exception1?  The  French  claims,  the  north- 
eastern boundary,  the  affair  of  the  Caroline,  the  Oregon  controversy,  have  all 
shaken  for  the  time  being  our  relations  with  the  two  most  formidable  powers  of 
Europe — formidable  to  us  only  because  they  have  powerful  navies — a  collision 
with  either  of  which  would  be  rather  a  different  affair  from  that  with  our  neigh- 
boring republic,  with  whom  similar  disturbances  ripened  into  actual  hostilities. 
The  naval  power  of  England  is  greater  than  ever  before  in  her  history,  and 
the  disparity  between  us  is  yearly  increasing,  particularly  in  her  steam  navy. 
In  the  admiralty  navy  list  for  April,  1850,  we  find  one  hundred  and  fifty 
steamers-of-war;  of  course  many  of  these  are  already  obsolete  in  construction 
and  machinery,  but  she  is  building  new  ones  and  launching  numbers  every  year. 
In  addition  to  these,  especially  constructed  for  war  purposes,  she  has  between 
sixty  and  seventy  mercantile  steamers,  capable  of  being  armed  with  thirty-two 
pounder  cannon,  for  which  the  guns,  carnages,  and  ammunition  are  actually 
prepared.  She  has,  still  further,  two  hundred  and  forty  more,  capable  of  mount- 
ing a  lighter  armament,  and  some  six  hundred  besides,  which  might  be  of  ser- 
vice to  resist  invasion  from  her  neighbors.  Exclusive  of  her  squadrons  abroad, 
which  are  large  and  efficient,  with  a  due  proportion  of  steamers  to  each,  in 
January,  1851,  she  had  in  commission  at  home  fourteen  sail  of  the  line,  three 
of  them  screw  steamers,  ten  frigates,  four  of  them  steamers,  besides  several 
steam  sloops,  all  ready  for  sea.  She  has  also  ready  for  commissioning  twenty 
other  powerful  steamers,  viz :  eight  large  frigates  and  twelve  sloops. 

The  training  of  officers  and  men  is  in  full  keeping  with  this  colossal  force. 
Her  squadron  of  evolutions  offers  the  finest  school  for  both,  and  the  gunnery 
ships  are  making  her  able  seamen  expert  artillerists,  good  swordsmen,  and 
capital  shots  with  pistol  and  carbine. 

The  navy  of  France  is  also  powerful ;  it  has  risen  entirely  from  its  almost 
total  extinction  during  the  long  and  bloody  contest  from  1789  to  1815.  In 
steamers-of-war,  at  the  commencement  of  this  year,  she  had  one  line-of-battle- 
ship  of  ninety  guns,  with  screw  propellers,  fourteen  steam  frigates  of  first  class, 
mounting  from  eight  to  sixteen  guns  of  heavy  ordnance ;  fifteen  steam  corvettes, 
and  forty  despatch  steamers,  most  of  them  mounting  from  two  to  four  shell- 
guns. — (See  Etat  General  de  la  Marine  et  des  Colonies,  for  February,  1851.) 

Both  these  navies  have  reached  the  highest  state  of  efficiency,  skill,  and  dis- 
cipline, and  their  -morale  never  was  higher:  that  of  England,  roused  to  the 
maintenance  of  its  boasted  supremacy  on  the  ocean;  that  of  France,  burning 
for  an  opportunity  to  show  the  world  that  is  practical  skill  is  now  equal  to  that 
science  and  bravery  which  were  ever  conspicuous. 

When  completed,  we  shall  have  in  our  navy  five  steam  frigates  and  one 
steam  sloop.  These  vessels  mount  or  will  mount  from  six  to  ten  guns,  some  of 
them  of  large  calibre ;  they  are  strong,  well-built,  and  efficient  vessels,  one  or 
more  of  them  quite  equal,  if  not  superior,  to  anything  of  the  same  class  abroad. 
But  this  statement,  compared  with  the  two  made  above  of  the  navies  of  England 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  445 

and  France,  shows  terrible  odds  against  us.  It  is  well  to  remember  this ;  but 
it  is  not  exhibited  here  with  the  intention  of  making  it  the  basis  of  an  argument 
to  show  that  we  should  set  to  work  and  erect  such  fleets  here.  The  temper  of 
our  people  in  relation  to  any  such  expenditures  has  already  been  spoken  of,  and 
there  is  no  desire  to  advocate  extravagant  cost  for  contingent  advantages. 

But  this  disparity  between  us  and  other  nations  in  our  means  of  offence  and 
defence,  already  so  great,  is  yearly  increasing.  How  is  it  to  be  got  rid  of  or 
lessened  ?  The  reply  is  often  made :  Has  it  not  ever  been  so  ?  was  it  not  quite 
as  great  when  we  went  into  the  war  of  1812?  And  it  may  well  be  asked  how 
that  disparity  was  overcome  in  that  memorable  contest.  In  the  first  place,  it 
was  lessened  by  the  skill,  courage,  and  coolness  of  our  officers,  united  to  the 
fine  spirit,  good  gunnery,  and  high  discipline  of  the  crews.  In  the  second 
place,  by  a  process  equalling  the  greatest  piece  of  strategy  ever  performed  on 
land  by  the  greatest  military  captains.  We  built  frigates  which  in  size,  calibre 
of  guns,  and  in  the  brave  hearts  who  took  charge  of  them,  literally  struck  off 
from  the  British  navy  list  everything  below  a  line-of-battle  ship,  at  least  so  far 
as  these  frigates  were  concerned. 

The  first  encounter  of  our  frigates  with  theirs  astounded  Britain.  In  account- 
ing for  her  defeats,  it  was  natural  for  her  only  to  have  seen  the  disparity  in  size 
and  armament,  but  the  official  account  of  these  frigates  shows  something  more, 
and  this  is  now  acknowledged  with  becoming  candor  by  some  of  her  distin- 
guished men.  Sir  Francis  Head,  in  a  recent  work,  says :  "  Gunnery  was,  in 
naval  warfare,  in  the  extraordinary  state  of  ignorance  we  have  just  described, 
when  our  lean  children,  the  American  people,  taught  us,  rod  in  hand,  our  first 
lesson  in  the  art."  Certain  it  is  that  the  British  admiralty  board  thought  it 
necessary  to  put  a  stop  to  what  they  conceived  to  be  a  very  unequal  contest, 
and  accordingly  intimated  confidentially  to  the  captains  of  their  ships  that  they 
did  not  conceive  that  any  of  his  Majesty'syhg-ate?  should  engage  single-handed 
the  larger  class  of  Ameican  ships,  which,  though  they  may  be  called  frigates, 
are  of  a  size,  complement,  and  weight  of  metal  much  beyond  that  class,  and 
more  resembling  line-of-battle-ships. 

Now,  can  we  not  once  more  render  obsolete  one-half  or  two-thirds  of  the 
English  and  French  navies,  and  compel  these  powers  to  remodel  their  steam  as 
well  as  sailing  ships'?  It  is  the  opinion  of  officers  who  have  closely  examined 
this  subject,  aided  by  actual  experiments,  that  we  have  not  yet  reached  the 
maximum  point  in  the  use  afloat  of  heavy  ordnance. 

It  is  proposed  to  build  ships  that  will  carry  guns  of  larger  calibre  and  longer 
range  than  any  heretofore  used ;  to  have  auxiliary  steam  power,  with  the  ma- 
chinery out  of  reach  of  shot  or  shell,  to  be  disencumbered  of  side-wheels,  and, 
when  not  using  this  auxiliary  power,  to  be  fast  and  manageable  under  canvas — 
very  much  such  a  ship  as  the  Princeton  was,  on  a  larger  scale,  and  with  the 
improvements  which  seven  years  have  introduced.  All  candid  minds  will  now 
admit  that  the  conception  and  principle  involved  in  the  construction  and  arma- 
ment of  this  ship  was  in  advance  of  her  day,  for  in  casting  round  we  have  found 
nothing  combining  so  many  requisites  for  a  steamer-of-war. 

The  advantage  of  guns  with  long  ranges  is  feelingly  dwelt  upon  by  Sir 
Francis  Head,  already  quoted.  Speaking  of  the  American  navy  in  the  last 
war,  he  says :  "  They  not  only  converted  their  seamen  into  practical  gunners 
and  expert  artillerymen,  but,  by  substituting  long  guns  instead  of  our  short 
ones,  they  secured  for  themselves  the  immense  advantage  of  being  able,  without 
loss  or  danger,  luxuriously  to  pummel  us  to  death,  at  ranges  which  they  had 
precalculated  they  would  be  completely  out  of  our  reach." 

It  would  seem  unnecessary  to  mention  that  all  improvements  in  the  imple- 
ments of  war,  the  moment  they  are  proved  effective,  will,  of  course,  be  seized 
upon  by  other  powers,  for  concealment  in  these  matters  is  no  longer  attempted. 
But  the  great  point  to  be  gained  is  to  compel  these  powers,  as  it  were,  to 


446  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

start,  de  novo,  with  us,  and  to  render  comparatively  valueless  tlieir  gigantic 
naval  establishments.  In  the  building  of  a  steam  navy  we  have  scarcely  com- 
menced, and  it  is  rather  mortifying  to  think  that  even  Spain  has  as  many 
steamers-of-war  as  we  have.  Candor  compels  the  admission,  however,  that  cir- 
cumstances have  greatly  favored  us,  and  though  this  extreme  economy  or  in- 
difference might  have  cost  us  dear,  certain  it  is  that  many  millions  of  dollars 
have  been  saved  by  the  delay.  England  and  France  have  been  going  through 
the  usual  costly  process  in  such  matters  before  reaching  a  measure  of  excellence — 
one  improvement  almost  immediately  laid  aside  for  another,  and  this  one  as 
rapidly  giving  way  to  something  still  better ;  while  all  this  time  we  have  been 
dealing  most  sparingly  with  this  very  expensive  agent,  steam  power.  But  now 
that  a  great  degree  of  perfection  has  been  reached  in  its  application,  that  the 
science  and  mechanical  skill  of  the  country  are  at  so  high  a  point,  that  our 
wealth  and  resources  have  so  increased,  shall  we  continue  to  refuse  a  reasonable 
measure  of  preparation  for  future  exigencies  ? 

Allusion  has  been  made  to  the  assistance  England  is  prepared  to  receive  from 
her  mercantile  steam  vessels  ;  and  it  may  be  said  we  have  the  same  resources,  so 
far  as  they  go,  of  falling  back  upon  our  splendid  mail  steamers.  These  vessels 
would  doubtless  prove  serviceable  in  many  ways ;  they  may  carry  a  few  guns 
of  very  respectable,  though  not  of  the  largest  calibre ;  built  for  speed,  they  would 
be  admirable  despatch  vessels,  serve  to  reconnoitre  with  safety  the  movements 
of  an  enemy,  give  warning  of  his  approach,  and  the  amount  of  his  force — in 
short,  be  what  Nelson  termed  his  frigates,  "  the  eyes  of  the  fleet."  But  these 
steamers  cannot  form  the  basis  of  a  steam  navy ;  such  an  idea  would  be  fatal  to 
our  naval  efficiency.  It  is  not  intended  by  this  to  object  to  government's  giving 
adequate  protection  to  these  mail  steamers,  in  order  to  carry  out  the  international 
postal  arrangements.  But  they  are  not  such  steamers  as  the  government  would 
now  build  for  war  purposes ;  the  side- wheel  may  be  said  to  be  almost  obsolete, 
and  their  machinery  is  altogether  too  much  exposed  to  shot  and  shell ;  ships  so 
costly  must,  at  least,  be  made  less  vulnerable.  But  if  the  mail  steamers  are  to 
be  depended  upon,  as  our  steam  navy,  and  not  as  auxiliaries  to  it,  as  the  English 
and  French  mercantile  steamers  are  to  their  navies,  then  another  question 
presents  itself.  At  what  stage  of  an  impending  emergency  is  the  government, 
in  conformity  with  the  right  granted  in  the  contract,  to  take  these  steamers  ? 

If  this  be  deferred  until  a  late  moment,  there  may  be  no  time  to  fit  them  for 
war  service,  for  very  material  alterations  will  have  to  be  made.  If  further 
deferred,  until  hostilities  break  out,  they  certainly  will  not  be  ready  for  the  first 
brush,  and  half  of  them  may  be  picked  up  abroad  by  the  smallest  armed  cruiser. 
Should  they  be  taken  by  the  government  prematurely,  tlieir  business  and  profit 
are  broken  up,  and  pass  into  the  hands  of  their  rivals,  who  may  run  their  steamers 
to  the  last  moment  consistent  with  safety ;  for  by  the  other  powers,  as  stated 
above,  they  are  only  held  as  auxiliaries. 

A  few  alarms,  then,  leading  to  no  rupture,  may  saddle  the  government  with 
a  class  of  steamers  not  fit  for  the  navy  proper,  to  be  disposed  of  at  an  enormous 
loss ;  for  the  alterations  which  will  have  been  made  to  convert  them  into  "  men- 
of-war"  will  have  wholly  unfitted  them  for  their  peaceful  pursuits;  just  as 
much  so  as  the  exorbitant  expenditure  for  the  luxurious  accommodation  of 
passengers  is  wholly  unnecessary  for  a  steam  frigate.  In  truth,  in  the  transfer 
of  these  mail  steamers  this  item  may  be  so  great  that  it  should  not  be  altogether 
overlooked.  It  has  been  stated  that  the  saloons,  cabins,  and  decorations  of  one 
of  these  lines  have  cost  from  one  hundred  thousand  to  one  hundred  and  twenty 
thousand  dollars  per  ship,  which,  of  course,  must  be  paid  for,  though  not  one 
dollar  of  it  would  be  required  for  naval  use.  Two  iron  hooks  to  swing  his 
hammock,  make  the  berth  of  the  seaman,  and  a  few  pine  boards  compose  the 
bunk  of  the  officers. 

In  conclusion,  whatever  may  be  decided  in  relation  to  the  national  defence  by 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  447 

fortification,  whether  these  be  continued,  extended,  or  modified,  I  beg  leave  to 
express  an  emphatic  dissent  from  all  theories  having  for  their  object  the  substi- 
tution of  active  ships-of-war  for  permanent  works.  This  would  be  placing  the 
navy  in  a  false  position  before  the  country ;  giving  it  duties  to  perform  for  which 
its  organization  is  inapplicable ;  preparing  for  its  future  discredit  and  loss,  through 
failures  to  execute  that  which  should  never  have  been  undertaken,  which  is  not 
embraced  in  the  general  scope  and  design  of  a  naval  establishment. 

To  retain  the  navy  for  harbor  defence  was  entertained  at  the  commencement 
of  the  last  war  with  England ;  the  proposition  to  do  so  sprung  from  the  appre- 
hension that  it  could  not  compete  with  the  vastly  superior  English  forces  upon 
the  ocean.  But  at  that  time  some  brave  and  sagacious  officers  in  the  high  ranks 
saved  the  navy  from  the  fate  that  threatened  it,  and  to  these  gentlemen  it  owes 
all  its  subsequent  honors,  usefulness,  and  prosperity.  If  any  such  ideas  prevail, 
at  this  day,  in  or  out  of  the  profession,  those  holding  them  would  do  well  to 
pause  and  consider  what  the  navy  would  have  lost,  and  what  the  country  would 
have  lost,  if  our  ships-of-war  had  at  that  eventful  period  been  deprived  of  the 
opportunity  of  filling  so  bright  a  page  in  the  nation's  history  by  their  achieve- 
ments upon  the  ocean.  In  this  connexion  an  eloquent  passage  in  the  speech  of 
a  great  statesman  is  recalled,  delivered  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  in 
1838.  After  alluding  to  our  being  at  war  with  England,  at  a  moment  when 
she  had  gained  an  ascendancy  on  the  seas  over  the  whole  combined  powers  of 
Europe,  and  quoting  the  familiar  verse  of  her  poet, 

"  Her  march  is  o'er  the  mountain  wave, 
Her  home  is  on  the  deep," 

Mr.  Webster  says :  "  Now,  sir,  since  we  were  at  war  with  her  I  was  for  inter- 
cepting this  march;  I  was  for  calling  upon  her,  and  paying  our  respects  to  her 
at  home;  I  was  for  giving  her  to  know  that  we,  too,  had  a  right  of  way  over 
the  seas,  and  that  our  officers  and  our  sailors  were  not  entire  strangers  on  the 
bosom  of  the  deep;  1  was  for  doing  something  more  with  our  navy  than  to  keep 
it  on  our  shores  for  the  protection  of  our  own  coasts  and  our  own  harbors;  I  was 
for  giving  play  to  its  gallant  and  burning  spirit;  for  allowing  it  to  go  forth  upon 
the  seas,  and  to  encounter  on  an  open  and  an  equal  field  whatever  the  proudest 
or  the  bravest  of  the  enemy  could  bring  against  it.  I  knew  the  character  of  its 
officers  and  the  spirit  of  its  seamen,  and  1  knew  that  in  their  hands,  though  the 
flag  of  the  country  might  go  down  to  the  bottom,  while  they  went  with  it,  yet 
that  it  could  never  be  dishonored  or  disgraced. 

"Since  she  was  our  enemy,  and  a  most  powerful  enemy,  I  was  for  touching 
her,  if  we  could,  in  the  very  apple  of  her  eye;  for  reaching  the  highest  feather 
in  her  cap;  for  clutching  at  the  very  highest  jewel  in  her  crown."  *  *  *  * 
"  The  ocean,  therefore,  was  the  proper  theatre  for  deciding  this  controversy  with 
our  enemy ;  and  on  that  theatre  my  ardent  wish  was  that  our  own  power  should 
be  concentrated  to  the  utmost." 

It  would  be  ill  suited,  indeed,  to  the  spirit  of  this  nation  to  retain  its  naval 
forces  in  its  own  waters  during  a  war,  especially  if  that  war  was  with  a  naval 
power.  Steam,  this  new  element  in  the  affairs  of  the  world,  has  very  materially 
changed  our  position  with  reference  to  other  nations.  Our  distance  from  Europe, 
measured  in  time,  is  now  reduced  to  a  brief  period  of  ten  days.  These  United 
States  have  hitherto  been  advancing  the  general  cause  of  human  liberty  by  an 
active  and  progressive  peace ;  but  do  not  events  abroad  more  and  more  indicate 
that  we  may,  at  no  distant  day,  be  forced  into  our  own  defence — to  aid  this 
cause  of  freedom  by  an  active  war? 

Respectfully  submitted. 

S.  F.  DUPONT,^ 
Commander  United  States  Navy. 


448  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

No.  5. 
Report  of  Lieutenant  J.  Lanman. 

NEW  YORK  NAVY  YARD,  September  20,  1851. 

SIR  :  In  obedience  to  the  within  order  of  the  honorable  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following,  as  the  result  of  my  best  reflec- 
tions upon  the  subject  referred  to  in  your  communication  of  the  17th  June  last, 
addressed  to  the  honorable  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy : 

1st.  "  To  what  extent,  if  any,  ought  the  present  system  of  fortifications  for 
the  protection  of  our  seaboard  to  be  modified  in  consequence  of  the  application 
of  steam  to  vessels-of-war,  the  invention  or  improvement  of  projectiles,  or  other 
changes  that  have  taken  place  since  it  was  adopted  in  the  year  1816 1 M 

The  great  change  produced  upon  all  maritime  nations  by  the  application  of 
steam  must,  of  course,  have  a  most  important  bearing  in  regard  to  the  system 
of  our  national  defences,  as  adopted  in  the  year  1816,  and  that  system  most 
applicable  to  the  same  purpose  at  the  present  day. 

I  desire  to  say  that  should  a  foreign  power  design  hostilities  against  the 
United  States,  their  steamers,  with  transport  ships  in  tow,  would  not  attempt 
to  pass  our  fortifications,  but  could  land  thousands  of  troops  upon  our  shores  at 
the  numerous  points  convenient  for  so  doing,  and  free  from  the  annoyance  of 
any  battery. 

At  the  same  time,  I  conceive  it  all  important  that  our  seaports  should  be  pro- 
tected ;  yet  the  great  improvements  made  in  projectiles,  and  the  advancement 
in  the  science  of  gunnery,  would  suggest  that  our  fortifications  need  not  be  so 
extensive,  and  consequently  erected  at  much  less  expense.  Though  I  would 
not  demolish  any  of  the  works  now  completed,  yet  those  being  erected  could  be 
so  modified  as  to  receive  the  heavy  armament  of  the  present  day,  and  be  finished 
at  much  less  expense  than  by  carrying  out  the  designs  of  fortifications  planned 
many  years  since  and  not  yet  completed. 

2d.  "  What  reliance  could  be  placed  on  vessels-of-war,  or  of  commerce,  float- 
ing batteries,  gunboats,  and  other  temporary  substitutes  for  permanent  fortifica- 
tions ? " 

In  reply  I  would  say  that  great  reliance  could  be  placed  on  war  steamers  of 
moderate  draught  of  water,  armed  with  our  efficient  eight  and  ten-inch  colum- 
biads,  as  they  should  at  all  times  be  in  readiness  to  take  in  tow  any  armed 
vessels  at  the  naval  station,  and  in  a  few  hours  from  port  could  oppose  the  land- 
ing of  the  enemy  upon  any  part  of  the  adjacent  coast. 

Sailing  vessel  of  the  commercial  marine  and  river  steamers  (suitable  for  the 
purpose)  would  be  available  means  of  transporting  troops  to  oppose  the  landing 
upon  our  shores  of  any  hostile  force. 

Floating  batteries  and  gunboats,  and  other  temporary  substitutes  for  perma- 
nent fortifications,  I  conceive  to  be  heavy  expenditures  of  the  public  treasury, 
and  not  of  the  least  possible  benefit  to  the  government.  Of  course  I  would 
except  such  temporary  means  of  defence  as  a  case  of  emergency  might  demand, 
when  the  people  of  our  country  are  ever  ready  to  look  out  for  themselves. 

3d.  "  Is  it  necessary  or  expedient  to  consider  the  system  on  fortifications  on 
the  shores  of  the  northern  lakes  ?  " 

The  same  answer  will  apply  to  those  works  that  I  have  made  in  regard  to 
the  fortifications  on  our  seaboard.  Those  unfinished  should  be  modernized,  and 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  449 

those  in  service  armed  with  projectiles  and  otherwise  adapted  to  the  improve- 
ments of  the  year  1851. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  your  obedient  servant, 

JOSEPH  LANMAN, 
Lieutenant  United  States  Navy. 
Hon.  C.  M.  CONRAD, 

Secretary  of  War. 


No.  6. 
Report  of  Lieutenant  M.  F.  Maury. 

NATIONAL  OBSERVATORY,  Washington,  August,  1851. 

SIR  :  I  have  received  a  communication  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  cover- 
ing the  copy  of  a  letter  from  yourself  of  June  17,  1851,  requesting  him  to 
communicate  certain  resolutions  of  Congress  concerning  land  defences  and  forti- 
fications to  several  officers  of  the  navy,  and  "  to  obtain  their  separate  opinions  in 
writing"  upon  the  following  points,  viz  : 

1st.  "  To  what  extent,  if  any,  ought  the  present  system  of  fortifications  for 
the  protection  of  our  seaboard  to  be  modified,  in  consequence  of  the  application 
of  steam  to  vessels-of-war,  the  invention  or  improvement  of  projectiles,  or  other 
changes  that  have  taken  place  since  it  was  adopted  in  the  year  1816  ?" 

2d.  "  What  reliance  could  be  placed  on  vessels-of-war,  or  of  commerce,  float- 
ing batteries,  gunboats,  and  other  temporary  substitutes  for  permanent  fortifica- 
tions ?" 

3d.  "  Is  it  necessary  or  expedient  to  continue  the  system  of  fortifications  on 
the  northern  lakes  ?" 

The  resolutions  are : 

"  1st.  Resolved,  That  the  Secretary  of  War  be  directed  to  report  to  this 
House,  the  second  Monday  in  December  next,  on  the  subject  of  the  land  de- 
fences of  the  country,  in  which  he  will  review  the  general  system  adopted  after 
the  war  with  Great  Britain,  and  since  pursued,  in  regard  to  the  permanent  forti- 
fications then  deemed  necessary  for  the  national  defence ;  and  that  he  report 
whether  the  general  plan  may  not  now  be  essentially  modified  by  reducing  the 
number  of  works  proposed  to  be  erected,  and  by  abandoning  some  of  the  forts 
now  in  progress  of  construction." 

"  2d.  Resolved,  That  the  Secretary  of  War  also  report  the  number  of  fortifi- 
cations which  have  been  built,  including  those  nearly  completed  under  the 
general  system,  the  number  in  progress  of  construction,  and  the  number  not  yet 
commenced,  but  proposed  to  be  erected,  and  in  such  form  as  will  conveniently 
show  the  States  and  Territories  in  which  the  several  forts  are  situated  or  to  be 
located,  when  the  work  was  commenced,  when  completed  or  expected  to  be 
finished,  the  number  and  calibre  of  the  guns  mounted  or  to  be  mounted,  the 
estimated  cost,  the  amount  expended,  and  the  sums  yet  required  to  finish  or 
construct,  as  the  case  may  be,  each  work." 

I  am  directed  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  give  this  subject  my  "best 
reflections,  and  to  communicate  the  result  to  the  Secretary  of  War." 

To  make  clear  the  result  of  my  reflections  upon  this  subject  it  is  first  neces- 
sary to  pass,  at  least  briefly,  in  review  the  condition  of  the  country  immediately 
preceding  the  year  1816,  when  the  present  system  of  fortifications  was  adopted, 
and  to  contrast  the  condition  and  military  resources  of  the  United  States  then, 
and  their  condition  and  military  resources  now. 

H.  Kep.  Com.  86 29 


450  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

In  1816  our  population  was  eight  millions;  we  had  just  come  out  of  a  trying 
and  expensive  war  with  the  most  powerful  nation  in  the  world ;  our  soil  had 
been  invaded,  the  Capitol  burned,  towns  had  been  besieged,  villages  laid  waste, 
and  the  people  greatly  harassed  by  the  presence  among  them  of  an  insolent  foe. 

The  application  of  steam  as  a  motive  power,  even  to  river  craft,  was  but  an 
experiment,  and  men  had  not  yet  waked  from  their  dream  in  which  they  first 
saw  upon  the  ocean  visions  of  steam  navigation.  Kailroads  had  not  then  begun 
to  thread  themselves  over  the  country,  nor  had  the  first  telegraphic  wire  streaked 
the  horizon.  The  country  had  been  and  might  again  be  invaded ;  the  alarm 
could  be  spread  only  at  the  rate  of  one  hundred  miles  a  day ;  and  to  repel  the 
enemy  our  generals  could  bring  up  their  forces  only  at  the  rate  of  what,  in  this 
day  of  steam  and  railroad  car,  would  be  considered  as  a  snail's  pace ;  twenty 
miles  was  a  good  day's  march  for  an  army. 

Under  these  circumstances,  with  the  horrors  of  war  and  the  dread  of  invasion 
fresh  in  the  minds  of  the  people,  it  was  natural  that  the  attention  of  the  govern- 
ment should  be  directed  to  a  system  of  defence  along  our  borders  which,  in 
another  war,  should  make  the  weak  points  strong,  the  salient  impregnable,  and 
the  exposed,  the  rich,  and  the  tempting  secure ;  thus  rendering  the  country  in 
another  war  safe  from  invasion.  Accordingly,  the  plan  was  to  line  the  seaboards 
with  forts  and  castles,  which  should  oppose  the  advances  of  the  enemy,  beat 
him  back,  resist  sieges,  and  support  garrisons  for  defence,  until  re-enforcements 
should  arrive  or  the  patience  and  the  energies  of  the  assailants  should  become 
exhausted.  Under  these  circumstances  the  present  system  of  fortifications  was 
commenced. 

For  defending  the  approaches  to  any  particular  part  of  the  coast,  the  engi- 
neer, in  planning  his  works,  had  to  take  into  account  the  importance  to  us  of 
the  place  to  be  defended;  the  importance  which  the  enemy  would  probably 
attach  to  its  occupation  by  himself;  and  the  force  that  he  would  or  could, 
probably,  bring  against  it.  Also  an  element  which  entered  largely  into  the 
engineer's  plans  was  the  kind  of  force,  the  calibre  of  guns,  &c.,  that  his  fort 
would  have  to  withstand. 

But  since  that  time  great  changes  have  taken  place.  The  relative  importance 
of  ports  and  harbors,  and  places  to  be  defended  along  the  coast,  has  greatly 
changed.  The  implements  of  warfare  and  the  means  of  attack  and  defence 
have  changed;  structures  that  were  well  calculated  to  resist  the  batteries  of  the 
best  appointed  ships  in  1816,  would  now  tumble  down  before  the  appliances  of 
modern  warfare.  The  improvements  which  have  since  taken  place  in  ships, 
their  armaments  and  locomotion,  are  vast;  and  therefore  works  may  be  found 
along  our  coast  which,  though  sufficient  in  their  day,  would  now  be  wholly 
inadequate  to  the  purpose  for  which  they  were  intended. 

At  best,  a  fort  can  actually  defend  so  much  of  the  coast  only  as  lies  within 
the  range  of  its  guns ;  outside  of  this  range  and  enemy  may  disembark  an  army, 
land  his  heavy  ordnance  in  the  very  sight  of  the  strongest  castle,  as  we  our- 
selves have  since  done  at  Vera  Cruz,  and  proceed  to  invest,  from  the  rear,  the 
strongholds  of  the  country.  It  was  therefore  practicable  for  a  bold  and  dashing 
enemy,  notwithstanding  the  powerful  and  costly  works  at  Old  Point  Comfort, 
in  Virginia,  to  land  in  sight  of  these  works  an  army,  in  Lynn  Haven  bay,  march 
up  to  Norfolk  without  coming  in  reach  of  the  protecting  battery,  and  invest  the 
city  and  the  navy  yard — the  very  places  the  guns  of  these  forts  were  intended 
to  protect. 

True,  it  was  practicable  to  erect  works  of  defence  at  Lynn  Haven  bay ;  but 
being  erected,  the  sagacity  of  our  engineers  perceived  there  were  still  other 
places  and  times  at  which  an  enemy  might  land  and  march  up  to  Norfolk  with- 
out once  coming  in  range  of  the  Lynn  Haven  guns.  The  country  saw  this, 
and  perceived  that  effectually  to  prevent  an  enemy  of  naval  resources  from 
landing  on  our  coast  in  war  would  require  a  structure  but  little  short  of  a 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  451 

Chinese  wall,  with  bastions  mounting  guns  to  range  and  rake  every  point,  from 
one  end  of  our  extended  sea-front  to  the  other. 

Solomon's  exchequer  could  not  withstand  the  drafts  which  such  a  complete 
system  of  defence  would  make  upon  the  treasury ;  and  neither  the  minds  of  the 
people  nor  the  purse  of  the  public  was  prepared  to  incur  it.  Accordingly,  the 
most  important  points  were  selected  for  fortifications,  which,  even  if  completed, 
would  not  have  protected  the  country  from  invasion ;  they  would  only  have 
prevented  the  enemy  from  anchoring  with  his  fleet  in  the  most  safe  roadsteads, 
and  from  landing  with  his  forces  at  the  most  convenient  places,  and  from  batter- 
ing down  our  cities  with  the  guns  of  his  men-of-war. 

And  upon  the  carrying  out  of  this  system,  as  incomplete  as  it  necessarily  was, 
there  was  involved,  according  to  the  estimates  of  the  most  skilful  and  accom- 
plished engineers,  a  sum  of  money  which  it  would  be  difficult  for  the  imagination 
to  conceive,  for  it  required  eight  or  nine  places  of  figures  to  comprehend  it,  so 
enormous  was  the  amount. 

Virile  this  system,  expensive  and  defective  as  it  was,  was  in  progress,  com- 
menced those  changes  in  the  country  to  which  I  have  alluded;  a  change  of ' 
population  from  eight  to  twenty  odd  millions,  in  the  means  of  spreading  the- 
alarm  of  an  intended  invasion ;  a  change  from  the  signal  fire  on  the  mountain 
and  the  horse  and  his  rider,  to  the  fiery  footed  messenger  of  heaven,  to  raise  the 
country.  For  the  foot  pace  of  twenty  miles  a  day,  as  the  weary  rate  of  our1 
advancing  armies,  a  change  which  ties  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery  all  to  the 
tail  of  the  iron  horse,  mounts  them  on  railroads,  and  speeds  off  with  them  at  the 
rate  of  twenty  times  twenty  miles  a  day,  with  the  ability  to  land  them  at  the 
appointed  place  at  the  appointed  time,  refreshed  with  the  ride  and  ready  for 
battle ;  a  change  in  ordnance  and  missiles  of  death,  which  are  far  more  destruc- 
tive and  much  more  terrible  in  battle  than  any  ever  known  in  the  annals  o£ 
military  warfare,  Anno  domini  1816. 

These  changes  are  enough  to  revolutionize  the  system  of  coast  defences.. 
They  have  rendered  effete  in  part  the  system  of  1816. 

Railroads  are  now  already  completed,  or  actually  in  process  of  construction,, 
leading  from  New  York  up  among  the  granite  hills  of  New  England — back  to 
the  lakes  and  beyond  the  mountains — cuts  the  great  Miami  bottom,  and  spread- 
ing themselves  out  over  the  rich  prairies  beyond. 

From  Norfolk  they  go  north  and  south,  and  are  ramifying  themselves  far 
away  into  the  back  country,  with  the  intent  of  reaching  the  very  heart  of  the 
nation  in  the  good  valley  of  the  west. 

Now,  were  it  possible  for  an  enemy,  with  the  greatest  army  that  ever  was  led 
into  battle  by  the  greatest  captain,  to  take  the  country  by  surprise,  and  to  land 
at  Long  Island  sound,  or  in  Lynn  Haven  bay,  and  to  be  disembarking  his  last 
piece  of  artillery  before  he  was  discovered,  these  railroads,  the  power  of  steam, 
with  the  aid  of  lightning,  would  enable  the  government,  before  he  could  reach 
the  heights  of  Brooklyn,  or  the  outskirts  of  Norfolk,  to  have  there  in  waiting; 
and  ready  to  receive  him  and  beat  him  back  into  the  sea,  a  force  two  to  one- 
greater  than  his,  however  strong. 

Suppose  that  in  1847  there  had  been  in  active  operation  between  Vera  Cruz; 
and  the  city  of  Mexico  a  line  of  magnetic  telegraph  and  such  a  railroad  as  is- 
the  Erie  road  of  New  York,  can  it  be  supposed  that  our  generals,  being  cogni- 
zant of  the  facts,  would  have  so  much  as  entertained  the  idea  of  landing 
there  as  they  did  and  laying  siege  to  the  town. 

All  the  world  knows  where  our  railroads  are,  and  that  the  country  is  pro- 
tected from  military  surprise  and  invasion  from  the  sea  by  a  net-work  of  tele- 
graphic wires ;  the  mere  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  Norfolk  and  New  York 
can  bring  to  their  defence  such  resources  will  forever  prevent  even  the  thought 
in  the  mind  of  an  enemy  of  landing  in  force  at  Lynn  Haven  bay  or  on  Long 
Island. 


452  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

Those  roads,  therefore,  render  a  siege  to  any  of  the  works  of  defence  before 
those  places  out  of  the  question. 

To  lay  siege  to  any  place  along  our  sea-front  involves  not  only  the  disem- 
barking of  an  army,  but  the  landing  also  of  the  siege-train.  This  requires  time. 

From  the  time  that  the  head  of  our  invading  column  jumped  out  of  the  boats, 
up  to  their  waists  in  the  water,  at  Vera  Cruz,  till  General  Scott  was  ready  to 
send  his  summons  to  the  city,  was  thirteen  days,  and  it  was  four  days  more 
before  his  heavy  artillery  drew  overtures  from  the  besieged — total,  seventeen 
days. 

Imagine  an  army,  the  best  equipped  it  may  be  the  world  ever  saw,  that  should 
attempt  to  beleaguer  one  of  our  strongholds  for  seventeen  days.  Within  that 
time  we  could  bring  against  him,  by  railroads  and  steamboats,  millions  of  the 
freemen,  which  this  country  ever  holds  in  reserve,  to  fight  its  battles.  It  might 
be  Boston,  before  which  this  imaginary  army  is  supposed  to  set  down  in  im- 
aginary siege,  or  it  may  be  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Norfolk,  Charleston,  or 
New  Orleans — it  is  immaterial  where.  In  less  than  half  the  Vera  Cruz  time 
^we  could  throw  millions  of  men  into  any  one  of  these  places,  and  subsist  them, 
iin  the  meantime,  by  a  daily  market  train  of  cars  and  steamboats,  catering  for 
ithem  in  the  abundant  markets  of  the  Mississippi  valley. 

It  is  impossible  that  any  army,  however  brave,  spirited,  and  daring,  should 
*ever  think  of  invading  a  country  like  this,  and  attacking  us  upon  our  own 
:ground,  when  we  have  under  our  command  such  powers  of  concentration  and 
:such  force  in  reserve  as  twenty  millions  of  freemen,  the  electric  telegraph,  the 
(railroad  car,  the  locomotive,  and  the  steamboat. 

The  present  system  of  fortifying  the  coast  is  founded  on  the  principle  of 
imaking  the  fortifications  "strong  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  the  great  objects 
to  be  secured."* 

This  is  the  principle  upon  which  every  system  of  national  defence  must  rest ; 
and  as  to  this  principle  itself  there  can  be  no  difference  of  opinion.  The  ques- 
tion is,  in  what  shall  the  strength  of  a  fortification  consist?  For  a  fortification 
that  is  strong  against  the  most  powerful  weapons  and  modes  of  attack  known 
•to. our  age  may  be  weak  before  those  that  the  inventions  and  improvements  of 
.another  age  may  call  forth. 

In  the  feudal  times  castles  were  built  to  enable  those  within  to  withstand  the 
attack  of  spearsmen  and  archers.  These  old  castles  were  strong  in  their  day, 
but  in  ours  they  are  impotent  and  of  no  avail. 

The  fortifications  of  1816  were  built  to  withstand  the  armaments  which  were 
Amounted  upon  the  ships  of  that  day;  and  what  were  they? 

In  .1812  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  when  preparing  to  besiege  Badajos,  wrote 
to  Admiral  Berkley,  commanding  the  Lisbon  station,  to  request  the  loan  of 
.twenty  twenty -four  pounders  from  the  fleet.  Admiral  Berkley,  in  reply  to  the 
request  for  twenty-four  pounders,  stated  that  no  ship  under  his  command  carried 
guns  of  so  heavy  a  nature;  but  offered  to  supply  twenty  eighteen  pounders, 
\with  carriages  and  ammunition  complete.!  It  would  be  difficult  to  £nd  now-a- 
<days  any  ship  in  any  fleet  with  guns  so  small  as  a  twenty-four  pounder = 

Now  it  has  been  proven,  or  made  probable,  that  it  is  practicable  to  put  on 
Aboard  ships,  carry  to  sea  with  safety,  and  manage  with  effect,  long  guns  with  a 
calibre  for  shot  of  one  hundred  and  thirty-five  pounds  at  least;  and  it  would  be 
as  reasonable  to  expect  a  fortification  which  was  built  to  resist  shot  of  eighteen 
or  twenty-four,  or  even  of  thirty-two  or  forty -two  pounds,  to  withstand  the  con- 
cussion of  shot  of  one  hundred  and  thirty-five  pounds  weight  as  it  would  be  to 

*  See  report  of  the  board  of  army  officers,  1840,  on  the  millitary  defences  of  the  coun- 
try— a  paper  that  is  drawn  with  great  ability,  and  to  which  I  shall  occasionally  refer.  It  is 
contained  in  Pub.  Doc.  No.  206,  House  of  Reps.,  1st  session  26th  Congress. 

f  Journal  of  Sieges  in  Spain  and  Portugal,  vol.  1,  p.  145. 


I 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  453 

expect  a  thirty-two  pounder  to  strike  harmlessly  against  a  wall  which  was  built 
only  to  resist  a  ten  pound  shot. 

In  1816  our  fortifications  had  to  be  provided  with  the  means  of  withstanding 
sieges.  Hence,  they  were  required  to  be  as  strong  in  the  rear  as  in  the  front, 
and  to  be  equally  invulnerable  from  every  direction.  But  now  steam  and  elec- 
tricity render  our  seaboard  fortifications  invulnerable  in  the  rear  and  protect 
them  against  sieges.  Attempts  to  cany  by  storm  may  be  made ;  but  as  for  an 
enemy  who  sees  and  understands,  as  the  leader  of  every  army  must  see  and 
understand,  the  powers  of  concentration  which  steam  gives  us — as  for  such  an 
enemy  to  think  of  setting  down  before  one  of  our  strongholds  and  proceeding 
regularly  to  invest  it,  by  executing  parallels,  building  fascines,  digging  trenches, ' 
throwing  up  enbankments,  making  approaches  and  the  like,  it  is  out  of  the 
question.  Our  railroads  perfectly  protect  the  entire  coast  line  from  Maine  to 
Georgia  from  any  such  attempt.  We  may  be  blockaded  by  sea,  and  harassed 
from  ships,  but  we  cannot  be  beleagured  on  the  land. 

These  are  the  changes  which  have  rendered  necessary  a  change  in  the  whole 
system  of  national  defence,  and  the  chief  stationary  works  of  defence  which  we 
now  want  along  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  are  those  that  will  protect  our  cities  and 
towns  from  the  great  guns  of  big  ships. 

We  may  admit,  in  imagination,  now,  a  dashing  enemy  again  into  the  Chesa- 
peake; we  may  suppose  him  landed,  with  all  his  forces,  and  to  be,  without  op- 
position, in  the  act  of  taking  up  his  line  of  march  again  for  this  city. 

Now,  is  it  not  obvious — supposing  the  country  to  be  in  a  reasonable  state  of 
reparation  at  the  commencement  of  war — supposing  this  much,  is  it  not  obvious, 
y  sending  telegraphic  messages,  and  using  the  powers  of  steam  for  conveyance, 
the  American  general  might  sit  down  here,  in  Washington,  and  at  daylight  the 
next  morning  commence  an  attack  upon  that  enemy,  both  in  front  and  in  rear, 
with  almost  any  amount  of  force,  consisting  of  regulars,  volunteers,  and  militia, 
that  can  be  named.  Ketreat,  for  such  a  foe,  would  be  out  of  the  question,  and 
re-embarkation  an  impossibility. 

Therefore,  so  far  as  the  system  of  1816  was  intended  to  defend  the  country 
from  invasion  along  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  steam,  railroads,  and  the  telegraph 
have  rendered  it  as  effete  as  did  the  invention  of  fire-arms  the  defences  which 
the  military  science  of  that  age  had  erected  against  the  shafts  of  the  archer. 

It  is  not  going  too  far  to  say  that,  as  for  invasion,  we  might  raze  every  forti- 
fication along  the  Atlantic  coast  without  exposing  the  country  to  the  danger  of 
being  overrun  by  an  enemy  in  war.  He  might,  in  such  a  case,  take  possession 
of  our  seaports,  destroy  our  dock  yards  and  arsenals,  and  do  an  incalculable 
amount  of  mischief,  but  as  for  his  venturing  to  leave  the  strongholds  on  the 
seabord,  and  attempting  to  penetrate,  even  for  a  few  miles  into  the  interior, 
would  be  out  of  the  question. 

He  would  be  besieged  from  the  moment  of  his  landing;  he  might  return  to 
us  our  cities  in  ruins,  our  dock  yards  in  ashes ;  but  as  for  invading  the  country, 
and  marching  his  armies  over  it  from  place  to  place,  our  steam  machines  forbid 
it.  Hence  I  maintain,  we  now  want  fortifications  only  to  do  what  railroads  and 
steam  never  can,  viz :  as  before  said,  to  protect  our  seaport  towns  from  the  great 
guns  of  big  ships. 

Suppose  the  system  of  1816  to  have  been  completed;  that  the  fortifications 
therein  contemplated  had  all  been  built,  provisioned,  equipped,  and  garrisoned. 
Now,  saving  only  those  which  protect  the  large  cities  from  the  guns  of  men-of- 
war,  suppose  the  alternative  should  be  presented  to  our  military  men,  whether 
they  would  undertake  to  defend  the  country  from  invasion,  with  such  a  complete 
system  of  fortifications,  but  without  the  assistance  of  railroads,  steamers,  and 
telegraph,  or  with  the  assistance  of  railroads,  steamers,  and  telegraph,  but  with- 
out the  aid  of  the  fortifications. 

I  suppose,  could  such  an  alternative  be  submitted  to  every  officer  of  the  army, 


454  FORTIFICATIONS  AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

from  the  oldest  down  to  the  youngest,  that  there  would  be  but  one  answer,  and 
that  would  be,  "  down  with  the  forts,  and  give  us  the  railroad,  the  locomotive, 
the  steamboat,  and  the  telegraph." 

I  do  not  mean  to  advance  the  opinion  that  railroads,  steam,  and  the  telegraph, 
with  the  military  powers  of  concentration  which  they  give  us,  have  rendered 
fortifications  entirely  useless.  By  no  means :  steam  and  electromagnetism  on 
the  land  can  do  but  little  against  the  tremendous  power  of  armed  ships  on  the 
water;  and  if  these  can  bring  any  one  of  our  large  cities  within  the  reach  of 
their  guns,  its  destruction  is  inevitable,  despite  all  that  the  powers  of  the  loco- 
our  motive  and  the  telegraph  can  do.  It  is  chiefly  to  keep  such  ships  from  burning 
cities  and  havens,  within  reach  of  their  broadsides,  that  we  want  forts  and  castles. 

Therefore  seeing  that,  in  1816,  when  the  present  system  of  defending  the 
coast  was  planned,  railroads  and  the  magnetic  telegraph  were  unknown,  they 
now  ought  to  involve  modifications  of  that  system.  In  military  operations  they 
are  powerful  auxiliaries.  They  introduce  new  elements  and  new  features  into 
the  arts  of  war;  they  bear  upon  the  whole  system  of  attack  and  defence. 
They,  therefore,  cannot  fail  to  make  necessary  certain  modifications  in  any 
system  of  coast  defence  which  was  planned  without  regard  to  them. 

With  this  exposition  of  my  views,  I  proceed  to  answer  your  first  question,  viz : 

"1.  To  what  extent,  if  any,  ought  the  present  system  of  fortifications  for  the 
protection  of  our  seaboard  to  be  modified,  in  consequence  of  the  application  of 
steam  to  vessels-of-war,  the  invention  or  improvement  of  projectiles,  or  other 
changes  that  have  taken  place  since  it  was  adopted  in  the  year  1816  ?" 

Let  us  first  consider  the  modification  applicable  to  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  and 
then  those  that  are  applicable  to  the  Pacific. 

The  only  fortifications  that  are  wanted  along  our  Atlantic  seaboard,  except 
those  at  Key  West  and  the  Tortugas,  at  Ship  island,  and  at  one  or  two  more 
such  places,  are  those  which  will  protect  our  cities  and  towns  from  the  broad- 
sides of  men-of-war. 

The  forts  already  completed,  or  well  advanced  towards  completion,  are  believed 
to  be  sufficient  for  this.  They  should,  however,  be  mounted  with  heavier  ordnance, 
and  pieces  of  the  most  effective  calibre  for  throwing  explosive  shot  and  shells. 

In  1840,  the  House  of  Representatives,  by  resolution  of  April  9th,  called 
upon  the  War  Department  for  a  report — among  other  things,  "  of  a  full  and  con- 
nected system  of  national  defence." 

The  subject  was  referred  to  a  board  of  engineer  officers,  who  presented  their 
views  in  a  masterly  manner.  I  have  before  referred  to  this  well-drawn  paper, 
and  shall  have  frequent  occasion  to  refer  to  it  again.  That  report  sustains  the 
system  of  1816.  The  source  whence  it  comes  entitles  it  to  far  more  weight  than 
is  attached  to  any  of  my  opinions.  Nevertheless,  honestly  differing  with  that 
board  in  some  of  its  positions,  I  hope  I  may  be  permitted  to  express  that  differ- 
ence of  opinion  without  laying  myself  liable  to  the  charge,  from  any  quarter, 
of  want  of  respect  for  the  distinguished  officers  who  composed  that  board. 

That  report,  which  is  by  far  the  most  able  paper  that  I  have  seen  in  favor  of 
the  system  of  1816,  does  not  contemplate  any  guns  for  our  fortifications  heavier 
than  a  forty -two  pounder,  or  an  eight-inch  howitzer ;  of  course  I  speak  techni- 
cally, and  do  not  allude  to  mortars. 

It  may  be  considered  as  a  fact  pretty  well  established,  that  two  or  three  ex- 
plosive nine  or  ten-inch  shells,  well  aimed  and  properly  planted,  are  enough  to 
tear  out  the  side  of  the  largest  ship,  and  completely  to  disable,  if  not  wholly  to 
destroy  her. 

I  quote  from  the  experiments  made  with  nine-inch  explosive  shot,  in  the  har- 
bor of  Brest,  upon  the  Pacificateur,  an  eighty-gun  ship.* 

c'Vide  an  account  of  experiments  made  in  the  French  navy  for  the  trial  of  shell  guns, 
&c.,  by  J.  H.  Paixhan's  Lieutenant  Colonel— translated  from  the  French  by  Lieutenant 
John  A.  Dahlgren,  U.  S.  N. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  455 

The  piece  to  be  fired  was  mounted  on  a  small  pontoon,  and  planted  off  upon 
the  water  to  the  distance  of  about  six  hundred  and  forty  yards  from  the  eighty- 
gun  ship,  which  was  to  be  the  target. 

The  experiments  were  made  in  the  presence  of  a  number  of  the  most  eminent 
officers  in  the  French  navy. 

The  first  shot  sufficed  to  determine  opinions;  but,  to  complete  the  evidence, 
twelve  shots  were  fired. 

The  following  is  a  summary  from  the  official  report  on  the  occasion : 

"  The  first  shot  struck  low,  and,  as  soon  as  the  explosion  was  heard  the 
commission  repaired  on  board.  A  thick  smoke  filled  the  between  decks,  where 
the  bomb  had  burst.  The  fire  engine  was  worked  and  the  smoke  lasted  ten  or 
twelve  minutes ;  the  bomb  had  made  a  breach  of  eight  and  a  half  inches  in  di- 
ameter in  the  ship's  side,  which  there  was  twenty-nine  inches  thick;  it  had 
torn  off  two  feet  of  the  inner  plank  and  then  exploded ;  made  a  hole  in  the  orlop 
deck  of  two  to  three  feet  square,  kncoked  away  and  shattered  to  atoms  more 
than  one  hundred  and  sixty  square  feet  of  timber. 

"  The  second  gun  traversed  the  quarter-deck,  carrying  with  it  two  peices  of 
plank,  one  of  which  was  five  and  a  quarter  feet  long,  then  striking  the  mainmast 
obliquely,  it  knocked  off  a  splinter  from  three  to  four  feet  long  and  nine  and  a 
half  inches  thick,  and  bursting,  tore  away  a  mast  band  ten  and  a  half  feet  in 
circumference,  weighing  one  hundred  and  thirty  pounds ;  this  mass  of  iron  was 
driven  with  such  a  force  that  one  of  its  halves  struck  the  opposite  bulwark,  sev- 
enteen feet  distant,  where  it  flattened  and  adhered.  The  splinters  of  the  bomb 
shattered  the  bitts,  cut  some  of  the  braces,  and  would  have  injured  many  men 
and  articles  of  rigging  if  the  ship  had  been  equipped.  The  explosion  also  set 
fire  to  a  coil  of  rope. 

"  The  third  bomb  entered  the  side,  between  two  ports,  struck  and  tore  off  an 
oaken  knee  seven  feet  five  inches  long  and  six  and  a  half  to  thirteen  and  three- 
quarter  inches  thick,  which,  with  its  iron  fastenings,  weighed  more  than  two  hun- 
dred and  six  pounds ;  then  bursting,  its  splinters  knocked  down  forty  of  the 
wooden  figures  nailed  around  the  guns  to  represent  men.  The  explosion  also 
shattered  one  of  the  beams  supporting  the  cfeck  above,  starting  several 
planks,  one  of  which  was  ten  and  a  half  feet  long,  and  another  five  and  a  quarter 
feet,"  &c. 

"To  abridge  this  detail,  I  will,"  says  the  reporter,  "only  refer  to  the  two 
most  remarkable  shots  of  the  remaining  nine. 

"  Perceiving  that  the  bombs  always  passed  through  the  side  of  the  vessel, 
the  charge  of  the  gun  was  diminished  each  time.  With  four  and  a  half  pounds 
of  powder,  and  always  at  six  hundred  and  forty  yards,  a  bomb  struck  in  the 
wood,  between  two  ports,  and  burst,  tearing  away  the  frame  and  planking,  and 
making  a  breach  of  several  feet  in  height  and  width,  so  shattered  that  all  pre- 
sent thought  that  the  shot  would  have  endangered  the  vessel  had  it  taken  effect 
near  the  water-line. 

"  Besides  this,  two  pieces  of  the  iron  work,  weighing  sixteen  pounds,  were 
driven  in  board  by  the  force  of  the  explosion,  and  nineteen  figures  knocked 
down. 

"  Finally,  the  twelfth  and  last  bomb,  with  the  same  small  charge  and  at  the 
same  distance,  struck  the  corner  of  a  port,  knocked  away  a  heavy  piece  of  iron 
work,  and  lodged  on  the  other  side  of  the  ship  against  an  iron  knee  five  and  a 
quarter  inches  in  size  and  firmly  supported ;  the  blow  made  three  fissures  in 
the  iron,  two  of  which  were  four  and  a  quarter  inches  thick ;  and  the  bbmo 
still  unbroken  buried  itself  further  in  the  side,  burst,  and  knocked  down  twenty 
figures." 

As  to  the  havoc  made  upon  a  ship  by  these  projectiles,  the  French  commis- 


456  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

sion  was  of  opinion  that  it  was  "  so  terrible  and  so  great  that  it  is  thought  that 
one  or  two  bombs  of  this  kind  bursting  in  a  battery  would  make  such  confusion 
as  to  cause  the  surrender  of  the  vessel,  or  at  least  conduce  materially  to  it;"  and 
"to  produce,  by  the  power  of  the  bomb  and  its  splinters,  such  damage  in  the 
frame  that  if  the  explosion  should  take  place  near  the  water-line  the  vessel 
would  probably  sink.  There  is  no  doubt  on  this  subject,"  it  was  added,  "  as 
may  evidently  be  perceived  from  the  result  of  bomb  No.  — ,  which,  had  it  struck 
a  few  feet  lower,  would  certainly  have  done  irreparable  mischief," 

That  any  ship  "  must  unavoidably  give  over  the  attack  on  being  struck  with 
a  few  shells." 

"  That  it  would  be  very  useful  to  mount  these  guns  either  on  floating  pon- 
toons, gunboats  with  sweeps,  or  steamers  ;  and  it  is  thought  that  for  the  defence 
of  roads  and  coasts,  or  for  attacking  ships  in  a  calm,  or  on  a  lee  shore,  the 
success  of  the  bomb  cannon  would  be  infallible." 

Furthermore,  that  commission  of  distinguished  men  also  expressed  the  unani- 
mous opinion  "  that  these  shell  guns  would  be  of  incalculable  utility  in  coast 
batteries,  gunboats,  or  launches,  bombardment,  floating  batteries,  steamers,"  &c. 

The  subject  was  brought  before  the  Academy  of  Science,  and  the  opinion  of 
the  board  were  indorsed  by  that  body  after  full  deliberation. 

Subsequently  a  second  trial  was  made  upon  the  same  ship  in  the  presence  of 
another  board  of  officers,  with  like  results.  This  board,  after  a  full  discussion 
as  to  the  effect  of  these  shells,  gave  it  as  their  opinion  likewise,  that  "their  power 
is  so  terrible  that  should  one  or  two  bombs  of  this  kind  burst  in  a  battery,  the 
vessel  would  be  rendered  untenable ;  that  the  explosion  of  a  bomb  in  the  frame 
of  a  ship  would  be  productive  of  great  mischief;  and  if  this  occur  at  the 
water-line,  the  vessel  must  founder,  as  may  be  inferred  from  the  effect  of  bomb 
No.  8." 

Respecting  the  use  of  this  kind  of  ordnance  in  fortifications  the  commission 
were  unanimously  of  the  opinion  that  these  guns  are  capable  of  prodigious  effect 
in  coast  batteries,  as  no  ship  of  any  force  could  possibly  w  ithstand  such  a  Jire 
at  640  guns  or  1,300  yards ;  that  it  will  also  be  desirable  to  mount  the  new 
artillery  on  floating  batteries,  launches,  gunboats,  or  steamers  ;  and  it  is  believed 
that  the  bomb  cannon  is  well  adapted  to  the  defence  of  roads  and  coasts,  the 
attack  of  ships  in  a  calm,  or  on  a  lee  shore,"  &c. 

Moreover,  the  experiments  which  have  been  conducted  by  the  Bureau  of  Ord- 
nance and  Hydrography  of  the  United  States  navy,  show  that  guns  of  this  heavy 
calibre  will  carry  further  and  truer,  and  penetrate  deeper  than  32-pounders ;  and, 
therefore,  considering  that  the  navies  of  the  world  are  substituting  these  heavy 
guns,  whenever  they  can,  for  the  old  32-pounders,  and  considering  that  it  is 
ships,  and  not  sieges,  that  our  fortifications  are  to  be  called  upon  to  withstand, 
it  appears  to  me  it  would  be  both  prudent  and  judicious  so  to  modify  the  plan 
of  1816  as  to  furnish  our  forts,  as  far  as  practicable,  with  heavy  ordnance,  all  of 
the  most  effective  and  destructive  kind. 

Whether  a  ship's  battery,  throwing  10-inch  solid  shot,  would  not  readily 
breach  the  walls  of  our  strongest  forts  is  worthy  of  inquiry.  The  concussion 
from  such  a  broadside  would  be  tremendous.  It  is  true  there  are  no  ships  at 
present  that  can  throw  such  a  broadside,  yet  it  is  thought  practicable  and  de- 
sirable by  navy  officers  to  build  such  ships,  and  experiments  have  been  made 
which  leave  no  doubt  that  such  ships  will  be  built.  Whether  our  ramparts  on 
shore  could  withstand  such  ordnance  is  not  for  me  to  say.  I  therefore  suggest 
the  inquiry. 

It  is  a  curious  fact  that,  as  a  general  rule,  the  fire  of  large  forts  has  always 
been  proportionally  less  destructive  than  those  mounting  only  a  few  guns,  and 
having  those  in  barbette,  in  open  battery,  either  with  or  without  breastworks. 
This  may  be  accounted  for  by  the  smoke;  for  wild  firing  applies  not  only  to 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  457 

the  guns  of  a  fort,  mounted  in  casemates,  but  also  to  the  guns  of  double-decked 
ships. 

A  single  broadside  from  the  gun-deck  of  a  man-of-war  will  so  fill  her  between 
decks  with  smoke  as  to  render  the  object  at  which  she  is  firing  invisible,  and 
consequently,  unless  she  will  wait  for  her  own  smoke  to  clear  off,  which  requires 
some  time,  the  rest  of  her  firing,  as  all  sea  fights  prove,  is  without  aim,  very 
much  by  guess,  and  therefore  to  little  purpose. 

The  same  is  the  case  with  guns  fired  from  casemates  of  forts  on  shore,  for  in 
no  other  way  can- we  account  for  the  random  firing;  the  very  shots,  in  proportion 
to  the  whole  number  cast,  that  tell  in  the  engagements  of  double-decked  ships 
and  casemated  forts. 

Two  frigates  or  two  seventy-fours  will  engage  each  other  within  pistol  shot, 
or  a  fleet  will  attack  a  fort,  and  when  we  come  to  count  the  shot  that  have  been 
fired,  and  to  compare  those  that  have  told  with  those  that  have  been  thrown 
away,  and  then  recollect  the  size  of  the  target,  we  are  astonished. 

In  the  action  between  the  Constitution  and  the  Guerriere,  which  lasted  for 
about  half  an  hour,  the  two  ships  being  within  pistol  shot,  the  former  sufferred 
"  very  little  in  her  hull,  and  lost  but  seven  men."* 

In  the  fight  between  the  United  States  and  Macedonian,  the  two  ships  were 
at  close  quarters  for  one  hour.  The  former  had  five  men  killed.  "  The  United 
States,"  says  the  same  authority,  "  suffered  surprisingly  little,  considering  the 
length  of  the  cannonade." 

In  the  case  of  the  Constitution  and  the  Java,  the  action  lasted  two  hours. 
The  Constitution  lost  nine  men,  and  only  "  received  a  few  round  shot  in  her 
hull."  Perhaps  in  this  time  the  Java  did  not  fire  less  than  two  thousand  shot, 
and  fifty  of  them,  well  placed  in  the  hull  of  her  antagonist,  would  have  sunk  her. 

The  Hornet  and  the  Peacock  were  single-decked  ships ;  their  smoke  would 
clear,  and  the  Hornet  could  see  to  take  aim.  In  less  than  fifteen  minutes  she 
sunk  her  antagonist. 

In  the  battle  of  the  Nile,  where  seventy-fours  were  principally  engaged,  and 
they  in  smooth  water  at  anchor,  and  close,  too,  lasted  through  a  part  of  three 
days.  (No  firing  here  like  the  Hornet's,  though  her  target  was  so  small  in 
comparison.  The  secret  is,  she  fired  with  aim;  they,  blinded  in  smoke,  without.) 

The  action  between  the  Wasp  and  the  Frolic,  also  -  single-decked  vessels, 
lasted  forty-three  minutes,  in  which  time  the  killed  and  wounded  aboard  the 
Frolic  amounted  to  between  ninety  and  one  hundred.  These  small  vessels  are 
more  unsteady  in  a  sea-way  than  large  ones;  they  do  not  offer  so  large  a  target, 
and  yet  their  fire  is  so  destructive.  How  else  is  it  to  be  accounted  for  1 

In  the  battle  of  Trafalgar,  which  was  of  long  duration,  and  mostly  between 
ships-of-the  line,  the  loss  was  only  about  six  men  to  every  ten  guns  engaged, 
not  one-tenth  part  of  what  it  was  in  the  action  of  the  Wasp. 

The  use  that  I  intend  to  make  of  these  facts  may  be  objected  to,  on  the 
ground  that  I  deduce  a  principle  from  the  sea  and  apply  it  to  the  land,  viz : 
that,  because  at  sea,  guns  fired  in  the  open  air  are  much  more  destructive  than 
those  about  which  the  decks  confine  the  smoke,  it  does  not  follow  that  guns, 
when  served  from  behind  sand  bags  or  mud  banks  on  shore,  are  more  destructive 
than  they  would  be  if  served  in  casemates,  by  a  crew  blinded  with  smoke.  I 
will  quote  cases  directly  in  point :  our  army  in  Mexico,  with  guns  behind  sand 
bags,  battered  down  the  walls  of  Vera  Cruz,  and  lost  only  some  half  dozen  men 
in  the  siege. 

At  the  battle  of  Fuenterabia,  in  1836,  the  town,  with  two  guns  of  small  calibre 
behind  an  old  wall,  and  a  third  of  large  calibre,  which  was  added  on  the  evening 

*  Cooper's  Naval  History. 


458  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

of  the  attack,  was  successfully  defended  for  a  whole  day  from  a  combined  attack 
of  British  and  Spaniards,  in  six  armed  steamers  and  a  number  of  gunboats.* 

Then  there  was  the  famous  case  of  the  Martello  tower,  in  the  bay  of  Martello, 
in  Corsica ;  one  heavy  gun,  on  the  top  of  a  tower,  beat  off  in  1794  "  one  or  two 
British  ships-of-war,  without  sustaining  any  material  injury  from  their  fires.'* 

"  This  circumstance,"  says  Colonel  Pasley,  in  his  rules  for  conducting  the 
practical  operations  of  a  siege,  "  ought  merely  to  have  proved  the  superiority 
which  guns  on  shore  must  always,  in  certain  situations,  possess  over  those  of 
shipping,  no  matter  whether  the  former  are  mounted  on  a  tower  or  not" 

This  is  quoted  with  approbation  by  Colonel  Totten,  in  his  celebrated  report 
of  1840,  as  an  example  of  the  superiority  of  forts  over  ships.  But  it  appears  to 
me  only  to  prove  and  beautifully  to  illustrate  the  superiority  of  one  gun,  so 
mounted  that  it  can  fire  wit/i  aim,  over  many  guns  that  are  enveloped  in  smoke, 
and  fired  without  aim. 

But  if  this  Martello  case  affords  grounds  really  for  the  "just  decision"  claimed 
by  these  two  distinguished  military  authorities,  then  why  have  any  forts  at  all  ? 
Why  should  our  army  engineers  advocate  so  elaborately  in  1836,  and  with  so 
much  ingenuity  in  1840,  the  continuance  of  the  system  of  1816,  if  one  gun  on 
shore,  "  whether  mounted  on  a  tower  or  not,"  can  and  ought  to  beat  off  "  one  or 
two  British  ships-of-war  ?"  May  I  not,  therefore,  in  proposing  to  reply,  in  part, 
upon  open  batteries  on  the  shore  for  coast  defence,  urge  the  modification  as  a 
thing  proved  by  actual  experiment,  and,  by  legitimate  conclusion,  quote  in  favor 
of  such  modification  the  opinion  of  our  most  distinguished  engineers  1  We  can 
never  expect  our  works  on  the  seashore  to  have  anything  stronger  to  resist  than 
"  British  ships-of-war;"  and  if  one  gun,  in  open  battery  on  the  shore,  "whether 
mounted  on  a  tower  or  not,"  be  superior  to  "  one  or  two"  of  those  ships,  surely 
our  seaport  towns  of  second  and  third  rate  importance  may  safely  rely  upon 
open  batteries  on  the  beach  to  protect  them  from  "  British"  or  any  other  "  men- 
of-war." 

Colonel  Jones,  another  authority  of  equal  weight  in  military  matters,  quotes 
Nelson's  attack  upon  Copenhagen,  Sir  John  Duckworth's  daring  passage  of  the 
Dardannelles,  the  attack  at  Acre  in  1840,  and  Lord  Exmouth's  cannonade  of 
Algiers,  as  cases  which  lead  to  the  supposition  that  land  batteries  cannot  resist 
an  attack  by  fleets.  The  Queen  Charlotte,  bearing  Lord  Exmouth's  flag,  being 
brought  within  fifty  yards  of  the  Mole,  at  Algiers,  "  poured  such  an  irresistible 
fire  on  the  works  around,"  says  Colonel  Jones,  "  as  to  silence  every  gun,  and 
was  ultimately  compelled  to  withdraw,  with  the  loss  of  only  eight  men  killed 
and  one  hundred  and  thirty-one  wounded." 

The  sides  of  a  ship  are  of  wood;  it  is  combustible,  the  walls  of  a  fort  are  not; 
and  on  board  ships  in  a  fight  it  is  the  splinters  that  do  the  mischief.  One  gun, 
even  in  open  battery  on  the  shore,  has  greatly  the  advantage  of  one  gun  on 
board  ship.  The  former  can  take  better  aim,  has  nothing  to  fear  from  splinters, 
and  presents  a  very  small  target;  whereas  it  has  the  whole  ship,  with  all  its 
vulnerability  for  a  target.  But  as  to  the  superiority  of  ships  over  forts,  it 
appears  to  me  there  is  scarcely  room  for  the  question;  each  in  its  own  sphere  is 
superior  to  the  other. 

And  that  the  Queen  Charlotte  should  silence  the  mole  battery,  is  to  be  ac- 
counted for  upon  the  principle  of  firing  with  and  without  aim.  She  was  within 
fifty  yards  of  it ;  it  therefore  occupied  nearly  or  quite  one-half  of  her  horizon, 
and  she  could  not  miss  it,  it  was  so  large.  In  comparison  to  the  fort  she  was  a 
small  target,  and  it  required  some  attention  to  aim  to  hit  her ;  but  the  smoke  on 
both  sides  prevented  this. 

Therefore,  supposing  that  in  the  attacks  of  ships  against  forts,  the  guns  on 
each  side  be  served  with  equal  bravery,  the  question  of  superiority  resolves 

*  Colonel  Totten' s  Report  on  National  Defence,  1840,  Doc.  No.  206,  page  16. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  459 

itself  almost  entirely  into  a  question  of  marksmanship.  A.  shot  that  is  fired 
without  aim  is  generally  a  shot  thrown  away, 

Nevertheless,  the  gallant  colonel  very  properly  cautions  the  "  engineer 
charged  with  the  defences  of  maintaining  a  fortress,  so  to  arrange  his  batteries 
that  the  defence  may  be  from  several  points  distant  from  each  other,  armed  with 
fifty-six  pounders  as  the  lowest  calibre." 

The  system  of  1816,  according  to  the  report  of  the  board  of  army  officers  in 
1840,  does  not  contemplate  a  single  gun  heavier  than  a  forty -two  pounder,  or  an 
eight-inch  howitzer.  It  contemplates  mortars,  but  mortars  against  ships  and 
random  shots. 

Previous  to  the  attack  of  the  junk  ships  in  1782,  Gibraltar  resisted  a  bom- 
bardment for  two  years.* 

In  1789,  Admiral  Rodney  threw  into  Havre  de  Grace  19,000  heavy  shells, 
and  1,150  carcasses,  in  fifty-two  hours,  "  to  destroy  a  few  boats."t 

In  1792,  the  Duke  of  Saxe  Tessehen  threw  into  Lille,  in  one  hundred  and 
forty  hours,  "without  effect,  30,000  hot  shot  and  six  hundred  shells."f 

In  1795,  Pichegree  threw  3,000  shells  into  Manheim,  and  5,000  into  the  Fort 
of  the  Bhine.§ 

In  1807,  at  Copenhagen,  in  three  days  of  partial  heavy  firing,  6,412  shells, 
besides  carcasses  were  thrown.])  All  these  were  thrown  to  no  purpose. 

At  Fort  Browne,  on  the  Rio  Grande,  our  men  dodged  the  shells  thrown  by 
the  Mexicans  from  Matamoras. 

At  Fort  McHenry  "the  bomb  bursting  in  air"  furnished  the  poet  with  a 
stanzas ;  they  produced  no  other  effect. 

Bonaparte's  opinion  of  them  may  be  learned  from  the  instructions  which  he 
caused  to  be  issued  to  the  governors  of  besieged  towns. 

"Quant  aux  effets  des  bombes,  et  des  autres  projectiles  incendiaires,  nous  ex- 
aminerons  plus  tard,  les  moyens  de  les  diminuer ;  mais  nous  observerons  des  ce 
moment,  qu'ils  n'ont  jamais  contraint  une  place,  bien  defendue  ase  rendre.  Les 
anciens  sieges,  en  offrent  la  preuve;  et  les  examples  tout  reens  de  Lille,  de 
Theonville,  et  de  Mayence,  la  confoiment." 

Therefore  let  us  modify  the  system,  so  far  as  most  of  the  mortars  and  all  the 
6,309  pieces  of  ordnance,  from  a  twelve  up  to  a  long  forty-two  pounder,  required 
by  the  plan  of  1816,  are  concerned,  and  substitute  for  them  the  heavy  calibres 
of  the  present  day — -the  .nine,  ten,  and  eleven-inch  solid  shot  and  shell  guns. 

Taking  the  Martello  tower  for  our  guide,  let  us  also,  instead  of  building  forts 
of  the  second  and  third  class,  contemplated  in  the  system  of  1816,  send  to  every 
town  along  the  seaboard,  that  an  enemy  could  reach  in  his  ships,  one  or  more 
heavy  pieces,  and  plant  them  there  in  open  battery  upon  the  beach,  for  the  de- 
fence of  the  place,  "no  matter  whether  they  be  mounted  in  a  tower  or  not." 

By  a  proper  organization,  easy  to  be  effected  and  kept  up  without  any  draft 
upon  the  treasury  whatever,  except  for  powder  and  ball  to  practice,  volunteer 
crews  for  these  guns  may  be  procured  from  the  towns  themselves.  Well-trained 
officers  of  the  army  should  be  sent  'to  instruct  them.  In  such  hands  each  gun  so 
planted  and  served  out  in  the  open  air,  having  an  embankment  or  a  few  sand- 
bags for  protection,  will  be  more  than  a  match  for  "two  British  ships-of-war." 

Sir  Sidney  Smith,  whose  dashing  gallantry  and  skilful  bravery  have  been  so 
much  admired,  attacked  and  felt  the  force  of  one  of  these  open  batteries  in  1806. 
He  was  in  the  Pompee,  an  eighty-gun  ship,  and  accompanied  by  two  frigates  ; 
he  anchored  about  seven  hundred  yards  from  a  battery  of  two  guns,  situated  on 
the  extremity  of  Cape  Licosa. 

"  The  line-of-battle-ship  and  frigates  fired  successive  broadsides  till  their  am- 
munition was  nearly  expended;  the  battery  continually  replying  with  a  slow 

°Sir  J.  T.  Jones's  Journal  of  Sieges  in  Spain,  vol.  II,  page  374. 
Ibid.  JIbid.  §Ibid.  l|Ibid. 


460  FOKTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

but  destructive  effect.  The  Pompe'e,  at  which  ship  alone  it  directed  its  fire,  had 
forty  shot  in  her  hull ;  her  mizzentopmast  carried  away;  a  lieutenant,  midship- 
man, and  five  men  killed,  and  thirty  men  wounded.  At  length,  force  proving 
ineffectual,  negotiation  was  resorted  to,  and  after  some  hours'  parley,  the  officer, 
a  Corsican,  and  a  relation  of  Napoleon,  capitulated.  It  then  appeared  that  the 
carriage  of  one  of  the  two  guns  had  failed  on  the  second  shot,  and  the  gun  had 
consequently  been  fired  lying  on  the  sill  of  the  embrasure ;  so  that,  in  fact,  the 
attack  of  an  eighty-gun  ship  and  tivo  frigates  had  been  resisted  by  a  single 
piece  of  ordnance"* 

Whatever  Napoleon's  cousin  could  do  with  a  gun,  our  officers,  our  soldiers, 
and  the  yeoman  of  this  country  can  do  as  well. 

This  turning  out  of  the  citizens  to  defend  their  town,  with  a  gun  in  open  battery, 
against  the  attack  of  ships-of-war,  is  no  experiment  with  us.  The  thing  has 
been  handsomely,  gallantly,  and  successfully  done. 

"  The  affair  of  Stonington,"  says  General  Totten  in  his  report  of  1840, 
"  during  the  last  war,  affords  another  instance  of  successful  defences  by  a  battery . 
In  this  case  there  were  only  two  guns  (eighteen  pounders)  in  a  battery  which 
was  only  three  feet  high,  and  with  embrasures.  The  battery  being  manned  ex- 
clusively by  citizen  volunteers  from  the  town,  repelled  a  persevering  attack  of  a 
sloop-of-war,  causing  serious  loss  and  danger,  but  suffering  none." 

In  the  war  of  1828,  between  Peru  and  Columbia,  I  was  serving  on  the  Pacific 
station.  Admiral  Guise,  a  dashing  officer  and  brave  Scotchman,  attacked  the 
city  of  Guayaquil  with  the  Peruvian  squadron,  which  consisted  of  a  frigate,  a 
sloop-of-war,  and  several  brigs  and  schooners.  The  approaches  to  the  city  were 
undefended.  He  took  up  his  position  without  molestation  within  musket  shot 
of  it  and  commenced  his  fire. 

Under  cover  of  the  dark  the  besieged  threw  up  an  embankment,  and  planting 
two  or  three  field-pieces  behind  it  opened  a  fire  upon  the  ships  at  daylight,  killed 
the  admiral,  and  beat  off  his  squadron. 

The  annals  of  war,  the  written  arguments  of  the  most  distinguished  officers 
of  the  engineer  corps,  and  the  facts  which  I  shall  state,  afford,  to  my  judgment 
and  reason,  ample  grounds  for  the-  position  which  I  maintain  as  to  the  dispensing 
with  fortifications,  in  a  large  majority  of  cases,  along  the  seaboard ;  and  of 
substituting  therefor  a  few  pieces  of  this  new,  heavy,  and  destructive  ordnance, 
without  the  protection  of  any  mason  work  whatever.  If  these  facts,  annals, 
and  arguments  do  not  impress  conviction  upon  your  mind  as  strongly  as  they 
do  upon  mine,  it  is  not  because  of  their  insufficiency — but  because,  in  attempting 
to  apply  and  illustrate  them,  I  have  obscured  their  bearing  and  weakened  their 
force. 

"  The  fortifications  of  the  coast,"  says  the  board  of  army  officers,  whose  able 
report  of  1840  quieted  the  public  mind,  and  fastened  for  ten  years  longer  upon 
the  country  the  effete  system  of  1816  ;  "The  fortifications  of  the  coast,"  say 
they,  "  must  be  competent  to  the  double  task  of  interdicting  the  passage  of  ships 
and  resisting  land  attacks — two  distinct  and-  independent  qualities.  The  first 
demands  merely  an  array  in  suitable  numbers  and  in  proper  proportions  of 
heavy  guns,  covered  by  parapets,  proof  against  shot  and  shells"} 

Now  I  propose  to  show  that  the  railroads  and  the  means  of  locomotion  in 
this  country  sufficiently  defend  our  fortifications  from  land  attacks ;  and  that 
consequently  the  principal  requisite  henceforward  in  a  system  of  fortifications 
for  the  coast,  is  merely  an  array  in  suitable  numbers  and  in  proper  proportions 
of  heavy  guns  along  the  beach  to  cover  the  approaches  of  ships  from  sea  to 
seaport  towns. 

*  Journal  of  Sieges. — Colonel  Jones. 
fPage  41,  Doc.  206,  House  Rep.,  1st  session  26th  Congress. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


461 


To  support  the  propositions  taken  by  General  Totten  in  favor  of  the  system 
of  1816,  both  in  his  report  of  1840  and  1836,  there  was  a  table  in  the  latter 
estimating  the  number  of  men  that,  according  to  the  census  of  1830,  could  be 
concentrated  in  Boston,  Newport,  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Norfolk,  Baltimore, 
Charleston,  Savannah,  and  New  Orleans  in  eleven  days. 

This  table  was  made  the  basis  of  important  deductions  in  favor  of  the  present 
system ;  and  as  the  state  of  things  now  is  so  entirely  different  from  what  it  was 
then,  I  quote  the  table  in  order  to  show  that  the  changes  which  have  taken 
place  in  our  means  of  concentrating  and  moving  forces  in  war  leave  abundant 
room  for  many  modifications  in  the  old  system  of  1816. 

TABLE  P.* 

Exhibiting  tJie  amount  of  militia  force  that  may  be  concentrated  at  Boston, 
Newport,  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Norfolk,  Baltimore,  Charleston,  Savan- 
nah, and  New  Orleans  successively,  from  the  first  to  the  eleventh  day;  each 
day's  march  being  computed  atffteen  miles—founded  on  the  census  of  1830. 


Days. 

Boston. 

Newport, 

New  York. 

Philadel- 

Norfolk. 

Baltimore. 

Charles- 

Savannah. 

New  Or- 

R. I. 

phia. 

ton. 

leans. 

1 

5,422 

1,397 

20,218 

26,132 

1,864 

10,046 

2,513 

1,173 

3,032 

2 

28,351 

2,373 

28,131 

26,521 

2,880 

18,042 

7,160 

3,960 

7,836 

3 

34,  138 

12,340 

44,123 

35,450 

4,416 

21,266 

9,475 

5,948 

8,716 

4 

39,561 

17,  143 

57,925 

69,  100 

7,608 

27,916 

14,601 

6,588 

12,499 

5 

49,127 

33,221 

59,4^8 

70,608 

11,101 

31,897 

18,  443 

9,263 

14,474 

6 

59,893 

42,807 

81,252 

127,666 

14,511 

49,648 

22,490 

19,725 

17,339 

7 

81,867 

61,335 

104,180 

154,036 

20,699 

65,382 

24,393 

21,903 

17,906 

8 

97,697 

65,583 

137,048 

167,703 

28,039 

77,543 

29,416 

25,220 

22,561 

9 

111,655 

83,111 

152,841 

195,265 

32^562 

78,  164 

40,835 

36,630 

26,433 

10 

125,326 

109,268 

164,116 

219,983 

36,446 

87,520 

45,582 

41,345 

28,140 

il 

144,076 

130,824 

191,353 

221,603 

45,549 

101,970 

59,701 

60,42-2 

31,647 

This  possible  concentration  of  forces,  which  it  required  eleven  days  to  make 
in  1836,  may  be  now  doubled  and  trebled,  and  made  in  as  many  hours;  surely, 
therefore,  this  process  of  concentration — this  immense  artificial  military  aid 
which  steam  and  electricity  now  afford,  and  which  was  not  anticipated  nor 
counted  upon  in  1816,  when  the  foundations  of  the  system  were  laid ;  surely 
they,  by  protecting  our  forts  against  sieges,  call  for  modifications  and  suggest 
changes  which  it  would  be  wise  to  consider  and  prudent  to  make. 

In  this  country,  more  than  in  any  other,  the  genius  of  free  institutions  compels 
the  government  to  keep  pace  with  the  improvement  of  the  age.  The  people  do 
it,  and  they  are  the  government.  But  in  military  establishments  there  is  evi- 
dently a  disposition  to  lag  behind. 

"  In  1708  Marshal  Boufners,  by  authority  from  the  King,  given  on  the  advice 
of  the  most  experienced  generals  of  that  warlike  age,  ceded  the  strongest  fortress 
in  France  to  Prince  Eugene  and  the  Duke  of  Marlborough,  to  avoid  the  risk  of 
the  breaches  being  carried  by  storm ;  and  in  those  days  the  superiority  of  the 
assailants  was  never  doubted.  The  art  of  attack  has  since  that  period  received 
various  improvements,  and  the  art  of  defence  remains  the  same."! 

The  edition  from  which  I  quote  was  published  in  1846 — the  work  is  one  of 
acknowledged  authority  among  military  men — and  according  to  it,  it  would  be 
better  to  give  our  forts  away  than  actually  to  subject  them  to  a  siege.  Neither 
Vera  Cruz  nor  any  other  fort  in  Mexico  could  withstand  a  siege  from  us.  How 
important  therefore  is  it  that  we  should  introduce  in  our  system  of  coast  defences 


o  Page  71,  Doc.  293,  first  eession  twenty -fourth  Congress, 
f  See  Journal  of  Sieges  in  Spain,  vol.  2,  page  336. 


462 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


some  of  the  "various  improvements"  which  the  art  of  attack  has  received  since 
1708,  and  of  which  the  art  of  defence  has  received  so  few!  That  instead  of 
fighting  ships  from  batteries  of  old-fashioned  carroiiades,  long  twelves,  eighteens, 
and  twenty -fours ;  instead  of  the  old-fashioned  mortars,  which  Napoleon  put  his 
seal  against,  let  us  have  in  our  forts  the  improved  shell  guns  and  heavy  ordnance 
of  the  present  day,  which  will  plant  shot  and  shell  where  they  are  aimed,  and 
cany  destruction  to  a  distance  which  not  a  gun  with  which  our  forts  (according 
to  the  list  by  the  army  board  in  1840)  are  to  be  furnished  can  ever  reach. 

I  am  permitted  by  Commodore  Warrington  to  quote  from  experiments  which 
he  has  caused  to  be  made  in  naval  gunnery  at  the  Washington  navy  yard. 

These  experiments  are  going  on  there  daily ;  any  one  who  pleases  may  witness 
them.  I  cite  from  them  to  illustrate  the  position  I  maintain  as  to  the  destructive 
powers  of  this  new  and  heavy  ordnance,  the  accuracy  of  its  fire,  &c. 

The  figures  are  copied  from  the  note-book  of  Lieutenant  Dahlgren,  United 
States  navy,  the  officer  who  conducts  the  experiments. 

The  target  is  built  of  one  upright  and  two  horizontal  layers  of  stout  oak  logs, 
bolted  and  fastened  together  in  the  most  substantial  manner.  It  is  two  and  a 
half  feet  thick.  These  experiments  were  not  conducted  to  represent  the  effects 
of  this  heavy  ordnance  upon  forts  and  their  walls,  but  upon  wooden  walls  and 
the  sides  of  ships.  Therefore  shells  were  used  in  the  eight  and  nine-inch  pieces 
to  contrast  their  range  and  probable  effect  with  the  range  and  probable  effect  of 
a  solid  32-pound  shot. 

The  charge  of  powder  used  with  the  32-pound  shot  was  twenty-eight  per  cent, 
of  its  weight.  The  charge  used  with  the  two  shells  was  only  about  thirteen  per 
cent,  of  their  weight,  or,  in  proportion,  not  half  as  much  as  that  used  with  the 
solid  shot.  Figures  1,  2,  and  3  exhibit  a  horizontal  section  of  the  target,  made  to 
show  the  penetration  of  the  shot. 

Fig.  1. 


8-inch  shell,  seven  pounds  of  powder. 

The  penetration  of  the  8-inch  shell  was  the  least.  It  was  unloaded.  Had  it 
been  charged  it  would  have  been  lodged  in  the  best  place;  for,  exploding  in  the 
middle  of  the  target  built  to  represent  the  side  of  a  man-of-war,  it  would  have 
torn  it  to  pieces. 

Figure  2  is  the  32-pound  shot.  The  hole  that  it  leaves  behind  it  is  so  filled 
up  with  splinters  that  a  common  knitting-needle  cannot  be  thrust  in  after  it. 
Such  a  shot  as  figure  2  would  do  no  serious  hurt  to  a  ship's  side.  • 

Fig.  2. 


32-pounder  shot,  nine  pounds  of  powder. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


463 


Figure  3  is  the  9-inch  shell.  Here  the  shot 
went  through  and  dropped  down  on  the  other 
side  of  the  target,  as  shown  in  the  drawing.  It 
tore  off  the  logs  and  scattered  the  splinters  in 
the  most  frightful  manner.  Much  more  would 
it  have  gone  through  had  the  shot  been  solid 
instead  of  hollow,  and  had  it  been  fired  with 
a  full  instead  of  a  very  reduced  charge  of 
powder. 

These  big  hollow  shot,  and  the  bigger  the 
better,  are  the  things  for  our  forts  to  use 
against  ships ;  whereas  it  is  the  big  solid  shot 
that  ships  want  to  use  against  forts,  for  shells, 
after  striking,  are  apt  to  explode  without  pene- 
trating or  breaking  a  stone  wall. 

Figure  4  illustrates  a  common  example  of 
target  firing  in  the  open  air.  This  target  is 
not  one-fourth  the  size  of  that  presented  by 
the  cross  section  of  a  frigate.  One  nine  or 
ten-inch  shell  lodged  in  the  ship's  bows  as 
she  approaches,  and  exploding,  would  prob- 
ably sink  or  destroy  her.  Neither  of  the  two 
gentlemen  named  on  figure  4  (whose  balls 
were  so  well  planted)  ever  saw  a  shotted 
gun  fired  before.  They  pointed  and  aimed 
it  themselves;  and  it  is  a  fair  example  of 
what  an  unpracticed  eye  may  do  with  a  gun 
when  planted  where  it  may  be  fired  with  aim. 

Certainly  we  have  nothing  l^e  invasion  by 
sea  to  fear  from  any  nation  on  this  side  of  the 
water,  and  it  is  hardly  probable  that  any  of 
the  crowned  heads  on  the  other  side  would 
have  the  hardihood  to  send  into  this  country 
invading  armies  from  beyond  the  sea.  The 
very  air  we  breathe  protects  us  from  any 
such  liability.  It  is  free  air.  Our  republican 
institutions  are  dangerous  to  kings;  and,  in 
the  minds  of  the  kings,  the  effect  of  these 
institutions  upon  the  soldiers  of  royal  armies 
is  far  more  dreadful  than  would  be  the  sys- 
tem of  1816,  with  all  its  panoply  of  big  forts 
and  great  guns. 

It  is,  therefore,  that  our  forts  should  be  constructed  and  armed  almost  exclu- 
sively for  resisting  and  repelling  the  attack  of  ships. 

According  to  the  Paixhan  experiments  and  the  opinion  of  the  French  ofiicer, 
one  or  two  shot  from  an  eight-inch  gun  lodged  in  the  side  of  a  seventy-four 
would  disable  her.  What  would  be  the  effect,  therefore,  of  one  or  two;  twice  as 
large,  from  a  ten-inch  gun,  striking  a  frigate  or  a  steamer  ? 

In  turn,  and  per  contra,  suppose  the  battery  of  this  heavy  ordnance  intended 
to  keep  ships  off  from  all  our  towns,  except  the  principal  cities,  to  be  planted  on 
the  beach  without  any  support.  The  target  that  one  of  these  guns  and  its  crew 
would  expose  to  the  ship  is  very  small,  and  when  we  consider  the  English  mode 
of  firing,  and  their  sea  fights,  it  would  not  be  one  shot  in  a  hundred  that,  being 
fired  from  a  ship,  would  strike  such  a  target ;  her  own  smoke  would  conceal  it 
from  her.  It  affords  no  surface  for  splinters,  which  do  the  mischief.  So  that 


464 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


unless  the  shot  would  strike  the  gun  or  its  carriage,  and  there  is  no  necessity  of 
having  them  as  exposed  as  in  this  hypothetical  case  I  have  represented  them  to 
be,  a  shot  from  the  ship  might  pass,  even  among  the  men,  without  its  stiiking 
any  of  them,  and  consequently  without  doing  any  mischief. 

Fig.  4. 


Experimental  battery.     Practice  with  9-inch  shell  guns,  January  2,  1851. 


Screen,  550  yards.     Shell,  73  pounds.     Charges,  9£  pounds. 

Present :  Hon.  Mr.  Stanton  (chairman)  and  Hon.  Mr.  White,  (member,)  of  the  Naval  Com- 
mittee of  the  House  of  Kepresentatives.     Some  of  the  shot  were  fired  by  these  gentlemen. 
The  lower  shells  were  fired  with  the  quadrant,  (54',)  the  upper  by  the  sights  alone. 

On  accoun^of  the  above  recited  facts  and  circumstances,  on  account  of  the 
considerations  and  reasons  which  they  suggest,  I  propose,  in  answer  to  your 
first  question,  modifications  to  our  present  system  of  fortifications,  &c.,  in  the 
following  particulars,  to  wit : 

1st.  That  inasmuch  as  the  new  and  improved  heavy  ordnance  for  throwing 
shot,  both  hollow  and  solid,  has  a  longer  range,  gives  greater  accuracy,  and  is 
far  more  destructive  than  most  of  the  ordnance  with  which  our  forts  are  now 
furnished,  or  than  that  by  which,  according  to  the  report  of  1840,  it  is  intended 
to  furnish  them;  therefore,  I  recommend  that  most  of  this  ordnance  of  inferior 
range,  penetration,  accuracy,  and  destructiveness,  be  disposed  of;  that  the  sup- 
plies of  more  be  discontinued ;  and  that  the  new  and  improved  ordnance  be 
substituted  in  its  stead. 

I  would  not  recommend  that  any  of  the  old  ordnance  should  be  sold  or  melted 
down  until  the  supplies  of  the  new  are  completed,  or  nearly  so,  for  occasion 
may  arise,  before  we  can  be  completely  furnished  with  the  new,  when  the  old 
would  be  of  great  service. 

2d.  That  no  further  expenses  be  incurred  for  preparing  our  fortifications  along 
the  Atlantic  seaboard,  to  withstand  sieges  by  land. 

3d.  That  none  of  the  works  (except  those  in  Portsmouth  harbor)  proposed  in 
the  army  report  of  1840,*  table  D,  "as  works  to  be  first  commenced"  nor  in 
table  E,  as  "works  to  be  commenced  next  after  those  in  D;"  nor  in  table  F,  as 
"works  to  be  last  commenced,"  be  commenced  at  all. 

4th.  That  for  the  protection  of  the  towns,  villages,  and  landings,  therein  to 
be  provided  for,  one  or  more  pieces,  according  to  the  condition  of  the  place,  of 
the  most  effective  ordnance,  be  planted  at  suitable  points  behind  simple  embank- 
ments or  earthen  parapets. 

*  See  page  74-7,  Doc.  No.  206,  House  Kep.,  1st  session. 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES  465 

The  carnages  of  the  guns  so  mounted  should  be  constructed  with  the  view 
of  easy  transportation  from  one  point  to  another  along  the  shores  of  the  harbor 
to  be  defended ;  so  that  on  rails,  paved  or  plank  roads  built  for  the  purpose,  these 
pieces  might  in  fact  constitute  a  locomotive  battery  along  the  beach,  and  not 
leave  it,  as  all  shore-batteries  have  done,  entirely  optional  with  the  assailants  to 
choose  position.  As  far  as  the  defences  of  the  town  against  ships  are  concerned, 
this  improved  ordnance  may  thus  be  converted  into  a  sort  of  "flying  artillery." 

5th.  Instead  of  supporting  garrisons  at  the  public  expense,  in  times  of  peace, 
for  the  care  and  management  of  these  guns,  it  is  proposed  that  they  and  their 
munitions,  properly  secured,  be  given  in  charge  of  the  State,  or  of  the  authori- 
ties of  the  place  to  be  defended;  first  taking  such  legislative  steps  in  the  mat- 
ter as  will  induce  the  formation  of  one  or  more  volunteer  artillery  companies  at 
such  place  for  the  purpose  of  exercising  the  guns,  learning  the  practice,  keeping 
them  in  order,  and  ready  for  use,  &c. 

Officers  of  the  army  should  be  detailed  to  instruct  the  volunteers  thus  offer- 
ing, in  the  great  gun  exercise ;  to  examine  and  report  upon  the  state  of  these  com- 
panies and  batteries,  and  keep  the  government  informed,  at  all  times,  as  to  the 
efficiency  and  condition  of  each. 

The  whole  seaboard  defences  of  this  kind  should  be  classed  in  divisions,  each 
in  charge  of  an  artillery,  or  engineer  or  ordnance  officer  of  rank,  with  a  proper 
staff. 

The  headquarters  of  each  division  should  be  the  principal  place  in  it,  as  at 
Old  Point  for  one.  New  York  for  another,  Charleston,  Savannah,  New  Orleans, 
&c.,  for  others.  Each  of  these  places  should  be  provided  with  the  means  of 
great  gun  exercise,  including  a  field  of  practice,  targets,  the  kind  of  roads  for 
manoeuvring  this  kind  of  ordnance,  &c. 

The  commander  of  each  division  should  have  authority  to  invite,  annually,  or 
as  often  as  necessary,  these  volunteer  artillery  companies,  or  the  best  disciplined 
of  them,  to  visit  his  headquarters  and  exercise  in  the  practicing  field,  at  target 
firing,  &c. ;  the  government  paying  the  expenses  of  the  trip,  by  allowing  so 
much  mileage,  and  so  much  per  day  during  the  visit. 

We  see  our  volunteer  companies  now  are  continually  in  the  habit  of  visiting 
distant  towns  and  villages,  as  a  body,  in  their  military  capacity,  and  at  their  own 
expense.  The  practicing  and  the  exercise  with  such  terrible  pieces  would  draw 
together  a  large  concourse  of  people.  This  would  give  eclat,  and  the  presentation 
of  a  sword,  or  some  other  reward  for  the  best  shot,  would  invest  this  feature  of 
the  modified  system  of  defence  with  much  animation,  and  infuse  into  these 
volunteer  artillery  men  a  spirit,  a  nerve,  and  skill  which,  in  the  day  of  battle, 
would  make  their  pieces  as  firm  as  "Bragg's  battery,"  and  far  more  terrible  and 
destructive  than  they  would  be  if  casemated  in  stone  walls  and  enveloped  all 
the  time  with  their  own  smoke. 

So  far  my  remarks,  in  reply  to  your  first  question,  relate  to  the  defences  of 
the  Atlantic  seaboard  only.  I  proceed  now  to  consider  how  far,  and  to  what 
extent,  the  system  of  1816  may  be  modified  with  regard  to  the  defences  of  our 
Gulf  and  Pacific  coasts. 

I  will  speak  first  of  the  defences  for  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

We  have  seen  that  the  system  of  1816,  as  extravagant  as  it  is,  was  never 
intended,  in  the  mind  even  of  its  slrongest  advocates,  to  provide  fortifications 
for  every  port,  harbor,  and  anchorage  along  the  seaboard  in  which  an  enemy 
might  find  shelter,  take  refuge,  or  form  rendezvous  in  time  of  war. 

Fortress  Monroe  would  not  prevent  an  enemy  from  entering  the  Chesapeake 
bay,  nor  hinder  him  from  anchoring  safely  with  his  fleet  at  Tangier  island,  nor 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Rappahannock,  the  York,  or  the  Potomac  river,  nor  at  any 
one  of  the  numerous  safe  and  commodious  anchorages  that  are  to  be  found  above 
Old  Point.  As  far  as  any  permanent  fortifications  that  it  is  possible  to  erect  at 

H.  Rep.  Com.  86 30. 


466  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA- CO  AST   DEFENCES. 

Fortress  Monroe  and  the  Rip  Raps  are  concerned,  an  enemy  might  select  any 
one  of  the  above-named  places  as  a  rendezvous  for  his  fleet,  and  make  that  his 
centre  of  operations  against  the  whole  bay  coast,  the  rivers  and  towns  along  it, 
and  carry  on  his  depredating  and  marauding  expeditions  with  just  as  much 
impunity  as  though  no  such  fortress  had  been  built. 

It  protects  Norfolk  and  the  navy  yard  from  a  fleet,  but  it  does  not  prevent 
that  same  fleet  from  running  up  to  York  river,  or  the  Rappahannock,  or  the 
Potomac,  or  up  the  bay,  nor  does  it  prevent  it  from  landing  an  army  at  any  one 
of  these  places,  and  marching  it  off  against  Richmond,  Fredericksburg,  Wash- 
ington, or  Baltimore.  The  railroad  and  telegraph  do  that. 

The  circumstances  that  such  a  fortress  as  Monroe,  with  an  important  navy 
yard  under  its  cover,  is  between  his  fleet  and  the  sea,  might  somewhat  cramp  or 
embarrass  such  an  enemy  in  his  operations  is  admitted,  but  it  would  not,  there- 
fore, prevent  them,  for  if  his  naval  forces  in  the  bay  were  superior  to  our  own, 
he  would  command  the  bay  in  spite  of  the  fort. 

Even  if  the  Chesapeake  bay  was  lined  with  works  from  head  to  mouth,  and 
on  both  sides,  such  a  chain  of  military  posts,  however  strong  and  costly,  could 
not  prevent  an  enemy  from  entering  the  bay  with  his  fleet,  and  safely  riding 
upon  its  broad  bosom,  out  of  the  reach  of  their  guns.  He  might  still  make  it 
the  centre  of  his  operations ;  most  of  the  time  the  anchorage  is  safe  in  any  part 
of  the  bay ;  these  forts  would  be  immovable ;  they  could  not  go  after  him ;  and 
at  most,  they  would  only  prevent  him  from  selecting  the  most  convenient  places 
for  shelter,  and  the  best  points  from  which  to  operate.  That  is  all. 

The  same  is  the  case  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  For  eight  or  nine  months  in  the 
year  vessels  may  ride  in  safety  at  anchor  off  the  shore,  anywhere  between  Pen- 
sacola  and  Galveston.  The  land  there  forms  a  lee,  and  affords  a  shelter  from 
the  northers.  From  two  to  twenty  miles  from  the  land,  and  in  depth  varying 
from  three  or  four  to  twenty-five  or  thirty  fathoms,  the  anchorage  is  good. 

Now,  if  we  rely  upon  fortifications  to  protect  that  coast,  it  will  be  observed, 
the  whole  Gulf  front  might  be  lined  with  them,  and  still  they  would  be  harmless 
against  a  fleet  with  its  powers  of  locomotion.  It  could  string  itself  at  anchor 
along  the  coast,  in  sight  of  the  very  works  built  for  defending  it ;  and  if  our 
reliance  were  upon  them,  it  might  capture  or  dam  up  in  stagnant  ruin,  all  the 
commerce  of  the  Mississippi  valley.  In  the  Gulf,  as  well  as  in  the  Chesapeake, 
and  in  our  own  waters  generally,  we  must  have  the  naval  supremacy.  In  any 
plan  of  providing  for  the  national  defences  that  is  an  essential  feature,  and  it 
ought  to  be  sine  qua  non  with  Congress. 

The  plan,  therefore,  of  providing  permanent  fortifications  for  the  Gulf,  seems 
to  be  this :  that  we  should  select  a  few  of  the  points  which  would  be  most  im- 
portant for  us  as  places  of  refuge  and  rendezvous,  and  which,  if  occupied  by  an 
enemy  in  war,  would  enable  him  the  most  to  annoy  us,  and  fortify  them. 

These  points  are  Key  West  and  the  Tortugas,  and  perhaps  Ship  and  Cat 
islands.  In  a  commercial  and  military  sense,  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the 
Caribbean  Sea  are  but  an  expansion  of  the  Mississippi  and  Amazon  rivers.  In 
this  view  of  the  subject,  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  is  not  at  the  ^alize,  nor 
that  of  the  Amazon  at  Paia;  they  are  both  in  the  Florida  pass,  between  Key 
West  and  Cuba. 

For  one-half  the  year  there  is  a  sort  of  monsoon  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  ;  during 
this  period  the  winds  are  from  the  southeast ;  at  this  season,  therefore,  the  winds 
and  the  currents  in  the  Yucatan  pass  are  such  as  to  prevent  the  passage  that 
way  of  vessels  from  the  Gulf. 

Moreover,  the  island 'of  Jamaica,  where  the  English  have  a  naval  station, 
overlooks  the  Yucatan  pass.  When  the  northeast  winds  prevail  the  Yucatan 
pass  is  open  to  sailing  vessels;  but  a  few  steamers,  with  Jamaica  as  the  centre 
of  operations,  would  close  it  to  our  commerce. 

When  the  southeast  winds  prevail,  the  route  of  a  sailing  vessel  bound  from 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  467 

the  Gulf  to  Jamaica,  is  not  through  the  straits  of  Yucatan;  it  is  through  the 
Florida  Pass  by  Key  West,  and  then  back  on  the  south  side  of  Cuba.  Now  a 
maritime  enemy  seizing  upon  Key  West  and  the  Tortugas  could  land  a  few 
heavy  guns  from  his  ship  and  make  it  difficult  for  us  to  dislodge  him.  Here 
railroads  and  the  telegraph  do  not  reach,  and  as  long  as  he  should  hold  that 
position,  so  long  would  he  control  the  commercial  mouth  of  the  great  Mississippi 
valley. 

In  that  position  he  would  shut  up  in  the  Gulf  whatever  force  inferior  to  his 
own  we  might  have  there.  He  would  prevent  re-enforcements,  sent  to  relieve  it 
from  Boston,  New  York,  and  Norfolk,  from  entering  the  Gulf.  Indeed,  in  a  war 
with  England,  the  Tortugas  and  Key  West  being  in  her  possession,  it  might  be 
more  advisable,  instead  of  sending  from  our  Atlantic  dock  yards  a  fleet  to  the 
Gulf,  to  send  it  over  to  the  British  islands  and  sound  the  Irish  people  as  to 
throwing  off  allegiance. 

This  country  is  too  rich  and  powerful  to  confine  itself  to  a  system  of  national 
defences  which  looks  to  a  passive  state  for  it  in  any  war.  It  cannot  content 
itself  by  waiting  for  the  enemy  to  come,  that  we  may  simply  beat  him  off  from 
our  shores.  Neither  is  it  sufficient  for  it  to  have  the  ability  to  send  out  a  few 
cruisers  and  armed  privateers  to  prey  upon  the  commerce  of  an  enemy. 

We  have  seen  its  free  institutions,  by  their  silent  operations  in  times  of  peace, 
shaking  the  thrones  of  Europe,  and  causing  the  crowned  heads  that  sit  upon 
them  to  tremble.  In  time  of  war  it  must  have  the  ability  to  re-enforce  that 
influence  with  its  strong  "right  arm."  The  sensibilities  of  the  people  every- 
where are  alive  to  that  influence — their  sympathies  are  so  strongly  with  us,  that 
should  it  become  necessary  to  carry  war  into  any  of  the  maritime  States  of 
Christendom,  the  American  legions  would  be  regarded  by  the  masses  as  friends 
and  deliverers,  not  as  enemies. 

Therefore,  instead  of  being  content  with  the  capture  of  a  few  men-of-war  and 

unoffending  merchantmen  for  prizes,  we  want  a  system  of  defences  which  shall 

enable  us  to  send  naval  expeditions  against  the  enemy's  country,  invite  and 

*  assist  the  down-trodden  millions  to  throw  off  the  hateful  yoke,  to  break  their 

bonds  asunder,  and  to  stand  up  as  freemen,  like  ourselves. 

In  an  expedition  upon  Jamaica,  Key  West  being  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy, 
it  would  be  difficult  for  our  Gulf  and  Atlantic  forces  to  unite. 

Therefore  the  works  at  Key  West  and  the  Tortugas  should  be  provided  with 
shell-guns  of  the  most  destructive  calibre,  and  their  walls  should  be  substantial 
enough  to  resist  the  concussion  of  a  man-of-war  broadside.  They  are  wanted 
to  give  protection  to  our  fleeing  merchantmen,  to  afford  a  refuge  to  our  fleets 
until  time  and  opportunity  and  circumstances  serve  for  striking  the  blow,  or 
making  a  move.  They  are  wanted  by  us,  because  they  would  be  so  immensely 
valuable  to  an  enemy. 

The  railroads  that  will  be  in  operation  from  Pensacola  and  Mobile  soon,  and 
probably  before  any  additional  fortifications  can  be  erected  there,  will  secure 
these  places  from  invasion  and  seizure ;  and  the  works  already  there,  with  a  few 
'  more  guns  in  open  battery  along  the  beach,  would  effectually  protect  them  from 
the  great  guns  of  ships.  Still,  an  enemy  with  a  fleet  superior  to  the  one  we 
might  have  in  the  Gulf  could  anchor  along  the  shore,  as  he  can  in  the  Chesa- 
peake, and  greatly  harass  our  commerce  there.  No  system  of  fortifications  can 
prevent  that. 

In  the  next  maritime  war,  (and  in  such  a  war  we  have  nothing  to  fear  from 
any  quarter  except  one,)  it  is  not  upon  the  Atlantic,  properly  speaking,  that  the 
great  sea.-fight  is  to  take  place  :  it  is  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  or  near  the  English 
shores. 

Jamaica  is  an  important  naval  station ;  it  commands  one  entrance  to  the  Gulf. 
There  Great  Britain  can  assemble  her  fleet,  and  within  three  days  have  it  off 
the  Balize,  in  position  to  strike  a  terrible  blow  at  the  commerce  of  that  valley. 


468  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

Shutting  up  the  Florida  Pass,  she  would  have  complete  control  of  the  Gulf. 
Norfolk  and  New  York  are  inconveniently  situated  to  defend  it.  Some  years 
ago  a  man-of-war  was  sent  with  despatches  from  Norfolk  to  Pensacola ;  she  was 
fifty-odd  days  in  making  the  passage. 

The  means  of  defence  for  the  Gulf  should  be  within  the  valley  that  belongs 
to  it.  The  resources  of  this  valley  are  ample,  its  means  most  abundant,  and  its 
people  are  its  best  and  most  appropriate  defenders.  Pensacola  should  therefore 
be  built  up  as  a  naval  station,  and  the  depot  at  Memphis  fostered  with  care  and 
solicitude.  Instead  of  draining  the  treasury  for  forts,  under  the  system  of  1816, 
these  two  places  should  be  put  in  condition  for  building,  equipping,  and  fitting, 
upon  a  scale  sufficient  to  secure  to  us,  in  war,  the  naval  supremacy  at  least  in 
the  Gulf. 

In  a  war  with  England,  and  with  those  two  places  as  the  centres  of  opera- 
tions, it  probably  would  be  found  desirable  to  move  upon  Jamaica  and  other 
British  islands  in  that  quarter.  New  York  and  the  Atlantic  dock  yards  would 
probably  be  the  centre  of  other  operations ;  and  if  Jamaica  fall  in  such  a  war, 
it  must  fall  under  the  guns  and  before  the  gallantry  of  the  west — the  east  will 
have  need  and  occupation  for  all  its  forces  in  other  quarters. 

Memphis  is  fast  rising  in  importance  as  a  place  of  construction.  Private 
enterprise  has  already  commenced  to  establish  building-yards  there;  and  in  that 
teeming  region  there  is  no  lack  of  naval  and  maritime  resources.  The  ropewalk 
there  is  of  no  consequence.  We  want  docks,  storehouses,  machine-shops,  and 
founderies  for  casting,  forging,  making,  and  building  anchors  and  cables,  ships 
and  engines ;  and  for  preparing  and  keeping  in  store,  out  of  the  excellent  ma- 
terials to  be  found  in  that  valley,  all  the  arms  and  munitions  of  war  which  would 
be  required  for  the  defence  of  the  Gulf,  the  capture  of  Jamaica  or  any  other 
British  possession,  if  Britain  be  the  enemy. 

The  affections  of  these  islanders  for  the  mother  country  cannot,  in  the  nature 
of  things,  be  as  strong  or  as  abiding  as  those  of  our  citizens  for  their  own  homes ; 
and  therefore  it  may  be  imagined  that  an  attempt  by  us  to  invade  and  get  pos- 
session of  these  islands  would  be  quite  a  different  affair  from  an  attempt,  on  her 
part,  at  invasion  and  conquest  here.  A  tower  of  strength  has  this  nation  in  the 
brave  hearts  and  strong  arms  of  its  gallant  yeomanry.  Small  indeed  would  be 
the  degree  of  aid  and  comfort  which  a  national  enemy  would  derive  from  dis- 
loyalty and  disaffection  of  American  citizens. 

I  have,  on  former  occasions,  presented  my  views  at  large  with  regard  to  the 
importance  of  Memphis  as  a  naval  depot.  These  views  are  before  the  public, 
and  therefore  I  deem  it  unnecessary  to  repeat  them  here.  We  have  turned  the 
corner,  and  are  now  going  ahead  in  the  peaceful  race  for  the  commercial  su- 
premacy of  the  seas;  the  next  trial  is  to  be  for  maritime  supremacy  of  another 
sort.  It  is  hoped  that  the  day  for  that  contest  is  far  distant.  But  every  people 
are  liable  to  war;  and  it  is  a  fact  which  we  cannot  blink,  that,  in  providing  for 
the  contingency,  our  statesmen  and  warriors  must,  for  many  years  to  come,  have 
an  eye  to  the  forces  which  Great  Britain,  rather  than  any  other  power,,  can  bring 
against  us.  But  let  that  contest  come  when  it  may,  it  is  most  likely  to  be  de- 
cided in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  its  twin  basin,  the  Caribbean  sea ;  they  are  the 
receptacles  of  all  that  the  two  grandest  systems  of  river  basins  in  the  world 
will  have  to  pour  into  the  lap  of  commerce.  The  valley  of  the  Mississippi  on 
one  side,  and  the  valley  of  the  Amazon  on  the  other,  will  in  time  make  these 
two  arms  of  the  sea  the  commercial  centre  of  the  world. 

The  mouth  of  the  Amazon,  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco,  and  the  mouth  of  the 
Magdalena,  are,  commercially  speaking,  almost  as  much  in  the  Florida  Pass  as 
is  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  river.  Such  is  the  course  of  the  currents,  and 
such  the  direction  of  the  winds  in  that  part  of  the  world,  that  a  vessel  sailing 
from'  the  mouth  of  any  one  of  these  rivers  for  Rio  de  Janeiro,  in  Brazil,  or  for 
India,  or  for  the  markets  of  the  Pacific  around  Cape  Horn,  or  for  Africa,  or  for 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  469 

Europe,  has  first  to  steer  to  the  northward  and  westward  until  she  reaches  the 
parallel  of  25°  or  30°  north.  This  brings  her  off  our  own  shores;  and  it  is  im- 
possible for  her  to  pursue  any  other  route,  so  long  as  the  northeast  trade-winds 
prevail,  or  the  great  equatorial  current  which  feeds  the  Gulf  Stream  continues  to 
flow  across  the  Atlantic.  No  vessel  trading  under  canvas  from  the  mouth  of 
these  rivers  to  the  markets  of  South  America,  Europe,  Asia,  or  Africa,  can  go 
any  other  way.  They  must  pass  by  our  doors. 

Therefore,  in  planning  a  system  of  national  defences,  who  can  overestimate 
the  importance  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  as  a  nucleus  of  naval  means,  the  centre  of 
naval  operations  ?  That  centre  is  at  Key  West  and  the  Tortugas ;  hence  the 
great  need  of  strong  works  there. 

Interests  of  the  most  delicate,  valuable,  and,  to  an  enemy,  of  the  most  attractive 
kind,  are  even  now  daily  springing  up,  and  expanding  themselves  out  upon  the 
waters  and  about  the  borders  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  Caribbean  sea — interests 
which,  if  they  should  be  injured  or  put  in  needless  jeopardy,  will  create  a  greater 
sensation  throughout  this  country  than  would  the  landing  of  a  hundred  thousand 
men-at-arms  upon  our  shores.  These  interests  are  maritime — they  are  Ameri- 
can ;  their  defences  and  protection  are  naval ;  they  must  be  watched  and  guarded 
from  the  Mississippi  valley.  Memphis  and  Pensacola  by  nature  are,  by  rights 
ought  to  be,  and  by  legislation  should  be,  the  centres  of  operations  in  the  case. 

Panama,  Nicaragua,  and  Tehuantep  echave,  or  are  about  to  impose  new  obli- 
gations upon  us.  We  must  look  to  them,  and,  in  providing  for  the  common 
defence,  take  them  into  consideration.  They  are  links  in  the  chain  which  binds 
the  most  remote  corners  of  the  republic  together.  They  are  the  gateways  be- 
tween distant  parts  of  the  Union ;  and  they  must  therefore  be  cared  for  in  peace, 
guarded  and  protected  in  war. 

The  Amazonian  basin,  embracing  an  area  more  than  twice  the  extent  of 
our  great  Mississippi  valley,  fills  too  large  a  space  in  the  world  to  escape  atten- 
tion from  us,  when  we  are  in  the  very  act  of  laying  the  foundations  for  a  perma- 
nent system  of  national  defence.  With  all  the  climates  of  India,  with  unheard 
of  capacities  of  production,  and  the  most  boundless  sources  of  wealth  in  the  field, 
the  forest,  and  the  mine,  that  valley,  so  soon  as  it  shall  begin  to  feel  the  axe  and 
the  plough,  will  pour  into  our  lap  a  commerce,  the  value  of  which  is  as  limitless 
as  are  its  own  vast  resources.  Nature  has  placed  us  in  the  position  to  command 
that  commerce.  The  great  business  of  fetching  and  carrying  there  must  be  ours. 
For  coming  and  for  going,  the  winds  are  fair  for  us ;  and  we  are  the  only  nation 
for  whose  shipping  they  are  so  fair. 

That  arm  of  the  ocean  which  severs  the  continent  nearly  in  twain,  to  make 
between  the  "Father  of  Waters,"  at  the  north,  and  the  "King  of  tlivers,"  at  the 
south,  a  receptacle  for  their  commerce,  is  receiving  from  the  Mississippi  valley 
alone  an  amount  of  produce  that  astonishes  the  world.  Yet  the  Mississippi  val- 
ley is  not  half  peopled  up.  What,  therefore,  will  this  oceanic  basin,  this  com- 
mercial receptacle  for  the  surplus  produce  of  the  two  grandest  systems  of  river 
basins  on  the  face  of  the  earth  be,  when  the  great  Amazonian  valley,  of  double 
area,  with  its  everlasting  summer  and  its  endless  round  of  harvests,  comes  to  be 
subdued  and  brought  into  cultivation  ?  What  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  is  now,  is  as 
nothing  to  what  it  is  to  be.  It  abounds  with  commercial  elements  that  cannot 
be  comprehended  for  their  magnitude;  and  in  proportion  as  it  becomes  the  seat 
of  maritime  wealth  and  greatness,  so,  too,  must  it  become  the  centre  of  naval 
strength  and  power.  As  Columbus  lay  sick,  it  was  upon  the  waters  of  this  sea- 
basin  that  the  angel  visited  him  in  a  dream,  and  told  him  that  God  had  made 
his  name  great  and  sent  him  to  "unbar  the  gates  of  ocean."  The  keys  to  these 
gates  are  at  Key  West  and  the  Tortugas,  Memphis  and  Pensacola.  Nature  has 
placed  them  among  the  wonderful  resources  of  the  great  valley ;  and  to  stand  as 
gatekeeper  before  them  is  the  mission  of  those  naval  forces  that  naturally  cen- 
tre-in the  Gulf. 


470  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


OF  THE  PACIFIC  SEABOARD. 

No  American  statesman  will,  I  imagine,  rest  content  with  any  plan  of  national 
defence  which  does  not  contemplate  for  us  at  least  the  naval  supremacy  in  our 
own  waters.  That  is  the  starting  point — and  that  is  the  point  which,  in  the 
erection  of  military  works  on  the  land,  in  the  construction  of  floating  batteries 
for  our  harbors,  or  in  the  building  of  ships  and  steamers  for  the  sea,  should  be 
constantly  kept  in  view.  It  is  the  true  basis  to  work  upon. 

In  a  military  point  of  view,  California  and  Oregon  are  colonies.  Far  remote 
from  the  heart  of  the  country  and  the  strength  of  the  nation,  they  are  young  and 
feeble,  open  to  attack,  and  inviting  to  conquest.  In  war  no  relief  can  be  sent 
them,  however  beset,  unless  at  great  risk  and  with  an  enormous  expenditure  of 
both  time  and  money. 

The  voyage  by  sea  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  ports  of  the  United  States 
is  the  longest  voyage  in  the  world.  Within  the  whole  scope  and  range  of  com- 
merce, there  are  no  two  shore-lines  so  remote  from  each  other,  in  time,  as  these 
are. 

The  average  passage  of  all  the  vessels  which  sailed  from  the  Atlantic  ports  for 
California  in  1850  was  one  hundred  and  eighty-seven  days — six  months.  These 
vessels  went  singly,  each  making  the  best  of  her  way  without  regard  to  the  oth- 
ers. In  a  fleet,  it  is  the  dullest  vessel  which  regulates  the  speed  of  all ;  the 
fastest  must  reduce  canvas,  yard,  and  stand  along  under  easy  sail,  that  the 
slow  vessels  may  keep  up. 

Bound  hence  with  a  fleet  for  the  relief  of  California,  our  ships  would  have  to 
pass  no  less  than  three  important  naval  stations,  all  belonging  to  the  same  power. 
One  of  them,  St.  Helena,  is  on  the  wayside ;  the  two  others,  Bermuda  and  the 
Falkland  Islands,  are  right  in  the  middle  of  the  road. 

If  the  fleet  should  escape  the  vigilance  and  annoyance  of  the  men-of-war  sta- 
tioned at  those  islands,  there  are  still  before  it  the  storms  of  Cape  Horn,  the 
dangers  of  the  sea,  and  the  war  of  the  elements  for  it  to  encounter  and  contend 
with. 

Such  would  be  the  length  of  the  voyage,  and  such  the  difficulties  and  the  risks 
to  be  encountered  by  the  way,  that  the  practicability  of  sending  succor  to  Cali- 
fornia around  Cape  Horn,  in  a  war  with  England,  may  be  considered  out  of  the 
question. 

Single  ships  might  find  their  way  in  safety  around,  but  as  for  a  large  fleet, 
covering  as  it  goes  miles  in  extent,  and  attracting  the  attention  of  the  enemy 
with  the  multitude  of  its  ships — escaping  all  the  dangers  that  would  beset  it  by 
the  way — surely  no  one  would  count  upon  it,  and  it  would  be  folly  to  expect  it. 
California  and  Oregon  must,  therefore,  rely  upon  the  means  of  defence  which 
can  be  sent  forth  from  their  own  harbors  in  war ;  and  the  question  is,  how  shall 
those  means  be  provided  in  peace  ? 

Shall  the  system  of  1816,  which  has  been  tried  and  found  too  costly  and  de- 
fective for  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  be  transferred  to  the  Pacific,  and  engrailed  upon 
its  shores  for  another  third  of  a  century  ?  Or  shall  the  government  resort  to 
railroads,  steam  and  the  navy,  and  do  for  that  country  what  has  been  found  to 
answer  so  well  for  this  1 

The  extent  of  our  sea  front  on  the  Pacific,  compared  with  our  sea  front  on 
the  Atlantic,  is  as  eighteen  to  twenty-four;  that  is,  the  Pacific  is  three-fourths 
the  extent  ot  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  To  apply  the  system  of  1816  to  the  former 
would,  in  my  judgment,  be  injudicious  as  to  policy,  extravagant  as  to  expendi- 
ture, and  inadequate  as  to  purpose;  and  therefore  the  system  of  1816,  excepting 
in  so  far  as  two  or  three  works  are  concerned,  should  not  be  applied  to  the 
Pacific.  We  want  no  forts  along  that  sea  front,  save  only  those  that  are  neces- 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  471 

sary  to  keep  hostile  ships,  with  their  great  guns,  out  of  the  reach  of  our  cities, 
and  to  give  protection  to  our  dock  yards. 

There  is  not  at  this  time  a  single  dock  yard  upon  the  waters  of  the  Pacific, 
belonging  to  any  nation,  at  which  even  a  frigate  can  be  built  and  equipped. 
All  the  maritime  powers  are  far  removed,  with  their  naval  resources,  from  the 
eastern  shores  of  that  ocean.  By  establishing  a  dock  yard  there,  and  providing 
it  with  the  means  and  facilities  for  repairing  and  equipping,  we  may,  without 
difficulty,  secure  the  naval  supremacy  upon  that  ocean;  and  once  possessed,  it 
will  not  be  an  easy  matter  for  any  power  to  wrest  it  from  such  hands. 

The  most  desirable  means  of  defence  for  those  regions  are  such  as  we  have  on 
the  Atlantic — a  navy,  steam,  the  railway  and  the  locomotive,  with  their  powers 
of  concentration. 

The  characteristic  feature  which  the  improvements  of  the  age  have  impressed 
upon  military  operations  is  mobility.  To  the  degree  with  which  armaments 
and  armed  forces  are  invested  with  locomotion  and  with  celerity  in  movement, 
to  that  degree  and  in  that  ratio  are  they  provided  with  the  elements  of  power 
and  destruction.  It  is  its  mobility,  imparting  toil  in  the  field  of  battle,  a  sort  of 
ubiquity,  that  makes  flying  artillery  such  a  tremendous  arm  in  modern  warfare. 

It  is  the  swift  foot  of  the  armed  steamer  which  has  given  her  such  tremendous 
force  for  battle  that  has  appalled  the  most  able  sea  captains,  and  left  the  mili- 
tary men  of  the  world  at  variance  as  to  the  extent  of  her  powers,  so  transcendent 
are  they  in  the  minds  of  all. 

The  part  that  railroads  and  magnetic  telegraphs  are  to  play  in  the  great 
drama  of  war  with  this  country  has  not  yet  been  cast,  much  less  enacted.  In 
a  military  point  of  view,  they  convert  whole  States  into  compact  and  armed 
masses.  They  can  convey  forces  from  one  section  of  the  Union  to  another  as 
quickly  as  re- enforcements  can  be  marched  from  one  part  of  an  old-fashioned 
battle-field  to  another. 

The  money  that  is  expended  in  the  erection  of  a  fort  adds  nothing  to  the 
national  wealth,  but  the  money  that  is  spent  in  fortifying  with  railroads,  while 
it  gives  the  military  strength  required,  vastly  increases  also  the  elements  of 
national  power,  wealth,  and  greatness. 

There  have  been  expended  by  the  States  and  people  of  the  States,  on  this 
side  of  the  Rocky  mountains,  about  four  hundred  millions  of  dollars  in  building 
ten  thousand  miles  of  railroads  and  canals.  These  works  have  not  only  effec- 
tually provided  for  the  common  defence  so  far  as  invasion  is  concerned,  but, 
besides  reimbursing  the  projectors  of  them,  in  most  cases,  they  have  in  all  in- 
creased the  value  of  the  land  in  their  vicinity,  advanced  trade  and  commerce, 
promoted  the  general  welfare,  and  in  the  aggregate  added  not  less  than  a  thou- 
sand million  of  dollars  to  the  gross  sum  of  the  national  wealth. 

The  money  that  has  been  expended  under  the  system  of  1816  has  added 
nothing  to  the  value  of  the  soil ;  it  has  afforded  no  facilities  to  commerce ;  it  has 
not  increased  the  national  prosperity  in  any  manner  whatever;  and,  therefore, 
as  to  the  alternative  of  providing  for  the  defences  of  the  Pacific  coast  by  lining 
it  with  forts  and  castles,  or  by  sending  a  railroad  there  and  collecting  naval 
means,  it  appears  to  me  there  is  no  choice,  no  need  for  deliberation,  no  necessity 
for  argument. 

The  strongest  work  that  stone  and  mortar  can  make,  being  erected  at  the 
mouth  of  the  harbor  of  San  Francisco,  would  not  interrupt  a  blockade,  nor  pre- 
vent an  enemy  from  starving  California  into  terms.  It  is  the  navy  alone  that 
can  do  this;  and  vessels,  with  munitions  of  war  sufficient  for  the  purpose,  should 
be  placed  under  cover  there  now. 

California  does  not  produce  breadstuffs  enough  for  her  own  consumption, 
probably  she  never  will.  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  not  one  of  our  New 
England  States,  including  New  York,  does  that.  Mining,  commerce,  and  manu- 


472  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

factures,  rather  than  agriculture,  will  probably  ever  constitute  the  chief  indus- 
trial pursuits  of  that  distant  State. 

And  until  California  has  the  means  of  deriving  a  support  from  the  back  coun- 
try she  must  look  for  it  to  the  sea ;  therefore  an  enemy,  by  taking  up  his  position 
before  the  harbor  of  California  in  force  sufficient  to  establish  a  rigid  blockade, 
may,  without  striking  a  blow,  starve  the  people  into  terms  of  surrender. 

The  greater  the  number  of  men  in  garrison,  in  such  a  case,  and  the  larger  the 
army  sent  there  by  us  for  its  defence,  the  greater  the  distress ;  for  the  reason 
that  they  would  the  sooner  eat  out  the  substance  of  the  land,  and  so  assist  the 
enemy  in  his  work  of  starvation. 

A  railway  to  California  would  make  that  country  as  invulnerable  and  as  se- 
cure from  invasion  as  railroads  have  made  the  country  on  this  side  of  the  Rocky 
mountains ;  and  with  a  railway  a  blockade  would  only  annoy  commerce,  not 
starve  the  people. 

In  a  consideration  of  the  soundest  policy  this  railway  is  called  for.  I  have 
studied  the  subject,  and  the  result  of  my  best  reflections  with  regard  to  it  has 
led  me  to  the  opinion  that  the  general  government  cannot  too  soon  take  the 
steps  necessary  and  proper  for  procuring  it  to  be  built,  and  for  collecting  at  the 
other  end  of  it  the  nucleus  of  a  navy,  with  powers  of  expansion  sufficient  to  meet 
any  probable  emergency. 

The  vessels  of  our  navy  serving  in  the  Pacific,  instead  of  being  brought  home 
around  Cape  Horn  for  repairs,  should  be  laid  up  in  ordinary  in  California  until 
sufficient  numbers  are  gradually  collected  there  to  form  this  nucleus.  The  com- 
merce of  the  country  will  supply  the  seamen  for  them  whenever  they  shall  be 
required. 

My  answer  to  your  second  question,  viz  :  "What  reliance  could  be  placed  on 
vessels-of-war,  or  of  commerce,  floating  batteries,  gunboats,  and  other  temporary 
substitutes  for  permanent  fortifications?"  is,  to  a  great  extent,  included  in  the 
answer  just  given  to  your  first. 

The  defences  upon  which  this  country  must  and  ought  to  rely  are  locomotive  ; 
therefore,  to  employ  naval  means  to  build  floating  batteries,  which  would  have 
to  be  confined  to  the  limits  of  the  harbor,  would  be  a  waste  of  money,  when  we 
might,  with  that  same  money,  give  them  wings  or  impart  to  them  the  breath  of 
steam,  and  send  them  here  and  there  wherever  they  would  be  of  most  avail. 

The  money  which  a  floating  battery  would  cost  might  keep  a  steamer  afloat ; 
which,  with  its  powers  of  locomotion,  might  reduplicate  itself,  as  it  were,  along 
the  coast,  by  appearing  successively  before  a  number  of  places,  and  arriving  at 
each  place  exactly  at  the  right  time.  If  the  enemy  would  not  come  to  the 
floating  battery  it  would  be  of  little  use ;  but  as  for  the  steamer,  if  the  enemy 
would  not  come  to  it,  it  could  go  to  the  enemy;  it  could  select  its  own  time, 
manner,  and  point  of  attack,  and  thus  make  up  by  activity,  skill,  and  manoeuvre, 
what  it  wants  in  strength, 

The  reliance  to  be  placed  on  vessels  of  commerce  for  coast  defences  is  casual 
and  accidental ;  Upon  an  emergency  they  might  be  armed  and  sent  /to  sea  to 
harass  the  commerce  of  the  enemy ;  they  might  be  used  as  transports  or  as 
fire-ships ;  or  they  might  be  sunk  in  channel-ways  to  block  up  entrances,  &c., 
and  to  assist  the  works  on  shore  to  protect  the  towns.  When  wanted,  they  will 
be  at  hand;  and  in  planning  military  expeditions,  or  preparing  for  defence,  it  is 
enough  for  our  sea  captains  and  great  generals  to  know  that  the  commercial 
marine — old  hulks  and  new  vessels — are  among  their  means  of  attack  and 
defence,  and  constitute  an  important  part  of  the  military  resources  which  they 
hold  in  reserve — which  are  at  all  times  available,  and  which,  therefore,  may  be 
brought  into  play  when  required. 

The  report  of  the  board  of  engineers  of  1840  treats  the  subject  of  floating 
batteries  at  length.  It  shows  conclusively  that  they  are  neither  tne  most 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES..  473 

efficient,  effective,  nor  judicious  shape  into  which  the  money  voted  for  national 
defence  may  be  put. 

The  arguments  of  the  board  upon  this  part  of  their  subject  appear  to  me  con- 
clusive ;  and,  therefore,  further  remarks  here  with  regard  to  floating  batteries 
would  be  useless. 

A  prominent  idea  upon  which  the  system  of  1816  appears  to  have  been 
founded  is,  that  we  as  a  naval  power  were  to  remain  in  hopeless  inferiority  ; 
and  hence  the  burden  of  the  argument  for  a  system  of  national  defence  has  been 
"  build  stationary  works — works  that  the  enemy  must  come  after ;  line  the  coasts 
with  forts  and  castles  to  save  the  country  from  invasion,  our  women  and  children 
irom  the  violence  of  enemies." 

Railroads  and  steam  have  converted  every  village  into  a  camp,  every  telegraph 
office  into  a  watch-tower,  on  which  is  placed  a  sentinel  more  sleepless  than 
Argus,  for  guarding  and  defending  the  coast  from  invasion.  Steam,  and  rail- 
roads, and  canals  have  connected  every  forest  in  the  land  into  a  timber  shed  for 
the  navy,  and  our  merchants  and  ship-builders  have  established  scores  of  dock 
yards  along  the  sea  shore,  and  upon  the  banks  of  our  rivers,  at  which  keels 
may  be  laid  and  vessels  launched  and  equipped  with  a  rapidity  that  has  never 
before  been  known  in  any  age  or  country. 

.In  1836  General  Cass,  then  Secretary  of  War,  assumed  the  position,  and 
Greneral  Jackson  indorsed  it,*  (hat  for  the  defence  of  the  coast  the  chief  reliance 
should  be  on  the  navy;  and  that  the  system  of  1816  (that  of  the  board  of  engineers) 
comprises  works  which  are  unnecessarily  large  for  the  purposes  which  they  have 
to  fulfil. 

At  that  time  steam  navigation  was  a  problem  which  had  yet  to  be  solved 
upon  the  ocean.  Dr.  Lardner  had  attempted  it  in  the  closet,  and  proved,  as  he 
said,  that  the  conditions  of  the  problem  involved  an  impossibility.  He  there- 
fore pronounced  it  an  absurdity ;  and  so  men  generally  considered  it.  At  that 
time  railroads  were  much  less  complete,  and  far  less  numerous  than  they  now 
are.  The  electric  telegraph  was  also  unknown. 

Now  the  ocean  is  clouded  with  the  smoke  of  sea  steamers ;  the  country  is 
laced  with  lines  of  telegraph,  and  fretted  with  a  network  of  railways — all  tend- 
ing to  make  reliance  upon  the  navy  still  more  exclusive,  dependence  upon  the 
system  of  1816  still  more  needless. 

The  board  of  engineers,  to  show  how  erroneous,  in  their  judgment,  this  opinion 
of  General  Jackson  was,  supposed  a  case  in  1836,  and  cited  it  again  in  1840 
as  an  illustration. 

The  case  was  well  put ;  it  produced  a  great  effect  upon  the  public  mind ;  and 
as  it  is  the  hinge  upon  which  the  continuation  of  the  present  system  was  made 
to  turn,  I  beg  leave- to  quote  the  case  now,  that  we  may  see  how  it  will  stand 
the  test  of  the  new  condition  of  things ;  how  the  improvements  that  have  since 
taken  place  will  affect  it,  and  how  far  it  may  be  modified  by  the  ground  I  have 
been  endeavoring  to  make  good. 

"In  the  report,"  says  the  board  of  1840,t  presented  by  the  engineer  depart- 
ment in  March,  1836,  (Senate  Document,  1st  session  24th  Congress,  vol.  4, 
No.  293)  "  there  is  a  demonstration  of  the  actual  economy  that  will  result  from 
an  efficient  system  of  sea-coast'  defence ;  which  is  to  the  following  effect,  refer- 
ring to  the  document  itself  for  detail. : 

"  There  is  first  supposed  to  be  an  expedition  of  twenty  thousand  men  at 
Bermuda  or  Halifax  ready  to  fall  upon  the  coast.  This  will  make  it  necessary, 
if  there  be  no  fortifications,  to  have  ready  a  force  at  least  equal  at  each  of  the 
following  points,  namely :  1st,  Portsmouth  and  navy  yard ;  2d,  Boston  and  navy 

0  See  page  5,  No.  206  H.  Doc.,  1st  session  26th  Congress.  See  also  page  1,  No.  293  S. 
D:c  ,  1st  session  24th  Congress. 

f  Page  70,  No.  206  H.  Doc.,  ,st  session  26th  Congress. 


474  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

yard ;  3d,  Narraganset  roads ;  4th,  New  York  and  navy  yard ;  5th,  Philadel- 
phia and  navy  yard  ;  6th,  Baltimore  ;  7th,  Norfolk  and  navy  yard  ;  8th,  Charles- 
ton, South  Carolina ;  9th,  Savannah ;  and  10th,  New  Orleans,  to  say  nothing 
of  other  important  places. 

"At  each  of  these  places,  except  the  last,  ten  thousand  men  drawn  from  the 
interior,  and  kept  under  pay,  will  suffice,  the  vicinity  being  relied  on  to  supply 
the  remainder.  At  New  Orleans,  seventeen  thousand  men  must  be  drawn  from 
a  distance.  In  a  campaign  of  six  months,  the  whole  force  will  cost  at  least 
$26,750,000. 

"  The  garrisons  necessary  to  be  kept  under  pay  for  the  fortifications  in  these 
places  will  cost  for  the  same  time  $8,430,500.  The  difference  ($18,319,500) 
will  then  be  only  $3,448,150  less  than  the  whole  expense  of  building  these 
defences,  viz :  $21,767,656;  whence  it  follows  that  the  expense  of  these  erec- 
tions would  be  nearly  compensated  by  the  saving  they  would  cause  in  a  single 
campaign." 

This  is  the  demonstration,  first  given  in  1836,  and  repeated  in  1840,  to  prove 
the  very  great  economy  and  complete  efficiency  of  the  system  of  1816  ;  and  in 
order  to  complete  this  demonstration,  it  was  required  that  twenty-one  millions 
of  money  and  upwards  should  be  first  given  to  fortify  only  ten  places  along  a 
sea  front  of  two  thousand  five  hundred*  miles  in  extent ;  for  there  were  "  other 
important  places,"  of  which  nothing  was  to  be  said. 

Now  let  us  suppose  that,  in  conformity  with  the  modifications  which  I  have 
suggested,  and  according  to  the  idea  of  maintaining  such  a  system  of  national 
defence  that  will  secure  to  us  the  naval  supremacy  in  our  oivn,  waters,  a  portion 
of  this  $8,430,500  which  the  plan  of  the  board  requires  to  keep  for  six  months 
only  the  "  necessary  garrisons"  in  the  powerful  works  which  are  supposed  to  be 
erected  at  each  one  of  the  ten  threatened  places.  Let  us  suppose,  I  say,  that, 
according  to  the  proposed  modifications  of  the  system,  a  part  of  this  eight  and 
a  half  millions  had  been  applied  to  the  building  of  some  twenty  or  twenty-five 
nien-of-war  steamers,  such  a  force  of  steamers  would  be  required,  even  under 
the  system  of  the  engineers,  to  serve  as  a  coast  guard  in  war,  to  brush  from  the 
outside  of  our  harbors,  which  are  protected  on  the  inside  by  forts,  any  block- 
ading ships  that  the  enemy  may  station  there,  and  to  keep  straggling  cruisers 
from  capturing  and  plundering  our  merchantmen  in  the  sight  of  these  same 
forts,  and  along  our  shores  generally. 

To  keep  up  the  proposed  garrisons  for  one  year  at  the  ten  threatened  places 
only,  would  require,  according  to  the  estimate  of  the  board  of  engineers  them 
selves,  $16,861,000. 

The  steamers  will  last  many  years;  and  according  to  the  estimate  of  the 
navy  board,f  made  at  the  same  time,  would  cost,  for  the  twenty-five,  $5,625,000, 
or  only  about  one-third  of  the  actual  cost  of  the  garrisons  for  one  year,  after  the 
forts  were  built  at  a  cost  of  $21,767,6564 

These  twenty-five  steamers  would  be  stationed  along  the  coast,  and  distribu- 
ted, we  may  suppose,  in  the  following  manner,  viz :  two  with  their  headquarters 
at  Portsmouth,  three  at  Boston,  four  at  New  York,  two  at  Charleston,  two  at 
Pensacola,  and  two  at  the  Balize. 

The  case  put  supposes  it  to  be  known  that  this  expedition  of  twenty  thou- 
sand men,  who  are  about  to  invade  a  country  of  more  than  twenty  millions,  has 
rendezvoused  at  Halifax  or  Bermuda,  suppose  it  to  be  at  Halifax. 

Two  or  three  of  these  twenty-five  smart,  active  steamers  are  sent  to  watch 
the  enemy's  movements.  As  soon  as  he  puts  to  sea  and  takes  his  departure, 
one  of  them  makes  for  the  nearest  post  on  our  coast,  and  there  delivers  to  the 

0  See  Engineer's  (Col  Totten's)  Report,  1840. 

fPage  83,  No.  293,  Seuate  Doc.,  1st  session  24th  Congress. 

JPage  70,  No.  293,  Senate  Doc.,  1st  session  24th  Congress. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  475 

magnetic  telegraph  the  intelligence  that  the  enemy  has  put  to  sea,  and  is  steer- 
ing, with  his  expedition  of  twenty  thousand  strong,  towards  Charleston.  The 
effect  is  electrical ;  instantly  bodies  of  armed  men  heeding  the  summons  would 
spring  up,  not  from  bush  and  brake,  in  a  single  glen,  as  at  the  sound  of  Roderick 
Dhu's  whistle,  but  from  every  town  and  hamlet,  mountain  side  and  valley  in 
the  land.  Harnessing  up  the  iron  war-horse,  they  would  hold  him,  panting  on 
the  railway,  ready  at  the  word  to  speed  off  with  them  for  the  appointed  place,  at 
the  rate  of  thirty,  forty,  or  fifty  miles  the  hour,  according  to  the  emergency. 

In  the  meantime,  and  without  confusion,  message  is  sent  by  lightning  for  the 
look-out  steamers  and  naval  forces  in  the  Gulf  to  proceed  towards  Savannah, 
and  for  those  at  the  north  to  steer  south  and  look  into  the  Chesapeake  for  further 
orders.  Or  they  may  be  directed  to  cross  the  enemy's  hause  and  bring  him  to 
action,  or  cut  off  his  stragglers,  or  otherwise  harass  and  annoy  him. 

At  the  end  of  three  or  four  days,  or  it  may  be  a  week  or  more,  according  to 
the  weather,  and  the  great  variety  of  circumstances  that  tend  to  retard  the 
movements  of  such  a  force  at  sea,  another  of  the  guarda  costa  steamers  puts  into 
the  capes  of  the  Delaware  or  elsewhere,  with  the  certain  intelligence  that  the 
enemy  is  bound  for  Charleston.  Because  his  rate  of  sailing  is  regulated  by  the 
speed  of  the  slowest  vessel  in  the  fleet,  he  is  yet  three  days  from  Charleston  at 
the  least. 

All  our  ships-of-war  that  have  returned  from  cruises,  that  are  just  fitting  out, 
or  that  may  happen  to  be  in  port,  together  with  the  whole  coast  guard  of  twenty- 
five  steamers  which,  at  the  commencement  of  the  war,  were  found  on  hand,  may 
thus  appear  off  Charleston  as  soon  as  he :  certainly  they  would  be  there  before 
he  could  disembark.  And  should  he  be  so  infatuated  as  to  attempt  a  landing,  it 
would  be  practicable  for  us  to  have  there,  in  force  ready  to  receive  him,  an  army, 
with  a  regiment  even  of  foot,  from  every  State  in  the  Union,  except  perhaps 
California  and  Oregon. 

Is  it  possible  that  an  enemy  could  be  tempted  by  any  inducement  whatever 
to  land  in  such  a  country,  provided  with  such  means  of  defence,  invested  with 
such  armed  ubiquity,  and  such  powers  of  concentration  ? 

Fort  Moultrie,  which  has  beleagured  an  enemy  before,  and  has  demonstrated 
that  it  can  hold  a  force  from  sea  in  check  long  enough  at  least  for  the  lightning 
to  go  for  help,  and  for  steam  to  come  with  it,  is  there  to  beleaguer  him  again  ; 
and  our  coast  fleet,  which  we  have  supposed  to  be  assembled  there  as  a  witness 
to  this  hypothetical  attempt  at  invasion,  would  be  ready  at  the  bar  to  receive 
this  discomfited  and  crippled  foe  as  ,he  attempted  to  escape.  Great  would  be 
the  disappointment  to  the  country  if  such  a  fleet  should  fail  to  give  an  account 
of  such  an  enemy. 

The  present  system  of  fortifications  seems  to  have  been  planned  upon  the 
idea  that  in  all  wars  this  country  was  to  stand  on  the  defensive,  and  that  all  the 
energies  of  the  enemy  would  be  directed  to  siege  and  invasion. 

But  in  the  death  struggle,  what  have  we  to  fear  from  invasion  ?  There  is  no 
pillar  nor  post  in  this  country  which,  like  the  Paris  of  France,  when  it  falls, 
carries  the  whole  political  edifice  with  it.  There  is  no  Paris  in  America.  Unlike 
Europe,  the  armed  occupation  of  a  capital  here  would  be  no  more  than  the  oc- 
cupation of  any  other  town  by  an  enemy ;  unlike  Europe,  there  are  no  disaf- 
fected people  in  this  country  for  a  foe  to  tamper  with.  The  government  is  by 
the  people,  for  the  people,  and  with  the  people.  It  is  the  people.  And  as  for 
invasion,  there  would  be  neither  danger  to  the  country,  nor  its  government,  nor 
its  institutions.  Our  free  institutions  are  our  best  fortifications  to  protect  the 
country  from  siege,  and  the  land  from  invasion.  Captivating  the  minds  of  his 
soldiers,  the  civil  and  political  freedom  enjoyed  by  all  in  these  United  States 
would  convert  the  rank  and  file  of  an  invading  foe  into  friends.  An  enemy 
planting  his  foot  upon  our  soil  could  at  best  hold  no  more  of  it  than  that  upon 
which  he  actually  stands  and  covers  with  his  guns.  If  he  attempted  to  move, 


476  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

in  whatever  direction  he  should  take  up  the  line  of  march,  the  people  in  front  he 
would  find  enemies,  and  those  that  he  left  behind,  emboldened  by  his  own  deserters, 
would  rise  up  in  arms  against  him  the  moment  his  presence  was  withdrawn  from 
them. 

What  attempts  at  invasion  did  England  make  during  the  last  war  ?  She  was 
afraid  of  desertion  and  the  propagandise*  of  republican  institutions  then.  It  is 
true,  she  made  a  foray  upon  Washington,  but  found  a  precipitate  retreat  neces- 
sary, and  that  foray  was  as  barren  and  empty  of  military  result  as  a  cloud 
without  water.  She  attempted  New  Orleans,  but  there  she  encountered  one  of 
those  sand-bag  or  cotton-bag  forts,  and  her  hosts  fell  before  it. 

In  the  war  of  1812  we  were  young  and  feeble ;  England  was  at  the  summit 
of  her  power.  The  difference  between  the  military  condition  of  the  two  countries 
was  immense ;  yet  upon  what  point  along  the  seaboard  did  she  attempt  invasion] 
Against  what  battery  did  she  lay  siege  ?  If  in  the  defenceless  state  of  the 
country  then — a  country  that  had  a  navy  to  build,  that  had  yet  to  plan  its  sys- 
tem of  fortifications,  to  concentrate  means  of  defence — if,  under  those  circum- 
stances, sieges  were  not  laid  nor  invasion  attempted  at  any  point  along  an  open 
sea  front,  with  its  indentations  and  windings  of  six  thousand  miles — if  but  with 
one-third  of  our  present  population — if  with  not  one-tenth  part  of  our  present 
military  resources,  nor  not  the  twentieth  of  our  present  powers  of  concentration, 
siege  and  invasion  were  not  attempted  then  by  a  most  naughty  and  proud  foe, 
is  it  likely  that  in  case  of  war  now,  when  she  looks  upon  us  as  her  equal,  and 
at  least  as  her  match  in  everything  except  in  the  number  of  "  wooden  walls  " — 
is  it  probable  or  possible  that,  with  such  a  power  for  an  enemy  now,  anything 
like  siege  or  invasion  from  the  sea  would  be  attempted  or  thought  of? 

With  a  home  squadron  comprised  chiefly  of  steamers,  it  would  be  difficult  to 
conceive  how  an  enemy  should  so  threaten  as  to  make  it  necessary  to  establish 
a  garrison  of  17,000  or  even  10,000  men  for  six  months  at  Charleston  or  any 
one  of  the  ten  places  named  in  the  report. 

The  operations  of  these  twenty -five  steamers  would  be  mostly  confined  to  our 
own  waters  in  war,  for  with  want  of  depots. of  coal  abroad  they  would  be  required 
to  return  into  port  at  the  end  of  every  two  or  three  weeks  at  least  for  a  fresh 
supply  of  fuel. 

Now  bearing  in  mind  my  answer  to  your  first  question,  and  always  supposing 
that  one  of  the  principal  features  in  the  system  of  national  defence  hereafter  to 
be  provided  for  this  country  is  naval  supremacy  for  it  in  its  own  waters,  my 
answer  to  your  second  question  is,  with  the  modifications  already  proposed,  that 
all  needful  "reliance"  for  coast  defence  can  be  placed  on  vessels-of-war  and  of 
commerce,  upon  open  shore  batteries,  steam,  railroads,  and  telegraph,  OUR  FREE 
INSTITUTIONS,  and  such  like  "substitutes  for  permanent  fortifications." 

In  reply  to  your  third  and  last  question,  as  to  the  expediency  of  continuing 
the  present  system  of  fortifications  on  the  shores  of  the  northern  lakes,  I  have 
to  remark  that,  in  my  judgment,  it  is  neither  necessary  nor  expedient  so  to  do. 

As  for  invasion  from  that  quarter,  the  difference  in  political  condition  between 
Canada  and  the  United  States  is  an  ample  fortification  for  us. 

Large  bodies  of  the  people  there  now  are  known  to  be  in  favor  either  of 
separation  from  the  mother  country  or  of  annexation  to  the  United  States. 

An  American  army,  therefore,  going  over  into  Canada  in  a  war  with  England 
would  be  looked  upon  by  a  large  number  of  the  people  there  as  friends  and 
deliverers,  not  as  enemies  and  oppressors. 

The  last  war  on  the  waters  of  the  lakes  was  a  war  of  ship-building. 

He  who  could  muster  the  strongest  naval  forces  there — and  there  they  had  to 
be  created — had  the  supremacy.  And  if,  in  case  of  war  now,  England  should 
succeed  in  getting  ahead  of  us  with  her  naval  forces  on  the  lakes  she  could 
inflict  great  injury.  A  few  days  of  uninterrupted  control  there  by  a  few  armed 
vessels,  insignificant  altogether  as  to  absolute  force,  would  make  dreadful  havoc 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES  477 

upon  our  lake  shipping,  our  lake  commerce,  and  our  lake  towns,  if  no  precautions 
were  taken  to  guard  against  it. 

The  commerce  of  the  lakes  will  soon  be  worth  to  us  as  much  or  more  than 
the  commerce  of  the  Atlantic. 

During  the  season  of  lake  navigation  there  is  put  afloat  upon  those  waters 
every  week,  on  the  average,  millions  of  American  property,  besides  vessels  and 
the  lives  of  American  citizens. 

In  no  part  of  the  world,  except  in  the  offings  and  harbors  of  the  great  com- 
mercial emporiums,  is  there  to  be  found  such  a  concentration  of  merchandise  afloat. 
Nor  is  there,  in  case  of  our  naval  inferiority  upon  the  lakes,  any  part  of  the 
world  that  affords  such  an  abundant  harvest  of  prizes  to  tempt  the  cupidity  of 
seamen. 

It  is  the  policy  of  this  country  never  to  be  the  aggressor;  it- loves  peace  and 
hates  war,  and  therefore  it  is  not  likely  ever  to  be  the  party  to  strike  the  first 
blow  in  war.  That  is  an  advantage  at  which  Great  Britain  generally  aims,  and 
that  she  fully  understands  and  appreciates  the  importance  of  striking  quickly 
upon  the  lakes  in  case  of  war  with  this  country  we  have  evidence  conclusive. 

Before  she  sent  her  minister  plenipotentiary  here  with  his  ultimatum,  when 
the  friendly  relations  between  the  two  countries  a  few  years  ago  seemed  to  be  so 
much  in  danger,  she  first  assembled  a  fleet  of  fifty-odd  sail  in  our  waters,  and 
upon  our  frontiers  one-third  of  the  whole  British  army,  notwithstanding  that 
she  was  at  that  time  engaged  in  two  distant  and  expensive  foreign  wars. 

No  one  who,  calling  to  mind  those  times,  will  examine  her  military  journals 
of  that  day  can  foil  to  be  impressed  with  the  fact  that  her  forces  were  especially 
arranged  with  a  view  to  Canada  and  the  lakes,  and  that  there  the  first  blow,  or 
a  blow  synchronous  with  the  first,  was  to  be  struck.  Her  intentions  then  were 
too  manifest  to  be  forgotten  or  disregarded  even  now. 

It  is  true  the  war  might  commence  during  the  season  when  the  navigation  of 
the  lakes  is  annually  closed,  and  when,  consequently,  all  naval  forces  would  be 
tied  up.  In  that  case  we  should  .have  nothing  to  fear.  But  it  might  commence 
in  the  height  of  the  commercial  season ;  and  the  war  might  be  commenced  on 
her  part  by  first  admitting  from  the  sea  a  fleet  of  small-class  vessels,  passing 
them  up  through  the  Canadian  ship-canals  into  the  lakes,  and  there  letting  the 
declaration  of  her  intentions  consist  in  an  attack  upon  Buffalo,  Chicago,  and 
other  lake  towns  with  their  shipping. 

These  interests  are  too  valuable  and  important  to  be  left  at  the  mercy  of  an 
enemy  even  for  a  day.  Therefore  it  would  be  advisable,  so  long  as  Canada  is 
an  English  colony,  to  provide  against  a  naval  surprise  on  the  lakes. 

For  this  purpose  it  is  only  necessary  to  look  to  the  means  of  assembling 
quickly  a  small  naval  force  on  the  lakes,  and,  in  the  meantime,  to  place  at  the 
several  cities  and  towns,  and  at  the  termini  of  the  various  railroads  and  canals 
along  the  lake  shores,  a  few  pieces  of  ordnance,  according  to  the  plan  suggested 
for  the  towns  generally  along  the  Atlantic  seaboard. 

The  forts  which  are  already  on  the  lakes  need  not  be  garrisoned  in  war  only 
until  we  acquire  the  naval  supremacy  there. 

We  have  canals  and  railroads  by  which  we  could  send  the  frames  of  vessels 
and  all  requisite  naval  means  to  the  lakes  at  short  notice  and  in  time  to  re-enforce 
what  we  might  suddenly  assemble  there. 

It  seems,  therefore,  that,  acting  upon  the  policy  of  so  shaping  our  system  of 
national  defence  as  to  secure  the  naval  supremacy  in  our  own  waters,  we  should 
proceed  to  build  the  engines,  provide  the  armaments,  and  get  out  at  the  navy 
yards  of  Memphis  and  New  York  the  frames  of  a  few  small  men-of-war  steamers 
for  the  lakes.  The  engines  and  the  armaments  might  be  placed  upon  the  lake 
shores  at  once.  The  frames,  on  the  first  appearance  of  the  war  cloud,  could  be 
sent  there  by  the  Erie  and  the  Michigan  canals,  put  together,  and  be  ready  for 
launching  at  a  moment's  warning. 


478  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

The  Mediterranean  is  an  inland  sea,  so  are  our  lakes  and  rivers.  Eminently 
continental  in  its  proportions  and  maritime  in  its  features,  our  country  looks  out 
upon  blue  water  to  the  east,  the  south,  and  the  west ;  the  ocean  front  of  the 
United  States  alone  is  greater  in  extent  than  the  ocean  front  of  the  whole  of 
Europe.  Therefore,  like  action  to  the  orator,  a  navy  to  us  is  the  first,  second, 
and  third  chief  requisite  to  any  effective  system  of  national  defence. 
Respectfully,  &c., 

M.  F.  MAURY, 
Lieutenant  United  States  Navy. 
Hon.  CHARLES  M.  CONRAD, 

Secretary  of  War. 


No.  7. 
Report  of  Lieutenant  J.  A.  Dahlgren. 

ORDNANCE  OFFICE,  UNITED  STATES  NAVY  YARD, 

W^ashington,  September,  1851. 

SIR  :  I  had  the  honor  to  receive  a  communication  from  the  honorable  Sec- 
retary of  the  Navy,  enclosing  certain  queries  from  yourself  in  relation  to  the 
defences  of  the  United  States  coast,  with  directions  to  "  give  to  the  subject  my 
best  reflections,  and  communicate  the  result  to  the  Secretary  of  War."  I  have 
complied  with  the  directions  of  the  honorable  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  as  far  as 
permitted  by  the  limited  time  allowed  for  the  purpose,  and  now  beg  leave,  very 
respectfully,  to  lay  before  you  such  facts  and  opinions  as  have  a  bearing  on  the 
subject-matter  of  the  queries  proposed. 

Query  1. — To  what  extent,  if  any,  ought  the  present  system  of  fortifications 
for  the  protection  of  our  seaboard  to  be  modified,  in  consequence  of  the  applica- 
tion of  steam  to  vessels-of-war,  the  invention  or  improvement  of  projectiles,  or 
other  changes  that  have  taken  place  since  it  was  adopted  in  the  year  1816  ? 

Shells  projected  horizontally  from  cannon  are  most  destructive  agents  when 
used  against  shipping,  but  are  not  so  efficacious  against  the  masonry  of  regular 
works  as  shot,  though  in  entering  an  embrasure  and  bursting  they  might  do 
considerable  mischief. 

So  far,  therefore,  as  casemated  batteries  are  concerned,  shells  have  added 
very  little  to  the  power  of  ships ;  but  against  guns  en  barbette  they  will  be 
found  of  material  assistance,  especially  if  charged  with  balls  and  used  as 
shrapnel.  And  against  open  works,  the  concentration  afforded  by  the  well- 
served  broadsides  of  one  or  more  ships,  should  suffice  to  silence  the  works,  if 
the  vessels  have  no  unusual  disadvantages  to  encounter,  and  are  brought  within 
sure  distance. 

On  the  other  hand,  shells  are  exceedingly  destructive  to  vessels  if  exploded 
in  their  sides ;  but  as  land  works  already  possess,  in  shot,  especially  when 
heated,  superabundant  means  for  destroying  ships  that  will  expose  themselves 
long  enough  to  their  fire,  it  may,  on  the  whole,  be  deemed  fairly  doubtful 
whether,  in  a  general  view,  the  introduction  of  shells  has  materially  altered  the 
relations  of  fort  and  ship  when  opposed  to  each  other. 

If  the  question  between  them  were  merely  the  relative  capacity,  so  far  as 
attack  and  defence  were  concerned,  there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  solving  it. 
But  in  the  great  majority  of  cases,  where  the  sea  defences  of  the  United  States 
are  concerned,  the  true  question  is  in  regard  to  the  capacity  of  ships  to  endure 
the  fire  of  forts  long  enough  to  pass  them  without  so  much  injury  as  to  interfere 
with  the  subsequent  operations. 

And  it  is  on  this  account  that  the  application  of  steam  is  to  be  considered  as 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  479 

materially  affecting  the  power  of  forts.  For  whether  it  be  used  as  a  chief  motive 
power  or  as  an  auxiliary,  it  gives  great  facility  in  concentrating  and  appearing 
suddenly  on  given  points,  and  in  assuring  a  certain  and  rapid  transit  when 
required  to  pass  the  fire  of  a  fort. 

In  the  defence  of  nearly  every  one  of  the  large  commercial  cities,  it  will  be 
observed  that  the  chief  reliance  to  prevent  the  approach  of  an  enemy  is  by 
fortifying  some  approach  to  it ;  the  naval  question  merely  touches  the  practica- 
bility of  passing  the  fire  of  these  works,  and  not  of  sustaining  it  any  longer  than 
may  be  necessary  in  the  most  rapid  movement  that  the  ship  is  capable  of. 

To  illustrate  this  practically  let  us  turn  to  the  mode  proposed  in  the  engineer's 
report*  for  excluding  an  enemy  from  the  lower  bay  of  New  York  by  a  fort  on 
Sandy  Hook,  with  floating  batteries  and  bomb  ketches  inside. 

The  ordnance  commonly  mounted  in  the  coast  fortifications  are  32-pounders, 
42-pounders,  and  eight-inch  howitzers.  The  effective  fire  of  the  32-pounder  can 
hardly  be  said  to  extend  beyond  a  mile  where  heavy  ships  are  concerned. 

At  that  distance  the  penetration  will  not  exceed  fourteen  inches  when  the 
shot  strikes  the  surface  fairly  and  directly.  If  the  impact  be  oblique  or  on 
ricochet,  the  penetration  is  decreased  accordingly.  The  effect  of  the  fire  is 
further  decreased  by  the  unavoidable  deviation  of  shot  at  the  distance  of  a  mile, 
and  by  the  movement  of  the  object  which  is  changing  its  position  in  direction 
and  distance.  It  would  be  difficult  to  estimate  correctly  the  number  of  shot 
which  would  have  a  maximum  penetration  under  these  circumstances,  but 
perhaps  not  more  than  one  in  ten.  The  forty-two  pounder  and  army  eight-inch 
howitzer  will  not  vary  this  capacity  considerably,  and  it  seems  reasonable  to 
assume  that,  if  the  distance  be  greater  than  a  mile  no  material  injury  will  be 
experienced  from  such  pieces  by  a  heavy  ship  when  under  way. 

The  sketch  annexed  represents  the  localities  in  question  as  given  by  the  chart 
of  the  Coast  Survey.  The  track  at  mean  low  water  allowed  to  the  heaviest 
steamerst  is  shown  by  the  coloring. 

The  effective  fire  for  the  proposed  fort  as  indicated  by  the  circle,  evidently 
covers  no  considerable  part  of  the  passage,  and  if  a  steamer  chose  to  take  the 
main  channel  she  would,  by  keeping  its  extreme  right,  be  under  fire  about  six 
or  seven  minutes,  and  never  approach  the  guns  of  the  fort  nearer  than  fourteen 
hundred  yards,  thus  rendering  the  chances  of  any  damage  exceedingly  slight. 
But  the  swash  channel  offers  sufficient  depth  for  her  draught,  and  by  using  it 
the  steamer  would  pass  entirely  out  of  reach  of  the  fort.  The  sole  reliance, 
then,  to  exclude  the  fleet  becomes  the  floating  batteries  and  bomb  ketches ; 
whether  they  may  be  trusted  or  not  will  be  considered  subsequently;  the  present 
object  is  merely  to  inquire  if  the  fort  has  the  power  of  itself  to  exclude  shipping. 
It  seems  evident,  therefore,  that  while  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  forts  have 
gained  any  advantage  from  the  use  of  shells,  it  is  certain  their  efficacy  has  been 
considerably  diminished  by  the  application  of  steam  to  the  vessels-of-war, 
which  by  their  decreased  draught  are  enabled  to  enter  channels  not  accessible 
to  ships -of-the-line,  and  when  obliged  to  pass  the  fire  of  permanent  works  are 
enabled  to  do  so  in  so  little  time  as  hardly  to  afford  the  batteries  an  opportunity 
to  effect  any  essential  damage. 

Query  2. — What  reliance  could  be  placed  on  vessels  of  war  or  of  commerce, 
floating  batteries,  gunboats,  and  other  temporary  substitutes  for  permanent  forti- 
fications 1 

In  proceeding  to  answer  this  query,  I  find  the  ground  already  occupied  by 
certain  propositions  contained  in  an  official  document  drawn  up  in  1840  in  rela- 
tion to  the  defences  of  the  coast.  The  source  from  which  these  views  emanate 
and  their  official  character  entitle  them  to  full  consideration,  so  that  I  do  not 

0  To  War  Department,  1840. 

•j-  Susquehanna,  full  loaded,  draws  nineteen  feet  eleven  inches. 


480  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

Sketch  of  nook  with  fort — Its  fire  and  channel  way. 


The  effective  fire  of  the  fort  is  shown  by  the  circle. 

feel  at  liberty  to  disregard  them  in  treating  the  question  proposed,  and  it  becomes 
imperative  to  scrutinize  them ;  because,  if  correct,  they  not  only  establish  what 
they  were  designed  to  prove,  the  unfitness  of  naval  forces  for  protecting  the 
coast,  but  also  their  utter  unfitness  for  any  purpose  whatever,  which  it  is  pre- 
sumed was  not  contemplated. 

The  passages  referred  to  are  as  follows  : 

"  Even  should  all  these,  in  the  form  we  have  presented  them,  be 
objected  to,  we  may  still  challenge  opposition  to  the  following  broad  proposi- 
tions, namely : 

"First.  If  the  sea-coast  is  to  be  defended  by  naval  means  exclusively,  the 
defensive  force  at  each  point  deemed  worthy  of  protection  must  be  at  least  equal 
in  power  to  the  attacking  force. 

"  Second.  As,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  there  can  be  no  reason  for  expecting 
an  attack  on  one  of  these  points  rather  than  another,  and  no  time  for  transferring 
our  state  of  preparation  from  one  to  another  after  an  attack  has  been  declared, 
.each  of  them  must  have  assigned  to  it  the  requisite  means ;  and, 
^  "  Third.  Consequently,  this .  system  demands  a  power  and  defence  as  many 
times  greater  than  that  in  the  attack  as  there  are  points  to  be  covered." 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  481 

To  the  first  proposition  there  lies  a  reasonable  demurrer,  because,  under  the 
circumstances  likely  to  attend  the  defence  of  any  harbor  or  roadstead  which  is 
"  approached  by  a  channel,  great  disadvantage  must  accompany  the  attempt, 
particularly  when  the  passage  lies  among  the  shoals,  of  which  there  is  no  indica- 
tion, save  by  artificial  marks  or  the  lead.  Where  the  movements  of  ships  are 
only  limited  by  bold  shores  there  can  be  little  embarrassment  in  keeping  them 
from  danger;  but  where  the  keenest  eye  can  detect  nothing  on  the  surface  of 
-  the  water  to  give  warning  of  the  risk,  and  a  slight  error  in  the  course  or  a  tide- 
eddy  may  ground  a  ship  directly  under  fire,  it  is  evident  that  the  attention 
requisite  to  clear  these  obstacles  successfully  will  prevent  the  officers  of  a  fleet 
from  giving  full  directions  to  its  offensive  powers,  though  at  the  very  time  the 
opposing  ship  may  be  concentrating  a  deliberate  and  destructive  fire  on  the 
leading  ship  attempting  to  enter,  or  the  assailants  may  be  compelled  by  wind 
and  weather  to  postpone  essaying  the  entrance,  even  under  these  disadvantages  ; 
while  thus  detained  he  must  be  exposed  to  the  severe  gales  and  to  much  damage, 
a  consideration  not  to  be  overlooked  on  our  coast,  even  in  the  summer  months. 
In  1778  the  English  and  French  fleets,  then  off  Rhode  Island,  were  separated 
from  each  other  while  manoeuvring  for  the  weather  gauge  during  the  month  of 
August,  and  many  of  the  heaviest  ships  dismasted  on  both  sides. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  defending  force,  fully  cognizant  of  the  difficulties 
which  await  the  enemy,  either  take  such  position  at  anchor,  or  under  way  with 
steam  or  sail,  as  will  be  best  suited  to  annoy  the  enemy  when  most  occupied  in 
clearing  the  intricacies  of  unknown  shoals,  and  increase  the  danger  by  concen- 
trating a  deliberate  fire  at  a  moment  critical  not  only  to  the  vessel  most  exposed 
to  it  but  to  those  which  follow  and  are  liable  to  be  thrown  into  disorder  by  the 
least  mishap. 

Be  it  remembered  that  this  capacity  of  transferring  the  power  of  its  armament 
from  one  point  to  another  is  the  essential  quality  in  the  present  case  which  the 
fort  does  not  possess. 

Under  such  circumstances  the  most  cool  and  brave  are  apt  to  hasten  too 
much,  naturally  desiring  to  shorten  the  time  of  inaction,  and  to  make  some 
return  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy ;  hence  the  liability  to  lose  the  services  of  one  or 
more  ships  in  the  moment  of  greatest  need. 

Well  known  instances  of  this  may  be  cited.  While  standing  in  to  attack  the 
French  at  the  Nile,  Nelson  lost  the  use  of  the  Culloden,  74,  which  grounded  on 
a  shoal,  though  not  even  under  fire  at  the  time,  arid  remained  there  useless 
during  the  whole  action.  At  Copenhagen  three  of  his  line  grounded  on  a  shoal — 
the  Agamemnon,  74,  the  Russell,  74,  and  Belloua,  74 ;  and,  in  leaving  their 
anchors  during  the  suspension  of  hostilities,  the  Defiance  and  Nelson's  own 
ship,  the  Elephant,  with  several  others,  grounded  under  the  guns  of  the  Three- 
Crown  battery. 

The  defending  force  has,  moreover,  the  advantage,  if  anchored,  of  being  able 
to  post  some  guns  ashore  so  as  to  enfilade  vessels  taking  the  direction  of  its  own 
line,  and  also  preven^  the  weather  ships  from  being  doubled  on  by  the  enemy. 

Every  naval  man  will  comprehend  the  difficulties  of  navigating  a  fleet  of 
heavy  ships  along  channels  skirted  closely  by  shoals  and  commanded  through- 
out their  extent  by  the  guns  of  an  enemy's  line ;  and  the  advantages,  on  the 
other  side,  of  being  able  deliberately  to  rake  ships  approaching  in  that  way  will 
be  very  apparent. 

Among  the  events  of  the  revolution  may  be  found  an  apt  illustration  of  this : 
In  1778  a  large  force  was  despatched  from  France  with  the  view  of  surprising 
the  English  fleet  in  the  Delaware.  Philadelphia  had  been  evacuated,  however. 
The  Count  de  Estaing  followed  to  New  York,  and  appeared  off  that  harbor 
about  the  10th  of  July.  Lord  Howe  was  by  no  means  prepared  for  his  arrival, 
but,  nevertheless,  he  proceeded  with  energy  and  judgment  to  defend  the  entrance 
with  a  force  vastly  inferior  to  that  of  the  enemy. 
H.  Rep.  Com.  86 31 


482  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

The  French  admiral,  after  deliberating  some  ten  days,  finally  declined  to 
attack,  and  on  the  22d  of  July  departed  on  another  expedition. 

On  this  occasion  there  were  strong  motives  for  bringing  the  English  fleet  to 
action.  Their  army  now  occupied  no  other  of  the  large  cities  than  New  York. 
The  recent  evacuation  of  Philadelphia  was  not  calculated  to  encourage  the 
hopes  of  the  royalists,  and  if  "  the  men-of-war  were  defeated  at  this  time,  the 
fleet  of  transports  and  victuallers  must  have  been  destroyed,  and  the  army  of 
course  fallen  with  them." — (Eakin,  page  77.)  The  reinforcements,  too,  arriving 
to  succor  the  fleet,  would  have  been  cut  off  in  detail.  The  consequence  might 
have  been  immediately  fatal  to  the  hopes  of  the  British,  though  favorable  to  the 
cause  of  humanity,  by  terminating  a  struggle  which  endured  four  years  subse- 
quently. 

The  difference  in  force  seemed  sufficient  to  justify  an  engagement  under  any 
circumstances.  The  French  had  twelve  ships  of  the  line,  carrying  eight  hun- 
dred and  seventy-six  guns.  The  English  only  nine  ships  that  could  be  brought 
into  line,  and  these  mounting  five  hundred  and  thirty-four  guns.  The  disparity 
was  even  greater  than  that  expressed  by  these  figures,  as  the  French  carried 
their  guns  in  ships  far  superior  in  size  and  strength  to  those  of  the  British. 

The  main  channel  which  the  French  were  obliged  to  make  use  of  was  thus 
defended  by  Lord  Howe :  Five  ships  of  fifty -four  guns  and  one  of  fifty  were 
anchored  in  line  bearing  about  W.NW.  from  the  easternmost  vessel  that  lay 
near  to  a  storeship,  which  was  armed  with  some  guns,  and  anchored  close  in 
with  the  Hook.  A  battery  of  two  howitzers  and  another  of  three  18-pounders 
were  posted  on  the  shore  close  to  the  weather-ship  to  prevent  that  end  from 
being  doubled  on,  and  four  regiments  landed  on  the  Hook  to  repel  any  attempt 
of  the  French  to  disembark  troops  and  destroy  the  batteries.  Three  ships  were 
placed  near  the  bar  to  embarrass  the  passage,  and  a  sixty-four,  with  frigates, 
lay  inside  of  the  line  to  be  used  as  occasion  might  require. 

When  the  French  had  passed  the  bar  in  sufficient  force,  the  three  ships  were 
to  retire  and  take  the  rear  of  the  line,  "  which  would  bring  their  broadsides  to 
bear  upon  the  direct  line  of  approach N  in  the  narrowest  part  of  it,  when,  by 
veering  again,  they  would  resume  their  situations,  and  continue  to  command  the 
long  line  of  course  which  the  enemy  must  pursue  as  he  advances,  while  the 
smaller  vessels  were  so  placed  as  to  harass  and  distress  him  from  inaccessible 
positions." — (Eakin,  page  86.) 

The  plan  of  defence  was  well  conceived,  and  would  no  doubt  have  been  care- 
fully executed. 

The  French  admiral  declined  to  attack  under  these  circumstances,  and  in  all 
probability  would  have  suffered  great  damage,  if  not  defeat,  if  he  had  made  the 
attempt. 

The  superiority  which  a  naval  force  derived  from  its  mobility  over  the 
strongest  works  is  very  apparent  in  this  case. 

The  French  ships  could  not  even  pass  the  bar  at  leisure ;  they  would  have 
been  under  fire  from  the  first  in  venturing  to  do  so,  and  be  exposed  to  a  raking 
fire  in  approaching  the  British  line,  which  they  were  not  even  at  liberty  to  pass 
as  they  could  have  done,  if  threatened  by  the  fire  of  a  fort  only,  but  would 
have  been  obliged  to  engage  and  to  destroy  it  as  an  indispensable  preliminary 
to  any  further  operations. 

Touching  the  second  proposition,  it  may  be  said  that  there  is  no  doubt  now 
of  the  time  that  will  be  required  to  carry  intelligence  from  any  one  point  to 
another,  nor  of  that  which  may  be  needed  to  transfer  aid  from  point  to  point 
along  the  seaboard. 

The  appearance  of  an  enemy,  his  force,  and  movements,  may  be  known  at 
New  Orleans  almost  instantly  after  it  is  known  at  Boston,  and  at  any  point 
between  these  cities ;  and  whatever  steam  force  may  have  been  posted  at  the 
principal  entrances  can  be  transferred  from  one  of  them  to  another  at  a  reliabel 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 


483 


Defence  of  New  York  harbor,  by  Lord  Howe,  against  the  French  fleet,  July,  1778. 


rate  of  speed.  Ten  knots  per  hour  is  not  excessive  for  a  good  ocean  steamer  in 
any  weather  in  which  an  enemy  would  be  likely  to  operate  in  a  matter  so  deli- 
cate as  forcing  a  disputed  channel. 


484  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

The  question,  therefore,  is  not  whether  the  inferior  force  stationed  at  a  port 
may  be  able  to  make  good  a  final  defence  against  an  enemy  appearing  sud- 
denly, but  whether  it  may  have  the  power  to  delay  his  movements  until  aid 
shall  arrive  from  another  quarter. 

Thus, -in  thirteen  hours  after  the  first  sight  of  an  enemy  from  the  Neversink 
heights,  a  squadron  from  the  Delaware  would  be  off  Sandy  Hook ;  and  twenty- 
eight  hours  would  bring  up  a  force  from  the  Chesapeake. 

If  the  hostile  fleet  shall  not  be  able  to  pass  the  channel,  destroy  the  squadron 
that  defends  it,  and  still  be  in  a  state  to  attempt  the  passage  of  the  Narrows  in 
ilinn  thirteen  hours,  it  is  very  certain  that  a  fresh  squadron,  even  though 
somewhat  inferior,  will  afford  him  good  reason  to  look  to  his  own  defence,  and 
think  of  retreating,  instead  of  venturing  to  prosecute  his  operations.  Finally, 
the  Cluvjipcake  vessels,  arriving  in  fifteen  hours  after  the  Delaware  steamers, 
will  give  more  than  a  chance  for  capturing  at  least  every  steamer  of  the  enemy 
that  has  been  crippled  in  the  engagement  with  the  New  York  squadron. 

The  means  requisite,  therefore,  at  each  port,  are  those  that  will  insure  the 
time  needed  to  concentrate  the  other  portions  of  the  home  squadron. 

The  result  of  the  preceding  propositions,  as  announced  in  the  third,  has 
received  its  practical  application  in  a  preceding  passage,*  thus:  "The  prepara- 
tion by  the  enemy  of  twenty  steam  frigates  would  require  the  construction  of 
two  hundred  of  equal  force  on  our  part,  supposing  that  we  design  to  cover  but 
ten  of  our  principal  harbors,  leaving  all  others  at  his  mercy." 

The  principal  objection  to  the  defensive  position  thus  assumed  to  be  imposed 
on  the  two  hundred  steamers,  by  the  necessities  of  the  first  and  second  proposi- 
tions, would  be  the  impossibility  of  carrying  it  into  execution.  There  is  certainly 
no  precedent  for  such  a  system  of  inaction ;  and  if  any  naval  officer  were  so 
disposed,  it  is  more  than  probable'  that  public  opinion  would  hardly  permit  the 
precedent  to  occur  here.  Novel  it  would  be  to  see  two  hundred  steamers  divided 
into  squadrons  at  distant  points,  quietly  awaiting  the  onset  of  one-tenth  their 
whole  number.  The  enemy  himself  would  probably  be  alarmed  at  such  a 
peculiar  demonstration,  and  rather  be  inclined  to  look  upon  it  as  a  trap  for  his 
twenty  ships. 

Admitting,  for  an  instant,  that  any  necessity  could  exist  for  pursuing  a  plan 
BO  strictly  defensive  in  its  character,  would  it  not  be  better  to  send  the  ships  out 
to  sea,  where  the  public  attention  would  not  be  enforced  to  the  humiliating 
character  of  the  operation,  and  cause  them  to  form  a  cordon  along  the  coast, 
from  Maine  to  Florida?  This  distance  of  fourteen  hundred  miles  could  be  easily 
lined  by  two  hundred  ships,  seven  miles  asunder;  and  being  within  the  notice 
of  any  unusual  signal  from  each  other,  -the  enemy's  twenty  ships,  in  attempting 
to  pass  the  line,  would  be  seen  and  overhauled  by  the  ready  concentration  of  an 
equal  number  from  the  cordon,  before  he  could  reach  the  port  to  be  assailed. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  no  naval  officer  can  doubt  that  if  the  United  States  had 
fully  available  two  hundred  war-steamers  of  the  largest  class,  or  sailing  ships  of 
equal  tonnage,  the  question  would  be  entirely  in  regard  to  the  character  of 
offensive  operations.  It  would  no  longer  be  an  object  to  defend  our  own  ports, 
but  to  capture  and  destroy  the  enemy's  ships  in  distant  seas,  while  protecting 
his  colonies  and  trade — to  intercept  his  commerce  everywhere — to  dispute  the 
command  of  the  high  seas  with  his  mightiest  fleets,  and  blockade  every  naval 
station  of  his  island  empire. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  prosecute  further  objections  to  these  propositions. 
Naval  men,  with  hardly  an  exception,  would  take  the  very  converse  of  the  first 
and  second  propositions,  and  utterly  protest  against  the  consequent  contained  in 
the  third.  Stronger  reasons  have  yet  to  be  adduced  to  make  good  the  position 
that  defence  by  means  exclusively  naval  is  impracticable,  for  the  reasons  given 
'in  these  three  propositions. 

*  Engineers'  report,  page  14. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  485 

The  practical  interpretation  of  the  second  query,  however,  has  no  reference 
to  the  question  of  an  exclusive  defence  by  the  forts  or  ships,  so  far  as  the 
Atlantic  coast  is  concerned,  if  I  understand  rightly.  The  answer  must  necessa- 
rily be  based  upon  the  existing  state  of  things ;  and  as  a  great  part  of  the  con- 
templated system  of  coast  fortification  has  been  completed,  the  expediency  of 
substituting  ships,  &c.,  has  reference  only  to  such  of  the  system  as  remains 
unfinished. 

The  works  for  the  protection  of  Boston  and  of  the  navy  yard  at  Norfolk  are 
already  completed.  At  New  York,  likewise,  excepting  the  fort  on  Sandy  Hook. 
The  approach  to  Philadelphia,  however,  and  the  anchorage  at  the  breakwater 
are  yet  undefended,  though  the  works  have  been  planned  and  perhaps  partly 
appropriated  for. 

I  have  no  doubt  when  these  places,  and  some  harbor  on  the  southeast  coast, 
have  received  whatever  aid  can  be  furnished  by  the  art  of  the  engineer,  that  a 
naval  force  of  no  immoderate  extent  will  be  fully  competent  to  defend  the 
Atlantic  seacoast  from  any  attempts  which  an  enemy  would  find  it  advisable  to 
make. 

Under  no  circumstances,  except  of  the  most  unquestionable  superiority  at  sea, 
is  it  presumed  that  it  would  be  well  to  resort  to  a  defence  exclusively  naval. 

The  ship  and  the  fort  have  each  a  particular  province  in  every  general  system  of 
well  regulated  national  defence,  and  if  these  can  be  agreed  on  the  result  will  be 
reliable  and  economical.  I  do  not  mean  to  apply  the  latter  word  to  the  least 
possible  outlay  of  means,  but  to  the  judicious  expenditure  of  whatever  may  be 
required  to  effect  the  end  proposed. 

It  is  not  needful  here  to  enter  into  any  statement  of  the  part  properly  allotted 
to  forts ;  this  has  been  ably  and  frequently  expounded  by  the  chief  engineer. 

Admitting  them  fully,  and  the  necessity  also  for  the  works  in  the  principal 
points  above  alluded  to,  as  the  base  for  the  naval  operations  that  are  to  guard 
the  intermediate  points,  it  may  be  well  to  examine  whether  even  the  great  har- 
bors and  watercourses  are  fully  defensible  by  fortifications,  when  of  the  most 
extensive  character. 

Let  us  again  revert  to  the  defences  of  New  York. 

The  first  object  is  to  prevent  the  occupation  of  the  lower  harbor  by  a  hostile 
fleet,  for  if  able  to  effect  this  the  enemy  would  obtain  the  following  advantages, 
according  to  the  report  of  the  board  of  engineers,  (page  54 :) 

"An  enemy's  squadron  being  in  the  bay,  into  which  entrance  is  very  easy, 
would  set  a  seal  upon  this  outlet  of  the  harbor.  Not  a  vessel  could  enter  or 
depart  at  any  season  of  the  year.  And  it  would  also  intercept  the  water  com- 
munication, by  way  of  the  Raritan,  between  New  York  and  Philadelphia. 

"The  same  squadron  could  land  a  force  on  the  beach  of  Gravesend  bay,  (the 
place  of  the  landing  of  the  British,  which  brought  on  the  battle  of  Long  Island, 
in  the  revolutionary  war,)  within  seven  miles  of  the  city  of  Brooklyn,  of  its 
commanding  heights,  and  of  the  navy  yard,  with  no  intervening  obstacle  of  any 
sort. 

"This  danger  is  imminent,  and  it  would  not  fail,  in  the  event  of  war,  to  be  as 
fully  realized  as  it  was  during  the  last  war,  when,  on  the  rumor  of  an  expedi- 
tion being  in  preparation  in  England,  27,000  militia  were  assembled  to  cover 
the  city  from  an  attack  of  this  sort.  It  is  apparent  that  the  defences  near  the 
city  and  those  of  the  Narrows,  indispensable  as  they  are  for  other  purposes, 
cannot  be  made  to  prevent  this  enterprise." 

There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  great  damage  that  would  be  wrought  to  the 
revenue  of  the  government,  and  to  the  immense  interests  of  various  sections,  by 
the  presence  of  an  enemy's  force  in  the  lower  harbor.  A  heavy  expenditure 
would  be  well  laid  out  in  establishing  the  means  of  prevention,  and  this  should 
certainly  be  looked  to  in  time. 


486  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

What  fortifications,  then,  can  be  applied  to  the  purpose,  and  how  far  will  they 
be  efficacious  in  excluding  a  fleet  ? 

A  glance  at  the  chart  will  show  a  wide  extent  of  water  between  the  outer 
extremes  of  land  that  form  the  harbor  from  Sandy  Hook  to  Coney  island; 
the  distance  is  about  seven  miles.  Large  ships,  however,  are  not  at  liberty  to 
pass  over  any  part  of  this  entrance.  Their  course  is  confined  to  two  channels, 
the  principal  one  of  which  is  near  the  Hook,  and  another  somewhat  to  the  north- 
ward of  it,  (the  swash.)  Line-of-battle  ships  can  use  the  first  only,  but  the 
heaviest  steam  frigate  in  our  service,  when  loaded  for  a  long  cruise,  only  draws 
twenty  feet,  (the  Susquehauna,)  and  therefore  has  sufficient  water  to  pass  in  by 
the  swash  channel. 

According  to  their  report  the  board  of  engineers  propose  to  fortify  the  east 
'branch  and  middle  ground,  under  the  belief  that  the  bottom  was  sufficiently 
permanent  to  receive  such  works.  Recent  surveys,  however,  have  so  far  shaken 
such  opinion  as  to  induce  them  to  forego  the  project. 

The  report  goes  on  to  state,  (page  55 :)  "  This  may,  however,  be  said  with 
certainty,  namely :  that,  all  other  means  failing,  works  may  be  erected  on  Sandy 
Hook  which  will  have  a  good  action  upon  the  channel,  and  under  cover  of 
which  bomb  ketches  or  steam  batteries,  or  both,  may  lie.  With  such  an  arrange- 
ment there  would  be  little  probability  of  the  lower  bay  being  occupied  as  a 
blockading  station." 

I  have  already  endeavored  to  make  it  apparent  that  any  works  on  the  Hook 
would,  of  themselves,  be  insufficient  to  prevent  the  passage  of  ships  into  the 
lower  harbor,  and  it  will  be  perceived  that  this  is  also  fairly  inferable  from  the 
passage  just  quoted,  as  it  includes  other  aid  in  the  arrangement  designed  to  pre- 
vent the  occupation  of  the  lower  harbor. 

Line-of-battle  ships,  in  taking  the  main  channel,  would,  however,  sustain  the 
fire  of  a  fort  without  material  detriment  for  the  eight  or  ten  minutes  required  to 
pass  it,  with  a  fair  wind  and  tide ;  and,  if  annoyed  by  the  floating  batteries  and 
ketches,  would  not  hesitate  to  run  close  to  them  and  brush  them  with  a  few 
broadsides,  which  would  probably  leave  them  little  more  to  do  than  to  take  care 
of  themselves. 

The  heaviest  steamers,  by  taking  the  swash  channel,  would  avoid  the  fire  of 
the  fort  and  floating  batteries  altogether,  and  afterward  have  leisure  to  destroy 
the  latter  from  the  anchorage  of  the  lower  harbor. 

So  far,  therefore,  from  believing  that,  "  with  such  an  arrangement,  there  would 
be  little  probability  of  the  lower  bay  being  occupied  as  a  blockading  station," 
it  seems  conclusive  that  tlie  occupation  of  the  lower  harbor  by  a  naval  force 
would  be  liable  to  the  least  degree  of  interruption  from  the  defences  planned  for 
that  purpose.  The  report  itself  admits  the  necessity  of  using  floating  batteries 
and  bomb  ketches  as  auxiliaries,  which,  of  all  the  naval  means,  are  certainly 
the  least  worthy  of  reliance.  With  the  limited  preventive  powers  of  a  fort,  so 
far  as  passage  is  concerned,  they  have  in  no  degree  the  least  of  its  capacity  to 
endure  battering,  their  material  being  as  vulnerable  as  that  of  a  ship,  *without 
its  great  advantage  of  passing  from  one  point  to  another,  whether  far  or  near. 
And  as  for  bomb  ketches  against  objects  no  larger  than  ships,  and  those  in  rapid 
motion,  it  may  be  said  that  the  chances  of  even  a  single  bomb  dropping  upon 
them  are  too  remote  to  be  taken  into  account  as  a  means  of  defence  in  the  con- 
ditions of  this  case. 

Conceiving,  therefore,  the  entrance  of  an  enemy  into  the  lower  harbor  to  be 
fairly  feasible,  the  next  matter  for  consideration  is  the  capacity  of  the  inner 
defences  to  prevent  entrance  into  the  upper  harbor  and  the  destruction  of  such 
means  of  war  and  revenue  as  may  be  found  in  and  about  the  city,  such  as  the 
vessels-of-war  built  or  building  at  the  navy  yard,  of  the  timber,  ordnance,  and 
stores,  arid,  above  all,  of  the  extensive  private  establishments  for  manufacturing 
steam-engines ;  a  purpose  which,  if  effected,  would  cripple  the  nation  in  every 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  487 

enterprise  of  offence  and  defence,  and  probably  could  not  be  remedied  in  the 
course  of  a  war. 

The  levying  of  contributions  might  not  be  disregarded  where  means  so  ample 
were  placed  by  the  chances  of  war  within  the  grasp  of  an  invader.  These 
objects  individually  are  sufficient  to  warrant  a  military  attempt  on  a  large  scale. 

The  number  and  character  of  the  works  arranged  by  the  engineers  are  best 
set  forth  in  the  language  of  the  "  Report,"  page  54  : 

"At  the  Narrows,  about  seven  miles  below  the  city,  the  passage  becomes  so 
contracted  as  to  permit  good  disposition  to  be  made  for  defence.  On  the  Long 
Island  side  of  the  Narrows  is  Fort  Lafayette,  which  is  a  strong  water  battery, 
standing  on  a  reef  at  some  distance  from  the  shore ;  and  immediately  behind  it, 
on  the  top  of  the  bank,  is  a  small  but  strong  work  called  Fort  Hamilton. 
Some  repairs  being  applied  to  these  works,  this  position  may  be  regarded  as 
well  occupied. 

"  On  the  west  side  or  Staten  Island  side  of  the  Narrows  are  the  following 
works  belonging  to  the  State  of  New  York,  viz :  Fort  Richmond,  which  is  a 
water  battery ;  Battery  Hudson,  which  is  at  some  height  above  the  water ; 
Battery  Morton,  which  is  a  small  battery  on  the  top  of  the  hill ;  and  Fort 
Tompkins,  which  is  also  on  the  top  of  the  hill,  and  is  the  principal  work.  All 
these  need  great  repairs,  but,  being  once  in  proper  order,  would  afford  a  very 
important  contribution  to  the  defence  of  the  passage,  nothing  further  indeed 
being  contemplated  for  this  position  except  the  construction  of  a  small  redoubt 
on  a  commanding  hill  a  little  to  the  southwest.  The  repairs  of  these  works 
cannot  too  soon  be  taken  in  hand,  and  it  is  hoped  some  arrangements  may  soon 
be  made  with  the  State  authorities  to  that  end. 

"  With  the  Narrows  thus  defended,  and  the  works  near  the  city  in  perfect 
order,  New  York  might  be  regarded  as  pretty  well  protected  against  any  attack 
by  water  through  this  passage." 

That  these  works  are  themselves  perfectly  capable  of  resisting  the  attack  of 
any  fleet  there  is  no  doubt,  but  that  they  are  able  to  interdict  the  passage  to  a 
like  naval  force  is  very  far  from  being  certain ;  on  the  contrary,  the  chances  of 
passing,  without  suffering  to  any  material  extent,  are  reasonable  enough  to 
warrant  the  attempt  in  view  of  the  great  results  to  be  derived  therefrom. 

The  distance  between  the  nearest  batteries  is  seventeen  hundred  yards.  The 
water  is  deep  to  the  very  shore  of  Staten  Island,  and  the  edge  of  the  reef  well 
marked,  on  the  Long  Island  side,  by  the  water  battery.  The  largest  ship, 
therefore,  may  choose  the  course  likely  to  be  most  advantageous  in  receiving 
the  least  weight  of  metal. 

If  the  officer  in  command  run  mid-channel  he  will  be  under  the  fire  of  both 
sides  at  a  most  effective  distance  (eight  hundred  yards)  when  right  abreast  of 
them,  but  by  taking  one  side  or  the  other  he  will  recede  from  one  fire,  and  in 
approaching  the  other  be  exposed  to  no  great  increase  of  effect. 

Suppose  he  choose  to  keep  the  left  shore  and  risk  the  fire  of  these  batteries, 
while,  by  doing  so,  he  will  place  fourteen  or  fifteen  hundred  yards  between  his 
ships  and  the  Long  Island  batteries. 

The  sketch  annexed  shows  the  course  within  the  scope  of  effective  fire,  which 
is  about  two  statute  miles.  It  will  hardly  be  questioned  that  a  decent  sea 
steamer  should  run  ten  knots  hourly  (sea  miles)  in  smooth  water ;  these  are 
equal  to  eleven  and  a  half  statute  miles.  Of  course,  she  takes  the  strength  of  a 
flood  tide  and  spreads  every  stitch  of  canvas  to  a  fair  wind,  which  ought  to  add 
another  mile,  making  the  total  speed  twelve  and  a  half  statute  miles  per  hour, 
(three  hundred  and  sixty-seven  yards  per  minute,)  at  which  rate  she  will  pass 
over  a  mile  in  four  and  three-fourth  minutes. 

Tracing  the  assigned  course  through  the  scope  of  the  guns  on  both  sides, 
marked  by  the  circles,  it  will  be  found  that  the  distance  run  is  about  two  miles ; 
that  is,  the  steamer  will  not  be  more  than  ten  minutes  under  fire. 


488  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

The  32-pounders  and  the  42-pounders  of  the  Long  Island  water  battery  will 
require  an  elevation  of  about  three  degrees  to  reach  the  enemy,  the  8-inch  sea- 
coast  howitzers  about  four  degrees — both  unfavorable  to  ricochet ;  for  the  pro- 
jectiles will  bound  high  in  rising,  and  with  a  power  much  diminished  even  when 
the  weather  is  smooth ;  but  with  the  ripple  occasioned  by  the  moderate  breeze, 
which  is  supposed  to  be  taken  advantage  of,  the  ricochet  could  not  be  depended 
on  for  direction  or  force,  and  therefore  the  direct  firing  only  will  be  available  on 
the  right  hand,  especially  from  Fort  Hamilton,  which  is  five  hundred  yards  in 
rear  of  the  water  battery,  and  the  guns  there  mounted  would  need  at  least  five 
degrees  ;  their  shot  could  have  no  ricochet  whatever,  and  would  generally  sink 
where  they  strike  the  water. 

Taking  into  consideration  the  deviation  of  the  projectiles  and  the  rapid  move- 
ment of  the  steamers,  the  chances  of  oblique  impact  from  the  incurvation  of  the 
trajectory,  the  variety  of  curved  surfaces  forming  a  ship's  side,  and  the  constant 
change  in  their  manner  of  presentation  to  the  direction  of  the  ball,  it  is  probable 
that  not  more  than  one  shot  or  shell  in  ten  can  be  relied  on  at  this  distance  to 
produce  a  maximum  penetration. 

The  principal  work  on  the  left,  Fort  Tompkins,  is  situated  on  a  high  hill,  and 
two  other  batteries  (Hudson  and  Morton)  are  in  elevated  positions.*  Their  fire 
is  therefore  not  so  efficacious  for  short  distances. 

To  an  enemy  which  should  thus  attempt  to  escape  the  fire  of  Fort  Lafayette, 
by  steering  in  with  the  Staten  Island  shore,  the  guns  of  the  water  batterv  (Fort 
Richmond)  would  be  very  formidable. 

This  work  mounts  twenty-seven  42-pounders,*  of  which  it  is  probable  that 
not  more  than  a  third  can  be  made  to  bear  on  any  one  point. 

At  two  hundred  yards,  which  is  to  be  the  nearest  approach  of  the  ships  in 
passing,  the  maximum  penetration  of  42-pounder  shot  in  oak  will  not  exceed 
fifty  inches. 

The  time  of  exposure  to  the  fire  of  the  fort  would  be  about  fifteen  minutes  for 
a  sailing  ship  at  the  rate  of  eight  knots,  and  about  ten  minutes  for  a  steamer 
going  eleven  knots. 

Would  the  damage  received  in  that  time  be  likely  to  injure  so  many  vessels 
as  to  prevent  the  design  on  the  city  entirely,  in  consequence  of  the  reduction  of 
the  force  ] 

In  attempting  to  arrive  at  some  satisfactory  response  to  this  query  one  is 
bound  to  avoid  possible  contingencies,  and  to  adhere  to  those  Avhich  experience 
has  indicated  as  probable. 

A  shell  properly  placed  will  sink  a  ship ;  a  hot  shot  will  set  her  on  fire ;  but 
it  would  be  very  unwise  thence  to  infer  that  this  would  necessarily  be  the  effect 
of  every  shot  fired  at  the  ship. 

The  Hornet  sank  the  Peacock  in  fifteen  minutes ;  but  no  naval  officer  would 
infer  from  the  fact  that  a  sloop-of-war  could  generally  obtain  a  like  result.  So 
far  from  that,  it  is  unprecedented  and  may  hardly  occur  again. 

Uncertainty  as  to  the  distance,  change  of  position,  interposition  of  the,  smoke 
in  a  covered  battery,  lack  of  deliberation,  will  cause  the  failure  of  many  shot  to 
strike  the  object  at  all. 

The  exactly  fatal  spot  is  limited  to  a  few  inches  of  surface  near  the  water 
line ;  in  other  places  a  ship  will  sustain  a  large  number  of  shells. 

The  prodigious  endurance  of  line-of-battle  ships  will  appear  to  any  one  who 
will  look  over  the  records  of  sea  fights.  Hour  after  hour  they  have  been  known 
to  sustain  an  unceasing  fire  at  each  other,  with  every  gun  on  the  whole  broad- 
side, and  yet  but  one  or  two  cases  of  sinking  during  a  fight  will  be  found. 

0  See  report  of  Board  of  Engineers. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA- CO  AST    DEFENCES. 

Passage  through  the  Narroivs,  New  York  harbor. 


489 


Let  us  note  a  few  instances  of  endurance  that  have  occurred  in  well-known 
engagements : 

In  1770  the  Sandwich,  ninety-eight,  received  seventy  shot  holes,  seventeen 
of  them  between  wind  and  water,  (Rodney  and  DeGuichen.)  She  continued  to 
form  part  of  the  English  fleet,  and  cruised  actively,  as  the  flag-ship,  until  Rodney 
went  home,  eighteen  months  afterwards. 

At  Copenhagen,  Nelson  anchored  his  ships  ahout  three  hundred  yards  from 
the  Danish  line,  and  received  its  fire  for  more  than  three  hours.  Of  the  fleet 


490  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

not  one  was  sufficiently  injured  to  interfere  with  the  active  operations  against 
Sweden  and  Russia  that  followed. 

More  recently,  in  an  affair  ill  calculated  to  maintain  the  prestige  of  ships  in 
attacking  batteries,  it  will  be  seen  that  a  line-of-battle  ship  received  the  fire  of 
two  batteries,  of  four  guns  each,  during  seven  hours.  The  deliberate  operation 
of  one  of  these  with  hot  shot,  through  the  whole  afternoon,  was  entirely  unmo- 
lested by  the  fire  from  the  ship,  as  it  appears  hardly  more  than  half  a  dozen 
shots  from  her  struck  near  the  battery ;  yet  she  did  not  take  fire  until  six  in  the 
evening.  I  allude  to  the  action  of  the  Danish  ship  Christiana  VIII,  of  eighty- 
four  guns,  Eckenfjorde,  1849. 

At  Algiers  (3816)  the  Impregnable  received  two  hundred  and  sixty-eight 
shots  in  her  hull,  of  which  fifty  penetrated  below  the  lower  deck,  and  three,  of 
68-pounders,  six  feet  below  the  water  line. 

Even  frigates  will  endure  severe  service.  The  Macedonian  received  one  hun- 
dred shots  in  her  hull  in  the  engagement  with  the  frigate  United  States,  and  was 
brought  safely  into  port.  After  receiving  repairs  in  her  topworks  she  was  used 
in  the  United  States  navy  for  sixteen  years,  after  which  she  was  broken  up  and 
rebuilt  entirely. 

In  1810  the  Galatea,  a  small  thirty-two  gun  frigate  of  eight  hundred  tons, 
received  seventy-eight  shots  in  her  hull,*  many  between  wind  and  water.  She 
continued  to  cruise,  however. 

A  fleet  of  line-of-battle  ships,  then,  would  have  little  to  dread,  it  is  believed, 
from  Fort  Richmond  in  attempting  to  pass  it,  and  could  probably  do  so  without 
material  damage.  If  the  enemy  should  deem  it  advisable  to  allow  the  leading 
ship  to  anchor  abreast  the  battery  during  the  thirty  minutes  occupied  by  the 
line  in  passing,  the  other  ships  would  be  insured  against  the  severest  of  the  fire, 
and  the  entire  loss  devolved  on  one  which  certainly  ought  to  endure  this  without 
being  disabled. 

Steamers  have  the  additional  liability  of  injury  to  the  machinery  or  boilers, 
thereby  suspending  the  action  of  the  engine.  But  if  their  sides  are  lined,  as 
they  should  be,  with  the  coal  bunkers,  their  contents  would  suffice  to  arrest  the 
progress  of  the  shot  or  shells,  and  prevent  damage  to  the  machinery ;  the  explo- 
sion of  the  latter  might  be  rendered  comparatively  harmless  in  the  loose  masses 
of  coal,  unless  it  were  bituminous,  and  on  that  account  susceptible  of  being 
ignited. 

The  fire  of  the  ships  would,  of  course,  be  kept  up,  though  probably  with  very 
little  damage  to  casemated  works.  The  smoke  enveloping  the  hulls  would, 
however,  tend  to  increase  the  difficulties  of  distinguishing  from  the  fort  suffi- 
ciently, and  would  embarrass  the  aim,  while  the  entrance  of  an  occasional  shot 
into  an  embrasure  might  dismount  a  gun  and  fracture  the  cast  iron  casemate 
carriage  into  atoms,  thereby  doing  infinite  mischief. 

It  has  been  assumed  that  the  enemy  attempts  the  passage  of  the  Narrows  in 
broad  day.  But  suppose  he  choose  a  dark  night  and  mid-channel.  The  strait 
is  more  than  three-fourths  of  a  mile  wide,  without  a  shoal  nearer  than  the  shore. 
There  is  neither  difficulty  nor  danger,  so  far  as  the  navigation  is  concerned ;  and 
the  random  fire  of  guns  at  eight  hundred  yards,  from  both  sides  of  the  shore, 
would  be  a  small  matter. 

The  brief  outline  of  the  probable  results  of  a  well-designed  and  well-conducted 
endeavor  to  pass  the  Narrows  may  perhaps  fail  to  shake  the  faith  of  military 
men  in  the  capacity  of  the  works  to  exclude  ships.  But  would  it  be  wise  to 
trust  the  fate  of  the  city  even  to  a  chance,  remote  as  it  may  be  1  For  if  success- 
ful, even  the  board  of  engineers  would  hardly  rely  on  the  works  about  the  city 

°  In  a  squadron  that  captured  the  French  frigate  Renommee,  afterwards  named  the  Java, 
and  taken  by  the  United  States  ship  Constitution. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  491 

as  a  means  of  further  prevention.  Speaking  of  them,  (Fort  Columbus,  &c.,)  the 
report  says,  (page  53:) 

"It  is  a  disadvantage  of  their  positions,  however,  that  the  destruction  of  the 
city  might  be  going  on  simultaneously  with  the  contest  between  these  forts  and 
the  fleet." 

If  the  Narrows  are  forced,  certain  it  is  that  in  less  than  half  an  hour  the 
steam  frigates  will  be  within  range  of  the  batteries  of  Governor's  island  and 
the  small  forts  about  the  city.  What  now  will  intervene  to  prevent  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  public  works  1  Should  the  enemy  choose  to  pass  some  of  his  ships 
round  to  the  northward  of  Governor's  island,  every  shot  from  our  own  guns 
that  misses  his  hulls  will  tell  on  the  devoted  city,  and  effect  more  damage  than 
the  enemy  himself  would,  in  cold  blood,  be  willing  to  inflict.  A  force  now  may 
also  be  detached  to  the  navy  yard  and  other  places.  Rockets,  carcasses,  and 
shell  put  in  operation,  and  in  a  few  hours  the  flames  will  strip  us  of  the  public 
and  private  resources.  If  a  detachment  be  landed,  meanwhile,  to  aid,  the  work 
will  be  done  effectually;  and  the  ebbing  tide  convey  the  fleet  to  the  lower 
harbor,  there  to  intercept  the  commerce  and  to  blockade.  Two  or  three  steamers 
of  the  attacking  force  may  be  destroyed,  the  detachment  on  shore  cut  off;  but 
what  would  such  losses  be  in  comparison  to  those  inflicted1? 

In  the  conclusion  from  certain  premises,  then,  the  views  here  entertained 
accord  with  that  of  the  engineer's  report,  as  thus  expressed : 

"If  the  mere  passing  under  sail,  with  a  leading  wind  and  tide,  one  or  even 
two  sets  of  batteries,  and  then  carrying  on  operations  out  of  the  reach  of  these 
or  any  other,  were  all,  the  enemy  might  perhaps  accomplish  it." 

At  the  same  time  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  defence  of  a  port  may  be 
made  good,  when  its  shore  line  permits  of  the  condition  prescribed  by  the  report 
as  sufficient,  thus : 

"Batteries  should  succeed  each  other  along  the  channel,  so  that  the  enemy 
may  nowhere  find  shelter  from  the  effective  range  of  shot  and  shells  while  within 
the  harbor,  even  should  he  succeed  in  passing  the  first  batteries.  Provided  the 
shores  admit  this  disposition,  and  the  defences  be  supplied  with  an  armament, 
numerous,  heavy,  and  selected  with  reference  to  the  effects  on  shipping,  the  facts 
we  have  quoted  from  history  show  that  these  defences  may  be  relied  on." 

The  only  question  will  be  as  to  the  certainty  of  so  disposing  the  land  works. 

Other  passages  which  occur  in  the  report  of  the  board  of  engineers  seem  far 
more  applicable  to  the  case  under  consideration,  and  I  cheerfully  avail  myself 
of  them  as  fully  expressing  all  that  I  desire  to  add  on  this  head. 

"There  are,  doubtless,  situations  where  it  may  be  necessary  for  us  to  present 
a  defensive  array,  at  the  same  time  that  to  do  so  by  fortifications  alone  would  be 
impracticable;  and  it  is  not,  therefore,  prejudging  the  question  we  are  about  to 
examine;  it  is  neither  underrating  fortifications,  nor  overrating  these  floating 
defences,  to  say  that  these  last  are,  some  or  all  of  them,  indispensable  in  such 
position. 

"  Any  very  broad  water,  where  deep  soundings  may  be  carried  at  a  distance 
from  the  shores  greater  than  effective  gun-range,  and  where  no  insular  spot, 
natural  or  artificial,  can  be  found  or  formed  nearer  the  track  of  ships,  will  present 
such  a  situation,  and  we  may  take  some  of  our  great  bays  as  examples. 

"Broad  sounds  and  wide  roadsteads,  affording  secure  anchorage  beyond  good 
gun-range  from  the  shores,  will  afford  examples  of  another  sort ;  and  harbors 
with  very  wide  entrances  and  large  surfaces  exhibit  examples  of  still  another 
kind. 

"As  in  all  such  cases  fortifications  alone  will  be  ineffectual,  and,  nevertheless, 
recourse  to  defences  of  some  sort  may  be  unavoidable,  it  has  not  failed  to  be  a 
recommendation  in  the  several  reports  on  the  defence  of  the  coast  since  1818, 
that  there  should  be  a  suitable  and  timely  provision  of  appropriate  floating 
defences.  And  until  the  invention  of  man  shall  have  caused  an  entire  revolution 


492  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

in  the  nature  of  maritime  attack  and  defence,  these  or  kindred  means  must  be 
resorted  to ;  not,  however,  because  they  are  means  intrinsically  good,  or  suitable 
under  other  circumstances,  but  because  they  are  the  only  means  applicable." 

Admitting,  then,  that  "any  very  broad  water,  where  deep  soundings  may  be 
carried  at  a  distance  from  the  shores  greater  than  effective  gun-range,  and  where 
no  insular  spots,  natural  or  artificial,  can  be  found  or  formed  nearer  the  track  of 
ships',  will  present  such  a  situation ;  and  we  may  take  some  of  our  great  bays  as 
examples,"  as  a  premise  to  the  second  query,  then  what  auxiliaries  shall  be 
resorted  to  ?  Of  all  those  which,  in  connexion  with  permanent  works,  might  be 
selected  to  control  effectually  the  channels  of  our  principal  watercourses  and 
harbors,  none  are  less  reliable  than  floating  batteries  and  gunboats. 

In  the  well-constructed  fort,  the  chief  merit  is  a  capacity  of  endurance  almost 
impregnable  to  the  assaults  of  shipping. 

In  the  ship,  a  mobility  which  gives  the  facility  of  transferring  the  great  power 
of  her  battery  to  any  part  of  the  channel  that  may  need  it.  The  disadvantage 
of  one  is  its  immobility,  which  restricts  it  to  a  fixed  point,  whence  it  can  control 
nothing  beyond  gun  range ;  of  the  other,  a  vulnerable  material  very  susceptible 
of  damage  from  protracted  battering. 

The  floating  battery  unites  the  weak  points  of  both  fort  and  ship.  It  is 
neither  spear  nor  shield,  and  is  altogether  objectionable,  as  inefficient,  costly,  and 
unsuited  to  the  character  and  resources  of  a  great  nation.  Its  worthlessness  as 
a  defence  is  well  manifested  by  the  affair  at  Copenhagen  in  1800,  under  circum- 
stances when,  of  all  others,  it  would  have  been  most  gratifying  to  every  sense 
of  justice  that  it  should  have  protected  the  neutral  rights  of  a  brave  but  feeble 
nation.  On  that  occasion  there  were  six  hundred  and  twenty-eight  guns  mounted 
on  a  line  of  floating  defences,  supported,  as  well  as  the  urgency  of  the  case  ad- 
mitted, by  several  forts  and  a  reserve  of  heavy  ships. 

Nine  English  line-of-battle  ships  entered  the  channel  skirted  by  the  Danish 
line  ;  commenced  action  at  distances  varying  two  hundred  to  four  hundred  yards, 
captured  and  destroyed  the  Danish  floating  batteries  in  three  or  four  hours,  and 
sustained  no  damage  sufficient  to  interfere  with  their  proceeding  against  the 
other  parties  to  "  armed  neutrality  " — Sweden  and  Russia. 

The  report  of  the  board  of  engineers,  previously  referred  to,  embodies  many 
interesting  details  of  this  event,  to  which  the  only  material  objection  is  the 
mode  of  stating  the  force. 

1st.  The  Bellona,  74,  and  Russell,  74,  grounded  on  the  edge  of  the  shoal,  having 
their  own  line  directly  between  them  and  the  Danes,  so  that  their  fire  could  be 
of  little  avail,  though  themselves  might  be  much  damaged  by  the  shot  from  the 
enemy  which  missed  the  English  line. 

2d.  The  frigates  and  sloops  had  been  directed  to  take  the  stations  of  these 
ships  opposite  the  tick  rouer  battery,  so  that  of  the  twelve  line-of-battle  ships 
only  nine  were  opposed  to  the  floating  batteries,  being  about  fifty  guns  stronger 
than  the  Danish  line,  and  not  three  hundred  and  eighty -two,  as  the  report  infers. 

One  of  the  board  of  engineers'  deductions  from  this  engagement  is  go  conclu- 
sive that  it  may  be  quoted  without  further  comment.  It  is  thus  (page  20  :) 

"  That  it  illustrates  strikingly  the  advantages  that  a  fleet  possesses  over  a 
stationary  line  of  floating  defences.  Lord  Nelson  was  superior  to  the  whole  of 
his  adversary's  floating  force ;  but  not  being  disposed  to  run  any  unnecessary 
hazard,  he  directed  all  his  force  upon  a  part  of  the  Danish  line,  which  was  of 
course  defeated  ;  and  had  there  been  no  other  than  a  floating  force  present,  so  of 
course  would  have  been  the  remainder,  had  it  been  twice  the  strength  it  was. 
This  example  fully  confirms  what  we  have  before  urged  on  this  topic." 

Some  idea  of  the  expense  of  large  floating  batteries  may  be  gathered  from 
the  paper  of  General  Gaines  on  coast  defence.  Those  proposed  by  him  were  to 
carry  one  hundred  and  twenty  to  two  hundred  cannon.  The  estimated  cost  by 


FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  493 

the  chief  naval  architect  was  $1,400,000,  for  each  of  the  batteries  with  its  tow 
boats  ;  which  sum  would  build  three  line-of-battle  ships  or  two  war  steamers. 
'  It  is  further  to  be  urged,  that  any  such  passive  system  of  defence  is  entirely 
at  variance  with  the  tone  and  temper  of  our  people,  and  the  reputation  of  a 
powerful  nation.  The  national  policy  may  be  strictly  defensive,  but  when  com- 
pelled to  resort  to  war,  its  system  of  operations  should  be  rather  offensive  in  its 
character,  if  it  were  only  to  enforce  the  sound  maxim  of  preserving  its  own  soil 
from  the  desolating  presence  of  an  enemy. 

If  the  floating  battery  is  the  most  useless  of  all  the  stationary  defences,  the 
gunboat  may  be  considered  as  the  most  miserable  of  all  the  war  craft  that  sail ; 
nothing  more  effectual  could  possibly  be  devised  to  render  skill  and  bravery 
unavailing.  The  experience  which  we  have  already  had  has  sufficiently  con- 
firmed opinion  in  the  navy  as  to  the  dependence  that  may  be  placed  on  the  per- 
formance of  these  pigmy  warriors,  and  renders  it  needless  to  occupy  time  in  any 
labored  exposition  of  their  worthlessness.  In  reciting  the  events  of  past  days, 
our  own  naval  historian  (Cooper)  has  very  distinctly  given  his  estimate  of  their 
demerits,  which,  by  the  way,  he  does  not  altogether  confine  to  the  question  now 
at  issue,  of  capacity  for  offence  and  defence,  if  we  may  judge  from  the  following 
pithy  paragraph : 

"  This  was  the  development  of  the  much  condemned  '  gunboat  system,'  which 
for  a  short  time  threatened  destruction  to  the  pride,  discipline,  tone,  and  even 
morals  of  the  service." 

It  is  singular,  however,  that  two  distinguished  statesmen  should,  about  the 
same  time,  have  given  their  faith  to  the  efficacy  of  the  gunboat — one  in  England, 
and  the  other  here.  Mr.  William  Pitt,  about  the  year  1803,  in  a  motion  cen- 
suring the  ministry,  found  a  strong  reason  in  their  neglect  to  provide  more  gun- 
boats. Admiral  Sir  E.  Pellow,  then  in  Parliament,  was  unable  to  sustain  his 
political  friends  in  the  measure,  and  in  a  short  and  characteristic  speech  used 
these  words : 

"  As  to  the  gunboats  which  have  been  so  strongly  recommended,  this  mosquito 
fleet,  they  are  the  most  contemptible  force  that  can  be  employed." 

About  thirteen  years  later  it  fell  to  his  lot  to  verify  this  opinion.  In  his 
memorable  attack  on  Algiers,  it  is  stated  that  "soon  after  the  battle  began  the 
enemy's  flotilla  of  gunboats  advanced,  with  a  daring  which  deserved  a  better 
fate,  to  board  the  Queen  Charlotte  and  Leander.  The  smoke  covered  them  at 
first,  but  as  soon  as  they  were  seen,  a  few  guns,  chiefly  from  the  Leander,  sent 
thirty-three  out  of  thirty-seven  to  the  bottom." 

Dispensing,  then,  with  such  inefficient  aids,  there  remains  for  consideration 
the  navy  proper,  which,  it  may  be  asserted,  is  indeed  not  only  a  sure  reliance, 
if  it  be  properly  constituted,  but  is  indispensable  to  any  degree  of  security  along 
our  line  of  coast,  now  washed  for  thousands  of  miles  by  the  two  great  oceans ; 
and  also  to  maintain  the  communication  by  water  and  the  isthmus  between  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  States,  where  forts,  floating  batteries,  and  gunboats  can  no 
longer  enter  into  the  question,  even  were  they  a  perfect  defence  for  every  other 
interest  covered  by  our  flag. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  believed  to  be  susceptible  of  proof  that  a  naval  force, 
somewhat  greater  than  the  attacking  force,  may  be  relied  on  in  connexion  with 
the  present  or  proposed  works  at  Boston,  New  York,  Delaware,  Chesapeake, 
and  some  southeast  port,  to  protect  the  coast  from  Florida  to  Maine,  and  (as 
corollary  to  this  proposition,)  will  destroy  or  capture  the  enemy  that  may  com- 
mit itself  seriously  against  either  of  these  ports. 

To  illustrate  this,  I  will  assume  the  attacking  force  to  be  ike  twenty  steam 
frigates  of  the  engineer's  report  of  1840.  To  New  York  harbor,  to  Delaware 
and  Chesapeake  bays,  would  be  assigned  a  certain  number  of  ships,  varying 
with  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  time;  for  the  present,  let  us  assume  the 
defending  force  to  be  stationed  thus :  New  York  ten  ships,'  Delaware  eight,  and 


494  FORTIFICATIONS    AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

Chesapeake  seven;  and  to  avoid  the  recounting  of  local  details,  I  again  recur 
to  New  York  as  the  object  selected  by  the  enemy. 

The  stationary  floating  defence  to  be  used  will  be  the  old  sailing  frigates  and 
line-of-battle  ships  of  the  navy,  having  heavy  batteries  on  the  gun-decks,  and 
pivot  pieces  of  the  largest  calibre  on  the  upper  deck.  Every  spar  taken  out, 
even  to  the  lower  masts,  and  the  ships  well  secured  with  several  chains  to  their 
moorings;  one  at  A,  to  bear  on  the  ships  in  crossing  the  bar;  three  at  B,  C,  and 
D,  to  close  the  swash  channel;  and  one  at  E,  inside  of  the  southwest  spit; 
which,  with  the  fort  on  the  Hook,  is  to  assist  in  defending  the  main  channel. 

The  enemy's  twenty  ships  are  signalled  from  the  Neversink  heights,  and  in 
half  an  hour  the  Delaware  and  Chesapeake  squadrons  are  at  sea  steering  north. 

It  is  obvious  that  any  loss  of  time  from  irresolution  or  from  want  of  informa- 
tion which  is  to  be  obtained  by  reconnoitring,  must  be  to  the  disadvantage  of 
the  enemy. 

Suppose  him  well  supplied  with  pilots,  which,  in  a  war,  the  Cunard  line  can 
furnish  abundantly,  and  aware  that  reinforcements  are  on  the  way,  it  is  probable 
that  the  attack  will  be  commenced  without  delay. 

The  first  point  of  defence  is  at  the  bar ;  the  deep  water  here  is  so  narrow 
that  the  enemy  will  hardly  risk  his  ships  in  any  one  channel,  even  in  two  col- 
umns, and  his  line  is  therefore  exposed  to  the  concentrated  fire  of  our  ten  ships, 
and  of  the  line-of-battle  ship  at  A. 

After  crossing,  the  van  will  endeavor  to  form  the  line  abreast,  as  far  as  the 
channel  admits,  in  order  to  relieve  the  leading  ships ;  but  our  own  ships  recede 
before  them,  and  by  this  time  the  guns  of  the  line-of-battle  ships  B  and  C  are 
beginning  to  tell.  Following  our  steamers,  the  enemy  soon  comes  within  the 
fire  of  the  fort,  and  advancing  onward,  the  line-of-battle-ship  at  E  is  brought 
into  play.  The  headmost  of  his  ships  have  now  for  more  than  half  an  hour 
been  under  the  concentrated  fire  of  four  hundred  pieces  of  the  heaviest  calibre ; 
and  it  is  hardly  possible  that  they  should  not  be  incapacitated  for  moving  with 
any  rapidity.  Even  if  their  offensive  powers  be  undisabled,  they  must  there- 
fore be  soon  dropped  astern  by  their  main  body  moving  with  full  speed,  and 
their  force  be  lost  in  the  rest  of  the  day's  operations.  On  the  other  hand,  our 
own  ships  have  felt  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  leading  ships  only,  and  if  any  one 
be  damaged,  can  anchor  near  the  fort  or  line-of-battle  ships,  and  do  good  ser- 
vice on  the  passing  ships. 

It  is  probable  that  in  rounding  the  southwest  spit,  the  number  of  the  hostile 
fleet  will  be  reduced  to  fifteen  or  sixteen  ships,  capable  of  full  motive  power,  if 
an  average  degree  of  success  have  attended  the  defending  force.  And  these 
must  be  brought  to  action  before  reaching  the  city. 

Without  pretending  to  indicate  the  precise  time  and  place  most  proper  for 
this,  suppose  that  it  be  decided  to  make  a  stand  before  entering  the  Narrows. 

When  it  is  evident  that  the  enemy  will  not  attempt  to  force  the  swash,  and 
has  followed  the  main  channel,  the  line-of-battle  ships  A,  B,  C  may  slip  their 
moorings  and  be  towed  by  river  steamers  on  each  side  up  the  s\yash,  their 
draught  having  been  adapted  to  that  purpose,  and  take  in  moorings  previously 
provided  at  the  debouche  of  the  channel  into  the  main  course  below  the  Narrows. 

Our  own  steamers  will  here  prepare  to  receive  the  attack,  or  to  make  it  if 
declined  by  the  enemy,  who  may  adhere  to  the  main  purpose  of  reaching  the 
city. 

The  action  will,  of  course,  terminate  in  the  defeat  of  the  weaker  party,  though 
not  necessarily  in  the  destruction  or  capture  of  his  ships.  But  in  what  condition 
will  the  enemy  find  his  ships  1  How  many  of  his  steamers  will  there  remain  to 
attempt  the  passage,  and  what  will  be  their  capacity  to  do  it  after  the  rough 
handling  that  has  been  experienced  ? 

It  may  be  that  not  one  of  his  vessels  has  struck  its  flag  or  is  disabled,  but  the 
power  of  moving  with  certainty  and  speed  is  crippled,  and  their  exposure  to  the 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA  COAST   DEFENCES. 


495 


Proposed  defence  of  New  York  harbor. 


fire  of  the  forts  therefore  so  much  increased  in  time  as  to  render  the  attempt 
hazardous.  Pieces  of  heavy  ordnance  can  also  be  mounted  on  stout  merchant 
ships  and  steamers,  forming  a  reserve  to  be  placed  along  the  passage  where  the 
guns  of  the  forts  do  not  command,  so  as  to  sustain  a  steady  cannonade  on  what- 
ever ships  of  the  enemy  may  remain  in  a  condition  to  proceed.  Meanwhile  a 
few  hours  will  bring  up  a  fresh  squadron,  and  soon  after  this  will  be  reinforced, 
so  that  fifteen  steamers  in  perfect  order  will  enter  the  bay.  The  result  must  be 
the  capture  and  destruction  of  the  invading  force. 

This  is  the  view  which  I  consider  fairly  presentable  of  the  favorite  case  so 
frequently  urged,  wherein  the  advantage  is  enjoyed  by  the  assailing  party  of 
selecting  time  and  place  without  warning  to  the  defending  force. 

It  seems  highly  probable  that  the  defence  of  any  important  point,  with  some 


49 G  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

exception  as  it  regards  the  southeast  and  Gulf  coasts,  can  be  made  good  with  no 
greater  additional  force  in  the  aggregate  than  above  mentioned,  admitting  every 
advantage  that  can  be  claimed  for  this  arrangement  of  the  enemy. 

That  advantage  is  limited  to  a  space  in  time  that  admits  of  no  accident  to 
force,  speed,  or  any  of  the  multifarious  details  >f  a  fleet.  Its  operations  must 
be  as  precise  and  perfect  as  those  of  the  machine  that  moves  each  steamer. 

From  the  moment  that  the  hostile  fleet  COUNTS  in  sight  there  is  a  sure  concen- 
tration of  a  superior  force,  and  in  a  few  hours  {,  here  will  no  longer  be  the  power 
to  choose.  An  action  is  inevitable ;  and  whatever  be  the  result  to  our  own 
squadron,  that  of  the  enemy  will  certainly  be  unable  to  prosecute  any  enterprise 
against  harbors  or  coasts  for  the  time. 

It  is,  however,  out  of  the  question  for  any  such  fleet  to  hazard  itself  on  a 
coast  where  the  certain  superiority,  no  matter  how  small,  exists ;  and  the  entire 
line  of  shore  northward  would  therefore  be  fully  secured  against  an  enemy's  vessel. 

Southward  of  Hatteras  the  necessity  of  naval  means  for  defence  is  even  more 
stringent  than  to  the  northward. 

The  objects  of  attack  differ  as  widely  also  from  those  just  under  consideration 
as  the  manner  in  which  shipping  must  be  applied  to  defence  in  order  to  be 
available. 

The  resources  of  private  enterprise  are  no  longer  aggregated  so  densely,  but 
are  scattered  along  the  country  bordering  on  the  coast  in  a  manner  that  renders 
it  difficult  for  the  most  eager  marauder  to  do  much  in  his  line. 

The  commercial  cities  are  pretty  well  defended  from  the  extensive  movements 
of  large  fleets  by  the  bars  which  border  the  channel-ways  to  their  harbors. 

The  interior  lines  of  communication  formed  by  the  long  downs  of  sand  that 
skirt  the  Atlantic  shore  are,  however,  accessible  to  vessels  of  inferior  force,  and 
the  command  of  these  would  give  the  control  of  all  the  trade  that  by  its  light 
draught  finds  convenience  in  the  smoother  waters  of  the  inlet.  The  most  im- 
portant debouch,  however,  for  the  resources  of  the  country  is  the  outlet  of  the 
Mississippi,  through  which  is  poured,  in  a  never-failing  tide,  the  rich  products 
of  the  great  valley  of  the  river.  To  check  this,  to  impede  it,  to  harass  in  the 
least  degree,  would  be  an  evil  of  the  greatest  magnitude,  and  be  felt  in  the  re- 
motest regions  of  the  west. 

The  general  character  of  the  southern  shore  of  itself  prevents  the  operations 
of  vessels  of  heavy  draught ;  hence  the  defence  must  be  nearly  the  reverse  of 
that  recommended  for  the  shores  north  of  Hatteras.  There  heavy  ships  will  lie 
inshore,  and  light  cruisers  be  thrown  out  seaward  to  watch  the  motions  of  the 
main  force  of  the  enemy,  and  coastwise  to  check  small  marauders  or  parties  for 
wood  and  water.  On  the  southeast  and  Gulf  coast  the  light  steamers  and  vessels 
of  the  third  class  would  keep  the  inlets  and  their  approaches  and  the  various 
avenues  contiguous  to  the  Mississippi.  While  seaward  the  heaviest  ships  must 
abide  the  first  brunt  of  the  attack  and  defence  at  all  risk,  so  as  to  cripple  the 
forces  of  the  assailant  should  he  be  strong  enough  to  close  with  the  inshore 
squadron. 

The  true  and  only  key,  however,  to  the  defence  of  these  shores,  and  to  the 
immense  interest  there  collected,  is  the  Havana.  The  island  to  which  it  belongs 
enters  its  western  extreme  into  the  Gulf,  leaving  but  two  passages  for  vessels  so 
narrow  as  to  be  commanded  with  the  greatest  facility;  these  are  the  great 
thoroughfares  of  trade  and  the  mail  steamers  from  New  Orleans  to  California 
and  New  York.  Hence  if  the  use  of  the  Havana  be  even  at  the  disposal  of  an 
enemy  while  in  the  hands  of  a  neutral  power,  each  and  all  of  these  interests 
could  be  with  difficulty  defended,  even  by  a  superior  naval  force,  and  never 
guaranteed  against  severe  losses.  While  from  it  as  a  United  States  port,  a 
squadron  of  moderate  size  would  cover  the  southeast  and  Gulf  coasts,  protect  the 
foreign  and  inshore  traders,  and  secure  the  lines  from  New  Orleans  or  New  York 
to  the  Pacific  States  by  way  of  the  Isthmus,  its  occupation  would  necessarily 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  497 

be  the  object  of  every  expedition,  military  or  naval,  preliminary  to  any  attempt 
on  the  southern  trade  or  territory. 

At  present  the  force  of  large  vessels  for  the  southeast  coast  would  be  obliged 
to  use  the  harbor  of  Brunswick  as  their  depot,  refuge,  and  centre  of  operations. 
The  report  of  the  commissioners  has  already  decided  this  to  be  the  best  south 
of  the  Chesapeake.  With  the  command  afloat,  Key  West  and  the  Tortugas 
might  be  used,  but  not  otherwise,  as  no  supplies  are  to  be  had  at  either,  and  no 
water  at  the  latter.  Pensacola  would  have  to  answer  for  the  Gulf  shore. 

The  coast  of  the  Pacific  States  diifers  in  many  respects  from  that  of  the  At- 
lantic in  formation  as  well  as  in  condition. 

The  circumstances  of  settlement,  product,  and  trade  have  yet  to  determine 
much  that  will  govern  in  the  extent  and  application  of  the  elements  of  defence. 

At  present  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  two  great  harbors  at  San  Francisco 
and  the  Columbia  river  will  require  immediate  measures  for  their  protection. 
The  sites  of  land  works  have  probably  been  vindicated  by  the  engineers  sent 
for  that  purpose,  though  some  time  must  elapse  before  these  can  be  completed. 

It  seems,  therefore,  that  the  naval  force  in  these  regions  should  be  of  the 
most  effective  character  in  power  and  number,  singly  and  collectively,  inasmuch 
as  it  must  for  a  while  be  the  exclusive  reliance  for  a  defence  of  any  kind  of 
harbors,  as  well  as  of  coasts.  The  squadron  should  always  be  able  to  land  at 
any  point  a  force  of  two  thousand  seamen  and  five  hundred  marines,  which, 
with  twenty  or  thirty  of  the  boat  howitzers  on  their  field  carriages,  would  be 
found  an  effective  auxiliary  in  emergencies. 

The  manner  in  which  our  own  squadron  operated  along  the  coast  of  California 
while  held  by  the  Mexicans  will  best  exhibit  the  character  of  the  attempts 
likely  to  be  made  by  an  enemy  against  our  own  people  now  inhabiting  that 
State.  If  the  views  above  expressed,  in  relation  to  the  defence  of  the  United 
States  harbors  and  coasts,  be  correct,  it  then  remains  to  consider  the  species  of 
naval  force  which  will  be  required  to  perform  the  part  assigned  to  it. 

By  referring  to  the  navy  list  it  will  be  seen  that  the  number  of  heavy  ships 
that  is  available,  or  could  be  made  so  by  necessary  repairs,  consists  of  nine  line- 
of-battle  ships,  twelve  frigates,  and  five  steamers. 

This  force  is  obviously  too  small  for  the  objects  for  which  a  navy  should  be  de- 
signed. If  the  number  already  assumed  to  be  required  for  the  defence  of  the 
Atlantic  coast  in  war  be  applied  to  that  purpose,  it  would  leave  a  very  insuffi- 
cient force  for  the  Pacific  shores,  for  the  protection  of  the  line  of  communication 
by  sea  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  States,  and  for  general  cruising  to  cover 
our  own  commerce,  and  annoy  that  of  the  enemy. 

Not  only  is  the  effective  number  of  the  present  navy  too  small,  but  the  char- 
acter of  the  force  has  been  depreciated  to  a  very  serious  extent  by  the  superior 
powers  of  offence  that  have  been  conferred  on  the  large  steamers  that  now  con- 
stitute part  of  a  navy  here  and  elsewhere.  The  cannon  carried  usually  as  the 
main  reliance  of  line-of-battle  ships  and  frigates  are  thirty-two  and  forty-two- 
pounders.  In  our  service  the  latter  calibre  may  be  considered  as  exceptionable, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  not  recognized  by  the  regulations  of  1845. 

The  war  steamers  carry  sixty-four  pounders.  It  is  true  that  the  line-of-battle 
ships  may  have  one  hundred  of  the  thirty-two-pounders,  while  a  steamer  of  the 
same  tonnage  has  but  three  of  the  sixty-four-pounders. 

But  it  will  be  admitted  that  if  the  constituent  of  one  battery  is  deficient  in 
any  one  element  of  power,  ,which  is  possessed  by  that  of  another  battery,  that 
no  mere  increase  in  the  number  will  compensate  for  this  defect.  Thus,  if  the 
thirty-two-pounder  shot  fired  with  nine  pounds  of  powder  be  inferior  to  a  shot 
of  sixty-four  pounds  fired  with  sixteen  pounds  of  powder  in  the  distance  to 
which  it  will  range  with  sufficient  force  to  do  material  damage,  then  it  is  plain 
that  so  long  as  that  distance  can  be  preserved  it  will  matter  little  whether  a 
II.  Hep.  Com.  86 32 


498  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

ship  oppose  one  hundred  or  one  thousand  thirty-two-pouudcrs  to  the  three  sixty- 
four-pounders  :  she  will  receive  constant  damage  from  the  repeated  efforts  of  tin,- 
small  number  of  large  pieces  without  the  power  of  inflicting  any  harm  by  lit -r 
large  number  of  small  pieces.  A  similar  relation,  in  effect,  may  be  noted  in  the 
effects  of  other  military  projectiles.  Thus,  we  know  that  grape  from  a  thirty- 
two-pounder  would  be  harmless  against  the  side  of  a  ship,  when  the  shot  would 
pass  through  easily,  and  yet  the  stand  of  grape  is  composed  of  three-pound 
shot  which,  even  if  fired  separately,  would  still  be  very  little  nearer  the  effect 
of  the  thirty-two-pounder  shot. 

The  important  question  is  in  relation  to  the  capacity  of  the  steamer  to  main- 
tain the  distance  suited  to  her  powers  of  annoyance — and  of  this  there  can  be 
little  doubt  since  the  passage  between  the  United  States  and  England  is  made 
with  ease  and  certainty  in  the  severest  winter  weather  by  the  steam  packets, 
their  average  speed  being  then  seven  to  eight  knots  with  fair  and  foul  winds, 
and  they  could  in  all  probability  go  very  little  below  their  highest  rate  in  any 
weather  in  which  cannon  could  be  used. 

.Those  who  have  witnessed  the  performance  of  the  Mississippi  in  some  of  the 
Mexican  "northers"  know  what  can  be  done  by  a  good  steamer  in  a  strong  gale. 
Thus  the  twenty  steam  frigates  would  be  very  unequally  matched  in  action,  by 
our  covering  squadron  of  sailing  ships  with  the  thirty-two  and  forty-two-pounders, 
if  it  could  be  said  that  they  were  matched  at  all.  The  remedy  for  this  is  not 
difficult,  and  can  readily  be  attained  by  a  reorganization  of  our  armament, 
though  it  would  be  more  expensive  to  adapt  the  present  sailing  ships  fully 
to  the  ordnance  which  experimental  practice  has  indicated  as  preferable  than  to 
build  new  ships.  Thus  a  two-decker  would  cany  the  same  weight  of  metal,  but 
not  the  same  number  of  cannon.  Hence,  it  would  become  necessary  to  reduce 
the  number  of  ports,  and  to  re-distribute  them  along  the  broadside ;  and  to  do 
this,  the  whole  planking  and  frame,  nearly  to  the  water's  edge,  must  be  removed 
and  replaced  to  suit  the  changes  required  in  piercing  the  side  with  the  proper 
number  of  ports — involving  an  expense  equal  to  half  the  cost  of  a  new  ship. 

They  would  still  need  an  addition  that  could  not  be  dispensed  with,  which 
is  an  auxiliary  steam  power  sufficient  to  give  a  moderate  rate  in  a  calm,  in 
manoeuvring  or  in  getting  out  and  in  harbor.  For  this  purpose,  greater  length 
would  be  required  than  any  of  our  present  frigates  possess,  as  they  now  barely 
stow  the  provisions  and  water  required  for  distant  cruising.  If  these  ships  be 
cut  and  lengthened,  the  cost  in  connexion  with  that  necessary  for  heavier  ord- 
nance will  be  fully  equal  to  the  expense  of  building  new  ships  with  every  dis- 
advantage that  can  attach  to  a  sacrifice  of  unity  of  design  in  model ;  for  no 
skill  in  the  builder  could  possibly  develop  any  one  essential  of  form  in  this 
piece  of  patchwork,  except  by  mere  accident. 

The  true  policy,  not  only  as  regards  economy,  but  in  reference  also  to  accom- 
plishing the  object  in  view,  is  to  commence  without  delay  the  reorganization  of 
our  naval  power  by  the  gradual  addition  of  ships  built  upon  the  most  recent 
models,  and  to  carry  heavy  ordnance  as  well  as  an  auxiliary  steam  power. 

The  experimental  practice  at  the  navy  yard  has  developed  some  points  of 
interest  in  relation  to  the  pieces  likely  to  combine  the  several  essentials  of  ac- 
curacy, range,  and  force,  and  the  bearing  of  all  the  results  has  induced  me  to 
propose  the  construction  of  a  class  of  ships  designed  to  unite  a  higher  degree  of 
^fficiency  than  any  frigate  or  seventy-four  mounting  the  present  armament,  &c. 

Instead  of  twenty-six  thirty -two-pounders,  and  four  eight-inch  shell  guns  on 
the  gun  deck,  the  new  frigate  is  to  carry  twenty-six  nine-inch  shell  guns.  The 
comparative  penetrating  'power  of  the  two  pieces  is  shown  in  the  sketch  an- 
nexed: The  thirty  -two-pounder  shot  passed  twenty-one  inches  into  an  oak 
target,  three-fourths  of  a  mile  distant.  The  nine-inch  shell,  uncharged,  broke 
through  the  whole  thickness  of  thirty  inches. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


499 


Fig.  1. 


Shot  from  a  long  32-pounder,  charge  9  Ibs. — Penetration  in  oak,  distant  1,300  yards,  thickness  30  in. 

The  diminution  of  force  which  both  would 
undergo  at  greater  distances  would  lessen 
the  power  of  the  thirty-two-pounder  shot 
yet  more,  while  the  nine-inch  shell  would 
still  retain  every  advantage  arising  from  its 
explosive  power.  The  only  pieces  of  the 
present  force  that  would  approach  it  being 
the  two  eight-inch  shell  guns,  which,  in  num- 
ber and  intensity  of  effect,  are  not  compar- 
able to  the  thirteen  nine-inch  shell  guns. 

If  the  distance  were  lessened,  the  broad- 
side of  nine-inch  shell  guns  would  in  weight 
of  metal  alone  be  nearly  double  that  of  the 
thirty -two -pounder  and  eight -inch  shell 
guns. 

On  the  spar  deck  are  to  be  no  broadside 
guns,  but,  in  lieu  thereof,  seven  shell  guns, 
of  ten  or  eleven-inch  calibre,  on  pivots,  and 
capable  of  being  pointed  around  the  circle  in 
every  direction. 

An  auxiliary  propeller  power  will  be  placed 
astern,  for  which  purpose  the  length  of  the 
ship  must  be  adapted  to  its  convenient  re- 
ception. 

The  points  of  this  ship  will  be : 

1st.  Cost  of  Construction. — This  ought 
not  to  exceed  the  cost  of  an  ordinary  sailing 
frigate,  with  the  additional  expense  of  steam 
equipment. 

The  St.  Lawrence  cost  about  $350,000 ; 
and  the  cost  of  a  suitable  engine,  boilers, 
&c.,  as  furnished  by  Kemble,  would  be  about 
$70,000;— total,  $420,000. 

The  Susquehanna  steam  frigate  cost  very 
little  less  than  $700,000. 

2d.  Force.  —  The  broadside  weight  of 
metal  of  the  new  frigate  would  be  about 
1,800  pounds.  The  Pennsylvanian,  three 
decker,  present  armament,  2,100  pounds. 
The  Ohio,  two  decker,  1,500  pounds, 


500  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 


Comparing  the  long  range  with  that  of  the  steam  frigate. 

New  ship,  seven  pivot  guns,  11-inch 940  pounds. 

Susquehanna,  three  64-ponnders 192       " 

3d.  Cost  in  commission. — Only  greater  than  that  of  a  sailing  frigate  when 
steam  is  used,  the  crew  not  exceeding  six  hundred  men,  which  is  about  that  of 
the  Congress  frigate. 

Comparing  such  a  frigate  with  the  heaviest  steam  frigate,  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  advantages  are,  far  greater  superiority  in  range  and  force,  as  the  propeller 
frigate  opposes  seven  1 1-inch  shell  guns  to  three  64-pounders,  the  relations  of  which 
are  about  those  of  the  9-inch  to  the  32-pounders;  and  though  her  speed  by  steam 
is  not  equal,  yet  if  the  steam  frigate  once  commit  herself  to  the  chances  of  a  com- 
bat she  will  be  beaten,  for  her  motive  power  is  far  more  vulnerable  in  nearly  every 
point,  and  if  deranged  in  the  least  by  any  of  the  contingencies  of  an  engagement, 
she  is  at  once  exposed  to  the  nearer  approach  of  the  propeller,  and  consequently 
to  the  full  effect  of  the  broadside  guns,  while  her  opponent  loses  but  an  auxiliary 
power,  if  any  of  her  machinery  be  touched,  her  defence  being  made  good  against 
the  steamer  at  any  distance  or  position  which  the  latter  may  select. 

If  opposed  by  the  ordinary  line-of-battle-ship  with  the  present  armament  of 
32-pounders  and  42-pounders,  the  propeller  frigate  may,  at  a  long  range,  play 
her  seven  pivot  guns  with  comparative  impunity,  or  she  may  close  and  bring  into 
action  the  whole  broadside. 

Of  course  it  is  not  designed  to  assert  that  the  navy  would  be  constituted  of 
this  force  exclusively,  but  only  that  on  such  a  class  of  ships  reliance  might  safely 
be  placed  for  defence  of  the  coasts  and  harbours  against  any  of  the  heaviest  ships 
in  foreign  service.  In  time  of  peace  they  would  cruise  as  flag-ships,  while  the  infe- 
rior classes  might  receive  pieces  of  such  calibre  and  number  as  would  be  suitable. 

The  second  class  would  be  ships  with  a  light  deck  over  the  battery  and  a  pivot 
gun  on  the  to'gallant  forecastle  and  poop. 

The  third  class,  ships  with  a  light  deck  over  a  broadside  battery,  or  else  neither 
light  deck  nor  broadside  pieces,  but  heavy  pivot  guns  to  the  extent  of  the  accom- 
modation. 

All  the  vessels  of  lower  rate  to  be  steamers  of  five  hundred  to  one  thousand 
tons,  mounting  two  pivot  guns. 

Query  3.  Is  it  necessary  or  expedient  to  continue  the  system  of  fortifications 
on  the  shores  of  the  northern  lakes  ? 

It  would  be  a  loss  of  expenditure  already  incurred  not  to  finish  the  works  which 
have  been  commenced  on  the  northern  frontier,  and  these  would  certainly  be  use- 
ful in  the  initial  operations  of  a  war ;  though  there  can  be  but  little  doubt  that  if 
it  ever  becomes  necessary  to  direct  the  military  operations  of  the  United  States 
to  that  quarter,  the  population  of  the  States  that  border  thereon  would  furnish  a 
force  fully  sufficient  to  a  prompt  and  final  issue  against  any  army  that  co,uld  be 
sent  from  England.  It  may  indeed  be  questioned  whether  any  decent  opportu-*, 
nity  for  severing  a  connexion  so  expensive  and  unproductive  would  not  be  very 
acceptable  to  the  government  of  Great  Britain. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JNO.  A.  DAHLGKEN, 
Lieutenant  United  States  Navy. 

Hon.  C.  M.  CONRAD,  Secretary  of  War. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  501 

F. 

Order  to  the  Chief  Engineer. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  April  17,  1851. 

The  chief  engineer  will  please  prepare  and  report  to  the  department  the  infor- 
mation called  for  by  the  second  of  the  enclosed  resolutions. 

He  will  also,  at  as  early  a  period  as  practicable,  submit  to  the  department  his 
views  and  opinions  on  the  subject  embraced  in  the  first  of  these  resolutions,  and 
will  request  Colonel  Thayer,  Lieutenant  Colonel  De  Russy,  Major  Delafield,  and 
Major  Chase  to  submit  to  the  department  their  views  and  opinions  in  relation  to 
this  subject. 

It  is  desired  that  the  chief  engineer  and  the  above-named  officers  should  direct 
their  inquiries  particularly  to  the  following  points : 

1st.  How  far  the  invention  and  extension  of  railroads  have  superseded  or  dimin- 
ished the  necessity  of  fortifications  on  the  seaboard. 

2d.  In  what  manner  and  to  what  extent  the  navigation  of  the  ocean  by  steam, 
and  particularly  the  application  of  steam  to  vessels-of-war,  and  recent  improve- 
ments in  artillery  and  other  military  inventions  and  discoveries,  affect  this 
question. 

3d.  How  far  vessels-of-war,  steam  batteries,  ordinary  merchant  ships  and 
steamers,  and  other  temporary  expedients,  can  be  relied  upon  as  a  substitute  for 
permanent  fortifications  for  the  defence  of  our  seaports. 

4th.  How  far  the  increase  of  population  on  the  northern  frontier,  and  of  the 
mercantile  marine  on  the  northern  lakes,  obviates  or  diminishes  the  necessity  of 
continuing  the  system  of  fortifications  on  these  lakes. 

C.  M.  CONRAD,  Secretary  of  War. 

The  CHIEF  ENGINEER. 


•     No.  8. 
Report  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  R.  E.  De  Rtcssy. 

FORT  MONROE,  VIRGINIA,  July  26,  1851. 

SIR:  Being  called  upon  by  the  instructions  of  the  Hon.  the  Secretary  of  War 
to  present  my  views  and  opinions  on  certain  points  specified  in  his  letter  to  the 
engineer  department  of  April  17,  1851,  I  beg  leave  to  place  before  you  the  fol- 
lowing observations  upon  the  subject,  which  I  request  you  will  lay  before  the 
Secretary  of  War. 

Fortifications  had  their  origin  with  the  Greeks,  and  have  been  adopted,  im- 
proved, and  perfected  by  all  civilized  nations  from  that  time  to  this.  They  long 
since  have  become  a  combination  of  sciences,  involving  mathematics,  pyrotechny, 
strategy,  and  the  art  of  war.  The  objects  of  fortifications  are  to  make  strong  by 
art  what  otherwise  would  need  an  accumulation  of  active  physical  means,  as  also 
to  protect  exposed  positions  from  sudden  assaults  of  an  enemy.  In  producing 
the  first  result,  they  leave  at  the  disposal  of  the  country  invaded  or  attacked  an 
active  force  which  otherwise  might  be  kept  in  check  by  an  equal  or  superior  one. 
Again,  they  secure  in  a  great  degree,  within  certain  distances,  positions  rendered 
important  either  by  their  location  or  the  magnitude  of  their  commerce  and 
resources ;  hence  all  important  seaports  should,  in  my  opinion,  be  protected  by 
suitable  fortifications. 

1st.  Because  otherwise  an  enemy's  fleet  might  for  a  time  with  impunity  ride 


502  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

in  safety  in  our  harbors,  and  harass  or  even  destroy  the  commerce  and  property 
in  those  harbors. 

2d.  Because  they  become  dangerous  barriers,  which  an  enemy  is  seldom  dis- 
posed to  leave  behind  him,  the  custom  of  war  being  to  attack  fortifications  when 
offensive  operations  are  intended  to  be  carried  on  by  an  enemy  beyond  their 
localities ;  and  finally,  a  fortification  is  the  usual  depot  for  all  munitions  of  war, 
both  in  implements  and  provisions.  The  heavy  ordnance,  so  essential  to  our 
present  system  of  defence,  could  hardly  be  stored  in  safety  elsewhere,  unless  at 
such  distances  from  the  seaboard  as  to  render  their  transportation  tardy  and  per- 
haps hazardous  to  the  several  points  where  they  might  be  immediately  needed. 
I  will  close  these  preliminary  remarks  by  adding,  that  fortifications  give  confi- 
dence at  home  and  mistrust  to  an  enemy,  and  compel  him  to  make  additional 
and  costly  preparations,  both  in  money  and  time,  when  he  expects  to  come  in 
contact  with  them. 

,  I  will  now  proceed  to  give  my  views  and  opinions  on  the  several  points  enume- 
rated in  the  Secretary's  letter  to  the  chief  engineer,  and  will  discuss  these  in  the 
order  in  which  they  are  presented. 

1st.  I  look  upon  the  invention  and  extension  of  railroads  as  of  important  advan- 
tage during  a  state  of  war,  so  far  as  the  rapid  transit  of  both  troops  and  munitions 
are  concerned,  but  that  advantage  might  be  too  much  depended  upon. 

Railroads  are  so  easily  impaired  or  destroyed  that  it  would  be  dangerous  to 
depend  entirely  upon  their  use.  An  enemy  would  naturally  weigh  the  value  or 
importance  of  such  conveyances,  and  would  offer  such  high  rewards  for  their 
destruction  as  would  be  likely  to  meet  with  success.  It  is  well  known  that  our 
railroads  are  generally  constructed  through  the  most  uninhabited  portions  of  our 
country,  and  are  in  consequence  liable  to  be  approached  and  destroyed  by  mer- 
cenaries, who  would  run  many  risks  to  obtain  rewards  commensurate  with  the 
importance  of  the  undertaking. 

I  have  already  remarked  that  without  fortifications  our  harbors  and  seaports 
would  be  exposed  to  an  enemy's  fleet,  and  I  now  give  it  as  my  opinion  that  all 
the  facilities  afforded  by  the  railroads  that  centre,  for  instance,  in  and  about  the 
city  of  New  York  woiild  not  prevent  an  enemy's  fleet. from  destroying  that  city, 
were  it  not  protected  by  suitable  fortifications.  The  same  result  would  undoubt- 
edly attend  any  other  of  our  important  commercial  cities  on  the  seaboard;  this 
opinion  is  based  upon  the  supposition  that  an  active  and  competent  naval  force 
would  be  employed  by  the  enemy  to  attain  these  important  results  by  a  sudden 
attack,  and  that,  too,  combined  with  an  adequate  number  of  troops  in  case  it 
would  be  found  necessary  to  make  a  simultaneous  one. 

We  have  had  during  the  late  war  with  Great  Britain  many  instances  to  warrant 
this  opinion.  I  will  cite  a  few  of  them  to  show  the  necessity  of  fortifications  in 
our  harbors. 

The  defence  of  Fort  McHenry  saved  the  city  of  Baltimore.  The  defence  of 
Craney  island  saved  Norfolk  and  the  navy  yard  at  Gosport.  The  temporary 
defences  at  Sandy  Hook,  New  York,  prevented  the  blockading  squadro'n  from 
entering  within  the  waters  of  the  bay,  and  compelled  the  ships  every  evening  to 
make  an  offing,  thereby  giving  an  opportunity  to  our  merchant  vessels  to  slip 
out  of  the  harbor.  These  latter-  defences  were  insignificant  in  themselves,  but 
they  acted  in  conjunction  with  some  fifteen  or  twenty  gunboats,  each  mounting 
one  gun,  which  were  generally  anchored  in  the  cove,  and  ready  at  any  time  to 
co-operate  with  the  fort  and  block-house  erected  on  the  Hook ;  and,  had  Fort 
Washington  been  defended  instead  of  being  destroyed,  it  is  my  opinion  that  the 
Capitol  of  the  Union  would  have  remained  unmolested  during  that  war.  v 

2d.  The  navigation  of  the  ocean  by  steam,  and  the  application  of  steam  to 
vessels-of-war,  would  seem,  in  rny  opinion,  to  increase  the  necessity  of  fortifying 
our  sea-coast.  The  great  advantage  of  steam  power  lies  more  in  the  certainty 
of  accomplishing  an  object  in  a  given  time  than  in  increasing  the  strength  and 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  503 

power  of  an  enemy.  In  other  words,  an  expedition  planned  for  a  particular 
point  on  our  sea-coast  by  a  transatlantic  power  can  be  calculated  to  a  day  when 
steam  vessels  are  being  employed  for  the  purpose ;  but  those  steam  vessels,  in 
the  presence  of  or  passing  our  fortifications,  are  more  exposed  to  be  injured  by 
our  forts  than  ships-of-war  would  be.  The  machinery  of  the  one  cannot  be  well 
protected,  consequently  is  easily  impaired,  and  when  impaired,  the  steamer's 
motive  power  is  either  retarded  or  entirely  suspended,  whilst  the  other  is  so  con- 
structed as  to  be  at  times  crippled  in  her  hull  and  even  her  spars  by  shots 
without  losing  much,  if  any,  of  her  way  in  passing  a  battery. 

I  have  just  said  that  the  certainty  of  arriving  at  a  particular  point  at  an  ap- 
pointed time  is  the  advantage  obtained  by  the  use  of  steam  in  vessels-of-war  ; 
that  advantage  is  a  great  one,  and  the  only  means  to  counteract  it  is  to  have 
permanent  defences  where  it  is  likely  an  enemy  would  endeavor  to  surprise  any 
one  or  more  of  our  seaports. 

I  believe  it  to  be  demonstrable  that,  with  our  present  system  of  fortifications, 
provided,  as  they  are  intended  to  be,  with  the  heaviest  mortars,  howitzers,  and 
columbiads,  the  advantage  on  our  side  would  be  increased  had  we  to  contend 
against  war  steamers  instead  of  ships-of-the-line. 

The  difference  of  speed  between  the  two  kinds  of  vessels  when  within  shot 
distance  from  our  forts  is  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  greater  surface 
offered  in  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  deck  of  a  steamer,  and  the  constant 
exposure  of  her  machinery  to  curved  fires. 

The  machinery  of  these  war  steamers  is  supposed  to  occupy  about  one-fifth 
of  the  length  of  the  vessel ;  one  single  shell  or  shot  passing  through  that  por- 
tion of  her  hull  would  in  all  probability  injure  some  part  of  that  machinery,  and 
delay  or  stay  her  progress.  With  our  heavy  guns  we  may  calculate  to  reach 
with  certainty  and  effect  an  enemy's  vessel  at  the  distance  of  two  miles.  If 
that  vessel  is  compelled  to  pass  under  our  guns,  she  will,  sailing  at  the  rate  of 
twelve  miles  per  hour,  be  within  reach  of  our  pieces,  say  twenty  minutes ;  in 
those  twenty  minutes  each  gun  will,  upon  an  average,  discharge  twelve  shots, 
consequently  a  battery  of  say  forty  guns  will  discharge  four  hundred  and  eighty 
shots  and  shells,  which,  when  directed  with  skill,  will,  in  most  instances,  have 
their  effect  against  passing  vessels. 

In  answering  the  third  point  in  the  Secretary's  letter  to  the  chief  engineer,  I 
would  say  that  vessels-of-war  would  at  all  times  afford  important  services  in 
the' defence  of  our  seaports ;  and  could  they  be  so  multiplied  as  to  be  found  at 
each  port  in  sufficient  numbers  to  cope,  with  the  assistance  of  auxiliary  means 
obtained  on  the  spur  of  the  moment,  with  a  powerful  naval  force,  then  they 
would  in  a  measure  remove  the  necessity  of  creating  another  species  of  defence ; 
but  this  state  of  things  cannot  well  take  place.  Our  navy  can  never  attain  such 
pre-eminence,  and  consequently  must,  while  subdivided  along  the  coast,  as  it 
will  be  in  time  of  war,  be  found  in  the  minority  by  an  invading  force,  and  thereby 
be  compelled  to  seek  for  protection  under  our  fortifications.  Their  co-operating 
with  the  defences  in  our  harbors,  they  will  become  extremely  important  and  of 
great  assistance. 

Steam  batteries  have  often  been  spoken  of,  and  might,  perhaps,  be  of  service 
where  the  channel-way  is  narrow,  and  can  afford  them  protection  from  the 
shores  ;  but  in  open  roadsteads  I  would  not  rely  much  upon  them  ;  they  neces- 
sarily must  be  slow  and  unwieldly,  and  in  consequence  liable  to  be  turned  and 
even  avoided  by  an  active  naval  force.  All  other  temporary  expedients,  such 
as  arming  merchant  ships,  steamers,  &c.,  might,  perhaps,  be  made  useful  for  a 
short  time,  and  upon  a  particular  emergency,  but  no  reliance  could  be  placed 
upon  them.  The  immense  expense  attending  the  transformation  of  these  ves- 
sels together  with  the  cost  of  their  imperfect  armament,  would  hardly  warrant 
the  introduction  of  such  a  doubtful  system  of  casual  defence  in  our  large  sea- 
ports. The  havoc  which  would  naturally  result  to  these  light  vessels,  when 


504  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

engaged  with  heavy  ships-of-the-line  and  war  steamers,  would,  I  am  inclined  to 
believe,  be  extremely  disastrous.  The  expense,  moreover,  for  such  temporary 
means  would,  I  believe,  exceed  the  cost  of  the  permanent  fortifications  con- 
structed for  the  same  object. 

Permit  me  for  a  moment  to  digress,  by  stating  that  there  is  one  consideration 
attending  our  expenditures  for  fortifications  which,  in  my  opinion,  is  for  from 
being  unimportant  to  the  general  welfare  of  the  country,  aside  from  the  impor- 
tance I  attach  to  fortifications  as  national  defences,  and  which  but  few,  perhaps, 
have  considered ;  it  is,  that  every  article  used  for  our  defences  is  found  in  a 
crude  state  in  our  country,  and  generally  in  the  neighborhood  of  our  important 
works.  The  manipulation  of  these  materials  gives  employment  to  a  largo  and 
useful  class  of  our  citizens,  and  creates,  as  it  were,  a  sort  of  revenue  which 
benefits  both  the  laborer  and  the  government,  first  by  rewarding  industry, 
and  that  industry,  by  the  natural  course  of  things,  bringing  back  to  the  aid  of 
the  general  government  portions  of  the  revenue  which  that  industry  enables  the 
laborer  to  obtain  from  abroad  through  our  custom-houses.  For  instance,  a 
quarry,  when  worked,  requires  many  hands ;  these  hands,  devoting  all  their 
time  to  their  arduous  labor,  find  it  necessary  to  exchange  the  price  of  that  labor 
for  the  necessaries  of  life,  hence  imported  goods  of  many  kinds  must  find  a 
market  with  them.  The  manufacturers  of  bricks,  cement,  lime,  lumber,  iron, 
and  other  materials  used  in  the  construction  of  our  fortifications  come  under  the 
same  rule,  and,  independent  of  the  mechanics  and  laborers  employed  in  our 
public  works,  form  a  large  and  useful  class  of  our  citizens,  all  returning  to  the 
general  fund  a  portion  of  revenue  created,  in  fact,  only  by  their  industry. 

I  name  this  fact  to  show  that,  although  many  look  upon  our  system  of  defence 
as  costly,  yet  the  advantages  of  it,  independent  of  the  security  it  affords  to  the 
country  in  a  military  point  of  view,  are  substantial  and  important  to  the  commu- 
nity at  large,  inasmuch  as  they  create  a  revenue  by  bringing  out  the  latent 
resources  of  the  country. 

The  fourth  point  relates  to  our  northern  frontier  and  its  defences.  I  can  but 
look  upon  that  frontier  as  an  exposed  one,  and  consequently  requiring  the  watch- 
ful eye  and  fostering  care  of  the  government.  Our  neighbors  have  been  dili- 
gently employed  since  the  war  of  1814  in  strengthening  her  borders,  and  many 
vast  improvements  have  been  made  by  them  to  keep  pace  with  our  increasing 
strength  in  population  on  the  lakes.  Their  population,  too,  is  increasing,  and 
the  Welland  canal  has  removed  obstacles  which  gives  them  now  the  advantage 
of  an  inland  navigation  from  the  St.  Lawrence  through  to  all  the  lakes.  If  there 
ever  was  a  time  when  a  system  of  defences  planned  and  executed  for  the  pro- 
tection of  our  extensive  northern  frontier,  it  is  the  present  one,  when  we  can 
weigh  the  advantages  that  could  be  derived  from  the  great  improvements  already 
in  evidence  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  lakes.  If  Great  Britain  should  ever  here- 
after be  found  at  war  with  us,  a  portion  of  the  naval  force  would  be  found  on 
the  lakes,  and  interfering  with  our  frontier  towns  and  cities  and  our  inland  com- 
merce. The  redundancy  of  her  population  at  home  would  naturally  place,at  her 
disposal  the  means  of  increasing  her  forces  in  those  inland  seas,  and  by  a  sys- 
tem of  locomotive  warfare  disturb  and  annoy  a  population  numerically  much 
stronger  than  the  forces  she  would  oppose  to  them. 

To  meet  this  state  of  things  it  would  seem  indispensable  to  fortify  permanently 
certain  points  in  our  northern  frontier,  not  only  for  the  protection  of  those  posi- 
tions, and  as  depots  for  provisions  and  munitions  of  war,  but  as  great  rallying 
points  for  the  militia  and  other  troops. 

The  remarks  I  have  already  made  upon  the  subject  of  national  defences  for 
the  seaboard,  in  connexion  with  auxiliary  means,  will  apply  to  the  lake  defences 
so  far  as  the  mercantile  marine  is  concerned  ;  they  might  become  of  use  if  sup- 
ported or  protected  by  permanent  fortifications,  but  left  to  themselves  they  could 
hardly  be  expected  to  cope  with  vessels- of- war. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  505 

In  the  war  of  1812  and  1814  the  ascendency  on  the  lakes  between  the  British 
navy  and  ours  fluctuated  according  to  the  number  of  vessels  constructed  and 
the  time  they  took  their  element ;  one  single  vessel  added  to  the  one  or  the 
other  would  give,  for  the  time  being,  the  preponderance  to  that  side;  but  the 
time  is  past  when  we  ought  to  think  of  adopting  the  same  system,  since,  by  the 
vigilance  of  Great  Britain,  she  has  opened  the  way  for  any  number  of  armed 
vessels  she  may  be  able  to  spare  from  her  own  coast.  These  circumstances 
would,  of  themselves,  seem  to  indicate  the  necessity  of  fortifying  the  vulnerable 
as  well  as  the  important  points  on  the  lakes. 

The  few  defences  temporarily  erected  during  that  war  on  the  northern  frontier 
bore  testimony  of  their  great  usefulness  in  checking  the  enemy's  ingress.  At 
Plattsburg,  for  instance,  when  our  navy,  protected  under  the  guns  of  the  forts, 
gained  a  brilliant  victory  over  the  enemy ;  Sir  George  Prevost,  with  an  army  of 
fourteen  thousand  men,  found  there  an  opposition  which  compelled  him  to  retreat 
precipitately,  leaving  his  sick  and  wounded  at  the  mercy  of  the  American 
general  commanding.  Thus  a  garrison  of  fourteen  hundred  men,  which  was  the 
force  of  General  Macomb,  within  well  planned  defences,  protected  our  navy  on 
Lake  Champlain,  and  taking  the  offensive  as  well  as  the  defensive,  compelled 
an  army  of  fourteen  thousand  men  to  abandon  the  project  of  invading  the 
country,  which  was  understood  to  be  the  avowed  intention  of  the  British  com- 
mander. 

Many  other  instances  of  the  kind  occurred  during  that  war  which  could  be 
mentioned  to  show  the  importance  of  works  of  defence  on  our  inland  borders. 

In  conclusion,  permit  me  to  say  that  to  protect  the  lives  of  its  citizens  is  a 
high  consideration  with  every  government,  but  with  none  can  it  be  so  important 
as  with  ours,  when  it  is  considered  that  our  population  is  yet  too  thin  and  sparse 
to  furnish  large  masses  for  war  services.  We  must,  in  consequence,  use  all 
means  at  our  disposal  to  reduce  the  number  of  troops  required  for  active  service 
in  time  of  war,  and  these  should,  so  far  as  practicable,  be  protected  by  these 
means  ;  I  know  of  none  more  effectual  for  this  important  object  than  permanent 
fortifications.  By  multiplying  them  you  relieve  a  portion  of  your  useful  citizens 
from  the  perils  and  hardships  incident  to  the  fields  of  battle,  and  leave  them  at 
home  to  pursue  their  useful  avocations. 

In  presenting  this  feeble  view  of  the  subject,  could  I  persuade  myself  that 
any  portion  of  it  would  be  acceptable  or  useful  to  the  honorable  the  Secretary 
of  War,  it  would  be  most  gratifying  to  me;  as  imperfect  as  it  is,  I  submit  it 
with  all  respect. 

R.  E.  DE  RUSSY, 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Engineers. 

Brigadier  General  Jos.  G.  TOTTEN, 

Chief  Engineer  of  the  United  States,  Washington. 


No.  9. 
Report  of  Major  W.  H.  Chase. 

CHASEFIELD,  NEAR  PENSACOLA,  April  17,  1SG1. 

The  undersigned,  in  compliance  with  the  orders  of  the  Secretary  of  War, 
communicated  through  the  chief  engineer,  has  the  honor  to  submit  to  the  War 
Department  the  following  views  and  opinions  of  the  subject  embraced  in  the 
first  resolution  of  the  series  adopted  by  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States  during  its  session  on  the  3d  of  March,  1851. 


506  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

In  viewing  "  the  general  system  adopted  after  the  war  with  Great  Britain, 
and  since  pursued  in  regard  to  the  permanent  fortifications  then  deemed  nf-e<-.— 
sary  for  the  national  defence,"  it  will  be  relevant  to  the  subject  to  allude  to  the 
condition  of  that  defence  when  the  United  States  declared  themselves  indepen- 
dent of  Great  Britain,  and  prepared  to  sustain  that  declaration  by  force  of  arms 
during  the  period  of  peace  from  1783  to  1S12,  and  during  the  war  of  18 12-' 15. 

In  the  first  period  the  defences  on  the  seaboard  of  the  colonies,  extending 
from  Nova  Scotia  to  Florida,  were  confined  to  a  few  points.  England  having 
driven  the  French  from  their  North  American  colonies,  had  little  fear  of  any 
future  attempt  on  the  part  of  France  either  to  regain  her  lost  possessions  or  to 
attack  the  other  possessions  of  England  in  America. 

In  the  course  of  the  war  of  independence  the  English  were  driven  in  succes- 
sion from  Boston,  New  York,  Yorktown,  and  other  places,  and  finally  from  the 
whole  country,  by  which  the  power  of  the  United  States,  even  in  its  incipiency 
to  resist  aggression  from  the  most  powerful  of  nations,  was  favorably  exhibited. 

Few  or  no  additional  sea-coast  defences  were  constructed  during  the  war, 
yet  the  public  and  private  armed  ships,  issuing  from  the  ports  of  the  United 
States,  did  immense  injury  to  British  commerce,  and  even  kept  the  whole 
western  coasts  of  England  and  Scotland  in  constant  alarm.  Some  hastily  raised 
redoubts  on  Dorchester  heights,  compelled  the  English  to  retreat  from  Boston 
with  their  fleet  and  army ;  and  the  castle  defending  the  entrance  to  the  harbor, 
falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Americans,  together  with  some  temporary  erections 
of  earth  on  the  surrounding  heights  and  islands,  secured  Boston  from  again 
being  occupied  by  the  enemy.  Charleston  was  successfully  defended  by  the 
Palmetto  fort  against  a  squadron  of  ships ;  and  the  success  generally  of  the 
Amercan  arms  up  to  the  surrender  of  Yorktown,  demonstrated,  if  not  the 
impossibility  of  reducing  the  colonies  to  subjection,  at  least  the  enormous  expen- 
diture of  life  and  money  attendant  on  the  attempt. 

This  truth  led,  with  other  things,  to  a  change  of  policy  in  England  in  regard 
to  the  United  States.  The  new  administration  made  peace  with  the  colonies ; 
and  the  wise  statemen  of  England  saw  that  an  intimate  commercial  intercourse 
with  the  United  States  as  an  independent  power  would  probably  be  more 
advantageous  to  the  interests  of  their  country  than  the  possession  of  colonies 
that  would  require  much  blood  and  treasure  to  regain  and  hold  ;  whilst  the  trade 
with  the  same  would  be  interrupted  and  precarious.  The  foundation  of  this 
policy  was  the  preservation  for  the  future  of  uninterrupted  friendly  relations 
between  England  and  America ;  and  it  was  the  determination  of  the  party  in 
power  to  secure  at  all  hazards  and  at  all  times  peace  with  the  United  States. 

But  unfortunately  for  a  strict  adherence  to  these  views,  the  great  wars  growing 
out  of  the  French  revolution  placed  England  in  position  to  struggle  for 
her  very  existence  as  an  independent  power;  and  in  the  course  of  the  con- 
test principles  in  relation  to  neutrality  were  adopted,  and  so  rigidly  adhered  to, 
that  the  interests  and  honor  of  neutral  nations,  and  of  the  United  States  in 
particular,  were  compromised.  In  persisting  to  assert  her  arrogant  pretensions, 
the  government  of  England  was  deceived  by  its  diplomatic  agents  and  friends 
as  to  the  effect  produced  in  America.  These,  judging  of  the  strength  of  the 
party  in  opposition  to  Mr.  Madison's  administration,  and  of  the  talent  and 
influence  of  the  principal  men  of  that  party,  constantly  represented  to  the 
English  government  that  the  President  would  not  recommend  to  Congress  a 
declaration  of  war  against  England  in  the  face  of  the  powerful  party  opposed 
to  such  a  measure.  A  secretary  of  legation  in  Washington  was  the  only  corres- 
pondent of  the  English  ministry  who  understood  the  exact  state  of  things  in 
the  United  States.  He  repeatedly  advised  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  that 
the  latter  was  not  correctly  informed  of  the  feeling  in  America;  and  that,  unless 
the  orders  in  council  were  revoked  and  other  obnoxious  measures  and  acts 
abated,  Avar  would  certainly  be  declared  against  England  by  the  United  States. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  507 

At  last  the  secretary  was  listened  to,  and  the  orders  in  council-  were  repealed ; 
but  before  the  news  reached  the  United  States  war  had  been  declared.  The 
messengers  bearing  respectively  the  declaration  of  war  and  the  order  removing 
the  principal  cause  which  led  to  the  declaration,  passed  each  other  on  the  ocean. 

Thus  was  the  war  of  1812-'15,  or,  as  it  has  been  termed,  "the  second  war 
of  independence,"  a  blunder  which  England  lost  no  time  in  remedying,  by  seek- 
ing for  and  concluding  a  peace  with  the  United  States  as  soon  as  she  could  do 
so  with  honor  to  herself. 

At  the  time  peace  was  made  England  was  nevermore  powerful.  Triumphant 
over  all  her  enemies  in  Europe  by  sea  and  land,  she  was  left  by  the  general 
peace  of  1814  in  possession  of  vast  means,  ready  organized  and  practiced  in 
war,  with  which  she  might  have  given  the  United  States  some  severe  though 
not  fatal  blows.  But  however  much  her  pride  of  power  might  have  been  grati- 
fied by  carrying  her  triumphant  arms  to  America,  she  preferred  at  once  to  resume 
peaceful  and  intimate  relations  with  the  United  States,  and  to  secure  all  the 
advantages  flowing  therefrom,  then  and  forever.  Her  far-seeing  statesmen  knew 
that  the  true  policy  to  be  followed  in  respect  to  the  United  States  in  1815  was, 
with  increased  reasons  for  its  adoption,  that  indicated  by  the  statesmen  of  1783; 
and  they  resolved  that  no  future  blunder  should  lead  to  a  war  between  the 
United  States  and  England  so  far  as  the  latter  could  prevent  it.  In  this  favor- 
able state  of  the  political  atmosphere,  the  clouds  that  lowered  over  the  north- 
eastern boundary,  over  Canada  during  the  patriot  demonstration,  and  over  Oregon, 
were  soon  cleared  away.  It  is  true  that  the  United  States  yielded  in  these 
instances  something  more  than  was  due  to  England's  just  claims ;  but  it  was 
rather  the  graceful  yielding  of  a  daughter  to  a  mother's  solicitation  than  the 
acknowledgment  of  any  power  of  coercion  possessed  by  England.  If  the 
peaceful  views  of  England  were  not  then  generally  acknowledged,  they  are  now 
made  manifest.  England  is  not  only  at  this  time  to  a  great  degree  dependent 
on  the  United  States  in  commercial  matters,  but  signs  are  significant  that  she 
considers  her  future  fate  depends  on  maintaining  the  most  friendly  relations  with 
the  United  States,  so  that  they  would,  from  interest  in  commercial  matters,  and 
perhaps  from  a  better  feeling  for  their  noble  mother,  look  with  disfavor  on  any 
combination  of  the  European  powers  to  humble  and  crush  her. 

France  also  gave  evidence  how  much  importance  she  attached  to  the  main- 
tenance of  the  most  intimate  relations  in  trade  with  this  country,  and  how 
reluctantly,  if  at  all,  she  would  resort  to  hostilities  with  the  United  States.  The 
King  of  the  French,  supported  by  public  opinion,  was  enabled  to  overcome  the 
opposition  of  the  chambers  to  the  payment  of  the  amount  stipulated  by  treaty 
to  be  paid  for  spoliations  on  our  commerce.  This  public  opinion  was  especially 
expressed  by  numerous  petitions,  coming  up  from  the  great  commercial  and 
manufacturing  districts  of  the  kingdom,  praying  that  the  difficulties  with 
America  might  be  settled  and  peace  preserved. 

During  the  period  extending  from  1783  to  1812,  considerable  expenditures 
were  made  from  time  to  time  on  the  forts  and  batteries  at  the  principal  seaports, 
in  anticipation  of  possible  Avar  growing  out  of  the  French  revolution,  and  more 
recently  in  consequence  of  the  continued  aggression  on  our  commerce  by  English 
cruisers;  so  that  when  war  actually  broke  out  in  1812  there  was  not  a  town  of 
any  magnitude  that  was  not  supplied  with  one  or  more  batteries.  Nevertheless, 
there  were  a  great  many  small  towns  exposed  without  defence  to  the  enemy,  and 
were  left  unmolested  by  him,  seeing  that  their  destruction  or  injury  could  in  no- 
wise facilitate  his  operations,  whilst  such  acts  of  vandalism  would  serve  only  to 
hold  him  up  to  the  execration  of  the  civilized  world. 

In  the  course  of  the  war  of  1812-' 15  the  defences  of^the  country  were  con- 
siderably increased  in  value  by  the  construction  of  field-works;  and  in  no 
instance  were  such  defences,  supported  by  well-trained  and  patriotic  volunteers, 
ever  overcome.  Attacks  were  made  on  Fort  Boyer  at  Mobile,  on  Fort  McHeriry 


508  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

at  Baltimore,  and  on  Fort  St.  Philip  below  New  Orleans,  and  were  successfully 
repelled.  Our  vessels-of-war  were  blockaded  in  New  London,  and  chased  into 
Marblehead  and  Boston,  where  they  found  security  under  the  batteries.  Castine 
was  taken  and  held  by  the  enemy,  but  being  a  point  of  no  importance  it  was 
not  retaken,  for  it  served  to  detach  a  portion  of  the  enemy's  forces  from  opera- 
ting at  other  points. 

Washington  was  reached,  and  the  Capitol  brutally  attacked  and  defaced. 
The  success  of  the  enemy,  in  this  instance,  was  obtained  less  from  the  well- 
arranged  plan  of  his  operations  than  from  the  imbecility  of  the  generals  com- 
manding the  American  forces  rallied  for  the  defence.  The  enemy  was  signally 
defeated  many  times,  by  sea  and  land,  and  the  war  was  triumphantly  terminated 
by  the  battle  of  New  Orleans. 

Thus  was  the  country  preserved  intact,  during  a  war  of  two  years  and  eight 
months,  against  the  operations  of  an  enemy  having  the  mastery  at  sea,  and  when 
the  defences  of  the  country  were  comparatively  weak. 

It  should  be  here  remarked  that  a  large  expenditure  of  money  was  incurred 
in  consequence  of  the  want  of  facile  lines  of  rail,  canal,  or  common  way  com- 
munications leading  toward  and  along  the  northern,  Atlantic,  and  Gulf  frontiers, 
through  which  men,  munitions,  and  machinery  of  war  could  be  transported. 
Yet  in  face  of  these  difficulties,  movements  were  generally  made  when  required, 
efficiently  and  with  considerable  promptness. 

It  was  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  wielding  mobile  forces  for  the  defence 
of  the  seaboard  and  lake  frontiers,  rather  than  from  any  signal  success  obtained 
by  the  enemy  against  the  ports  and  batteries,  that  it  was  determined  at  the  close 
of  the  war  to  adopt  a  system  of  defence  by  permanent  fortifications  on  a  large 
scale.  Under  an  excitement  fed  by  the  friends  of  the  scheme,  Congress  voted 
large  sums  of  money  to  be  expended  on  works  which  were  to  be  planned,  prin- 
cipally, by  a  foreign  engineer,  with  such  help  as  might,  perchance,  be  rendered 
by  the  native  officers  of  engineers,  some  of  whom  had  not  altogether  escaped 
distinction  in  the  late  war.  A  distinguished  general  officer  of  engineers  in 
France,  who  stood  high  in  the  estimation  of  Napoleon,  was  engaged  and  re- 
ceived in  service  of  the  United  States  under  the  title  of  assistant  engineer,  with 
the  rank  and  pay  of  a  brigadier  general.  No  protest  against  this  arrangement 
was  made  by  those  officers  of  engineers  whose  rank  and  influence  would  have 
entitled  them  to  be  heard  in  opposition,  if  any  was  entertained  by  them.  The 
acquiescence  of  these  officers,  if  not  amounting  to  approval,  led  Congress  and 
the  authorities  to  suppose  that  no  serious  disapproval  of  the  measures  adopted 
was  entertained  by  them.  Being  thus  negatively  indorsed,  it  was  considered 
that  a  good  arrangement  had  been  made  by  the  government,  by  which  a  lack  of 
skill  in  the  native  officers,  unfitting  them  for  the  task  of  designing  the  grand 
scheme  of  defence,  might  be  supplied  by  an  importation  from  abroad. 

Under  the  auspices  of  the  foreign  engineer,  a  scheme  for  the  defence  of  the 
seaboard  from  Passamaquoddy  to  the  Sabine  was  devised,  involving  a  cost  of 
many  millions  of  dollars,  and  submitted  to  and  approved  by  the  government. 

The  progress  of  construction  of  the  works  under  the  new,  or  as  it  has  been 
termed  "the  third  system  of  defence,"  was  not  very  rapid.  The  Gulf  frontier 
being  considered  the  weakest  and  most  assailable  was  first  attended  to,  and  in 
about  ten  years  the  river  and  lake  approaches  to  New  Orleans,  and  the  entrance 
to  Mobile  bay,  were  occupied  by  strong  works.  The  commencement  of  new 
works  of  the  system  was,  in  the  meantime,  gradually  extended  to  the  north  and 
south  Atlantic  coasts,  and  subsequently  to  all  of  the  most  important  points  along 
the  Gulf  and  Atlantic  frontiers.  These  defences,  combining  the  repairs  of  old 
works  with  the  construction  of  new  ones,  place  the  sea-coast  of  the  United  States 
in  a  better  condition  of  defence  than  that  of  any  other  sea-coast  in  the  world. 

In  planning  the  new  works,  it  seems  to  have  been  taken  for  granted,  in  many 
instances,  that  each  work  must  depend  on  itself,  without  chance  of  succor  from 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  509 

forces  operating  on  the  rear  and  flanks.  "Works  were  thus  constructed,  to  sustain 
a  siege  from  ten  to  fifty  days,  in  the  midst  of  a  population  from  which  relief  to 
"the  invested  work  could  be  drawn  in  twenty-four  hours.  The  expensive  ar- 
rangement of  these  land  defences  have  greatly  increased  the  cost  of  the  works, 
already  from  their  nature  very  costly ;  and  at  this  day  excite  the  surprise  of  the 
professional  examiner,  acquainted  with  the  vast  means  of  collateral  defence  pos- 
sessed by  the  United  States,  that  anything  more  should  have  been  required  for 
most  of  the  works,  than  security  against  assault  by  escalade. 

The  report  to  be  made  by  the  chief  engineer  of  the  United  States,  on  the 
second  resolution  of  the  series  before  mentioned,  will  exhibit  the  exact  condition 
of  the  works  composing  "the  third  system  of  defence,"  the  number  and  strength 
of  the  works;  the  first  estimates  of  cost;  their  extent,  capacity,  armament,  and 
actual  cost;  and  an  estimate  of  the  sums  necessary  to  complete  them. 

This  exhibition  will  prove  what  has  been  herein  stated,  that  the  United  States, 
at  this  time,  possess  the  best  fortified  sea-coast  in  the  world. 

Whilst  the  defence  of  the  coast  has  been  gradually  accomplished  in  the  course 
of  thirty-five  years  by  the  construction  of  permanent,  extensive,  and  expensive 
fortifications,  new  and  important  elements  in  the  national  defence  and  security 
have  been  rapidly,  almost  magically,  developed.  Our  population  has  increased 
from  8,000,000  to  23,000,000.  The  progress  of  improvement  in  agriculture, 
manufactures  and  commerce,  and  in  the  facile  lines  of  intercommunication  neces- 
sary to  meet  the  demands  of  the  growing  prosperity  of  the  country,  has 
advanced  in  a  ratio  even  greater  than  that  of  the  population. 

The  lines  of  communication,  in  combination  with  the  electric  telegraph,  whilst 
they  impart  new  life  and  vigor  to  the  country,  bring  distant  sections  of  it  in 
easy  correspondence  with  the  centre,  at  once  affording  security  against  foreign 
aggression,  and  making  the  people  more  interested  in  preserving  those  glori- 
ous institutions  under  which,  for  seventy  years,  they  have  happily  lived  and 
prospered. 

The  interior  and  exterior  commerce  of  the  country  have  advanced  with  sur- 
prising strides,  the  latter  has  become  so  necessary  to  the  leading  commercial 
nations  of  the  world,  that  its  interruption  would  produce  disastrous  results  to 
those  nations.  The  stoppage  of  the  supply  of  cotton  following  a  war  with  the 
United  States,  would  be  attended  in  England  by  the  most  serious  consequences 
to  her  trade  and  finances — consequences  deemed  by  many  as  being  fatal  to  the 
political  institutions  of  that  country. 

In  this  brief  review  we  have  passed  through  three  epochs:  that  of  the  rev- 
olutionary war ;  that  of  the  war  of  1S12-'15  ;  and  that  of  the  elapsed  time  from 
1815  to  1851. 

In  the  first  epoch  it  has  been  shown  that  the  power  of  England,  although 
relatively  greater  than  it  is  now  in  respect  to  this  country,  aided  also  as  it  was 
by  a  considerable  portion  of  the  inhabitants  remaining  loyal  to  England,  was 
inadequate  to  subdue  our  people,  or  to  retain  any  portion  of  our  soil. 

In  the  second  epoch  it  has  also  been  shown  that  though  the  national  defence 
by  permanent  fortifications  was  weak  in  comparison  with  the  present  one,  and 
the  means  for  the  operation  of  the  mobile  forces  were  limited  and  difficult  in 
their  use,  the  most  formidable  demonstrations  of  the  enemy  were  easily  defeated 
and  the  country  preserved  from  any  injurious  attacks  of  the  enemy,  except  in 
one  or  two  instances. 

And  in  the  third  epoch  it  is  shown  that,  in  the  several  international  difficulties 
which  have  arisen  with  France  and  England,  those  powerful  nations  gave  evidence 
throughout  the  pending  negotiations,  of  their  desire  to  maintain  that  pacific  policy 
so  essential  to  the  prosecution  of  the  commercial  and  manufacturing  pursuits  which 
have  been  extended  so  rapidly  in  their  respective  countries  during  the  last  thirty 
years. 

This  epoch,  now  of  thirty- five  years  duration,  is  distinguished  for  the  profound 


510  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

peace  which  has  been  maintained  throughout  the  civilized  world  without  inter- 
ruption, except  in  the  instances  of  the  Mexican  war,  and  of  some  unimportant 
conflicts  in  Europe ;  and  that  whilst  it  has  thus  been  distinguished,  it  is  no  less 
so  on  account  of  the  wonderful  progress  made  in  the  arts  and  sciences,  by  whose 
influence  the  character  of  nations  and  of  their  governments  have  been  greatly 
changed  for  the  better,  affording  new  guarantees  that  the  pacific  policy,  so  long 
and  profitably  maintained  by  the  leading  commercial  nations,  will  continue  to 
be  cherished  toward  all  countries  and  toward  ours  in  particular. 

In  view,  then,  of  all  these  things,  and  especially  of  the  new  elements,  moral, 
political,  aiid  physical,  claimed  to  have  been  developed  and  to  have  greatly  in- 
creased the  power  of  the  United  States,  and  which  must  be  considered  in  relation 
to  the  future  arrangement  of  the  national  defence,  the  undersigned  thinks  that 
the  general  plan  adopted  thirty-rive  years  ago  should  be  essentially  modified, 
by  reducing  the  number  and  size  of  the  works  proposed  to  be  constructed,  and 
by  abandoning  some  of  the  defences  now  in  progress  of  construction,  or  which 
are  about  to  be  constructed  under  existing  appropriations  made  by  Congress. 

The  undersigned  is  also  of  the  opinion  that  the  best  interests  of  the  country 
require  that  the  subject  of  modification  should  be  submitted  to  a  board  composed 
of  artillery  and  engineer  officers,  and  some  eminent  civilians.  That  no  new 
work  should  be  commenced,  even  if  it  has  been  appropriated  for  by  Congress; 
and  that  no  appropriation  should  be  made  by  Congress  for  the  completion  and 
repairs  of  existing  works,  until  the  whole  subject  of  the  national  defence  has 
been  considered  and  reported  by  the  said  board. 

The  Secretary  of  War  desires  "  that  the  chief  engineer  and  the  above-named 
officers  (Colonel  Thayer,  Lieutenant  Colonel  De  Russy,  Major  Delafield,  and 
Major  Chase)  should  direct  their  inquiries  particularly  to  the  following  points : 

"  1st.  How  far  the  invention  and  extension  of  railways  have  superseded  or 
diminished  the  necessity  of  fortifications  on  the  seaboard? 

"2d.  In  what  manner  and  to  what  extent  the  navigation  of  the  ocean  by 
steam,  and  particularly  the  application  of  steam  to  vessels-of-war,  and  recent 
improvements  in  artillery  and  other  military  inventions  and  discoveries,  affect 
the  question? 

"  3d.  How  far  vessels-of-war,  steam  batteries,  ordinary  merchant  ships  and 
steamers,  and  other  temporary  expedients  can  be  relied  upon  as  substitutes  for 
permanent  fortifications  for  the  defence  of  the  large  seaports  ? 

"  4th.  How  far  the  increase  of  the  population  on  the  northern  frontier,  and  of 
the  mercantile  marine  on  the  northern  lakes,  can  obviate  or  diminish  the  necessity 
of  continuing  the  system  of  fortifications  on  those  lakes?" 

The  results  of  the  inquiries  made  by  the  undersigned  in  the  premises  are 
expressed  as  follows : 

1st.  The  invention  and  extension  of  railways  and  of  the  electric  telegraph,  in 
connexion  with  the  great  increase  in  the  number  and  size  of  steam  vessels  navi- 
gating the  rivers,  bays,  lakes,  and  ocean,  have  added  greatly  to  the  strength  of 
the  Union,  by  bringing  the  most  distant  sections  within  a  few  days]  travel  of 
the  centre,  and  do  thus  contribute  to  preserve  tranquillity  at  home  and  repel 
aggression  from  abroad. 

The  lines  of  railways,  assuming  the  radiating  point  at  New  York,  will  shortly 
be  extended  to  most  of  the  important  seaboard  and  inland  towns  in  the  United 
States.  The  telegraph  lines  following  the  rails,  and  also  diverging  from  them, 
are  beginning  to  interlace  the  country  in  every  direction.  By  these  means,  and 
the  rapid  increase  of  our  population  indigenously  and  by  immigration,  agricul- 
ture and  manufactures, 'have  been  surprisingly  extended  throughout  our  broad 
domain,  and  an  internal  commerce  has  arisen,  by  the  interchange  of  the  products 
of  art  and  of  our  various  climates,  which  is  considered  to  be  of  greater  value 
than  the  exterior  commerce  of  the  country.  With  the  exception  of  a  few  articles, 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  511 

our  artificial  and  natural  productions  embrace  everything  that  can  be  produced 
in  any  part  of  the  world. 

These  are  immense  elements  of  strength  to  a  nation,  and  insure  its  power  and 
prosperity.  This  is  the  moral  effect. 

The  existence  of  these  railways  and  telegraphs  contribute  directly  and  physi- 
cally to  the  defence  of  the  country,  by  enabling  men  and  military  supplies  to  be 
collected  promptly  and  moved  rapidly  to  points  threatened  with  invasion.  Rail- 
ways extend  already  along  the  coast,  in  some  instances,  in  double  lines,  from 
Portland  to  Savannah,  connecting  all  the  intermediate  cities  and  other  important 
points  with  the  canals  and  rivers  and  the  naval  and  military  arsenals  and  depots. 
From  this  great  base  line,  other  lines  convergent  and  divergent,  have  reached 
lakes  Erie,  Ontario,  and  Champlain,  and  they  are  rapidly  approaching  and 
crossing  the  great  lakes  and  rivers  of  the  west.  And  it  is  hoped  that  Congress 
will  not  long  delay,  in  conjunction  with  the  State  of  Texas,  in  making  such  a 
donation  of  lands  as  will  enable  private  enterprise  to  commence  and  complete  a 
railway  leading  from  some  point  between  the  mouth  of  Red  river  and  New  Orleans, 
through  Louisiana  and  Texas  to  El  Paso,  and  thence  through  the  valley  of  the 
Gila  to  San  Diego,  in  California. 

A  single  example  of  the  pervading  extent  of  the  railway  system  will  at  once 
illustrate  the  subject,  and  exhibit  in  a  favorable  light  these  new  means  for  the 
national  defence.  The  completion  of  the  railway  now  in  course  of  completion, 
from  Wilmington,  in  North  Carolina,  to  Manchester,  in  South  Carolina  will 
enable  troops  to  be  transported  continuously,  by  railway,  from  the  valley  of  the 
Tennessee  to  Norfolk  in  two  days,  to  Washington  in  two  and  a  half  days,  and 
to  Charleston  and  Savannah  in  one  day.  The  extension  of  the  railway  now 
being  made  from  Chattanooga,  on  the  Tennessee  river,  to  Nashville,  will  enable 
the  volunteers  from  the  superb  military  population  of  Tennessee  to  be  carried  to 
the  most  distant  points  of  the  north  and  south  Atlantic,  almost  at  a  moment's 
warning,  and  in  the  course  of  three  or  four  days;  whilst  the  speedy  completion 
of  the  road  from  Atlanta,  in  Georgia,  to  Montgomery,  in  Alabama,  and  the 
probable  construction  of  a  road  from  Montgomery  to  Mobile  and  Pensacola,  will 
bring  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  within  a  day's  travel  of  the  same  great  State  of  Ten- 
nessee. 

At  the  north  the  system  of  railways  is  much  more  extended.  The  New 
York  and  Erie  road,  now  complete,  is  proposed  to  be  extended  along  the  shore 
of  Lake  Erie  to  Cleveland,  and  thence  to  Detroit,  from  whence  a  road  has  been 
carried  to  Chicago,  on  Lake  Michigan.  The  seaboard  base  of  railways  will 
thus  be  brought  within  easy  communication  of  the  most  distant  lake  frontier. 

The  Massachusetts,  Vermont,  St.  Lawrence,  and  Montreal  railways  will  bring 
the  whole  Canada  frontier,  extending  from  Lake  Ontario  down  to  Montreal, 
within  twenty -four  hours'  travel,  on  an  average,  of  Boston,  Portland,  and  New 
York. 

The  transportation  of  troops  on  railways  may  be  effected  with  great  prompt- 
ness. The  first  regiment  of  Pennsylvania,  raised  in  Philadelphia,  the  most  dis- 
tant^point  from  the  scene  of  action,  were  transported  so  rapidly  to  New  Orleans, 
ma  Pittsburg  and  the  Pennsylvania  railways,  that  the  regiment,  one  thousand 
strong,  was  placed  in  the  van  of  the  volunteer  forces,  raised  for  the  campaign 
against  Mexico,  under  General  Scott. 

Sufficient  has  been  said  to  show  that  railways  and  the  electric  telegraph  con- 
tribute largely  to  the  national  defence  ;  that  the  works^ covering  our  large  sea- 
ports and  other  important  points,  placed  in  connexion  with  the  railways  and 
telegraph,  if  they  were  now  to  be  constructed,  might  be  much  reduced  in  size 
and  cost,  if  not  in  number ;  that  the  facility  with  which  these  works  could  be 
relieved,  in  case  of  an  attempted  siege,  would  have  rendered  it  only  necessary 
for  them  to  be  made  secure  against  a  coup-de-main. 

Under  these  views  of  the  subject,  it  is  at  once  perceived  that,  whilst  the  ex- 


512  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

tension  and  invention  of  railways  and  the  electric  telegraph  do  not  supersede, 
they  greatly  diminish  the  necessity  of  adding  to  the  number  and  cost  of  the 
fortifications  on  the  seaboard ;  or,  in  other  words,  that  the  future  prosecution  of 
the  system  of  defence  by  permanent  fortifications  should  be  on  a  very  reduced 
scale  in  comparison  with  the  magnificent  one  adopted  thirty-five  years  ago. 

2d.  The  navigation  of  the  ocean  by  steam,  and  the  application  of  steam  to 
vessels-of-war,  have  certainly  added  to  the  facilities  of  naval  operations  in 
making  attacks  and  transporting  troops.  But  such  operations  are  necessarily 
confined  to  short  lines,  like  those  between  France  and  England,  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, or  on  the  lakes  between  Canada  and  the  United  States. 

Attacks  by  steamers  can  only  be  formidable  when  they  are  numerous  and 
filled  with  troops  destined  for  a  grand  attack ;  but  when  they  are  thus  filled 
with  troops,  munitions  of  war,  provisions,  armament,  and  their  regular  crews, 
little  room  is  left  for  the  fuel  necessary  to  propel  them  to  the  scene  of  action 
and  in  retreat.  Such  steamers  cannot  be  propelled  either  conveniently  or  rapidly 
until  the  propelling  power  can  be  produced  at  a  less  outlay  for  fuel.  At  the 
rate  supposed  to  be  the  maximum  of  speed  of  war-steamers,  lines  of  operations 
over  one  thousand  miles  (five  hundred  in  advance  and  five  hundred  in  retreat) 
cannot  be  occupied  advantageously,  or  with  the  efficiency  necessary  to  a  great 
movement  of  a  strategic  or  direct  attack.  Numerous  transports  would  be  neces- 
sary to  convey  supplies  of  coal  to  convenient  places  on  the  coast,  where  depots 
for  the  same  would  have  to  be  established  and  defended  at  great  cost,  for  they 
would  be  constantly  in  danger  of  attack  by  sea  and  land  from  enterprising  as- 
Builants.  Besides,  the  great  loads  of  men,  munitions,  armaments,  provisions, 
and  fuel  that  war  and  transport  steamers  would  be  obliged  to  carry,  multiply 
the  dangers  of  navigation. 

Certainly  steamers  could  make  sudden  and  brief  attempts  to  enter  harbors 
and  destroy  towns,  but  fast-sailing  ships  with  favorable  winds  could  do  the  same, 
if  this  kind  of  marauding  and  piratical  warfare  was  carried  on  by  any  Christian 
nation  calling  itself  civilized,  and  if  not  opposed  by  the  same  machines  of  war 
as  those  used  by  the  enemy  and  by  acts  of  retaliation. 

Such  attempts  might  be  successful  in  attack  and  retreat,  if  made  in  the  night, 
even  if  the  harbor  was  strongly  fortified,  if  the  fortifications  were  unaided  by 
rafts  and  hulks  lying  across  the  channels. 

But  a  demonstration  011  a  large  scale  against  the  important  ports  and  arsenals, 
for  the  purpose  of  taking  possession  and  levying  contributions,  requires  con- 
siderable land  forces,  even  against  such  points  as  were  not  defended  by  batteries, 
for  at  such  points,  in  time  of  war,  earth  erections  would  be  made  and  easily  sup- 
plied with  cannon  of  heavy  calibre,  that  would  do  great  damage,  by  direct  and 
vertical  cannonade,  to  the  enemy's  vessels  and  forces  afloat  after  they  had  entered 
the  harbor,  and  probably  compel  them  to  leave  it,  and  force  him  to  select  a  more 
distant  point  for  the  initiative  of  attack. 

If  the  enemy,  strong  in  ships  and  soldiers,  could  be  driven  from  Boston  by 
the  erection  of  some  redoubts  in  the  course  of  one  night,  it  is  hardly  to  be  sup- 
posed that  he  would  attempt  to  recapture  the  position,  or  to  attack  any  either 
position  similarly  situated. 

Any  such  demonstration  at  the  present  day  would  be  checked  by  the  means 
just  enumerated,  and  be  met  on  its  flanks  and  in  front  by  the  mobile  forces  ral- 
lied by  the  telegraph  to  the  point  of  attack. 

The  improvement  in  artillery,  as  regards  size  and  efficiency,  has  been  of  late 
years  very  great,  but  it  inures  more  to  the  benefit  of  the  defence  than  the  attack. 
In  the  same  way  that,  if  steam  applied  to  ships-of-war  afford  any  advantage  to 
the  attack,  steam  applied  on  railways,  combined  with  the  electric  telegraph, 
affords  greater  advantages  to  the  defence,  by  reason  of  the  greater  facility  with 
which  forces  may  be  moved  by  the  latter  means. 

From  all  which  it  may  be  safely  asserted  that  the  navigation  of  the.  ocean  by 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  513 

steam,  the  application  of  steam  to  vessels-of-war,  and  recent  improvement  in 
artillery  and  other  military  inventions,  do  not  exhibit  the  attack  of  forts  on  the 
seaboard  superior  to  the  defence,  where  those  forts  are  connected  with  railways 
and  are  brought  within  succor  of  the  surrounding  population,  nor  do  they  render 
additions  to  the  present  fortifications  in  number,  size,  or  cost  in  anywise  neces- 
sary. But,  on  the  contrary,  the  improvement  in  artillery,  if  those  fortifications 
had  now  to  be  built,  would  enable  their  plans  to  be  reduced  one-half  in  size  and 
the  armament  one-fourth  in  amount. 

The  substitution  of  the  10-inch  columbiad  for  the  mixed  and  most  inefficient 
armaments  with  which  our  fortifications  have  been  garnished  at  great  expense, 
is  already  forced  upon  us  by  the  introduction  of  those  superb  guns  on  board  of 
vessels-of-war.  It  would  be  ridiculous,  if  it  be  intended  to  adhere  in  any  degree 
to  the  present  system  of  sea-coast  defence,  to  retain  the  present  armaments, 
composed  principally  as  they  are  of  12,  18,  24,  32,  and  42-pounders.  It  is  the 
opinion  of  many  persons,  entertained  for  years  past,  that  but  one  class  of  guns 
should  be  generally  used  in  our  batteries  on  the  coast,  and  that  these  guns 
should  be  of  the  largest  calibre  which  experiment  has  demonstrated  could  be 
efficiently  used.  • 

Fort  McKee,  in  the  harbor  of  Pensacola,  is  supplied  with  one  hundred  and 
twenty  guns,  composed  of  about  equal  numbers  of  24,  32,  and  42-pounders. 
The  average  effective  range  of  these  guns  may  be  stated  at  1,100  yards,  and 
the  weight  of  metal  that  may  be  projected  from  the  entire  battery  at  3,920 
pounds.  Now  thirty  10-inch  columbiads  would  throw  the  same  weight  of  solid 
shot  and  strike  an  object  with  precision  at  2,200  yards  distant ;  so  that  whilst 
the  number  of  guns  at  Fort  McKee  might  be  reduced  seventy-five  in  one  hun- 
dred, the  effective  range  by  solid  and  hollow  shot  would  be  increased  one  hun- 
dred in  one  hundred,  and  the  efficiency  of  the  batteries  greatly  increased,  at  the 
same  time  the  size  &  that  work  might  be  reduced  at  least  one-half. 

3d.  Our  large  seaports  and  naval  depots  being  already  covered  by  extensive 
works,  and  requiring  but  small  additional  defences,  the  discussion  of  the  question 
as  to  the  superiority  of  those  defences  over  vessels-of-war,  floating  batteries, 
ordinary  merchant  vessels  and  steamers,  and  other  temporary  expedients,  would 
seem  to  be  unnecessary  All  experience,  however,  has  shown  that  any  kind  of 
floating  defences  is  inferior,  on  every  score,  to  land  batteries  where  the  localities 
will  permit  the  latter  to  be  used.  This  subject  has  been  ably  discussed  and 
illustrated  in  the  report  made  by  a  board  of  officers  to  the  Secretary  of  War  in 
1840,  on  the  national  defences.  Other  temporary  expedients,  such  as  rafts, 
hulks  sunk  in  channels,  and  ridges  of  stone  thrown  across  the  same,  could  be 
relied  upon,  in  most  instances,  only  as  auxiliary  defence  to  land  batteries. 

4th.  In  considering  how  far  the  increase  of  population  on  the  northern  frontier, 
and  of  the  mercantile  marine  on  the  northern  lakes,  obviates  the  necessity  of  con- 
tinuing the  system  of  fortifications  on  those  lakes,  it  will  be  necessary  to  bring 
into  view  some  of  the  elements  of  strength,  moral,  physical,  and  political 
possessed  by  the  United  States,  and  which  have  already  been  alluded  to  in  this 
report. 

The  chief  moral  and  political  element  is  the  aversion  to  war  with  the  United 
States  felt  by  Great  Britain,  whose  present  superiority  in  naval  means  of  attack 
makes  her,  of  all  nations,  alone  formidable  to  us.  This  aversion  arises  from  the 
intimate  and  entangling  relations  in  commerce  with  this  country,  and  from  the 
dependence  of  England  upon  the  United  States  for  the  chief  supply  of  cotton  to 
the  leading  branch  of  her  manufactures.  And  this  aversion  to  the  slightest 
approach,  of  international  hostility  is  not  abated  by  the  consideration  that  the 
untoward  event  of  war  with  the  United  States  would  prompt  Russia  and  France 
to  carry  out  their  long-cherished  designs  of  aggrandizement  in  Turkey,  Syria, 
and  India. 

The  principal  physical  elements  are :  first,  the  facility  with  which,  by  means 

H.  Rep.  Coin.  86 33 


514  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

of  existing  railways,  we  could  approach  Montreal  with  a  large  force,  and  drive 
thence  the  British  forces  to  seek  shelter  under  the  walls  of  Quebec,  and  finally 
from  all  Canada ;  by  which  simple  and  rapid  movement  the  two  provinces  would 
fall  without  a  struggle  into  our  possession,  with  one-half  of  its  population,  at 
least,  inclined  to  a  change  of  sovereignty;  and  second,  the  superiority  of  our 
mercantile  marine,  affording  convertible  means  for  a  naval  force,  giving  us  the 
mastery  of  the  lakes,  and  enabling  us  to  crush  any  partisan  attempts  coming 
from  the  Canada  shore;  and  third,  the  superiority  of  our  advantages  on  the 
score  of  a  military  population  lying  along  the  whole  northern  and  lake  frontier. 

These  great  moral,  physical,  and  political  advantages  being  undeniable,  the 
continuation  of  the  system  of  fortifications  on  the  northern  and  lake  frontier 
would  involve  a  useless  waste  of  public  money. 

The  large  sums  of  money  expended  and  proposed  to  be  expended  on  the 
defensive  works  extending  from  House's  Point  to  the  Sault  of  St.  Marie  would 
have  been,  and  will  be  more  beneficially  applied  to  the  improvement  of  the  lake 
harbors  and  dependent  rivers,  thus  promoting  the  interests  of  commerce  in  time 
of  peace,  and  affording  depots  for  our  naval  forces  in  time  of  war. 

By  demonstrating  that  such  an  application  of  the  public  money  would  directly 
promote  the,  national  defence,  not  only  on  the  lakes,  in  substitution  of  fortifica- 
tions, but  on  the  seaboard,  in  aiding  the  defence  by  fortifications,  much  of  tlie 
opposition  entertained,  on  constitutional  grounds,  towards  internal  improvements, 
would  be  removed. 

Under  these  views,  it  is  the  opinion  of  the  undersigned  that  the  whole  system 
of  fortifications  for  the  defence  of  the  northern  and  lake  frontiers  should  at  once 
be  abandoned,  and  that  no  more  money  be  applied  even  for  the  repairs  or  com- 
pletion of  the  existing  works. 

The  undersigned,  in  conclusion,  would  express  his  opinion  in  repetition,  that 
a  board  of  artillery  and  engineer  officers  and  civilians  shoilld  be  formed  to  take 
into  consideration  the  whole  subject  of  the  national  defences,  as  called  for  by  the 
resolutions  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  passed  in  the  session  of  March  3, 
1851,  and  as  particularly  and  searchingly  alluded  to  by  the  Secretary  of  War, 
in  his  order  of  April  17,  1851,  with  a  view  to  the  changes  necessary  to  be  made 
in  "the  third  system  of  defence,"  commenced  thirty-five  years  ago;  and  of  the 
adaptation  of  the  same,  inversely,  to  the  increased  power,  political,  physical,  and 
moral,  of  the  United  States. 

The  composition  of  such  a  board  being  well  calculated  to  have  the  whole 
subject  opened  fairly  and  discussed  freely,  by  which  errors  of  opinions,  par- 
ticularly those  arising  from  professional  prejudices  and  interests,  would  be 
exposed  and  corrected,  the  truth  in  the  premises  made  manifest,  and  the  good 
of  the  commonwealth  secured. 

Civilians  versed  in  national  and  international  policy,  and  officers  known  to  be 
opposed  to  the  system  of  defence  on  its  present  scale,  as  well  as  those  who  have 
declared  in  its  favor,  would  cause  the  pour  and  centre  to  be  fairly  stated,  and 
all  sophistry  and  false  principles  to  be  detected  and  discarded. 

In  the  event  of  such  a  board  being  formed,  it  is  suggested  that  the  uyes  and 
noes  on  all  important  questions  should  be  ordered  to  be  taken  and  recorded. 
Respectfully  submitted, 

WM.  H.  CHASE, 
Major  of  Engineers. 

Hon.  C.  M.  CONRAD, 
Secretary  of 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  515 

No.  10. 
Report  of  Major  R.  Delafield. 

Views  and  opinions  of  Major  Richard  Delafield,  of  the  corps  of  engineers,  on 
the  following  points  connected  with  the  defence  of  the  coasts  of  the  United 
States,  called  for  by  the  Secretary  of  War  in  his  communication  of  the  17th  of 
April,  1851: 

1st.  How  far  the  invention  and  extension  of  railroads  have  superseded  or 
diminished  the  necessity  of  fortifications  on  the  seaboard  ? 

No  member  of  the  corps  of  engineers,  so  far  as  I  am  acquainted,  has  ever 
considered  it  expedient  to  construct  permanent  fortifications  along  our  seaboard, 
to  defend  it  against  armies  operating  on  the  land.  The  art  of  fortification,  in 
such  an  emergency,  is  principally  confined  to  temporary  field-works,  thrown  up 
after  the  enemy  has  effected  a  landing,  and  selected  his  route  of  approach. 

Such  fortifications  are  only  needed  to  oppose  infantry  and  field  artillery, 
requiring  little  less  than  earth  for  their  construction,  and  executed  by  the  troops 
in  the  field,  and  with  a  few  days'  labor. 

To  the  more  speedy  accomplishment  of  this  particular,  in  the  defence  of  the 
nation,  railroads  have  contributed  greatly. 

Fortifications  of  a  permanent  character,  requiring  a  long  time  to  construct  and 
perfect,  are,  however,  considered  indispensably  necessary  to  prevent  the  ingress 
of  the  powerful  floating  batteries  that  can  sail  or  steam  into  our  harbors,  against 
which  railroads  can  oppose,  neither  directly  nor  indirectly,  an  efficient  resistance. 

The  city  of  New  York,  for  example,  is  within  three  hours'  sail  of  the  ocean. 
Ships-of-war  of  the  heaviest  class,  and  war  steamers  with  troops,  can  come  to 
the  docks  of  this  city,  or  lay  at  anchor  in  the  East  and  North  rivers,  and  do  as 
much  injury  and  destruction  as  may  suit  an  enemy's  purpose.  Now,  although 
several  railroads  centre  in  this  city  from  distant  and  most  populous  sections  of 
our  country,  they  can  bring  nothing  to  prevent  the  entrance  of  a  maritime  force. 
No  number  of  men  that  can  be  concentrated  in  New  York,  or  along  the  shores 
of  the  water  approaches,  however  well  disciplined  they  may  be,  can  oppose, 
with  any  probability  of  success,  the  passage  of  a  hostile  fleet  from  the  sea  to 
the  city,  or  prevent  its  destroying  its  mercantile  marine  and  real  estate.  Field 
artillery,  infantry,  cavalry,  and  riflemen  can  have  no  effect  upon  ships-of-the- 
line ;  and  the  increase  of  numbers  would  but  swell  the  loss  of  our  citizens  by 
uselessly  exposing  them  to  a  ship's  broadsides. 

The  many  thousands  of  uniformed  militia  that  could,  within  forty-eight  hours, 
be  concentrated  by  railroad  and  river  steamers  in  New  York  and  its  vicinity, 
could  do  positively  nothing  in  arresting  a  hostile  fleet  from  destroying  the  city. 

It  will  be  asked,  then,  are  railroads  of  no  value  or  use  in  the  defence  of  the 
sea-coast?  Most  certainly,  they  are  a  valuable  auxiliary;  economizing  time 
and  treasure,  and  preventing  many  a  predatory  expedition  that  an  enemy  might 
otherwise  undertake. 

Landings  for  supplies  of  provisions,  water,  or  for  any  hostile  purpose  against 
all  the  cities  and  towns  of  the  Union,  are  rendered  much  more  difficult  and  haz- 
ardous to  an  enemy.  Ere  he  can  effect  a  landing,  march  to  the  city,  and  destroy 
or  lay  it  under  contribution,  the  railroads  and  river  steamers  could  transport 
from  hundreds  of  miles  the  uniform  militia  of  the  country  in  far  greater  num- 
bers than  any  fleet  can  be  expected  to  bring  across  the  ocean;  provided,  we  can 
cause  such  landings  to  be  made  at  such  a  distance  from  the  cities  as  to  give  time 
for  the  railroads  and  steamers  to  transport  the  militia  after  they  are  assembled. 
In  all  such  landings  an  enemy  can  have  no  other  description  of  force  than  we 
can  bring  to  oppose  him.  He  has,  in  such  case,  been  compelled  to  leave  his 
heavy  battering  ships. 


516  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

But  so  long  as  he  could  reach  the  cities  in  his  ships,  he  never  could  throw 
the  advantage  in  our  favor  by  landing,  unless  the  distance  to  march  was  within 
a  few  hours'  march  of  his  landing. 

There  is,  then,  no  other  permanently  reliable,  economical,  and  efficient  means 
of  preventing  the  approach  and  entrance  into  our  harbors  of  these  ships'  bat- 
teries, whether  sailing  or  steam,  than  by  opposing  them  with  similar  and  supe- 
rior batteries,  and  compelling  the  ships  to  fight  the  batteries  by  temporary 
obstructions  in  the  channels — locating  these  batteries  at  the  greatest  distance 
that  can  be  found  to  protect  the  channels.  Such  batteries  are  \mtfortifications. 
In  their  construction  we  must  arrange  them  for  the  heaviest  class  of  guns,  to 
secure  their  action  at  the  greatest  distance,  and  to  produce  the  greatest  injury  to 
ships-of-the-line  or  steamers. 

That  the  troops  manning  these  batteries  may  not  be  exposed  to  the  ships' 
fire,  they  must  be  covered  in  front  by  earth  or  masonry,  and  either  placed  so 
high  that  from  a  ship's  deck,  thirty  feet  above  water,  they  cannot  be  looked 
into,  or  else  must  be  covered  over  head  to  secure  the  gunners.  Where  the  site 
is  not  naturally  high  enough  for  this  purpose,  we  gain  it  by  masonry,  which 
introduces  the  construction  known  as  a  casemated  battery.  Once  forced  to  this 
mode  of  construction,  economy  prompts  us  to  put  tiers  of  guns  over  each  other. 

.But  these  batteries,  however  well  calculated  to  protect  the  men  at  their  guns, 
must  be  enclosed  in  the  rear ;  otherwise,  the  marines  of  a  fleet  could  land,  pass 
into  them  and  drive  the  artillerists  from  their  guns. 

This  makes  an  enclosed  battery  or  fortification,  and  upon  these  alone  can  we 
depend  to  protect  our  harbors,  cities,  dock  yards,  &c.,  economically  and  efficiently. 

These  enclosed  works  must  be  of  such  a  nature  that  there  shall  be  no  one 
point  outside  that  cannot  be  seen  from  some  point  within,  of  such  a  height  that 
they  cannot  be  scaled  by  an  active  and  disciplined  force,  and  so  strong  that  field 
artillery  cannot  destroy  them,  which  gives  time  for  the  militia  of  the  country 
to  march  to  their  relief,  and  force  back  any  troops  that  may  have  landed  to 
take  them. 

The  great  change  brought  about  by  railroads  and  river  steamers  in  our  sys- 
tem of  defence  is  in  lessening  the  artificial  strength  of  the  land  defences  of  the 
sea-coast  fortifications.  Just  after  the  war  of  1812  to  1815,  it  was  considered 
necessary  to  give  them  such  strength  as  to  require  as  many  days  for  their 
reduction  as  would  suffice  for  assembling  the  militia  in  mass  and  marching  to 
the  relief  of  the  forts. 

The  time  of  taking  a  well-constructed  fort,  properly  defended,  is  a  matter  of 
calculation,  when  its  strength  is  such  as  to  compel  the  forms  of  a  siege.  The 
basis  of  this  calculation  is  the  excavation  and  removal  of  a  given  quantity  of 
earth,  and  the  landing,  mounting,  and  serving  a  given  number  of  heavy  guns. 
The  guns  are  to  be  mounted  on  the  edges  of  the  ditches  of  the  forts,  and  this 
can  only  be  done  by  what  is  termed  zigzag  approaches,  constituting  a  siege. 
At  the  period  above  referred  to,  there  were  few  positions  in  the  United  States 
that  did  not  allow  time  for  an  enemy  to  land,  and  take,  in  the  above  manner,  an 
ordinary  bastioned  front,  ere  the  militia  of  the  country  could  come  to  its  relief 
in  sufficient  numbers  to  contend  with  disciplined  forces. 

But  at  the  present  time  we  have  but  to  fulfil  the  condition  of  strength  on 
the  land  side  to  resist  a  coup  de  main  or  escalade,  thereby  forcing  an  enemy  to 
bring  up  a  battering  train  for  its  reduction,  and  we  gain  the  time  necessary  for 
its  relief.  We  now  need  no  second  line  of  defence — a  simple  flanked  scarp,  cov- 
ered wifh  earth,  suffices.  Herein  is  the  great  difference  brought  about  by  rail- 
roads, that  of  reducing  the -magnitude  and  expense  of  the  land  defences  of  the 
sea-coast  batteries.  But  the  power  of  the  batteries  themselves,  it  will  be  seen 
hereafter,  must  be  stronger  than  ever. 

2d.  In  what  manner  and  to  wha.t  extent  the  navigation  of  the  ocean  by  steam, 
and  particularly  the  application  of  steam  to  vessels-of-war,  and  recent  improve- 


FORTIFICATIONS  AND  SEA- COAST  DEFENCES.       517 

ments  in  artillery  and  other  military  inventions  and  '  discoveries  affect  this 
question  ? 

The  navigation  of  the  ocean  by  steam  has  had  a  great  influence  upon  the 
defence  of  our  seaboard.  "  The  heavy  armament  of  war  steamers,  their  ample 
storage  and  accommodation  for  troops,  the  rapidity  of  their  evolutions  and  facility 
of  transport,  altogether  constitute  them  convenient  and  formidable  instruments 
for  offensive  warfare,  particularly  for  making  a  descent  upon  any  line  of  coast 
with  a  powerful  army.  Since  1815  it  has  enabled  seamen  to  set  the  elements 
at  defiance,  and  this  would  lead  hostile  powers  to  consider  us  more  open  to 
invasion." 

Before  its  introduction,  it  required  an  immense  marine  and  long  time  for  prep- 
aration ere  an  enemy  could  effect  an  invasion  of  our  shores.  The  expedition 
fitted  out  by  England  against  New  Orleans  was  known  by  us  to  be  in  prepara- 
tion, for  some  part  of  our  coast,  six  months  before  its  arrival.  After  sailing,  it 
had  to  rendezvous  at  Jamaica,  (from  whence,  also,  we  heard  of  its  concentra- 
tion,) and  again  at  Ship  island,  before  commencing  to  disembark.  This  gave 
much  time  for  us  to  prepare.  At  that  date  we  may  be  considered  as  having  had 
six  months'  notice  of  an  intended  expedition. 

At  the  present  time,  with  the  aid  of  steam,  the  notice  comes  with  the  blow ; 
a  few  days  now  suffices  to  invade  either  Boston,  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Bal- 
timore, Norfolk,  Charleston,  or  Savannah,  from  Bermuda.  It  is  the  introduc- 
tion of  steam  navigation  that  has  given  such  an  advantage  over  us,  compared 
with  the  sailing  vessels  of  1815. 

In  1812  Great  Britain  considered  Halifax  a  suitable  place  for  her  naval 
depot,  and  stores  for  her  fleet  on  our  coast.  It  so  continued  until  a  recent  date, 
when  they  discovered  that  our  proximity  by  land  enabled  us  to  reach  and  destroy 
it,  beyond  their  power  to  prevent  it.  The  consequence  has  been,  that  a  central 
point  opposite  our  Atlantic  seaboard  (Bermuda)  has  been  selected,  fortified,  and 
still  being  fortified  with  great  care  and  strength,  and  fitted  as  a  naval  depot. 
To  it,  already,  have  all  the  naval  stores  been  removed  from  Halifax.  It  is 
secure  against  the  power  or  force  we  can  most  readily  command,  (an  army,)  and, 
by  fortifications,  is  secure  against  any  naval  armament  we  are  likely  to  possess. 

From  this  point  an  army  can  embark  in  steamers,  and  in  three  days  be 
anchored  in  our  harbors,  without  any  other  notice  than  their  coming  in  sight  of 
our  headland,  but  not  long  enough  to  enable  us  to  draw  together  militia  to 
oppose  them.  Hence  it  is  tuat  we  are  comparatively  weaker,  at  this  time,  by 
the  introduction  of  steam  navigation. 

Another  important  facility  to  an  enemy,  and  to  our  disadvantage,  is  gained 
by  the  steamship.  Fifteen  such  vessels  as  have  lately  been  built  will  carry  an 
army  of  ten  thousand  men,  with  their  munitions,  to  any  point  on  our  Atlantic 
coast  in  a  given  space  of  time,  and  without  any  necessity  for  other  rendezvous 
than  the  point  of  attack.  Whereas,  some  hundred  sailing  transports  would  be 
required  for  the  same  army,  and  no  calculation  made  of  their  arriving  at  their 
destination  within  days  of  each  other. 

The  defences  of  the  coast  of  France  and  England,  on  the  channel,  forcibly 
illustrate  the  change  effected  by  ocean  steam  navigation.  England  considered 
herself  safe  from  invasion,  by  the  strength  of  her  channel  fleet.  France  con- 
sidered herself  equally  safe,  by  the  fortifications  of  her  harbors.  For  a  long 
period  neither  power  could  injure  each  other,  guarded  as  they  were.  The  fleets 
of  England  made  many  demonstrations  upon  the  coasts  of  France,  but  never 
effected  anything  of  importance,  and  Napoleon  made  a  powerful  combined  dem- 
onstration with  his  army  and  fleet,  and  failed  by  the  superiority  of  the  English 
fleet. 

But  since  steam  has  risen  to  its  present  importance,  these  two  nations  are 
considered  as  having  materially  changed  their  relations  of  defence. 

France,  with  her  preponderating  land  force,  transported  by  steamers,  can 


518  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

readily  invade  England.  The  channel  fleet  of  old  would  no  longer  be  a  pro- 
tection. The  statesmen  of  England,  fully  aware  of  this  state  of  things,  have 
for  some  time  past  been  endeavoring  to  restore  their  ascendency. 

A  channel  fleet  combined  with  the  aid  of  fortification,  "which  experience  in 
war  and  science  can  suggest,"  (Duke  of  Wellington  to  the  chief  engineers,)  is 
now  their  reliance,  but  it  is  a  fleet  of  steam  ships-of-war.  Several  of  their 
ships-of-the-line  have  been  fitted  with  screw  propelling  engines,  as  an  auxiliary 
power,  retaining  the  sails  and  their  powerful  broadsides.  The  first  ship  built 
in  the  English  dock  yards  of  this  class  is  the  Sanspareil  of  eighty-one  guns, 
2,235  tons;  carrying  on  her  lower  deck  thirty  32-pounders  of  fifty-six  hundred- 
weight, nine  feet  six  inches  long;  main  deck,  thirty  eight-inch  guns  of  fifty-two 
hundredweight,  eight  feet  long;  quarter  deck  and  forecastle,  twenty  32-pound- 
ers of  twenty-five  hundredweight,  six  feet  long,  one  ten-inch  gun  of  eighty- 
four  hundredweight,  nine  feet  four  inches  long,  with  a  three  hundred  and  fifty 
horse-power  engine,  launched  at  Davenport  in  April,  1851.  With  vessels  of 
this  description  they  hope  to  retain  their  ascendency  on  the  water,  and  protect 
their  ports,  in  the  absence  of  the  fleet,  against  sudden  attacks  of  an  enemy's 
steamers,  by  fortifications. 

In  relation  to  the  application  of  steam  to  ships-of-war,  up  to  the  building  of 
the  above  vessel,  the  problem  had  not  been  solved.  Not  a  single  steamship 
had  been  built  calculated  to  contend  with  a  land  battery,  or  a  broadside  of  a 
ship-of-the-line.  We  have  not,  to  this  day,  an  instance  of  steamers  having 
exposed  themselves  successfully  or  for  any  determined  purpose  to  hostile  guns, 
with  the  exception  of  the  little  English  iron  steamer  Nemesis  in  the  Chinese 
war,  where  she  accomplished  much,  but  against  batteries  of  no  value. 

As  transports  and  tow-boats,  they  have  contributed  greatly  to  the  success  of 
fleets  on  the  invasion  of  Algiers  by  the  French  under  Beaumont ;  the  fleet  was 
towed  into  position  abreast  the  Algerine  batteries  by  their  war  steamers.  At 
Vera  Cruz  they  made  the  same  use  of  their  steamers — at  Beyrout,  on  the  coast 
of  Syria,  although  the  English  had  the  best  of  their  war  steamers,  they  were 
only  used  as  tow-boats — taking  distant  stations  in  the  latter  part  of  the  action 
and  shelling  the  fortification. 

The  French  army  that  recently  operated  against  Rome  was  transported  from 
Toulon  by  steamers,  carrying  artillery,  cavalry,  and  infantry. 

The  result,  then,  of  the  navigation  of  the  ocean  by  steam  goes  to  prove  a 
greater  necessity  than  ever  for  defending  our  cities,  harbors  and  dock  yards  by 
some  efficient  means,  whether  by  fortifications,  steam  vessels-of-war,  or  other 
means,  is  yet  to  be  considered. 

The  next  branch  of  inquiry  under  this  second  head  is  :  "  In  what  manner  and 
to  what  extent  has  the  recent  improvements  in  artillery  and  other  military 
inventions  and  discoveries  affected  this  question  ?" 

The  recent  improvements  in  artillery,  I  apprehend,  are  rather  the  result  of 
calling  old  things  by  new  names,  and  thus  bringing  them  afresh  into  notice, 
than  any  substantial  advantage. 

The  use  of  what  is  generally  called  the  Paixhan  gun  is  supposed  to  have 
produced  a  great  revolution  in  the  sea-coast  defence.  It  is  no  more  nor  less 
than  firing  hollow  shot  horizontally,  a  practice  that  has  prevailed  as  long  as  the 
howitzer  has  been  known  (about  1693.)  The  only  difference  between  the  field 
and  siege  howitzer  and  Colonel  Paixhan's  gun  is,  that  he  makes  his  gun  longer, 
and,  by  his  writings,  has  caused  them  to  be  introduced  again  on  board  ships-of- 
war,  and  probably  more  used  for  sea-coast  batteries. 

In  our  own  service  we  had  made  use  of  such  long  howitzers  for  sea-coast 
defence  years  before  Colonel  Paixhan  gave  anything  to  the  public  on  the  subject. 
We  called  them  columbiads,  many  of  which  are  now  to  be  seen  on  Governor's 
island,  in  this  harbor,  that  were  in  use  from  1812  to  1815. 

On  the  ocean  the  use  of  hollow  shot  fired  horizontally  was  made  by  the  Count 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  519 

De  Grassc,  off  the  Chesapeake,  during  our  revolutionary  war,  and  abandoned  in 
consequence  of  the  serious  injury  caused  by  the  accidental  explosion  of  the 
shells  about  the  decks. 

Since  their  re-introduction  similar  results  have  occurred.  The  steamer  Medea, 
one  of  Admiral  Stopford's  fleet,  operating  against  the  Egyptians  in  1840,  when 
off  Alexandria,  was  seriously  injured  by  the  bursting  of  a  shell  that,  with  five 
others,  had  been  got  on  deck  for  examination ;  one  beam  was  split  asunder,  the 
whole  deck  raised,  and  every  buckhead  in  the  captain's  cabin,  ward,  and  gun- 
rooms torn  to  shreds,  and  the  vessel  set  on  fire. 

About  the  same  period  (December,  1840,)  a  similar  accident  occurred  on  board 
the  Excellent,  the  gunnery  ship  at  Portsmouth,  on  trying  some  shells  after  hearing 
of  the  accident  on  board  of  the  Medea.  The  fuses,  in  both  cases,  were  metal 
with  screw  caps,  supposed  to  be  a  secure  preventive  against  accidents  on  board 
vessels.  The  use,  therefore,  of  this  improvement  in  artillery,  for  steamers,  and 
on  board  ships- of- war  is,  I  conceive,  quite  problematical,  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  its  value  in  the  sea-coast  batteries  is  increased  by  the  greater  ranges, 
precision  of  fire,  and  facility  of  causing  the  explosion  about  the  intended  and 
critical  moment. 

While  such  shells  fired  from  ships  against  stone  walls  and  earthen  parapets 
are  harmless,  breaking  to  pieces  in  the  one  case,  and  throwing  up  a  few  yards  of 
earth  only  in  the  other,  the  injury  to  the  steamer  or  ship  is  far  greater  than  from 
any  other  artillery  in  use. 

It  may  not  be  amiss,  under  this  head,  to  show  the  effect  of  this  species  of 
artillery  upon  vessels,  proving,  as  I  think,  very  conclusively,  the  safe  reliance 
we  may  have  in  defending  our  harbors  by  them  if  mounted  in  favorable  positions. 

The  effect  of  hot  shot  and  shells  from  these  columbiads  (I  must  be  permitted 
to  use  the  American  name  as  of  prior  invention)  against  shipping  was  shown  by 
Captain  Hastings,  in  the  service  of  the  Greeks,  who,  at  Salona,  in  1826-'7,  fired 
not  only  hot  shells,  which  he  substituted  for  hot  shot,  as  by  their  weight  they 
broke  through  both  sides  of  small  vessels,  but  he  fired  carcasses  and  shells  from 
68-pounder  guns.  During  the  affair  at  Salona,  he  says,  by  the  time  he  had  fired 
twice,  a  brig-of-war  blew  up,  owing  to  a  shell  exploding  in  her  magazine.  An 
armed  transport  brig  sank  forward  owing  to  a  shell  exploding  in  her  bow,  and 
was  set  on  fire  aft  by  a  hot  shell.  At  Trickere  he  burnt  a  brig-of-war  with  hot 
shot.  During  an  attack  of  the  Greeks  against  a  monastery  at  Pinseus,  within  the 
straits  between  Salonis  and  Megara,  and  for  the  relief  of  Athens,  the  Turkish 
pacha  opened  a  battery  of  five  guns  upon  the  Greek  steamer  Perseverance,  two 
of  them  long  five-inch  howitzers,  producing  considerable  effect.  One  shot  struck 
the  carriage  of  a  long  68-pounder  and  exploded  there,  another  exploded  in  the 
counter  of  the  Perseverance  and  tore  out  two  streaks  for  a  length  of  six  feet, 
and  started  out  the  planking  from  two  adjacent  streaks,  when  the  steamer 
retreated  from  this  dangerous  position. 

In  the  attack  on  the  harbor  of  Tolo,  the  Greeks  directed  the  fire  of  68-pounders' 
shells  on  a  brig — a  shell  struck  her,  exploding  in  her  hull  and  blew  her  foremast 
into  the  water.  They  afterwards  made  an  attack  upon  a  Turkish  squadron  of 
nine  vessels,  and  opened  a  fire  upon  the  Turkish  admiral's  ship,  distant  about 
five  hundred  yards,  with  hot  shells.  The  second  fire  of  two  hot  shells  from  the 
long  guns  and  two  carcasses  from  carronades,  one  lodged  in  the  hull  df  the 
Turkish  commodore,  and,  reaching  the  magazine,  blew  her  up.  A  carcase  shell 
exploded  in  the  bows  of  a  brig  next  to  the  commodore ;  she  sank  foi  ward,  while 
a  hot  shell  striking  her  stern,  which  stood  up  in  shallow  water,  soon  enveloped 
her  in  flames.  In  a  few  minutes  another  vessel  was  on  fire,  and  an  Algerine 
vessel  having  received  a  shell,  which  exploded  between  decks,  was  abandoned 
by  her  crew. 

In  the  harbor  of  Patras,  the  Greeks  made  an  attack  upon  an  Austrian  brig 
loaded  for  the  Turkish  army,  by  opening  upon  her  a  fire  of  shells  from  68- 


520  FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

pounders ;  one  of  them  exploded  in  her  hull  near  the  water's  edge,  tore  out  a 
great  part  of  her  side,  when  she  sank  almost  immediately. 

All  these  results  are  calculated  to  show  the  effect  of  hollow  shot  fired  horizon- 
tally from  what  is  generally  called  Paixhan  guns  against  shipping,  and  proves 
the  efficacy  of  sea-coast  defences  armed  with  such  artillery. 

Of  the  effect  of  such  a  fire  against  forts,  from  ships  or  steamers,  I  recall  to 
mind  that  of  the  French  fleet  under  Joumanville,  against  the  castle  of  St.  Juan 
d'Ulloa,  when  a  shell  entering  an  embrasure,  passed  into  a  magazine  through 
an  unprotected  door,  and  blew  it  up. 

In  1840,  the  steam  frigates  Phoanix,  Stranbole,  Gorgon,  and  Vesuvius,  were 
of  the  fleet  that  made  an  attack  upon  St.  Jean  d'Acre.  They  shelled  the  tmon 
with  long  guns,  from  positions  beyond  gun-range  of  the  batteries,  during  the 
attack  by  the  ships-of-the-line,  keeping  beyond  the  range  of  the  shore  batteries, 

During  the  Carlist  war,  in  Spain,  several  English  steamers  presented  them- 
selves against  the  land  batteries,  but  retired  on  receiving  the  first  fire  from  the 
land. 

Other  than  the  several  instances  herein  referred  to  I  can  recall  to  mind  now, 
and  they  all  go  to  show  that  the  use  of  columbiads  is  a  most  reliable  means  of 
protecting  our  harbors  against  ships  or  steamers. 

Another  improvement  having  a  bearing  on  this  subject  is  that  of  submarine 
artillery.  Fulton's  efforts  with  torpedoes  were  of  little  avail  during  his  lifetime. 
The  attempts  upon  the  English  ship  Plantagenet,  in  Lynuhaven  bay,  and  upon 
Admiral  Wan-en's  fleet,  off  New  London,  during  the  war  of  1812  to  1815,  which 
proved  abortive,  are  the  Only  instances  I  am  aware  of  with  these  machines. 
Since  his  death,  however,  a  new  agent — that  of  electro-galvanism — has  come 
into  use,  enabling  us  to  explode  a  shell  or  magazine  of  powder  under  water  at 
any  particular  instant  of  time.  This  power  may  be  made  auxiliary  in  the  defence 
of  our  coast,  in  the  channels  over  which  hostile  vessels  must  pass  in  approaching 
our  cities ;  but  it  can  only  be  of  use  in  connexion  with  forts,  from  which  the 
electro-agent  is  worked,  and  from  whence  to  protect  the  torpedoes  until  the 
proper  moment  of  using  them,  as  well  as  from  whence  to  ascertain  the  exact 
instant  of  time  in  firing  them.  An  undefended  position  will  not  admit  of  their 
successful  application.  It  is  an  uncertain  auxiliary  in  the  defence  of  our  ship 
channels,  yet  one  that  would  be  resorted  to  by  officers  acquainted  with  its 
advantages.  Gutta-percha  elastic  tubes,  within  which  the  wires  may  be  pro- 
tected, is  another  modern  invention,  facilitating  the  use  of  the  electro-galvanic 
mode  of  instantaneous  explosion. 

The  effect  of  the  railroad  is  to  economize  greatly  the  military  resources  of  the 
nation,  by  relying  upon  a  much  smaller  disciplined  force  to  act  against  hostile 
landings.  For  example,  the  same  troops  that  would  operate  against  a  hostile 
army  moving  on  Boston,  would  suffice  to  act  against  the  same  force  that  should 
afterwards  attempt  to  march  upon  New  York,  Philadelphia,  or  Baltimore,  or 
Washington.  Before  their  transports  could  pass  from  one  to  the  other,  the  rail- 
road could  transport  the  army  to  oppose  them. 

It  is  a  knowledge  of  an  enemy's  movements  only  that  is  necessary  to  enable 
us  to  take  advantage  of  the  railroad  speed  of  transportation ;  and  here  the  more 
recent  discovery  of  the  electro-telegraph  comes  into  valuable  use.  But  there 
is  nothing  in  these  inventions  or  improvements  that  lessens  the  importance  and 
necessity  of  opposing  the  powerful  floating  armaments  that  can  be  brought 
against  us  by  equally  powerful  batteries ;  for  let  me  again  repeat,  that  a  myriad 
of  men,  with  rifles  and  other  small  arms,  is  nothing  against  a  ship's  broadside. 

One  other  change  in  modern  artillery  deserves  to  be  noticed :  During  the  last 
half  century  the  calibre  of  the  guns  mounted  on  board  ships-of-war  has  greatly 
increased,  and  made  it  necessary  to  increase  the  power  of  the  batteries  that  may 
be  constructed  to  oppose  them.  Objections  have  sometimes  been  taken  to  the 
power  of  our  sea-coast  batteries ;  a  little  reflection  will,  I  doubt  not,  show  the 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND   SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  521 

necessity  of  their  being  made  equal,  in  all  respects,  to  the  batteries  by  which 
they  can  be  assailed. 

From  1776  to  1783  frigates  of  thirty-two,  twenty-eight,  and  twenty-four 
guns  mounted  twelve-pounders  on  their  main  deck. 

In  1800  most  of  the  English  frigates  mounted  twelve  and  eighteen-pounders. 
In  February  of  that  year  the  admiralty  ordered  all  ships  of  twenty-four  and 
twenty  guns  to  be  fitted  on  the  main  deck  for  thirty-two  pounder  carronades,  in 
lieu  of  the  long  NINE-POUNDERS  hitherto  carried. 

The  Danish  forty-gun  ship  Freya  mounted  eighteen-pounders.     The  Danish 
vessels  at  Copenhagen,  attacked  by  Nelson,  mounted — 
Forty-eight  thirty-six-pounders. 
Three  hundred  and  sixty  twenty-four-pounders. 
Seventy  eighteen-pounders. 
Ninety-eight  twelve-pounders. 
Fifty-two  eight-pounders. 
Nelson's  fleet  mounted — 

One  hundred  and  forty  thirty-two-pounders. 
Seventy-four  twenty-four-pounders. 
One  hundred  and  ninety -two  eighteen-pounders. 
Twenty-two  twelve-pounders. 
One  hundred  and  fourteen  nine-pounders. 
Six  six-pounders ;  together  with  carronades. 

1805.  The  Victory,  Nelson's  flagship  at  Trafalgar,  mounted  on  her  first  deck, 
long  thirty-two-pounders  ;  second  deck,  long  twenty-four-pounders  ;  third  deck, 
long  twelve-pounders;  quarter  deck  and  forecastle,  twelve-pounders,  and  two 
sixty-eight-pounders,  carronades.  The  French  admiral's  ship,  in  the  same 
action,  mounted  thirty-two  and  eighteen-pounders;  thirty  of  the  eighteen- 
pounders  on  her  upper  deck.  The  Tarinant,  of  ninety  guns,  mounted  eighteen- 
pounders  on  her  main  deck.  The  Belle  Isle  has  twenty -four-pounders  on  her 
main  deck.  The  San  Ildefonsa  had  fifty-eight  long  twenty-four-pounders  on 
the  first  and  second  decks ;  four  long  eight-pounders  and  ten  thirty-six-pound- 
ers, carronades,  on  the  quarter  deck  and  forecastle. 

1808.  The  Caledonia,  English  ship  of  one  hundred  and  twenty- two  guns, 
launched  this  year,  mounted  on  first  deck,  thirty-two-pounders;  second  deck, 
twenty-four-pounders;  third  deck,  eighteen-pounders;  quarter  deck,  twelve- 
pounders  and  thirty-two-pounders,  carronades,  and  the  same  calibre  on  the  fore- 
castle; on  the  roundhouse  she  carried  eighteen-pounders. 

1811.  France  had  no  frigate,  and  England  only  four  that  carried  long  twenty- 
four-pounders,  at  this  date. 

1820.  At  this  date  France  ordered  thirty  and  thirty-two-ponnders  for  all 
their  ships-of-war. 

1839.  Finally,  the  English,  on  the  20th  of  February  of  this  year,  ordered 
all  her  ships-of-war  to  be  armed  with  thirty-two  and  sixty-eight-pounders. 

1851.  By  referring  to  another  part  of  this  memoir,  it  will  be  seen  that  an 
eighty-one-gun  ship-of-the-line  is  now  mounted  with  the  tremendous  battery  of 
thirty-two-pounders  and  eight-inch  guns. 

This  regular  increase  demands,  on  our  part,  a  like  armament,  and  that^we 
relax  nothing  in  the  artillery  for  the  defence  of  the  coast,  requiring  more  time 
to  build,  and  stronger  works  to  receive  and  resist  such  artillery. 

3d.  How  far  vessels-of-war,  steam  batteries,  ordinary  merchant  ships,  and 
steamers,  and  other  temporary  expedients,  can.be  relied  upon  as  a  substitute  for 
permanent  fortifications  for  the  defence  of  our  large  seaports  ? 

It  follows,  from  what  has  been  said  under  the  two  previous  heads,  that  a 
nation  may  rely  upon  a  navy  as  a  substitute  for  fortifications,  in  a  great  meas- 
ure, for  the  defence  of  not  only  her  large  seaports,  but  for  her  coasts  generally. 


522  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

The  two  cases  of  France  and  England  exemplifying  that  either  a  fleet  or  forti- 
fications have  heretofore  sufficed. 

The  great  question  that  arises,  in  adapting  the  one  or  the  other  exclusively, 
will  be  the  cost,  the  efficiency  at  the  eventful  moment,  and  the  consequences,  in 
a  political  point  of  view,  of  directing  such  immense  resources  as  dependence 
upon  a  fleet  would  require  to  a  system  that  has  its  advantage  in  throwing  the 
evils  of  war  from  our  shores  at  the  same  time  that  its  success  brings  a  spirit  of 
conquest  and  aggrandizement,  limited  only  by  the  extent  to  which  the  nation 
may  be  led  by  the  glory  its  arms  shall  achieve. 

My  opinion  is,  that  sound  policy  calls  upon  us  to  adopt  the  mixed  system  of 
permanent  batteries  in  conjunction  with  ships-of-the-line  and  war  steamers. 

If  we  adopt  a  floating  system,  we  must  make  ourselves  superior  afloat  to  our 
enemy.  Every  seaport  and  dock  yard  must  be  provided  with  its  own  floating 
batteries,  available  for  its  waters  and  adjacent  shoals.  The  great  estuaries 
leading  into  the  heart  of  the  country  must  each  be  watched  and  protected. 
The  floating  defences  that  will  protect  Boston  cannot  secure  the  Hudson,  Dela- 
ware, Chesapeake,  southern  coast,  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  Pacific,  at  one  and  the 
same  time.  Nor  can  we  place  reliance  upon  our  superior  fleet  blockading  our 
enemy  in  his  ports.  The  fallacy  of  this  reliance  is  exemplified  by  the  sailing 
of  the  Yavlan  fleet  and  transports  no  less  than  three  times  without  being  per- 
ceived, and  being  afloat  in  the  narrow  sea  of  the  Mediterranean  fifty-two  days, 
notwithstanding  all  the  watchfulness  of  the  English  fleet ;  a  single  detachment 
of  the  enemy's  fleet  escaping  the  blockade,  sails  for  any  of  our  harbors,  where 
it  must  be  met  either  by  floating  or  land  batteries.  Hence,  we  have  no  alterna- 
tive but  a  decided  superiority,  if  we  place  reliance  upon  floating  batteries. 

These  floating  defences  are  of  the  most  perishable  character,  and  enormously 
expensive  in  first  cost  and  repairs,  compared  with  land  batteries.  To  have  some 
idea  of  the  cost  of  fleets,  let  us  look  to  the  history  of  Europe. 

The  French  estimate  that  a  ship  will  last  but  twelve  years  ;  and  to  have  forty 
ships-of-the-line  and  fifty  frigates  in  commission,  it  is  necessary  to  have  fifty- 
three  ships-of-the-line  and  sixty  frigates,  so  great  and  constant  are  the  necessary 
repairs.  The  fact  was  stated  to  the  French  Chamber  by  C.  Dupin,  as  deduced 
from  their  own  experience. 

The  cost  of  maintaining  the  French  fleet  annually,  from  1689  to  1789,  was 

averaged $7,808,000 

From  1776  to  1783  was  averaged 19,400,000 

"      1783  to  1786  it  was 12,6CO,000 

For  the  year  1797. .do 16,700,000 

1805 . .  do 28,000,000 

1808.  .do 22,000,000 

1814.  .do 10,200,000 

1816 .  .do 9,600,000 

1818.  .do 8,640,000 

In  1837  the  Chambers  voted 10,800,000 

In  1847 do 18,053,908 

The  cost  of  maintaining  the  navy  of  the  United  States  for  forty-one  years, 
from  1792  to  1832,  inclusive,  was  $112,097,122,  giving  an  annual  average 

of $2,734,076 

From  1812  to  1815,  inclusive,  it  amounted  to 26,376,215 

The  annual  average  being  (four  years) 6,594,053 

From  1831  to  1837, 31,393,151 

The  annual  average  being  (six  years) 5,232,191 

The  cost  of  maintaining  the  navy  of  Great  Britain,  from  1799  to  1851, 
(not  including  1841  to  1844,)  a  period  of  forty-one  years,  amounts  to  the 
sum  of $2,283,645,277 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  523 

The  annual  average  being  (forty-nine  years) $46,604,284 

From  1799  to  1815,  fifteen  years  of  war 1,356,248,803 

The  annual  average  being 79,779,341 

From  1816  to  1851,  not  including  1841  to  1844 927,395,437 

The  annual  average  being  (thirty-two  years) 28,981,106 

These  enormous  sums  enable  us  to  form  some  judgment  of  the  gradual 
increase  in  the  annual  expenses  of  maintaining  a  navy,  and  the  expenses  in 
periods  of  peace,  compared  with  war.  Now  let  us  examine  into  the  magnitude 
of  the  fleets  of  Europe,  at  different  points,  to  form  some  idea  of  the  number  of 
ships  we  must  have  to  secure  that  superiority  that  will  justify  our  reliance  upon 
floating  defences. 

The  French  fleet,  by  no  means  the  strongest  we  are  likely  to  contend  with, 
consists  of  the  following  number  of  large  ships  at  the  period  stated : 

In  1789 81  ships-of-the-line,  and  69  frigates. 

March,  1791 73 do 67 ..  .do. 

Dec.,      1791 86 do 78... do. 

1792 82 do 68. .  .do. 

Feb.,      1793 75 do 59 . .  .do. 

1801 39 do 35... do. 

June,     1814 73 do 41... do. 

1817 68 do 38... do. 

1827 59 do 51 . .  .do. 

1828 59 do 51... do. 

July,      1829 33 do 41. .  .do.  only. 

At  this  date  she  was  building  eighty  ships  to  restore  her  navy  and  replace 
the  rotten  and  decayed  ships. 

In  1837  she  had  one  hundred  and  fifty-three  ships  afloat,  and  in  1847  she 
had  two  hundred  and  sixteen  ships  afloat,  sixty-six  of  which  were  steamers. 

The  study  of  the  above  shows  the  losses  that  the  vanquished  have  to  sustain 
from  time  to  time — an  item  to  be  more  particularly  stated  hereafter. 

The  following  table  gives  a  more  enlarged  view  of  the  strength  of  the  differ- 
ent naval  powers : 


524  FORTIFICATIONS  AND   SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

Fleets  of  the  different  nations  in  1783,  1793,  1829,  and  1840. 


England. 

jj 

1 

d 

1 

Holland. 

Sweden. 

1 

as 

ir 

| 

Portugal. 

3 
1 

P 

1783. 
Sbips-of-the-line  

105 

80 

50 

32 

Ships  of  fifty  guns.  .... 

13 

7 

3 

Frigates  .  

132 

103 

48 

28 

217 

86 

31 

13 

88 

34 

25 

6 

455 

319 

160 

79 

1793. 
Ships-of-the-line  

153 

86 

76 

49 

30 

60 

39 

149 

78 

56 

38 

11 

57 

21 

Smaller  vessels 

109 

82 

72 

32 

60 

3 

140 

411 

246 

204 

119 

101 

120 

200 

1829. 
Ships-of-the-line  ... 

131 

33 

6 

12 

32 

2 

Frigates          . 

149 

41 

12 

80 

25 

6 

Smaller  vessels 

336 

148 

94 

63 

24 

15 

615 

222 

102 

105 

81 

23 

1840. 
Ships-of-the-line  .   . 

120 

49 

3 

11 

11 

50 

15 

11 

Frigates 

141 

62 

4 

21 

8 

25 

15 

30 

Smaller  vessels 

•317 

242 

9 

32 

14 

40 

18 

16 

578 

353 

16 

54 

33 

115 

48 

57 

Having  now  some  data  upon  which  to  judge  of  the  number  of  ships  we  must 
have  as  a  substitute  for  permanent  fortifications  for  the  defence  of  our  coast,  let 
us  now  examine  the  losses  that  must  be  sustained  by  a  reliance  upon  floating 
defences,  as  conqueror  and  conquered. 

Loss  of  the  English  fleet  during  the  war  from  1793  to  1801.  Captured, 
destroyed,  wrecked,  foundered,  and  burnt : 

Ships-of-the-line 20 

Under  the  line  . . 145 


Tetal 


165 


Loss  of  the  French,  Dutch,  Spanish  and  Danish  ships  during  the  same  war. 
Captured,  destroyed,  wrecked,  foundered,  and  burnt : 

Ships-of-the-line 84 

Under  the  line,  of  which  150  were  frigates 234 


Total 


318 


Loss  of  the  English  fleet  during  the  war  from  May,  1803,  to  July,  1815. 
Captured,  destroyed,  wrecked,  foundered,  and  burnt : 

Ships-of-the-line 13 

Under  the  line  . .  .   304 


Total.,  317 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  525 

Loss  of  the  enemy's  fleet  during  the  same  wars,  namely,  French,  Dutch, 
Spanish,  Danish,  Russian,  Turkish,  and  American.  Same  causes  as  above : 

Ships-of-the-line 71 

Under  the  line 108 

Total 179 

In  our  statements  of  the  cost  of  maintaining  fleets,  the  total  expenditure  has 
been  given,  including  wages  of  seamen,  ordnance,  &c.  To  make  some  compar- 
ison between  the  cost  of  building  fortifications  and  building  ships,  the  following 
facts  may  be  useful  : 

The  wear  and  tear  of  ships  of  the  English  fleet,  1799  to  1819, 

inclusive,  was $322,849,296 

The  cost  of  building  and  repairing  ships  during  the  same  period, 

was 70,789,070 


Total  cost  of  wear  and  tear  and  building  in  21  years 393,638,366 

Or,  an  average  per  annum  of 18,744,784 

The  cost  of  building  the  ships  afloat,  comprising  the  navy  of  the 

United  States  in  1842,  was $9,052,725 

The  cost  of  repairs  upon  the  same  vessels  from  time  to  time,  was  5,579,229 


Total 14,631,984 


Here  we  have  the  repairs  to  first  cost  in  the  ratio  of  five  and  a  half  to  nine. 
This  cost  was  for  fifty  vessels,  or  for  five  ships-of-the-line,  eleven  frigates, 
including  two  steamers,  and  thirty-four  smaller  vessels,  mounting  in  all  1,440 
guns.  The  average  cost  per  gun,  repairs  included,  is  $10,161.  The  average 
cost  per  gun,  omitting  repairs,  is  $6,286. 

But  cost  of  an  exclusive  reliance  upon  floating  defences  is  far  greater  than 
appears  by  this  statement.  To  it  should  be  added  the  cost  and  repairs  put  upon 
the  Constellation,  Java,  Guerriere,  two  steamers  Fulton,  and  all  the  other  ves- 
sels lost,  broken  up,  foundered,  &c.,  of  which  I  can  find  no  account,  and  which 
of  themselves  (the  cost)  would  go  far  towards  building  lasting  and  permanent 
defences  for  some  of  the  harbors  on  our  coast. 

I  would  wish  to  present  the  cost  of  the  several  fortifications  on  our  coast  and 
the  repairs  from  time  to  time,  but  have  ne  data  therefor.  The  only  fortifica- 
tions with  which  I  can  make  the  comparison  is  Fort  Schuyler,  the  cost  of  which 

to  this  date  is $843, 187 

To  this  add  for  completion,  (it  is  now  ready  to  receive  its  entire  ar- 
mament, and  is  as  defensible  as  can  be  made ;  the  work  remaining 
to  be  done  consists  in  conveniences  for  the  garrison,)  say. .......  50,  000 

Making  the  sum  of 893,  187 

This  work  is  to  be  armed  with  one  hundred  and  eighty-four  guns,  producing 
an  average  of  $4,855  per  gun.  This  single  fort,  calculated  to  endure  for  ages, 
is  considered  an  equivalent  in  defence  to  am  enemy's  fleet,  and  a  substitute  for  a 
fleet  of  floating  batteries,  otherwise  necessary. 

If  we  look  to  permanent  land  batteries  for  the  defence  of  our  harbors,  we 
have  at  all  times  a  suitable  disciplined  force  in  the  uniform  militia  of  our  cities 
and  towns  for  their  garrisons,  ready  at  short  notice  to  man  the  guns.  On  the 
contrary,  for  floating  defences  we  must  look  to  the  more  limited  number  of 
sailors,  unaccustomed  to  guns,  and  to  be  disciplined  for  the  purpose. 

There  is  no  room  for  doubt,  in  my  mind,  that  we  cannot,  with  due  regard  to 


526  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

the  safety  of  our  cities,  towns,  and  dock  yards,  rely  upon  vessels-of-war  and 
steam  batteries,  and  that  economy  demands  a  dependence  to  be  placed  in  heavy 
land  batteries  built  in  the  most  permanent  manner.  The  reliance  upon  ordi- 
nary merchant  ships  and  steamers,  as  well  as  any  other  temporary  expedient,  I 
consider  as  no  dependence  whatever.  Let  us  imagine  a  small  fleet  only  of  such 
STEAMSHIPS  OF  THE  LINE  as  that  elsewhere  described,  mounting  thirty-two 
pounders  and  eight  and  ten-inch  columbiads,  and  what  chance  is  there  against 
such  broadsides  for  anything  that  can  be  made  of  merchant  ships  and  mercan- 
tile steamers  1  Such  vessels  are  in  no  manner  suited  for  heavy  armaments,  and 
would,  in  a  measure,  have  to  be  rebuilt  to  fit  them  for  defence.  Against  a  single 
ship-of-the-line,  becalmed  or  anchored  in  smooth  water,  we  might  hope  to  inter- 
pose a  formidable  resistance  with  temporary  batteries  on  merchant  ships'  decks, 
towed  by  mercantile  steamers;  but  against  several,  mutually  acting  either  on  the 
offensive  or  defensive,  and  with  auxiliary  steam  power,  (or  even  without,)  capable 
of  flanking  each  other's  position,  no  defence  whatever  could  be  placed  in  them. 
There  is  no  part  of  our  coast  where  beneficial  results  might  be  better  calcu- 
lated upon  from  temporary  expedients  of  this  character  than  Louisiana.  The 
ports  being  built  to  keep  off  the  enemy's  heavy  batteries,  he  must  take  to  his 
boats.  These,  when  transporting  troops,  could  readily  be  run  down  and  de- 
stroyed by  merchant  steamers.  A  hostile  army  that  might  have  gained  the  dry 
land  of  the  Mississippi  would  be  exceedingly  annoyed  by  floating  batteries  on 
the  decks  of  ships  towed  by  steamers ;  but  as  a  defensive,  no  reliance  could  be 
placed  upon  them.  The  facility  with  which  field-guns  and  howitzers  could  set 
fire  to  and  destroy  such  floating  expedients  is  exemplified  by  the  destruction  of 
vessels  used  by  us  in  the  defence  of  Louisiana  in  181 4-' 15.  Where  such  expe- 
dients are  unexpected,  and  no  suitable  force  at  hand  to  contend  with  them,  they 
are  of  great  value ;  but  let  our  enemy  know  that  such  is  our  only  defence,  and 
he  readily  commands  the  means  of  destroying  them. 

4th.  How  far  the  increase  of  population  on  the  northern  frontier,  and  of  the 
mercantile  and  marine  on  the  northern  lakes,  obviates  or  diminishes  the  neces- 
sity of  continuing  the  system  of  fortifications  on  these  lakes  ? 

Upon  this  point  I  am  not  so  well  prepared  to  present  my  views  fully,  having 
seen  but  little  of  the  country  and  possessing  few  statistical  facts  upon  which  to 
rely. 

On  the  lakes,  as  on  the  ocean,  we  have  no  need  of  fortresses  to  arrest  the 
movements  of  invading  armies.  It  is  against  the  operations  of  floating  batteries, 
as  in  the  former  case,  that  we  build  forts  in  this  section  of  our  country.  Had 
our  neighbors  no  vessels  or  means  of  procuring  them  we  would  have  no  need  of 
forts ;  but  we  know  they  possess  both  a  naval  and  a  mercantile  marine  of  steam 
aad  sailing  vessels,  and  have  fortified  positions  superior  in  strength  to  our  own, 
within  which  to  protect  their  mercantile  marine,  and,  when  occasion  offers,  to 
equip  them  either  as  transports  or  armed  vessels. 

In  the  event  of  a  war,  a  desperate  effort  would  be  made  to  seize  upon  every- 
thing afloat  in  our  ports.  The  same  effort  we  would  doubtless  make  .to  secure 
the  floating  power  of  our  neighbors.  We  know,  however,  that  Kingston  has 
for  years  past  been  fortified,  and  strong  works,  I  believe,  are  still  in  progress 
for  the  land  and  water  defences  of  that  harbor.  So  long  as  they  hold  it,  we 
cannot  gain  the  important  point  of  capturing  the  only  means  in  their  possession 
to  annoy  us.  An  invasion  into  the  heart  of  our  country  is  not  likely  to  be 
thought  of;  and  if  undertaken,  must  result  in  the  destruction  of  the  invading 
force  by  the  vast  increase  and  present  density  of  our  population. 

It  would  not  be  possible  for  an  invading  army  to  leave  the  lake  shores  beyond 
a  few  days'  march.  With  the  command  of  the  lakes,  our  shores  and  all  the 
towns  and  important  lines  of  canals  and  railroads  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  an 
enemy  to  lay  under  contribution,  or  burn  and  destroy,  as  might  be  their  policy. 
Without  heavy  batteries  to  combat  their  fleet,  we  can  offer  no  successful  oppo- 
sition by  our  superiority  of  numbers  to  such  predatory  naval  expeditions. 


FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  527 

With  a  naval  superiority  we  could  blockade  their  ports  and  have  the  means 
of  pursuing  any  vessels  that  might  escape  the  blockade.  To  protect  ourselves 
in  this  way  our  force  must  be  decidedly  superior ;  and  our  resources  would  enable 
us  to  do  so  if  we  can  in  the  commencemeet  of  a  war  save-  even  our  mercantile 
marine  and  capture  that  of  our  enemy.  Without  fortified  harbors  I  cannot  see 
how  we  can  gain  such  results  and  advantages  with  an  enemy  possessing  safe 
harbors,  offering  effectual  security  to  his  vessels. 

Nor  could  we  at  once  calculate  upon  reducing  Kingston.  The  fortifications 
at  that  place  cannot  be  taken  by  assault  or  destroyed  by  bombardment.  It  is 
only  by  the  operations  of  a  systematic  siege  that  they  can  be  arrested  from  the 
hands  of  an  enemy.  Some  time  must  elapse  after  the  breaking  out  of  the  war 
before  we  could  hope  to  take  so  important  a  place. 

The  command  of  the  wider  parts  of  the  St.  Lawrence  is  in  the  hands  of  the 
power  possessing  the  naval  superiority.  We  could  not  cross  that  river,  where 
its  banks  are  beyond  gunshot  from  our  shores  without  such  naval  ascendency, 
thereby  prolonging  the  time  necessary  for  reducing  Kingston. 

The  commercial  ports,  in  which  self-interest  now  draws  our  numerous  mer- 
chant steamers  and  ships,  should  therefore  be  provided  with  such  heavy  land 
batteries  as  will  effectually  secure  the  shipping  in  the  commencement  of  hostili- 
ties and  during  any  temporary  check  to  our  operations  on  land  and  water. 

The  same  protection  should  be  given  to  inlets,  by  which  vessels  could  cut  the 
lines  of  our  railroads  and  canal  communications. 

Such  batteries  or  fortifications  are  our  only  certain  security.  No  increase  of 
population  or  of  mercantile  marine  can  give  us  that  protection  (with  the  means 
our  neighbors  have  at  command)  in  the  commencement  of  hostilities ;  nor  can 
we  gain  the  ascendency  on  the  lakes  without  some  fortified  harbor,  under  cover 
of  which  to  build  and  equip  a  fleet.  The  subjugation  of  the  Canadas,  if 
the  result  of  a  war,  will  not  be  accomplished  before  Quebec  and  Kingston  are 
reduced. 

These  two  places,  if  defended  in  proportion  to  their  artificial  strength,  will 
call  for  harder  fighting  and  more  prolonged  than  any  battle  we  have  yet  fought. 
They  certainly  can  be  taken,  and  we  believe  we  know  enough  of  their  con- 
struction to  fit  out  the  necessary  armaments,,  but  it  Avill  require  time,  and  large 
military  resources,  during  which  the  lake  coast  should  not  be  left  unguarded 
and  unprotected. 

The  reduction  of  these  two  fortresses  cuts  off  in  the  one  case  all  further  relief 
from  the  northern  country,  and  all  means  of  further  annoyances  by  water  in  the 
other;  but  the  entire  subjugation  and  annexation  of  the  country  to  ours  depends 
more  upon  the  people.  Unless  they  see  fit  to  govern  themselves,  as  a  part  of 
our  confederacy,  we  cannot  make  them.  We  may  hold  it  by  military  power, 
but  with  the  people  opposed,  the  struggle  will  not  cease  with  the  fall  of  Quebec 
and  Kingston. 

All  of  which  is  respectfully  submitted. 

RICHARD   DELAFIELD, 

Major  of  Engineers. 


Letter  from  Charles  Stewart,  United  States  navy. 

BORDENTOWN,  NEW   JERSEY, 

November  11,  1851. 

SIR  :  I  received  from  the  Hon.  Secretary  of  the  Navy  a  copy  of  your  letter 
to  him,  dated  June  22,  together  with  a  copy  of  the  resolutions  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  at  their  last  session,  in  relation  to  the  fortifications  adopted 
in  the  year  1816  by  the  United  States  government,  and  after  the  war  with 


528  FORTIFICATIONS   AND    SEA-COAST   DEFENCES. 

Great  Britain,  requesting  answers  to  the  questions  propounded  in  the  letter  from 
some  of  the  naval  officers.  Having  no  knowledge  of  the  plan  proposed  at  the 
period  referred  to,  Ilam  only  enabled  to  predicate  my  opinion  on  the  presumption 
that  what  was  then  adopted,  and  that  under  the  experience  of  the  war  which 
had  then  terminated,  was  the  best  that  could  be  devised  to  afford  protection  to 
those  places  and  interests  they  were  designed  to  secure. 

The  first  question  demands  to  know,  "To  what  extent,  if  any,  ought  the 
present  system  of  fortifications  for  the  protection  of  our  seaboard  to  be  modified, 
in  consequence  of  the  application  of  steam  to  vessels-of-war,"  &c.,  &c. 

In  answer  to  this  question,  I  beg  leave  to  say  that  no  good  reason  presents 
itself  to  my  mind  for  the  abandoning  of  any  of  the  works  now  in  progress  of 
construction,  or  for  the  reduction  of  the  number  contemplated  to  be  erected,  in 
consequence  of  the  application  of  steam  to  the  purposes  of  maritime  warfare,  or 
in  consequence  of  the  improvement  in  projectiles.  But,  on  the  contrary,  I 
should  presume,  that  as  the  application  of  steam  is  now  assuming  a  determined 
and  fixed  means  in  the  prosecution  of  national  hostilities,  that  instead  of  an 
abandonment  of  any  portion  of  the  defences  that  have  been  adopted,  a  more 
extensive  means  of  resistance  and  protection  at  all  such  points  as  present  objects 
worthy  of  being  attacked  on  our  maritime  frontier  would  be  called  for  and 
induced,  that  the  honor  of  the  government  may  be  sustained  and  the  deep 
interest  of  the  people  secured.  It  may  be  true,  yet  I  do  not  think  it  probable, 
that  some  of  the  places  contemplated  to  be  fortified  in  the  plan  of  1816  may 
have  so  deteriorated  in  interest  as  to  admit  of  modifications  or  changes  in  the 
plan  of  fortifying ;  of  this,  however,  I  have  no  means  of  forming  an  opinion ; 
but  if  we  take  into  consideration  the  great  advantage  and  facilities  which  steam 
power  will  accord  to  naval  armaments  for  approach,  attacking,  or  for  passing 
insufficient  fortifications,  it  cannot  but  appear  to  the  government  that  this  con- 
stitutes a  new  and  highly  dangerous  power  to  be  guarded  against  in  all  future 
time;  more  especially  on  a  maritime  frontier  of  very  great  extent,  and  deeply 
indented  with  water  communication,  affording  to  an  enemy  who  possess  steam 
power  the  greatest  facilities  of  annoyance  in  all  directions  of  our  country. 

Your  second  question  asks,  "  What  reliance  could  be  placed  on  vessels  of 
war  or  of  commerce,  floating  batteries,  gunboats,  &c.,  &c.,  as  substitutes  for 
permanent  fortifications  ? " 

In  answer  to  this  question,  I  must  say  that  I  am  of  opinion  that  bfct  little 
reliance  ought  to  be  placed  for  the  security  of  high  national  interest  on  defences 
of  such  doubtful  character.  They  are  too  subject  to  untoward  casualties  to 
constitute  at  all  times  a  reliable  means  of  resistance;  and  besides,  they  would 
require  permanent  fortifications  to  afford  them  continuance  and  protection.  As 
auxiliaries  to  permanent  works  in  resisting  attacks,  they  might  be  made  avail- 
able sometimes  with  good  effect,  but  no  further  ought  they  to  be  relied  on. 

To  the  third  question  which  you  ask,  "  Is  it  necessary  or  expedient  to  con- 
tinue the  system  of  fortifications  on  the  shores  of  the  northern  lakes  1 " 

I  again  beg  to  express  my  entire  ignorance  of  what  that  system  proposes 
should  be  done.  But  considering  that  those  lake  shores  constitute  an  important 
frontier  boundary  between  our  interior  country  and  a  powerful  military  and 
naval  nation,  I  should  think  that  it  would  be  politic  to  secure  by  fortifications 
as  far  as  reasonably  practicable,  all  the  important  positions  essential  to  commer- 
cial purposes  and  naval  preparations  for  the  lakes.  In  this  direction  there  is 
but  one  power  with  whom  we  may  be  brought  into  collision,  and  that  is  Great 
Britain.  She  is,  however,  a  power  who,  on  a  probability  of  hostilities  with  the 
United  States,  would  readily  throw  on  to  our  border  and  on  the  lakes  a  power- 
ful re-enforcement  of  military  and  naval  annoyance  to  our  lake  frontier. 

Very  respectfully,  I  have  the  honor  to  remain  your  obedient  servant, 

CHAKLES   STEWART. 

Hon.  C.  M.  CONRAD, 

Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. 


THIS  EOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 


DEC  15  1915 


fin 


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MAY  1   1959 

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